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


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# The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean

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**Author:** Ruth Wodak

**Pub. Date:** 2015

**Product:** Sage Academic Books

**DOI:** https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446270073

**Disciplines:** Media, Communication & Cultural Studies, Communication Studies, Linguistics, Political Science, Political Communication, Discourse Analysis, Political Communications

**Access Date:** January 21, 2026
**Publisher:** SAGE Publications Ltd
**City:** 55 City Road
**Online ISBN:** 9781446270073

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Singapore | Washington DC

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55 City Road
London EC1Y 1SP

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Thousand Oaks, California 91320

SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd
B 1/I 1 Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area
Mathura Road
New Delhi 110 044

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Singapore 049483



First published 2015



Editor: Mila Steele
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Marketing manager: Michael Ainsley
Cover design: Jen Crisp
Typeset by: C&M Digitals (P) Ltd, Chennai, India
Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY


**Library of Congress Control Number: 2015932198**

**British Library Cataloguing in Publication data**

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 978-1-4462-4699-3
ISBN 978-1-4462-4700-6 (pbk)

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# Acknowledgements

For Jakob

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# Preface

Every day, when opening the newspapers in the morning, big headlines catch my eye, the most recent galvanizing provocation by a particular right-wing populist party or yet another success of such a party at recently held European, national or regional elections is discussed – the rise and, indeed, discursive prominence of right-wing populist parties currently seems to be without end. Thus, at some point, I had to take a difficult and deliberate decision: to stop collecting data and to finish this book. Other books will no doubt pick up the challenge and continue documenting the development of the European Union, the 28 EU member states and their political systems as well as follow the US primaries and the potential success of Tea Party candidates in various regional and national elections. In any case, it is undisputable that right-wing populist parties have moved away from the margins in many EU member states and beyond; that they have indeed become mainstream parties and movements. Many people react to this with surprise, asking themselves, how could this happen? And why is it happening now?

No simple explanations seem viable – this book therefore presents an attempt to trace, understand and explain the trajectories of such parties from the margins of the political landscape, transformations from fringe parties originally ridiculed and made light of, to the centre, manifesting a general move to the right in their figurative wake. Currently, we observe a normalization of nationalistic, xenophobic, racist and antisemitic rhetoric, which primarily works with ‘fear’: fear of change, of globalization, of loss of welfare, of climate change, of changing gender roles; in principle, almost anything can be constructed as a threat to ‘Us’, an imagined homogenous people inside a well-protected territory. Post-war taboos such as the expression of blunt racism and antisemitism in public have been breached in the course of these changes and, frequently, we are left with the impression that the political arena at present follows the dictum ‘Anything goes!’ and that few, if any, alternatives to such a stance exist, because mainstream parties have incorporated many of the previously rejected proposals into their policy preferences and, indeed, effective legislation.

In 1989, at the momentous occasion of the fall of the so-called Iron Curtain which had divided Europe into West and East, nobody expected that the immigration from the former Communist countries, Turkey and the Middle East would entail a rise in xenophobia and fear of losing jobs, and cause a division into ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, into the real ‘Austrians, Brits, Swedes, Germans or Danes’ and the ‘Others’, that is, foreigners. Old borders were dismantled and new borders were erected: via visas, language and citizenship tests, a veritable multitude of rules and regulations.

Of course, immigration from the East is not a new phenomenon; before 1989, however, these migrants

were refugees fleeing a totalitarian system; or they were so-called 'guest-workers' who were welcomed and, indeed, often fetched in the 1960s and 1970s in order to help out with jobs which nobody else wanted to take on. Many such guest-workers stayed in Scandinavia, Germany or Austria and have since acquired a new citizenship and belonging. After 1989, however, people leaving Eastern European countries were perceived as 'economic' migrants who voluntarily left their homes, in most cases legitimately searching for better lives. These new fears merged with traditional racist and antisemitic beliefs and discrimination against minorities that had already lived for many decades (and, in many cases, centuries) inside Western EU member states, for example, against the guest-workers, against Roma, Jews and other ethnic and religious, autochthonous minorities. 'Modern strangers' (to borrow Georg Simmel's term) or 'post-modern strangers' (in the words of Zygmunt Bauman) were constructed as a ubiquitous threat to welfare, the economy and culture, even to 'civilization' as a whole.

The horrendous events of 9/11 were another tipping point in this development: Muslims were suddenly perceived as an acute danger to security in many Western countries. More restrictions for immigration were quickly legitimized via security measures presented as necessary and therefore rarely challenged. Turkey's potential accession to the EU triggered even more debates and evoked old collective memories of the victory of the Habsburgs against the Ottoman Empire in the 16th and 17th centuries, thus defending the 'Christian Occident' against 'Islam and the Orient'. And, finally, EU enlargement in 2004 led to a merging of the concepts of refugees, migrants and asylum seekers: an enemy image of *the* 'Other' started to dominate political struggles and debates. This image has taken many local forms and shapes; it is a floating signifier, indeed an empty signifier which anybody can articulate for their political interests. In the US, moreover, the election of Barack Obama to President triggered the rise of the Tea Party movements in opposition to the government's economic, security and health care policies – most probably also in reaction to a 'black man' sitting in the White House.

As will be elaborated throughout this book, however, there exists no one-size-fits-all explanation for the continuing rise and success of right-wing populist parties. Many factors contribute to this success, such as renationalizing nativist tendencies, border narratives and ideologies, economic fears, and the many dramatic pasts – revealing similarities and differences between countries. Regarding the latter, for instance, countries with fascist and national-socialist pasts differ significantly from countries without such pasts. The scapegoats constructed by rich countries differ from those constructed by poor countries that have been vehemently struck by the economic and Eurozone crises since 2008. It is a notable, though far from coincidental, fact that many frequently violent and polemical debates are conducted over the regulation of female bodies – gender roles have changed, and it seems as if the ultimate 'Other' is currently personified by and identified with the

headscarf and burqa, with the ways Muslim women choose to dress (or are sometimes forced to dress).

Charismatic leaders and aggressive rhetoric are also important factors; indeed, for a long time, right-wing populist parties were primarily identified with and recognized by their rhetoric, argumentation schemes and aggressive debate mode. However, these factors per se do not suffice as salient characteristics; they do not suffice at all in defining the complex phenomenon of right-wing populism. It is the *contents*, that is, the ideologies and beliefs, the proposals and imaginaries conveyed by such rhetoric, that have to be observed, analysed and understood; only in conjunction do they provide insights into the many facets of right-wing populism on the rise. Meaning is constructed by form and content, to be understood and explained via many layers of contextual knowledge – historical, socio-political, intertextual and interdiscursive, as well as situative.

In 2010, at the occasion of one of my public lectures on right-wing populist rhetoric and ideologies – this time in the town hall in Örebro, Sweden – my son, Jakob, who was present, challenged me on the point of possible similarities and differences with the US Tea Party, which, as mentioned above, had been launched as a vocal opposition to Barack Obama's Presidency in 2008. He urged me to write a book that would also compare European right-wing politics and policies with the American political movement, which is absorbed largely in the Republican Party. Hence this book is ultimately an attempt to understand and explain at least some of these recent developments and to provide manifold examples intended to trace the *micro-politics* of right-wing populism, performing the many discourses, genres, images and texts in various more formal and also informal contexts. Fifteen *vignettes* serve this end throughout the book, approximating in-depth analyses of what we might consider snapshots of the political situation taken in Austria, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the Ukraine, the UK and the US. The analyses of right-wing populist micro-politics are embedded in much contextual knowledge, in some facts and figures from various national and EU elections, and in important theoretical discourse-analytic, sociological, historical and political science theories. As a framework, they guide the fine-grained linguistic, pragmatic, rhetorical and argumentation analysis. Nevertheless, this book also and primarily addresses readers outside of academia pure – this is why I have made a point of employing a more popular, comprehensible style of writing while still doing justice to the requirements of systematic linguistic analysis.

I start out in Chapter 1 by introducing readers to the complex phenomenon of right-wing populism, to the many contradictions posed by their programmatic statements, and to the – obviously successful – construction of fear throughout our societies. In Vignette 1, I present one of many examples of the 'politics of denial' and the blame-game: how the current leader of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) Heinz-Christian Strache (brand name HC Strache), speaking in an interview on prime-time Austrian television, continually denies having intentionally posted an antisemitic cartoon on his Facebook page. In Chapter 2, I provide some

factual background (election results on the European and national levels from the 1980s to the present, in 2014) as well as a brief (and necessarily incomplete) review of important sociological and political science literature on right-wing populism. Two vignettes illustrate two important aspects of these ideologies: Euro-scepticism and the long and difficult search for European identities; and the rewriting of narratives of the past manifesting the need for national foundational myths, that is, historical revisionism. Chapter 3 elaborates important aspects of the discourse-historical approach (DHA) to critical discourse studies, and focuses on some salient linguistic phenomena and devices as well as specific discursive strategies, rhetorical tropes, argumentation schemes and the notion of *topos*: the *topoi of urgency*, *threat*, *the saviour* and *history* occur throughout right-wing populist rhetoric. Moreover, discursive strategies of justification and legitimation are frequently employed in the recurring 'politics of denial'. Vignette 4 is dedicated to the in-depth deconstruction of discourses about security, analysing a speech by the Dutch right-wing populist politician Geert Wilders. The illustrated strategies can, of course, be applied to many other instances of security debates. Vignette 5 focuses on one of the key concepts used throughout this book: 'calculated ambivalence', the strategy of addressing multiple and contradictory audiences via a single, cleverly layered message. Indeed, Jörg Haider, the former leader of the FPÖ, took this strategy to new heights. Vignette 6 identifies another important discursive strategy amply used in right-wing populist (and exclusionary) rhetoric: the strategy of victim/perpetrator reversal. This strategy is part and parcel of the justification discourse and the many attempts of shifting blame, creating scapegoats and blame avoidance. A summary of the most relevant contents as well as rhetorical and discursive strategies is provided at the end of this chapter, addressing readers who might have only a passing interest in linguistic details.

Chapter 4 is dedicated to the first of five topic-oriented chapters, tackling discourses about nationalism. Here, I argue that right-wing populism is characterized by renationalizing tendencies that go far beyond the commonly used 'family and house metaphors': *body and border politics* are emphasized in ethno-nationalist discourses drawing on traditional racist and indeed fascist ideologies. In this chapter, I further argue that we are currently experiencing a *normalization* of exclusionary rhetoric and illustrate this claim with two vignettes (8 and 9) from mainstream politics in the UK: the so-called 'bus incident', that is, 'Operation Vaken' during which London buses carried posters asking 'illegal migrants' to leave the country; and several political speeches by protagonists of the UK coalition government on restricting immigration. Furthermore, Vignette 7 exemplifies the above-mentioned body politics by analysing a poster series from Switzerland, Germany and Italy; Vignette 10 elaborates the new policies of gate-keeping via the emphasis on the 'mother-tongue', language and citizenship tests. Chapter 5 discusses the rise of antisemitism across Europe and traces significant differences in this respect between Western and Eastern European countries. I decided to restrict myself to analysing two instances of Holocaust denial, one each in Austria and in the UK, by way of two

respective vignettes as case studies: Vignette 11 traces the 2010 election campaign for Austrian Presidency and the candidacy of the FPÖ MP Barbara Rosenkranz. Vignette 12 focuses on the BNP's leader Nick Griffin and his participation – for the first time in the history of the BBC – in the well-known Thursday evening discussion programme *Question Time*. Both protagonists employ variants of coded Holocaust denial which have to be deconstructed in systematic qualitative ways. This chapter illustrates very clearly that antisemitism and anti-Muslim sentiments can occur simultaneously; Islamophobia has thus not substituted traditional antisemitism. It also reveals that old and new antisemitic stereotypes occur in parallel or are even merged, via a strategy I label as the '*Iudeus ex Machina*' strategy, that is, whenever scapegoats are needed, the enemy image of 'the Jews' is readily seized and articulated in ever new variants.

Chapter 6 presents the many 'faces' of right-wing populist leaders and politicians, their performance across the social and more traditional media, be it on Facebook, in comic books or in backstage speeches. Here, I also draw on some fieldwork in Washington, DC, conducted in the spring of 2012 during the Republican primaries for the November 2012 US presidential election. The concept of 'authenticity', that is, what it means to be a 'real American', is discussed with the example of the polarized debate surrounding Barack Obama's presidency. Moreover, I introduce some aspects the US Tea Party and, more specifically, the underlying ideology of Sarah Palin's 'frontier feminism'. Vignette 13 presents a case study of one right-wing populist leader, HC Strache of the Austrian FPÖ, as an example of the media-savvy young and demagogic, successful and charismatic male leaders of right-wing populist parties.

Chapter 7 confronts a rarely discussed and controversial phenomenon: the gender ideologies and the discourses that seek to discipline and regulate women's bodies in right-wing populism. It is, as a matter of fact, somewhat surprising that the debates about the 'burqa and headscarf' as well as about 'abortion and contraception' have not been noted as salient for both European and US right-wing populist ideologies. Indeed, I claim that these debates function as litmus tests between conservative values and progressive values. Political struggle has shifted from focusing on social class to focusing on values that cut across the traditional left/right cleavage. New frames are adopted by politicians from all parties and by both women and men. Vignette 14 illustrates the fear that is strategically and intentionally triggered by the constructed danger to 'our' Western culture through Muslim dress conventions. Vignette 15 elaborates on the debate about abortion, usually carried by male politicians, throughout US politics. The final Chapter 8 brings the many aspects discussed throughout this book together and poses the pertinent question about alternative politics: How can we all avoid falling into 'the trap' cleverly constructed day-in and day-out by right-wing populist ideologies and its rhetorical manifestations? While a ready-to-go recipe or check-list to this end is clearly beyond the scope of any single book, prospective critique implies not taking anything for granted and opening

up alternatives. The glossary provides facts and figures of the most important right-wing populist parties across Europe and beyond, thus aspects of the necessary socio-political context for the various analyses throughout this book.

Many friends and colleagues have contributed immensely to this book over the past three years of intensive research and writing (although this topic has continuously occupied my research agenda and thoughts since 1989 and our first research project on media reporting about immigration from 1990, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, resulting in articles and books in the 1990s). Rainer Bauböck, Rudolf de Cillia, Helmut Gruber, Franz Januschek, Tony Judt, Katharina Köhler, András Kovács, Verena Krausneker, Theo van Leeuwen, Jay Lemke, Bernd Matouschek, Anton Pelinka, Alexander Pollak, Martin Reisigl, Maria Sedlak-Arduç and Teun van Dijk were all part of discussions and research about the Austrian Freedom Party FPÖ, its then leader Jörg Haider and his 'infamous' rhetoric in the 1990s and early 2000s. Without these important discussions and our teamwork in various projects, the interdisciplinary foundations for these new and unexplored research agenda would not have been established. Debates on many occasions at Civil Society events (with Ernst Berger, Walter Manoschek, Rubina Möhring, Doron Rabinovici, Heidi Schrodt, Peter Weinberger and many others) after 2000 and the instalment of the so-called 'black and blue' government in Austria (a coalition comprising the Austrian People's Party ÖVP and the FPÖ) also contributed to the understanding of the enormous and unforeseen impact of changes implemented by this government, acknowledging that this was the first time the *European cordon sanitaire* was breached: a right-wing populist party with frequently coded racist, nativist, revisionist and antisemitic utterances became part of a government in the EU. These activities lastly formed my ethnography; I was able to experience the effects of such policies first-hand.

From 2003 to 2005, I participated in a European Fifth Framework Project with the acronym XENOPHOB ('The European Dilemma; Institutional Patterns and Racial Discrimination', http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/67097_en.html) as Principle Investigator of the Austrian team, together with Michał Krzyżanowski and Fleur Ulsamer. In this project we were able to conduct focus groups and thus record and analyse 'voices of migrants' in systematic detail, documenting many narratives about traumatic experiences. Via my work as Director of the Austrian National Focus Point, of the then European Monitoring Centre against Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC; under the leadership of Beate Winkler) from 2000 to 2002 (and later on as Vice-Director), I had the privilege of meeting many European experts and attending important workshops on developments after 9/11. Apart from Michał and Fleur, I am indebted to Brigitte Beauzamy, Tom Burns, Gerard Delanty, Helena Flam, Paul Jones, Jens Rydgren and Nicos Trimikliniotis, for inspiring discussions and their many exciting ideas.

