Trust in political institutions and support for authoritarianism in Latin American students: Does civic knowledge make a difference?

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Document with tables.

Country	Year	School	Students	Woman (%)	Age (mean)
Chile	2009	177	5173	0.51	14.18
Chile	2016	178	5081	0.49	14.17
Colombia	2009	196	6200	0.54	14.38
Colombia	2016	150	5609	0.52	14.59
Dominican Republic	2009	145	4569	0.55	14.86
Dominican Republic	2016	141	3937	0.51	14.19
Mexico	2009	215	6565	0.52	14.08
Mexico	2016	213	5526	0.50	14.03
Guatemala	2009	145	3998	0.49	15.52
Paraguay	2009	149	3391	0.52	14.82
Peru	2016	206	5166	0.48	14.03

How much do you trust each of the following groups, institutions or sources of information?

Variable	Levels	ICCS09 Code	ICCS16 Code
National Government	1. Completely	IS2P27A	IS3G26A
National Parliament	2. Quite a lot	IS2P27F	IS3G26F
Political parties	3. A little	IS2P27E	IS3G26E
Courts of justice	4. Not at all	IS2P27C	IS3G26C

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the government and its their power?			
g. Concentration of power in one person guarantees order	1. Strongly disagree 2. Disagree	LS2P03A	LS3G02A
a. Dictatorships are justified when they bring order and safety.	3. Agree 4. Strongly agree	LS2P03D	LS3G02D
b. Dictatorships are justified when they bring economic benefits		LS2P03E	LS3G02E

Country	ICCS 2009	ICCS 2016	Diff.
Chile	483 (3.5)	482 (3.1)	-1 (5.6)
Colombia	462 (2.9)	482 (3.4)	20 (5.5)
Dominican Republic	380 (2.4)	381 (3.0)	1 (5.0)
Mexico	452 (2.8)	467 (2.5)	15 (4.9)
Guatemala	435 (3.8)	-	-
Paraguay	424 (3.4)	-	-
Peru	-	438 (3.5)	-

Notes: Statistically significant differences ($p < 0.05$)

() Standard errors appear in parentheses.

	Chile		Colombia		Dominican Republic		Mexico		Peru	Guatemala	Paraguay
	2009	**2016**	**2009**	**2016**	**2009**	**2016**	**2009**	**2016**	**2016**	**2009**	**2009**
National Government	0.65	0.50	0.62	0.55	0.74	0.78	0.58	0.57	0.49	0.45	0.66
Local Government	0.63	0.53	0.60	0.56	0.70	0.70	0.55	0.57	0.55	0.55	0.66
Courts of justice	0.56	0.50	0.50	0.48	0.63	0.63	0.49	0.61	0.46	0.48	0.49
The police	0.71	0.64	0.55	0.49	0.56	0.56	0.43	0.49	0.50	0.33	0.45
Political parties	0.34	0.33	0.35	0.28	0.51	0.50	0.35	0.37	0.33	0.26	0.32
National Parliament	0.54	0.42	0.49	0.46	0.67	0.73	0.54	0.56	0.42	0.49	0.59
Media	0.74	0.62	0.72	0.69	0.76	0.78	0.57	0.56	0.62	0.70	0.74
The Armed Forces	0.81	0.74	0.80	0.78	0.68	0.74	0.62	0.71	0.64	0.63	0.61
Schools	0.80	0.71	0.87	0.85	0.88	0.91	0.72	0.73	0.78	0.88	0.88
The United Nations	0.65	0.60	0.62	0.63	0.68	0.73	0.66	0.71	0.67	0.66	0.70
People in general	0.52	0.48	0.49	0.43	0.61	0.62	0.47	0.52	0.47	0.47	0.57
Social media		0.54		0.49		0.61		0.48	0.45		
Average Country	0.63	0.55	0.60	0.56	0.68	0.69 $\approx$	0.54	0.57	0.53	0.54	0.61

Note: Statistically significant differences ($p < 0.05$)

