Decolonization Immigrations and the Social Origins of the Second Generation: The Case of North Africans in France[1]

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Immigrations resulting from decolonization challenge the ability of researchers to track accurately the incorporation of the second generation through classifications based on country of origin. This article considers a classic example of such an immigration – from North Africa to France at the time of and after the independence of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. This immigration was ethnically complex, composed – to take a rough cut – of the former colonists of European background (the pieds noirs) and low-wage laborers belonging to the indigenous population (the Maghrebins). A historical review indicates that the key to distinguishing these two groups lies in the exact citizenship status of the immigrants, for the former colonists were French by birth and the others generally were not. Analyzing micro-level data from the censuses of 1968, 1975, 1982, and 1990, we apply this distinction to the family origins of the second generation, born in France in the period 1958-1990. We show that the pied-noir population exhibits signs of rapid integration with the native French, while the Maghrebin population remains apart. A logistic regression analysis reveals that, based on a few characteristics of their parents, one can distinguish the Maghrebin from the pied-noir second generations with a high degree of accuracy. This finding demonstrates the sharp social distinction between the two groups and suggests a method for future research on their incorporation.

In a number of countries of Europe, immigration has occurred in substantial part as a consequence of decolonization: the examples of France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands come readily to mind. This form of immigra-

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tion generally consists of two major streams, one a movement of "return" on the part of the former colonizing population, overwhelmingly European in ethnic background, and the other a labor migration by the formerly colonized, who belong ethnically to the indigenous populations of the newly independent nations.

The evolution of immigrant populations coming from the same countries of origin at around the same time but having distinctive ethnic and possibly juridical status in the countries of reception poses interesting issues for the study of processes of incorporation. In general, the literature on immigration tends to treat the country of origin as the predominant ethnic marker, as is reflected in the names given to immigrant ethnic groups, *e.g.*, Mexican Americans or Turks in Germany. But in the cases of decolonization immigrations, the ethnic cleavages between groups coming from the same countries of origin are likely to result in very different trajectories of incorporation. Thus, the returning members of the colonizing population, who often enjoy a juridical status no different from that of the natives of the receiving society, may be able to integrate rapidly into it. This is not generally true for the immigrants who belong to the previously colonized population. As members of a nation that has suffered from exploitation by the metropolitan society and that usually has been engaged in combat against it to achieve independence, their relationship to the society in which they live is fraught with problems. They are likely to be confronted with harsh stereotypes originating in the colonial experience and to be treated in a discriminatory fashion by individuals who hold their origins in low regard. They are themselves likely to view the host society with suspicion, as a potential source of harm to themselves, and to define their stay in it as purely instrumental, even though a settlement process may be underway for many of them (Sayad, 1987).

We know less about the dynamics of incorporation in the aftermath of decolonization than we should. The study of the second generation is especially difficult, even though scholars have long recognized this generation's pivotal position. It is evident that the incorporation of the immigrant generation is less determinative of the future of ethnic groups arising from immigration than is the incorporation of the generations that come after, born and/or raised in the host society. But investigation with systematic data of the second generation is rendered problematic insofar as one of the prime measures of ethnic origins, parental birthplace, is now ambiguous as an indicator.

The current study deals with the second generation of North Africans in France. The French-born children of parents from the countries of Algeria,

Morocco, and Tunisia represent one of the classic instances of an ethnically complex population resulting from decolonization. This population includes the most numerically important of second-generation ethnic groups in France – and the one most problematic from the point of view of ultimate integration; it is the product of the immigration of Muslim North Africans, also known as Maghrebins.[2] This immigration in fact began around the time of World War I, when Algeria was legally a part of France and could be drawn upon as a source of vitally needed low-wage labor, but it did not reach its high point until after decolonization, which occurred in the mid-1950s for Morocco and Tunisia and in 1962 for Algeria. Yet decolonization also brought departing European colonists, not just Arab and Berber workers. The immigration of the so-called *pieds noirs*, who fled Algeria in large numbers in 1962, at the moment of independence, is the most prominent example.[3] Indeed, the complexity is greater than this simple distinction can capture. Associated with the fleeing *pieds noirs* were also Muslims who had fought on the French side in the Algerian war of independence, the *harkis*, who were treated in many respects as juridically the same as the *pieds noirs* but were ethnically distinct (Jordi and Hamoumou, 1999).

Ethnic complexity interacts strongly with the problematic nature of data sources in the French case to make the study of the different ethnic elements in the North African second generation difficult. As is well known, France has strongly resisted the inclusion of direct measures of ethnic origin in the census and other major data sources on the grounds that ethnic distinctions among French citizens will ultimately undermine its distinctive paradigm of integration, the so-called Republican model (*see* Le Bras, 1998;

[2]They are often called "Muslims" in the French literature, but this name puts too much weight on a religious identity. Though the great majority are raised as Muslims, some are Christian; and many are non-observant in France (*see* Kepel, 1991). Though stereotyped in popular consciousness as "Arabs," many are not speakers of Arabic, but of a Berber language. For these reasons, we will usually use the term "Maghrebin," derived from an Arabic term for the North African region of origin, to refer collectively to those immigrants and their descendants who have neither European backgrounds nor Jewish origins.

[3]For the sake of convenience, we apply the term *pieds noirs* to the European colonists coming from any of the former French colonies in North Africa. In fact, the great majority come from Algeria. The census of 1968, which occurs at a point when the *pied-noir* immigration is largely complete, shows that the "non-Muslim" portion among French citizens born in Algeria amounted to 918,000 (French census takers used names to separate Maghrebins from non-Maghrebins among French citizens, a practice that stopped after this census). By contrast, Moroccan- and Tunisian-born French citizens (by birth), the equivalent European populations from these countries, numbered 163,000 and 146,000, respectively (INSEE, 1972:Table 19).

Schnapper, 1991; Todd, 1994). The principal sources of information about ethnic membership come from nationality – *i.e.*, citizenship – data and from questions on birthplace and, in some surveys, on parental birthplace (Simon, 1998). But citizenship data are of doubtful value for the second generation because France has generally awarded citizenship to its members, at the age of majority at the latest (Weil, 1991); thus, most of it disappears into the native French population in census and other data. Where parental-birthplace information is available, it can distinguish those with North African-born parents from other French citizens, but it obviously cannot separate the children of *pieds noirs* and other European colonists from those having Arab or Berber parents. For these reasons, the only systematic source of data about second-generation Maghrebins has been the 1992 MGIS survey, conducted by Michèle Tribalat (1995, 1996). However, this one-time survey limited by design its sample of this second generation to those born in the 1962-1972 period, which is distinctive if only because it follows immediately upon Algerian independence; and it sheds no light on the children of the *pieds noirs*.

