




Pool Tag Quick Scanning for Windows Memory Analysis

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Commercial Break

- Monthly Security Meetup
- Next meeting tentatively March 30th
- 6 PM
- Lucy's Retired Surfer Bar
- www.nolasec.com



Commercial Break

- 4th Annual Day-Long Conference
- April 16, 2016
- 16 speakers
- \$15
 - T-Shirt
 - Food
 - Drinks



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What We'll Cover

Pool Tag Quick Scanning for Windows Memory Analysis

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Abstract

Pool tag scanning is a process commonly used in memory analysis in order to locate kernel object allocations, enabling investigators to discover evidence of artifacts that may have been freed or otherwise maliciously hidden from the operating system. The fastest current scanning techniques require an exhaustive search of physical memory, a process that has a linear time complexity over physical memory size. We propose a novel technique that we are calling "pool tag quick scanning" that is able to reduce the scanning space by 1-2 orders of magnitude, resulting in much faster discovery of targeted kernel data structures, while maintaining a high degree of accuracy.

Keywords: Microsoft Windows, Memory Analysis, Memory Forensics, Live Forensics, Pool Tag Scanning, Pool Scanning, Incident Response

Memory Forensics

A BRIEF INTRODUCTION

- Traditional Analysis Deals w/ Non-Volatile Data
 - Hard Drives
 - Removable Media
 - Etc.
- Live Forensics Deals with Volatile Data
 - RAM Mostly
 - Must be Collected From a Running Machine
 - Not as Much Control Over Environment

- RAM Dumps Contain Both Structured and Unstructured Information
 - Unstructured
 - Strings
 - Application Data
 - Fragments of Communication
 - Encryption Keys
 - Structured
 - Kernel and Application Structures

- With This Data We Can Gather Information About
 - Processes
 - Open Files
 - Network Connections
 - "In-Memory-Only" Application Data
 - Private Browsing Mode
 - Unencrypted Data
 - Webmail
 - Etc.

- Advanced Malware
- Encrypted or Temporary File Systems
- "Live" Computing Environments
- Analysis
 - Volatility
 - Rekall
 - Redline
 - HPMAF

How It Works

- Two Approaches
 - Signature-Based Data Carving
 - Structured Analysis
- We'll Discuss Both

Signature-Based Data Carving

- Simply Scan the Raw Memory Dump for Patterns
 - Ex. Firefox Porn Private Browsing History
 - Search for "HTTP-memory-only-PB"
 - Strings afterwards will be URLs
 - Can use Regular Expressions
 - Ex. Email Addresses: .*@.*\..*

 Bulk Extractor is a Good Example of This Technique

Signature-Based Data Carving

- Pros
 - Reasonably Fast
 - Easy to Implement
 - Strings, Grep, & Awk
 - Sometimes All You Need

Signature-Based Carving

- Cons
 - Not Context-Aware
 - Which Process or File?
 - Fragmented Data is Hard to Recover
 - Physical Memory is Essentially a "Random" Collection of 4KB Pages
 - Fails on Compressed Images
 - Pagefile.sys
 - OS X
 - Windows 10


- Attempts to Recreate the OS Runtime State
 - Locate Kernel
 - Parse Structured Kernel Information
 - Perform Address Translation
 - Parse All the Things!
- Tool Examples
 - Volatility
 - Rekall
 - HPMAF

- Why the Kernel?
 - Managing Codebase of the OS
 - References Information About Everything
 - Processes
 - Files
 - Sockets
 - Drivers

- Locate the Kernel
 - Memory Dump Format
 - Crash Dump
 - Hiberfile.sys
 - Register State
 - Some Registers Point to Key Kernel Structures
 - Data Carving
 - Look for "Known Signatures" inside the kernel

- Parse Structured Kernel Information
 - Look for Structured Data That Should Live at Known Positions in the Kernel
 - Ex. Linked List of Processes
 - nt!PsActiveProcessHead
 - Parsing This Data Will Give Us Virtual Addresses of Artifacts

