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HIS495

Draft #1

Notes: This is an incredibly, incredibly rough draft. I have not yet written the introduction; below is the section that is immediately after the introduction: A review of legal and historiographic treatments of the Jedwabne controversy over its fifty year legacy. I am doing my writing in LaTeX, but due to some temporary technical issues, I wasn't able to compile the document. Unfortunately, this means that the writing below uses my shorthand for keeping track of references ('N' refers to Neighbors, 'JIC' refers to an article 'Jedwabne Before the Court', and 'NR' refers to an article republished in The Neighbors Respond).

Evolution of Historical Memory

It is unlikely that a complete time-line of the events in Jedwabne on July 10, 1941 can ever be produced. Although the massacre occurred in the Summer of 1941, the continued upheaval of World War II delayed written documentation of the events in Jedwabne for several years. As early as 1945, a testimony by Szmul Wasersztejn, a survivor the pogrom, was deposited into the archives of the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw. Knowledge that a pogrom occurred, however, did not initiate concrete action; it took another four years until formal investigations into the pogrom produced further written testimonies of the events. The decades following the 1949 trials failed to produce any major new caches of information. Despite a stale source base, historiographical treatments of the Pogrom have been anything but. Although we may not be able to trace the precise timeline of events of the Jedwabne massacre, it is fruitful to consider how synopses of the massacre have evolved in the intervening decades.

Legal Memory

In December 27, 1947, Całka Migdał, a pre-war emigre from Poland to Uruguay, learned of the pogrom second-hand. Although Migdal emigrated, his family remained, and in a letter to the Central Committee of Jews in Poland, he demanded judicial action. <JIC416>

> We have information that they [the Jews of Jedwabne] died, not at the hands of Germans, but at the hands of Poles. We also know that Poles have not so far been prosecuted for this crime. They live on in the same small town [...] One person from our town, who is oday living in Palestine, wrote to us about this matter." <NR137>

The Committee forwarded summaries of both Wasersztejn's deposition and Migdał's letter to the Ministry of Justice for further investigation. On February 16, 1948, the Ministry instructed the public prosecutor of the District Court in Łomża to initiate a formal investigation. Although the instructions arrived at District Public Security Office in Łomża on March 23, 1947, it took an aditional nine months before local authorities made the firsts arrests in relation to the Pogrom on January 8, 1948. <JIC417> Prosecutors based initial arrests on the account of Wasersztejn, but of the sixteen participants identified, only two were detained. The testimony of Bolesław Ramotowski, the first individual to be detained, identified an additional forty-eight participants; only fourteen were detained for any amount of time. <JIC417> In all, the testimonies given during the investigations and trial produced the identities 115 participants in the Pogrom. The prosecution ultimately charged twenty-two individuals with participation in the pogrom. <JIC418>

In his detailed 2011 synopsis of the investigation and trial, "Jedwabne Before the Court," Krzysztof Persak notes that a handful of tropes pervade the testimonies of the investigation and

trial. Initial testimonies by those detained were forthcoming in admitting non-violent participation. He notes Władysław Dąbrowski's testimony as charactaristic of this pattern: "I did not take part in murdering Jews; I only took part in guarding them in the market square." The details of the actual murder were less forthcoming; the suspects spoke reluctantly about the events near the barn, and only four admitted to being there. Conversely, most of the individuals sought as prosecuting witnesses claimed emphatically to know nothing about any murder of Jews. The latter trope came to characterize the processions of hearing before the Lomza District court on May 16 and 17, 1949. Most of the defendants redacted the statements they made during the investigation, and all plead not guilty. Although the defense attempted to shift the blame away from the accused, Persat notes that none proposed a narrative that shifted full responsibility for the massacre onto Gestapo forces. Ultimately, the court concluded that, while complicity in murder was a severe crime, those involved had been "forced to cooperate" with the Gestapo. Eleven of the defendants were sentenced to between eight and ten years of prison. Only one, Karol Bardoń, the was sentenced to death on the basis that he acted voluntarily. The remaining ten defendants were acquitted for lack of evidence.

