

*Dissertation Chapter & Job Market Paper*  
Loyalty Signaling, Bureaucratic Compliance, and Variation of State Repression  
in Authoritarian Regimes

## Appendix I: Supplemental Empirical Evidence

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## Group A. Technical Details of Data Generation, Coding, and Analysis

### A1. Overview of Variables Included in Three Levels of Analysis

(Abbreviation: P: provincial-level analysis; C: city-level analysis; I: individual-level analysis.)

Variable Name	Rationale for Inclusion	Included in
<i>1. Leader's Personal Characteristics</i>		
Pre-1949 revolutionary background	Key explanatory variable of the study. I use whether an official served as a <i>Red Army combatant</i> or an <i>undercover agent</i> before 1949 to capture their level of trust. In later robustness checks, I also use alternative indicators of trust, such as (1) whether one had been arrested or (2) whether one belonged to an undesirable social class.	P, C, I
Dummy: ethnic minority	Ethnic status could impact an official's compliance to the Han-dominated CCP regime.	P, C, I
Age by 1957	Younger officials could have stronger career prospects and incentives.	P, C, I
Dummy: born locally	Local-born officials could have stronger knowledge & resources to carry out repression, but can be more reluctant to execute locally undesirable policies.	P, C, I
Dummy: higher education	Whether an official received any postsecondary education could impact their ideological attitudes.	P, C, I
Years of CCP membership	Seniority in the Party indicates higher status, greater security, and less need to signal loyalty through costly repression.	P, C, I
Political rank by 1957	One's existing political rank could correlate with one's incentive to engage in repression.	P, I
<i>2. Locality-level Covariates</i>		
Number of CCP members/1,000	According to Koss (2018), the number of rank-and-file Party members indicates local regime strength and could impact policy implementation outcomes.	P, C, I
Locality's distance to Beijing	According to Fearon and Laitin (2003), a locality's distance to the national capital is negatively correlated with the regime's territorial outreach.	P, C, I
Locality's distance to provincial seat	The rationale for inclusion is the same as above, included in the analysis of prefecture-level cities as a control.	C
Dummy: provincial seat	As administrative centers, provincial capitals usually had stronger state capacity.	C
Density of pre-1947 CCP enclaves	I measure the percentage of counties in a province that are officially categorized as an "old revolutionary base" ( <i>geming laoqu</i> ), where at least 50% of townships in each of those counties had been controlled by the CCP anytime between 1927 and 1947. This variable indicates the level of pre-existing penetration of CCP in a province.	P, I
Fraction of urban residents	Percentage of citizens in a province who were urban residents. A majority of prosecutions occurred in cities, so more urbanized provinces could prosecute a greater number of citizens.	P

Variable Name	Rationale for Inclusion	Included in
<i>3. Personal Covariates of Individual Rightists</i>		
<i>(Only included in the individual-level analysis.)</i>		
Dummy: male	The gender of denounced rightists may impact their punishment. Males were more likely to receive harsher penalties than females.	I
Age by 1957	Historical accounts show that younger rightists were more likely to receive harsher, physical punishment, such as re-education through labor or imprisonment.	I
Dummy: Family social background	A dummy variable shows whether an official's family belonged to a "reactionary" social class deemed hostile to the CCP regime, such as landlords, kulaks, officials from the old regime, or the bourgeoisie.	I
Allegation: oppose political system	A dummy indicating whether an individual was denounced as a "rightist" for opposing the one-party regime and the current political order.	I
Allegation: oppose central policy	A dummy indicating whether an individual was denounced as a "rightist" for opposing Mao's major policy agenda, such as the agricultural collectivization and the nationalization of industry.	I
Allegation: defy superior cadres	A dummy indicating whether an individual was denounced as a "rightist" for defying the leadership or directions of upper-level Party cadres.	I
Allegation: demand redress	A dummy indicating whether an individual was denounced as a "rightist" for demanding redress and compensation for their unfair treatment in previous repressive campaigns.	I

## A2. Data Generation Process and Coding Strategies for Provincial- and Prefecture-level Data

In the main text, I show the correlation between a locality's density of prosecuted rightists and its leader's revolutionary background. To supplement my analysis, in this section I explain the source and generation process of aggregate-level data at both provincial and prefecture-city levels.

### i. Indicators of Local Campaign Intensity and other Local Conditions:

- a. **Names and the total number of localities at provincial/prefecture level.** I use the *Map of the Administrative Evolution of the People's Republic of China* (中华人民共和国行政区划沿革地图集), an authoritative sourcebook published in 1999 which records the year-by-year changes in administrative divisions at all three levels (province, prefecture, and county) in China between 1949 and 1999. From the book, I identify the names of all 27 provinces (excluding Tibet and Taiwan) and 91 prefecture-level cities (excluding Shiqi City, which had been downgraded to a township before the campaign ended) at the time of the Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957.




Figure A2-1: Left: Front cover of the *Map of the Administrative Evolution of the People's Republic of China*. Right: an example page in the book, showing the administrative divisions of Liaoning Province in 1957.

- b. **Total number of rightists prosecuted during the ARC.** To search for the total number of rightists prosecuted by each provincial and prefectural authority, I primarily rely on the official gazetteers (地方志) published by each locality's Local History Office (史志办公室). A majority of those gazetteers are published between 1985 and 2000. Those gazetteers often included a section on local Party history, providing statistics on major Maoist campaigns (including the Anti-Rightist Campaign) within the respective localities. I manually extract the number of locally prosecuted rightists from the texts of each gazetteer and incorporate this information into the dataset. **Figure A2-2** shows an example of a paragraph from Wuxi City Gazetteer (无锡市志), where the total number of rightists denounced in 1957 is reported.

- **Potential Concerns of Data Authenticity.** One potential concern was that local officials could have exaggerated the number of rightists, driven by their desire to display adherence to the Party line. However, it should be noted that the issue of data fabrication is *less concerning* in the

context of the Anti-Rightist Campaign. In the mid-1980s, the Chinese authorities “rehabilitated” (平反) nearly all rightists who had been denounced during the ARC.<sup>1</sup> As part of this process, the authorities reviewed and recalculated the number of rightists to facilitate compensation for former rightists. The data from the local gazetteers, which I used in this study, was derived from this particular process. Since the local leadership in the 1980s was different from the officials responsible for the prosecutions in the 1950s, they had little incentive to fabricate or inflate the data. Thus, while the overall accuracy of data in 20th-century China is often subject to scrutiny, this dataset was less susceptible to systematic bias that would be linked to the attributes of officials and could impact the main findings of this research.




Figure A2-2. An example paragraph from the Wuxi City Gazetteer, which contains data on the number of rightists. The circled sentence states: “During the Anti-Rightist Struggle in 1957, 816 people had been wrongfully prosecuted as rightists in the entire city.”

- c. **Total number of residents in 1957.** I collect this data to calculate the fraction of total population who were denounced as rightists. Similarly, I obtain this data from provincial- and prefecture-level gazetteers (地方志) published by each locality. If I cannot find data about a certain locality from gazetteers, I then check *The Collection of Demographic Statistics of the Peoples Republic of China, 1949–1985* (中华人民共和国人口统计资料汇编1949–1985) to see if it contains the needed information.
- d. **Total number of CCP members in a locality by the end of 1956.** I primarily obtain the number of CCP members in a given locality from official gazetteers (地方志) or CCP local organizational history (地方组织史资料) published by the local government. I use the number of Party members surveyed in 1956 instead of 1957 for two reasons. First, since a large fraction of CCP members were purged from the Party during the ARC, the result would be affected by endogeneity issues if I used the 1957 data. Second, most provinces and prefecture-level cities held Party congresses in 1956, and many local authorities conducted exhaustive censuses of all Party members. Therefore, the 1956 data

was more accurate and reliable compared to other years' data. See **Figure A2-3** for an example.

年份	党员总数	接收新党员	女党员	党员占全市人口%	年份	党员总数	接收新党员	女党员	党员占全市人口%
1949	957	82	缺	0.26	1966~1970年无统计数字				
1950	1523	409	缺	0.43	1971	29980	5388	8537	5.19
1951	1943	68	269	0.45	1972	31260	1476	8875	5.35
1952	4365	2203	1543	0.98	1973	34464	2009	9612	5.80
1953	7864	1602	1679	1.54	1974	36821	887	10139	6.13
1954	10105	2718	3277	1.91	1975	39339	771	10569	6.43
1955	13833	3610	4714	2.56	1976	41861	1368	11204	6.66
1956	19919	6336	6987	3.77	1977	43749	1045	11771	6.77
1957	19164	285	6896	3.41	1978	46015	1241	12270	6.92
1958	17495	431	6264	4.14	1979	49319	1858	13269	6.57
1959	20048	1427	6814	4.34	1980	51251	1187	13883	6.70
1960	24645	2078	7657	3.89	1981	51391	1243	13815	6.58
1961	37258	168	9329	3.82	1982	53403	927	14590	6.88
1962	23094	34	7431	3.80	1983	156988	2375	24229	4.05
1963	22863	无	7374	3.74	1984	162936	3945	25300	4.17
1964	23221	1	7371	3.77	1985	172478	6609	27146	4.41
1965	22862	158	7370	3.69	—	—	—	—	—

注：(1) 表内数字以历年党员统计年报为准。1983年后含3县。  
(2) 党员每年总数与增加数不相符的原因主要是党员的调动、自然减少及领导关系变更。  
(3) 1983年后的各项统计数字含江阴、无锡、宜兴3县。

Figure A2-3. An example table from the Wuxi City Gazetteer, which presents the annual number of CCP members based in the city between 1949 and 1985. For each locality, I examine the two primary official local histories (Local Gazetteer (地方志) and Local CCP Organizational History (组织史资料)) to extract data on party members.

- e. **Density of pre-existing CCP enclaves in a province.** For provincial-level analysis, I include the percentage of counties in which *over 50 percent of their townships were part of a “revolutionary base” (革命根据地) controlled by the CCP at any point between 1927 and 1947*. In CCP discourse, such counties were designated as “Old Revolutionary Zones” (革命老区). Generally, the Party’s control and influence were stronger in these areas compared to new territories acquired by the CCP during the Chinese Civil War after 1947. I collect the number of ORZ counties and calculate their percentage in each province using the book *China’s Old Revolutionary Zones (中国革命老区)*, which documents the names and percentage of ORZs in each province.<sup>2</sup>
- f. **A locality’s distance to Beijing.** On the provincial level, I measure the distance from the provincial capital to Beijing. On the prefecture-city level, I calculate the distance from the city’s downtown to Beijing. I obtain both distances using Google Map’s “measure distance” function.
- g. **A prefecture city’s distance to the provincial capital (prefecture city-level analysis only).** Similarly, I measure this data using Google Map’s “measure distance” function.

## ii. Biographical Information of Local Officials



Figure A2-4. An example *Baidu Baike* entry showing the biography of Pan Fusheng 潘复生, former provincial Party secretary of Henan. I primarily extract data from *Baidu Baike* sources, supplemented by information from local gazetteers.




