

# Feed-in tariff Optimization

off-shore wind industry

TEAM ONE

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# BACKGROUND

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
This project focuses on offshore wind industry in Taiwan.

The government wants to attract developers and therefore provide a Feed-in Tariff (FiT), which is a price announced every year higher than the normal purchase price.





# Taiwan Electricity Industry



# PROBLEM & GOAL





## Problem

the Taiwan Power Company will typically lose money from buying clean energy from developers

## Goal

the goal is to allure foreign developers into the Taiwan market with the minimum loss for TPC by optimizing the FiT.

# Optimization Process



# Data

✓	01	Year
✓	02	Developers
✓	03	Average Electricity Fee
✓	04	FiT ( Feed-in tariff)
✓	05	development expenditure
✓	06	Announced capacity
✓	07	Annual Yield = auction MW * 24 * 365 * 0.45 (capacity factor)

# MODEL

Regression

Solver

Result



# Regression

Incremental Developer #

SUMMARY OUTPUT	
Regression Statistics	
Multiple R	0.988517942
R Square	0.977167722
Adjusted R Square	0.863006335
Standard Error	0.36120653
Observations	7



# Regression

Incremental Developer #


	Coefficients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value
Intercept	2.308871252	5.903273829	0.391117085	0.762652033
Previous Year FiT	-1.891036233	1.111065861	-1.702001924	0.338178715
Previous 2 Year FiT	0.807784184	0.40308622	2.003998509	0.294658942
FiT	1.004837164	0.756596296	1.328102145	0.410867446
Devex (NTD/kW)	-3.20484E-05	3.28386E-05	-0.975936829	0.507752441
Announced Auction kW (cumulated)	4.60922E-07	2.72824E-07	1.689446444	0.3402412

# Regression

Incremental Developer #

INCREMENTAL DEVELOPER #

$$\begin{aligned} &= \text{FiT} + \text{FiT last year} + \text{FiT 2 years before} \\ &+ \quad \quad \quad - \quad \quad \quad + \\ &+ \text{DEVEX} + \text{Remaining Develop Capacity} \\ &\quad \quad \quad - \quad \quad \quad + \end{aligned}$$




# Solver

Minimize TPC loss

TPC profit/loss

= (Optimize FiT - Average Electricity Price)

\* Annual Yield





Year	Incremental Developers	Previous Year FiT	Previous 2 Year FiT	FiT	Devex (NTD/kW)	Announced Auction kW (cumulated)	Average Electriciy Fee	Annual Yield = auction MW * 24 * 365 * 0.45 (capacity factor)	Optimized TPC profit/ Loss
2014				10.97063557	158,500				
2015				10.97063558	169200		2.8852		
2016	0.229082413	10.97063558	10.97063557	8.402682731	180100	15475000	2.8852		
2017	1.18558E-07	8.402682731	10.97063558	3.837064341	181600	14500000	2.8852		
2018	6.770917599	3.837064341	8.402682731	3.837064343	175000	14500000	2.5488	15741000000	-20278569021
2019	1.807316198	3.837064343	3.837064341	3.83706434	135700	9000000	2.5488		
2020	0.884322591	3.83706434	3.837064343	3.83706434	164500	9000000	2.6253		
2021	-3.99858E-09	3.83706434	3.83706434	2.6253	154100	9000000	2.6253		
2022	1.091401305	2.6253	3.83706434	2.6253	148400	6000000	2.6253	8586000000	0
									-20278569021



# Model result

	Original		Optimized	
Year	Developers in Market	FiT(NTD/KW)	Developers in Market	FiT(NTD/KW)
2014	-	5.6076	0	10.97063557
2015	3	7.1085	3	10.97063558
2016	5	7.1085	3.229082413	8.402682731
2017	8	7.4034	3.229082531	3.837064341
2018	10	7.1177	10.00000013	3.837064343
2019	11	6.2795	11.80731633	3.83706434
2020	12	5.8015	12.69163892	3.83706434
2021	13	5.3064	12.69163892	2.6253
2022	13	5.1356	13.78304022	2.6253

# Model result

Original Loss

-88.18 b

Optimized Loss

-20.28 b





# CONCLUSION

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## Future scope

- With High FiT from 2014-2016 is enough incentives for developers enter new markets
- It is alluring developer into the market without fulfilling promised FiT, harming government reputation.