Chapter 4

Key exchange protocols
Cryptographic hash functions, MACs
Digital signature

Key Exchange protocols

In TLS transmitted data is encypted with symmetric block cipher AES

Before encryption with AES can start, a symmetric key must be agreed between the communicating parties. For this there exists algorithms, which are called <u>key exchange protocols</u>

- RSA Exchange has been the most used method in the past years
- ECDHE has replaced recently RSA Exchange in many TLS connections
- **DH Exchange** is is also widely used (f.e in encrypted video conferences)

DH = Diffie Hellman key Exhange

ECDHE = Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman key Exchange

RSA key exchange

One of the communicating parties creates a random symmetric key K and sends the key to the other party using recipients public RSA key.

Possible security concerns

- 1. If the hacker manages to factor recipients public RSA key, he can break the encryption of messages containing AES keys and break the encryption of transmitted data not only in the current session, but also in future sessions..
- 2. Authorities in some countries could require companies to give private RSA keys of their servers to officials.

Diffie – Hellman key exchange

System parameters are: large (2048 bit) prime **p** and a "generator" $\mathbf{g} \in \mathsf{Zp}$ (base for exponentiation)

Alice creates a random private key a





Bob creates a random private key b

Alice calculates a public key Ya using a as exponent and sends Ya to Bob in an unsecure channel

 $Y_a = q^a \mod p$

Bob calculates a public key Yb using b as exponent and sends Yb to Alice in an unsecure channel

$$Y_b = g^b \mod p$$

Both can now use their private keys to calculate the shared key K from the messages they have received.

Alice calculates the shared key

$$K = Y_b^a \mod p = (g^b)^a \mod p = g^{ab} \mod p$$

Bob calculates the shared key

$$K = Y_a^b \mod p = (g^a)^b \mod p = g^{ab} \mod p$$

There is a risk of so called Man in The Middle attack, in which a third party Eve acts between Alice and Bob, pretending to both directions to be the other communicating party. The attack can be avoided if all users have own system parameters p and g. The public key of Bob is in this case the triple (p_B , g_B , Y_B). Often the other party, here for example Bob is a server. The public key, the triple is found in Bob's certificate digitally signed by some certification authority.

Security of DH is based on Discrete Logarithm Problem

A hacker can capture the public messages $Ya = g^a \mod p$ ja $Yb = g^b \mod p$ by listening the unsecure channel, but he cannot solve private keys **a** and **b** from them. Solving exponent x from $y = g^x \mod p$ is very hard - as hard as factoring large integers in RSA

<u>DLP = "Discrete Logarithm Problem"</u> is the name of this "hard problem", which is behind the security of DHE.

DLP: Solving integer x from $y = g^x \mod p$, where integers y, g and prime p are given

Usual recommended secure size of p is 2048 bits

There remains details about DH exchange, which are not answered in this lecture: for example:

- 1. What does group and cyclic group mean in mathematics?
- 2. How do we find a generator g of a cyclic group? Is there a test to decide if some integer is a generator?


These questions will be answered in an appendix, which is found in the Moodle.

There is also a bonus problem, which gives one extra point.

For the bonus problem you need to read Appendix2

ECDHE Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman Exchange

A more recent key exhange is ECDHE, which has replaced RSA exchange in many web services (for example in some Finnish banks). ECDHE is another example of the use of cyclic groups



Elliptic curves used in ECC are curves

$$y^2 = x^3 + a x + b$$

About 150 years ago it was shown, that it is a possible to define an addition of two points of the curve. Result is a third point of the curve, which we denote as P + Q.


P and Q are freely chosen curve points.

ECC cryptography uses discrete elliptic curves.

Discrete elliptic curve consists of integer pairs (x,y), which satisfy equation $y^2 = x^3 + a x + b \pmod{p}$, where a and b are integers and modulus p is prime.