Figure A2-5. If a local official's information is unavailable on *Baidu Baike*, I search for their biographical information from local gazetteers. This screenshot shows a short biography of Wu Jiamo 伍嘉谟, the Party Secretary of Guiyang City during the ARC, from the Guiyang City Gazetteer.

- **Names of local leaders.** I obtain the names of all Party Secretaries who were in charge of each of 27 provinces and 91 prefecture-level cities from local gazetteers (地方志). Then, I use *Baidu Baike* (百度百科, <http://baike.baidu.com>), a widely used online encyclopedia in China, to find the personal biographies of local leaders. All contents related to Party officials in *Baidu Baike* have been proofread and reviewed by the Chinese authorities, so those biographies can be viewed as authoritative (see **Figure A2-4**). If no *Baike* entry contains the information of a certain official, I then rely on a variety of alternative sources, such as local annuals (年鉴), gazetteers (地方志), or other credible historical sources (see **Figure A2-5**).
- **Revolutionary history:** Based on careful reading of the biographies of local officials, I code their revolutionary records in the following manner:
  1. For provincial leaders in charge of the ARC in 1957, all of them ( $N=27$ ) joined the Chinese Communist Party before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. I code an official as an



“underground agent” if they had spent *more than one year* serving as a clandestine operative in territories controlled by the Kuomintang or Japan between 1927 and 1949; in contrast, I consider them to be a “Red Army combatant” if they had worked continuously as a battleground military officer without major disruption during the same period.

2. For prefecture city leaders ( $N=91$ ), I first decide whether they had served as undercover agents using the criteria outlined above. Then, among those officials who had continually served in the Communist military before 1949, I further categorize them into two groups. I code an official as a “Red Army-era veteran” if they joined the military before January 1, 1938; and a “post-1938 combatant” otherwise.


- **Personal biographical information:** Also drawn from the biographies of each local official, I manually obtain and code the following personal covariates:

- a. **Ethnic background:** “1” if an official belonged to any ethnic minority and “0” if they were ethnically Han Chinese.
- b. **Age by 1957:** calculated by subtracting their year of birth from 1957.
- c. **Local status:** for provincial leaders, “1” if the official was born in their currently assigned province; “0” if not. For prefecture-city leaders, “1” if the official was born in their currently assigned city, “2” if the official was born in the same province of their currently assigned city, and “0” if one was born in a different province. (*For the sake of convenience, in regression analysis I recode the local status of prefecture-city officials as a dummy variable.*)
- d. **Postsecondary education** “1” if an official attended any higher education institution (including higher military academies such as the Whompoa Military Academy) and “0” if otherwise.
- e. **Length of CCP membership by 1957:** calculated by subtracting an official’s first year of joining the CCP from year 1957.

- **Political Rank by 1957.** (*provincial-level analysis only*) The last CCP Congress before 1957, where a cohort of Central Committee members were elected, was the 8th Party Congress held in September 1956. From the CCP’s official website,<sup>3</sup> there is a complete list of all full and alternate members in the 8th Central Committee. By comparing this list with my data, I construct two dummy variables indicating whether one is a full CC member or an alternate member.

**Final Note from the Authors on Data Source:** My RAs and I have carefully documented the original source of each type of data in the dataset. If any questions or concerns arise, I will be happy to provide further details of the data source and coding methodologies for review and verification. I welcome helpful suggestions and critiques of my data collection methodology and will respond to any comments as much as I can. Please reach out to me at [qianj@uchicago.edu](mailto:qianj@uchicago.edu).

### A3. Data Source and Coding Strategies for Individual-level Data (ARCD)



(a) ARCD, print version



(b) ARCD, digital version

Figure A2-5: The Anti-Rightist Campaign Database in print (left) and CR-ROM (right) formats. While I primarily rely on the print form for data extraction, the CD-ROM version is used for cross-referencing and validation.

#### i. Source and Scope of Data

The individual-level data is drawn from the *Anti-Rightist Campaign Database*, compiled by Song Yongyi 宋永毅, a research librarian at California State University, Los Angeles, in collaboration with the now-defunct University Services Centre at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. This text database is a collection of the political verdicts (处理结论) on high-profile rightists from internal Party registries. The database is available in both print and digital formats (see **Figure A2-5**). During data collection, I primarily use the print version for coding, while using the digital version for cross-checking.

The individuals included in ARCD mainly belonged to one of the nine registries maintained by the CCP General Secretariat, which was later to be circulated internally within the Party between 1958 and 1961. Namely:

1. *Report from the Central Propaganda Department to the Central Committee on the Decisions of Famous Rightists in the Field of Literature, Art, Journalism, and Print Media* 中央宣传部关于著名文学、艺术、新闻、出版界右派的处理结论向中央的报告 (1 volume), compiled in late 1957;
2. *Decision from Beijing Municipal Party Committee on Handling the Rightists among the Faculty Members and Students in Higher Education Institutions* 北京市委关于对高等学校教师和学生中若干右派分子的处理办法 (1 volume), compiled in 1957;

3. *Collection of the Decisions on 108 Rightists from the Party Committees of Central and State Organs* 中央国家机关党委对108名右派分子的处理意见 (**6 volumes**), compiled in 1958;
4. *Collection of the Decisions on Eliminating the Rightists within the Party* 关于清除党内右派分子的决定汇编 (**6 volumes**), compiled in 1959;
5. *Collection of the Opinions from the Central United Front Department on the Handling of Rightists among Members of the Democratic Parties* 中央统战部关于对民主人士中的右派分子处理意见 (1 volume), compiled in December 1959;
6. *Collection of the Penalty Decisions on all Cadres above the County Secretary Level who were Expelled from the Party* 县委书记以上干部受到开除党籍处分的决定汇编 (1 volume), compiled in 1960;

A rightist were registered in one of the nine registries because they meet one or more of the following criteria as a “high-profile” individual:

1. They were a Party or government official above administrative rank 13 行政十三级 (equivalent to a prefecture-level Party Secretary);
2. They were a Party or government official who held key leadership position in a county-level Party committee or above;
3. They were a non-CCP politician from one of the nine subordinate “democratic parties” 民主党派 who sat in those parties’ central committees;
4. They were prominent non-CCP intellectuals, artists, writers, scholars, or student activists who purportedly “caused a harmful public influence” due to their critique of the Party or its policies.

## ii. Data Generation and Coding Process

I extract a total number of 542 *complete* political verdicts from the database. Based on a careful reading of each verdict, I manually construct a dataset including the personal backgrounds and alleged “wrongdoings” of all high-profile rightists. I collect the following indicators of a rightist’s personal and political backgrounds:

1. Gender and age of a rightist. Historical accounts show that male and younger individuals were more likely to receive harsher treatment, such as “re-education through labor”, after having been denounced as a rightist. I use mean imputation to replace the missing data on age.
2. Whether the rightist’s family background (*jiating chengfen* 家庭成分) belongs to a “reactionary” social class designated by the CCP, including:
  - Landlord (*dizhu* 地主)
  - Kulak (*funong* 富农)

- Politicians, bureaucrats, or military officers (*fandong guanliao/fandong junguan* 反动官僚/反动军官) who had served in the *ancien régime* before 1949, including (1) the Kuomintang, (2) Japanese occupation authorities, (3) the Sheng Shicai regime in Xinjiang, or (4) the Tibetan authority under Dalai Lama.
- Families with relatives who committed felony, also known as “bad elements of society” in official terminology (*huai fenzi* 坏分子)
- Bourgeoisie (*zichan jieji* 资产阶级) or comprador bourgeoisie (*zichan jieji* 买办阶级)

In Maoist terminology, those social categories are collectively known as “the five black types” (*hei wulei* 黑五类) and were the main targets in Mao’s various political campaigns in the 1950s and 1960s. A rightist’s social class is coded as “bad” if they belong to any of the five categories.

<b>陈达之</b>	Name of the denounced person
男，36岁，山东人，家庭出身地主，本人成分学生，高中程度，共产党员（1938年入党）现任监察部研究室副主任（12级）。 一、主要反动言行	Personal information of the rightist, including their gender, age, background, whether a Party member, and current job title.
<p>1、公开反对毛主席“关于农业合作化问题”的报告，诽谤“党总是一时反右来个左，一时反左又来个右”，并反对毛主席在“中国农村的社会主义高潮”一书序言中关于“现在的问题是右倾思想在许多方面作怪”的指示，宣称农业合作化“搞冒了”，诬蔑毛主席说合作化以后农民生活有了改善是“安民布告”，攻击粮食统购留粮过少；他还诬蔑周总理在“八大”的报告中关于第二个五年计划农民收入的估计数字“没有根据”；攻击刘少奇同志在报告中提到的惩戒政策是“纵容了干部的违法乱纪”；反对中央对广西饿死人事件的处理，认为有关地、县委书记应该杀头或判刑。</p> <p>2、诬蔑镇反运动是上级主观主义交下来的“杀人任务”，反对肃反运动采取群众路线的方针和规定5%的控制数，又为反革命分子胡风喊冤，认为报上公布的三批材料罪证不足。</p> <p>3、认为“人大常委会所通过的报告和决定，事先都经过党中央和国务院的讨论”，人大常委会“不起作用”，是“假民主”，“民主人士是摆样子的”。</p> <p>反对“再论无产阶级专政的历史经验”一文中指出匈牙利反革命事件的发生，是“国际帝国主义起了主要的决定性的作用”，而强调是拉科西、格罗集团的错误所致。</p> <p>4、陈是王翰反党集团的骨干，研究室反党小集团头目。大鸣大放期间和王翰、彭达等积极向党进攻，散布流言蜚语，进行分裂党的活动。攻击党组的领导，诬蔑监察工作的任务和作法向来不明确，“一年否定一年”。并造谣说“钱瑛和王翰挤走了刘景范，钱瑛现在又想挤走王翰”，王翰受“压抑”，工作“消沉”。</p> <p>5、纠合右派分子舒新启、刘永等通过“国家监察工作”积极散布王翰反党集团的反党主张。大鸣大放期间，坚持要在“国家监察工作”上登载右派言论，党组决定不登，他就提出严重抗议，骂党组“怕揭自己的丑”，又私自向国务院各工业部门的14个国家监察局的干部发信，煽动他们揭发监察工作中的“矛盾”，并派舒新启、刘永到几个国家监察局去“点火”。</p> <p>6、反右派斗争中，包庇右派分子刘永，虽经领导上多次批评教育，仍坚持为刘永辩护，甚至以辞去支部书记和退出研究室的领导小组来对党威胁，阻止对刘永的斗争。</p>	<p>Alleged wrongdoings of the individual that warrant their “rightist” label. We manually categorize each person’s allegations into one or more the following categories:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Criticize the regime or political system</li> <li>2. Criticize specific policies and rules;</li> <li>3. Defy one’s superior;</li> <li>4. Complain about one’s past grievance and seek redress;</li> <li>5. Have unresolved historical problems;</li> <li>6. Defend, shield or collude with other accused rightists.</li> </ol>
<p>二、斗争中的态度： 承认错误，表示愿意悔改。</p> <p>三、处理意见： 撤销原有职务，留用察看。 开除党籍。</p>	Type of punishment designated to the person

Figure A2-6: An example verdict of a denounced rightist named Chen Dazhi extracted from ARCD. The document include the individual’s name, gender, political status, social class, job title and rank, alleged “wrongdoings,” and assigned punishment.