When I moved to Lancaster in 2004, I continued with this work, for example in the Economic and Social

Research Council (ESRC)-funded project RASIM (http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/projects/rasim/), together with Paul Baker, Costas Gabrielatos, Majid Khosravinik, Michał Krzyżanowski and Tony McEnery. This media study opened new horizons, both methodologically and theoretically. We were able to analyse substantial amounts of data via corpus linguistic tools and then analyse a smaller corpus using qualitative discourse analysis; we provided much evidence for the continuous production and reproduction of exclusionary rhetoric via print media. During my time at Lancaster and in the UK, I had the great pleasure of working and publishing extensively with John Richardson on related topics – a truly wonderful experience. Many conversations at Lancaster, with David Barton, Paul Chilton, Jonathan Culpeper, Anne-Marie Fortier, Neil Foxlee, Bob Jessop, Maureen McNeil, Greg Myers, Lynne Pearce, Andrew Sayer, Jacky Stacey, Ngai-Ling Sum, John Urry and Sylvia Walby proved extremely fruitful. The 'Dynamics of Memory' Research Group, including Mercedes Camino, Agata Fialkowski, Patrick Hagophian, Aristotle Kallis, David Seymour, David Sugarman and Naomi Tadmor, contributed many insights through the comparison of right-wing populist politics with the past experiences of totalitarianism in many other European countries and beyond. I was extremely lucky to receive much feedback at various stages of my research. In 2010, I was able to fund and organize an international and interdisciplinary symposium with Brigitte Mral and Stig-Arne Nohrstedt at the University of Örebro where I had been awarded the Kerstin Hesselgren Chair of the Swedish Parliament in 2008. The interesting discussions in a wonderful Swedish lake environment provided the opportunity to address the many contradictory aspects, both general and specific, of right-wing populism with prominent international experts. During my semester at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, in spring 2014, as Davis Chair for Interdisciplinary Studies, I was able to spend much time with close friends and colleagues, with Deborah Tannen, Paul Portner, Anna de Fina, Marilyn Merrit and Heidi Hamilton. While walking through the woods, Deborah and I discussed, amongst many other topics, the gender politics of the Tea Party as well as the linguistics of apologies and disclaimers.

Most importantly, however, I am extremely grateful to my former and current PhD students: it was and continues to be a great pleasure and challenge to work with them, to discuss not only their research but also mine; I owe many insights to their critical, inspiring and knowledgeable questions and comments: Ana Tominc supported me in my research on the Tea Party, transcribed the *Question Time* episode analysed in Chapter 5 and became an expert in drawing diagrams; Salomi Boukala helped in collecting the complex and diverse facts about the various European right-wing populist parties and discussed the ongoing crisis in Greece as well as the rise of the Golden Dawn Party with me; Sten Hansson provided much insight on blame avoidance and found many websites and documents about the UK and UKIP; Federico Sicurella told me about the peculiar role of nationalistic intellectuals in post-Yugoslavia, Johnny Unger about the impact of social media for political movements, Bernhard Forchtner and Karin Stögner about the intricacies of the

Frankfurt School, Kristof Savski about ‘Slovenian language-only’ movements, Can Küçükali about recent political developments in Turkey and José Manuel Ferreiro Gomez about past and present in Chile. I am also very grateful to Shaimaa Zaher, Soudeh Ghaffari, Zoe Arezoo and Taira Amin who all taught me a lot about the complexities of Islam and the various Muslim communities. Tony Capstick traced the difficult journey for Pakistani immigrants to Lancashire in the UK, and thus documented the many obstacles facing migrants in our globalized world. Reaching the end of this list, I have come to realize that there would be much more to say! Let me conclude, therefore, with a summary ‘Thank you’ to the many students, colleagues and friends who have also played an important role in conceptualizing this book.

Finally, I am extremely grateful to Andrew Sayer, who commented on the draft manuscript of this book and provided very useful comments, and to the anonymous reviewers of the book proposal and manuscript who detected important gaps and inconsistencies. Of course, this book would not have been finished without the support of Markus Rheindorf. Markus read many drafts of the chapters, revised my English, and frequently detected inconsistencies, redundancies and contradictions. I am very grateful to him for his patience and his loyalty. I am also indebted to SAGE Publications and specifically to Mila Steele, who always managed to heave me out of black holes whenever I fell into them during my writing, as well as to Imogen Roome and Solveig Gardner Servian who were both responsible for the careful copy-editing of the book manuscript.

My son Jakob not only triggered the idea for this book, he also had to listen to my worries and fears, and commented on my final draft chapters. I have learnt so much from his profound intellectual critique, from his differentiated views about politics, and from his informed questions and comments. This summer, Jakob spent a month in Vienna and we shared the same office – Jakob working on his PhD thesis and I on this book. Sometimes, we interrupted each other, though meaningfully; Jakob was always ready to listen, to read and to discuss. My loving partner Georg frequently had to live without me during the writing of this book: literally, because we commuted between Lancaster and Vienna; and metaphorically, because I sometimes vanished into my study – into the self-imposed isolation of writing – when focused entirely on finishing the last chapters. Our many discussions at dinner, on the phone, in the holidays, in the range of everyday situations in recent years were dominated by aspects of this book. His contributions are invaluable, his patience endless, and his support was always forthcoming. I am so grateful to both of you, thank you!

Ruth Wodak

# Acknowledgements

I am indebted to:

Salomi Boukala and Ashgate, for the reuse of some parts of Geert Wilder's speech and parts of our analysis of this speech (Wodak and Boukala, 2014)

Jakob Engel and Routledge/Taylor and Francis, for the reuse of parts of the analysis of the 'Rosenkranz Affair' (Engel and Wodak, 2013)

John E. Richardson and *Controversies*, for the reuse of Image 7.2 and parts of our analysis of this image (Richardson and Wodak, 2009a)

Martin Reisigl and Wiley-Blackwell, for the reuse of Image 6.10 and parts of our analysis of this image (Wodak and Reisigl, 2015; in press)

*Journal of Language, Identity, and Education*, for the reproduction of two images (Images 4.6 and 4.7) and parts of the analysis of these images (Wodak, 2013c)

Nicole Doerr, for the use of Image 4.4

All the respective parts of analyses mentioned above have been shortened and also partly changed, refocused and rewritten. All the co-authors mentioned above have given me their explicit written permission for such use in this book.

# Populism and Politics: Transgressing Norms and Taboos

> ‘For fundamentalist elites all over the world, fear is an effective antidote against the secularizing effects of communicative freedom.’
>
> Matteo Stocchetti (2007, 229)

## Analysing the Micro-Politics of Right-wing Populism

Whenever I lecture about right-wing populism and right-wing populist rhetoric, people in the audience pose many questions, such as:

> Are not all politicians populists?
>
> Don’t other politicians sometimes construct scapegoats and use similar rhetorical tropes as do right-wing populist politicians?
>
> Don’t the so-called right-wing populist politicians all draw on the same plethora of linguistic, pragmatic or rhetorical devices as already used by Cicero and other rhetoricians from antique times?

Such challenges raise the pertinent question of the novelty of this topic. What kind of new knowledge or which kind of explanations could anybody actually add to what we have long known about this complex phenomenon? Let me start with some brief answers to these and similar questions.

Most importantly, right-wing populism does not only relate to the *form* of rhetoric but to its specific *contents*: such parties successfully construct fear and – related to the various real or imagined dangers – propose scapegoats that are blamed for threatening or actually damaging our societies, in Europe and beyond.

Moreover, tendencies of *renationalization* across the EU and beyond can be observed; tendencies of creating ever new borders (and even walls), of linking the nation state and citizenship (naturalization) with nativist (frequently gendered and fundamentalist religious) *body politics*, lie at the core of right-wing populist ideologies. We thus seem to be experiencing a revival of the ‘*Volk*’ and the ‘*Volkskörper*’[1] in the separatist rhetoric of

right-wing populist parties, for example, in the Ukraine, Russia, Greece as well as Hungary. At the same time, very real walls of stone, brick and cement are also being constructed to keep the 'Others' out, who are defined as different and deviant. *Body politics are therefore integrated with border politics*.

Of course, much research in the social sciences provides ample evidence for the current rise of right-wing populist movements and related political parties in most European Union (EU) member states and beyond.[2] On the one hand, we observe neo-Nazi movements in the form of extreme far-right parties and horrific hate crimes such as that committed by Anders Breivik in July 2011 in Norway, from which all right-wing populist parties immediately distanced themselves publicly;[3] on the other hand, a salient shift is occurring in the forms and styles of political rhetoric of 'soft' right-wing populist parties which could be labelled as 'the *Haiderization* of politics', a label relating to the former leader of the Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreich or FPÖ), Jörg Haider. Haider's performance, style, rhetoric and ideologies have become the metonymic symbol of such parties' success across Europe. Indeed, the FPÖ has paved the way for the dissemination of a new, frequently *coded* xenophobic, racist and antisemitic, exclusionary and anti-elitist politics since 1989 and the fall of the so-called Iron Curtain.[4]

Right-wing populist parties across Europe and beyond draw on and combine different *political imaginaries*[5] and different traditions, evoke (and construct) different nationalist pasts in the form of *identity narratives*, and emphasize a range of different issues in everyday politics: some parties gain support via flaunting an ambivalent relationship with *fascist* and *Nazi* pasts (e.g. in Austria, Hungary, Italy, Romania and France); some parties, in contrast, focus primarily on a *perceived threat from Islam* (e.g. in the Netherlands, Denmark, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland); some parties restrict their propaganda to a *perceived danger to their national identities* from ethnic minorities and migrants (e.g. in Hungary, Greece, Italy and the UK); and some parties primarily endorse a *traditional Christian (fundamentalist) conservative-reactionary agenda* (e.g. in the US).[6] In their free-for-all rush for votes, most right-wing populist parties evidently pursue several such strategies at once, depending on the specific audience and context; thus, the above-mentioned distinctions are primarily of an analytic nature. In any case, I claim that:

- all right-wing populist parties instrumentalize some kind of ethnic/religious/linguistic/political minority as a *scapegoat* for most if not all current woes and subsequently construe the respective group as dangerous and a threat '*to us*', to 'our' nation; this phenomenon manifests itself as a 'politics of fear';
- all right-wing populist parties seem to endorse what can be recognized as the 'arrogance of ignorance'; appeals to common-sense and anti-intellectualism mark a return to pre-modernist or pre-En-

lightenment thinking.

In this book I am concerned with the *micro-politics* of right-wing populist parties – *how they actually produce and reproduce their ideologies and exclusionary agenda in everyday politics, in the media, in campaigning, in posters, slogans and speeches*. Ultimately, I am concerned with how *they succeed (or fail) in sustaining their electoral success*. The dynamics of everyday performances frequently transcend careful analytic categorizations; boundaries between categories are blurred and flexible, open to change and ever new socio-economic developments.

Below, I first elaborate on the many ways in which fear is continuously invoked and legitimized by right-wing populist parties; I then briefly trace the history of populist movements and present a working definition of right-wing populism that should help in understanding the impact of these political movements in the 21st century. Moreover, by way of example, I illustrate the typical *politics of denial* that characterizes much of right-wing populist rhetoric – the specific ways in which media scandals are provoked and then dominate the agenda, forcing all other important topics into the background. Indeed, instrumentalizing the media, both traditional and new, is part and parcel of the immediate success of such political movements. After discussing the example in Vignette 1, I identify some of the typical characteristics and rhetorical patterns of right-wing populist parties in a range of national contexts selected due to the distinctions made above, such as Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the UK and the US.

**Right-wing Populism: Form and Content**

Returning to the questions raised above, we see that they are not difficult to answer: For example, the sociologist and media expert Dick Pels (2012, 31ff.) emphasizes that it would be dangerous to regard modern populism as void of serious content or to reduce the new right-wing populism to a 'frivolity of form, pose and style' and thus to downplay its outreach, its messages and resonance. Indeed, it would be, Pels continues, 'erroneous to think there is no substance behind its political style. […] It is precisely through its dynamic mix of substance and style that populist politics has gained an electoral lead position in current media democracy' (ibid., 32; see also Reisigl 2013, 159). Pels lists various important socio-political challenges that currently concern voters, especially during times of financial and environmental crises, and which are related to a multitude of fears, disaffection and pessimism: fear of losing one's job; fear of 'strangers' (i.e. migrants); fear of losing national autonomy; fear of losing old traditions and values; fear of climate change; disappointment and even

disgust with mainstream politics and corruption; anger about the growing gap between rich and poor; disaffection due to the lack of transparency of political decision making and so forth (Rydgren 2007). Thus, when analysing right-wing (or, indeed, left-wing) populist movements and their rhetoric, it is essential to recognize that their propaganda – realized as it is in many genres across relevant social domains – always *combines and integrates form and content*, targets specific audiences and adapts to specific contexts. Only by doing so are we able to deconstruct, understand and explain their messages, the resonance of their messages and their electoral success.

### Right-wing Populism: Creating Scapegoats

'Populism simplifies complex developments by looking for a culprit', states the political scientist Anton Pelinka (2013, 8). He argues that:

> [a]s the enemy – the foreigner, the foreign culture – has already succeeded in breaking into the fortress of the nation state, someone must be responsible. The élites are the secondary 'defining others', responsible for the liberal democratic policies of accepting cultural diversity. The populist answer to the complexities of a more and more pluralistic society is not multiculturalism. […] right-wing populism sees multiculturalism as a recipe to denationalize one's (own) nation, to deconstruct one's (own) people.
>
> (ibid.)

Right-wing populist parties seem to offer simple and clear-cut answers to all the fears and challenges mentioned above, for example by constructing scapegoats and enemies – 'Others' which are to blame for our current woes – by frequently tapping into traditional collective stereotypes and images of the enemy. The latter depend, I further claim, on the respective historical traditions in specific national, regional and even local contexts: sometimes, the scapegoats are Jews, sometimes Muslims, sometimes Roma or other minorities, sometimes capitalists, socialists, career women, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the EU, the United Nations, the US or Communists, the governing parties, the elites, the media and so forth. 'They' are foreigners, defined by 'race', religion or language. 'They' are elites not only within the respective country, but also on the European stage ('Brussels') and global level ('Financial Capital'). Important fissures and divides within a society, such as class, caste, religion, gender and so forth, are neglected in focusing on such 'Others'

or are interpreted as the result of 'elitist conspiracies'. The discursive strategies of 'victim–perpetrator reversal', 'scapegoating' and the 'construction of conspiracy theories' therefore belong to the necessary 'toolkit' of right-wing populist rhetoric. In short, anybody can potentially be constructed as dangerous 'Other', should it become expedient for specific strategic and manipulative purposes. Pelinka recently observed a shift in the construction of the 'Other' and particularly emphasizes that

> contemporary populism does not so much mobilize against the (perceived) enemy above but more against the (perceived) enemy from abroad. Populism has become more and more ethno-nationalistic. Populist anti-élitism today is directed against those who seem to be responsible for Europeanization and globalization, and especially for mass migration, against élites who have opened the doors to foreign influence and to foreigners. […] And, of course, the tendency to see individuals (politicians – the 'classe politica', or intellectuals – 'the chattering classes') as responsible for modernizing trends is beyond any realistic and empirically sound analysis of the trend which tends to put an end to the nation state.
>
> (2013, 9)

It is therefore important that we attempt to understand and explain *how* right-wing populist parties continuously *construct fear* in order to address the collective common-ground as well as their reasons and (rhetorical and communicative) means. This is necessary in order to understand *why and how* right-wing populist parties are achieving ever more success across Europe and beyond, especially in recent national and European elections. This is the main question that I attempt to answer throughout this book, by exploring and systematically analysing a range of different socio-political contexts, histories and empirical examples.

## Creating Fear: Legitimizing a Politics of Exclusion

Obviously, the phenomena of right-wing extremism and right-wing populism are not new. And neither is their focus on fear. Indeed, David Altheide in his book *Creating Fear* (2002) very convincingly presents the ways in which scenarios of danger have been constructed ubiquitously in US media and politics for many years. He argues that

> fear has become a dominant public perspective. Fear begins with things we fear, but over time, with

> enough repetition and expanded use, it becomes a way of looking at life. Therefore, it is not 'fear of crime', for instance, that is so interesting to me, but rather how fear has emerged as a framework for developing identities and for engaging in social life. Fear is one of the perspectives that citizens share today; while liberals and conservatives may differ in their object of fear, all sides express many fears and point to 'blameworthy' sources – often each other! The fear 'market' has also spawned an extensive cottage industry that promotes new fears and an expanding array of 'victims'.
>
> (2002, 3)

Altheide goes on to emphasize that a large number of social scientists and experts are now marketing 'their self-help books, courses, research funds and expertise' which address anxieties related to the 'self' (2002, 3). Best (2001, 6) substantiates Altheide's arguments and claims that the media produce and reproduce fear and, simultaneously, sell solutions related to moral assumptions to a quite passive audience in the US. Of course, such threats and dangers easily refer to scenarios and horror stories created during the Cold War and continued after 9/11 (e.g. Stocchetti 2007; Stone 2002). In the US (and elsewhere), these debates are frequently instrumental in legitimizing proposals for either more gun control or less gun control – a conflict which has found its way into European debates as well; of course, the horrific 'Breivik incident' lends itself to such debates.