The prosecutors did not attempt to produce a complete narrative of the events of the pogrom, but the statements of the judges nonetheless suggest a crude outline. "The violence employed by the Germans [with respect] to the defendants was a result of a great number in which they appeared in Jedwabne on the critical day, and [of] the fact that the Jews had to be driven out of their homes to the assembly point, which the Germans could not do due to their relatively small number." While there were not a significant enough number of Germans to carry out the pogrom themselves, their numbers were such that they were able to coerce some of Jedwabne's inhabitants into cooperation. Moreover, they went on to clarify coercian should not

be understood in the limited sense of a German personally overseeing that each defendant carried out their orders. <JIC422>

Post-Trial Memory

Notwithstanding a minor retrial that occurred in 1954, historical memory of the Jedwabne massacre remained mostly static for another decade. In either 1962 or 1963, a monument memorializing the victims of the pogrom was erected by the Lomza ZBoWiD on the site of the mass grave in Jedwabne <NR52>. It's inscription purported both a count of the pogrom's victims and the identities of the perpetrators. "Execution site of the Jewish Population. The Gestapo and Nazi gendarmarie burned alive 1,600 people on 10 July, 1941". <JIC424> In 1967, the Main Commission to Investigate Nazi War Crimes in Poland launched investigations into war crimes in the Bialystok region. The investigation into the Jedwabne crime similarly described it as "burning of around 1,600 Jews from Jedwabne, Łomża district, by the Germans in July 1941." In 1966, Syzmon Datner, in an article in the Bulletin of the Jewish Historical Institute characterized the anti-Jewish crimes in the Bialystok after the attack on the USSR by Germany as being the product of German special operations forces. According to Datner, German units organized "outbursts", for propagandist purposes: "As a rule, they photographed the scenes that were played out as evidence that the Jews were hated not only by the Germans." He contends that Germans collaborated with Poles in these crimes, supplying arms and inciting racial tension, but shying away from direct participation when possible. "The Germans dragged the dregs of the local community, as well as the so called Blue Police into these crimes. This was a phenomenon that was relatively rare in occupied Poland, as well as in the rest of the Bialystok region, where the location population--Polish and Belarusian alike--refused to be hoodwinked by German

provocation [...] In a few cases , the local scum and criminal elements allowed themselves to be used as henchmen by the Germans. However, the majority of the work was done by German Hands." <NR55>

While Datner did not specifically describe the pogroms of Jedwabne, the model he described remained the primary premise of descriptions of the Jedwabne pogrom until the publication of Neighbors. After a three-year freeze of the renewed investigations begining in 1968, the legal investigation of the Jedwabne crime was taken over in 1971 by Waldemar Monkiewic. Over the next three years, Monkiewic interrogated five witnesses, resulting in the identification of several Germans involved in the Pogrom. One witness, Julia Sokołowska, a cook at the gendarmarie post in Jedwabne, claimed there was a confluence of 240 gendarmaries in Jedwabne--most from surrounding towns. Follow-up investigations conducted by Germany failed to bear fruit, and the Polish investigation into Jedwabne was discontined in 1977.

Between 1982 and 1989, Monkiewic published a series of articles purporting to construct a historical timeline of the events in Jedwabne. These reports reflected the best summary of historical memory after the pogrom. In 1986, in a ceremony marking the 250th anniversary of Jedwabne's town charter, Monkiewicz stated the pogrom was initiated when 150 police entered Jedwabne by motor vehicle, and estimated between six-hundred and nine-hundred Jewish causalities. For what he described as "understandable reasons", he omitted mention of the names of the Polish auxiliary police known to be involved in the crime. Monkiewicz, gave a detailed synopsis of the event in Jedwabne three years later in the University of Bialystok's Studio Podlaskie:

> In early July 1941, 200 men from the 309th and 316th German police battalions were detached to form a special unit, called Kommando Bialystok, under the

command of Wolfgang Birkner, who was seconded from the Warsaw Gestapo. Only 10 july, this unit arrived in Jedabne by truck. Bot the gendarmerie and the auxiliary police were engaged in the operation carried out against the Jews. The auxiliary police were involved only in leading the victims to the square and escorting the victims to the square and escorting them out of the town. There, the Nazis committed unspeakable cruelty, driving some 900 people into a barn that they next closed, and the walls of which they splashed with gasoline and set alight, causing the martyrs deaths of the men, women, and children inside.

An Alternative Narrative

Monkiewic's 1989 narrative remained the definitive narrative of the Jedwabne for a decade. The first revisionist analysis of the Jedwabne events--an essay published by Jan Gross in 1999, "Lato 1941 w Jedwabnem" in the multi-author book, Non-provincial--went largely unnoticed. The work featured Wasersztejn's eye-witness account of the pogrom, but lacked the direction and force of his followup work. It was not until he saw Agnieszka Arnold's documentary "Neighbors" that he came to the "realization that Wasersztejn had to be taken literally." <NR341> In the Spring of 2000, Gross published "Sasiedzi: Historia zaglady zydowskiego miasteczka" (followed by it's english edition "Neighbors" a year later). At the same time, Gross, a professor of history at Princeton, published a series of English-language lectures on Jedwabne that were circulated on the internet.

As a revisionist work, Neighbors bore the onus on demonstrating the necessities of its revisions. As such, Neighbors presented not just the events of the progrom, but contextualized it the history and future of Jedwabne. Gross begins thusly, with a brief history of Poland and the

town of Jedwabne. When Jedwabne received its town charter in 1736, it had already been settled for at least three hundred years. It's Jewish population bled over from the nearby town of Tykocin, and Jews were initially subject to the Tykocin Jewish communal authority. By 1770, however, Jedwabne Jews constructed a wooden synnagogue. The Jewish population numbered three-hundred-eighty-seven, a clear majority in a town with a total population of only four-hundred-fifty. Jedwabne's population climaxed at 3,000 on the eve of WWI but the devastation of war and the Russian policy of Jewish resettlement from near-front-line territories reduced the number of inhabitants to seven hundred. Over the next two decades, Jedwabne's population slowly recovered. By 1931, Jedwabne boasted 2,167 inhabitants. Jews formed a majority of the town's 144 craftsmen. The interwar period, was not without sporadic bouts of antisemitism. In 1934, a Jewish woman was killed in Jedwabne. The shooting of a peasent in a neighboring town a few days later fueled a rumor that Jedwabne's Jews had taken revenge on the poles. However, Gross contends that, true to his monograph's title, Jedwabne's Jews and Poles were mostly peaceful neighbors.

The first period of Soviet occupation strained this uneasy relationship. The signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact on August 23, 1939 paved the way for WWII and effectively partitioned Poland between the USSR and Germany. Hitler's armies invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, followed by the Red Army on September 17. The precise boundaries of the parition, however, were not finalized until September 28th. Thus, for a brief period in the Autumn of 1939, Jedwabne was occupied by the Wehrmact, then surrendered to Soviet authorities. During this period, Jews across Poland squired the reputation of having a privileged relationship with the soviet occupiers. Gross does not doubt that Jews filled some government positions, but contends that there are no indications that the relationship between Jews and Poles

in Jedwabne was any more antagonistic than elsewhere in Poland.