3. Whether an individual was accused of one or more of the following six “wrongdoings,” coded as six indicator variables. According to the *Guidance on the Criteria of Identifying Anti-Rightist Elements* (中共中央关于划分右派分子标准的通知), a Central Committee rule published in 1957, the six allegations were used as standards to determine who should be denounced as a rightist:
- Attacking the regime or questioning the legitimacy of the single-Party political system;
  - Opposing, or questioning the merit of, key policies made by Chairman Mao or the Party, such as the agricultural collectivization;
  - Defying or disobeying the instructions or decisions of one’s supervisor, an upper-level cadre, or upper-level Party committees;
  - Criticizing the previous coercive campaigns (such as the *Sufan* 肃反 movement) launched by the regime, demanding remedy or compensation of their grievance;

*Outcome Variable: Type of Punishment.* To construct the dependent variable, I first code a rightist’s specific type of punishment. According to *Principles of Disciplining the Rightists in State Apparatus, Democratic Parties, and Higher Institutions* (关于在国家薪给人员、民主党派、高等学校中的右派分子处理原则), a Central Committee decree published in 1957, Party cadres and full-time workers were subject to seven categories of penalties. Students and part-time trainees also faced seven types of penalties, which were slightly different in substance. For *Party cadres* and *full-time employees*, the category of penalties are:

- Oral warning, but exemption from any penalty (免于处分) (coded as “1”);
- Demotion, relegation to a lower rank, and reduction of wage (降职降级降薪) (coded as “2”);
- Removal from all current positions and reassignment to a basic-level job (撤销一切职务, 另行分配较低工作) (coded as “3”);
- Removal from all current positions and being placed in a probationary period (撤销一切职务, 留用查看) (coded as “4”);
- Labor under supervision (监督劳动) (coded as “5”);
- Re-education through labor (劳动教养) (coded as “6”);
- Criminal conviction (刑事处罚) (coded as “7”);

For rightists who were current students or trainees, they were also subject to seven types of slightly different penalties. From least to most severe, those penalties were:

- Oral warning, but exemption from any penalty (免于处分) (coded as “11”);
- Probation in school, while keeping student status (保留学籍, 留校察看) (coded as “12”);
- Probation with additional labor duties in school, while keeping student status (保留学籍, 劳动察看) (coded as “13”);

4. Expulsion from school (开除学籍) (coded as “14”);
5. Expulsion from school, with supervised labor (开除学籍, 监督劳动) (coded as “15”);
6. Expulsion from school, with labor through education (劳动教养) (coded as “16”);
7. Criminal conviction (刑事处罚) (coded as “17”);

I consider three categories – “supervised labor”, “labor through education”, and “criminal convictions” as *coercive penalties*, and all others as *non-coercive penalties*. Rightists who received the three punishments would definitely lose their personal freedom during the entire period of prosecution. Other types of penalties, while still costly to the individual who received them, would not constrain a person’s freedom. As shown in the main text, the dependent variable in the logistic regression is a dummy variable based on this coercive/non-coercive dichotomy.

Most verdicts included in Song Yongyi’s database specify the type of punishment on each denounced rightist. If a rightist’s penalty is not clearly stated in their verdict, I conduct a comprehensive search from other available sources, such as one’s biography, memoirs, obituaries, etc. to fill in the missing value. I will be happy to provide a scanned version of my original data source if requested.

#### A4. Supplemental Notes on China’s Administrative Units in 1957




Figure A3: Central and Prefecture-level Cities in the Administrative Hierarchy of China, 1957

**i. Scope of Data.** In my provincial-level analysis, I analyze the variation of anti-rightist prosecutions among China’s 27 provincial-level units (including 21 provinces, 3 autonomous regions, and 3 central municipalities). In the analysis of prefecture-level cities, my sample includes 91 out of 92 prefecture-level cities on the sub-provincial level (excluding Shiqi City 石岐市, which was revoked and annexed into several nearby

prefectures before the end of the campaign, so its data was unavailable.)


**ii. Note on the status of Tibet in 1957.** I do not include Tibet in the provincial-level analysis. Between 1951 and 1959, under an agreement between the Central Government and the 14th Dalai Lama, Tibet remained a part of the PRC but continued to be governed by the Dalai Lama's Kashag regime as an autonomous entity. As such, Tibet did not have a Party-state political structure comparable to the rest of the PRC in 1957, and the Anti-Rightist Campaign was not implemented on a societal level in Tibet. A small-scale purge took place among the Party cadres within the CCP Liaison Office 中共西藏工委 in Lhasa, but nothing more than that. In the individual-level dataset, only four "rightists" were from Tibet, all of whom were cadres in the CCP Liaison Office.

**iii. The Rationale for Using Prefecture-level Cities in Analysis:**

- In the 1950s, provinces in China were commonly divided into more urban prefecture-level cities (*shengxiashi* 省辖市) and more rural districts (*zhuanqu/diqu* 专区/地区). Unlike prefecture-level cities which had complete government structure, districts were informal subdivisions of a province led by a commissioner (*xingshu zhuan yuan* 行署专员) from the provincial government to oversee a certain number of counties. Those districts had no constitutional status and lacked formal government structures such as a People's Congress, a specialized bureaucracy, or a court. Formally, heads of those districts were dispatched representatives of the provincial government, who had limited agency or discretionary power over local governance.
- I limit the scope to 92 prefecture-level cities for the following reasons. First, those cities were predominantly urban. Since the ARC primarily targeted urban residents (*chengzhen renkou* 城镇人口), I can exclude the confounding effect of a locality's urbanization rate on repression intensity. Second, under a *nomenklatura* rule known as "appointing two-levels down" (*xiaguan liangji* 下管两级), prefecture-city Party chiefs were appointed directly by the Center, and thus were held accountable to Beijing rather than their direct Party bosses in the respective province. Lastly, as mentioned in the paper, cities were endowed with a range of discretionary powers, such as making local ordinances, determining specific policies and regulations, and making economic and fiscal plans. Thus, variation of ARC campaign intensity among prefecture-level cities can reflect the agency and individual choice of city Party chiefs.

## Group B. Summary Statistics Tables and Figures

### B1. Frequency Map: Number of Denounced Rightist per 10,000 Citizens, by Province



Note: The unit of measurement is the number of rightists per 10,000 residents. Source of data: Provincial Gazetteers (*shengzhi* 省志) published by the local history office of each province. Blank areas: regions where the ARC was not implemented (Tibet and Taiwan).



## B2. Summary Statistics, 27 Provinces

### B2. Summary Statistics, Provincial-Level Data

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Key dependent variable:</i>					
Num. of rightists per 1,000	27	0.917	0.445	0.319	2.236
<i>Provincial leader's personal characteristics:</i>					
Red Army combatant	27	0.593	0.501	0	1
Undercover cadre	27	0.407	0.501	0	1
Ethnic minority	27	0.111	0.320	0	1
Age by 1957	27	48.704	4.802	40	57
Years in CCP by 1957	27	28.074	4.047	21	36
Born locally	27	0.259	0.447	0	1
Postsecondary education	27	0.333	0.480	0	1
Political rank: full CC member	27	0.370	0.492	0	1
Political rank: alternate CC member	27	0.296	0.465	0	1
<i>Geopolitical conditions of provinces:</i>					
Num. of CCP members per 1,000	27	18.575	6.719	10.707	36.324
Distance from provincial capital to Beijing (1,000km)	27	1.075	0.626	0.000	2.411
Pre-1947 CCP enclave density	27	0.355	0.280	0.000	0.829
Fraction of provincial population as urban	27	0.219	0.191	0.071	0.945

### B3. Summary Statistics, 91 Prefecture-level Cities

#### B3. Summary Statistics, Prefecture-City Level

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Key dependent variable:</i>					
Num. of rightists per 1,000	91	2.361	1.989	0.177	12.423
<i>Provincial leader's personal characteristics:</i>					
Red Army combatant	91	0.099	0.300	0	1
Undercover	91	0.462	0.501	0	1
Post-1938 combatants	91	0.440	0.499	0	1
Age	91	41.055	4.433	32	56
Ethnic Minority	91	0.055	0.229	0	1
Locally born	91	0.330	0.473	0	1
Postsecondary education	91	0.176	0.383	0	1
Years in CCP by 1957	91	20.648	3.796	16	32
<i>Geopolitical conditions of provinces:</i>					
Num. of CCP members per 1,000	91	28.970	24.733	3.837	201.371
Distance from city to provincial capital (1,000km)	91	0.144	0.132	0	0.487
Distance from city to Beijing (1,000km)	91	1.045	0.583	0.140	2.411
Provincial capital dummy	91	0.264	0.443	0	1

#### B4. Summary Statistics, Individual Data (Estimating Sample)

Summary statistics of 451 individuals comprising (1) local rightists prosecuted by provincial authorities and (2) central government bureaucrats prosecuted by their affiliated ministries or departments. Individuals in the two categories are included in my quantitative analysis.

B4. Individual-level Summary Statistics, Estimating Sample

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Type of Penalty:</i>					
Coercive penalty	441	0.190	0.393	0	1
Non-coercive penalty	441	0.810	0.393	0	1
<i>Personal Characteristics</i>					
Male	451	0.953	0.211	0	1
Age	451	41.264	9.815	14	71
Belonging to reactionary classes	447	0.503	0.501	0	1
<i>Denounced by:</i>					
Provincial authorities	451	0.698	0.459	0	1
Central ministries	451	0.302	0.459	0	1
<i>Type of Alleged Wrongdoings:</i>					
Oppose political system	451	0.186	0.390	0	1
Oppose central policy	451	0.794	0.405	0	1
Defy superior cadres	451	0.936	0.246	0	1
Demand redress of past campaigns	451	0.490	0.500	0	1

## B5. Summary Statistics, Individual Data (Full Sample)

Includes *all rightists* in the original Anti-Rightist Campaign Database, including (1) local rightists prosecuted by their respective provincial authorities; (2) central government bureaucrats prosecuted by their affiliated ministries or departments; *and* (3) prominent intellectuals, artists, and social elites not affiliated with Party or government authorities. Only the first two categories are used in the analysis.

B5. Individual-level Summary Statistics, Full Sample

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Type of Penalty:</i>					
Coercive penalty	527	0.194	0.395	0	1
Non-coercive penalty	527	0.806	0.395	0	1
<i>Personal Characteristics:</i>					
Male	542	0.948	0.222	0	1
Age	523	41.922	10.479	14	76
Belonging to reactionary classes	542	0.509	0.500	0	1
<i>Denounced by:</i>					
Provincial authorities	542	0.579	0.494	0	1
Central ministries	542	0.266	0.442	0	1
Non-government institutions	542	0.155	0.362	0	1
<i>Type of Alleged Wrongdoings:</i>					
Oppose political system	542	0.192	0.394	0	1
Oppose central policy	542	0.786	0.411	0	1
Defy superior cadres	542	0.921	0.271	0	1
Demand redress of past campaigns	542	0.506	0.500	0	1

## B6. Difference of Means, Provinces led by Combatant & Undercover Officials

This table corresponds to Figure 1 (left) and bar charts 11–14 of Figure 3 of the main text.

