Policy Influence: Do Public Pressure Campaigns Influence Bureaucratic Policymaking?

Appendix and Replication Code

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(R code is only in the HTML version)

1 Data

Replication data are available in SQL and Rdata at https://github.com/judgelord/rulemaking.

```
load(here::here("data", "rules_metadata.Rdata"))

rules %<>% mutate(year = str_sub(posted_date, 1,4) %>% as.numeric())

# alternatively
#rules <- dbGetQuery(con, "SELECT * FROM rules")

#FIXME REPLACE WITH date
d <- rules %>%
  filter(year > 2004, year < 2021, document_type %in% c("Proposed Rule", "Rule"))

load(here::here("data", "comments_min.Rdata"))</pre>
```

```
# add docket_id
comments_min %<>%
 mutate(docket_id = id %>% str_remove("-[0-9]*$"))
# hand coded
load(here::here("data", "coalitions_coded.Rdata"))
load(here::here("data", "comments_coded.Rdata"))
# load(here::here("data", "mass_coded.Rdata"))
# common names
comments coded %<>%
 mutate(coalition = coalition_comment,
         agency = str_remove(docket_id, "-.*"))%>%
 mutate(org_name = org_name %>% str_to_title())%>%
 mutate(coalition = coalition %>% str_to_title())
# common names
coalitions_coded %<>%
 mutate(coalition = coalition_comment,
         comments = coalition_comments,
         Comments = Coalition_comments,
         agency = str_remove(docket_id, "-.*"))%>%
 mutate(coalition = coalition %>% str_to_title())
# coalitions_coded %<>% mutate(across(where(is.character, str_to_title))
# TODO merge in mass comments that were not hand-coded
```

These data currently include 212516 dockets, 134927 rulemaking dockets from 1909 to 2020. These dockets received approximately 99329768 comments.

This analysis relies on rulemaking dockets from 2005 through 2020. These 44583 rulemaking dockets received 75614762 comments.


1.1 Clustering with text reuse

My theoretical approach requires that I attribute form letter comments to the organizations, campaigns, and broader coalitions that mobilized them. To do so, I identify comments that share text. I find that a 10-word phrase repeated across more than a few comments is always either text copied from the proposed policy or a form letter provided by a campaign. Thus, for the text of each comment, I first remove all 10-word phrases that appear in the proposed rule (including the preamble and call for comments). Then, I identify all comments that share ten-word phrases with 99 or more other comments. Finally, I collapse these form letter comments to one representative document for hand-coding.

For each comment on a rulemaking docket, I identify the percent of words it shares with other comments using a 10-word (or "10-gram") moving window function, looping over each possible pair of texts to identify matches. [Where a new presidential administration used the same docket number to solicited more about n-gram window functions and comparisons with related partial matching methods such as the Smith-Waterman algorithm, see Casas, Denny and Wilkerson 2017: and Judge-Lord (2017).) When actors sign onto the same comment, it is clear that they are lobbying together. However, various businesses, advocacy groups, and citizens often comment separately, even when they are aligned. Text-reuse (using the same ten-word phrases) captures this alignment.

Figure 1 shows the percent of shared text for a sample of 50 comments on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's 2016 Rule regulating Payday Loans. Comments are arranged by the document identifier assigned by regulations gov on both axes. The black on

the diagonal indicates that each document has a perfect overlap with itself. Black squares off the diagonal indicate additional pairs of identical documents. For example, 100% of the words from Comment 95976 are part of some tengram that also appears in 95977 because the exact same comment was uploaded twice. The cluster of grey tiles indicates a coalition of commenters using some identical text. Comments 91130 through 91156 are all partial or exact matches. All are part of a mass comment campaign by Access Financial. The percent of the identical text is lower than many mass-comment campaigns because these are hand-written comments, but the n-gram method still picks up overlap in the OCRed text in the header and footer. Tengrams that appear in 100 or more comments indicate a mass comment campaign. Some agencies use similar "de-duping" software [CITE] and only provide a representative sample comment. In these cases, my linking method assumes that the example comment is representative, and I link these comments to others based on the text of the sample comment provided.



1.2 Hand-coded sample

To estimate the influence of public comments on policy, I code almost all* comments on a random sample of rules, recording the type of organization, the lobbying coalition to which each belongs, the type of coalition (primarily public or private interests), their policy demands, and the extent to which the change between draft and final rule aligned with their demands. This level of alignment between policy asks and policy outcomes is my measure of lobbying success. It does not identify a causal relationship—true policy influence, but it is state of the art with these kinds of observational data (see Yackee and Yackee (2006)).

*On each selected rule, I code all comments submitted as file attachments or emails, but only some comments typed in a text box. I include comments typed in a text box if they share text with other comments (see above). This includes nearly all comments on most




Figure 1: Percent of Matching Text in a Sample of Public Comments

rules, excluding entirely unique text-box content, which is marginal qualitatively and quantitatively. For comments sharing text, I code one sample document for all versions of the form letter.

My approach to measuring lobbying success starts with policy demands raised in comments. I code the general regulatory/deregulatory direction of the policy change, but the dimensions of conflict on which I judge lobbying success are those identified by commenters. They do not emerge from a reading of the policy or not any a priori concept. Instead, I read the change between draft and policy with an eye for alignment with commenters' requests (including requests that specific parts of the draft policy do not change.) My approach of identifying the dimensions of the conflict by comments has benefits and downsides. Compared to other potential measures of success, it is more likely to focus on things that commenters care about. For example, one could measure success by the number of times a comment is mentioned in the agency's response to comments. However, this may capture strategic responsiveness by agencies choosing to discuss some issues more than others. It also counts explicit rejections toward the measure of responsiveness. One could also measure success by focusing on a-priory potential aspects of the policy. Balla et al. (2020) count five factors: (1) the number of regulated entities, (2) number of activities or substances being regulated, (3) the level of pollution standards, (4) the compliance and effective deadlines of the regulation, and (5) the monitoring and reporting requirements. Each takes one value (increasing or decreasing), and each is weighted equally in the analysis. In contrast, starting with comments allows commenters to highlight the issues they care most about.

1.2.1 By organization

Organization-level data sample:

```
comments_coded %>%

dplyr::select(document_id, comment_type, comments, starts_with(c("org_", "coalition"))
```

```
group_by(coalition_comment) %>%
  slice(n = 2) \%
  kablebox()
document\_id
comment_type
comments
org_name
org_type
org_lead
coalition_comment
coalition_type
coalitions
coalition_unopposed
coalition\_congress
coalition\_size
coalition_position
coalition\_business
coalition\_success
coalition\_leader\_success
coalition\_comments
coalition\_id
Coalition_size
```

 ${\bf Coalition_comments}$ Coalition_Position coalition DOT-OST-2011-0044-0291 org 1 American Aviation Institute ngo;thinktank TRUE aai public 5 FALSE 0 2 1.000000 0 -2.0000000 -2.0000000 2 1

9

2-10

Opposes rule

Aai

FEMA-2016-0003-0170

org

1

State Of Alaska

gov;state

TRUE

aasa

public

10

FALSE

0

15

1.000000

0

2.0000000

2.0000000

16

2

11-100 Opposes rule Aasa ${\rm CFPB\text{-}2019\text{-}0022\text{-}5924}$ mass 1 NANA TRUE aca international private 6 FALSE 0 48 4.521739 57 0.33333330.333333369 3