Yet there is every reason to hypothesize that this ethnic distinction is of great moment for the integration of the respective groups into French society. This article offers a first approach to separating the two major ethnic components in North African immigration and to studying the social and demographic origins of their second generations. We do this by drawing upon microdata from the French censuses of 1968, 1975, 1982, and 1990 in order to construct a picture of the second generation born in the 1958-1990 period. By using the citizenship information available for the immigrant generation, we can distinguish rather accurately between the children of *pieds noirs* and those of the Maghrebin immigrants. The resulting picture reveals very sharp differences between these two groups, with the *pieds noirs* and their children appearing to achieve a rapid integration into French society and the Maghrebins remaining apart. Indeed, so sharply are the groups distinguished in social and demographic terms that, as we show, with a small number of indicators, such as the educational levels and birthplaces of both parents, one can distinguish quite accurately between the two groups. A byproduct of our approach therefore is a method for distinguishing these groups in survey data where parental birthplace and other information is available (such as the *Formation-Qualification-Profession* surveys, generally conducted at least once a decade). This method opens up the possibility of tracking the second generation of both groups in recent data.

HISTORY OF COLONIAL, DECOLONIAL, AND POST-COLONIAL IMMIGRATIONS

Though the stories of the colonization and decolonization of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, as well as of their population movements of immigration and repatriation, can be fit within a common framework, they also differ in some significant ways.

These three countries form the region known as the Maghreb (the name originates with the Arabic word for "western"), whose population, before the arrival of the French, was composed of four predominant elements: Berbers, the original indigenes; Arabs, whose presence dates to invasions beginning in the eleventh century; Jews, who arrived in North Africa after their expulsion from Spain in 1492; and small numbers of European merchants coming principally from the Iberian peninsula. Much of the Maghreb was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire during the sixteenth century, but French domination was imposed three centuries later, beginning with the conquest of Algiers in 1830 and ending with the establishment of a protectorate in Morocco in 1912. Domination, however, took different forms in the different countries, a fact that is associated with different population policies during the colonial period, differences in the process of attaining independence, and differences in immigration and repatriation before, during and after decolonization.

The singular case is Algeria. Almost as soon as conquest occurred, French policy there was characterized by the encouragement of European settlement and by assimilation of the territory to the metropole (on the history of colonial Algeria, *see* Stora, 1991). As early as 1845, a portion of Algerian territory had been declared an integral part of France, and approximately 110,000 Europeans were in residence, only half of them French. Much of the land held by indigenous groups, often in a collective form, was expropriated, permitting the emergence of large farms owned by Europeans. Those Europeans coming from countries other than France – notably, Italy, Portugal, and Spain – rapidly acquired French citizenship, which was withheld from indigenes, at least in a more than nominal form. The educational inequalities between the populations were also quite extreme and were accentuated by the elimination of Muslim religious schools: on the eve of independence, the rate of schooling in the non-European population attained just 15 percent (Stora, 1995:45). Under these conditions, which greatly favored the population of European origin, its size rose robustly, attaining 500,000 in 1901 and roughly 1 million at the moment of independence in 1962.

While Algeria became incorporated into the departmental structure of France, Morocco and Tunisia, by contrast, were never more than protectorates. This status involved a somewhat softer form of domination in that it left in place some of the previously existing forms of authority, such as the sultanship in Morocco. There was much less encouragement of European settlement, and the French demographic presence mostly took the form of modest-sized enclaves in the cities. One consequence of the difference from the Algerian situation was the emergence of an indigenous *petite bourgeoisie* in both protectorates, a stratum that proved to be a fertile soil for nationalism.

As this picture suggests, independence was attained more easily in the cases of Morocco and Tunisia than in Algeria. Tunisia passed rapidly from a stage of autonomy to one of complete independence, which was attained in 1956; Morocco attained independence in the same year, within a short period after the Rif uprising. In Algeria, by contrast, the large community of European colons consistently opposed reforms to improve the status of indigenous groups or alter the relationship of Algeria to the metropole. Consequently, independence was achieved only after a bloody war, which lasted from 1954 until 1962.

France was the first country of Europe to become a country of immigration, which was initiated in the 1880s by immigration from central Europe and from the border states of Belgium and Italy (Noiriel, 1988). The need for immigrant labor increased greatly during World War I, a time when European immigrants were not available. The earlier incorporation of Algeria into the French state, entailing free movement between it and the metropole, facilitated recruitment among its indigenous population, who fought alongside Frenchmen in the trenches and replaced workers who had been called to the front. This experience inaugurated a large-scale flow. Between 1914 and 1954, more than 2 million Algerians resided in metropolitan France. Overwhelmingly, this was a sojourner immigration of men without their families, but nevertheless a permanent Muslim population began to emerge in some French cities. The end of the Algerian war did lead to some return migration, and the Algerians resident in France were forced, as a result of the Evian accords that ended the war, to choose between French and Algerian citizenship. But these accords preserved the privileged access of Algerian workers to the French labor market, and the immigration was suspended only by the unilateral action of Algeria in 1973, following a wave of violence against Algerians in France. In a pattern familiar from other immigration interruptions, this suspension produced the rapid reunification of Algerian families in France and accelerated the process of settlement.

The immigrations from Morocco and Tunisia developed later as large-scale phenomena. Though Moroccans were also recruited by the metropole starting with World War I, theirs was a much smaller immigration than the Algerian one and left fewer permanent traces. But, starting in 1964, the French National Office of Immigration (ONI) initiated a policy of recruitment of Moroccan workers, who came principally from rural areas. This immigration was more closely controlled by the French state than the Algerian immigration, which benefited from freedom of movement, and Moroccan workers were channeled toward particular industrial sectors, such as the mining industry. The immigration of families became evident during the 1970s.

The Tunisian immigration, the last of the three to develop into a sizable flow and the smallest, has also been the most socioeconomically diverse. During the period when Tunisia was a protectorate, there was a small but noticeable flow of students. There has also been a significant commercial immigration to France. The immigration of workers did not commence until after independence and was especially pronounced in the 1964-1973 period. More than was true of the immigrants from the other countries of the Maghreb, Tunisian immigrants have come from urban milieus and have possessed some educational credentials (Simon, 1981).