B6. Difference of Means Tests: 27 Provinces

Variables	Difference of Means		
	Means		<i>p-value</i>
	Combatant	Undercover	
<i>Outcome Variable:</i>			
Number of rightists/1,000 citizens	0.737	1.180	0.022**
<i>Leadership Personal Characteristics:</i>			
Fraction of ethnic minority	0.188	0.000	0.083*
Age by 1957	49.625	47.364	0.266
Born locally	0.250	0.273	0.901
Postsecondary education	0.250	0.273	0.901
Years of CCP membership by 1957	28.880	26.910	0.279
Political Rank:			
Fraction of CC full member	0.375	0.364	0.955
Fraction of CC alternate member	0.375	0.182	0.280
Fraction of CC non-Member	0.250	0.455	0.303
<i>Provincial-level Covariates:</i>			
CCP member density per 1,000	17.788	19.720	0.525
Provincial capital's distance to Beijing	1109.21	1025.88	0.747
Fraction of counties with preexisting CCP enclaves	0.261	0.492	0.039**
Fraction of citizens as urban residents	0.201	0.245	0.622
<i>N</i>	16	11	
Excluding Taiwan (not controlled by the PRC) and Tibet (where ARC was not implemented outside of the Party committee). All FPSs were male so gender not included. <i>p-value</i> : * 0.1; ** 0.05; *** 0.01.			

## B7. Difference of Means, Prefecture-level Cities led by Combatants and Undercover Agents

This table corresponds to Figure 2 (left) of the main text.

B7. Difference of Means Tests: 91 Prefecture-level Cities			
Variables	Character Traits		
	Means		<i>p-value</i>
	Combatant	Undercover	
<i>Outcome Variable:</i>			
Number of rightists/1,000 citizens	2.023	2.721	0.096*
<i>Leadership Personal Characteristics:</i>			
Fraction of ethnic minority	0.064	0.114	0.703
Age by 1957	40.000	42.182	0.017**
Born locally	0.340	0.318	0.824
Postsecondary education	0.106	0.250	0.077*
Years of CCP membership by 1957	20.170	21.159	0.213
<i>Provincial-level Covariates:</i>			
CCP member density per 1,000	30.139	27.772	0.638
City's distance to Beijing	1088.766	998.955	0.466
City's distance to provincial seat	175.915	109.409	0.015**
Provincial seat dummy	0.170	0.364	0.038**
<i>N</i>	47	44	
Excluding Shiqi City, which was relegated to a township before the end of ARC. All FPSs were male so gender is not included. <i>p-value</i> : * 0.1; ** 0.05; *** 0.01.			

## B8. Difference of Means, Red Army and Undercover Cadres among *both* Provincial and Central Ministry Party Chiefs

Corresponding to bar charts 1–10 in the Figure 3 of the main text.

B8. Difference of Means Tests: 78 Provincial and Ministry Chiefs			
Variables	Character Traits		
	Means		<i>p-value</i>
	Combatant	Undercover	
<i>Alternative Indicators of Trust:</i>			
“Bad” social class	0.297	0.512	0.053*
Arrested before	0.162	0.439	0.006***
<i>Other Personal Character Traits:</i>			
Ethnic minority	0.108	0.049	0.342
Age by 1957	50.703	49.415	0.336
Home distance to Shanghai	879.593	909.676	0.712
Years of CCP membership by 1957	29.513	27.610	0.031**
Political Rank			
Fraction of CC full member	0.432	0.317	0.300
Fraction of CC alternate member	0.189	0.171	0.835
Fraction of CC non-Member	0.378	0.512	0.240
Postsecondary education	0.216	0.610	0.0002***
Length of current appointment	4.353	4.047	0.581
<i>N</i>	37	41	
All Party chiefs were male, so gender is not included. Significance level: * 0.1; ** 0.05; *** 0.01.			

## Group C. Validation Tests of Certain Variable Selection

### C1. Exogeneity of Local Leaders in Relation to Assigned Locality

One potential concern for my empirical results is the selection effect. That is, the conditions of the province that an official is assigned to may be correlated with certain personal backgrounds or credentials. To mitigate this concern, I calculate the correlation coefficients between one's personal variables and the local characteristics of one's assigned province. Table C1-1 presents the correlation matrix for 27 provinces and their leaders; Table C1-2 presents the pattern for 91 prefecture-level cities.

C1-1. Correlation Matrix: Provinces & Provincial Leadership

<i>Provincial FPS variables</i>	<i>Provincial-level Variables</i>				
	Population	CCP Member per 1,000	Distance to Beijing	CCP Enclave Density	Urban Fraction
Undercover	0.077	0.144	-0.0667	0.413	0.113
Ethnic Minority	-0.156	-0.178	-0.024	0.0076	-0.100
Age by 1957	0.0218	0.388	-0.456	0.388	0.489
Postsecondary	-0.078	0.163	-0.115	-0.090	-0.001
Locally Born	0.0161	-0.334	0.0412	0.240	-0.290
Years in CCP	-0.067	0.394	-0.390	-0.335	0.603
CC Full Member	0.196	0.365	-0.146	-0.291	0.233
CC Alt. Member	-0.025	-0.231	-0.052	-0.011	0.084

**Table C1-1** addresses the potential concern that provincial officials with specific personal backgrounds might be more likely to be assigned to localities with particular conditions. Nearly all pairwise correlation coefficients have absolute values of less than 0.5, implying no evidence for a correlation between a local leader's personal background and the conditions of their assigned locality. Notably, undercover agents were *not* disproportionately assigned to provinces with higher or lower levels of pre-existing CCP control, density of CCP members, or urbanization rates.




C1-2. Correlation Matrix: Prefecture-level Cities &amp; City Leadership

<i>City FPS Variables</i>	<i>City-level Variables</i>				
	Population	CCP Member per 1,000	Distance to Beijing	Distance to Provincial Capital	Provincial Capital Dummy
Undercover	0.232	-0.012	-0.137	-0.249	0.246
Post-1938 Cadre	-0.368	0.047	0.155	0.295	-0.329
Ethnic Minority	-0.156	-0.122	0.039	0.097	-0.128
Age by 1957	0.392	0.046	-0.093	-0.125	0.168
Postsecondary	0.104	0.087	-0.056	-0.044	-0.014
Locally Born	-0.088	-0.144	-0.197	-0.042	-0.048
Years in CCP	0.506	-0.003	-0.079	-0.106	0.267


**Table C1-2** examines the correlation between prefecture city leaders and the socioeconomic conditions of their assigned cities. Similarly, the table shows no evidence that one's personal background could impact one's likelihood to be appointed to a certain type of locality. Overall, there is no significant concern regarding the endogeneity of local leaders in relation to their assigned locality.

## C2. Examining the Temporal Pattern of Local Leadership Appointment

Another potential concern that could affect the results is the possibility that Mao strategically placed his loyalists in local leadership positions *shortly before* the ARC to better accomplish his objectives. To address this concern, I provide two bar graphs illustrating the temporal distribution of local officials' *starting years* in their designated localities. For all incumbent leaders in 1957, I define their "starting year" as the *first year* they began working in their current locality. The first graph displays the distribution of provincial Party chiefs ( $N=27$ ), while the second graph presents the distribution of prefecture-city Party chiefs ( $N=91$ ).



C2-1. Distribution of Assignment Years for Provincial Leaders



D2-2. Distribution of Assignment Years for Prefecture City Leaders

The two bar charts can hopefully mitigate the concern that Mao strategically appointed his loyal subordinates to localities shortly before the ARC to facilitate the prosecution of rightists. On the provincial level (**Figure C2-1**), more than one-third of officials ( $n = 12$ ) were assigned to work in their current province around the founding of the People's Republic in 1949. A majority of officials had started working in their assigned province before 1955, two years away from the ARC. Only two officials were recently dispatched to their current province in 1956 and 1957 respectively.

At the prefecture city level (as shown in **Figure C2-2**), the assignment times of City Party Secretaries were relatively evenly distributed between 1949 and 1957. There was no sharp increase in the number of officials who were assigned to their current positions in 1956 and 1957, which supports my argument that Mao did not strategically maneuver his trusted officials to local leadership positions in order to achieve his campaign objectives before the Anti-Rightist Campaign.

### C3. Validity of Combatant-Undercover Dichotomy as an Indicator of Political Trust

In the main text, I argue that former Red Army combatants were more trusted by Mao and enjoyed greater job security, while former undercover agents faced greater suspicion and a more tumultuous career path. The following two tables provide additional evidence that compared to their Red Army counterparts, former undercover cadres face greater disadvantages and hurdles in their post-1949 political careers. I collect the official biographies of all Chinese officials who had served in either of the two main provincial leadership positions (First Party Secretary or Governor) between 1950–1966. **C3-1** provides a difference of means *t* test to demonstrate the two groups’ differences in personal backgrounds, revolutionary credentials, and career paths. **C3-2** performs a logistic regression to illustrate the effect of their revolutionary backgrounds on (1) their chance of getting promoted to a higher rank;<sup>4</sup> (2) their chance of death by Red Guard violence during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76).

C3-1. Difference of Means Tests: All Provincial Leaders between 1950–66

Variables	Difference of Means		
	Means		<i>p-value</i>
Cadre Characteristics	Combatant	Undercover	
<i>Personal Characteristics</i>			
Age by 1949	41.600	39.937	0.137
Ethnic Minority	0.040	0.048	0.845
Postsecondary Education	0.180	0.469	0.0008***
Length of Party Membership by 1949	20.880	17.111	0.000***
<i>Pre-existing Political Rank by 1949:</i>			
Percentage of Non-CC Members	0.740	0.921	0.014**
Percentage of CC Alternate Members	0.120	0.031	0.091*
Percentage of CC Full Members	0.120	0.047	0.182
<i>Type of Job Assignment:</i>			
Only served as FPS	0.480	0.317	0.082*
Only served as Governor	0.220	0.508	0.001**
Served both roles	0.300	0.174	0.126
<i>Political Fate, 1949–1976:</i>			
Promotion in Party Rank	0.600	0.317	0.003**
Died of torture in Cultural Revolution	0.080	0.238	0.019**
<i>N</i>	50	64	
Note: Exclude the four governors (Deng Baoshan 邓宝珊, Chen Qian 程潜, Burhan Shehidi 包尔汉, and Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme 阿沛阿旺晋美) who were not CCP members. They were former officials of Kuomintang, Xinjiang, or Tibetan governments who defected to the CCP during the Chinese Civil War (1945-49) and the Battle of Chamdo (1950-51). As a return, they were appointed as the figurehead governors in their home provinces but wielded no real power.			