Example and graph of a discrete elliptic curve

Equation $y^2 = x^3 + 2x + 4 \pmod{61}$, where 0 < x,y < 60



Points of curve $y^2 = x^3 + 2x + 4 \pmod{61}$

Formulas of addition P + Q

$$k = (y_2-y_1)^*(x_2-x_1)^{-1} \mod p$$

 $X_{P+Q} = k^2 - x_1 - x_2 \mod p$
 $y_{P+Q} = y_1 - k (x_{P+Q}-x_1) \mod p$

This curve has 52 point, which are seen in the picture. The points of the curve form a cyclic group, where the group operation is addition of points. The formulas of addition are in the left bottom corner of this slide. They are not important here.

One generator is point G = (4,25).

All the curve points are in the set of multiples of generator: {G, 2G, 3G,..., 51G}.

To make the group complete, we add to the group a neutral element, which is symbol O.

It works like number zero of normal addition:

$$P + O = O + P = P$$
 for all P of the curve.


How ECDHE key exchange works?

Curve and generator point G are given as system parameters

- 1. Alice chooses random private key **a** and sends Bob her public key its multiple: point **aG** in an unsecure channel
- 2. Bob chooses random private key **b** and sends Alice its multiple: point b**G** in an unsecure channel
- 3. Both of them calculate the symmetric key K= a*b*G

Alice: K = a(bG)

Bob: K = b(aG)



TLS uses standardized curves, where modulus p and number of points have at least 250 bits


Security: The hacker can listen the channel and capture messages aG and bG, but he is not able to calculate private keys a and b - at least not in a reasonable time.

Solving x from P = x*G, if points G and P are known, is called ECDLP, "Elliptic curve Discrete Logarithm Problem". It is a similar "Hard Problem" as DLP behind DH exchange.

In Moodle there is a ChatGPT- generated javascript calculator for ECDHE. Following example uses Elliptic Curve $y^2 = x^3 + 2x + 4 \pmod{61}$, where generator G = (4,25).

Calculate the shared key K, if the private keys of Alice and Bob are 13 and 23.


1. Alice calculates her public key Ya=13G



2. Bob calculates his public key Yb=23G

ter a:	
0	
ter b:	
0	
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3.Bob calcu-Lates the shared key K=23*Ya



4.Alice calculates the shared key K=13*Yb

2	0	
Curve Para	meter b:	
4	0	
Modulus q:		
61	0	
Integer n:		
13	0	
Point P x-c	oordinate:	
11	\$	
Point P y-co	oordinate:	
25	0	Calc

Summary of concepts in section Key Exchange Protocols

Protocol is a standard procedure, which defines or makes possible connections between devices or software. One party sends a message to the other party, who reacts to the message and possibly answers according to the protocol.

Key exchange protocol standard protocol used for agreeing on symmetric key between two parties.

DLP is a mathematically hard problem, which is the basis of the security of Diffie Hellman Exchange

ECDLP is a mathematically hard problem, which is the basis of security of ECDHE exchange

Cryptographic hash functions

Message Authentication codes MAC's

Digital signature

Hash functions

Definition: Hash functions are one-way functions, which produce a **fixed length digest** from the message. Hash values are also called "message digests"

Uses of hash functions:

- 1. Hash values are used to **ensure the integrity of data transmission** which **means ensuring** that data is not changed during transmission.
- 2. **Password files** of servers do not store passwords, but their **hash values**
- 3. **<u>Digital signature</u>** is calculated using hash value of message.
- 4. <u>Checksums</u> are short hash values, which for example antivirus software calculates for folders and files.

Requirements for a secure hash function

Hash function is denoted below as h(m), where argument m is message

- **1.h(m)** is a <u>one-way function</u>. It is not possible to calculate the message m from its hash value h(m).
- 2. <u>Collision resistance 1</u>. If the hash h(m1) for one message m1 is known, it should be impossible to generate another message m2 with same hash value. Other messages with same hash surely exist, but there should be no method for finding them.
- 3. **Collision resistance 2**. It should be impossible to generate two message m1 and m2 with same hash value.

Known hash functions

Chinese scientists showed in 2005 the vulnerability of many common hash functions. They found a method to generate another message with a same hash value as the original message.

MD5

- broken in 2005

SHA-1 (160 bit)

- not recommended

Following hash functions are regarded as safe

SHA256

SHA384

• SHA512

Example: The sha256 hash of the message "It is tuesday evening" is in integer form 6623456100241117758449834941878944891859918738851279717564990321414630267034 and hexadecimal form 0ea4 be49 0ee7 d159 4948 a6dd bb7d 64ca 3ade 2afb 5d27 1024 1043 c9db e1ef d89a

Secure hash length. "Birthday paradox".