FRENCH DATA SOURCES

The study of the ethnically complex immigration to France from North Africa is made difficult by the limitations of French data. In general, the data do not contain direct measures of ethnic origin similar, say, to the ethnic and racial self-identifications commonly available in U.S. data (Simon, 1998). Indeed, a very strong intellectual and political tradition in France firmly opposes the use of such measures on the grounds that they would introduce unwanted distinctions by origin among French citizens (*see, e.g.*, Le Bras, 1998). Consequently, the analysis of immigration to France must rely on other indicators, namely, country of birth and citizenship; some surveys (*e.g.*, the *Formation-Qualification-Profession* survey) also ask about the countries of birth of parents.

Thus, it is possible to identify adult members of the second generation, at least in some data, but it is not possible to classify them wholly and directly in ethnic terms from citizenship and parental country-of-birth information alone. Obviously, knowing that individuals had parents born in Algeria does not tell us whether their origins are *pied noir* or Maghrebin. Nor does their

own citizenship status, except for the small number of cases where members of the Maghrebin second generation have rejected French citizenship. Overwhelmingly, the children of *pieds noirs* are French citizens by birth because that was the status of their parents. At this date, most French-born children of Muslim Algerian parents are also French by birth because of the "double *droit de sol*" provision in French law, which, in the general case, is interpreted to mean automatic citizenship for the third generation; but since Algerian parents born before 1962 were born on French soil, this provision applies to much of the Algerian second generation as well. Under French law, most other members of the Maghrebin second generation become French at the age of majority (Weil, 1991).

What is telling in the vast majority of cases about the ethnic status of the second generation is the citizenship status of their parents, which is available only for those members of the second generation who reside with their parents and thus can be linked to them in data collected for all members of a household. But to use parental citizenship information effectively, one must take into account 1) French citizenship law and its application by colonial authorities and at the moment of independence; 2) the perceptions of juridical status on the part of immigrant populations; and 3) at least occasionally, the classification decisions of statistical authorities, who may have changed respondent answers to conform to their own understandings of the juridical and ethnic situations.

The basic distinction in French data is among three categories: French by birth; French by acquisition (*e.g.*, naturalization, marriage, or declaration); and non-French. The difference between the first two corresponds to the two basic modes of access to French citizenship: that is, attribution at birth by filiation or, in certain cases, by the effect of *jus soli*; and acquisition subsequent to birth by virtue of a right recognized by law or by grant of the state (*e.g.*, naturalization). (Once individuals give up French citizenship, they can no longer claim it by birth even if that was previously their status; though they may be able to regain French citizenship through reintegration, this process falls juridically into the second category.) For our purposes, the key difference lies between the category of French by birth and the other two. In the great majority of cases, the *pied-noir* immigrants were French by birth, even if their ancestors came from countries other than France, while their Maghrebin counterparts were not. The Moroccans and Tunisians rarely attained French citizenship during the colonial period, while the Algerians who did generally lost it at the moment of independence; even if they subsequently became

French citizens again, they could no longer be French by birth.

Most important because of their large numbers among the European colonists returning after decolonization are the *pieds noirs* of Algeria. At the moment of Algerian independence, they were guaranteed the status of French by birth; many of them possessed this status beforehand, either because their parents and grandparents were French citizens or because of naturalizations in previous generations. Algerian Jews can be included here because they had been granted French citizenship by the Cremieux decree of 1871. Before independence, Muslim Algerians were also regarded as French nationals, but with more limited citizenship rights than Europeans possessed. While it was legally possible for them to accede to full citizenship (*statut de droit commun*) before World War II, only 5,000 did so according to Francois Gaspand because they would have effectively had to renounce their Muslim identity. However, the Evian accords terminating the war forced them to choose between French and Algerian nationalities and gave them only a short period in which to claim French citizenship (this could be done until January 1, 1963), if they wanted it. The French census of 1968, the first conducted after Algerian independence, shows 85,000 "*Français musulmans*," a large part of whom were the *harkis*. Juridically, all the *Français musulmans* were French by birth.

In Morocco and Tunisia, French citizenship was open to Europeans, whatever their national origins. Only in exceptional cases could it be attained by members of the indigenous populations, either for services rendered to the French state or through educational achievements. Yet, for these countries, there was not the same mass attribution of French citizenship by birth as occurred in the case of Europeans leaving Algeria in 1962. Thus, here, there could be some Europeans who came to France after decolonization but were not French citizens by birth, either because they had retained citizenship in another European country or naturalization occurred in their generation.

To this picture must be added the perceptions that different populations have of their juridical status. Michèle Tribalat (Tribalat *et al.*, 1991) has suggested that, over time, those who are French by acquisition tend to declare themselves to be French by birth (*see also* Rouault and Thave, 1997:68-74). But this seems to be true mainly of individuals in the second generation who become French at or around the age of majority – in some cases by simple declaration, in others automatically, depending on the law prevailing at the time. This tendency results from the complications of citizenship law for this generation combined with birth in France. The confusion is much less for the first generation, individuals born outside of France, as Roualt and Thave

(1997) demonstrate. Moreover, because the acquisition of French citizenship by citizens of Maghrebin countries is fraught with conflict because of the burdens of the colonial past, it is an action whose significance is generally downplayed by those undertaking it and depicted as a consequence of purely practical considerations (Sayad, 1987). It is plausible that naturalization under such circumstances is especially unlikely to be confused with citizenship by birthright. Adding to the plausibility is the demonstrated finding that Maghrebin parents are less likely to report that their own children are French citizens by birth when this is in fact the case (Tribalat, 1991).

One has to add here a comment about the actions of census authorities, who have departed on occasion from the principle that statistical data should be based on the declarations of the respondents. Perhaps the most notable cases concern the reclassifications in censuses between 1946 and 1968 of persons born in North Africa by their apparent ethnic origin. These individuals were classified as Muslim or not depending upon the apparent character of their names.

In sum, these complications indicate that the citizenship status of immigrant parents is not an infallible measure of the ethnic membership of the second generation. But because of the ethnic distinctions that prevailed in the accessibility and attribution of French citizenship to the residents of North African countries, it is still a serviceable one. We think that the results of our analysis support this contention quite strongly.