Table C3-2. Political Fates of Provincial Officials

	<i>Dependent Variable: Fates of Provincial-level Officials</i>			
	Promoted in the Rank		Killed in Cultural Revolution	
	(1) No Control	(2) Personal Controls	(3) No Control	(4) Personal Controls
<i>Cadre Background Dummy:</i>				
Undercover	-1.122*** (0.393)	-0.924* (0.514)	1.259** (0.599)	1.629** (0.658)
<i>Personal Characteristics:</i>				
Ethnic minority		21.006 (2,278.907)		-16.054 (1,625.549)
College or above		0.387 (0.572)		-0.207 (0.593)
Age by 1949		0.007 (0.062)		-0.023 (0.069)
Years of CCP membership by 1949		0.210*** (0.079)		0.128 (0.081)
<i>Preexisting Political Rank by 1949:</i>				
Full CC member		-2.225** (0.967)		-0.757 (1.231)
Alternate CC member		17.688 (1,918.538)		-0.417 (1.181)
Constant	0.405 (0.289)	-4.212** (2.008)	-2.442*** (0.521)	-3.995* (2.334)
Observations	114	114	114	114
Log Likelihood	-74.153	-54.813	-48.787	-46.013
Akaike Inf. Crit.	152.305	125.626	101.574	108.026

Note: See the note in C3-1.

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Those results credibly show that when an official's personal backgrounds (age, ethnicity, etc.), political seniority (length of Party membership), and pre-1949 political standing are controlled for, having served as an undercover agent led to a higher chance of promotion after 1949 and a lower risk of death by Red Guard violence during the Cultural Revolution.

## Group D. Regression Tables for Provincial- and Prefecture City-level Analysis

### D1. Provincial-level OLS Estimates, Full Table

Corresponding to Figure 1 (right) of the main text.

C1. Provincial-level OLS Regressions, Full Models

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Num. of rightists per 1,000			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Type: undercover	0.444*** (0.154)	0.509*** (0.155)	0.397** (0.150)	0.384** (0.177)
<i>Personal covariates:</i>				
Age by 1957		0.014 (0.032)		0.012 (0.032)
Ethnic minority		−0.165 (0.296)		−0.122 (0.272)
Born locally		−0.194 (0.205)		−0.188 (0.196)
Postsecondary education		−0.260 (0.152)		−0.221 (0.139)
Years in CCP		0.038 (0.039)		−0.005 (0.040)
Rank: CC full member		−0.121 (0.245)		−0.001 (0.235)
Rank: CC alt. member		−0.139 (0.210)		−0.215 (0.197)
<i>Local covariates:</i>				
CCP member per 1,000			−0.006 (0.013)	−0.018 (0.015)
Distance to Beijing (1,000km)			−0.016 (0.143)	−0.094 (0.166)
Pre-1947 CCP enclave density			−0.018 (0.303)	−0.003 (0.327)
Percentage urban residents			1.399*** (0.404)	1.306** (0.525)
Constant	0.737*** (0.098)	−0.807 (0.932)	0.582 (0.414)	0.630 (1.263)
Observations	27	27	27	27
R <sup>2</sup>	0.249	0.560	0.583	0.719
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.218	0.364	0.484	0.478
Residual Std. Error	0.394	0.355	0.320	0.322
F Statistic	8.268***	2.863**	5.872***	2.985**

*Note:* Exclude Tibet and Taiwan.

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## D2: Alternative Model: ANCOVA Analysis for Provincial-level Data

Due to the small number of observations ( $N = 27$ ) in the provincial-level analysis, the normality assumption of the OLS regression may be violated. As such, I employ the Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) method to check the robustness of the result, shown below.

D2. Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) Results: 27 Provinces

	<i>Dependent Variable: Num. of Rightists per 1,000</i>				
	Df.	Sum Square	Mean Square	F-value	Pr(>F)
<i>Treatment Group</i>					
(Baseline: Combatant-ruled provinces)					
Undercover-ruled provinces	1	1.282	1.282	12.381	0.003***
<i>Covariates of FPS Personal Characteristics</i>					
Ethnic minority	1	0.252	0.252	2.434	0.141
Age by 1957	1	0.547	0.547	5.286	0.037*
Locally born	1	0.207	0.207	1.997	0.179
Postsecondary education	1	0.437	0.437	4.216	0.059
Length of Party membership by 1957	1	0.108	0.108	1.042	0.325
<i>Political Rank</i>					
CC full member	1	0.001	0.001	0.010	0.923
CC alternate member	1	0.055	0.055	0.530	0.479
<i>Covariates of Provincial Characteristics</i>					
Num. of CCP members per 1,000	1	0.111	0.111	1.067	0.319
Fraction of counties with preexisting CCP enclaves	1	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.993
Dist. from provincial capital to Beijing	1	0.039	0.039	0.380	0.547
Percentage of population as urban	1	0.671	0.671	6.474	0.023**
Residual	14	1.450	0.104		
Note: Excluding Taiwan and Tibet. All FPSs were male so gender not included. $p$ -value: * 0.1; ** 0.05; *** 0.01.					

### D3. Prefecture City-level OLS Regression Estimates, Full Table

Corresponding to Figure 2 (right) of the main text.

#### D3. Prefecture-level OLS Regressions, Full Models

	<i>Dependent Variable: Number of Rightists per 1,000</i>					
	Baseline: All combatants			Baseline: Red Army officers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Type: undercover	0.865*** (0.294)	1.048** (0.387)	1.139** (0.483)	1.562* (0.831)	2.764*** (0.984)	1.830*** (0.405)
Type: post-1938 combatants				0.853 (0.982)	2.314 (1.423)	0.932 (0.990)
<i>Personal covariates:</i>						
Age by 1957		−0.099 (0.071)	−0.106 (0.074)		−0.091 (0.075)	−0.102 (0.075)
Ethnic minority		1.487 (1.680)	−0.251 (0.381)		1.046 (1.155)	−0.312 (0.356)
Locally born		−0.059 (0.426)	0.128 (0.370)		−0.061 (0.470)	0.127 (0.391)
Postsecondary education		−0.304 (0.505)	−0.719 (0.470)		−0.292 (0.493)	−0.693 (0.470)
Years in CCP		0.114* (0.055)	0.090* (0.045)		0.235*** (0.076)	0.140** (0.056)
<i>Local state capacity:</i>						
CCP members per 1,000			0.050*** (0.009)			0.047*** (0.009)
Distance to provincial seat (1,000km)			2.414 (2.164)			2.527 (2.139)
Distance to Beijing (1,000km)			−2.096* (1.137)			−2.079 (1.214)
Provincial seat			0.396 (0.999)			0.424 (1.016)
Provincial FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province Clustered s.e.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	91	91	91	91	91	91
R <sup>2</sup>	0.356	0.398	0.544	0.367	0.433	0.549
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.122	0.112	0.280	0.124	0.150	0.275
Residual Std. Error	1.863	1.874	1.688	1.861	1.834	1.693

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01



#### **D4: Robustness Checks for Prefecture City-level Analysis**

I perform two strands of robustness checks on the prefecture city analysis (N=91), shown **Table D2** on the next page. In particular, these robustness tests intend to achieve the following objectives:

1. In **Models 1** and **2**, I remove all the cities that had prosecuted a disproportionately large number of citizens as “rightists”, that is, more than 7 rightists per 1,000 citizens. The purpose was to rule out the possibility that the observed correlation was primarily caused by those outliers.
2. In **Models 3** and **4**, I add three central-administered cities – Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin – to the sample and perform the same regression analysis. I hope to examine whether the observed pattern is unique to prefecture-level cities or all major cities (centrally-administered cities and prefecture-level cities) in China.
  - Note: Since centrally-administered cities were provincial-level units in their own right, their distance to the provincial capital was coded as 0, and the value of *provincial seat* dummy was coded as 1 by definition.

As can be seen from the following table, the main results remain robust regardless of how the scope of data is changed. Controlling for other personal variables of local leaders and local state capacity, one’s undercover background consistently displays a positive correlation with the frequency of rightists prosecuted in a city. The robustness test further reinforces my main theoretical framework.

#### D4. Robustness Checks, City-level Analysis

<i>Dependent variable: Num. of Rightists per 1,000</i>				
	Remove Outliers		Add 3 Central Municipalities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Type: Undercover	0.826** (0.399)	1.062** (0.503)	1.139** (0.481)	1.830*** (0.404)
Type: post-1938 combatants		0.321 (0.769)		0.932 (0.986)
<i>Personal covariates:</i>				
Age by 1957	−0.015 (0.046)	−0.013 (0.048)	−0.106 (0.073)	−0.102 (0.074)
Ethnic minority	−0.266 (0.324)	−0.279 (0.323)	−0.251 (0.379)	−0.312 (0.354)
Locally born	0.227 (0.297)	0.223 (0.300)	0.128 (0.368)	0.127 (0.390)
Postsecondary education	−0.467 (0.420)	−0.458 (0.424)	−0.719 (0.468)	−0.693 (0.468)
Years in CCP	0.062 (0.040)	0.078 (0.055)	0.090* (0.045)	0.140** (0.056)
<i>Local state capacity:</i>				
CCP members per 1,000	0.037*** (0.011)	0.036*** (0.011)	0.050*** (0.009)	0.047*** (0.009)
Distance to provincial seat	1.242 (1.943)	1.275 (1.937)	2.414 (2.154)	2.527 (2.129)
Distance to Beijing	−1.255 (1.029)	−1.258 (1.051)	−2.096* (1.132)	−2.079* (1.209)
Provincial seat	−0.316 (0.491)	−0.301 (0.509)	0.396 (0.994)	0.424 (1.012)
Provincial FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province Clustered s.e.	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	88	88	94	94
R <sup>2</sup>	0.526	0.527	0.547	0.551
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.236	0.224	0.260	0.255
Residual Std. Error	1.086 (df = 54)	1.095 (df = 53)	1.688 (df = 57)	1.693 (df = 56)

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## Group E. Regression Tables for Individual-level Analysis

### E1. Individual-level OLS Regression Estimates, Full Table

Corresponding to Table 1 of the main text.