Gross traces the beginning of the pogrom to the morning of July 10, when all of Jedwabne's Catholic adult males were called to to assemble outside the Jedwabne town hall. Gross surmises that there must have been some prior knowledge of what was to occur, as carts carrying people from nearby hamlets had been arriving since dawn. The assembled men "were equipped by the German gendarmerie and Karolak and Sobuta with whips and clubs. Then Karolak and Sobuta ordered the assembled men to bring ot the swuare in front of the town hall all the Jews of Jedwabne." <N56> The Jews were thusly ordered to assemble to the market square for cleaning duty. Such an order was not entirely out of the ordinary in Jewish-Polish relations of that period. Gross's narrative divides the subsequent events into four approximate phases: hunting, humiliation, holocaust and plunder.

Apparently cognizant that what was to ensue was not, in fact, 'cleaning duty', several hundred Jews attempted to escape. A band of teenagers brought captured Nielawicki as he attempted to flee across the fields to Wizna; he was beaten and brought to the square. Olszewicz, another Jewish survivor the pogrom, has his first escape thwarted similarly by roaming guards; he too was beaten and brought to the square. In all, Gross estimates between 100 and 200 Jews escaped from Jedwabne. Of those caught, some were brought to the square as Nielawicki and Olszewicz were, but most were killed on the spot. Testimonies singled out a member of the Kobrzyniecki family, first name historically unknown, as the most effective killer of this phase; in two separate testimonies, he is described as gutting eighteen Jews with a knife.

Those who did not attempt to flee were subjected to humiliating acts. A dozen Jews were ordered by Sobuta and Wasilewski "to do some ridiculous gymnastic exercises." Another group was ordered to fell a statue of Lenin errected by the Soviets during the previous period of

occupation. " When the jews broke the stature, they were told to put its varisus pieces on some boards and carry it around, and the rabbi was told to walk in front with his hat on a stick, and all had to sing, 'The war is because of us, the war is for us.'" <N62>

Gross surmised that, having realized the relative ineffectiveness of piecmeal killings, the participants sought a more efficient method of execution. X recalled, "When I came to the square, they told me to give my barn to burn the Jews, to which I started pleading to spare my barn." Another barn was used, instead. "While varying the statue , all the Jews were chased toward the barn, and the barn was doused with gasoline and lit, and in this manner fifteen hundred Jewish people perished." <N22> The aforementioned member of the Kobrzyniecki family is identified as having lit the barn on fire. Three Jews entrapped in the barn managed to escape; Janek Neumark, his sister and daughter were pressed against the barn door when a blast of hot air blew it open. Though their exit was bared by Staszek Sielawa, wielding an axe, the trio managed to disarm him and make it to the cemetery, where they hid.

Having ridden the town of most of it's Jews, the remaining inhabitants of Jedwabne found themselves grossly unprepared for the aftermath. The hot July weather fueled fears that an epidemic would ravage the town unless the corpses were disposed of with haste. The manager of Jedwabne's Gendarme accused the mayor of over-promising in a public confrontation: "You insisted that you'd put things in order with the Jews, but you don't know how to put things in order at all." <N65> The plunder of Jewish property now began, a phase to which Gross devoted an entire chapter to. Those responsible for burying the corpses searched through the singed clothing for hidden valuables. Although the gendarmie attempted to seize found property, "anyone who hid it in his shoe saved the catch." <N64>

After Neighbors

Gross's thesis entered the public conscience three weeks before the publication of the Polish edition of Neighbors with Andrzej Kaczynski's article, "Burnt Offering" in Rzeczpospolita (a Polish daily newspaper that at the time had a daily circulation of 207,000 units). Kaczynski's brief article proved to be prophetic of the debate to come, introducing to the discussion the debate over historicity, the possibility of the culpability of historians.