ANALYSIS STRATEGY

Our goal is to distinguish a potentially critical ethnic difference within the large population of second-generation individuals with parents born in North Africa and thus to separate the children of the *pieds noirs* from those of Maghrebin immigrants. We acknowledge that within these two broad ethnic streams lie other ethnic differences, though they are almost certainly smaller in consequence than is the one on which we focus. Thus, among the *pieds noirs* are the descendants of colonial immigrants to North Africa from other European countries besides France, as well as Algerian Jews. Among the Maghrebins are individuals originating in three different countries, each with its own specific immigration history. Further, the Maghrebins are divided ethnically between Arabs and Berbers, a distinction of considerable importance in the societies of origin. Perhaps the most problematic group of all is the *harkis*, the indigenous Algerians who served the French forces during the war of independence and suffered exile at its end in 1962 (Jordi and Hamoumou,

1999). Though treated juridically in the same way as the *pieds noirs*, the evidence suggests that their social place in France was no better, perhaps even worse, than that of ordinary Muslim immigrants. Fortunately for our analysis, their numbers are small: data from the 1968 French census reveal only 85,000 Algerian-born "Muslims" who are French citizens by birth, and incomplete year-of-arrival data suggest that a substantial minority of this group are not *harkis* but Algerians resident in France before 1962 who opted for French citizenship at the time of independence. In rough terms, this numerical picture accords with the 49,000 non-*pied noir* Algerians who arrived in France in the several months following independence (Jordi and Hamoumou, 1999:132), though this official count probably understates the actual flow.

To examine the trajectories of incorporation of the two major groups, we will analyze in effect the social origins of the second generation – that is, the social characteristics of their families of origin. We can accomplish this by reconstructing the birth cohorts of the second generation through successive French censuses – 1968, 1975, 1982, and 1990. By identifying the households in which youthful members of the second generation are found, we can determine their ethnic membership from the citizenship characteristics of their parents. In general, the North African-born parents who declare themselves to be French citizens by birth are *pieds noirs*, while those who say their French citizenship has been acquired (*e.g.*, by naturalization or marriage) or declare that they are not French citizens are Maghrebin immigrants whose mother tongue is Arabic or Berber.

French census data offer several important ways by which the social origins of the second generation can be characterized:

1. Parental exogamy – This is indicated by whether a North African-born parent has married a person born in France as opposed to another North African-born individual. Exogamy is a self-evident indicator of assimilation to a host society. As we will soon show, it is quite common among the parents of the second generation of *pieds noirs*, no doubt especially for those who immigrated to France at young ages.
2. Parental education – The widespread view concerning the Maghrebin immigrants of the early years is that they had, in the overwhelming majority, but a few years of primary schooling at best. Indeed, on the eve of independence, only 15 percent of the indigenous Algerian population had attended any school. But levels of schooling have risen fairly rapidly in North Africa – in Algeria, after independence in 1962

(Stora, 1995). Thus, how the educational gap between the parents of second-generation Muslims and those of second-generation *pieds noirs* has evolved over time is a significant question.

3. Labor market position – In the early years of the Muslim immigration from North Africa, it appears that a very large number of immigrants entered the French labor market at its lowest levels in the form of unskilled labor. Much less attention has been given to the labor market position of the *pieds noirs*, though much anecdotal evidence indicates that it was not as humble. But how the labor market situation of both groups of immigrants has evolved over time is not known.

From this brief discussion, it should be obvious why it is important to examine the social origins of the second generation by birth cohort. Since the characteristics of prospective immigrant parents are changing over time, because of changes in the immigrant stream (of Maghrebin immigrants especially) and because of gradual adaptation to French society (probably more important in the *pied-noir* case), an analysis without attention to historical time would lose sight of important dynamics at work in possibly distinguishing between the two groups.

CHARACTERISTICS OF BIRTH COHORTS

Table 1 shows the distribution of parental ethnic exogamy for various cohorts of second-generation individuals.[4] The distributions are presented separately for the children of *pieds noirs* and those of Maghrebin immigrants, but the total numbers, presented in the table, allow one to follow the changes in the relative sizes of these two populations. The residual column, labeled "other possibilities," contains individuals whose parents fall in categories other than those named explicitly – this would occur, for instance, if one parent was an immigrant from a country other than in North Africa – and also individuals in one-parent households. A very small portion of the second generation springs from unions of *pied noir* with Maghrebin immigrants. These individuals are classified by the ethnic membership of their fathers, both here and in the rest of the analysis.

[4]In the tables of this section, our analysis takes from each census only those children born since the last census. Thus, the children, who are no older than 8 years (the distance between the 1982 and 1990 censuses), have an extremely high likelihood of living in their parents' household.

TABLE 1
SECOND-GENERATION *PIEDS NOIRS* AND MAGHREBINS BY PARENTAL ENDOGAMY AND BIRTH COHORT
(ENTRIES ARE PERCENTAGES BASED ON NS IN ROWS)

	Pied Noirs					Maghrebins				
Cohort	Both Parents Pied Noir	Only Father, Mother French	Only Mother, Father French	Other Possibilities	N	Both Parents Maghrebin	Only Father, Mother French	Only Mother, Father French	Other Possibilities	N
58-59	20.6	34.9	29.9	14.6	7643	50.1	30.0	3.6	16.3	5755
60-61	21.6	33.7	30.3	14.5	9078	54.8	24.5	3.8	16.9	7911
62-63	37.1	24.7	26.1	12.2	16824	59.2	21.9	3.8	15.1	10098
64-65	37.0	27.6	24.1	11.4	21314	64.6	18.5	3.2	13.7	12546
66-67	30.8	31.9	26.4	10.9	20911	67.5	17.7	2.9	11.9	13709
68-69	24.3	35.6	28.3	11.9	16141	66.4	18.6	2.7	12.4	11501
70-71	19.2	39.0	31.0	10.9	16692	67.5	18.7	2.8	11.0	12647
72-73	16.5	39.4	33.4	10.8	16540	69.7	17.6	2.0	10.8	13998
74-75	13.6	39.1	34.4	13.0	18480	73.5	14.1	2.4	10.1	18427
76-77	11.8	40.0	36.0	12.3	17993	75.5	12.7	2.5	9.3	19789
78-79	10.9	40.1	36.8	12.2	18942	77.4	12.1	2.7	7.9	22110
80-81	10.2	41.5	36.9	11.3	20108	76.7	12.3	3.1	8.0	24829
82-83	9.3	40.0	35.5	15.2	19317	74.3	10.5	3.3	11.9	24484
84-85	8.9	41.5	34.9	14.7	18461	72.5	11.6	3.6	12.4	23916
86-87	8.1	43.7	34.1	14.1	17653	69.7	13.4	4.4	12.6	22494
88-90	7.2	45.8	33.4	13.5	15959	66.7	15.0	5.5	12.8	21649

Note: Data for cohorts 58-67 are from the 1968 census; for 68-73 from the 1975 census; for 74-81 from the 1982 census; and for 1982-1989 from the 1990 census.