11-100 Supports rule Aca International WHD-2019-0003-12782 org 1 National Association Of Home Builders corp;group TRUE acg private 3 FALSE 0 23 4.000000 0 1.87500001.875000024

4

12

11-100 Supports rule Acg NPS-2018-0007-71052org 1 Institute For Free Speech ngo;advocacy TRUE aclu public 4 FALSE 1 57 1.013158 0 1.9672131

1.9672131765

11-100 Opposes rule Aclu ICEB-2015-0002-41564 org 1 Southeast Missouri State University ngo;university TRUE afl-cio public 6 FALSE 0 5 5.0000002 1.00000001.0000000 5 7

2-10 $Supports\ rule$ Afl-Cio FWS-HQ-NWRS-2012-0086-0094org 1 Alaska Oil And Gas Association corp group TRUE alaska oil and gas association private 3 FALSE 0 5 1.800000 3 -0.4000000 -0.4000000 5

10

15

2-10 Opposes rule Alaska Oil And Gas Association DEA-2018-0005-1537 org 1 Association For Accessible Medicines corp group TRUE ama public 4 FALSE 0 2 4.000000 1 2.00000002.00000002 11

2-10

2-10 Supports rule Ama ED-2016-OESE-0032-19253NA 1 New York State Council Of School Superintendents NA FALSE american association of school administrators public 18 FALSE 0 8 NaN 0 NaN NaN 8 14

17

2-10

NA

American Association Of School Administrators

 ${\rm CFPB\text{-}2019\text{-}0022\text{-}9597}$

org

1

Aldridge Pite Haan Llp

corp;law firm

TRUE

american bar association

public

6

FALSE

1

26

2.535714

0

1.1666667

1.1666667

28

16

18

11-100 Opposes rule American Bar Association PHMSA-2012-0082-0327 org 1 Dakota Gasification Company corp TRUE american petroleum institute private 7 FALSE 0 209 1.563380 104 -0.4956522 -0.4956522214

19

More than 100

More than 100 Opposes rule American Petroleum Institute NOAA-NMFS-2013-0101-1828 org 1 Forked River Tuna Club ngo;membership TRUE american sportfishing association private 5 FALSE 0 5 5.000000 1 0.0000000

0.00000001542

22

2-10

More than 100 Supports rule American Sportfishing Association IRS-2016-0015-0141 mass 1 American Federation Of Government Employees gov;federal TRUE americans for tax fairness public 4 FALSE 0 9 4.888889 0 2.00000002.00000002985324

More than 100 Supports rule Americans For Tax Fairness WHD-2019-0001-59320 org 1 Partnership For Medicaid Home Based Care corp;small corp TRUE ancor private 6 FALSE 0 10 5.000000 0 NaN NaN 12 26 2-10

43

29

11-100

11-100 $Supports\ rule$ Ancor ${\rm CEQ\text{-}2019\text{-}0003\text{-}346818}$ org 1 Cahto Tribe gov; tribe FALSE association of american indian affairs private 7 FALSE 0 41 2.7906980 -1.1428571 -1.1428571

11-100

Opposes rule

Association Of American Indian Affairs

BSEE-2017-0008-0595

org

1

Dnv Gl

corp

FALSE

auditors

private

4

FALSE

0

3

2.000000

1

-0.666667

-0.666667

3

33

2-10 Opposes rule Auditors ${\bf CFPB\text{-}2016\text{-}0025\text{-}211877}$ org 1 Michigan Cbc Host Committee corp TRUE axcess financial private 6 FALSE 0 106 1.321101 57 -0.6029412 -0.6029412

More than 100

112

34

25

More than 100 Opposes rule Axcess Financial PHMSA-2012-0082-0317 org 1 Village Of Elburn gov;local FALSE barrington and illinois trac coalition public 7 FALSE 0 118 4.808000 4 -0.6129032 -0.6129032125 36 More than 100

11-100

26

More than 100 Supports rule Barrington And Illinois Trac Coalition USCBP-2007-0064-0358 org 1 International Flying Samaritans ngo;service;advocacy TRUE bbp public 3 FALSE 0 20 1.550000 7 -1.2000000 -1.2000000 23 38

11-100 Opposes rule Bbp DOI-2015-0005-4423 org 1 Kapolei Community Development Corporation corp FALSE big autonomy public 6 FALSE 0 7 4.750000 2 2.00000002.00000008 39

40

11-100

2-10 Supports rule Big Autonomy DOI-2015-0005-4332 org 1 Democratic Party Of Hawaii Hawaiian Affairs Caucus ngo; political party FALSE blanket crew public 6 FALSE 0 14 4.071429 1 2.0000000 2.0000000 14

11-100 Supports rule Blanket Crew NOAA-NMFS-2013-0101-1881org 1 Diane Marie Fishery corp TRUE blue water fishermen's association private 5 FALSE 0 3 1.666667 2 -2.0000000 -2.0000000 3

42

30

2-10

Opposes rule

Blue Water Fishermen's Association

USCG-2010-0990-1744

org

1

Aep River Operations

corp;transportation

FALSE

boatus

public

3

FALSE

0

5

2.333333

2

-1.0000000

-1.0000000

6

43

2-10 Opposes rule Boatus FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0097-107766mass 72178Humane Society ngo TRUE center for biological diversity public 7 FALSE 0 39 1.193548 0 -1.3255814 -1.3255814856518

48

32

More than 100 Opposes rule Center For Biological Diversity NOAA-NMFS-2018-0035-0319org 1 Center For Sportfishing Policy corp group; coalition TRUE center for sportfishing policy private 5 FALSE 0 6 1.333333 1 -2.0000000 -2.0000000 6 50 2-10

2-10

Opposes rule

Center For Sportfishing Policy

TREAS-DO-2007-0015-0032

org

1

Center For Regulatory Effectiveness

corp;thinktank

FALSE

chamber of commerce

private

20

FALSE

0

4

1.200000

1

-0.6000000

-0.6000000

5

51

56

11-100

2-10 Opposes rule Chamber Of Commerce DOT-OST-2011-0044-0737org 1 Air Transport Association Of America, Inc., International Air Transport Association, Regional Airline Association And Air Carrier Association Of America corp;group TRUE cmapublic 5 FALSE 0 17 4.0000000 2.00000002.000000017

35

11-100 Supports rule Cma NOAA-NMFS-2008-0096-0019 org 1 United National Fishermen's Assoc. corp group;ngo FALSE commercial fishers and processors private 13 FALSE 0 13 2.692308 6 -0.2857143 -0.2857143 13 58

36

11-100 Opposes rule Commercial Fishers And Processors NOAA-NMFS-2013-0050-0030 org 1 Portland Fish Exchange ngo FALSE commercial fishing private 8 FALSE 0 6 3.571429 5 0.8571429

0.8571429

7

59

64

11-100

2-10 Supports rule Commercial Fishing FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0097-57575 org 1 Montezuma County gov;local TRUE congressional sportsmen's foundation private 7 FALSE 0 37 3.864865 2 1.7333333 1.7333333