That a massacre occurred in Jedwabne was neither a revelation for the town's present-day residents nor for Polish academia. Moreover, while Gross produced a radically different narrative than the one proposed by previous treatments, he did so without introducing hitherto unknown source material. Unlike previous treatments of the Jedwabne massacre, however, Gross's thesis succeeded in penetrating the public conscience. Academic debate over Neighbors produced more journal articles in the span of a few months than had been written on the Jedwabne massacre over its fifty-year historiographic legacy; that's to say nothing of the explosion of the debate outside of academia. Not only have widely different narratives of the day's events since emerged, but the controversy of the historical episode of the small town has since transcended academia and erupted into mainstream Polish culture: shortly after the publication of Neighbors, the Polish government launched a federal investigation; former President Kwaśniewski's 2001 apology for the pogrom became a controversy in its own right; and much of the rhetoric discussing the massacre been vitriolic, even among academics. The ferocity of the Jedwabne debate reflects not a nation-wide appetite for accurate historical narratives, but a piercing test of Polish identity. Neighbors transformed the town of Jedwabne into a proxy for Polish-Jewish relations and placed it at the center of a crisis of Polish nationalism.

The controversy Neighbors initiated, in part, might be attributed to its literary virtues.

Gross's synopsis of the massacre differs from previous attempts in that it eschewed a descriptive voice for a narrative one. In the narration of the pogrom itself, Gross's own voice is sparsely heard; rather, he strings together the first-hand accounts of the pogrom in a cohesive manner. Although the testimonies of pogrom survivors such as Wasersztejn inspired Neighbor's alternative reading of the sources, they are not the primary testimonies heard in Neighbors. Nor does Gross focus on the most violent participants of the pogrom, those who set the barn ablaze or murdered Jews individually. Rather, filled with the accounts of those who stood by—the neighbors who refused shelter, who pedaled the property of the murdered Jews, and who harassed the very in Jedwabne few who protected Jews—Neighbors aligned complacency with collaboration. While this association is implicit (albeit, inescapable) during Gross's narration of the pogrom itself, Gross takes the additional step of devoting the succeeding chapters to a discussion of the moral ramifications of his findings and their context in broader Polish-Jewish relations.

Very Rough Outline of Sections to Come (Incomplete List)

1. Historicity as a Proxy for Shedding Guilt

Neighbors was followed by immediate calls for investigations, mostly by critics (who?).

- *Doubt over death count*
- *Degree to which the gestapo were involved*
- *Possible faults with Gross's evidence from the trials*

Lastly, provide a summary of the IPN report.

Critics in Polish academia seized challenges of historicity as a vehicle for disputing the moral ramifications of *Neighbors*. A month after Jedwabne's mayor called for an investigation, the

Polish parliament initiated a sweeping reexamination of the massacre. The reports of the National Institute of Remembrance, finalized in 2003 and mostly corroborating Gross's findings, hardly established a truth to which all adhered.[i] In 2005—two years after the IPN report and a full five after the publication of *Neighbors*—, the first monograph rebutting *Neighbors* was published, citing unamenable flaws of historicity as a cause for discrediting *Neighbors*. In *The Massacre in Jedwabne,* Polish historian Marek Chodakiewicz disputed both the severity of the massacre and the identity of its perpetrators. In contrast to Gross's estimate of 1,600 casualties, Chodakiewicz suggested a more paltry six hundred deaths.[ii] Chodakiewicz also disputed the identities of the perpetrators, contending that only a few antisocial Poles colluded with several truckloads of Gestapo in the murder of Jedwabne's Jews.[iii]

1.1. Investigations had little impact on public confusion.

Public opinion polls conducted in 2001 and 2002 revealed a fragmented understanding of the events that occurred in Jedwabne. Even after the publication of the IPN's report, 50% of those polled stated they were unsure who the perpetrators were; in another study, a significant minority indicated that Poles were among the victims of the pogrom.[iv]

2. Jewish-Soviet Collaboration or Polish Antisemitism?

Gross's critics and proponents also are divided on to what degree Jews 'instigated' the massacre by collaborating with the Soviets. Gross's pre-massacre history on Jedwabne might be better served in this section.