There are several striking characteristics of the table that reveal much about the history of the immigrations of these two streams, as well as their integration into French society. To begin with, there is the relative weight of the two groups in the second generation. In the late 1950s, the second generation of both groups was modest in size, but it rose sharply at the time of, and shortly after, Algerian independence, especially among the *pieds noirs*. During the 1960s, the children of the *pieds noirs* were more numerous than those of Maghrebin immigrants, by a margin approaching 2-to-1. But the number of children of immigrants from the Maghreb climbed very steeply during the 1960s and 1970s, in tandem with the arrival of new immigrants and with family reunification (which accelerated in France after 1973, when immigration was made more difficult), while the number of children of *pieds noirs* remained fairly stable. By the middle of the 1970s, the two components of the second generation were about equal in size and, thereafter, the children of Maghrebin immigrants were more numerous. By the late 1980s, there were 25-30 percent more of them in each cohort.

It is also obvious that the children of the *pieds noirs* are far more likely to spring from an intermarriage than are the children of the Maghrebins.

Quite apparently, marriage with native-born French is far more common for the *pied-noir* immigrants than for those from the Maghreb, though a relatively high fertility for endogamous Maghrebin marriages may also be a factor in producing the distribution in Table 1.[5] The very high rate of children from exogamous marriages in the *pied-noir* second generation even raises the suspicion that there is some error in the classification of parents by place of birth – that, more specifically, some *pieds noirs* report themselves as born in France on the grounds that, if born in Algeria before 1962, they were born in what was legally a department of France. However, such an error seems to us unlikely to have affected the results on a large scale. In French censuses, the birthplace data result from reports of specific places and departments, not from responses to a general question about whether an individual was born in France. Thus, the only kind of error that can affect the results here occurs when an individual misreports a place of birth, giving a location in metropolitan France rather than in North Africa as his or her place of birth. That this kind of misreport would have been committed by one member of a household but not another – all of the children in the table are in households where at least one parent reports a North African place of birth – seems highly unlikely on a sizable scale.

In both groups, a similar evolution appears over time, but at very different levels of exogamy. Thus, children are relatively likely to be born to exogamous parents before Algerian independence, at a time when immigration was largely an individual rather than a family affair. In addition, the Maghrebin immigration was constituted primarily of male workers, some of whom married in France (note the very high percentage of children born to North African men married to French wives). As immigration rose, so did the percentage of children born to endogamous parents. But this rise was quite brief in the case of the *pieds noirs*, a matter of just the few years after the arrival of the Algerian *pieds noirs* en masse in France; and thereafter the children of exogamous marriages prevail in ever larger numbers. By the 1980s, less than 10 percent are the product of a marriage between two *pied-noir* parents, and almost 80 percent have one parent who is a French native. By contrast, about two thirds to three quarters of the Maghrebin second generation possess two immigrant parents throughout virtually the entire period. There

[5]We note, however, that some of the children born in the endogamous marriages of Maghrebin immigrants were born in North Africa and thus are not counted here, while all of the children of exogamous marriages are very likely to have been born in France. This reduces the weight of any disproportionate fertility.

is a gradual rise in this fraction through the mid-1970s, probably as a function of family reunifications that bring wives to France, and thereafter it decreases modestly. The decrease that set in after the mid-1970s probably results from increased intermarriage on the part of immigrants who came to France as children and therefore attended French schools. The same explanation undoubtedly applies with even greater force to the *pied-noir* population. Since its immigration was much more concentrated in time, the parents of second-generation children born in the 1970s and 1980s are increasingly drawn from the ranks of immigrants who were brought as children to France.

There is also a gender difference in intermarriage evident in the table, and it too distinguishes between the two ethnic populations. In both populations, the children of intermarriages are more likely to have immigrant fathers than to have immigrant mothers, suggesting that immigrant men may find it easier to marry native French than immigrant women do. But the gender differential is much larger in the Maghrebin population than in the *pied-noir* one. There are two reasons why the gender differential might exist; they both also suggest why it might be so much larger for the Maghrebin group. In many immigrant populations, men outnumber women, and this sex ratio creates pressure for men to search for wives outside of the group. Because the Maghrebin immigration was originally dominated by men seeking low-wage labor in France, its sex ratio was far more unbalanced than was that of the *pied-noir* immigration. But the gender differential also conforms to an exchange explanation, dating back six decades to the work of Kingsley Davis and Robert Merton (Merton, 1941), that has been developed in the context of racial intermarriage in the United States. It holds that, in a racially stratified society, minority men find it easier to outmarry than do minority women because they are better able to trade a relatively high socioeconomic status, assuming they have attained it, for the superior racial status of majority-group wives. This logic would seem to apply, then, to the North Africans who are visibly, culturally, and religiously different from the vast majority of the French population – the Maghrebins, in other words. While the gender disparity, as readable in the parental backgrounds of the second generation, has diminished somewhat over time, it remains large and implies that, even when second-generation Maghrebins are the products of intermarriage, they are likely to carry distinctive surnames at a minimum and thus to remain recognizable to other French.

The differences between the two populations are also marked in Table 2, which presents the basic educational credentials of the parents of the sec-

ond generation. Since the common perception attributes little or no formal education to the Maghrebin immigrant generation, the distinction in the table is between parents without a diploma from any level of the educational system versus those who have at least one, even if it is only a certificate of primary school completion (the so-called CEP, the *certificat d'études primaires*). It should be noted that, until 1954, the age of mandatory education was only 14 in France, and therefore the percentage of French adults without any educational certificate was not trivial.