11-100 Supports rule Congressional Sportsmen's Foundation TREAS-DO-2007-0015-0112 elected 1 Congressman Joe Pitts congress; joseph r. pitts; mike pence; doug lamborn; joe wilson; phil gingrey; john t. doolittle; wally herger; w. todd akin; marilyn musgrave; bob goodlatte roger wicker; mark souder roscoe bartlett FALSE congressmen public 20 FALSE 0 1 4.0000000 2.00000002.0000000 1

1 1 Supports rule Congressmen TREAS-DO-2007-0015-0091 org 1 Consumer Bankers Association corp group TRUE consumer bankers association private 20 FALSE 0 2 2.000000 1 2.00000002.00000002

2-10 2-10 Opposes rule Consumer Bankers Association TREAS-DO-2007-0015-0087 org 1 Corporate One Federal Credit Union ngo;credit union FALSE credit unions private 20 FALSE 0 2 2.000000 0 -2.0000000 -2.0000000 2 71

2-10 2-10 Opposes rule Credit Unions FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0006-64000mass 100 Oregon Wild ngo;advocacy TRUE defenders of wildlife public 5 FALSE 0 88 1.138889 0 -1.6666667 -1.6666667 44084473

11-100 More than 100 Opposes rule Defenders Of Wildlife ED-2016-OESE-0032-13667org 1 South Dakota Department Of Education gov;state FALSE department of education public 18 FALSE 0 19 3.500000 0 NaN NaN 20

11-100 11-100 Supports rule Department Of Education USCIS-2010-0017-12455org 1 Department For Professional Employees, Afl-Cio ngo;union TRUE dpe afl-cio public 3 FALSE 0 2 1.000000 0 -2.0000000 -2.0000000 2

44

2-10 2-10 Opposes rule Dpe Afl-Cio FWS-R9-ES-2008-0093-0495org 1 Environmental Defense Fund ngo;advocacy TRUE earthjustice public 6 FALSE 0 97 1.024590 0 -1.7826087 -1.7826087 122 81

11-100 More than 100 Opposes rule Earthjustice USCBP-2007-0064-2108 org 1 Bahamas Hotel Association corp group TRUE ebaa public 3 FALSE 0 5 2.6000003 -1.2000000 -1.2000000 5

2-10
2-10
Opposes rule
Ebaa
NOAA-NMFS-2008-0096-0085
mass
1
Pew
ngo;environmental;pressure
FALSE
environmental community
public
13
FALSE
0
15
4.950000
0
-0.9090909
-0.9090909
20
90

11-100
11-100
Supports rule
Environmental Community
WHD-2019-0001-0052
org
1
Chatmoss Country Club
corp;small corp
TRUE
epi
public
6
FALSE
0
55
1.000000
0
-1.0000000
-1.0000000
60
93

48

11-100 11-100 Opposes rule Epi

CFPB-2016-0025-147205

org

1

Equifax

corp

TRUE

equifax

private

6

FALSE

0

1

5.000000

2

1.0000000

1.0000000

2

1 2-10 Supports rule Equifax ICEB-2015-0002-40752 org 1 NA ${\it ngo;} membership; advocacy; pressure\ group$ TRUE fair public 6 FALSE 0 1 1.000000 0 -2.0000000

-2.0000000

2

50

1

2-10

Opposes rule

Fair

TREAS-DO-2007-0015-0063

mass

1

Family Research Council

ngo;faith

TRUE

family research council

public

20

FALSE

0

6

5.000000

0

2.0000000

2.0000000

6

51

2-10 2-10 Supports rule Family Research Council FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0097-57575org 1 Montezuma County gov;local TRUE farm bureau private 7 FALSE 0 45 3.943396 17 1.91666671.9166667

53

11-100 11-100 Supports rule Farm Bureau FWS-R9-ES-2008-0093-7786org 1 Minerals Management Service gov;federal TRUE federal emergency management agency public 6 FALSE 0 2 3.500000 0 -0.5000000 -0.5000000 2

2-10 2-10 Supports rule Federal Emergency Management Agency NOAA-NMFS-2013-0050-0128org 1 Fisheries Survival Fund ngo TRUE fisheries survival fund private 8 FALSE 0 3 3.666667 1 2.00000002.0000000 3 102

2-10 2-10 Supports rule Fisheries Survival Fund NOAA-NMFS-2012-0059-0153org 1 Maine Coast Fishermen's Association ngo FALSE fishing industry private 6 FALSE 0 12 4.833333 7 -1.1666667-1.1666667 12

11-100 11-100 Supports rule Fishing Industry CEQ-2019-0003-172544org 1 George Washington University Regulatory Studies Center ngo;university TRUE george washington university regulatory studies center NA 7 FALSE 0 1 5.0000000 -2.0000000 -2.0000000 1 108

1 1 Supports rule George Washington University Regulatory Studies Center ED-2016-OESE-0032-11931org 1 Down Syndrome Indiana, Inc. ngo;advocacy FALSE global down syndrome foundation public 18 FALSE 0 4 4.333333 0 1.00000001.00000005

2-10 2-10 Supports rule Global Down Syndrome Foundation BSEE-2012-0005-0027org 1 State Of Alaska gov;state FALSE government public 5 FALSE 0 2 5.0000000 -1.0000000 -1.0000000 2 110

2-10 2-10 Supports rule Government FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0097-80560org 1 Nez Perce Tribal Executive Committee gov;tribe;ej FALSE great lakes indian fish and wildlife commission public 7 FALSE 0 5 1.400000 0 -1.0000000 -1.0000000 5 113

2-10 2-10 Opposes rule Great Lakes Indian Fish And Wildlife Commission TREAS-DO-2007-0015-0029 org 1 Sport View Television Corporation corp FALSE greyhound racing industry private 20 FALSE 0 7 1.0000007 -0.8000000 -0.8000000 7

2-10 2-10 Opposes rule Greyhound Racing Industry NOAA-NMFS-2018-0035-0330 org 1 Ocean Conservancy ngo;advocacy TRUE gulf restoration network public 5 FALSE 0 11 1.0000000 -1.9000000 -1.9000000 28488 115

11-100 More than 100 Opposes rule Gulf Restoration Network DEA-2018-0005-1133 org 1 Vizient corp; membership; health careTRUE hsca public 4 FALSE 0 9 1.6666672 -1.7777778-1.7777778 9

2-10 2-10 Opposes rule Hsca FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0097-59136 org 1 Oregon Department Of Fish And Wildlife gov;state FALSE hunters private 7 FALSE 0 25 3.880000 0 1.8000000 1.800000025 118

11-100 11-100 Supports rule Hunters FEMA-2016-0003-0200 org 1 Kentucky Division Of Emergency Management gov;state TRUE iaem-usa public 10 FALSE 0 20 2.000000 0 2.0000000 2.0000000 23 119

11-100 11-100 Opposes rule Iaem-Usa PHMSA-2012-0082-1960 org 1 Canadian Association Of Railway Suppliers corp group FALSE internationalpublic 7 FALSE 0 2 5.0000001 1.66666671.66666673

2-10 2-10 Supports rule International ED-2016-OESE-0032-10992mass 1 Boone County Schools gov;local FALSE kentucky coalition for advancing education public 18 FALSE 0 9 NaN 0 1.00000001.00000009 126

2-10 2-10 NAKentucky Coalition For Advancing Education OSHA-H005C-2006-0870-1962org 1 Kimberly-Clark Professional corp;corp TRUE kimberly-clark public 5 FALSE 0 5 3.600000 0 0.40000000.40000005 128

