Replicating 'How Newspapers Reveal Political Power'

Adapted from Ban et al. (2019)

Sean Hambali

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Introduction

Motivation

- How to measure power?
 - Difficult to empirically observe power
- Ban et al. (2019) provides an empirical measure of power via newspaper coverage
- Main thesis: relative amount of space dedicated to a particular subject measures the *relative* power of that subject. Why?
- Newsworthiness!
 - Size/impact of story matters
 - Prominence of actors also matters

___/^

Methods

What kind of power?



Data

- Primarily sourced from Newspapers.com
- Stratified sample from 50% of archive
- Focuses on years 1877-1977
- Uses OCR tools and regex to count occurrences of political actors and offices in newspapers texts

Table A.3 - Regular Expressions.


Error Type	Correct Character	OCR	Regex	Example
1:1 Substitution	e	c	[ec]	s[ec]nate
	V	y	[vy]	executi[vy]e
	0	c	[oc]	c[oc]mmittee
	i	1	[il]	$\operatorname{comm}[\operatorname{il}]$ ttee
	t	1	[t1]	commi[tl][tl]ee
	b	h	[bh]	[bh]udget
	g	y,j,q	[gyjq]	bud[gyjq]et
	f	t	[ft]	o[ft][ft]ice
	a	$_{\rm u,o}$	[auo]	sen[auo]te
1:2 Substitution	m	rm	[m(rn)]	co[m(rn)][m(rn)] ittee

(Validation) Results


Validation 1: Valuing congressional committees

- Hypothesis: More powerful congressional committees should get more news coverage.
- Ban et al. (2019) validates this hypothesis with committee "value" rankings constructed by Groseclose and Stewart (1998)

Result 1: Coverage vs Groseclose-Stewart rankings









Replication

Validation 2: Newspaper coverage of House Speakers

Hypothesis: There should be spike in coverage in the periods where senators serve as party leaders

Result 2: Coverage of speakers before, during and after leadership





Original


Replication


Validation 3: Strong vs. weak mayors

- Strong mayors (mayor-council):
 - Mayor and city council are elected separately
 - Mayor has broad executive authority
- Weak mayors (council-manager):
 - City council is the only elected office
 - Council appoints city manager to oversee executive branch
 - Mayor has little to no executive authority
- Hypothesis: Weaker mayor authority upon transition to council-manager setting, thus lower mentions in newspapers.

$$\hat{Y}_{ijt} = \frac{N_{ijt}}{\sum_{j=1}^{J} \text{Less Negatively.}}$$
 where , , and denote mentions and relative proportions, where is a substitution of the substitution of the

Result 3A: Coverage of city offices, before and after reforms





Original

Replication

Result 3B: Effect of switching from Mayor-Council to Council-Manager

TABLE 1 Impact of Switch from Mayor-Council to Council-Manager City Government

	All I	Mentions	Using City Name Filter			
	Relative Coverage of Mayor	Relative Coverage of City Manager	Relative Coverage of Mayor	Relative Coverage of City Manager		
Council-manager	-0.18	0.18	-0.25	0.29		
government form	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)		
N	3540	3540	2376	2376		
City fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		

Original

Result 3B: Effect of switching from Mayor-Council to Council-Manager

		Rel. Coverage of City Manager I Mentions	Rel. Coverage of Mayor Rel. Coverage of City Manager Using City Name Filter			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
Council-manager government form	-0.18***	0.18***	-0.25***	0.29***		
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)		
Observations	3,540	3,540	2,376	2,376		
R^2	0.76	0.70	0.70	0.68		
Within R ²	0.15	0.29	0.11	0.26		
Year fixed effects	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	✓		
City fixed effects	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark		

Replication


Validation 4: Coverage of Massachussets **Executive Council**


- Massachussets Executive Council is comprised of eight individuals elected from districts
- In late 1964, the council was stripped of its statutory powers following corruption and bribery charges
- Hypothesis: lower newspapers coverage on the Executive Council following the reform

$$EC_t = \frac{EC_t}{EC_t + C_t}$$

 $EC_t = \frac{EC_t}{FC_t}$ where and denote mentions of the Executive Council and the Governor in all available Massachussets newspapers, respectively.