TABLE 2
SECOND-GENERATION *PIEDS NOIRS* AND MAGHREBINS BY BIRTH COHORT AND PARENTAL EDUCATION (LACK OF DIPLOMA) (ENTRIES ARE PERCENTAGES BASED ON NS IN ROWS)

	Pieds Noirs					Maghrebins				
Cohort	Neither Parent Has Diploma	Only Mother Has Diploma	Only Father	Both	N	Neither Parent Has Diploma	Only Mother Has Diploma	Only Father	Both	N
62-63	20.5	7.7	12.4	59.4	12231	74.6	7.9	6.5	11.0	7488
64-65	19.9	7.7	12.1	60.3	15688	76.5	6.9	5.7	10.9	9406
66-67	17.8	7.5	11.6	63.1	15870	76.9	6.9	5.5	10.6	10468
68-69	15.9	7.8	10.7	65.6	15558	75.4	7.1	6.1	11.3	11010
70-71	13.6	7.8	10.3	68.4	16182	73.2	7.9	6.7	12.2	12210
72-73	11.7	7.3	9.9	71.2	16142	71.2	8.1	7.0	13.8	13632
74-75	14.1	7.8	9.5	68.7	17601	75.1	6.6	7.0	11.3	17611
76-77	11.3	7.4	9.0	72.3	17299	73.5	6.8	7.6	12.1	19129
78-79	10.8	8.1	9.0	72.2	18351	71.5	6.7	8.8	13.0	21553
80-81	10.1	8.3	8.9	72.6	19660	69.7	6.7	9.3	14.3	24316
82-83	6.6	6.2	7.2	79.9	18173	60.4	6.6	11.8	21.2	23146
84-85	6.4	6.0	7.1	80.5	17527	58.1	6.5	12.1	23.3	22621
86-87	6.0	6.1	6.7	81.2	16994	54.0	7.4	12.1	26.6	21448
88-90	5.4	6.2	6.7	81.8	15427	50.1	7.4	12.3	30.2	20696

Note: Only children living in households with two parents are included.

Very large differences in parental education separate the two populations. Starting with the birth cohorts of the mid-1960s, less than a fifth of the *pied-noir* second generation comes from families in which both parents are without some kind of diploma, while 60 percent are from families where both parents have earned an educational credential. As expected, the Maghrebin second generation has parents with a much lower exposure to formal education: until the late 1970s, about three quarters grew up in families where neither parent had earned any sort of diploma; only 10-12 percent had parents who had both achieved a diploma of some kind. Undoubtedly, many of the Maghrebin parents had not even attended school for more than a year or two, at most. As Michèle Tribalat has observed, the high rate of illiteracy among Maghrebin parents has thwarted to some extent the transmission of mother

tongues – Arabic or Berber, as the case may be – to the second generation (*see* Tribalat, 1995). Thus, while the second generation may learn to understand a minimal version of the mother tongue necessary for daily communication with parents and perhaps also to speak it, the lack of literacy in these languages, a product of growing up in homes with few or no written materials in mother tongues while attending schools insisting on proficiency in French, impedes any progress towards mastery.

Nevertheless, the levels of education among the parents of the Maghrebin second generation have risen over time, and markedly so. These changes can in part be attributed to the extension of schooling to greater parts of the population in the North African countries of origin and in part also to the increasing presence among parents of immigrants who came to France as children. An additional factor is the gradual increase over time of Tunisians among the parents of the second generation, since Tunisian immigrants have somewhat higher educational levels than do other Maghrebin immigrants. Consequently, the fraction of the Maghrebin second generation whose parents have no educational credentials declined from three quarters to half in the approximately three-decade period in the table. At the same time, the percentage of the second generation whose parents have both attained educational credentials tripled, from 10 to 30 percent.

But, at the same time, levels of education have also risen among *pied-noir* parents, and so the gap between the two populations has more or less been maintained. Thus, in the cohorts of the mid to late 1980s, the percentage of parents with no educational credentials at all is nine to ten times higher in the Maghrebin second generation than in the *pied-noir* one. Concomitantly, the percentage of children whose parents have both received some educational diploma is about three times higher in the *pied-noir* second generation. In terms of socioeconomic origins as measured by parental education, the gap is arguably as large in the late 1980s as it was in the early 1960s, despite the improvements in the educational levels of Maghrebin parents.

Finally, Table 3 confirms the expected difference in labor market situation between *pied-noir* and Maghrebin parents and demonstrates that it shifts little over time until we reach the parents of children born during the 1980s. Quite simply, the Maghrebin second generation is born overwhelmingly to blue-collar parents, while its *pied-noir* equivalent is not. For the cohorts of Maghrebins born during the 1970s, only one in six had parents other than blue-collar workers (or unemployed parents); and two fifths had parents whose jobs involved unskilled manual labor. These fractions improved some-

what for the cohorts of the 1980s; even so, no more than a quarter of the parents moved out of the blue-collar ranks, and a third remained in the unskilled category. The labor market situations of the parents of the *pied-noir* second generation present a strong contrast. Only 5-7 percent of them are involved in unskilled manual labor, while two thirds to three quarters are not in blue-collar jobs at all. And this fraction grows over time, thus more or less maintaining the gap between the parents of the two second generations.

TABLE 3
OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD FOR COHORTS OF THE *PIED-NOIR* AND MAGHREBIN SECOND GENERATIONS
(ENTRIES ARE PERCENTAGES CALCULATED WITHIN COHORT AND ETHNIC GROUP)

	Pieds Noirs				Maghrebins			
Cohort	Unskilled Blue Collar	Other Blue Collar	Unemployed	Other Jobs	Unskilled Blue Collar	Other Blue Collar	Unemployed	Other Jobs
74-75	7.3	20.9	2.9	68.9	39.8	35.8	6.8	17.6
76-77	7.0	20.3	2.5	70.1	41.3	35.8	5.6	17.3
78-79	7.1	21.8	2.5	68.7	42.3	36.4	5.0	16.3
80-81	7.9	22.1	2.8	67.1	42.8	35.9	4.5	16.8
82-83	6.1	19.9	1.8	72.3	33.1	40.1	5.9	21.0
84-85	5.7	19.9	1.8	72.6	32.0	39.5	5.4	23.1
86-87	6.4	19.7	1.6	72.3	30.3	39.4	5.3	25.0
88-89	6.1	18.8	2.1	73.0	28.9	39.1	5.5	26.4

Note: Because of changes in the occupational categories (*categories socio-professionnelles*) between the censuses of 1968 and 1975 and later ones, we present only the data from the censuses of 1982 and 1990.