67

2-10 2-10 Supports rule Kimberly-Clark ${\rm CEQ}\text{-}2019\text{-}0003\text{-}173043$ mass 50 Liuna NA TRUE liuna private 7 ${\rm FALSE}$ 0 112 4.533333 2 0.5333333 0.533333332892

More than 100 More than 100 Supports rule Liuna NOAA-NMFS-2013-0050-0137org 1 Maine Department Of Marine Resources gov;state TRUE maine department of marine resources public 8 FALSE 0 1 3.500000 0 2.00000002.00000002 131

1 2-10 Supports rule Maine Department Of Marine Resources NOAA-NMFS-2008-0096-0074org 1 Environmental Defense Fund ngo; environmentalFALSE marine fish conservation network public 13 FALSE 0 3 5.000000 0 -1.6666667-1.6666667 3

2-10 2-10 Supports rule Marine Fish Conservation Network TREAS-DO-2007-0015-0110 org 1 American Bankers Association corp group TRUE mastercardprivate 20 FALSE 0 5 1.500000 6 -1.3333333 -1.3333333 6 135

2-10 2-10 Opposes rule Mastercard OCC-2020-0026-0256 org 1 Innovative Lending Platform Association corp group TRUE mla private 3 FALSE 0 12 3.9166678 2.0000000 2.000000012 142

11-100 11-100 Supports rule Mla ${\rm CFPB\text{-}2016\text{-}0025\text{-}208735}$ elected 1 Senator Kimberly Lightford illinois senate district 4TRUE naacp public 6 FALSE 4 68 1.3285713 0.03174600.031746070

11-100 11-100 Opposes rule Naacp ${\rm CFPB\text{-}2019\text{-}0006\text{-}3621}$ org 1 Legal Services Advocacy Project ngo;legal;advocacy FALSE naca public 12 FALSE 2 71 1.0779223 -1.8000000 -1.8000000 77

11-100 11-100 Opposes rule Naca CFPB-2019-0006-22265 org 1 Minnesota Credit Union Network ngo;credit union TRUE nafcu private 12 FALSE 0 9 3.333333 2 0.44444440.44444449

2-10 2-10 Supports rule Nafcu ICEB-2015-0002-7242 mass 1 NA NA TRUE nafsa public 6 FALSE 0 56 4.43518510 1.16071431.1607143109 151

11-100
More than 100
Supports rule
Nafsa
ED-2016-OESE-0032-19481
NA
1
Fayette County Board Of Education
NA
FALSE
national association of state board of education
public
18
FALSE
0
7
NaN
0
NaN
NaN
7
154

2-10 2-10 NANational Association Of State Board Of Education ED-2016-OESE-0032-14344 NA 1 Nebraska Catholic Conference NAFALSE national association of state catholic conference directors private 18 FALSE 0 3 6.0000000 NaN NaN 3 155

2-10 2-10 Supports rule National Association Of State Catholic Conference Directors ED-2016-OESE-0032-3293NA 1 Department For Education, Office Of Catholic Schools/Diocese Of Columbus NA FALSE national association of state. catholic conference directors private 18 FALSE 0 2 NaN 0 NaN NaN 2 156

2-10 2-10 NA National Association Of State. Catholic Conference Directors FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0006-54714org 1 Southern Ute Indian Tribe gov;tribe;ej TRUE national congress of american indians public 5 FALSE 0 13 1.2307690 -0.5000000-0.5000000 13 158

11-100 11-100 Opposes rule National Congress Of American Indians ED-2016-OESE-0032-13748org 1 Connecticut Education Association ngo;advocacy FALSE national education association public 18 FALSE 0 9 3.5000000 NaN NaN 10 159

2-10 2-10 Supports rule National Education Association FWS-R9-ES-2008-0093-6974org 1 Friends Of Oceano Dunes ngo TRUE national endangered species act reform coalition private 6 FALSE 0 47 4.433962 21 0.28571430.285714353 160

```
11-100
11-100
Supports rule
National Endangered Species Act Reform Coalition
FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0007-60048
org
1
National Environmental Banking Association
corp group
TRUE
national environmental banking association
private
4
FALSE
0
1
4.000000
1
-2.0000000
-2.0000000
1
```

83

1 1 Supports rule National Environmental Banking Association NOAA-NOS-2013-0091-0074org 1 University Of Wisconsin System ngo;university TRUE national marine sanctuary foundation public 4 FALSE 0 16 4.263158 1 2.00000002.000000019

11-100 11-100 Supports rule National Marine Sanctuary Foundation BSEE-2017-0008-0595org 1 Dnv Gl corp TRUE national society of professional engineers private 4 FALSE 0 3 2.000000 1 -0.6666667-0.6666667 3

2-10 2-10 Opposes rule National Society Of Professional Engineers CFPB-2019-0022-9163 org 1 Native American Financial Services Association ngo;tribe TRUE native american financial services association NA 6 FALSE 0 1 1.000000 0 -2.0000000 -2.0000000 1 164

1 1 Opposes rule Native American Financial Services Association FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0097-80560org 1 Nez Perce Tribal Executive Committee gov;tribe;ej FALSE native americans public 7 FALSE 0 5 1.400000 0 -1.0000000 -1.0000000

5

2-10 2-10 Opposes rule Native Americans USCG-2010-0990-1889 org 1 Ri Party And Charter Boat Association corp group FALSE nbf public 3 FALSE 0 2 1.0000001 -2.0000000 -2.0000000 2 166

2-10 2-10 Opposes rule Nbf USCIS-2010-0017-12451org 1 National Council Of Asian Pacific Americans ngo;coaltion;advocacy TRUE ncapa public 3 FALSE 0 2 4.500000 0 2.00000002.00000002 167

168

2-10 2-10 Supports rule Ncapa WHD-2019-0001-59330 org 1 National Community Pharmacists Association corp;group TRUE ncpa private 6 FALSE 0 15 4.000000 0 2.0000000 2.0000000 15

11-100 11-100 Supports rule Ncpa ${\rm FEMA\text{-}}2016\text{-}0003\text{-}0253$ org 1 Louisiana Governor's Office Of Homeland Security And Emergency Preparedness gov;state TRUE ncsl public 10 FALSE 0 2 1.000000 0 2.00000002.0000000 2 169

2-10 2-10 Opposes rule Ncsl ${\bf CFPB\text{-}2016\text{-}0025\text{-}211911}$ org 1 Germania Credit Union ngo;credit union TRUE ncua public 6 FALSE 0 63 2.272727 4 0.09523810.095238166 170

11-100 11-100 Opposes rule Ncua ${\rm FEMA\text{-}2016\text{-}0003\text{-}0177}$ org 1 State Of Arizona Department Of Emergency And Military Affairs gov;state TRUE nema public 10 FALSE 0 38 2.886364 2 1.00000001.000000044 172

11-100 11-100 Opposes rule Nema NOAA-NMFS-2012-0059-0089org 1 Pacific Fishery Management Council ${\it gov;} federal; regional$ TRUE new england fishery management council public 6 FALSE 0 9 4.6666670 -1.3333333 -1.3333333 9 174

2-10 2-10 Supports rule New England Fishery Management Council OSHA-H005C-2006-0870-1703 elected 1 Congressman Robert A. Brady house-pa FALSE newport news public 5 FALSE 0 22 4.833333 0 1.03571431.035714330 176