	Chile		Colombia		Dominican Republic		Mexico		Peru	Guatemala	Paraguay
	2009	**2016**	**2009**	**2016**	**2009**	**2016**	**2009**	**2016**	**2016**	**2009**	**2009**
It is better for government leaders to make decisions without consulting anybody	0.16	0.14	0.12	0.13	0.34	0.31	0.24	0.26	0.20	0.18	0.21
People in government must enforce their authority even if it means violating the rights of some citizens	0.25	0.23	0.23	0.22	0.42	0.37	0.26	0.30	0.31	0.25	0.24
People in government lose part of their authority when they admit their mistakes	0.43	0.35	0.46	0.46	0.60	0.64	0.48	0.53	0.52	0.51	0.48
People whose opinions are different than those of the government must be considered its enemies	0.16	0.15	0.11	0.12	0.31	0.29	0.21	0.25	0.18	0.14	0.17
The most important opinion of a country should be that of the president	0.55	0.38	0.50	0.50	0.62	0.69	0.45	0.41	0.56	0.48	0.57
It is fair that the government does not comply with the law when it thinks it is not necessary	0.30	0.21	0.24	0.21	0.43	0.38	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.28	0.29
Concentration of power in one person guarantees order	0.52	0.44	0.51	0.54	0.68	0.74	0.56	0.56	0.63	0.60	0.58
The government should close communication media that are critical	0.21	0.22	0.16	0.37	0.36	0.26	0.32	0.71	0.29	0.18	0.18
If the president does not agree with Congress, he/she should dissolve it.	0.32	0.35	0.29	0.31	0.46	0.49	0.37	0.39	0.43	0.45	0.41
Dictatorships are justified when they bring order and safety.	0.65	0.57	0.74	0.73	0.70	0.73	0.69	0.67	0.77	0.78	0.69
Dictatorships are justified when they bring economic benefits	0.64	0.52	0.70	0.68	0.66	0.70	0.66	0.66	0.72	0.75	0.65
Average Country	0.38	0.32	0.37	0.37 ≈	0.51	0.52 ≈	0.41	0.42 ≈	0.45	0.42	0.41

Note: Statistically significant differences ($p < 0.05$)

	Authoritarianism	Authoritarianism	Authoritarianism	Trust	Trust
(Intercept)	75.87***	−178.68***	−180.92***	63.10***	0.07
	(0.32)	(23.00)	(23.01)	(0.26)	(27.35)
Civic Knowledge	−0.08***	−0.08***	−0.07***	−0.03***	−0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Trust in civic institutions	0.17***	0.17***	0.26***		
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)		
Highest parental educational level		0.03	0.03		0.03
		(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.03)
Home Literacy		−0.19***	−0.19***		−0.31***
		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.04)
Girl		−1.16***	−1.16***		−1.04***
		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.09)
Political discussion		−0.02***	−0.02***		0.12***
		(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)
2016		0.13***	0.13***		0.03*
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)
Interaction					
Trust::Civic Knowledge			−0.00***		
			(0.00)		
R^2	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.05	0.07
Adj. R^2	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.05	0.07
Num. obs.	51794	50281	50281	51954	50420
RMSE	97.78	97.69	97.67	117.01	116.37

***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$. Standard errors appear in parentheses.

Table 6: Regression Models: Support Authoritarianism and Civic Knowledge in Latin América

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
(Intercept)	85.49***	85.93***	85.44***
	(0.21)	(0.30)	(0.34)
Civic knowledge	−0.08***	−0.08***	−0.08***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Parent's education		−0.06*	0.05
		(0.03)	(0.03)
Books at home		−0.28***	−0.23***
		(0.04)	(0.04)
Girl (vs boy)		−1.37***	−1.32***
		(0.08)	(0.08)
Political discussion		0.00	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)
2016(vs 2009)			1.04***
			(0.08)
Colombia			0.79***
			(0.17)
Dominican Republic			−0.42
			(0.25)
Guatemala			0.10
			(0.32)
Mexico			0.55***
			(0.15)
Paraguay			−0.50
			(0.39)
Peru			0.06
			(0.21)
R^2	0.36	0.36	0.36
Adj. R^2	0.36	0.36	0.36
Num. obs.	54769	52148	52148
RMSE	99.05	99.25	99.04

***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$

Table 7: Regression Models: Institutional Trust and Civic Knowledge in Latin América

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
(Intercept)	63.10***	42.89***	13.74***	11.94***	13.20***
	(0.26)	(0.51)	(1.25)	(1.28)	(1.29)
Civic knowledge	−0.03***	−0.01***	0.05***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Support authoritarianism		0.23***	0.81***	0.75***	0.72***
		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Knowledge x authoritarianims			−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00***
			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Parent's education				0.02	−0.02
				(0.03)	(0.03)
Books at home				−0.31***	−0.27***
				(0.04)	(0.04)
Girl (vs boys)				−0.67***	−0.73***
				(0.09)	(0.09)
Political discussion				0.11***	0.11***
				(0.00)	(0.00)
2016 (vs 2009)					0.06
					(0.10)
Colombia					−0.32
					(0.19)
Dominican Repuiblic					2.61***
					(0.29)
Guatemala					−3.47***
					(0.37)
Mexico					−0.19
					(0.18)
Paraguay					−0.25
					(0.46)
Peru					−2.51***
					(0.24)
R^2	0.05	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.12
Adj. R^2	0.05	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.12
Num. obs.	51954	51794	51794	50281	50281
RMSE	117.01	114.45	113.75	113.41	112.94

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$