DISTINGUISHING THE TWO POPULATIONS

The preceding tables and discussion make clear that, on average, these are two different populations, but such an assessment still leaves room for the possibility of considerable overlap between them. Therefore, it is of interest to see how well one can differentiate them with ordinary socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. If one cannot discriminate between them to a high degree, then the overlap in their characteristics implies that native French may also not be able to easily tell members of the two groups in the second generation apart. By contrast, a high ability to discriminate between them implies that they are quite different populations, and various obvious social markers exist to tell them apart. As we will now demonstrate, the latter holds true.

To examine this question, we resort to a logistic regression, in which the dependent variable is membership in the Maghrebin or the *pied-noir* group, as determined by the citizenship category of the parents born in North Africa. The independent variables consist of simple demographic and socioeconomic indicators and a few interactions between them, as indicated by the previous discussion. The variables involved are as follows:

1. Places of birth of parents.
2. Parental levels of education.
3. Parental occupation (socioprofessional category, in French terminology).
4. Year of birth. As Table 1 shows, the later the birth of a second-generation child of a North African-born parent, the more likely the child is to be Maghrebin.
5. Region of residence. We employ a standard 22 category division of French regions, which we have amended by breaking out the separate departments of the region around Paris. Given the high concentration of immigrants there and their variable distribution across its suburbs in particular, this level of detail for Ile-de-France, as the Paris region is known, seems appropriate.
6. Ages of parents. The ages of parents are relevant in at least two ways. One is that the age differences between husband and wife tend to be greater among Maghrebin immigrants than in the French population as a whole (Todd, 1994). This difference arises because of marriage patterns in the Maghreb and also because immigration tends to delay marriage for many men, who are unmarried when they first come to France (Tribalat *et al.*, 1991:127). The other is that Maghrebin immigrant women start their child bearing at an earlier age than other women in France, with the consequence that the age gap between mother and child is smaller on average. Both age differences appear in our model.
7. Interactions. The discussion in the preceding section indicates the need for interactions to take into account the frequencies of certain combinations of parental characteristics, such as both parents being born in North Africa (an interaction between the birth places of the mother and father) and both having no educational credentials. It also reveals the need to take into account the changing configurations of parental characteristics across cohorts. Hence, we create limited sets of interactions between year of birth and parents' places of birth (the interactions involve both parents born in Algeria, in Morocco, or in Tunisia) and parental education (the interaction is with the term for neither parent having a diploma of any kind).

For this analysis, we use the data of the 1990 census and include the cohorts of children born in the two preceding decades who live in their

[6]We have also conducted a similar analysis with the data of the 1982 census, which allows us to carry the story back to 1962, the year of Algerian independence. The results are highly similar to those we report here.

parental homes.[6] Using the latest census data available is sensible because of the changes that have occurred in the social origins of the Maghrebin second generation during the 1980s; these should be taken into account. Because our analysis relies on the characteristics of both parents, we drop from it children who live with only one parent (this decision, however, is associated with only a modest loss of cases – about 7% of the total sample). The microdata on which we base the analysis represent a 25 persent sample of the French population; the number of second-generation cases available to us is huge, more than 360,000.

Table 4 presents the results of the analysis. Perhaps the first, and most important, remark to be made is that, with a limited number of substantive variables, one can predict the ethnic membership with great accuracy: although the sample is split almost evenly between the children of Maghrebin and *pied-noir* immigrants, the logistic equation correctly predicts the group membership of almost 94 percent. These two groups, in other words, are very clearly differentiated.

TABLE 4
LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF MAGHREBIN-*PIED NOIR* DISTINGTION IN THE SECOND GENERATION ON SOCIOECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FAMILY OF ORIGIN (1990 CENSUS)

Variables:	Logit Coefficients	Odds ratios
Intercept	-3.951[a]	
Parental country of birth		
Father:		
France		
Algeria	0.911[a]	2.49
Marocco	1.837[a]	6.28
Tunisia	1.817[a]	6.15
Other	0.440[a]	1.55
Mother:		
France	-	
Algeria	0.261[a]	1.30
Marocco	0.991[a]	2.69
Tunisia	0.592[a]	1.81
Other	0.043	1.04
Interaction:		
Same country	1.210[a]	3.36
Parental educational credentials		
Father:		
No diploma	0.834[a]	2.30
Primary school only (CEP)	0.227[a]	1.26
Beyond primary school	-	
Mother:		
No diploma	0.975[a]	2.65
Primary school only (CEP)	0.624[a]	1.87
Beyond primary school	-	
Interactions:		
Father and Mother no diploma	0.421[a]	1.52

TABLE 4 (CONTINUED)
LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF MAGHREBIN-*PIED NOIR* DISTINCTION IN THE SECOND GENERATION ON SOCIOECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FAMILY OF ORIGIN (1990 CENSUS)

Variables:	Logit Coefficients	Odds ratios
Interactions:		
Father no diploma; Mother CEP	-0.007	0.99
Father CEP; Mother no diploma	0.001	1.00
Father & Mother CEP	-0.382[a]	0.68
Socio-economic category of household head		
Agricultural	-0.538[a]	0.58
Artisans, Business owners	0.542[a]	1.72
Professional & Managerial	-0.398[a]	0.67
Lower-level professional	-0.002[a]	1.00
White-collar employees	-	
Semi-skilled blue collar	1.145[a]	3.14
Unskilled blue collar	1.455[a]	4.28
Unemployed or inactive	1.114[a]	3.05
Cohort (year of birth-1970)	0.069[a]	1.07
Age of father-age of mother[b]	0.067[a]	1.07
Age of mother-age of child	-0.014[a]	0.99
Interactions with cohort		
Both parents born in same country	0.028[a]	1.03
Both parents without diploma	-0.032[a]	0.97
Region (selected)[c]		
Burgundy	-	
City of Paris[d]	0.991[a]	2.69
Yveline[d]	0.412[a]	1.51
Essonne[d]	0.431[a]	1.54
Hauts-de-Seine[d]	0.949[a]	2.58
Seine-Saint-Denis[d]	1.212[a]	3.36
Val-De-Marne[d]	0.846[a]	2.33
Val d'Oise[d]	0.755[a]	2.13
Champagne/Ardenne	0.409[a]	1.51
Nord/Pas-de-Calais	1.041[a]	2.83
Brittany	-0.468[a]	0.63
Poitou/Charentes	-0.827[a]	0.44
Aquitaine	-0.899[a]	0.41
Midi/Pyrenees	-0.717[a]	0.49
Languedoc/Roussillon	-1.027[a]	0.36
Provence/Alpes/Cote d'Azur	-0.960[a]	0.38
Corsica	-1.129[a]	0.32

Notes: [a]p<.001
[b]Age difference set at 0 when mother is older than father
[c]Only regions and departments whose logit coefficients have an absolute value of .4 (change of at least 50% in the odds) are reported.
[d]Departments of Ile-de-France (Paris region).