Right-wing populist parties successfully create fear and legitimize their policy proposals (usually related to restricting immigration and so forth; see Wodak and Boukala 2014, 2015) with an appeal to the necessities of security. As will be elaborated later, such arguments became eminent after the end of the Cold War in 1989 and were, of course, forcefully invigorated after 9/11. Each crisis contributes to such scenarios, as can be observed with respect to the financial crisis and the Euro-crisis (Angouri and Wodak 2014; Stråth and Wodak 2009). In such crisis situations, both politics and media tend to reduce complex historical processes to snap-shots which allow constructing and triggering Manichean dichotomies – friends and foes, perpetrators and victims, and so forth. As argued by Murray Edelman in his seminal book *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (1967), crises are promoted to serve the interests of political leaders and other interest groups who will most certainly benefit from such definitions (e.g. Altheide 2002, 12). We are therefore confronted by a contingency of factors that serve to facilitate dichotomist perspectives, create scapegoats and play into the hands of right-wing populist parties: traditional and new threat scenarios, real and exaggerated crises as well as related horror and moral narratives, real and exaggerated security issues, media reporting that reproduces fear scenarios, and political parties which instrumentalize all these factors to legitimize exclusionary policies. It is evident that

all of these factors are related to each other: that they are, in fact, interdependent. This contingency is best understood by recalling the relevant observations made by Berger and Luckmann:

> Legitimation as a process is best described as a 'second-order' objectivation of meaning as it produces new meanings that serve to integrate the meanings already attached to disparate institutional processes. The function of legitimation is to make objectively available and subjectively plausible the 'first-order' objectivations that have been institutionalized.
>
> (1966, 110–111)

Moreover, the authors emphasize that

> [t]he problem of legitimation inevitably arises when the objectivations of the (now historic) institutional order are to be transmitted to a new generation […] when the unity of history and biography is broken. In order to restore it, and thus to make intelligible both aspects of it, there must be 'explanations' and justifications of the salient elements of the institutional tradition. Legitimation is this process of 'explaining' and justifying. Legitimation justifies the institutional order by giving a normative dignity to its practical imperatives. It is important to understand that legitimation has a cognitive as well as a normative element. In other words, legitimation is not just a matter of 'values'. It always implies 'knowledge' as well.
>
> (1966, 110–111)

#### Right-wing Populism: Crisis and Rising Unemployment

Following the above definition of legitimation, Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) introduced a framework for analysing the language of legitimation with four major categories: authorization, moral evaluation, rationalization and mythopoesis. Authorization is legitimation by referring to authority, be that a person, tradition, custom or law. Moral evaluation means legitimation by reference to value systems. Rationalization is legitimation by reference to knowledge claims or arguments. Mythopoesis is legitimation achieved by narratives; these are often small stories or fragments of narrative structures about the past or future. These main types involve a number of sub-types and are also frequently connected. Thus, to understand the specific dynamics of legitimation in particular contexts, such as the financial crisis of 2008 for example, it is important to focus on the typical patterns and characteristics of these discursive strategies in context. Indeed, it is of interest to under-

stand what kind of arguments are put forward and resonate with the public; for example, when legitimizing further austerity measures, governments tend to justify new cuts with necessity or responsibility – arbitrary cuts are then essentialized as necessary in order to protect the nation state and its people (Sayer 2015). When analysing right-wing populist rhetoric, we usually detect legitimization by moral evaluation and mythopoesis: the use of specific moral stances and exemplary reformulated historical narratives (myths) to legitimize 'Othering' and typically implement ever more restrictive immigration measures.

Accordingly, Dettke states that

> [n]ationalist and radical right parties have emerged everywhere in Europe. East and West, and once nationalist radical right wing parties become a stronger force also on the European level, it will be more difficult to preserve the legitimacy and authority of European institutions.
>
> (2014, 10)

More specifically, Dettke (ibid.) argues that the collapse of the Soviet empire has allowed long-suppressed national aspirations and goals to find their outlet in radical ethno-nationalist parties and movements, whereas in Southern Europe youth unemployment has become a – or perhaps *the* – salient problem, with more than one quarter (or even half) of the younger generation facing unemployment. In the spring of 2014, youth unemployment in Greece stood at 62.5 per cent, in Spain at 56.4 per cent, in Portugal at 42.5 per cent, and in Italy at 40.5 per cent;[7] youth unemployment therefore might in fact unleash a new wave of xenophobia, chauvinism and radicalism. These phenomena frequently remind us of the collective experiences of the 20th century and the staggering economic crisis of the 1930s. However, the analogy does not account for the impact of neo-liberal policies since the 1970s and 1980s, the disastrous effect of privatization of many domains of our societies and the deregulation of the financial sector as well as the resulting austerity policies to combat the financial crisis since 2008. As Sayer convincingly argues in his comprehensive analysis of the impact of neo-liberal austerity policies as response to the financial crisis,

> [a]usterity policies fall most heavily on those at the bottom while the top 10%, and particularly the top 1%, are protected … How ridiculous that the answer to our economic problems is seen as wasting more of our most important asset – people.
>
> (2015, 1)

The rise and success of right-wing populist parties can certainly also be explained as reaction to such policies, as uniting the modernization losers, the people 'who are left behind' (Mileti and Plomb 2007, 25). Oesch (2008) elaborates in great detail, while comparing five right-wing populist parties (the Austrian FPÖ, the Belgium VIB, the French FN, the Norwegian FrP and the Swiss SVP [see glossary for more information on these parties]), why many workers who traditionally voted for left-wing parties have recently tended to switch to right-wing populist parties. His results (while investigating preferences of male workers) illustrate well that fear-mongering has been successful in many instances, albeit in different ways: in the FPÖ and SVP, negative attitudes towards immigrants and fear of losing one's jobs dominate. Also, fear of negative influence on 'one's culture' is important. In Belgium, however, dissatisfaction with the government and the state of the Belgian democracy as well as cultural protectionism seem to be the primary motifs for voting for the VIB. The same holds true in Norway. In France, however, all three factors – dissatisfaction, fear of wage dumping, fear of the culture being undermined by immigration – prove salient (2007, 366–8). As the socio-cultural fears are also influencing other segments of society, old cleavages prove to be more and more obsolete and values are perceived as more important than social class and traditional class struggles (Marsdal 2013).

## The Concept of Populism

### Right-wing Populism: A First Definition

Right-wing populism can be defined as a political ideology that rejects existing political consensus and usually combines laissez-faire liberalism and anti-elitism. It is considered populism because of its appeal to the 'common man/woman' as opposed to the elites; this appeal to a quasi-homogenous *demos* is regarded as salient for such movements (see Betz and Immerfall 1998, 4–5). As Betz rightly argues,

> their [the 'elites'] inability to restore the sense of security and prosperity, which steady material and social advances in the post-war period had led their citizens to expect from their leaders, has become a major cause of voter alienation and cynicism. […] It is within this context of growing public pessimism, anxiety, and disaffection that the rise and success of radical right-wing populism in Western Europe finds at least a partial explanation.

(1994, 41)

Mudde and Kaltwasser elaborate this definition further and emphasize that populism (both left-wing and right-wing) 'considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, "the pure people" and "the corrupt elite"' (2012, 8). Moreover, they claim that populism always perceives 'politics to be an expression of the *volonté générale* of the people' (ibid.). This makes antagonism and the Manichean division into good and bad, friends and foes, we and 'the other' salient characteristics of populism. Mudde and Kaltwasser conclude their conceptual analysis by arguing that three core concepts necessarily belong to any serious definition of populism: the people, the elite and the general will; and its two direct opposites – elitism and pluralism (ibid., 9).[8]

When tracing the history of the concept of 'populism', we quickly discover that the word 'populism' stems from the Latin word *populus*, which means 'people' in English (in the sense of 'folk', 'nation', as in 'The Roman People' (*populus Romanus*) or the German '*Volk*', not in the sense of 'multiple individual persons', e.g. Musolff 2010):[9] 'populism' espouses 'government by the people as a whole'. This stands in contrast to elitism, aristocracy or plutocracy, each of which define an ideology that implies government by a small, privileged, specifically selected group above the masses (i.e. selected by birth, wealth, election, education and so forth). Populism has been a prominent political phenomenon throughout history. The *Populares*, for example, were an unofficial faction in the Roman senate whose supporters were well known for their populist agenda. Some of these senators, such as Tiberius Gracchus, Gaius Marius, Julius Caesar and Caesar Augustus, were very prominent. They all eventually employed referenda to bypass the Roman Senate and appeal directly to the people (NB women, slaves and foreigners were not permitted to vote).

#### Populism in the 19th and 20th Centuries: Historical Developments and National Differences

Populism as a modern phenomenon with a more direct impact on politics emerges in different forms, beginning with the 19th century. Such movements – from the so-called 'Agrarian populism' in the North American West to 'Peronism' in Argentina – all aimed for a better, 'real' democracy (e.g. Canovan 1981; Pelinka 2013). Although populism in the US and Europe currently tends to be associated mostly (but not only) with right-wing parties, the central meaning of populism – that democracy should reflect the 'pure and undiluted' will of the people – implies that it can accommodate ideologies of both the traditional right and left. However, while lead-

ers of populist movements in recent decades have claimed to be on either the left or the right of the political spectrum, there are also many populists who reject such dichotomist categorizations and claim to be neither 'left wing', 'centrist' nor 'right wing' (e.g. Betz 1994; Canovan 1981). In this way, one can in theory claim that populism supports popular sovereignty and majority rule; moreover, populists usually accept representation by someone of 'the people', but not of 'the elite' (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012, 17). Of course, it is the populists who define – quite arbitrarily and depending on their interests – who should belong to which group.

Left-wing and right-wing populist parties differ in important aspects, namely in that the latter are inwards looking, thus primarily nationalist/chauvinist, referring to a nativist body politics, while left-wing populist parties are traditionally oriented towards internationalism or post-nationalism. Pelinka (2013, 5) defines the beginning of populism as a form of protest against the overwhelming power of specific privileged elites in the 19th century: economic elites like the 'trusts' in the US; social elites like the dominant aristocracies; political elites like elected representatives who were perceived not to care enough for the interests of 'the people'. As Pelinka convincingly argues (ibid.), the intellectual and analytical weakness of populist democracy always seems to be rooted in the inherent hegemonic assumption that such a *homogenous people* exist. Who is included in and who is excluded from the *demos* is thus not related to social and cultural developments but seen as a very simplistic dogma, a quasi-discrete definition that ignores social differentiation, distinctions and fragmentations (Laclau 2005). National as well as ethnic and racialized identities are discursively constructed to create an imaginary of nativist (essentialized) and quasi-natural borders between 'Us' and 'Them'. Differences (of any kind) within 'the people' are therefore denied. Populists create a *demos* which exists above and beyond the divides and diversities of social class and religion, gender and generation.

Populism was also exceedingly influential in South American nation states. For example, in Argentina in the 1940s, a local brand of fascist populism termed 'Peronism' emerged, named after its leader Juan Perón. Its roots lie in the intellectual fascist movement of the 1920s and 1930s that delegitimized democracy in Argentina (Blamires 2006, 26). More recently, South American leaders such as former President Hugo Chavez in Venezuela endorsed a more left-wing populism. Moreover, recent research on populist politics and policies in South America (e.g. Peru and Venezuela) provides ample evidence that we are dealing with an 'inclusive populism' in these contexts, whereas right-wing populism in Europe manifests itself as an exclusionary force. Accordingly, Roberts justifiably claims that

> Chavez's self-proclaimed 'Bolivarian Revolution' was authentic, and it provided a textbook illustration

> of the ways in which populism's inclusionary dynamic can expand opportunities for democratic participation at the same time that its majoritarian logic restricts institutional spaces for effective democratic contestation.
>
> (2012, 138)

There have also been several versions of populist parties in the US, some inspired by the Populist Party of the 1890s, the party of the early US populist movement in which millions of farmers and other working people successfully enacted their anti-trust agenda (Pelinka 2013, 3, 15). Other early populist political parties in the US included the Greenback Party, the Progressive Party of 1912 led by Theodore Roosevelt, the Progressive Party of 1924 led by Robert M. La Follette, Sr., and the Share Our Wealth movement of Huey Long in 1933–1935. Populism continues to be an important force in modern US politics, especially in the 1992 and 1996 third-party presidential campaigns of billionaire Ross Perot and in the so-called 'Tea-Party' since Barack Obama's first term in 2008 (Schweitzer 2012).

Ralph Nader's 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008 presidential campaigns also endorsed a strong populist programme. Of course, any strict comparison between earlier populist movements and those of today is impossible because of significant changes in the so-called interests of the common people as well as socio-political changes and local and global developments. In one of the most recent examples of populist movements in 2012 and 2013, participants of the left-wing populist Occupy movement chose the widely popular slogan 'We are the 99 per cent'. The Occupy leadership used the elliptic and metonymic label 'the 1 per cent' to refer to the 1 per cent of Americans who are regarded as the wealthiest citizens; the 1 per cent that is commonly said and statistically proved to possess more than 50 per cent of the country's wealth (Sayer 2015). The Occupy movement emphasized that this 1 per cent was responsible for huge economic instability and inequality. Lowndes and Warren (2011) thus maintained that Occupy was the 'first major populist movement on the US left since the 1930s'.[10]

Finally, it is important to mention Silvio Berlusconi, leader of the People of Freedom Party and former Prime Minister of Italy for almost 10 years. When Berlusconi entered politics with his party Forza Italia in 1994, he established a new kind of populism which focused on the media's total control via ownership and censorship (Ruzza and Balbo 2013) – I label this form of populism *Berlusconisation*. Berlusconi and his allies have won three elections (1994, 2001 and 2008), the latter with his new right-wing party People of Freedom. In 2009

Beppe Grillo, a former comedian, blogger and activist, founded the so-called Five Star Movement. This party advocates direct democracy and free access to the Internet, and strongly condemns corruption. The movement's programme also contains elements of right-wing populism and American-style libertarianism. The party is considered populist, ecologist and Eurosceptic. Grillo is a highly successful performer and speaker, and comes across as authentic, close to the people and anti-elitist (Molé 2013). In the 2013 Italian election the Five Star Movement – to the surprise of all media and observers – gained 25.5 per cent of votes, winning 109 deputies and 54 senators (Fella and Ruzza 2013; Fusi 2014). Explanations range from deep disappointment with all parties of the establishment, anger about austerity measures, anti-Berlusconi vote, Euro-scepticism and protest to enthusiastic support for new creative forms of politics.

### Populism and Fascism

Some researchers have argued that populist elements have always also appealed to and appeared in far-right authoritarian or fascist movements.[11] For example, conspiracy theories combined with scapegoating as employed by various populist movements can create 'a seedbed for fascism' (Rupert 1997, 96). Certainly, national socialist populism interacted with and facilitated fascism in interwar Germany and Austria (Posch et al. 2013).

Along the same vein, Schmitt maintains that the Führer-state represented the 'people's will' more efficiently and more truthfully than the liberal parliamentarianism of Weimar or Westminster (e.g. Pelinka 2013, 5). Thus, the national-socialist Führer or the fascist Duce continuously emphasized and thus legitimized (via mythopoesis) that they acted on behalf of *the* people, as saviours, sent as messenger by some mythical (frequently religious) *persona*. In practice, this meant that the people should applaud the actions of the leader and, in so doing, legitimize them (Schmitt 2007, 80–96). Legitimation qua authority also played a decisive role in these ideologies – in German, this specific discursive strategy is labelled the *Sendebotentrick* (see Maas 1985). Post-war, the terminology changed to *Robin Hood*, the commoner who saves the 'common man and woman on the street'. The *topos of saviour* occurs widely in right-wing populist rhetoric and refers to a simple argumentation scheme such as: 'If danger is to be expected because of X and if A has saved us in the past, then A will be able to save us again' (Wodak and Forchtner 2014).

Thus, ever since the end of World War II, revisionist ideologies have circulated and been adopted by neo-

Nazi or right-wing extremist parties such as the FPÖ, the French Front National (FN), the Sweden-Democrats and the British National Party (BNP) (e.g. Beauzamy 2013a; Oje and Mral 2013; Richardson 2013a, 2013b; Wodak and Richardson 2013). While resemblances to older, well-known ideologies can be identified in many of the 'new' right-wing discourses (Mammone 2009), Betz (1996) rightly points to the fact that right-wing populism differs from those other trends as it does not convey a coherent narrative and ideology but rather proposes a mixed, often contradictory array of beliefs, stereotypes, attitudes and related programmes which aim to address and mobilize a range of equally contradictory segments of the electorate.

Below, in Vignette 1, I illustrate some typical discursive and rhetorical strategies employed by right-wing populist parties in their attempt to dominate the political agenda and media reporting, and thus to determine the hegemonic discourse, by briefly analysing a television interview with the current leader of the FPÖ, HC Strache. This vignette will reappear at various points throughout this book: in Chapters 2 and 3, some of the pertinent theoretical dimensions will be elaborated in more detail. In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, I will point to salient elements of visual rhetoric and argumentation (i.e. multimodality) which are prominent in the example discussed below. There, I will also analyse various television interviews and debates between right-wing populist politicians and television moderators. In the last chapter of this book, I discuss the implications of such hegemonic politics of denial as propagated by right-wing populist parties and their protagonists.