E1. Individual-level OLS Regression Estimates, Baseline Results

	<i>Dependent Variable: Dummy on Coercive Penalty</i>						
	Provincial Leaders Only				Provincial & Ministry Leaders		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Undercover	0.147** (0.063)	0.186*** (0.059)	0.207*** (0.072)	0.142** (0.065)	0.184*** (0.043)	0.175*** (0.040)	0.107*** (0.037)
Affiliation type: ministry					0.068 (0.042)	0.129*** (0.041)	0.009 (0.039)
<i>Leader Background:</i>							
Age by 1957		0.005 (0.010)	0.001 (0.015)	0.014 (0.016)		−0.012** (0.005)	−0.002 (0.006)
Ethnic minority		−0.059 (0.074)	−0.069 (0.081)	−0.051 (0.096)		−0.109** (0.046)	−0.052 (0.062)
Postsecondary education		−0.038 (0.056)	−0.042 (0.058)	−0.025 (0.063)		−0.028 (0.043)	−0.026 (0.051)
Years of CCP membership		−0.029** (0.013)	−0.027* (0.014)	−0.029* (0.017)		0.001 (0.008)	−0.008 (0.008)
Rank: CC full member		0.214*** (0.077)	0.217** (0.090)	0.127 (0.087)		0.103 (0.064)	0.046 (0.053)
Rank: CC alt. member		0.192** (0.092)	0.175* (0.094)	0.134 (0.110)		0.127* (0.066)	0.092 (0.066)
Born locally		−0.037 (0.100)	−0.042 (0.091)	−0.053 (0.099)	—	—	—
<i>Provincial State Capacity:</i>							
CCP members/1,000			−0.007 (0.006)	−0.004 (0.006)	—	—	—
Distance to Beijing (1000km)			−0.069 (0.091)	0.004 (0.0850)	—	—	—
Pre-1947 CCP enclave density			−0.093 (0.204)	0.031 (0.169)	—	—	—
<i>Individual rightist's background</i>							
Male				−0.001 (0.054)			0.002 (0.051)
Age				−0.009*** (0.002)			−0.009*** (0.002)
Reactionary social class				0.009 (0.034)			0.016 (0.031)
<i>Individual rightist's wrongdoings</i>							
Oppose political system				0.275* (0.161)			0.312*** (0.087)
Oppose central policy				0.012 (0.078)			0.042 (0.050)
Defy superior cadres				−0.025 (0.093)			0.037 (0.070)
Demand redress of past grievance				0.085*** (0.031)			0.080*** (0.028)
Constant	0.092** (0.036)	0.539* (0.310)	0.904 (0.755)	0.548 (0.765)	0.090*** (0.030)	0.582*** (0.203)	0.633*** (0.224)
Observations	308	308	304	300	441	441	437
Clustered s.e. by affiliation	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R <sup>2</sup>	0.040	0.085	0.088	0.221	0.067	0.090	0.253
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.037	0.061	0.053	0.172	0.063	0.074	0.227
Residual Std. Error	0.356	0.352	0.355	0.334	0.381	0.378	0.347

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## E2. Individual-level OLS Estimates, with Alternative Measures and Interactions

Corresponding to Table 2 of the main text.

### E2. Individual-level OLS Regression, with Alternative Measures and Interactions

	<i>Dependent Variable: Dummy on Coercive Penalty</i>					
	All Models: Include Both Provincial and Ministry Leaders					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Leader's revolutionary background:</i>						
Undercover	0.107*** (0.037)		0.047 (0.041)		−0.018 (0.051)	−0.038 (0.051)
Reactionary Social Class		0.104** (0.047)	0.032 (0.040)			0.043 (0.034)
Undercover × Bad Social Class			0.170** (0.073)			0.118* (0.070)
Arrested				0.141*** (0.040)	0.023 (0.040)	−0.008 (0.038)
Undercover × Arrested					0.182*** (0.069)	0.168** (0.069)
Affiliation: Ministry	0.009 (0.039)	−0.008 (0.046)	−0.041 (0.041)	0.020 (0.043)	0.001 (0.039)	−0.040 (0.042)
<i>Leader's personal background:</i>						
Age by 1957	−0.002 (0.006)	−0.0004 (0.006)	0.002 (0.005)	−0.001 (0.006)	0.001 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)
Ethnic minority	−0.052 (0.062)	−0.042 (0.066)	−0.009 (0.060)	0.004 (0.071)	−0.002 (0.068)	0.018 (0.069)
Postsecondary education	−0.026 (0.051)	−0.045 (0.059)	−0.081* (0.047)	0.006 (0.048)	−0.012 (0.045)	−0.065 (0.045)
Years of CCP membership	−0.008 (0.008)	−0.009 (0.008)	−0.008 (0.007)	−0.017* (0.009)	−0.016** (0.008)	−0.014* (0.007)
Rank: CC full member	0.046 (0.053)	−0.001 (0.053)	0.010 (0.049)	0.055 (0.056)	0.008 (0.054)	−0.024 (0.057)
Rank: CC alt. member	0.092 (0.066)	0.059 (0.064)	0.038 (0.053)	0.053 (0.066)	0.028 (0.055)	−0.003 (0.055)
<i>Individual rightist's background:</i>						
Male	0.002 (0.051)	0.003 (0.046)	0.022 (0.049)	−0.003 (0.048)	0.009 (0.049)	0.024 (0.048)
Age	−0.009*** (0.002)	−0.010*** (0.002)	−0.010*** (0.002)	−0.010*** (0.002)	−0.009*** (0.001)	−0.009*** (0.002)
Reactionary social class	0.016 (0.031)	0.005 (0.033)	0.012 (0.032)	0.019 (0.030)	0.020 (0.030)	0.015 (0.031)
<i>Individual rightist's wrongdoings:</i>						
Oppose political system	0.312*** (0.087)	0.333*** (0.087)	0.321*** (0.085)	0.316*** (0.085)	0.304*** (0.086)	0.313*** (0.085)
Oppose central policy	0.042 (0.050)	0.027 (0.044)	0.033 (0.048)	0.047 (0.048)	0.058 (0.049)	0.047 (0.048)
Defy superior cadres	0.037 (0.070)	0.054 (0.069)	0.046 (0.069)	0.042 (0.073)	0.038 (0.074)	0.046 (0.072)
Demand redress of past grievance	0.080*** (0.028)	0.073*** (0.028)	0.084*** (0.029)	0.073*** (0.027)	0.081*** (0.028)	0.084*** (0.029)
Constant	0.633*** (0.224)	0.686*** (0.222)	0.490** (0.224)	0.859*** (0.214)	0.741*** (0.203)	0.580*** (0.208)
Observations	437	437	437	437	437	437
Clustered s.e. by affiliation	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R <sup>2</sup>	0.253	0.250	0.274	0.261	0.273	0.285
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.227	0.223	0.245	0.235	0.243	0.253
Residual Std. Error	0.347	0.348	0.343	0.345	0.343	0.341

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

### E3. Robustness Checks for Individual-level Analysis

In the following two tables, I present a set of robustness checks for the individual-level analysis by changing the scope of the dataset. In other words, I remove certain subsets from the data to see whether the main regression results presented in **E3-1** and **E3-2** of the main text still hold for the remaining data.

1. First, I exclude all individuals prosecuted by three centrally-administered cities (直辖市): Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. The three provincial-level metropolises were China's political and economic centers and were the *first* provincial-level units to launch the campaign in 1957. Those cities hosted a much larger fraction of government officials and intellectuals, so the intensity of campaign implementation was purportedly higher than other provinces. Hence, it is necessary to ensure that individuals prosecuted in provinces *other than* the three metropolitan areas display the same correlation patterns.
2. I then exclude all individuals who were university students or trainees by the time of their prosecution. Historical accounts show that students were prosecuted more harshly during the ARC due to their more radical, heretical criticism of the Party. Many prominent student activists received decades-long criminal sentences during the ARC. Therefore, I exclude all students to see whether the same pattern holds for the remaining population.

The following two tables replicates the results in Table E1 and E2, with the two types of truncation. As can be seen from the tables, the main results remain robust regardless of how the scope of data is changed. When other personal covariates are controlled for, a leader's undercover background shows a consistent, positive correlation with the severity of punishment imposed on individual rightists.

### E3-1: Robustness Checks, Individual-level Baseline OLS Estimates

Dependent Variable: Coercive Punishment Dummy				
	Provincial Leaders Only		Provincial & Ministry Chiefs	
	(1) Exclude Central Municipalities	(2) Exclude Students	(3) Exclude Central Municipalities	(4) Exclude Students
Undercover	0.129 (0.116)	0.134** (0.063)	0.108* (0.059)	0.111*** (0.040)
Affiliation type: ministry			0.018 (0.047)	0.012 (0.040)
<i>Leader Background:</i>				
Age by 1957	0.008 (0.018)	0.003 (0.016)	−0.002 (0.006)	−0.003 (0.006)
Ethnic minority	−0.092 (0.101)	−0.087 (0.089)	−0.056 (0.065)	−0.049 (0.064)
Postsecondary education	−0.006 (0.080)	−0.021 (0.055)	−0.021 (0.056)	−0.026 (0.050)
Years of CCP membership	−0.027 (0.018)	−0.025 (0.015)	−0.008 (0.009)	−0.008 (0.008)
Rank: CC full member	0.131 (0.093)	0.119 (0.090)	0.047 (0.054)	0.039 (0.052)
Rank: CC alt. member	0.159 (0.119)	0.127 (0.106)	0.098 (0.068)	0.083 (0.064)
Born locally	−0.061 (0.106)	−0.076 (0.098)	—	—
<i>Provincial State Capacity:</i>				
CCP members/1,000	−0.004 (0.007)	−0.007 (0.005)	—	—
Distance to Beijing (1000km)	0.007 (0.097)	−0.016 (0.088)	—	—
Pre-1947 CCP enclave density	−0.004 (0.216)	0.026 (0.186)	—	—
<i>Individual rightist's background:</i>				
Male	0.021 (0.082)	0.034 (0.063)	0.010 (0.067)	0.026 (0.059)
Age	−0.008** (0.003)	−0.009*** (0.002)	−0.009*** (0.002)	−0.010*** (0.002)
Reactionary social class	0.017 (0.043)	0.037 (0.036)	0.016 (0.037)	0.034 (0.033)
<i>Individual rightist's wrongdoings:</i>				
Oppose political system	0.010 (0.144)	0.078 (0.104)	0.249*** (0.076)	0.237*** (0.065)
Oppose central policy	−0.112 (0.087)	−0.081 (0.061)	0.011 (0.054)	0.001 (0.046)
Defy superior cadres	−0.255* (0.150)	−0.106 (0.112)	−0.011 (0.104)	0.020 (0.081)
Demand redress of past grievance	0.114*** (0.035)	0.118*** (0.028)	0.091*** (0.033)	0.099*** (0.029)
Constant	1.058 (0.853)	1.141 (0.796)	0.708*** (0.268)	0.762*** (0.227)
Observations	226	273	363	410
Clustered s.e. by affiliation	✓	✓	✓	✓
R <sup>2</sup>	0.191	0.190	0.221	0.232
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.120	0.132	0.187	0.203
Residual Std. Error	0.328 (df = 207)	0.316 (df = 254)	0.352 (df = 347)	0.340 (df = 394)

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## E3-2: Robustness Checks, OLS Estimates with Alternative Measures & Interaction Terms