Reinforcing Judeo-communism as a viable historical model was the primary argument of Chodakiewicz in *The Massacre in Jedwabne*, where it served to contextualize the apathy of

Jedwabnians towards the pogrom.[v] In a 2001 article entitled “Collaboration Passed Over In Silence,” historian Tomasz Strzembosz charges Jews during Soviet occupation with the betrayal of the Polish nation.[vi] Strzembosz stops short of stating a justifications exists for the Pogrom, but alleges that Jews intentionally antagonized ethnic poles.[vii] This motif, which Joanna Michlic referred to as the “anti-Polish, pro-Soviet Jew,” provided Gross's critics a means of "of rationalizing and explaining” why ethnic Poles participated in the murder of their Jewish neighbors.[viii] The interpretation of Chodakiewicz's and Strzembosz's grievances of *Neighbors* is incorrect; the primary goal of neither historian is not to acquit the town of Jedwabne for committing the pogrom, but to minimize their guilt.[ix] Conversely, Gross argues that the perception that Jews were generally Soviet conspirators is mostly a product of confirmation bias. Both Chodakiewicz and Gross produced monographs arguing their divergent analyses of Polish-Jewish relations.[x] If not for the vitriol of discourse, this aspect of the debate might be dismissed as a matter of controversial, but ultimately benign, revisionism. However, by aligning complacency with collaboration, Gross's model set cultural stakes to the divergent histories presented above; if accepted, Gross's model had the potential to cast a shadow on Poland that extended far beyond the town and onto broader Polish-Jewish relations.[xi]

3. History as a Moral Hazard

Divergent interpretations of Poland's soviet legacy directly impacted what *Neighbor's* critics and supporters characterized as the moral hazard of embracing or neglecting Gross's thesis. Gross's proponents argued that the re-evaluation of Polish collaboration in Jedwabne necessitated a complete revisitation of the extant historiography of Polish-Jewish relations--a conclusion that depended on considering conflict and division as the rules, not the exceptions, of Polish-Jewish

relations. Sitting at the cusp of living memory and second-hand accounts, the recency of Jedwabne gave proponents a cause for haste. Left "undisturbed" by historians, Joanna Tokarska-Bakir argued that witnesses of Polish antisemitism would "take with them to the grave everything that still should be told" about Poland's darker chapters in Polish-Jewish relations.[xii] Conversely, Gross's critics, such as Strzembosz, considered such conclusions as unnecessary revisionism of a robust historiography.[xiii]

4. The Culpability of Scholars

The emergence of an entirely new history for a known event raised a question of whether, as scholars, they had collaborated in the deception of the Polish nation regarding Judeo-Polish relations. In the span of a year; *Neighbors* launched public consciousness of the Jedwabne pogrom from obscurity to social saturation; even academic critics of Gross appreciated the public attention *Neighbors* drew to their field of study.[xiv] Yet if raising awareness about Polish-Jewish relations was only a matter of substantive analysis, what could be said of the paucity of literature on Jedwabne before Neighbors? Gross and his proponents contended that this oversight of historiography was a negligent miscarriage of academic integrity.[xv] Strzembosz, a vocal critic of Gross whose region and time-frame of expertise included the Jedwabne massacre, justified his lack of publication on Jedwabne on the basis that he did not believe Jedwabne to be of remarkable importance.[xvi] Strzembosz additionally cited the repression of academic research during Soviet occupation.[xvii]

5. The Entanglement of Historical Memory and National Memory

The participants in the Jedwabne debate have consistently been defined by their stark

differences. Having lacked a shared narrative of the Jedwabne pogrom, having lacked a shared history of the nation of Poland, having lacked a consensus over the nature of the ailment facing the Polish nation, and having lacked a consensus over the appropriate panacea, these physicians of the Polish nation in fact lacked a common patient.