# 'Anything goes!': Setting the Agenda via Provocation and Scandalization

### Right-wing Populism: Taking Advantage of the Media

Currently, we are witnessing the development of a 'media-democracy' across Europe and beyond, in which the individual, media-savvy performance of politics seems to become more important than the political process (Grande 2000; Wodak 2010; Stögner and Wodak 2014). Accordingly, politics is reduced to a few slogans thought comprehensible to the public at large. This development can be recognized also in the fact that contemporary politics does not only rely on the media as 'the most important source of information and vehicle of communication between the governors and the governed' (Strömbäck 2008, 230). The media have

also contributed to the transformation of politics through more and continuous emphasis on 'frontstage performances' (Goffman 1959; Wodak 2011a). As argued by Forchtner et al. (2013), the manifold patterns of media communication and the clever and ubiquitous appropriation of media agenda and frames employed in the recent success of populist-right parties cannot be dismissed or marginalized as a mere coincidence. Furthermore, the disproportionate success of some of these parties, Ellinas (2009) goes on to suggest, can probably be explained by the excessive exposure that these parties receive in the media, despite their lack of what used to be regarded as required organizational and political structures (ibid.). As Bos et al. (2010, 3) illustrate, successful right-wing populist leaders have actually managed to achieve a delicate balance between, on the one hand, appearing unusual and populist, or anti-establishment, and on the other, authoritative and legitimate; thus they counter the elites but do not oppose the liberal democratic system per se. Frequently, this is achieved by scandalization (Wodak 2013a, 2013b) or by what Albertazzi labels 'dramatization', that is, 'the need to generate tension in order to build up support for the party […] by denouncing the tragedies that would befall the community if it were to be deprived of its defences' (2007, 335). Scandalization also implies manifold references to the allegedly charismatic leaders of such parties, who construct themselves as knowledgeable, saviours, problem solvers and crisis managers, which may lead voters to have more confidence in the effectiveness of the politics of the populist right-wing (see Chapter 6).

Of course, politics, media and business have always, to some degree, been interdependent.[12] The aforementioned changes have recently led to a further blurring of the boundaries between entertainment and information as well as between private and public domains, between marketing, advertising and campaigning, between politicians and celebrities and so forth (Higgins 2008; Street 2010); a blurring of boundaries, in other words, that used to be seen as vital and essential to the structure of modern, democratic societies. Wodak (2011a, 157) has described this process as the *fictionalization of politics*, that is, 'the blurring of boundaries in politics between the real and the fictional, the informative and the entertaining' that creates a reality for the viewer which appears ordered and manageable – and thus presents a deceptively simple illusion in contrast to the very real complexity and pluralism of present-day societies. Moreover, Hay (2007) contends that public discontent with contemporary politics (on which the rise of populist parties partly rests) has led not to a decrease but to an increase in what is expected of politicians; most parties have responded to these increased expectations by reducing an increasingly complex world to media-savvy personalities and their simplistic slogans. Criticism directed at mainstream programmes and content is routinely responded to by admitting that 'things have not been communicated well' or even 'not sold well' in the diction of the parties themselves and

by asserting that the only thing that needs to be improved is communication (by implication via the media) (Hansson 2015). Although Karvonen (2010) stresses major differences in the amounts and modes of personalization and performativity across EU member states, the case of the FPÖ is a telling example of this tendency.

Current analyses also stress the transformation of discourses and performances of political action and their representation in contemporary Europe in terms of the *celebrity culture* in the political field.[13] For example, beginning in the early 1990s, the Austrian politician Jörg Haider changed the character of the political game in significant ways (Krzyżanowski and Wodak 2009). The former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi (Mancini 2011; Semino and Koller 2009) exemplified this new type of political leader in Italy. The way the tension between extraordinariness and being 'one of us' (i.e. being 'authentic') was cleverly managed by Haider on frontstage and further developed by his successor, HC Strache (as he is branded), in many different publics and genres, from television interviews to snippets caught on video while dancing in a disco, from pamphlets and manifestos to posters and comic booklets, all of which are accessible on HC Strache's homepage[14] and disseminated via Facebook[15] (see Chapter 6).

*Media democracies* and the hybridity of political and everyday practices imply an increase in quasi-informality and 'democratisation', arguably also in 'politics as usual' (Wodak 2011a). Indeed, following Alexander (2006), the *symbolic dimension* of 'doing politics' must be understood as central to *all* efforts of a politician's performance, in the media, at election rallies, in parliament, at press conferences and so forth (Forchtner et al. 2013). While Alexander is certainly not the first scholar to emphasize the symbolic dimension of politics, his approach reaches further than both Edelman (1967) and Goffman (1959) in their focus on the symbolic dimensions of frontstage performance.[16] Alexander not only stresses the need to create a collective representation which is attractive to, and resonates with, the audience in election campaigns (and beyond), he also emphasizes that these performances must hook into the background culture, symbols, narratives and myths of the respective society in order to be successful. In other words, if such symbolic practices are supposed to resonate, they have to draw on and mobilize a common cultural structure, via appeals to common knowledge of epistemic communities, to the *endoxa* by using presuppositions, insinuations and other pragmatic devices as well as specific argumentation schemes. The details of the linguistic, rhetorical and argumentative analysis of right-wing populist text and talk will be examined in Chapter 3. Vignette 1 serves as an introduction to the analysis of the micro-politics of right-wing populist politics of denial, as typically performed in media debates

and interviews.

***Vignette 1***

***The Politics of Denial: 'There is no Star of David'***

On 18 August 2012, the leader of the FPÖ, HC Strache, posted a caricature on Facebook (Image 1.1) which recontextualized an American caricature from 1962 (Image 1.2) into a caricature which obviously alluded to antisemitic caricatures from the Nazi era that were published daily in the 1930s in the infamous German newspaper *Der Stürmer.* After the – predictable – scandal had erupted over explicit antisemitic features of the caricature, most newspapers in Austria and Germany published editorials and news reports about this incident; Strache was also interviewed on television on 20 August 2012;[17] he first denied having altered the original caricature; he then denied that the stars visible on the cufflinks of the banker were Stars of David; and finally he categorically denied any resemblances to antisemitic caricatures.

***Image 1.1 Caricature posted by HC Strache on Facebook, 18 August 2012***

*Image 1.2 American caricature, 1962*




The explicit differences between Images 1.1 and 1.2 are easy to detect: the nose of the sweating and greedily eating banker had been changed to a crooked, so-called 'Jewish nose' and the cufflinks had been decorated with the Star of David. These two changes both insinuate, and resonate with, images of the Nazi past, with the stereotypical image of 'the ugly Jewish banker' who exploits the poor (metonymically embodied by the image of a poor worker from the 1960s) and patronises the government that tries to ingratiate itself with the powerful and rich Jew by serving him an opulent meal and pouring wine. Image 1.3 shows this in detail.

*Image 1.3 Details of the 'greedy banker'*



By making these changes and posting the altered caricature with an extended comment (see Image 1.1), Strache utilized the theme of the financial crisis in at least three ways: first, to accuse the government of wrong policies and of submitting to the EU; second, to create a scapegoat that can be blamed for current woes by triggering traditional antisemitic stereotypes of world conspiracy and powerful Jewish bankers and capitalists; and third, to provoke a scandal and thus attract media attention and set the news agenda. The caricature is accompanied by a text panel on the right that explains the caricature in some detail and accuses the government of selling out to EU policies and foreign punters. This insinuates some other well-known anti-Jewish stereotypes: the world conspiracy and the Jewish capitalist. I will return to this text and its role in the scandal below. The 'Facebook incident', as I like to refer to the lengthy scandal surrounding the posting of the antisemitic caricature, will be employed to demonstrate several aims throughout this book: it introduces readers to the typical rhetorical strategies of *provocation*, *calculated ambivalence* and *denial*; it emphasizes the power of digital media in their use of traditional genres and the rapid spiral of scandalization; moreover, this example illustrates the importance of an in-depth and context-sensitive, multi-layered analysis when trying to understand and explain the dynamics of right-wing populist propaganda and manipulation.

The dialogue below is taken from the beginning of a television interview from 22 August 2012 (i.e. four days after the caricature was posted) on ORF II (ZIB 2; Austrian Broadcasting Company, daily news programme at 10 p.m.), and illustrates perfectly the politics of denial propagated by HC Strache (AW is Armin Wolf, anchor-man on the main Austrian news programme ZIB II; HCS is Strache).[18]

***Text 1.1***

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| [1] | AW | Now, last week you managed once again to make it into international |
| [2] | AW | headlines, and you did it by using this caricature, which you posted |
| | HCS | Hmhm |
| [3] | AW | on your Facebook page. The Zeit, |
| | HCS | Hmhm |
| [4] | AW | a respected German weekly newspaper, refers to this as 'antisemitic |
| [5] | AW | provocation', the Spiegel refers to is as 'a picture, just as in times of NS- |
| [6] | AW | propaganda', and even the BBC reported on it. Are you |
| [7] | AW | proud of that? |
| | HCS | No. This is absolute nonsense! I got |
| [8] | AW | You did |
| | HCS | this, um, caricature, um, shared by a user |

After asking HC Strache whether he is now 'proud' of being discussed in so many serious newspapers and radio stations across Europe (*Die Zeit*, *Der Spiegel*, the BBC), Strache utters his first denial (lines 7–9), an act-denial:[19] 'No, this is absolute nonsense, I got this caricature shared by a user.' Anchorman Armin Wolf immediately falsifies this claim and shows that Strache actually posted this caricature himself by pointing to a print-out of the relevant Facebook page (line 9). Strache then concedes that he first said something wrong and starts – by way of justification – to explain the caricature as illustrating the unfair and unjust redistribution of money taken away from the Austrian people. Here, Wolf interrupts in line 16 and qualifies the bankers as Jews ('who are Jews in your caricature'). At this point, the second round of denials starts and Strache says (lines 16–19):

***Text 1.2***

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| [16] | HCS | No, no, they are not, |
| | AW | What then? |
| [17] | HCS | Mister Wolf. And, um, with all due respect, I have |
| | | *(Continued)* |
| [18] | HCS | many Israeli, but also Jewish friends, who |
| [19] | HCS | have, um, seen this caricature, and not one of them can recognise antisemitism |

Via a well-known disclaimer ('I have many Israeli, Jewish friends'), Strache denies that the caricature should or even could be read as antisemitic, a typical intention-denial: the fallacious argument (*post hoc, ergo propter hoc* fallacy) is obvious: if his many Jewish friends do not classify the caricature as antisemitic, it cannot be antisemitic. Such disclaimers are widely used to prove that an utterance *cannot* be categorized as racist, sexist or antisemitic because 'Turkish, Arabic, female or Jewish friends' share the speaker's or writers' opinions. Moreover, the justification implies that if one has Jewish friends, then one is incapable of saying something antisemitic (see Wodak et al. 1990 for the analysis of similar fallacious argumentative moves).

After this unsuccessful denial, Wolf points to the Stars of David on the cufflinks and asks who might have put them there if not Strache himself. In his third attempt to deny wrongdoing and antisemitic stereotypes, Strache refuses to recognize the Star of David on the cufflinks (lines 23, 24) and starts a counter-attack with an *ad-hominem argument*: he claims that Wolf obviously cannot see well, his glasses are probably not strong enough; even if one would magnify the cufflinks, Strache further claims, no Star of David would be visible. Wolf then shows a Star of David he has brought with him to the studio and asks Strache if he can spot any similarity (line 32); Strache denies again and states that the picture on the cufflinks is blurred and that there is no star but actually something like a diamond. After this fifth

(act) denial, he refers to his 'Jewish friends' again who, Strache claims, believe that somebody is intentionally conspiring against him. In this way, Strache accuses the media and the public of conspiring against him by quoting his 'Jewish friends' – another typical justification strategy: claiming victimhood via victim–perpetrator reversal. Wolf continues his line of questioning and asks Strache why he apparently finds it impossible to simply apologize for posting such a caricature and why he would rather use a strategy of victim–perpetrator reversal instead of an apology. Strache answers by repeating his denials: there is no Star of David; the caricature is not antisemitic (this staccato-like question–answer sequence continues for several minutes).

***Text 1.3***

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| [20] | AW | Mister Strache … |
| | HCS | in this. If you see something else in this, |
| [21] | HCS | um, then, um, you have to ask yourself the question, why do you want to see |
| [22] | AW | Because you have three Stars of David here. Because you put three |
| | HCS | something else in this, because there is no antisemitism |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| [23] | AW | Stars of David here, or someone put them there … |
| | HCS | That is incorrect, Mister Wolf. |
| [24] | AW | No? You do not see three Stars of David here. |
| | HCS | Well … No, maybe you should have the |
| [25] | AW | Yes |
| | HCS | strength of your glasses checked, if you magnify this picture, |
| [26] | AW | Yes Really? Okay. We did |
| | HCS | you can see no Stars of David. Yeah. |
| [27] | AW | magnify the picture, Mister Strache. We did |
| | HCS | I can show you, too, yes. |
| [28] | AW | magnify the picture and you cannot see any Stars of David here? |
| | HCS | Exactly. Yes. Yes. No, |
| [29] | AW | Mister Strache, you don't see any Stars of David? |
| | HCS | there are no Stars of David to be seen, because … |
| [30] | AW | Mister Strache, I also brought you |
| | HCS | No! There are no Stars of David to be seen here. |
| [31] | AW | a Star of David for comparison. And |
| | HCS | Yes…. and this picture … That is one! Yeah? No, that is |
| [32] | AW | there are not three Stars of David here? |
| | HCS | one. No, that's a star with continuous |
| [33] | AW | Good. |
| | HCS | lines, there is no way you can see that with that blurry picture. |

In line 74, Wolf shifts to the meta-level and frames the entire discussion as a provocation strategy intentionally triggered by Strache to attract media attention. This interpretation is, not surprisingly, again denied by Strache (a goal-denial). The interview continues with other questions about Strache's programme for the autumn 2012.

***Text 1.4***

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| [70] | HCS | regarding that nose, I have already seen worse caricatures of my own |
| [71] | HCS | there we, I can only think of Mister Sinowatz or as a |
| [72] | HCS | neighbour, as a political neighbour, um, Mister Khol, or possibly |
| [73] | HCS | Mister Konrad as a comparison, but certainly not what you |
| [74] | AW | Well. Mister Strache, is it possible that you are |
| | HCS | are trying to create here. |
| [75] | AW | in reality quite pleased with the situation? Well, |
| | HCS | No, I am not pleased at all! |
| [76] | AW | well, you have once again created a lapse to provoke, the |
| | HCS | Quite the contrary. Yes, yes. |
| [77] | AW | outrage is enormous, um, not only in Austria, but also internationally, |
| [78] | AW | and you can once again present yourself as the poor and the persecuted, now |
| [79] | AW | you are the victim, suddenly, and can enjoy the headlines. |
| | HCS | Yes, yes. |

After the interview, many commentators accused Armin Wolf of having been too 'strict' on Strache; some newspapers like the widely read tabloid *Neue Kronenzeitung* wrote that the line of questioning had been unfair and not acceptable for this kind of interview genre; others equated the interview style with a tribunal or an interrogation.[20] These media comments show that Strache had obviously been quite successful in constructing himself as victim on the one hand and as a saviour of the Austrian people on the other hand, by telling the Austrians the 'truth' about the economic crisis, by discovering the causes of the crisis (allegedly, the 'Jewish banker') and by thus providing a scapegoat that everybody could blame for the crisis. However, simultaneously, the state prosecutor started to investigate whether the Facebook incident could be persecuted as hate incitement. In April 2013, the court decided that Strache's posting could not be regarded as a case of hate incitement – I will come back to this verdict in the final chapter of the book as the outcome of this investigation cannot be regarded as unique or exceptional. In fact, it is quite typical for the ways in which courts of law deal with right-wing populist discriminatory and exclusionary rhetoric. In short, the lack of legal consequences seems to confirm that 'anything goes'.

By systematically employing genres such as caricatures and comic books to convey xenophobic and antisemitic messages, right-wing populist parties cleverly play with the fictionalization of politics and frequently argue that no discriminatory message was intended as such genres play with humour and are inherently ironic or even sarcastic (Wodak and Forchtner 2014). The blurring of boundaries between fiction and reality, caricature and image, or between comic book plot and historical narrative is one of many ways of staging the strategy of *calculated ambivalence*, thus simultaneously addressing multiple audiences with –frequently contradictory – messages (Wodak 2013b; Engel and Wodak 2013; Wodak and Reisigl 2002). Facebook potentially adds to this strategy at least in one way: denying having posted the incriminatory content oneself and using the (seeming) anonymity of the Internet.

### The Right-wing Populist Perpetuum Mobile

Of course, as already mentioned above, the rise of right-wing populist movements in recent years would not have been possible without massive media support, inadvertent as it may have been in many cases. This does not imply that all newspapers share the same positions, although naturally some tabloids do. For example, the former leader of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), Jörg Haider, frequently appeared on the cover of weekly magazines such as *News* or *Profil*, thereby ensuring higher sales for these publications but at the same time adding to his visibility in the public sphere. The Austrian tabloid *Neue Kronenzeitung*, similar to the *Sun* or the *Daily Mail* but with a larger outreach in relation to the country's population (approx. three million Sunday readers in a country of eight million), campaigned for Haider both explicitly and implicitly: headlines, editorials, images and letters to the editor were all streamlined to provide support.

Right-wing populist politicians, as illustrated by Vignette 1, intentionally provoke scandals by violating publicly accepted norms (Köhler and Wodak 2011; Wodak 2013a, 2013b). In this way, the media are forced into a 'no-win' situation: if they do not report a scandalous racist remark or insinuation, such as Strache's caricature, they might be perceived as endorsing it. If they do write about it, they explicitly reproduce the prejudicial utterance, thereby further disseminating it. If they critically interview the politician, they give him/her more face time and an opportunity for perpetrator–victim reversal. This triggers a predictable dynamic which allows right-wing populist parties to set the agenda and distract the media (and the public) from other important news.