<i>Dependent Variable: Coercive Punishment Dummy</i>								
	Exclude 3 Central Municipalities				Exclude all students & trainees			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Leader's factional background:</i>								
Undercover		−0.011 (0.054)		−0.003 (0.054)		0.038 (0.040)		−0.001 (0.051)
Reactionary social class	0.158*** (0.047)	0.053 (0.045)			0.114** (0.045)	0.035 (0.038)		
Undercover × Bad class		0.192*** (0.072)				0.172** (0.068)		
Arrested			0.144*** (0.053)	−0.013 (0.049)			0.131*** (0.041)	0.016 (0.038)
Undercover × Arrested				0.255*** (0.087)				0.176** (0.072)
Affiliation: Ministry	0.014 (0.041)	−0.013 (0.040)	0.030 (0.048)	−0.018 (0.047)	0.013 (0.041)	−0.027 (0.039)	0.028 (0.044)	−0.002 (0.044)
<i>Leader's personal background:</i>								
Age by 1957	−0.002 (0.006)	0.001 (0.005)	−0.002 (0.006)	0.003 (0.005)	−0.002 (0.006)	0.001 (0.005)	−0.002 (0.006)	0.0004 (0.005)
Ethnic minority	−0.024 (0.069)	−0.009 (0.065)	−0.003 (0.072)	0.001 (0.070)	−0.037 (0.068)	−0.009 (0.062)	−0.002 (0.072)	−0.003 (0.070)
Postsecondary education	−0.043 (0.053)	−0.064 (0.049)	0.009 (0.049)	−0.031 (0.049)	−0.041 (0.055)	−0.076* (0.044)	0.008 (0.047)	−0.017 (0.045)
Years of CCP membership	−0.009 (0.008)	−0.010 (0.008)	−0.015* (0.009)	−0.015* (0.008)	−0.010 (0.008)	−0.009 (0.007)	−0.017* (0.009)	−0.015* (0.008)
Rank: CC full member	−0.023 (0.055)	−0.004 (0.051)	0.056 (0.057)	−0.006 (0.060)	−0.008 (0.053)	0.004 (0.048)	0.048 (0.055)	0.002 (0.055)
Rank: CC alt. member	0.064 (0.058)	0.040 (0.051)	0.054 (0.070)	0.013 (0.057)	0.057 (0.060)	0.033 (0.050)	0.050 (0.065)	0.022 (0.056)
<i>Individual rightist's background</i>								
Male	0.013 (0.062)	0.030 (0.064)	0.005 (0.063)	0.029 (0.064)	0.027 (0.055)	0.046 (0.057)	0.019 (0.056)	0.033 (0.056)
Age	−0.009*** (0.002)	−0.009*** (0.002)	−0.010*** (0.002)	−0.010*** (0.002)	−0.010*** (0.002)	−0.010*** (0.002)	−0.011*** (0.002)	−0.011*** (0.002)
Reactionary social class	−0.002 (0.039)	0.009 (0.039)	0.021 (0.036)	0.022 (0.036)	0.022 (0.036)	0.030 (0.035)	0.038 (0.032)	0.038 (0.032)
<i>Individual rightist's wrongdoings</i>								
Oppose political system	0.262*** (0.072)	0.257*** (0.073)	0.253*** (0.074)	0.243*** (0.074)	0.249*** (0.062)	0.242*** (0.063)	0.241*** (0.064)	0.233*** (0.063)
Oppose central policy	0.009 (0.054)	0.011 (0.051)	0.021 (0.052)	0.027 (0.051)	−0.007 (0.044)	−0.006 (0.044)	0.007 (0.045)	0.015 (0.045)
Defy superior cadres	0.017 (0.103)	0.011 (0.105)	−0.009 (0.111)	−0.010 (0.111)	0.051 (0.082)	0.036 (0.081)	0.028 (0.086)	0.016 (0.086)
Demand redress of past grievance	0.091*** (0.032)	0.100*** (0.033)	0.087*** (0.032)	0.091*** (0.033)	0.092*** (0.028)	0.103*** (0.029)	0.091*** (0.028)	0.099*** (0.029)
Constant	0.717*** (0.235)	0.631** (0.252)	0.910*** (0.237)	0.708*** (0.242)	0.791*** (0.216)	0.616*** (0.224)	0.974*** (0.223)	0.842*** (0.218)
Observations	363	363	363	363	410	410	410	410
Clustered s.e. by affiliation	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R <sup>2</sup>	0.235	0.252	0.231	0.248	0.231	0.256	0.237	0.250
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.202	0.215	0.197	0.211	0.202	0.223	0.208	0.218
Residual Std. Error	0.349	0.346	0.350	0.347	0.340	0.336	0.339	0.337

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## Group F. Additional Qualitative and Archival Evidence

### F1. Historical Evidence for: Distrust of Suspected Former Undercover Cadres

Mao's distrust of undercover partisans became publicly known in 1943, when he launched a "cadre screening" (审干 *shen gan*) campaign that specifically targeted Party officials in Yen'an who previously served as undercover agents. A Central Committee guidance in June 1943 accused without evidence that "our party organizations in Kuomintang-ruled areas were filled with traitors, and in some regions they even became a branch of Kuomintang".<sup>5</sup> As a result, former undercover partisans faced extensive background checks and interrogations under the presumption of guilt after they arrived in Communist-controlled areas. Many cadres, including high-ranking ones, were tortured and beaten by the interrogators in order to force them to confess their alleged collusion with the Kuomintang. Zeng Zhi (曾志), a senior undercover agent and the wife of future politburo member Tao Zhu (陶铸), recalled in her memoir, *A Survivor of the Revolution*, that

*"If any of my answers did not satisfy [the interrogators], they would knock my head with their hand, push me back and forth like a ball, and even pull my hair and kick my leg. They believed that I became a Kuomintang spy during my undercover work in Northwest Hubei. They claimed that a business card I received from a military depot commander of the 33th Group Army (of the Kuomintang) was my "spy identity card". They also became skeptical when I told them I was briefly detained and then released by Kuomintang plainclothes in Xiangfan. Some people hoped to find some dirt from their interrogation of me to support their groundless prosecution of [my husband] Tao Zhu.*

*Although I was extremely exhausted by their repeated interrogation, I held on to one principle no matter how fuzzy my brain was: I will never tell lies. No matter what tactic they used to force me to confess my "wrongdoings," I never said one thing that was irresponsible. Just because I didn't want to fabricate stories that did not exist, those comrades became really frustrated, yelled at me, and told me that my past history smells worse than a dog's feces. They said that I had no shame and had a thicker skin than the Great Wall. They said that others would weep during interrogation, but I did not shed one single tear.*

*The whole Party branch did not get what they hoped for during my interrogation. They asked other experienced interrogators from other branches to help, but still did not manage to force my confession. The struggle lasted for two weeks. After that, they thought I was too stubborn, so they left me alone."*<sup>6</sup>



## F2. Historical Evidence for: Insufficient Compliance Posed Greater Risk for Less Trusted Officials during ARC

Historical accounts show that officials from undercover backgrounds viewed the ARC anxiously as a test for their loyalty. Due to their obscure revolutionary history and lack of acquaintance with the central leadership, they were desperate to display their loyalty and alignment with the correct Party line. For them, failure to carry out the campaign enthusiastically could reinforce the existing suspicion due to their backgrounds, and could put their political careers at stake.

During the ARC, the highest-ranking local official who was purged for their passive attitude towards Mao's agenda was Pan Fusheng (潘复生), the First Party Secretary of Henan Province. Pan was a veteran undercover agent who was tasked with organizing anti-regime activities among students and peasants in Kuomintang-controlled areas in the 1930s. According to the accounts of his contemporaries, Mao neither knew Pan well nor were familiar with his contributions during the Revolution.<sup>7</sup> Although Pan was appointed as the First Secretary of Henan in 1952 due to his strong local experience in the province, Mao's attitude towards him was wary and lukewarm at best. A recent biography of Mao recorded an apparently cold encounter between Mao and Pan in 1952:

*When Mao's train stopped by at North Huanghe Station, Party Secretary Pan Fusheng, Governor Chao Zhefu, and Commander Liu Zhiyuan walked onto the train. Mao said: "I invited you to get on the train because I was on vacation this time. I don't want to disturb other people or discuss work-related things." Before Mao went on, Pan asked: "yesterday we decided to invite the Chairman to take a rest in our provincial Party Committee headquarter and meet major provincial officials from the Party, the government, and the military zone." "But wouldn't that mean I have to disturb others and talk about work?" Mao turned his head to (his deputy) Luo Ruiqin, "when I left Beijing, didn't you tell them what I don't want?" Luo replied: "I've told them already." ... Mao then waved his hand and said: "this time I will not stay in your provincial committee headquarter, nor will I meet with your provincial cadres. If you want me to meet them, wait until next time."<sup>8</sup>*

During the ARC, Pan had strong reservation about Mao's expected scale of prosecution. He repeatedly complained in private conversations that the alleged "right-wing" threat to the Party was exaggerated, and the "constructive" criticism from intellectuals should not be always interpreted as "anti-Party speech". In order to control the scale of the campaign, Pan announced in July 1957 that the prosecution would not target school teachers, any party cadre below the county level, or rural residents in Henan. He even required that the number of rightist to be prosecuted in Henan should not exceed 0.2 percent of the population. Later that month, Pan frankly expressed his dissent in front of Mao during an expanded Politburo session in Qingdao. Pan contended that the target of prosecution might be too wide, and the style of the campaign was "simplistic and cruel" (简单粗暴).<sup>9</sup>

Unlike his peer Jiang Weiqing, Pan's defiance to Mao's expectations was not tolerated by the Chairman. In October 1957, Pan was put on sick leave and was stripped of all powers, and his decision not to prosecute any cadre below the county level was quickly abolished.<sup>10</sup> During the second plenary session of the

Eighth Central Committee in May 1958, Pan was accused of forming an “anti-Party group” within Henan’s provincial Party committee aiming to “shelter and collude with the rightists.” When the meeting approved a resolution to condemn Pan’s “anti-Party, right-leaning wrongdoings”, it was reported that Mao was the first to stand up behind the presidium and clap to show his support.<sup>11</sup> Later, when commenting on Pan’s disobedience to the Party line, Mao expressed contempt of Pan’s work experience as an undercover Party liaison in rural Henan:

*Some comrades wasted their time in the countryside for decades, but they were not inspired by the conscience of peasants. They don’t understand the masses and cannot tell the good side. Look at Pan Fusheng — can you say he didn’t make any efforts when working in the countryside? But that experience just did not educate their minds.*<sup>12</sup>

As a result of his passive attitude during the ARC, Pan lost his Party membership and public office, was repeatedly criticized and humiliated in public meetings in Beijing and Henan, and was assigned to work at a remote farm in Henan. His moderate policy towards the alleged “rightists” was also immediately reversed – throughout the campaign, the Henan authorities labelled 70,806 individuals as “rightists”, greater than any other province in the country.