Supporters of revisionism charged that traditionalists were blinded by a national identity that repulsed critical introspection. For many Poles, *Neighbors* assaulted a "national myth" of Poles as victims and of Poland as the embodiment of Europe's "highest spiritual values."[xviii] Tokarska-Bakir argued that the rejection of Gross's thesis was an artifact of a nation stricken by a pathological obsession for innocence. From an internal perspective of Polish affairs, she wrote, one looses both the ability to critically evaluate matters placing Poland vulnerable to guilt, and "to see that the rules that govern Polish public and private debate are controlled by this pressure of innocence."[xix] One searing critique of the Jedwabne debate disparaged those ascribing to the traditionalist identity as entirely different species: "*Homo Jedvabicus.*"[xx] In this model of Polish nationalism, Polish identity existed in two states: one that denied introspection and another that embraced it. Tokarska-Bakir goes so far to wonder aloud if Gross could have written *Neighbors* if not for his time outside Poland.[xxi]

Gross's opposition, on the other hand, charged that revisionists were not only anti-Polish, but non-Polish. Chodakiewicz observed Poles were particularly critical "of both Gross and his thesis," while "a number of Western pundits embraced [Gross's] hypothesis wholeheartedly."[xxii] According to Chodakiewicz, the failure of Western pundits to accurately appraise Gross's thesis stemmed from ethnic stereotyping and a desire to present the entirety of Europe as Hitler's "willing executions."[xxiii] Chodakiewicz all but names one "Western pundit" in particular: Jan T Gross, who wrote *Neighbors* after emigrating from Poland. In this model of Polish nationalism,

revisionists attempted to destroy Polish heritage on the basis of unfettered extrospection.

i Jan T Gross, “Critical Remarks Indeed” in *The Neighbors Respond*, 344-5.

ii Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, *The Massacre in Jedwabne, July 10, 1941: Before, During, After,* (New York: East European Monographs, 2005), 72-84.

iii Ibid., 16.

iv Antony Polonsky and Joanna B. Michlic, *The Neighbors Respond: The Controversy Over the Jedwabne Massacre in Poland.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 69
“Poles' Opinions About the Crime in Jedwabne—Changes in Social Consciousness
.” *Polish Sociological Review*, 137 (2002), 118-127

v Chodakiewicz, *The Massacre in Jedwabne*, 45.

vi Tomasz Strzembosz “Collaboration Passed Over In Silence” *Rzeczpospolita*, 27 January 2001, in *The Neighbors Respond*, 223.

vii Ibid., 220, 226, 231-2.

viii Joanna Michlic, “The Soviet Occupation of Poland, 1939-41, and the Stereotype of the Anti-Polish and Pro-Soviet Jew,” *Jewish Social Studies*, 3 (2007), 137.

ix Ibid.

x Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, *After the Holocaust: Polish-Jewish Conflict in the Wake of World War II.* (New York: East European Monographs, 2003).
Jan T. Gross, *Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz.* (New York: Random House 2006).

xi Andrzej W. Tymowski, “Apologies for Jedwabne and Modernity” *East European Politics and Societies 16* (2002), 292.

xii Joanna Tokarska-Bakir, “Collaboration Passed Over in Silence,” *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 13-14 January 2001 in *The Neighbors Respond*, 76-77.

xiii Strzembosz “Collaboration Passed Over In Silence” *Rzeczpospolita*, 27 January 2001, in *The Neighbors Respond*, 220.

xiv Chodakiewicz, *The Massacre in Jedwabne*, 159

xv “A Roundtable Discussion: Jedwabne—Crime and Memory.” *Rzeczpospolita*, 3 March 2001, in *The Neighbors Respond*, 254.

xvi Ibid.

xvii Ibid.

xviii Ilya Prizel, “Jedwabne: Will the Right Question be Raised?” *East European Politics and Societies*, 16 (Feb 2002), 278.

xix Tokarska-Bakir, 76..

xx Jerzy Slawomir Mac, “Homo Jedvabicus” *Wprost*, 22 January 2001 in *The Neighbors Respond*, 114-8.

xxi Tokarska-Bakir, 75.

xxii Chodakiewicz, *The Massacre in Jedwabne*, 150

xxiii Ibid., 149.