This dynamic consists of several stages which I refer to as '*The right-wing populist perpetuum mobile*': this implies that such parties and politicians have developed discursive and rhetorical strategies which combine incompatible phenomena, make false claims sound innocent, allow denying the obvious, say the 'unsayable', and transcend the limits of the permissible. Usually, they get away without being sanctioned and, even if they have to apologize, they do so in a calculated and ambivalent way (see Chapter 3). Rarely do they have to resign and, even if they do, some of them seem to 'bounce back' quite quickly.

The specific dynamic is easily deconstructed:

- First, *scandal* (e.g. the posting of the antisemitic caricature) is *intentionally provoked* by the FPÖ.
- Once evidence for the inherently racist meaning is produced by the opposition, the offensive meaning of the image is immediately *denied* (intention and goal denials);
- then the scandal is *redefined* and *equated* with entirely different phenomena (by redefining and re-

formulating the meaning of concepts or by employing analogies and metaphors, or by constructing contrasts or arguing via *topoi of history*). In Vignette 1, the FPÖ employed the discursive strategy of *calculated ambivalence* and succeeded in conveying a *double-message* – readers could either share the opinion that any similarity with an antisemitic caricature was utterly coincidental, or they could share the antisemitic meanings insinuated by the crooked nose and the particular cufflinks.

- This strategy allows, as a further step, the respective politician to claim *victimhood* as he or she is accused of racism or antisemitism by the opposition and some media.
- The event is then *dramatized and exaggerated*, that is, the FPÖ/Strache claims to have been wrongly accused of having posted a racist or antisemitic slogan.
- Furthermore, the politician could emphasize the right of freedom of speech for himself as a *justificatory strategy*: 'Why can one not utter critique?', or 'One must be permitted to criticize Turks, Roma, Muslims, Jews …!' or '*We* dare say what everybody thinks' and so forth. Such utterances immediately *shift the frame and trigger another debate* – unrelated to the original scandal – about freedom of speech and political correctness, and thus serve as a distraction and allow evasion of the primary scandalous issue.
- Moreover, the accusation is instrumentalized for the construction of a *conspiracy*: somebody must be 'pulling the strings' against the original culprit of the scandal, and *scapegoats* (foreigners, liberal intellectuals, the Jewish Community, the opposition, etc.) are quickly discovered.
- Once the thus accused finally have a chance to present substantial counter-evidence, a *new scandal* is launched.
- A '*quasi-apology*' might follow in case 'misunderstandings' should have occurred, an apology based on a condition that is presented as unlikely, even surreal: by apologizing for other people's misunderstanding (rather than for one's own ambiguity), the apology is rendered a farce; and the entire process begins afresh with a new scandalous utterance, again an instance of calculated ambivalence.

This pattern illustrates how right-wing populist parties cleverly manage to set the agenda and frame media debates; other political parties and politicians as well as the media are, in turn, forced to react and respond continuously to ever new provocations. Few opportunities remain to present other frames, values and counterarguments, or any other relevant agenda. As a consequence, mainstream politics moves more and more to the right and the public becomes disillusioned, de-politicized and 'tired' of ever new scandals; hence, right-wing populist rhetoric necessarily becomes ever more explicit and extreme and continuously attracts further

attention.

## Constructing a 'Politics of Fear'

After having presented a typical example of the 'politics of denial', it is worth summarizing the various characteristics of right-wing populist parties introduced in this chapter. I propose nine features, which are, I claim, common to most if not all right-wing populist parties (see also Wodak 2013a; Reisigl 2013) and which will be discussed in the following chapters in greater detail.[21]

- Right-wing populism is based on a generalized claim to represent '*THE people*' in the sense of a homogenised ideal based on nativist ideologies, thus on *traditional body politics*. The construction of these groups is contingent on many historical, national and socio-political factors. This dogma is accompanied by a *revisionist view of history*. The *rhetoric of exclusion* has become part and parcel of a much more general discourse about strangers within and outside the 'body', that is, the nation state. Such minorities include the Roma and the Jews on the one hand and migrants on the other, following the overall motto: '*We*' (i.e. the Occident or Christian Europe) have to defend '*Ourselves*' against '*Them*' (i.e. the 'Orient': Roma, Jews, Muslims). Right-wing populist movements are based on a specific understanding of the '*demos*/people', thus denying complexity within society. These parties continuously construct themselves as the 'saviours of the Occident' who defend the man/woman on the street against both 'those up there' and 'the Barbarians' who might take away 'Austrian (British, Dutch, Belgian, Italian) jobs from Austrian (British, Dutch, Belgian, Italian) workers' and who 'do not want to integrate and adapt to our culture'. Similar slogans employing parallel scenarios abound.
- Right-wing populism[22] employs a *political style* that can relate to various ideologies, not just to one. We encounter left-wing and right-wing populist parties; the difference relates to the *political imaginaries* they put forward as well as to the parties' structures and recruitment patterns.
- Right-wing populism cuts across the traditional left/right divide and constructs *new social divides*, frequently related to many, sometimes legitimate and justified, fears about globalization and the subsequent rise of nationalism and chauvinism, the failure of current mainstream parties to address acute social problems, like the financial crisis and so forth.
- Right-wing populist parties' success depends on *performance strategies* in modern *media democracies*. This implies extensive use of the media (press and television, new media such as comics,

homepages, websites, Facebook, Twitter and so forth). Moreover, right-wing populist politicians are usually well trained as media personalities, and have frequently transformed a 'thug-like' appearance into that of a 'slick' mainstream politician: they appear youthful, handsome, fit and well dressed. In short, they assume the habitus of serious but young, involved and approachable statesmen and stateswomen. This image transformation is not always successful. Mainstream parties in particular often find it difficult to adopt similar strategies (as they do with the use of new media).

- The *personalization* and *commodification* of current politics and politicians lead to a focus on 'charismatic' leaders; right-wing populist parties usually have a hierarchical structure with (male) leaders who exploit modern trends of the political profession to perfection.[23] Recently, female leaders have also come to the fore (in France, Denmark, Norway and the US).
- Leading populist politicians employ *frontstage performance* techniques that are linked to popular *celebrity culture* (well-known from tabloids and sensationalist media reporting): They oscillate between self-presentations as a *Robin Hood*-like figure (i.e. saviour of 'the man and woman in the street', 'defender of the common people') and self-presentations as 'rich, famous and/or attractive' (i.e. an 'idol' to aspire to), frequently leading to a 'softer' image, adapted to mainstream values, but only on frontstage. Hence, such politicians carefully prepare their *appearance*and *performances* for different audiences; their rhetoric and programmatic proposals are heavily *context-dependent*. This implies a specific selection of meeting places (beer tents, pubs, stages, market places, discos, and the so-called 'tea-parties' in the US), the clothes they wear (from suits to casual leather jackets, T-shirts or folklore dress), their selection of spin-doctors and accompanying 'performers' on stage, the music, posters and logos on display and so forth.
- Right-wing populism usually correlates with *anti-intellectualism* and, as a result, with what I term *arrogance of ignorance*. Appeals to common-sense and traditional (conservative) values linked to aggressive exclusionary rhetoric are, for example, particularly apparent in some parts of the US *Tea Party* movement, performed and instrumentalized almost 'perfectly' by politicians such as Sarah Palin or Michelle Bachmann.
- Linked to anti-Muslim rhetoric and campaigns, right-wing populist parties currently endorse pseudo-emancipatory *gender policies* which, on second view, are extremely contradictory; in this vein, the US Republicans claim, for example, to support a so-called 'right-wing feminism' ('frontier-feminism'), which links feminist values to traditional family values and campaigns against pro-choice movements. Thus, on the one hand, traditional family values are emphasized (which position women primarily as mothers, caring for children and their families); on the other hand, although 'freedom for women' is propagated, this refers solely to Muslim women, who are depicted as wearing headscarves or burqas not by choice but by oppression. Gender becomes instrumentalized and linked to rhetoric of exclu-

sion, for example, the exclusion of Turkish migrants. The so-called 'freedom' of women is contrasted with fundamentalist Islam, which presupposes that every woman wearing a headscarf is at the same time suppressed and potentially dangerous in terms of terrorism. The theme of security is thus easily linked to the so-called 'freedom of women' by what is perceived as their common 'root of evil'.

- There is a distinct difference between populist styles and rhetoric in *opposition* and in *government*. Few right-wing populist parties maintain their strength or survive if elected into government because they lack the necessary experience, programmes, strategies and skills. In the Netherlands, for example, the extreme right lost immediately once they formed part of the second chamber in the Dutch government (2002–2006) after the assassination of Pim Fortuyn on 6 May 2002.

# Endnotes

1 These terms were primarily used in the 19th and 20th centuries to describe the 'people' from a racist and biological/biologistic perspective, i.e. nativist. Ultimately, these terms were salient in national-socialist ideology and propaganda and directed primarily against so-called 'parasites' who were allegedly threatening the 'host-body', i.e. Jews, Slavs, homosexuals and Roma (see Musolff, 2010, for an extensive discussion and discourse-historical analysis of these terms and related metaphors of body-politic).

2 See Feldman and Jackson (2013), Gingrich and Banks (2006), Harrison and Bruter (2011), Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012), Sir Peter Ustinov Institut et al. (2013), Wilson and Hainsworth (2012), Wodak et al. (2013).

3 For example www.news.at/a/anschlaege-norwegen-fpoe-hetzt-302711, accessed 3 May 2013.

4 See e.g. Krzyżanowski and Wodak (2009), Matouschek et al. (1995), Pelinka and Wodak (2002), Reisigl (2013), Wodak and Pelinka (2002) for more details. It is important to emphasize at this point that right-wing populist parties have appeared and gained much support in the former Eastern Bloc countries such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania (Dettke 2014). Unlike their counterparts in 'the West', they find it less difficult to promote explicit xenophobic, antisemitic and antiziganist messages (see Chapters 2, 4 and 8). They also draw on traditional antisemitic beliefs shared widely across the population, but these differ in their quality and explicitness from antisemitic resentments in the UK or France, e.g. where opinions about hegemonic Israeli politics are always integrated into debates about Jews (thus sometimes also insinuating world-conspiracy themes) (see Kovács 2013; Mãdroane 2013).

5 Political imaginaries are defined as being in a 'landscape of power as a space of political action signified in visual and iconographic practices and objects as well as in the literary-textual field that depicts the political scene, its structure, and its stakes' (Bob Jessop, personal communication, 10 February 2010).

6 See the Glossary for important facts related to all right-wing populist parties.

7 See www.statista.com/statistics/266228/youth-unemployment-rate-in-eu-countries/

8 Recent studies define and frequently analyse populism in terms of metaphors such as a 'virus', 'syndrome' or 'modern problem' (Taggart 2000; Taguieff 1984) or characterize populism as 'anti-democratic', 'anti-parliamentary' or as a 'dangerous excess' (Mény and Surel 2002). These accounts do not, however, directly contribute to a differentiated analysis of this complex phenomenon.

9 See also Latin *popularis*, referring to the 'people' (Latin *populus*; in French *populaire*, 18th century, which led to the German *populär* – which differs in meaning from 'populist') (Kluge 1999, 641).

10 See www.dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=551.

11 See De Cleen (2012), Fieschi (2004), Wodak and Richardson (2013) as well as Richardson and Wodak (2009a, 2009b).

12 See Bourdieu (1999, 2005), Chouliaraki and Morsing (2010).

13 See Corner and Pels (2003), Forchtner et al. (2013), Street (2004), Wodak (2010, 2011a) as well as Wodak and Forchtner (2014) for more details on the fictionalization of politics.

14 See www.hcstrache.at/, accessed 2 May 2013.

15 See Horaczek and Reiterer (2009), Köhler and Wodak (2011), Reisigl (2013), Scharsach (2012), Wodak (2013a, 2013b), Wodak and Köhler (2010) and Wodak and Reisigl (2014) for recent detailed studies and research on the FPÖ and HC Strache.

16 See Wodak (2011a, 14ff, 32ff, 190ff) for a summary and integrated model of frontstage and backstage political communication where I draw primarily on identity theories, Bourdieu's theory of habitus and capitals, Goffman's metaphor of theatre and performance, and Lave and Wenger's approach to communities of practice.

17 See http://derstandard.at/1345164507078/Streit-um-antisemitisches-Bild-auf-Strache-Seite, accessed 12

March 2015.

18 The transcription here follows rudimentary transcription rules developed for conversations. Such a transcription allows following the dynamic of the conversation and presents all voices as they interact, overlap and interrupt each other. This is a simplified presentation of the full transcript, which follows the HIAT rules for transcriptions.

19 See Chapter 3 for an extensive discussion of denials, justification strategies and disclaimers (van Dijk 1992).

20 See http://derstandard.at/1345165340089/Strache-Interview-im-Weichspuelmodus. The *Kleine Zeitung* commented on how Strache had succeeded in presenting himself as victim: www.kleinezeitung.at/nachrichten/politik/2936602/opferumkehr-des-h-c-strache.story; other politicians were angry about Strache's attacks on his former mentor Jörg Haider and so forth: www.heute.at/news/politik/art23660,763710. In any case, the interview (and the provocation via the Facebook incident) proved to be agenda-setting (all links accessed 5 May 2013).

21 Reisigl (2013, 145–6) lists five relevant dimensions that coincide with some of the nine aspects listed above – but he does not yet consider the important and constitutive role of '(gendered) body politics' in enough detail (see Chapters 4 and 7 in this volume). He proposes two dimensions as overriding all other aspects: the use of synecdoche and the use of the topos of 'people', i.e. the *argumentum ad populum*. De Cleen (2013) emphasizes four dimensions, where populism marks one of the four, the others being nationalism, authoritarianism and conservatism. There are, of course, other taxonomies as well. I will come to a more detailed discussion of a range of theoretical approaches in Chapter 2.

22 I prefer the term 'right-wing populism' to both 'radical' and 'extreme right-wing populism', as these superlatives are a question of relative scale and perception.

23 Silvio Berlusconi is an obvious case in point, due to his ownership of almost all the relevant Italian media.

https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446270073

# Glossary of Right-Wing Populist Parties

## AUSTRIA

**Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ)**
*Freedom Party of Austria*

| FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATION |
|---|---|
| April 1956 | EAF (European Alliance for Freedom) |

IDEOLOGY
Nationalism; Anti-immigration; Anti-Islam; Antisemitism; Euroscepticism

ELECTION RESULTS

| Year | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | European Parliament | 364,207 | 12.7 | 2/17 |
| 2008 | National Parliament | 857,028 | 17.5 | 34/183 |
| 2013 | National Parliament | 958,285 | 20.5 | 40/183 |
| 2014 | European Parliament | 556,835 | 19.72 | 4/18 |

The FPÖ was founded in 1956, 30 years before Haider became the party's leader; it was a successor to the Federation of Independents, which gathered former NSDAP members after the end of World War II. The party saw an electoral comeback under the leadership and populist, xenophobic, revisionist and antisemitic rhetoric of Jörg Haider (Wodak and Pelinka 2002). In the 1999 national election, the FPÖ won 26.9 per cent of the vote and became the second strongest party in Austria. This electoral success led to a coalition government between the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) and the FPÖ, accompanied by the introduction of sanctions from the EU claiming that participation of the FPÖ in a coalition government 'legitimized the extreme Right in Europe' (Krzyżanowski and Wodak 2009; Meret 2010). Under Haider's leadership, the party transformed into a far-right populist party claiming that its intention was to protect 'Austrian culture and national identity' and to safeguard Austrian people's rights and prosperity. The issue that continues to dominate the political agenda of the party is immigration. In 1993 the party launched a petition to collect signatures in favour of a popular referendum on the control of immigration in Austria. While this caused a political crisis within the party (Meret 2010), it did not put a halt to the anti-immigration discourse of the party's leadership. Its plans for restrictive amendments to the country's migration policy were accomplished during its participation in coalition government (2000–2006). The FPÖ adopted a more radical, anti-immigrant and especially anti-Muslim agenda under HC Strache. The party now presents itself as guarantor of Austrian identity, social welfare, and social and financial stability through the prism of its *Heimat* (homeland) profile and

has developed a Eurosceptic rhetoric (McLaughlin 2013). During the 2013 national election campaign, HC Strache used strong anti-immigration or racist discourse that increased the party's popular support; the FPÖ is now openly described as far-right and xenophobic (McLaughlin 2013).

**BELGIUM**

**Vlaams Belang (VB)**
*Flemish Interest*

| FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATION |
|---|---|
| November 2004 | EAF (European Alliance for Freedom) |

IDEOLOGY
Flemish nationalism; Separatism; Anti-Islam; Euroscepticism

ELECTION RESULTS

| | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | European Parliament | 647,170 | 9.9 | 2/22 |
| 2010 | Chamber of Representatives | 506,697 | 7.8 | 12/150 |
| 2010 | Senate | 491,519 | 7.6 | 3/40 |
| 2014 | European Parliament | 284,891 | 4.26 | 1/21 |

Vlaams Belang (VB), which originates from Vlaams Block – which was forced to disband in 2004 due to its xenophobic, antisemitic and discriminatory discourse (Mudde 2003; Osborn 2001) – is a Flemish nationalist party that advocates independence for Flanders and the establishment of a Flemish Republic. Immigration and security issues still dominate VB's political agenda. The party opposes multiculturalism, claims that strict limits on immigration are necessary and that immigrants should be obliged to adopt the Flemish culture and language (Coffé 2005). Although the new party's members have attempted to moderate the 'radical' character of VB's political programme, the leader of the new party and former chairman of Vlaams Block, Frank Vanhecke, soon maintained that 'the party changed its name but not its tactics or programme' (Coffé 2005; Erik 2005). Hence, the leadership of the party adopted anti-Muslim rhetoric on the basis of Islamist terrorism and emphasized the threat of 'immigrants' criminality' in general (Coffé 2005). In 2009 VB participated for the first time in the European Parliament election and began an alliance with other Eurosceptic nationalist parties. All other Flemish parties in Belgium have agreed not to participate in a coalition with Vlaams Belang, forming a cordon sanitaire (Coffé 2005).

