Do Private Regulations 'Ratchet Up?

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Outline

- Background on private authority
- ② Descriptive gap
- Approach
- Case: US forestry
- Future causal research

Private regulation































U.S. Forestry



Private Authority, Act 1: Protest



Private Authority, Act 1: Protest











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Private Authority, Act 3: Supply



"Certification of forest management and chain of custody was pursued at the request of Wisconsin's paper industry as the industry was under the threat of losing major customers"

Politics





Politics






SFI-00001





Figure: United States Timberland



Many theories of policy change

- "race to the bottom" (Gulbrandsen 2014)
- "converge" toward "higher" standard (Overdevest and Zeitlen 2014)
- converge to the middle bound by "ceilings and floors" (Cashore et al. 2004)
- "equilibrium" (Fischer & Lyon 2014)
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Little measurement

- high or low "stringency"
 - unmeasured
 - select issues
 - proportional cost and benefit (assumption)
 - perceived stringency (van der Ven 2015)
 - backers (Darnall et al. 2010)
- narrow or broad scope (Auld 2014, Heyes and Martin 2017)



Like public policy:

- Impacting
 - cost
 - compliance rate
 - outcomes

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- Impacting
 - cost
 - compliance rate
 - outcomes
- Impacted by:
 - balance of power among coalitions
 - decision-making process
 - social and industry norms

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- Impacting
 - trust and legitimacy
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- Impacting
 - trust and legitimacy
 - adoption by firms
 - competitor response
- Impacted by
 - market power/industry structure
 - consumer behavior
 - activist and industry groups
- Measured extremely poorly



Table: Measures of Policy Content

	Program Level	Issues Level	
Policy Ends	How comprehensive is the scope of issues addressed?	What are the specific requirements (i.e. policy settings) on each issue? (e.g. the specific size of stream buffer zones, specific best practices)	
Policy Means	In aggregate, across all issues, how prescriptive is the regulation? To what extent (e.g. on what portion of issues) are mandatory and substantive thresholds used?	 How prescriptive is the requirement? What specific ways are they applied?* (e.g. auditing processes) *Beyond the scope of this paper. 	

Table: Prescriptiveness of policy instruments

	Discretionary	Non-discretionary
Procedural (plan- or systems-based)	Flexible	Somewhat prescriptive
Substantive (e.g. a policy threshold)	Flexible	Most prescriptive

Table: Patterns of Change Among Private Regulations

Directions of Change (in comprehensiveness of scope, prescriptiveness of instruments, or levels of requirements)

Increasing
Opposite or Equilibrium
Decreasing

	Relationship Among Standards				
	Converging	Parallel	Diverging		
ng	<i>→</i>	1	1		
	1	1	<i>→</i>		
or	`\	→	/		
um	1	→	`_		
	`	>	→		
ng	→				

Relationship Among Standards

Figure: Comparing FSC-US and SFI on Scope and Prescriptiveness




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



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Increased

--- Net Change

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 - Restructuring constrained by core coalition
 - Industry-backed program "tying their hands?"

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- Responding to decreasing trust and legitimacy?
- "Gradual transformation" due to social norms/policy beliefs/goals

Thoughts?

Literature and framing?

Concepts of policy change?

Focusing causal research/theory?