


Table 1: Concepts and measurement of variation in the content of private regulations

Selected Scholarship	Concept	Measurement orientation	
García-Montiel et al. (2017)	“more rigorous,” “higher level,” “higher quality,” and thus “Greater complexity/ Effectiveness/ Cost” vs. “More Simplicity/Lower Cost”	Number of indicators. Descriptions of consistency, coherency, and completeness.	 <p>More Specific</p> <p>Broader</p>
Moore et al. (2012)	Management practices changed	Survey of self-reported number and type of management practices implemented	
McDermott et al. (2010; 2008)	“comprehensiveness and prescriptiveness”	Number of key issues with most prescriptive language	
Overdevest and Zeitlin (2012)	“far apart” or “closer” on select “Program Characteristics”	Binary table of select issues and descriptive examples	
Overdevest (2005, 2010)	“comparative quality”— “weaker” standards are “revised upwards” to be “equivalent” to “higher and more prescriptive standards”	Descriptive theory, examples, and review of previous comparisons	
Fransen (2011), Fransen & Conzelman (2015)	“stringency” as “comprehensive in scope, specific in content, and prescriptive in terms of requirements”	Descriptions based on “leading policy analysts per issue area”	
Hansen et al. (2006)	Select “general features” and “six aspects” of management	Descriptive table of select issues	
Auld (2014)	“Policy scope and regulatory domain” “policy changes,” “character of the rules developed”	Description of the set of problems addressed and how	
Cashore et al. (2004)	“stringency”	Descriptive theory and examples	
Smith & Fischlein (2010)	“stringency” of “weightings across multiple, and often conflicting, attributes,” also “excellence in content”	Descriptive theory and examples	
Porter (2014)	“hard law” or “soft law”	Descriptive examples	
Gulbrandsen (2004)	“variations in the strength of standards”—“more stringent and less discretionary,” “more rigorous and wide-ranging” vs. “weak or lax” “and allow far wider flexibility” Some “regulations have become more flexible” while others are “changing upward”	Descriptive examples	
Eberlein et al. (2014)	“differentiation among rule systems” along “dimensions of regulatory governance,” e.g. “more or less stringent requirements” or “regulatory capacity”	Descriptive typology and examples	
Hassel (2008)	“high and low quality regulation”, “higher standards” vs. “lower standards”	Descriptive theory and examples	
Bartley (2003)	“more credible claims” vs. “lax standards”	Descriptive theory and examples	
Abbott & Snidal (2008)	“substance and form of regulatory outcomes”— “stringent” “higher standards” vs. “less stringent” “business-friendly” “weaker standards”	Descriptive theory	
Bernstein & Cashore (2007)	Pressure to “raise” or “lower” requirements “explains convergence/ divergence”	Descriptive theory	
Kollman & Prakash (2011), Potoski & Prakash (2004), Prakash & Potoski 2006)	“lax” or “processes-based” vs. “more stringent” “outcome-based” or “product-based” “types of regulations”	ISO14001 classified as process-based, stringency assessed only for public regulations	
Prakash & Potoski (2007)	“stringent” vs. “lenient” standards	Proportional costs, social externalities, and branding benefits	
Formal models of “stringency” or “quality”	“sustainability quality level” (Poret 2016), “more ambitious” (Fischer et al., 2017), “stricter rules” (Schmitz et al., 2017), “stringency” (Fischer and Lyon 2014; Hayes and Martin, 2017)	Proportional costs & benefits to programs & firms	
Formal models of issue scope	“issue-width” in an “issue space” (Hayes and Martin 2015)	Proportional costs and benefits to programs and funders	