## BULGARIA

Ataka
*Attack*

| FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATION |
|---|---|
| April 2005 | NF (National Front) France |

IDEOLOGY
Ultranationalism; Antisemitism; Anti-Roma; Euroscepticism

ELECTION RESULTS

| Year | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | National Election | 395,707 | 9.4 | 21/240 |
| 2009 | European Parliament | 308,052 | 12.0 | 2/17 |
| 2013 | National Election | 258,481 | 7.3 | 23/240 |
| 2014 | European Parliament | 66,210 | 2.96 | 0/17 |

ATAKA is an example of political-media links, in so far as a popular television talk-show presented by the journalist Volen Siderov evolved into a political party in 2005. ATAKA can be defined as an ultra-nationalist party that views Bulgaria as a one-nation state and claims that 'differences of origin or faith have no priority over nationality' (ATAKA 2014). The country's Muslim minority was presented as 'evil' by the party's leadership (Pencheva 2009). Moreover, the party emphasizes Bulgarian culture, language and the Orthodox religion, and opposes Bulgaria's participation in the EU and NATO, attacking those who signed Bulgaria's membership of the EU as 'national traitors'. Furthermore, the party presents itself as fighting for the spiritual, social, educational and financial prosperity of the Bulgarian nation via the party's main slogan: 'Let's regain Bulgaria for the Bulgarians' (ATAKA 2014). The party blames the Roma for an increase in criminality in Bulgaria, and Jews and the EU for the financial and humanitarian crisis in the country (Rensmann 2011). The party also opposes the accession of Turkey to the EU as a 'Turkish threat' that intends to recolonize the Balkan region. ATAKA became the fourth largest party in Bulgaria by blaming both the colonial West-EU and Muslim Turkey (Tsolova 2013). ATAKA saw a sharp fall in its electoral percentages in the 2014 European Parliament elections.

## CYPRUS

**Εθνικό Λαϊκό Μέτωπο, Ethniko Laiko Metopo**
*National Popular Front (ELAM)*

| FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATION |
|---|---|
| May 2011 (as political party) | ENF (European National Front) |

IDEOLOGY
Far-right; Greek nationalism; Anti-immigration

ELECTION RESULTS

| Year | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 | Parliamentary | 4,354 | 1.08 | 0 |
| 2013 | Presidential | 3,899 | 0.88 | |
| 2014 | European Parliament | 6,957 | 2.69 | 0/6 |

The National Popular Front (ELAM) was approved by the Greek Cypriot Authorities as a legal political party in May 2011. Prior to its official formation into a political party, ELAM was a nationalist movement that was established in the late 2000s and led by Christos Christou, who was an active member of the Golden Dawn far-right party in Greece and still remains ELAM's leader (Katsourides 2013). He had already organized the political satellite of Golden Dawn in Cyprus under the name 'Golden Dawn-Cypriot Kernel', whose registration was rejected by the authorities, and then adopted the name ELAM (Kosmas 2013). The links between Golden Dawn and ELAM go beyond the party's name or leader in the form of support for their 'brother' or 'sister' movement (Katsourides 2013). ELAM identifies itself as an antisystemic, nationalist movement that supports the interests of the Greek Cypriots and fights illegal immigration. The party has been accused by the Cypriot media of promoting racism and being involved in acts of violence against immigrants, Turkish Cypriots and students.

## DENMARK

**Dansk Folkeparti (DF)**
*Danish People's Party (DPP)*

| FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATIONS |
|---|---|
| October 1995 | MELD (Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy)<br>EFD (Europe of Freedom and Democracy) |

IDEOLOGY
Ultranationalism; Anti-immigration; Euroscepticism

ELECTION RESULTS

| Year | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | European Parliament | 357,942 | 15.3 | 2/13 |
| 2011 | National Election | 436,726 | 12.3 | 22/179 |
| 2014 | European Parliament | 605,889 | 26.6 | 4/13 |

The Danish People's Party (DPP) was founded in 1995 after the split of the Danish Progress Party. It is a nationalist party that seeks to protect the monarch, the Church of Denmark and the rights and cultural heritage of the Danish people. The party's leadership opposes the transformation of Denmark into a multi-ethnic, multicultural society and adopts an anti-immigration, especially anti-Muslim, stance (Rydgren 2004). According to the former leader of the party, Pia Kjærsgaard, 'a multiethnic Denmark would be a national disaster' (DPP statements 1997). In 2001, after its electoral success, the party participated in the conservative-liberal coalition government (2001–2011) and implemented stricter policies on immigration. The DPP is responsible for establishing Europe's strictest law on immigration in 2002 (see BBC News 2005). In response to criticism from the Swedish government regarding its strict immigration rules, Pia Kjærsgaard maintained that '[i]f they want to turn Stockholm, or Malmö, into a Scandinavian Beirut, with clan wars, honour killings and gang rapes, let them do it. We can always put a barrier on the Øresund Bridge' (BBC News 2005). In 2010, the party proposed a complete halt to all immigration from non-Western countries and justified this on the basis of the party's moral responsibility to 'keep Denmark Danish' (DPP 2002).

## FINLAND

**Perussuomalaiset**
*Finns Party or True Finns*

| FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATIONS |
|---|---|
| May 1995 | MELD (Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy)<br>EFD (Europe of Freedom and Democracy) |

IDEOLOGY
Finish nationalism; Anti-immigration; Euroscepticism

ELECTION RESULTS

| Year | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | European Parliament | 162,930 | 9.79 | 1/13 |
| 2011 | National Parliament | 560,075 | 19.05 | 39/200 |
| 2012 | Presidential | 287,571 | 9.40 | 4th |
| 2014 | European Parliament | 222,457 | 12.9 | 2/13 |

The Finns Party was founded in 1995 after the dissolution of the Finnish Rural Party. Supporting the ideological and political pillars of its predecessor, the Finns Party is described as a populist, nationalist party that currently forms the main opposition in the Finnish Parliament, after its electoral success in 2011 (Mars 2011). The party developed its rhetoric on the basis of Finnish nationalism, authoritarianism and Euroscepticism. It opposes Finland's membership of the EU and NATO, criticizes globalism, attempts to minimize the Swedish influence in Finnish society by removing the obligatory character of Swedish as national second language in all levels of education, and promotes 'Finnish identity' (Arter 2010). The Finns Party supports limitations on and strict rules for immigration. It also demands that immigrants to Finland accept and adopt Finnish culture, emphasizing the threat of 'immigrants' criminality' (Arter 2010; Mars 2011). The Finns Party is typical of Scandinavian populist, far-right parties that often justify their anti-immigration views on the basis of 'welfare chauvinism' rather than racism; their nationalism is milder and connections with extreme groups weaker than the right-wing populists of central Europe (Kitschelt and McGann 1995).

## FRANCE

**Front National (FN)**
*National Front*

| FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATION |
|---|---|
| October 1972 | EAF (European Alliance for Freedom) |

IDEOLOGY
Nationalism; Anti-immigration; Antisemitism; Euroscepticism

ELECTION RESULTS

| Year | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2007 | National Assembly | 1,116,136 | 4.3 | 0/577 |
| 2009 | European Parliament | 1,091,691 | 6.3 | 3/72 |
| 2012 | National Assembly | 3,528,373 | 13.6 | 2/577 |
| 2014 | European Parliament | 4,711,339 | 24.85 | 24/74 |

The National Front was founded in 1972 in an effort to unify the different French nationalist movements of that period (Shields 2007). Until his resignation in 2010, Jean-Marie Le Pen was the leader of the party. Its first electoral success was in the 1984 European election, where the party won 11 per cent of the vote and 10 MEPs were elected (Hainsworth 2000). In the presidential election of 2002, Le Pen won against the socialist candidate Lionel Jospin in the first round and became the first far-right leader to participate in the final round of a presidential election, although he was beaten by the right-wing candidate, Jacques Chirac. In January 2011, Le Pen's daughter, Marine, was elected as the new leader of the FN. Under her leadership the party attempted to downplay its fascist, antisemitic and far-right pillars, moderate its discourse and construct itself as a mainstream right-wing party (Shields 2007). This new image of the FN increased its popularity and led to the party's victory in the 2014 European elections, but principles of nationalism and populism still dominate the party and are accompanied by anti-immigration, especially anti-Muslim, and Eurosceptic ideas (Shields 2007). The party claims that it will fight 'illegal immigration' and suggests the deportation of 'illegal immigrants', a reduction in legal immigration to France, and 'zero tolerance' of criminality (FN Programme, 2012). The FN also considers multiculturalism a threat to French national identity and opposes the Schengen Agreement. The party opposes France's membership of the EU and the Eurozone and argues that the EU is a supranational organization that acts against the best interests of European peoples. Instead, it suggests the formation of a 'Europe of nations', which would respect the national characteristics and principles of every country, and would include Russia and Switzerland, but not Turkey (FN Programme 2012). In November 2013, Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders announced their intention to cooperate in the 2014 European election during a press conference in The Hague. As Wilders noted, their aim is to 'fight this monster called Europe' which, according to Le Pen, 'has enslaved our various peoples' (see *Economist* 2013). The FN won the first place in France in the European Parliament elections of 2014.

## GERMANY

**Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD)**
*National Democratic Party of Germany*

| FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATION |
|---|---|
| November 1964 | ENF (European National Front) |

IDEOLOGY
Neo-Nazism (revisionist, racist, antisemitic, anti-democratic, *völkisch*); Anti-immigration

ELECTION RESULTS

| Year | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | Federal Parliament | 768,442 | 1.8 | 0/631 |
| 2009 | European Parliament | – | less than 1 | 0/99 |
| 2013 | Federal Parliament | 634,842 | 1.5 | 0/631 |
| 2014 | European Parliament | 300,815 | 1.03 | 1/96 |

The National Democratic Party of Germany was founded in 1964 as a successor to the German Reich Party and is a far-right party usually described as a neo-Nazi organization (Backer 2000). Members and supporters of the party are considered to participate not only in anti-immigrant protests, but also in hate crimes and attacks against immigrants, while the party's leadership is noted for its use of xenophobic, antisemitic and homophobic rhetoric (Deutsche Welle 2013b). The federal government has attempted to ban the NPD several times, in 2003, 2011 and 2012, claiming it is an 'anti-constitutional' party (Deutsche Welle 2013a; Rising 2012), but has not been successful. In March 2013, the government announced that it would not try again to ban the NPD (Eddy 2013). The NPD has never been elected to the national parliament (Bundestag), though its members have sat in regional parliaments. In 2004, the party won seats in the regional parliament of Saxony, and won six seats in the 2006 parliamentary election for Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. In the 2009 municipal elections, the party saw electoral success in eastern parts of Germany (see *Local* 2009; BBC 2006a). In the 2014 European Parliament elections, the NPD was elected for the first time with one member to the European parliament.

## GREECE

**Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός, Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós (LAOS)**
*Popular Orthodox Rally*

| FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATIONS |
|---|---|
| September 2000 | MELD (Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy)<br>EFD (Europe of Freedom and Democracy) |

IDEOLOGY
Ultranationalism; Antisemitism; Anti-immigration; Euroscepticism

ELECTION RESULTS

| Year | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | National Election | 386,205 | 5.63 | 15/300 |
| 2009 | European Parliament | 366,615 | 7.15 | 2/22 |
| May 2012 | National Election | 183,467 | 2.90 | 0/300 |
| June 2012 | National Election | 97,099 | 1.58 | 0/300 |
| 2014 | European Parliament | 154,027 | 2.69 | 0/21 |

The Popular Orthodox Rally was founded in 2000 by Georgios Karatzaferis, a few months after he was expelled from the conservative New Democracy party. Like many far-right parties, LAOS emphasizes its 'patriotic' profile. The ambiguities and discrepancies between the party's official programme and LAOS representatives' daily statements and speeches illustrate, however, the leading group's attempt to mask the extreme-right features of the party (Psarras, 2010). LAOS' programme reveals the populist ideology of the party, based on the idea of Greekness's superiority (LAOS 2007). At the same time, the party demands the expulsion of all 'undocumented' immigrants from Greece and focuses alleged migrants' criminality, especially in addressing their voters (Psarras 2010; Tsiras 2012). In this way, the party demonstrates its nationalist and racist characteristics along with its anti-communist, antisemitic and pre-dictatorship (supporters of the Greek military junta 1967–1974) pillars. Moreover, LAOS presented itself (in the 2009 national election) as an anti-systemic party fighting against political and financial powers and supporting the Greek people's interests. The party lost its populist, anti-system credentials by supporting the bailout agreement between the Greek government and the so-called 'troika' (European Central Bank, European Commission and International Monetary Fund) in 2010, and later (November 2011) by participating in a coalition government with two mainstream parties, centre-left PASOK and centre-right New Democracy (Tsiras 2012). Although the party left the coalition after a few months, its participation was a strategic miscalculation that marginalized the party's role (see national election results in May and June 2012 as well as the European Parliament elections 2014).

## GREECE

**Χρυσή Αυγή, Chrysí Avgí**
*Golden Dawn*

| FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATIONS |
|---|---|
| February 1983 | ENF (European National Front) |

IDEOLOGY
Ultranationalism; Neo-Nazism; Antisemitism; Anti-immigration

ELECTION RESULTS

| Year | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | National Election | 19,636 | 0.29 | 0/300 |
| 2009 | European Parliament | 23,566 | 0.5 | 0/22 |
| May 2012 | National Election | 440,966 | 6.97 | 21/300 |
| June 2012 | National Election | 426,025 | 6.92 | 18/300 |
| 2014 | European Parliament | 536,910 | 9.39 | 3/21 |

Golden Dawn was founded in 1983 by Nikolaos Michaloliakos, a supporter of both Greek military dictatorships (1936–1941, 1967–1974), who had been arrested several times (in 1974, 1976 and 1978) for his terrorist activities as a member of far-right extremist groups (Psarras 2012). The statutes of the party imply that it is a popular movement, 'with faith in the ideology of Nationalism' (Golden Dawn 2012, 2). However, Golden Dawn's neo-Nazi profile is clearly visible in the party's symbolism, with its flag resembling a swastika, Nazi salutes and chant of 'Blood and Honour' encapsulating its xenophobic and racist ideology. The party relies on a strict military hierarchy and includes hit squads committed to perpetrating hate crimes against migrants, leftists and homosexuals (Psarras 2012). Golden Dawn reappeared on the political landscape in 1993, in the midst of nationalist fervour due to a dispute between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia over use of the name Macedonia (Ellinas 2013; Psarras 2012). Golden Dawn members present themselves as nationalists who fight the so-called 'enemies' of the Greek nation, though explicit references to the ideology of National Socialism are avoided. As Michaloliakos notes: 'Back in the 1980s we flirted with all sorts of ideas of the interwar years including National Socialism and fascism. But by the 1990s, we settled the ideological issues and positioned ourselves in favour of popular nationalism' (Ellinas 2013). Golden Dawn's hit squads continued to carry out hate crimes and acts of violence against immigrants and political opponents, especially after their electoral success and the entry of the party into the Greek Parliament. At the same time Golden Dawn challenged the democratic reflexes of the Greek authorities by building ties to the Greek police; these were revealed when almost 50 per cent of Greek policemen voted for Golden Dawn in the 2012 national elections (Dalakoglou 2013). The first attempt by the Greek authorities to react against the Neo-Nazi threat and stop the far-right militias came in September 2013, when an antifascist hip-hop artist, Pavlos Fyssas or Killah P, was stabbed to death by a Golden Dawn member. This time it was a Greek who was killed by the neo-Nazis, not an anonymous immigrant, and the authorities proceeded to arrest party members and MPs, including

Nikolaos Michaloliakos. Golden Dawn increased its percentage of votes in the European Parliament elections in 2014 despite the jailing of its party leaders.