11-100 11-100 Supports rule Newport News WHD-2019-0001-59231 org 1 National Association Of Convenience Stores corp;group FALSE nfib private 6 FALSE 0 1 5.0000000 NaN NaN 1 177

1 1 Supports rule Nfib USCG-2010-0990-1192 org 1 National Marine Manufacturers Association corp group TRUE nmma public 3 FALSE 0 3 4.0000001 2.00000002.00000004

2-10 2-10 Supports rule Nmma NOAA-NOS-2013-0091-0058 org 1 North Pacific Fishery Management Council ${\it gov;} federal; regional$ TRUE north pacific fishery management council NA 4 FALSE 0 1 2.000000 0 1.00000001.00000001 182

1 1 Opposes rule North Pacific Fishery Management Council NOAA-NMFS-2013-0050-0025org 1 Northeast Hook Fisherman's Association corp group TRUE northeast seafood coalition private 8 FALSE 0 6 3.571429 5 0.85714290.85714297

99

2-10 2-10 Supports rule Northeast Seafood Coalition ${\rm FEMA\text{-}}2016\text{-}0003\text{-}0263$ org 1 Natural Resource Defense Council/American Rivers ngo;advocacy;ej TRUE nrdc public 10 FALSE 0 9 5.0000003 -2.0000000 -2.0000000 11 185

2-10
11-100
Supports rule
Nrdc
FEMA-2016-0003-0208
org
1
Illinois Emergency Management Agency
gov;state
TRUE
nreca
public
10
FALSE
0
32
1.277778
4
2.0000000
2.0000000
36
186

11-100 11-100 Opposes rule Nreca NOAA-NOS-2013-0091-0151 org 1 American Petroleum Institute And National Ocean Industries Association corp group FALSE ocean industries private 4 FALSE 0 2 2.0000002 -2.0000000 -2.0000000 2 187

2-10 2-10 Opposes rule Ocean Industries BSEE-2012-0005-0069 org 1 Ipaa corp group TRUE offshore operators committee private 5 FALSE 0 32 1.39473722 0.86206900.862069038

11-100 11-100 Opposes rule Offshore Operators Committee DOI-2015-0005-0018 org 1 Grassroot Institute Of Hawaii ngo; advocacy FALSE orwell watch public 6 FALSE 0 2 1.0000000 -2.0000000 -2.0000000 2 192

2-10 2-10 Opposes rule Orwell Watch TREAS-DO-2007-0015-0072 org 1 The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation corp group FALSE other banks private 20 FALSE 0 13 2.384615 9 0.38461540.384615413 193

11-100 11-100 Opposes rule Other Banks ED-2016-OESE-0032-13504org 1 Missouri Pta ngo;advocacy FALSE parent teacher association public 18 FALSE 0 7 5.0000001 1.00000001.00000007 197

106

2-10 2-10 Supports rule Parent Teacher Association ${\rm CEQ\text{-}2019\text{-}0003\text{-}172067}$ mass 91604 Partnership Project NATRUE partnership project public 7 FALSE 1 114 1.1678320 -1.7647059-1.7647059 400089

More than 100 More than 100 Opposes rule Partnership Project BSEE-2013-0011-0027individual 1 Oasis Earth NATRUE pew public 4 FALSE 0 13 4.692308 0 -0.7500000 -0.7500000 13 200

11-100
11-100
Supports rule
Pew
NOAA-NMFS-2013-0101-2237
mass
1
Environmental Action
ngo;pressure group
TRUE
pew charitable trusts
public
5
FALSE
0
60
4.984849
1
-0.5625000
-0.5625000
168293
202

11-100 More than 100 Supports rule Pew Charitable Trusts DEA-2018-0005-1555 org 1 Pharmaceutical Research And Manufacturers Of America corp group TRUE phrma public 4 FALSE 0 3 3.000000 1 0.66666670.66666673 203

2-10 2-10 Supports rule Phrma WHD-2019-0001-59287 org 1 Pennsylvania Department Of Labor & Industry gov;state TRUE ppwo public 6 FALSE 0 26 5.000000 0 -2.0000000 -2.0000000 27 204

11-100
11-100
Supports rule
Ppwo
ED-2016-OESE-0032-11745
org
1
River Vale Public School District
elected;superintendent
FALSE
public schools
public
18
FALSE
0
21
5.000000
0
NaN
NaN
22
206

11-100 11-100 Supports rule Public Schools NOAA-NMFS-2008-0096-0018org 1 Recreational Fishing Alliance ngo;corp group FALSE recreational fishers private 13 FALSE 0 5 3.000000 2 -0.4000000-0.4000000 5 208

2-10 2-10 Supports rule Recreational Fishers NOAA-NMFS-2018-0035-0319 org 1 Center For Sportfishing Policy corp group; coalition FALSE recreational fishing private 5 FALSE 0 6 1.333333 1 -2.0000000 -2.0000000 6 209

2-10 2-10 Opposes rule Recreational Fishing NOAA-NMFS-2012-0059-0093 org 1 North Pacific Fishery Managemetn Council ${\it gov;} federal; regional$ FALSE regional councils public 6 FALSE 0 9 4.666667 0 -1.3333333 -1.3333333 9 210

2-10 2-10 Supports rule Regional Councils NOAA-NMFS-2008-0096-0012 org 1 South Atlantic Fishery Management Council ${\it gov;} federal; regional$ FALSE regional fishery management councils public 13 FALSE 0 8 3.000000 0 0.1250000 0.12500008 211

2-10 2-10 Supports rule Regional Fishery Management Councils DOI-2015-0005-0023 org 1 Kingdom Of Hawai'i ngo; advocacy FALSE royalty public 6 FALSE 0 2 2.333333 0 0.00000000.00000003 214

2-10
2-10
Opposes rule
Royalty
BSEE-2013-0011-0007
org
1
Shell Exploration & Production Company
corp;energy
TRUE
shell
private
4
FALSE
0
88
2.244444
29
-1.2727273
-1.2727273
90
217

11-100
11-100
Opposes rule
Shell
WHD-2019-0003-0017
elected
1
Congresswoman Alma S. Adams
house-nc
TRUE
shrm
public
3
FALSE
0
23
5.000000
1
0.9600000
0.9600000
25
218

11-100 11-100 Supports rule Shrm PHMSA-2012-0082-0202 mass 1 Sierra Club ngo;pressure;membership TRUE sierra club public 7 FALSE 0 24 5.0000000 -1.2272727 -1.2272727 330381

11-100 More than 100 Supports rule Sierra Club NPS-2018-0007-1091 org 1 Smithsonian Institution ngo;museum TRUE smithsonian public 4 FALSE 0 3 1.333333 0 2.00000002.0000000

3

2-10 2-10 Opposes rule Smithsonian OSHA-H005C-2006-0870-1597 org 1 American Dental Association ngo;professional TRUE southern company public 5 FALSE 0 15 3.000000 0 0.66666670.666666715 224

11-100 11-100 Supports rule Southern Company BSEE-2012-0005-0027org 1 State Of Alaska gov;state TRUE state of alaska public 5 FALSE 0 2 5.0000000 -1.0000000 -1.0000000 2 227