The variables in the logistic regression equation provide more details about this differentiation than did the simple tables of the preceding section. For one thing, the specific countries of birth of parents are an excellent indicator of the ethnic origin of a second-generation individual, and their predictive power has increased over time. Because the *pied-noir* group is more heavily Algerian in origin than is the Maghrebin one, members of the second

generation with parents born in Morocco or Tunisia are more likely, *ceteris paribus*, to belong to the Maghrebin population. In addition, having both parents born in the same North African country substantially increases (by threefold) the likelihood that an individual is a part of this group. The value of this indicator increases over time, as indicated by the significant interaction between year of birth and parental endogamy. The elapse of a decade adds nearly .3 in logit terms to the endogamy coefficient, a far from trivial increment (thus taking it from 1.21 to 1.49).

Some other demographic characteristics of the parents also contribute to distinguishing between the two groups, but not as strongly as the birthplaces of parents and their endogamy. But the greater the age difference between husband and wife, the more likely the child is to be Maghrebin: compared to the child of parents who are the same age, a child of a father who is ten years older than the mother is almost twice as likely (exp [.685]) to be of Maghrebin origin. The age difference between mother and child is also indicative of ethnic origins, with the children of older mothers more likely to be *pied noir*, though the differences involved are quite small. Finally, the calendar year of a child's birth helps to differentiate between the two ethnic groups: the later a child is born, the more likely he or she is to have a Maghrebin background.

The ethnic distinction in the second generation is powerfully associated with the socioeconomic position of the immigrant generation. The contrast between parents without a formal educational diploma and all others remains marked. Compared to having two parents who both went beyond primary school, having two parents without any diploma increases the probability that an individual is of Maghrebin origin by a very large amount (2.23 in the logit scale, corresponding with an odds ratio of 9.3). This gap is somewhat attenuated over time, as implied by the interaction with year of birth: that is, it falls by .32 with the passing of a decade. The difference between parents without diplomas and those with minimal credentials, *i.e.*, primary-school diplomas, is also large: about 1.76 in the logit scale (5.8 as an odds ratio). In addition, if the primary wage earner in the household is engaged in labor, even skilled labor, then it is considerably more likely to be a Maghrebin household than if he or she is a white-collar employee. Thus, the combination of poorly educated parents with blue-collar jobs – a combination that is viewed as stereotypical of Maghrebin immigrants – applies to few *pied-noir* parents.

Geography also distinguishes rather sharply between the two groups in the second generation. Residing in certain parts of the Paris region, especially in the city itself or in the suburban departments of Hauts-de-Seine or Seine-

Saint Denis, which house some of the largest immigrant *banlieues*, is strongly indicative of Maghrebin origin, as is residing in the industrial north, in the area around Calais. In sharp contrast, residing in the most southern sections of France – in Languedoc, Provence, or Corsica – is strongly suggestive of *pied-noir* origins, as is residing along the southern part of the Atlantic coast (in the Aquitane region, for example). The importance of geography is demonstrated by the fact that the extreme geographic differences have the same order of magnitude as educational differences. Thus, the difference between living in Paris or in its *banlieus* of high immigrant concentration, on the one hand, and along the Mediterranean coast, on the other, is 2 or more in logit terms.

The combined effect of all these variables is very impressive, as is implied by the ability of the logit model to predict correctly the ethnic origin of a child in 94 percent of cases. To grasp this predictive power concretely, let us consider two, somewhat stereotypic cases: one is a child born in 1970 in the south of France to an Algerian father and French mother, who are of the same age and who both were educated beyond primary school; the father is a white-collar employee (in a bank, say), and the mother was 25 years old at the time of the child's birth. The other is a child born in 1978 in the Seine-St. Denis area (a suburban area outside of Paris) to two Algerian-born parents, neither of whom has an educational diploma. The father, who is ten years older than the mother, works in some form of unskilled labor; the mother was 18 years old when the child was born. According to the logit equation, the first child has a probability of just .013 of being Maghrebin (logit=-4.337), the second a probability of .973 (logit=3.600). The equation leaves no doubts about how they should be classified.

CONCLUSION

Our results tell a tale of two very different immigrations coming from the same countries and triggered, to a very large extent, by decolonization and its aftermath. The arrival of the *pieds noirs* was truly an immigration in the sense that it brought to metropolitan France individuals with family roots in the French colonies extending back several generations in many cases and some who lacked any ancestral roots in the metropole. Yet it has not been the subject of much investigation in the literature on immigration to France, and this analysis suggests why: even the immigrants achieved a rather quick integration into French society, as indicated by their high rate of exogamy, especially with metropolitan-born French. Their children, the second generation,

have undoubtedly integrated even more into French society, so that they do not form a visible and sizable group.

The situation could hardly be more different for the Maghrebin immigrants and their children. Set apart to start with by the nominal religion of the great majority – Islam (Kepel, 1991) – their marginal position in French society is revealed by the very low levels of education of the immigrants and their humble occupational status. The starting point for the Maghrebin second generation is very different from that of the *pied-noir* one. Limited systematic evidence (Tribalat, 1995), supplemented by a good deal of local and/or anecdotal evidence, suggests that the second generation is suffering from an unusually high level of social problems, such as early school dropout, unemployment, and deviance.

The analysis here indicates that 1) parental place of birth is not an unambiguous indicator of ethnic status in the second generation for immigrants arriving from former colonies of the host society; and 2) its problematic role can be surmounted in the French case, and perhaps in others, because of the very different trajectories of incorporation of the formerly colonist and colonized populations. This implies that, with a limited amount of information about the immigrant parents, one can distinguish these different ethnic streams in the second generation with a high degree of accuracy. A corollary, of course, is that the members of the second generation of the formerly colonized are, in the great majority of cases, distinguishable also to members of the host society. In sum, our study of the family origins of the second generation makes clear the urgent need to fix its place in French society with systematic study, and at the same time it may provide a tool whereby the Maghrebin second generation can be located in up-to-date data sets. That is our hope, at least.

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