## HUNGARY

**Jobbik**
*Movement for a Better Hungary*

| FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATION |
|---|---|
| October 2003 | AENM (Alliance of European National Movements) 2009 |

IDEOLOGY
Ultranationalism; Antisemitism; Antiziganism; Euroscepticism

ELECTION RESULTS

| Year | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | European Parliament | 427,773 | 14.77 | 3/22 |
| 2010 | National Election (1st round) | 855,436 | 16.67 | |
| 2010 | National Election (2nd round) | 141,323 | 12.26 | 47/386 |
| 2014 | European Parliament | 340,287 | 14.67 | 3/21 |

Jobbik was founded as a right-wing youth association in 2002 and transformed into a political party in 2003. After its electoral success in 2010, it became the main opposition party in the Hungarian Parliament. The party is described by scholars and journalists as a far-right, ethno-nationalist, populist political group (Huggan and Law 2009; Schori Liang 2007), features that the leadership of Jobbik rejects, in so far as it presents itself as a conservative, radical-patriotic, Christian party (Jobbik 2014a). The party's main European Parliament election slogan in 2009, 'Hungary belongs to the Hungarians', criticized by the European Electoral Commission, illustrates the ideological position of the party. Jobbik dedicates itself to supporting Hungarian minorities in Romania, spreading solidarity among Hungarians and fighting so-called 'foreign financial interests' in the country (Jobbik 2014b). The leadership of the party openly expresses antisemitic beliefs through the prism of a 'Jewish threat' allegedly wanting to dominate the country. The party organized a protest against the World Jewish Congress in Budapest in May 2013, and many members of the party have made explicit antisemitic statements (see BBC news, 4 May, 2013b). Although Jobbik denies allegations of racism and violence, its members and supporters have been accused of racist incidents against Roma and homosexuals (ibid.). Moreover, the party refers to alleged 'gypsy crime' and declares its intention to face up to it (Jobbik 2014b). In 2007, Jobbik's leader, Gábor Vona, founded the 'Hungarian Guard', which soon transformed into the party's paramilitary wing that harasses and intimidates members of the Roma community and homosexuals. Jobbik's Euroscepticism, antisemitism and racism are also expressed in the European Parliament, where they have found partners such as BNP's Nick Griffin, who supported Jobbik and cooperated with the party in the 2009 European Parliament election (LeBor 2009; Waterfield 2009).

## ITALY

**Forza Nuova (FN)**
*New Force*

| FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATION |
|---|---|
| September 1997 | ENF (European National Front) |

IDEOLOGY
Ultranationalism; Neo-Fascism; Anti-Immigration

ELECTION RESULTS

| Year | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2008 | Chamber of Deputies | 108,837 | 0.3 | 0 |
| 2008 | Senate of the Republic | 85,630 | 0.26 | 0 |
| 2013 | Chamber of Deputies | 89,811 | 0.26 | 0 |
| 2013 | Senate of the Republic | 81,521 | 0.26 | 0 |
| 2009 | European Parliament | 146,619 | 0.47 | 0 |

The Italian neo-fascist party Forza Nuova was founded in 1997 by Roberto Fiore and Massimo Morsello. In 1985 the founders were sentenced for being members of Armed Revolutionary Nuclei – a fascist terror group that was implicated in the Bologna bombing of 1980, which killed 85 people. They both escaped to London where they stayed for more than 10 years as political refugees. In Britain, Fiore, who identifies himself as a fascist (Pallister 1999), became a close friend of Nick Griffin (BNP); and in 1986, thanks to his friendship with the leader of the BNP, he founded, with Massimo Morsello, 'Easy London', a society offering help to young people living and working in London; together they set up the International Third Position, a neo-fascist organization (Ryan 2004). Although Forza Nuova was founded in 1997, its founders, Fiore and Marsello, only returned to Italy in 1999; and after Marsello's death in 2001, Fiore, who had maintained his ties with the British far-right organizations through educational and charity activities (Cobain 2008; Pallister 1999), became the sole leader of the party. He also became a member of the European Parliament when he replaced Alessandra Mussolini in 2007. Forza Nuova has been criticized for its political campaigns and acts of violence against immigrants and homosexuals. The party seeks repeal of the abortion law and openly expresses its opposition to immigrants (FN Programme 2012). Indeed, in March 2011, Fiore led Forza Nuova protests on the island of Lampedusa against immigration to Italy. Forza Nuova didn't participate in the European Parliament elections of 2014 in so far as the party's supporters failed to collect and submit the necessary 300,000 signatures.

## ITALY

**Lega Nord (LN)**
*North League*

| FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATION |
|---|---|
| February 1991 | EFD (Europe of Freedom and Democracy) |

IDEOLOGY
Ultranationalism; Federalism; Islamophobia; Euroscepticism

ELECTION RESULTS

| Year | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2008 | Chamber of Deputies | 3,024,758 | 8.3 | 60/630 |
| 2008 | Senate of the Republic | 2,644,248 | 7.9 | 26/315 |
| 2013 | Chamber of Deputies | 1,390,156 | 4.1 | 20/630 |
| 2013 | Senate of the Republic | 1,328,555 | 4.3 | 18/315 |
| 2009 | European Parliament | 3,126,915 | 10.2 | 9/72 |
| 2014 | European Parliament | 1,686,556 | 6.16 | 5/73 |

Lega Nord was officially founded as a federal political party in February 1991. The party's electoral breakthrough came in 1992, transforming Lega Nord into a leading political actor (Gallagher 1992b, 2000). In 1994, the party proceeded to form an alliance with Berlusconi's Forza Italia and doubled its parliamentary representation in that year's national election. In 1995, Lega Nord joined the National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale), a coalition of conservative and neo-fascist parties including the Italian Social Movement (MSI) led by Gianfranco Fini, who later became the leader of the Alliance (Gallagher 2000). The National Alliance participated in the coalition government under Berlusconi and the Lega Nord was represented in five ministries in Berlusconi's government in May 1994. That government collapsed in December 1994 (McCarthy 1995). In the 1996 national election, Lega Nord had an important electoral success (59 deputies and 27 senators), although it stayed outside party coalitions. Thereafter, the leaders of the party developed their rhetoric regarding the secession of northern Italy under the name *Padania*. The party's federalist, populist ideology dominated its discourse, and federalism became a major strand of the party's political agenda. Indeed, the official programme of the party cited 'federalist libertarianism' as its ideological basis. While Euroscepticism is another ideological characteristic of the Lega Nord, the party openly supports the direct election of the President of the European Commission and requests more powers for the European Parliament and European Central Bank (Lega Nord Programme 2012). The same contradictory tactics and discourses appear in the party's strategy on migration. Although the official party rejects charges of xenophobia and Islamophobia, illustrating the leadership's attempt to present a more moderate character to justify participation in right-wing coalitions, such as Berlusconi's House of Freedom (2000–2007) and People of Freedom (2007–2013), many members of Lega Nord make racist and xenophobic statements when they speak to audiences that consist of party members and sympathizers (Parenzo and Romano 2009). In December 2013, Matteo Salvini was elected as the new federal secretary of the party. He took a critical

view of the EU, especially of the Eurozone, and before the 2014 European Parliament elections started to cooperate with Marine Le Pen (NF) and Geert Wilders (PoVV).

| LATVIA | FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATIONS |
|---|---|---|
| **Nacionālā Apvienība**<br>*National Alliance*<br>(Coalition of 'For fatherland and freedom/LNNK' and 'All for Latvia') | July 2011 (as party)<br>2010 (as alliance) | AECR (Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists)<br>AEN (Alliance for Europe of the Nations) |
| | IDEOLOGY<br>Nationalism; Anti-immigration; Anti-Russian | |

ELECTION RESULTS

| Year | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2010 | National Election | 74,028 | 7.7 | 8/100 |
| 2011 | National Election | 127,208 | 13.9 | 14/100 |
| 2014 | European Parliament | 58,991 | 7.45 | 1/8 |

The National Alliance is a coalition of conservative, liberal and nationalist parties. It first appeared as an electoral alliance for the 2010 national election and unified the conservative party For Fatherland and Freedom with the nationalist, far-right party All for Latvia, which is considered racist and neo-Nazi (Muižnieks 2005; Nathan 2011). The alliance won eight seats in that election. In 2011 it became a party and increased its seats to 14 in the national election. It is now the fourth largest party in the Latvian Parliament and participates in the centre-right government of Latvia. The National Alliance emphasizes the importance of Latvian culture and language, opposing multiculturalism and immigration. The party, and especially its ally All for Latvia, regards Russians and Russian imperialism as a threat to the Latvian nation and calls for cooperation between Latvia and the EU (FN Programme 2012). One of the partners of the alliance, the conservative For Fatherland and Freedom, participated in the 2014 European Parliament elections and succeeded in having one MEP elected.

## NORWAY

**Fremskrittspartiet**
*Progress Party*

| FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATION |
|---|---|
| April 1973 | None |

IDEOLOGY
Liberalism; Anti-immigration

ELECTION RESULTS

| Year | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | National Election | 614,724 | 22.9 | 41/169 |
| 2013 | National Election | 463,560 | 16.3 | 29/169 |

The Progress Party was originally founded in 1973 as Party for a Strong Reduction in Taxes, Duties and Public Intervention by the right-wing political activist Anders Lange. Lange sought to establish an anti-tax, anti-bureaucracy protest movement, which transformed into the Progress Party in 1977 (Andersen and Bjorklund 2000). According to the party's leadership, 'the Progress Party is a classical liberal party that shall work for a major reduction in taxes, duties and government intervention, and for the safeguarding of the rights of the people and their freedom, as the Constitution presupposes' (Progress Party 2013) and its ideology is described as 'classical liberalism' (ibid.). However, media and academics describe it as a far-right party with xenophobic agenda (Andersen and Bjorklund 2000; Mudde 2000; Nilsen 2013). Although the Progress Party purports to be based on 'Christian and humanistic values', to oppose discrimination and support the integration of migrants into Norwegian society, its members usually resort to anti-immigration rhetoric (Paterson 2013). In the 1997 national election the Progress Party became the main opposition party in the country, a position that it also held following the national elections in 2005 and 2009. In 2013, the Progress Party in coalition with the Conservative Party won the national election and currently participates in a coalition government. This coalition has been criticized in the international media, especially because of the alleged links between the Progress Party and the terrorist Anders Behring Breivik, who was a member of the Progress Party in his youth and only left the party in 2006 (McDonald-Gibson 2013; Paterson 2013).

## POLAND

**Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS)**
*Law and Justice*

| FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATION |
|---|---|
| June 2001 | AECR (Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists) |

IDEOLOGY
Nationalism; Euroscepticism; Antisemitism; Homophobia

ELECTION RESULTS

| Year | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | European Parliament | 2,017,607 | 27.4 | 15/50 |
| 2007 | National Election | 5,183,477 | 32.1 | 166/460 |
| 2011 | National Election | 4,295,016 | 29.89 | 157/460 |
| 2014 | European Parliament | 2,246,870 | 31.78 | 19/51 |

The Law and Justice Party (PiS) presents itself as a conservative party, although there are close links between the party and the far right (Ciobanu 2013). Some of its tactics and aims, however, reveal its extreme-right ideological basis. PiS was founded in 2001 by the Kaczyński twins, Lech and Jarosław. The party won the 2005 election and Jarosław became Poland's Prime Minister, while Lech won the presidency. Since 2007, PiS has been the second largest party in the Polish Parliament. The main aims of the party are a struggle against alleged corruption and the ardent 'de-communication' of the country. On foreign policy, the party opposes the EU as a supranational organization; but supports economic and military integration with the EU on terms beneficial for Poland (Jungerstam-Mulders 2006). In contrast, the party supports Poland's strong alliance with the US. In other words, PiS can be characterized as a Eurosceptic and Atlanticist party. The discriminatory nature of the party first became apparent in 2002, when Lech Kaczynski, then mayor of Warsaw, refused permission for a Gay Pride parade, stating that it would be obscene and offensive to other people's religious beliefs. Thereafter, homophobia and opposition to homosexual rights were presented as ideological pillars of the party, together with distrust of minorities, antisemitism and nationalism (Day 2009; Traynor 2009).

## PORTUGAL

**Partido Nacional Renovador (PNR)**
*National Renewal Party*

| FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATION |
|---|---|
| February 2000 | ENF (European National Front) |

IDEOLOGY
Nationalism; Anti-immigration; Euroscepticism

ELECTION RESULTS

| Year | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | National Election | 11,503 | 0.2 | 0/230 |
| 2009 | European Parliament | 17,548 | 0.31 | 0/22 |
| 2011 | National Election | 13,214 | 0.37 | 0/230 |
| 2014 | European Parliament | | less than 0.5 | 0/21 |

Since the 'carnation revolution' Portugal has not witnessed resurgence in electoral success for extreme-right parties; quite to the contrary, the post-revolution has been characterized by the electoral failure of far-right parties that brought back memories of the old authoritarian regime. Hence, there was a 'marginalization of the far right' (Gallagher 1992a) in Portugal that still characterizes the country's political landscape (Zuquete 2007). The results of the recent national and European Parliament elections illustrate the marginalized role of the National Renewal Party, though the party's ideological core and discourse cannot be ignored by analysts of far-right rhetoric. At the time of its foundation, the party appeared to be neo-fascist and pro-Salazar's ideas. However, since then the party has transformed into a counterpart of the Western European organizations, especially after the election of Pinto Coelho to the party's leadership in 2005 (Zuquete 2007). One of the party's main slogans is 'Portugal for the Portuguese', and nationalism is proposed as the only way of solving the country's problems (Mudde 2000). At the same time, immigration is presented as an invasion that threatens Portuguese national identity and security as well as the survival of the Portuguese people (Zuquete 2007). The party's discourse targets immigrants and internal and external forces, such as the EU, that are considered to be responsible for the 'decadence' in and destruction of Portugal. The Eurosceptic ideology of the party combined with anti-systemic and populist elements, dominates the party's rhetoric and ensures its participation in the European National Front.

## RUSSIA

**Политическая партия ЛДПР**
*Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR)*

| FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATION |
|---|---|
| 1991 | none |

IDEOLOGY
Ultranationalism; Anti-communism; Anti-West; Antisemitism; Homophobia

ELECTION RESULTS

| Year | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 | Duma Election | 7,664,570 | 11.67 | 56/450 |
| 2012 | Presidential Election | 4,458,103 | 6.2 | - |

The LDPR was founded in 1991 and is led by the 'charismatic' figure of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, well-known to Russian and international audiences for his populist, nationalist and racist rhetoric (see BBC News 2012). The party is described as far-right, anti-communist and ultranationalist and is centred on Zhirinovsky's controversial personality (Cox and Shearman 2000). He encourages violent action and war in the name of a 'Greater Russia', supports the restoration of Russia with Belarus, Ukraine and other former Soviet republics and criticizes the discrimination by Baltic countries' leadership against Russian minorities (Dunlop 2011). The party is also opposed to both communism and capitalism, presents the West as the main threat to the Russian nation and favours a mixed economy and liberalism (Cox and Shearman 2000). The LPDR noted its first electoral success in the 1993 Duma election, receiving a sizeable minority of the vote (almost 23 per cent). In the 2011 Duma elections the party's percentage was 11.4 per cent, making it the fourth strongest party in Russia.

## SLOVAKIA

**Slovenská národná strana (SNS)**
*Slovak National Party*

| FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATIONS |
|---|---|
| December 1989 | EFD (Europe of Freedom and Democracy)<br>MELD (Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy) |
| IDEOLOGY<br>Ultranationalism; Euroscepticism; Anti-Hungarian; Anti-Roma | |

ELECTION RESULTS

| Year | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | European Parliament | 45,960 | 5.55 | 1/13 |
| 2010 | National Election | 218,490 | 5.08 | 9/150 |
| 2012 | National Election | 116,420 | 4.55 | 0/150 |
| 2014 | European Parliament | 20,244 | 3.61 | 0/13 |

The Slovak National Party (SNS) was founded in December 1989, its ideological base being the historical Slovak National Party of Czechoslovakia (1871–1938). The SNS presents itself as a nationalist party that emphasizes Christianity (Jeffries 2002). Its members' statements regarding Roma and the Hungarian minority in Slovakia illustrate the racist, ultranationalist character of the party (see BBC News 2006). Its former leader, Ján Slota, has received media attention because of his racist statements and violent attacks against Hungarians (Balogova 2008). Since 1990 SNS has won seats in every Slovak Parliament and participated in the coalition government from 2006 to 2010. In the 2012 national election SNS noted its first electoral collapse, failing to meet the 5 per cent electoral threshold, losing its deposit and any parliamentary representation.

## SPAIN

**España 2000**
*Spain 2000*

| FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATION |
|---|---|
| 2002 | NF (National Front) France |
| IDEOLOGY<br>Nationalism; Anti-immigration; Euroscepticism | |

ELECTION RESULTS

The party won five council seats in the municipal elections of 2011

| Year | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 | National election | 9,266 | 0.04 | 0 |

España 2000, considered to be a far-right party, was founded in 2002 in Spain. The extreme-right remains

a marginal ideology linked to the Franco era and the Spanish Civil War, and this is demonstrated by the party's weak national electoral results. However, the financial and social crisis in Spain led to an increase in España 2000 sympathizers (see Mason 2012). The party's main slogan is 'Spaniards first' and its aims relate to protection of Spanish national identity and Spaniards' social rights. The party's leading members maintain that they fight 'illegal migration' and globalization and support Spain's position in a Europe of nation-states, but not in a supranational organization such as the EU (España 2000, 2000a). Hence, the party has similarities with the French Front National, which has supported España 2000 at its national congress (España 2000, 2000b). Indeed, the decision of the party's leading team to congratulate Marine Le Pen for her success in the 2014 European Parliament elections illustrates the links between the French Front National and España 2000. Although the party's electoral success is limited to the districts of Valencia and Madrid, its actions extend beyond the borders of these areas, given that it has organized demonstrations against immigration from Muslim countries in various Spanish cities.