The length of secure hash should have 2 x key length of secure block cipher

Reason for requirement for double length is "birthday paradox"

What is the minimum number of students in the class, in which there is > 50% probability that the class has two students with the same birthday? Answer: 23

The calculation of probability confirms the result

$$P = 1 - \prod_{k=1}^{23} \frac{365 - k + 1}{365} = 0.51$$

Similar calculation can be done for probabilty of collisions of hash values:

If the size of "hash space" is n, there will be collisions at probability of 50% among approximately \sqrt{n} hash values

=> The number of 256 bit hashes is 2^{256} . The square root is 2^{128} which is the number of hashes where appears collision at >50% probability.

MAC -functions

message authentication codes

- MAC = hash function with symmetric key K as extra input. The other input is message m
- MAC ensures not only the integrity of message, but also authenticates the sender of message

* MAC is used in the same way as digital signatures at the end of transmitted data packets to quarantee integrity and sender's authenticity

HMAC-SHA

Is the most common MAC which is calculated from message m ja and symmetric key K using following formula

 $HMAC(K, m) = sha(K \oplus opad||sha(K \oplus ipad||m)$

⊕ = XOR sum

K = symmetric key

lpad and Opad are 64 bit constants, in hexadecimal form

lpad = 5c5c5c5c , Opad = 36363636

Operator || means concatenation of strings ("auto"||"mat" = "automat")

HMAC-SHA is used as pseudorandom password generator in devices, which produce one-time passwords. There is more information about HMAC in the last chapter.



Digital signature

- A digital signature enables secure online transactions. A digitally signed document is juridically equally valid as document manually signed at presence of wittnesses.

The goal of digital signature is to ensure that


- 1) document or message is not changed
- 2) sender or author is authenticated

Digital signature algorithm usually uses hash function and public key encryption

Typical signature used in TLS protocol is **sha256RSA**.

Other signatures, for example ECDSA is also possible

Diagram of digital signature



Digital signature is a number, which is the hash value of message encrypted with senders private key. The recipient receives a pair (message m, signature S). Usually pair (m,S) is encrypted with recipients public key. In that case the recipient needs to decrypt the pair before verification process.

The recipient verifies the signature in the following way:

- 1) Decrypts the signature with sender's public key. Result is the hash value of message.
- 2) He calculates another hash from the message.
- 3) If both hash values match, message is unchanged and sender authenticated.

Calculation of sha256RSA signature

$$S = (sha256(m))^d \mod n$$

Signature S is calculated in two steps

- 1. Calculate the sha256 hash value of the message m
- 2. Encrypt the hash value with senders private RSA key d. The result is the signature.

Calculated example of digital signature:

Alice sends Bob a message "It is tuesday evening" with shaRSA digital signature. Her RSA public key is n = 308911 and private key d = 133073. Calculate the message-signature pair which she sends to Bob.

Step 1: Alice calculates the SHA256 hash of the message

WolframALpha command

SHA256 "It is tuesday evening" gives

6623456100241117758449834941878944891859918738851279717564990321414630267034

Step2: Alice encrypts the has with her private key

In reality the public key n is much larger than 256 bit hash value. The verification of the signature does not work properly if hash value > public key os sender. We change in this demonstration the hash value in such a way that we take only four first digits from the beginning: 6623.

Signature **S** = **6623^133073** mod **308911** =**138680** and the sent pair is ("It is tuesday evening", 138680)

How the recipient verifies the signature?

The recipient Bob has received the pair (m,S) = ("It is tuesday evening",138680)

Step 1. Bob decrypts the signature with senders public key n = 308911 and public exponent e = 65537

Hash value decrypted from signature is **s** • **mod n** = **138680^65537 mod 308911** = **6623**

Step 2. Recipient calculates SHA of the received message directly from the message m. The first four digits of the result 66234561002... are 6623

Step 3. Comparison: <u>HASH values match => message is unchanged and sender authenticated</u>