2-10 2-10 Supports rule State Of Alaska DOI-2015-0005-4291 org 1 KoʻOlaupoko Hawaiian Civic Club ngo; advocacy FALSE support and assist public 6 FALSE 0 11 4.727273 0 2.00000002.000000011 230

11-100 11-100 Supports rule Support And Assist NOAA-NMFS-2013-0050-0128 org 1 Fisheries Survival Fund ngo FALSE sustainable fisheries private 8 FALSE 0 3 3.666667 1 2.00000002.00000003

2-10 2-10 Supports rule Sustainable Fisheries ED-2016-OESE-0032-13782org 1 Federation For Community Schools-Children's Home + Aid ngo;advocacy FALSE the coalition for comuninty schools public 18 FALSE 0 2 5.0000000 NaN NaN 2 234

2-10 2-10 Supports rule The Coalition For Comunity Schools ${\rm CFPB\text{-}2019\text{-}0006\text{-}5496}$ elected 1 Alcee Hastings; Collin Peterson; Henry Cuellar house-fl FALSE thrifty loans private 12 FALSE 3 16 4.111111 7 1.52941181.529411818

11-100 11-100 Supports rule Thrifty Loans PHMSA-2012-0082-1960 org 1 Canadian Association Of Railway Suppliers corp group FALSE transport canada public 7 FALSE 0 2 5.0000001 1.66666671.66666673 239

2-10 2-10 Supports rule Transport Canada ${\rm CFPB\text{-}2019\text{-}0006\text{-}28008}$ individual 1 Results ngo;charity FALSE true public 12 FALSE 0 45 1.6170210 -1.3863636 -1.3863636 47 240

11-100 11-100 Opposes rule True OFCCP-2014-0004-0071 org 1 International Bancshares Corporation corp;corp TRUE u.s. chamber of commerce private 4 FALSE 0 13 1.0000000 1.69230771.692307713

11-100 11-100 Opposes rule U.s. Chamber Of Commerce OFCCP-2014-0004-0037 org 1 Boston Women's Workforce Council ngo;advocacy TRUE united brotherhood of carpenters and joiners of america public 4 FALSE 0 7 5.0000000 -0.5000000-0.5000000 7 245

2-10 2-10 Supports rule United Brotherhood Of Carpenters And Joiners Of America MSHA-2011-0001-0140 org 1 Appalachian Citizens' Law Center ngo;legal TRUE united mine workers of america public 3 FALSE 0 4 4.500000 0 1.00000001.00000004 246

2-10 2-10 Supports rule United Mine Workers Of America $FEMA \hbox{-} 2016 \hbox{-} 0003 \hbox{-} 0246$ org 1 Air Worldwide corp FALSE usrc public 10 FALSE 0 10 2.272727 1 1.6363636 1.6363636 11 248

2-10 11-100 Opposes rule UsrcICEB-2015-0002-41442 org 1 The University Of Colorado Boulder ngo;university TRUE verizon public 6 FALSE 0 3 3.000000 1 0.33333330.33333333 250

2-10 2-10 Supports rule Verizon CFPB-2016-0025-211870 org 1 Civil Justice, Inc. ngo;membership;advocacy TRUE wcbc public 6 FALSE 0 141 4.8310814 0.7627119 0.7627119148 251

More than 100 More than 100 Supports rule Webe NOAA-NMFS-2012-0059-0153org 1 Maine Coast Fishermen's Association ngo TRUE west coast seafood processors association private 6 FALSE 0 12 4.833333 7 -1.1666667-1.1666667 12 252

11-100
11-100
Supports rule
West Coast Seafood Processors Association
WHD-2019-0001-59303
org
1
World Floor Covering Association
corp;group
TRUE
wfca
private
6
FALSE
0
54
4.981482
0
1.5000000
1.5000000
54
254

11-100 11-100 Supports rule Wfca MSHA-2011-0001-0005org 1 Alamo Cement corp;corp TRUE wyoming mining association private 3 FALSE 0 38 2.219512 0 -1.4500000 -1.4500000 41 257

138

1 DATA
11-100
11-100
Opposes rule
Wyoming Mining Association
NPS-2018-0007-43625
individual
1
NA
NA
TRUE
NA
NA
4
FALSE
0
2
1.076923
0
NaN
NaN
13

NA

2-10

11-100

Opposes rule

NA

Summary counts:

```
# org comments by type

comments_coded %>% filter(comment_type == "org") %>%

mutate(org_type = str_remove(org_type, ";.*")) %>%

count(org_type, sort =T) %>%

filter(n>1) %>%

kablebox()
```

org_type

n

ngo

1555

gov

672

corp

499

corp group

463

NA

```
25
org
8
elected
4
corp groups
2
# org comments by sub-type
comments_coded %>% filter(comment_type == "org") %>%
  filter(str_detect(org_type, ";")) %>%
 mutate(org_type_detailed = org_type) %>%
  count(org_type_detailed, sort =T) %>%
 kablebox()
org\_type\_detailed
n
ngo;advocacy
422
gov;local
209
gov;state
203
corp;group
92
```

ngo;legal 91 ngo;credit union 66 ngo;professional 66 ngo;university 52 ngo; advocacy 47 ngo;coalition 47 gov;tribe 45 gov;tribe;ej 38 corp;corp 36

ngo;faith

 ${\rm ngo;} {\rm membership}$

35

gov; federal34 ngo;union 33 gov;federal;regional 25 ngo;thinktank 23 corp;law firm 22 ngo;advocacy;membership 20 corp group; coalition 17 ngo;membership;advocacy 17 corp;bank 15 gov;local;coalition

15

15

ngo;legal;advocacy

corp;legal 14 corp;small corp 14 ngo;legal;membership 14 ngo;environmental 13 ngo;pressure group 13 corp;energy 11 ngo;think tank 10 ngo;philanthropy 9 corp; bank 8

8 ngo; environmental advocacy

ngo; credit union

ngo; advocacy; professional8 ngo;professional;membership 8 gov; state 7 gov;state agency 7 ngo;advocacy;coalition 7 corp group;energy 6 corp group;professional 6 ngo;advocacy;ngo;membership 6 ngo;healthcare 6 corp group; trade association 5 $corp\ group; membership; professional$

```
gov; tribe
5
gov;state;coalition
5
ngo;advocacy;pressure group
5
ngo;ej
5
ngo;trade association
5
ngo;tribe
5
corp group;membership
4
corp; think tank
4
gov; county
4
gov;city
4
gov;county
```

```
gov;local;ej
4
gov;local;ngo
4
gov;local;tribe;ej
4
gov;state;agency
4
gov;state;ej
4
ngo; environemental advocacy
4
ngo;advocacy;legal
4
ngo;medical
4
ngo;membership;pressure
4
ngo;tribe;ej;advocacy
4
ngo;university;legal
```

```
corp;busines
3
corp;gov;tribal;ej
3
corp; medical
3
gov; local
3
gov;local; court
3
ngo;
3
ngo; environemental protection
3
ngo; volunteer
3
ngo;advocacy;ej
3
ngo;advocacy;ngo
3
ngo;coalition;advocacy
```

```
ngo;corp group
3
ngo;education
3
ngo;federal credit union
3
ngo; financial services
3
ngo;legal;university
3
org;finance
3
corp group; advoacy
2
corp group; bank
2
corp group; chamber of commerce
2
corp group; energy
2
corp group; farmers
```

```
corp group; natural resoruces; mining association
2
corp group; ranchers
2
corp group; association; livestock
2
corp group;ngo
2
corp group;professional;membership
2
corp; oil and gas
2
corp; consultants
2
corp; consulting
2
```