- Perform Address Translation
 - Physical Memory is a "Random" Collection of Pages
 - Usually 4KiB
 - Each Process Has It's Own "Virtual Memory"
 - Linear Addresses
 - Ordered
 - Each Process Has a Table That Maps Virtual to Physical Addresses



- Parse All the Things!
 - Now We Know Where Things "Live" in Physical Memory
 - We Can Look at Physical Pages "in Order"
 - Decompress (if Needed)
 - Parse Artifacts
 - Data Carving
 - Structured Application Analysis

Pros

- An Incredible Amount of Information Can be Found
- Handles "Fragmented" Data Well
- Context Aware
 - Results Can be Associated With Specific Processes, Files, and Possibly Users
- Very Hard to Hide From

- Cons
 - Requires More Sophisticated Tools
 - Currently Available Tools Are Slow
 - That's where my research comes in

Overview

POOL TAG QUICK SCANNING

- The Windows Kernel contains several "Pools" of memory to handle object allocation
 - Sort of the kernel version of a process heap
- Each allocated object is prepended with a header, which has a 4 byte identifier of type and some other info
- Scanning memory for Pool Headers allows finding unallocated or unlinked structures

Purpose	Pool Tag
Driver Object	Driv
File Object	File
Kernel Module	MmLd
Logon Session	SeLs
Process	Proc
Registry Hive	CM10
TCP Endpoint	TcpE
TCP Listener	TcpL
Thread	Thre
UDP Endpoint	UdpA

Table 1: Selected non-paged pool allocations

- Volatility and Rekall will do an exhaustive search of the entire memory image looking for pool headers
 - Slow
 - Many False Positives
 - Pool tags are only 4 bytes (usually ASCII)
 - Scanning Userland memory
 - Some sanity checking can cut down on these

- In reality the pool will only take up a very small percentage of physical memory
 - Depends on usage, not physical memory size
 - Ex. 16 GiB physical memory
 - ~38MiB of allocated Non-Paged Pool pages
- By limiting our pool tag scanning to only those pages that the kernel uses to store the pool we can vastly speed up the process and cut down false positives

- The kernel maintains symbols for variables that tell us where each pool starts as well as the size of the pool's virtual memory space
 - However the virtual space reserved for pools are huge!
 - The vast majority of the pages are unallocated
- The kernel also maintains an allocation bitmap
 - One bitmap per pool
 - Each bit represents 2MiB of allocations

Windows Version	Static Ranges	Start of Dynamic Allocation	Allocation Bitmap
Vista SP0	MmNonPagedPoolStart - MmNonPagedPoolEndO	${\tt MmNonPagedPoolExpansionStart}$	${\tt MiNonPagedPoolVaBitMap}$
Vista SP1 - 8	N/A	MiNonPagedPoolStartAligned	${ t MiNonPagedPoolVaBitMap}$
8.1	N/A	MiNonPagedPoolStartAligned	MiDynamicBitMapNonPagedPool

Table 2: Relevant kernel symbols for identifying non-paged pool ranges

- By enumerating the bitmaps we can learn which pages in the pool's virtual address space are allocated
- We limit our pool tag scanning to only the allocated pages
- This is several orders of magnitude faster than scanning all of physical memory
- Does not grow linearly with physical memory size

- Some hits may be missed (false negatives)
 - Allocations from a previous boot
 - Some systems do not wipe memory on reboot
 - Pool pages reclaimed by the OS
 - In rare circumstances the pool can shrink
 - Hits from memory mapped files
 - For example a memory image from a VM
- These limitations are common to all current techniques starting with Windows 10 anyway