Result 4: Coverage of Massachussets Executive Council





Original


Replication


Application: Measuring the power of state party committees

- Prediction: State committees are no longer as powerful as they once were
- Ban et al. (2019) uses newspaper coverage to measure the power of state committees relative to local committees

Relative Party Mentions_{it} =

Result 5: Party Committee Power in 9 U.S. States





Original

Replication

A Closer Look at the Replication Exercise

Differences from the original results

- Able to replicate all of the main findings
- Minor differences in standard errors reported in regression table 3B

Replication diagnosis

- The authors could not provide access to the raw newspapers data since they are proprietary data.
- They only provide cleaned, aggregated term counts across years, states, etc.
- As such, I wasn't able to replicate the crucial first half of the paper, i.e., preprocessing the text.

	year	agriculture	appropria	armed_s	banking	budget	education	energy	foreign_a	governm	house_a	judiciary	merchant	natural_r	post_office	public_w
1	1877	3	69	0	17	0	5	12	43	0	0	103	0	0	7	0
2	1878	12	121	0	111	0	42	62	30	0	0	313	0	0	29	1
3	1879	30	199	0	49	0	33	82	20	0	0	193	0	0	5	0
1	1880	40	167	0	20	1	18	140	26	0	0	133	0	0	16	(
5	1881	20	61	0	2	2	8	48	37	0	0	89	0	0	5	1
6	1882	23	164	0	42	1	62	214	237	0	0	247	0	0	20	3
7	1883	8	53	0	1	1	10	59	35	0	0	171	0	0	3	1
3	1884	70	248	0	73	1	29	102	132	0	0	201	0	0	35	0
9	1885	12	142	0	3	1	7	10	51	0	0	90	0	0	7	0
)	1886	95	138	0	47	1	65	100	173	0	0	210	0	0	19	(
	1887	38	84	0	10	0	17	33	81	0	0	175	0	0	1	(
	1888	155	129	0	44	4	40	156	177	0	0	215	38	0	18	
	1889	26	105	0	0	0	15	13	70	0	0	169	8	0	3	
	1890	173	195	0	62	0	36	153	95	0	0	439	33	0	44	
5	1891	23	108	0	11	0	50	42	59	0	0	257	1	0	8	(
5	1892	213	320	0	36	0	15	101	200	0	0	352	16	0	28	(
	1893	50	246	0	260	0	31	77	182	0	0	293	1	1	4	
3	1894	168	269	0	299	2	4	254	206	0	0	874	12	0	24	
	1895	39	254	0	56	1	49	39	109	0	0	358	5	0	1	
	1896	85	289	2	133	1	22	252	525	0	0	404	20	1	42	
	1897	35	293	0	250	10	56	115	176	0	2	249	0	0	10	
	1898	29	374	0	246	8	15	121	707	0	2	214	8	1	21	
	1899	27	247	1	81	5	44	132	36	0	0	358	20	6	10	
	1900	91	150	0	37	0	8	222	142	0	0	379	93	69	39	
	1901	19	186	0	80	5	51	90	26	0	0	340	13	21	17	

Replication diagnosis

- The authors used Stata to pre-process the term counts to generate measures of interest and R to visualize the output
- I convert all Stata codes to R, posted all codes and output images/tables on GitHub.
- I find one minor error in their code:

```
1 ... %>%
2  mutate(
3  # Generate relative proportions
4  rel_mayor_council_total = r_city_council + r_mayor,
5  rel_mayor_council_control_total = r_control_sum_city_council + r_control_sum_mayor,
6  rel_mayor_council = r_mayor / rel_mayor_council_total,
7  rel_mayor_council_control = r_control_sum_mayor / rel_mayor_council_control_total,
8
9  # In the original paper, r_mayor was used instead of r_mayor_x
10  rel_mayor_council_total_x = r_city_council_x + r_mayor_x,
11  rel_mayor_council_total_x = r_mayor_x / rel_mayor_council_total_x
12  ) %>%
13  ...
```

Possible extensions

Possible extensions:

- Application to the Indonesian case: rapid decentralization in 1998 shifts political power from central government to local government
- Possible extension to other mediums, e.g., news broadcast?
- Robustness checks to the DiD regression under new approaches by Callaway & Sant'Anna (2020), Chaisemartin & D'Haultfœuille (2020)

• Limitations for extension:

- Limited nuance of the power being measured
- Limited use in developing country context due to pervasive power of "shadowy" political actors
- Limited use of newspapers in modern context, and possible changes to the incentive structure of newspaper outlets