1.2.2 By coalition

Coalition-level data sample:

```
coalitions_coded %>% ungroup() %>% group_by(docket_id) %>%
    slice_max(coalition_comments, n = 2) %>%
    dplyr::select(docket_id, starts_with("coalition")) %>%
    distinct() %>%
    kablebox()
```

 $docket_id$ $coalition_comment$ coalition_type coalitions $coalition_unopposed$ $coalition_congress$ coalition_size $coalition_position$ $coalition_business$ $coalition_success$ $coalition_leader_success$ $coalition_comments$ $coalition_id$ Coalition_size $Coalition_comments$ Coalition_Position coalition $BSEE \hbox{-} 2012 \hbox{-} 0005$ pew public

FALSE

0

4

4.750000

0

1.5000000

1.5000000

1530

200

2-10

More than 100

Supports rule

Pew

BSEE-2012-0005

offshore operators committee

private

5

FALSE

0

32

1.394737

22

0.8620690

0.862069038 188 11-100 11-100 Opposes rule Offshore Operators Committee BSEE-2013-0010 shell private 1 TRUE 0 1 1.0000000 -2.0000000 -2.0000000 1

217

1

Opposes rule
Shell
BSEE-2013-0011
shell
private
4
FALSE
0
88
2.244444
29
-1.2727273
-1.2727273
90
217
21711-100
11-100
11-100 11-100
11-100 11-100 Opposes rule
11-100 11-100 Opposes rule Shell

4

FALSE

0

13

4.692308

0

-0.7500000

-0.7500000

13

200

11-100

11-100

Supports rule

Pew

 $\operatorname{BSEE-2017-0008}$

center for biological diversity

public

4

FALSE

0

22

1.041667

0

-2.0000000

-2.0000000

59410

48

11-100

More than 100

Opposes rule

Center For Biological Diversity

BSEE-2017-0008

american petroleum institute

private

4

FALSE

0

7

3.571429

5

0.2857143

0.2857143

7

2-10 2-10 Supports rule American Petroleum Institute BSEE-2018-0002earthjustice public 4 FALSE 0 23 1.0740740 -1.8947368 -1.89473687162781 11-100 More than 100 Opposes rule Earthjustice

 $\operatorname{BSEE-2018-0002}$

american petroleum institute

private

4

FALSE

0

27

4.500000

22

0.2222222

0.2222222

28

19

11-100

11-100

Supports rule

American Petroleum Institute

CEQ-2019-0003

partnership project

public

7

FALSE

114

1.167832

0

-1.7647059

-1.7647059

400089

198

More than 100

More than 100

Opposes rule

Partnership Project

CEQ-2019-0003

liuna

private

7

FALSE

0

112

4.533333

2

0.53333333

0.53333333

159

2892

130

More than 100

More than 100

Supports rule

Liuna

CFPB-2016-0025

wcbc

public

6

FALSE

0

141

4.831081

4

0.7627119

0.7627119

148

251

More than 100

More than 100

Supports rule

Webe ${\rm CFPB\text{-}2016\text{-}0025}$ axcess financial private 6 FALSE 0 106 1.321101 57 -0.6029412-0.6029412112 34 More than 100 More than 100 Opposes rule Axcess Financial CFPB-2019-0006 naca

public 12

FALSE
2
71
1.077922
3
-1.8000000
-1.8000000

77

149

11-100

11-100

Opposes rule

Naca

 ${\rm CFPB\text{-}2019\text{-}0006}$

 ${\it true}$

public

12

FALSE

0

45

1.617021

162

-1.3863636

-1.3863636

47

240

11-100

11-100

Opposes rule

True

 ${\rm CFPB\text{-}2019\text{-}0006}$

true

NA

12

FALSE

0

45

1.617021

0

-1.3863636

-1.3863636

47

240

11-100

163

Opposes rule

True

CFPB-2019-0006

true

private

12

FALSE

0

45

1.617021

0

-1.3863636

-1.3863636

47

240

11-100

11-100

Opposes rule

True

CFPB-2019-0022

naacp

public 6 FALSE 3 119 1.0790964 -0.7407407 -0.7407407 177 148 More than 100 More than 100 Opposes rule Naacp CFPB-2019-0022aca international

private

FALSE

6

0

4.521739

57

0.3333333

0.3333333

69

3

11-100

11-100

Supports rule

Aca International

DEA-2018-0005

hsca

public

4

FALSE

0

9

1.666667

2

-1.7777778

-1.7777778

117 2-10 2-10 Opposes rule HscaDEA-2018-0005 phrma public 4 FALSE 0 3 3.0000001 0.66666670.66666673 203 2-10 2-10 Supports rule

Phrma

167

DOI-2015-0005 blanket crew public 6 FALSE 0 14 4.071429

2.0000000

2.0000000

14

40

11-100

11-100

Supports rule

Blanket Crew

DOI-2015-0005

support and assist

public

6

FALSE

0

11

4.727273

0

2.0000000

2.0000000

11

230

11-100

11-100

Supports rule

Support And Assist

DOT-OST-2011-0044

cma

public

5

FALSE

0

17

4.000000

0

2.0000000

2.000000017 56 11-100 11-100 Supports rule Cma DOT-OST-2011-0044 aai public 5 FALSE 0 2 1.0000000 -2.0000000 -2.0000000 2 1

2-10

2-10

Opposes rule
Aai
ED-2016-OESE-0032
public schools
public
18
FALSE
0
21
5.000000
0
NaN
NaN
22
206
11-100
11-100
Supports rule
Public Schools
ED-2016-OESE-0032
public schools
NA

18

FALSE

0

21

5.000000

0

NaN

NaN

22

206

11-100

11-100

Supports rule

Public Schools

FEMA-2016-0003

pew

public

10

FALSE

0

217

4.103139

1

-1.8918919

-1.8918919

2982

200

More than 100

More than 100

Supports rule

Pew

 ${\rm FEMA}\text{-}2016\text{-}0003$

nema

public

10

FALSE

0

38

2.886364

2

1.0000000

1.0000000

44

11-100 11-100 Opposes rule Nema FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0006defenders of wildlife public 5 FALSE 0 88 1.1388890 -1.6666667 -1.6666667440844 73 11-100 More than 100 Opposes rule Defenders Of Wildlife FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0006

0

national endangered species act reform coalition private 5 FALSE 0 76 4.19736836 0.22222220.222222276 160 11-100 11-100 Supports rule National Endangered Species Act Reform Coalition FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0007 defenders of wildlife public 4 FALSE

84 1.122449 0 -1.6938776 -1.6938776 702687 73 11-100 More than 100 Opposes rule Defenders Of Wildlife FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0007 national endangered species act reform coalition private 4 FALSE 0 73 4.148649 36

1.9629630

1.9629630

Opposes rule

74 160 11-100 11-100 Supports rule National Endangered Species Act Reform Coalition FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0097 center for biological diversity public 7 FALSE 0 39 1.193548 0 -1.3255814-1.3255814 856518 48 11-100 More than 100