RESULTS

Plugin	Type	Avg. Time	Running	Terminated	Prior Boot	Duplicate ⁴
psquickscan	Virtual	0.129s	128	21	0	0
psscan	Physical	$15.584\mathrm{s}$	128	22	15	43
psscan (Rekall)	Physical	$35.967\mathrm{s}$	128	22	15	43
psscan (Volatility)	Physical	25.448s	128	21	15	43

Table 3: A comparison of psquickscan and psscan results

Plugin	Type	Avg. Time	Running	Terminated	Prior Boot	$\mathrm{Duplicate}^4$
psquickscan	Virtual	0.129s	128	21	0	0
psscan (Rekall)	Virtual	71.513s	128	21	0	1
psscan (Volatility)	Virtual	60.526 s	128	19	0	1

Table 4: A comparison of virtual scanning

OS Version	Plugin	Data Scanned	RAM Size	Avg. Time	Running	Terminated	Duplicate
Vista SP0	psquickscan	38 MiB	$1\mathrm{GiB}$	0.083s	46	2	15
Vista SP0	psscan	$1\mathrm{GiB}$	$1\mathrm{GiB}$	0.356 s	46	2	15
Vista SP1	psquickscan	60 MiB	$1\mathrm{GiB}$	0.073s	48	0	0
Vista SP1	psscan	$1\mathrm{GiB}$	$1\mathrm{GiB}$	$0.400 \mathrm{s}$	48	0	0
Vista SP2	psquickscan	76 MiB	$1\mathrm{GiB}$	0.236s	50	1	0
Vista SP2	psscan	$1\mathrm{GiB}$	$1\mathrm{GiB}$	$0.547 \mathrm{s}$	50	1	11
7 SP0	psquickscan	64 MiB	$2\mathrm{GiB}$	0.075s	43	4	0
7 SP0	psscan	$2\mathrm{GiB}$	$2\mathrm{GiB}$	0.712s	43	6	4
7 SP1	psquickscan	64 MiB	$2\mathrm{GiB}$	0.075s	50	5	0
7 SP1	psscan	$2\mathrm{GiB}$	$2\mathrm{GiB}$	0.691s	50	5	0
8	psquickscan	44 MiB	$4\mathrm{GiB}$	$0.054 \mathrm{s}$	36	3	0
8	psscan	$4\mathrm{GiB}$	$4\mathrm{GiB}$	1.433s	36	3	0
8.1	psquickscan	244 MiB	$8\mathrm{GiB}$	0.170s	45	0	0
8.1	psscan	8 GiB	$8\mathrm{GiB}$	2.977s	45	0	0

Table 5: A sample of psquickscan and psscan results among different OS versions

Plugin	Data Scanned	Avg. Time
psquickscan	$5.76\mathrm{GiB}$	5.797s
psscan	$192\mathrm{GiB}$	$3 \mathrm{m} 8.421 \mathrm{s}$
psscan (Rekall)	$192\mathrm{GiB}$	$6 \mathrm{m} 7.207 \mathrm{s}$
psscan (Volatility)	$192\mathrm{GiB}$	4m42.412s

Table 6: Comparison of scanning speed on a 192 GB Memory Image

RAM Size	Plugin	Scanned	Time	Transferred
$2\mathrm{GiB}$	psquickscan	$102\mathrm{MiB}$	$9.489 \mathrm{s}$	116.115 MiB
$2\mathrm{GiB}$	psscan	$2\mathrm{GiB}$	28.132s	$2.014\mathrm{GiB}$
4 GiB	psquickscan	$122\mathrm{MiB}$	$9.640 \mathrm{s}$	$177.367\mathrm{MiB}$
4 GiB	psscan	$4\mathrm{GiB}$	56.971s	$4.027\mathrm{GiB}$
8 GiB	psquickscan	$246\mathrm{MiB}$	15.360s	$299.648\mathrm{MiB}$
8 GiB	psscan	$8\mathrm{GiB}$	3m26.449s	$8.132\mathrm{GiB}$

Table 7: Bandwidth comparison using F-Response to scan a Windows target $\,$