### **F3. Historical Evidence for: Denunciation of One's "Own Type" as a Loyalty Test**

A large number of historical records during the ARC show that many local officials who had served as undercover agents were suspected of sympathizing with "rightist views and behaviors" due to their personal history, and they faced stronger pressure to prove their allegiance to the Party line by complying with the campaign agenda. In 1957, Provincial Party Secretary Jiang Hua, a Red Army veteran supported by Beijing, denounced his rival Sha Wenhan, an undercover cadre and former governor, as a "rightist" who had engaged in anti-Party activities. Following this conflict, other provincial officials from undercover backgrounds were under strong pressure to participate in the condemnation of Sha to affirm their loyalty and to "clear up" their suspicion. For example, Peng Ruilin, a former undercover agent and a standing member of Zhejiang's Provincial Party Committee, later recalled that

*During the 7th Enlarged Meeting of Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee in the fall of 1957, (First Secretary) Jiang Hua, (Vice Secretary) Huo Shilian, (Vice Secretary) Lin Hujia, and (Vice Governor) Chen Weida invited me to Jiang Hua's residence on the second floor of the Old Dahua Hotel Building. They asked me to strictly reflect on myself and focus on exposing the anti-Party crimes of Sha Wenhan and (his deputy) Yang Siyi. . . During the conversation Lin and Chen repeatedly told me: "your problem is different from theirs in nature. If you are willing to expose their rightist wrongdoings, the Party can restore her trust in you and still put you in an important position." <sup>13</sup>*

Peng's experience was not uncommon among former undercover cadres during the ARC. Because their obscure revolutionary history made them easy targets for suspicion and prosecution, those cadres faced a stronger burden and pressure to openly denounce their old friends and colleagues as "rightists" and reaffirm their allegiance to the Party line by actively participating in the repressive campaign.

#### **F4. The Dominant Role of First Party Secretaries during the Anti-Rightist Campaign**

One potential concern of this research is that the analysis focuses solely on the historical backgrounds of First Party Secretaries in localities, without considering the governors or mayors in local governments. Historical evidence indicates that Party Secretaries held predominant power and influence in determining the intensity, magnitude, and pace of the Anti-Rightist Campaign in their respective localities. In contrast, heads of local governments (i.e. provincial governors or city mayors) had limited influence over campaign execution. Therefore, it is historically more accurate to only include the Party chiefs' backgrounds in the analysis of repression intensity during the ARC.

I support this argument by presenting three types of historical evidence. Firstly, historical accounts show that the central leadership explicitly assigned provincial Party bosses as the *primary decision-makers*, granting them significant power in implementing local campaigns. Secondly, several governors themselves were denounced as “rightists” during the campaign and were subsequently expelled from the Party due to advocating for a more moderate approach. This illustrates their *vulnerability* and *lack of influence* over campaign implementation. Lastly, in the 1950s, some governorships in certain provinces were *ceremonial positions* given to non-CCP public figures. These figurehead governors were appointed merely to showcase the regime's inclusivity, but they held no actual political power and influence in political processes.

##### **a. The Paramount Authority of Party Secretaries during ARC**

At the beginning of the ARC, Mao explicitly designated First Party Secretaries as the primary leader responsible for campaign implementation and endowed them with paramount authority to dictate the magnitude of anti-rightist prosecution in their respective jurisdictions. In July 1957, Mao summoned the First Party Secretaries of all provinces to Qingdao and assigned them the power to prosecute rightists. He instructed:

*The First Secretaries of provincial and municipal Party committees, along with the entire Party committee, must assume full control over this great struggle. They must completely control the political and ideological reform of the political circle, the education sector, the media (including all newspapers and publications), the scientific and technological community, the literary and artistic circles, the health sector, and the business community.*<sup>14</sup>

After Mao's meeting with provincial Party chiefs, the CCP Central Committee issued a notice titled *The Criteria of Identifying Rightists*, which granted Party chiefs the official power to identify and prosecute rightists in their respective areas. According to the notice, “all individuals identified as rightists in various workplaces must undergo review and approval by the Party leadership at the county level or above.”<sup>15</sup> Additionally, high-profile rightists with a “prominent social status” should be prosecuted under the authority of the “provincial Party leadership or above.”<sup>16</sup> Hence, this document formally declared the Party chief's authority in local campaign implementation.

## **b. The Vulnerable Status of Governors during the ARC**

Another piece of evidence highlighting the powerlessness and vulnerability of governors and other deputy local leaders during the ARC is the fact that several provincial governors themselves were denounced as rightists due to their opposition to the Party chief's radical approach to repression. The most prominent example is Sha Wenhan 沙文汉, the Governor of Province who was prosecuted as a "rightist" by Provincial Party Secretary Jiang Hua. According to the verdict, one of Sha's major wrongdoings was obviously his concern about prosecuting too many people, as well as his vocal defense of several high-profile rightists. The allegation states:

*"Sha aligned himself with rightists both inside and outside the Party. . . He arrogantly resisted the guidelines from the central authorities and directives from the provincial Party committee. He made every effort to shield Song Yunbin and Li Shihao, thereby undermining the campaign against the rightists..."*<sup>17</sup>

In fact, Sha was not the only provincial governor who was prosecuted for opposing the Party chief during the ARC. Sun Zuobin 孙作宾, the Governor of Qinghai Province, was similarly expelled from the Party for criticizing the "arbitrary" leadership style of Party Secretary Gao Feng. Those examples illustrate the limited power of local governors and mayors during the ARC, who had little influence over campaign implementation in the locality and could face severe consequences for defying the Party chief's decisions.

## **c. Ceremonial Nature of Governorships in Certain Provinces**

Lastly, during the 1950s, the position of governor in certain provinces was merely ceremonial and awarded to influential public figures who were not members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This appointment strategy aimed to showcase the regime's political inclusivity and broad representation. However, these figurehead governors held no governance responsibilities and were excluded from the CCP's decision-making bodies. Apparently, they held no real influence over the implementation of the campaign. The following table lists the names and backgrounds of "figurehead" provincial governors during the ARC:

*Provincial Governors without Actual Political Power during the ARC (1957-58)*

Name	Background	Title
Cheng Qian 程潜	Former Kuomintang general who defected to the CCP during the Chinese Civil War. Chen, who was not a CCP member, was appointed the role of the governor as a symbolic gesture to highlight the Party's political inclusivity. He spent most of his time in Beijing rather than Hunan, where he held the governorship.	Governor of Hunan
Deng Baoshan 邓宝珊	Former Kuomintang General who defected to the CCP during the Chinese Civil War. He was not a CCP member and was not assigned actual responsibilities. The reason for his appointment was similar to Chen Qian.	Governor of Shaanxi
Zhou Jianren 周建人	Prominent intellectual and younger brother of famous writer Lu Xun. Although he joined the CCP in 1948, he had never been a member of Zhejiang's Party Standing Committee and was excluded from most decision-making process in Zhejiang. He spent most of his time residing in Beijing.	Governor of Zhejiang

Based on the historical context of the 1950s, I choose not to include the governors and mayors of a locality in my analysis due to their limited role in the campaign and constrained political influence relative to the Party chiefs.

## Notes

1. Only 96 out of nearly 550,000 rightists prosecuted during the ARC in 1957 were not rehabilitated in the 1980s. See Jianhui Feng, *Mingyun yu shiming: Zhongguo zhishifenzi wenti shiji huimou* [Fate and Mission: a Century's Review of China's Intelligentsia Problems] (Beijing: Huawen Chubanshe, 2006): 60.
2. Zhongguo Laowu Jianshe Cujinhui [Chinese Old Zone Construction Association], *Zhongguo Geming Laoqu* [China's Old Revolutionary Zones] (Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Chubanshe [CCP Party History Publishing House], 1997)
3. The page that contains the list is: <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/139962/8437279.html>, accessed on December 6, 2021.
4. Following the precedent of Kung and Chen (2011), I measure promotion in terms of one's political status in the CCP Central Committee. I consider an official received a promotion if their status changed (1) from non-member to alternate member; (2) from alternate member to full member, or ; (3) from full member to politburo member *at least once* from 1949 to 1966.
5. Fu, Ping. "Shengan Yundong he Zhou Enlai [The Cadre Inspection Campaign and Zhou Enlai]," *Hongyan Chunqiu*, 4 (April 2000), 27–31.
6. Zeng, Zhi. *Yige geming de xingcunzhe: Zeng Zhi huiyilu* [A Survivor of Revolution: a Memoir by Zeng Zhi]. (Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe [Guangdong People's Press], 1998): 336.
7. Party History Office of the CCP Henan Provincial Committee. *Fengyu quqiu: Pan Fusheng shiwen jinianji* [The Wind and the Rain passed the Autumn: Poems and Articles in Memory of Pan Fusheng]. (Zhengzhou: Henan Renmin Chubanshe [Henan People's Press], 1993).
8. Yuan, Xiaorong. *Mao Zedong lijing xunshi jishi, 1949–1976* [Records of Mao Zedong's Trips Outside of Beijing, 1949–1976]. vol. 1. (Beijing: Renmin Ribao Chubanshe [People's Daily Press], 2016), 24–52.
9. Li, Ruojian. "Shumin youpai: jiceng fanyou yundong de shehuixue jiedu [The Ordinary Rightists: A Sociological Interpretation of the Anti-Rightist Campaign on the Citizen Level]," *Kaifang Shidai* [Open Times], 4 (August 2008): 48–69.
10. Xu, Ming. "Wu Zhipu yu Henan dayuejin yundong [Wu Zhipu and the Great Leap Forward Campaign in Henan]," *Ershiye Shi Ji* [Twenty-First Century], 8 (April 1998): 37–47.
11. Li, Ruojian. "Shumin youpai: jiceng fanyou yundong de shehuixue jiedu [The Ordinary Rightists: A Sociological Interpretation of the Anti-Rightist Campaign on the Citizen Level]," *Kaifang Shidai* [Open Times], 4 (August 2008): 48–69.
12. Mao, Zedong. "Zai bada erci huiyi daibiaotuan tuanzhang huiyishang de jianghua [Speech on the Representative Group Leader Meeting of the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth CCP Central Committee]," in *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao* [Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the PRC], vol. 7 (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe [Central Party Literature Publishing House], 1992), 194–211.
13. Chen, Xiuliang and Baolin Tang. *Jujue nuxing: zhonggong mimi Nanjing shiwei shuji Chen Xiuliang zhuan* [Rejecting Slave Mentality: A Biography of Chen Xiuliang, the CCP's Clandestine Party Secretary of Nanjing] (Hong Kong: Open Page Publishing, 2012), 341.
14. Mao, Zedong. "1957 nian xiaji de xingshi [The Situation in the Summer of 1957]," in *Mao Zedong xuanji* [Selected Works of Mao Zedong], vol. 5 (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe [People's Press], 1977), 463.
15. CCP Central Committee. *Zhonggong Zhongyang guanyu hua fen yopai fenzi de biao zhun de tongzhi* [The Notice of the CCP Central Committee on the Criteria of Identifying Rightists]. October 15, 1957.
16. Ibid.
17. CCP Zhejiang Provincial Committee. "Zhonggong Zhejiangsheng dierjie daibiao dahui dierci huiyi guanyu kaichu youpai fenzi

Sha Wenhan, Yang Siyi, Peng Ruilin, Sunzhanglu dangji de jueyi [The Resolution of the 2nd Plenary Meeting of the 2nd Zhejiang Provincial Party Congress on Revoking the Party Membership of Sha Wenhan, Yang Siyi, Peng Ruilin, and Sun Zhanglu],” in *Guanyu qingchu dangnei youpai fenzi de jueding huibian* [Collection of Decisions on Eliminating Rightists within the Party] (Beijing: Supervision Commission of the CCP Central Committee, 1958), 1-5.