**SWEDEN**

**Sverigedemokraterna (SD)**
*Sweden Democrats*

| FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATION |
|---|---|
| February 1988 | EAF (European Alliance for Freedom) |

IDEOLOGY
Swedish nationalism; Anti-immigration; Euroscepticism

ELECTION RESULTS

| Year | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | European Parliament | 103,584 | 3.3 | 0/18 |
| 2010 | National Election | 339,610 | 5.7 | 20/349 |
| 2014 | European Parliament | | 9.7 | 2/20 |

The Sweden Democrats' rhetoric is based on xenophobic, populist and nationalist arguments (Kitschelt and McGann 1995). There is, however, an important difference between the SD and other Scandinavian far-right parties that hinges on the ideological roots of the SD. It was founded in February 1988 as a successor to the xenophobic, racist Sweden Party and Progress Party that provided the SD with its fascist roots and connections (Rydgren 2006). During the 1990s, the SD's leadership rejected the party's fascist past and sought ideological identification with the French National Front, the Freedom Party of Austria and the Danish People's Party (Rydgren 2006). Since the 2000s, different leaders have continued the party's policy of moderation, which involves the expulsion of any extremist members and the establishment of a nationalist Eurosceptic profile (Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2006). The SD promotes 'Swedish culture and national identity',

opposes the special rights given to the Sami population of northern Sweden and criticizes the EU and the Eurozone. Moreover, the party's leadership claims that Swedish identity and Swedes are threatened by immigrants, and thus rejects their integration into Swedish society and multiculturalism, and seeks to restrict the number of immigrants on the basis of the Danish People's Party political agenda (Rydgren 2006). In the 2010 national election, the SD crossed the 4 per cent threshold and entered the Swedish Parliament for the first time, and since then has increased in popularity (see the 2014 European Parliament elections).

**SWITZERLAND**

**Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP)**
*Swiss People's Party*

| FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATIONS |
|---|---|
| September 1971 | None |

IDEOLOGY
Liberalism; Anti-immigration; Euroscepticism; Anti-Islam

ELECTION RESULTS

| Year | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 | Federal Election | 641,106 | 26.6 | 54/200 |
| 2007 | Federal Election | 672,562 | 28.9 | 62/200 |

At the time of writing, the Swiss People's Party is the strongest party in the Swiss Parliament and presents itself as a centre-right party for the middle classes. The orientation of the party's electoral platform for 2011–2015 is expressed by the slogan 'SVP – the party for Switzerland'. The SVP was founded in 1971 via a merger of the Party of Farmers, Trades and Independents (BGB) and the Democratic Party, and had become the strongest party in Switzerland by the 2000s (Stockemer 2012). According to the SVP's programme (2011–2015), the party intends to protect the Christian culture, rights, freedom and prosperity of the Swiss people, and is committed to lower taxes and less state control and bureaucracy; it supports an 'immigration policy tailored to the needs of Switzerland, instead of unlimited mass immigration' and the deportation of foreign criminals. Although these aims are not directly linked to a far-right party, its xenophobic ideology is apparent in its references to immigrants; they are represented as a threat to the security of the Swiss people and Swiss national identity (Stockemer 2012). Moreover, the party alleges that 50 per cent of the crimes in Switzerland are committed by foreigners. The anti-immigrant and especially anti-Islamic character of the party is illustrated by its usage of racist posters during election campaigns (BBC News 2007; Day 2011; Mir 2011). Another threat to Swiss identity, prosperity and independence alleged by the SVP is the possibility of Switzerland's entry into the EU, which the party vehemently opposes (Stockemer 2012; SVP Programme

2011–2015). The Eurosceptic, anti-immigration character of the party was also revealed by its role in the referendum concerning the anti-immigration law in 2014 and its leading position in the 'Yes' vote (Baghdjian and Schmieder 2014; Traynor 2014).

THE NETHERLANDS

**Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)**
*Party for Freedom*

| FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATION |
|---|---|
| February 2006 | EAF (European Alliance for Freedom) |

IDEOLOGY
Anti-immigration; Anti-Islam; Euroscepticism

ELECTION RESULTS

| Year | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | European Parliament | 769,125 | 17.0 | 5/25 |
| 2010 | House of Representatives | 1,435,349 | 15.5 | 24/150 |
| 2012 | House of Representatives | 950,263 | 10.1 | 15/150 |
| 2014 | European Parliament | 630,139 | 13.3 | 4/26 |

The Party for Freedom (PVV) is based on the 'charismatic' figure of its founder and leader, Geert Wilders. In the 2010 national election it became the third strongest party in the Netherlands; Wilders gave the governmental coalition his support, though without having ministers in the cabinet. In 2012, the PVV withdrew its support from the government due to its opposition to austerity measures, a decision that led to a political crisis. During the difficult political situation following the 2010 national election and PVV's support for the minority government, the party pushed for anti-immigration measures, such as the 'burqa ban' that was never implemented (CNN 2012). In this way, the PVV revealed its anti-immigration basis that has been further developed in the party's programme. The PVV calls for a halt to immigration from Muslim countries and intends to forbid Islamic schools, headscarves and the Quran. Moreover, the party seeks the deportation of criminals with foreign citizenship and restrictions on immigrant labour. Simultaneously, Wilder's party aims to protect 'Judeo-Christian culture' and punish any violent acts against Jews or homosexuals. It has a Eurosceptic profile, demanding withdrawal from the EU and the Eurozone, and a return to the old Dutch currency (see PVV Political Agenda 2010–2015). The anti-Muslim ideas dominate the rhetoric of Wilder, who usually emphasizes the alleged 'Islamic threat' to European Judeo-Christian civilization (Traynor 2008; Wodak and Boukala 2014). This anti-immigration and especially anti-Muslim ideological basis of the party have led to the PVV's characterization as a far-right party (Art 2011). The international media usually refer to the PVV as extreme-right and anti-Muslim, although Wilders maintained he was not anti-Muslim: 'I have a problem with Islamic tradition, culture and ideology, not with Muslim people […] I don't hate Muslims, I hate

Islam' (Traynor 2008).

**UKRAINE**

**Vseukrayinske obyednannia 'Svoboda'**
*All-Ukrainian Union 'Svoboda'*

| FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATION |
|---|---|
| October 1991 | AENM (Alliance of European National Movements) |
| IDEOLOGY | |
| Ultranationalism; Fascism; Antisemitism | |

ELECTION RESULTS

| Year | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2007 | National Parliament | 178,660 | 0.76 | 0/450 |
| 2012 | National Parliament | 2,129,246 | 10.45 | 36/450 |

Svoboda was originally founded in Lviv in 1991 as the Social-National party of Ukraine and was based on the collaboration of a number of ultra-nationalist movements that define themselves as enemies of communist ideology (Olszanski 2011; Rudling 2013). The name of the party was an intentional reference to the Nazi Party in Germany. Membership was restricted to ethnic Ukrainians, although the party also recruited skinheads and football hooligans (Rudling 2013). The Social-National party of Ukraine, Svoboda, was renamed the All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda, in February 2004 with the rise of Oleh Tyahnybok to party leader. Tyahnybok made significant efforts to moderate the party's extremist character and use of Nazi symbols. The new leader, however, did not deny the nationalist, antisemitic and anti-communist tradition of the party; quite the contrary as, in 2004, Tyahnybok was expelled from the parliament for a speech calling for Ukrainians to fight against a 'Muscovite-Jewish mafia' and praised the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists for having fought 'Muscovites, Germans, Jews and other scum who wanted to take away our Ukrainian state' (Rudling 2013). Svoboda's ideological base is (ultra-) nationalism. The party opposes ethnic minorities and languages, and its members openly express opposition to Russians, Jews, immigrants and homosexuals. In the 2012 Ukrainian parliamentary election, Svoboda won its first seats in the Ukrainian Parliament. In October 2012, Svoboda joined a formal coalition with the centre-right Batkivshchyna and UDAR parties to form the Parliament's collective opposition. Svoboda actively participated in the pro-EU protest campaign, February–March 2014, aiming to influence regime change and integration with the EU. Five members of Svoboda held positions in Ukraine's government following the clashes in February 2014 (Salem 2014).

UNITED KINGDOM

UK Independence Party (UKIP)

| FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATION |
|---|---|
| September 1993 | EFD (Europe of Freedom and Democracy) |

IDEOLOGY
Anti-immigration; Euroscepticism; Anti-Islam

ELECTION RESULTS

| Year | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | European Parliament | 2,498,226 | 16.6 | 13/72 |
| 2010 | House of Commons | 919,546 | 3.1 | 0/650 |
| 2014 | European Parliament | 4,376,635 | 26.6 | 24/73 |

UKIP was founded in 1993 and is described by the UK media and academics as a Eurosceptic, populist party (Abedi and Lundberg 2009), although UKIP identifies itself as a 'democratic, libertarian party' (UKIP 2013a). In the local election of 2013 the party saw some electoral success and won several council seats nationwide; in the national election 2015, UKIP won one seat in the House of Commons. The party is characterized as a one-issue party (Euroscepticism) and by the populist rhetoric and performance of its leader, Nigel Farage (see Abedi and Lundberg 2009; BBC News 2006b), who has been a UKIP MEP since 1999. UKIP was founded on the basis of Euroscepticism and still emphasizes the UK's withdrawal from the EU. It adopted a British anti-European stance and came second in the 2009 European Parliament election, behind the Conservatives, with 13 elected representatives (Underwood 2010). In the 2014 European elections, UKIP came first in the UK and had 24 MEPs elected. UKIP states that the UK should leave the EU and all other European organizations and institutions, such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Convention on Refugees and the Protection of Refugees. The party claims that as long as Britain remains under the EU's umbrella, the immigration issue that dominates the party's political agenda cannot be solved and the British authorities cannot 'deport foreign criminal and terrorist suspects where desirable' (UKIP 2013b). Moreover, the introduction to UKIP's policy on immigration mentions that the party aims to reduce 'uncontrolled immigration', introduce a 'freeze' on immigration for permanent settlement and deal with 'illegal immigrants' and their deportation (UKIP 2013b).

UNITED KINGDOM

British National Party (BNP)

| FOUNDED | EUROPEAN AFFILIATION |
|---|---|
| 1982 | AENM (Alliance of European National Movements) |
| IDEOLOGY | |
| Nationalism; Anti-immigration; Antisemitism; Fascism; Euroscepticism | |

ELECTION RESULTS

| Year | Type of Election | Votes | Percentage | Mandates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | European Parliament | 943,598 | 6.3 | 2/72 |
| 2010 | House of Commons | 563,743 | 1.9 | 0/650 |
| 2014 | European Parliament | 179,694 | 1.09 | 0/73 |

The British National Party (BNP) was founded in 1982 by John Tyndall, previously leader of the far-right National Front, a party with neo-Nazi ideology and links (Hill and Bell 1988). The BNP's ideological platform is considered fascist and nationalist (Copsey 2007; Renton 2005; Richardson 2013a, 2013b). The party has never won a seat in Parliament, though it did see electoral success in the 2009 European Parliament election, when two of its leading members, Nick Griffin and Andrew Brons, were elected MEPs. From the very beginning, the BNP's leadership has sought to distance itself from fascist and neo-Nazi groups, although the ideological pillars of the BNP are nationalism and fascism (Copsey 2007). In 1999, Nick Griffin was elected as the new leader of the party. Griffin's main aim was to modernize the party's image and moderate its ideological basis. An anti-immigration stance, however, remained the number one issue on the BNP's agenda, transforming quickly into Islamophobia, especially after 9/11 in New York and the 7/7 London bombings in July 2005 (Copsey 2007). The party's manifesto refers to freedom, security and democracy as important values of the British nation at risk. In particular, the party claims that 'democracy is under threat from the EU and mass immigration, both of which threaten to extinguish all of our traditions and culture' (BNP 2010). The BNP demands the deportation of all 'illegal immigrants' and those foreigners who are convicted of crimes in Britain (ibid.). It also demands Britain's immediate withdrawal from the EU, which is allegedly destroying Britain's national identity and nationhood. Moreover, the party describes immigration from Muslim countries to Britain as 'the Islamic colonization of Britain' and demands that 'Islamic immigration be halted and reversed as it presents one of the most deadly threats yet to the survival of our nation' (ibid.). Furthermore, the party opposes multiculturalism, and although it attempts to downplay its nationalist, fascist and antisemitic characteristics, it refers directly to 'British superiority': 'British people may take pride from knowing that the blood of an immense column of nation-building, civilization-creating heroes and heroines runs through their veins […]. Being British is more than merely possessing a modern document known as a passport. It runs far

deeper than that; it is to belong to a special chain of unique people who have the natural law right to remain a majority in their ancestral homeland' (BNP 2010). According to the UK media, several BNP members have attempted to 'protect' their British rights through violent activities (see BBC News 2013a). John Tyndall himself has convictions for assault and organizing neo-Nazi activities (Human Rights Watch 1997) and Nick Griffin was convicted of hate speech (Botsford 2013). The BNP cooperates with far-right or neo-Nazi parties, such as the Greek Golden Dawn, the Italian Forza Nuova and the Hungarian Jobbik, and plays a leading role in the Alliance of European National Movements (AENM).

## 1.1.United States of America[2]

### The US Tea Party Movement

Many academics, political scientists and journalists describe the Tea Party as an example of corporate-funded astroturfing associated with the Republican Party (Formisano 2012). Skocpol and Williamson define the Tea Party as 'neither solely a mass movement nor an astroturf creation, arguing for something in between: a grassroots movement amplified by the right-wing media and supported by elite donors' (2012, 50–51). The name 'Tea Party' refers to the 'Boston Tea Party', a protest by colonists who objected to a British tax on tea in 1773 without having the right to representation, and dumped British tea taken from docked ships into the harbour (Leopore 2010). The origins of the current Tea Party movement were, on the one hand, grassroots in nature, developing outside the existing power centres in Washington, DC, and in the more remote regions where conservative politics meet a more libertarian, right-wing opposition. On the other hand, roots derived directly from elements within the Republican Party apparatus and began as proxies for the party itself (Burghart and Zeskind 2010, 15). Among the earliest moments that led to the establishment of the Tea Party movement were the events of the 234th anniversary of the Boston Tea Party, primarily directed at the libertarian part of the Republican Party and focused on the Republican Congressman Ron Paul as the intellectual 'godfather' of the party. His supporters held a 'tea party moneybomb' to raise campaign funds for his campaign in the 2008 Republican presidential primaries (ibid.). After the election of President Barak Obama (2008) and the signature of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (February 2009), which led to many protests nationwide, the first official 'tea parties', such as the 'Freedom Works', appeared and continued to emerge throughout the summer. According to Burghart and Zeskind (2010), the turning point for the Tea Parties was the Freedom Works rally on 12 September 2009 in Washington, DC, when a massive

event gave Tea Party groups an opportunity to work together. Hundreds of thousands of Tea Parties met in the streets and shared their stories and their anger with the Obama government. Tea Parties had turned from periodic protests into a full-fledged social movement (ibid., 17).

Most politicians who support the Tea Party have participated in various electoral campaigns as Republicans (since 2008); however, as Abramowitz (2014) notes, Republican primaries have been the site of competitions between the more conservative Tea Party wing of the party and the more moderate establishment wing. The Tea Party is not a typical political party as it does not have a formal structure and hierarchy, and does not promote one single political agenda. However, most of the Tea Party groups focus on budget deficits, taxes and the power of the federal government. Moreover, Tea Party groups request tighter border security, and oppose amnesty for illegal immigrants, abortion and gun control. They also emphasize issues of (nativist) nationalism: many voiced concerns regarding Barack Obama's birth certificate and promoted the idea that the President of the US was not a 'real American' (Formisano 2012; Skocpol and Williamson 2012). Burghart and Zeskind (2010) studied the six main national organizational networks at the core of the Tea Party movement. They provide much evidence that the leading figures of the 1776 Tea Party (the faction more commonly known as TeaParty.org) were imported directly from the anti-immigrant vigilante organization called the Minuteman Project. Tea Party Nation seems to gather so-called birthers and has attracted Christian nationalists and nativists. Tea Party Express frequently outraged the public with the racist pronouncements of its leaders. Finally, both ResistNet and Tea Party Patriots, the two largest networks, have provided a home to well-known anti-immigrant nativists and racists (ibid., 57–65).

Opinion poll data reveal that the majority of the Tea Party supporters are white, middle-class, conservative men who used to vote Republican. However, they are more conservative and much more politically active than other Republicans (see opinion data in Abramowitz 2011; Burghart and Zeskind 2010). The close link between the Tea Parties, anti-immigrant politics and media support can be observed, for example, in Congresswoman Michele Bachmann's Tea Party Caucus in the House of Representatives. Founded in July 2010, the Tea Party Caucus quickly grew to include 51 representatives, all of them Republicans.

## Endnotes

1 I am very grateful to Salomi Boukala for helping me with the literature search and review for the glossary.

Obviously all the listed parties are right-wing populist parties; however, some of them can certainly be described as Neo-Nazi or fascist parties. I have added such characteristics whenever appropriate.

2 Because the Tea Party movement is embedded into the Republican Party, I cannot provide similar information on election results and so forth. As I have in respect to all the other parties in the Glossary.

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