Center For Biological Diversity FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0097

farm bureau

private

7

FALSE

0

45

3.943396

17

1.9166667

1.9166667

53

99

11-100

11-100

 ${\bf Supports\ rule}$

Farm Bureau

FWS-HQ-NWRS-2012-0086

defenders of wildlife

public

FALSE 0 13 4.692308 0 0.63636360.63636365327173 11-100 More than 100 Supports rule Defenders Of Wildlife FWS-HQ-NWRS-2012-0086alaska oil and gas association private 3 FALSE 0

5

3

1.800000

-0.4000000-0.4000000 5 10 2-10 2-10 Opposes rule Alaska Oil And Gas Association FWS-R9-ES-2008-0093 earthjustice public 6 FALSE 0 97 1.024590 0 -1.7826087 -1.7826087 122 81

11-100

More than 100
Opposes rule
Earthjustice
FWS-R9-ES-2008-0093
national endangered species act reform coalition
private
6
FALSE
0
47
4.433962
21
0.2857143
0.2857143
53
160
11-100
11-100
Supports rule
National Endangered Species Act Reform Coalition
ICEB-2015-0002
nafsa

181

public

6

FALSE

0

56

4.435185

10

1.1607143

1.1607143

109

151

11-100

More than 100

Supports rule

Nafsa

ICEB-2015-0002

afl-cio

public

6

FALSE

0

5.000000

2

1.0000000

1.0000000

5

7

2-10

2-10

Supports rule

Afl-Cio

IRS-2016-0015

americans for tax fairness

public

4

FALSE

0

9

4.888889

0

2.0000000

2.0000000

24 2-10 More than 100 Supports rule Americans For Tax Fairness IRS-2016-0015 congressmen public 4 FALSE 0 1 4.000000 0 -2.0000000 -2.0000000 1 65 1

Supports rule

1

Congressmen

IRS-2016-0015

small businesses

public

4

FALSE

0

1

4.000000

0

2.0000000

2.0000000

1

220

1

1

Supports rule

Small Businesses

IRS-2016-0015

swiss re

private

4

FALSE

0

1

3.000000

0

-1.0000000

-1.0000000

1

232

1

1

Supports rule

Swiss Re

MSHA-2011-0001

wyoming mining association

private

3

FALSE

0

38

2.219512

0

-1.4500000

-1.450000041 25711-100 11-100 Opposes rule Wyoming Mining Association MSHA-2011-0001 united mine workers of america public 3 FALSE 0 4 4.500000 0 1.00000001.0000000 4 246 2-10

2-10

Supports rule United Mine Workers Of America NOAA-NMFS-2008-0096environmental community public 13 FALSE 0 15 4.9500000 -0.9090909 -0.9090909 20 90 11-100 11-100 Supports rule **Environmental Community** NOAA-NMFS-2008-0096 commercial fishers and processors

private

13

FALSE

0

13

2.692308

6

-0.2857143

-0.2857143

13

58

11-100

11-100

Opposes rule

Commercial Fishers And Processors

NOAA-NMFS-2012-0059

pew

public

6

FALSE

0

31

1.000000

189

1

-1.6875000

-1.6875000

102875

200

11-100

More than 100

Opposes rule

Pew

NOAA-NMFS-2012-0059

fishing industry

private

6

FALSE

0

12

4.833333

7

-1.1666667

-1.1666667

12

11-100
11-100
Supports rule
Fishing Industry
NOAA-NMFS-2012-0059
west coast seafood processors association
private
6
FALSE
0
12
4.833333
7
-1.1666667
-1.1666667
12
252
11-100
11-100
Supports rule
West Coast Seafood Processors Association
NOAA-NMFS-2013-0050

191

pew public 8 FALSE 0 8 1.000000 1 -1.3333333 -1.3333333 74818 200 2-10 More than 100 Opposes rule Pew NOAA-NMFS-2013-0050commercial fishing private 8

FALSE

6

3.571429

5

0.8571429

0.8571429

7

59

2-10

2-10

Supports rule

Commercial Fishing

NOAA-NMFS-2013-0050

northeast seafood coalition

private

8

FALSE

0

6

3.571429

5

0.8571429

0.8571429

7 183

2-10

2-10

Supports rule

Northeast Seafood Coalition

NOAA-NMFS-2013-0101

pew charitable trusts

public

5

FALSE

0

60

4.984849

1

-0.5625000

-0.5625000

168293

202

11-100

More than 100

Supports rule

Pew Charitable Trusts NOAA-NMFS-2013-0101american sportfishing association private 5 FALSE 0 5 5.0000001 0.00000000.00000001542 22 2-10 More than 100 Supports rule American Sportfishing Association NOAA-NMFS-2018-0035

gulf restoration network

public

FALSE 0 11 1.000000 0 -1.9000000 -1.9000000 28488 115 11-100 More than 100 Opposes rule Gulf Restoration Network NOAA-NMFS-2018-0035recreational fishing private 5 FALSE

61.3333333

1

-2.0000000 -2.0000000 6 209 2-10 2-10 Opposes rule Recreational Fishing NOAA-NMFS-2018-0035center for sportfishing policy private 5 FALSE 0 6 1.3333331 -2.0000000 -2.0000000 6 50

2-10

2-10

Opposes rule

Center For Sportfishing Policy

NOAA-NMFS-2018-0035-0326

gulf restoration network

public

1

TRUE

0

1

1.000000

0

NaN

NaN

652

115

1

More than 100

Opposes rule

Gulf Restoration Network

NOAA-NOS-2013-0091

national marine sanctuary foundation

public 4 FALSE 0 16 4.2631581 2.00000002.000000019 162 11-100 11-100 Supports rule National Marine Sanctuary Foundation NOAA-NOS-2013-0091ocean industries private 4 FALSE 0

2.000000

2

-2.0000000

-2.0000000

2

187

2-10

2-10

Opposes rule

Ocean Industries

NOAA-NOS-2013-0091

american petroleum institute

private

4

FALSE

0

2

2.000000

2

-2.0000000

-2.0000000

19 2-10 2-10 Opposes rule American Petroleum Institute NPS-2018-0007aclu public 4 FALSE 1 57 1.013158 0 1.96721311.967213176 5 11-100 11-100 Opposes rule Aclu

NPS-2018-0007

smithsonian

public

4

FALSE

0

3

1.333333

0

2.0000000

2.0000000

3

221

2-10

2-10

Opposes rule

Smithsonian

OCC-2020-0026

aclu

public

3

FALSE

0

74

1.000000

0

-1.9523810

-1.9523810

222

5

11-100

More than 100

Opposes rule

Aclu

OCC-2020-0026

mla

private

3

FALSE

0

12

3.916667

8

2.0000000

2.000000012 142 11-100 11-100 Supports rule Mla OFCCP-2014-0004 aclu public 4 FALSE 0 11 4.0000000 -2.0000000 -2.0000000 7152 5 11-100 More than 100

Supports rule
Aclu
OFCCP-2014-0004
u.s. chamber of commerce
private
4
FALSE
0
13
1.000000
0
1.6923077
1.6923077
13
241
11-100
11-100
Opposes rule
U.s. Chamber Of Commerce
OSHA-H005C-2006-0870
OSHA-11003C-2000-0870
newport news

5

FALSE

0

22

4.833333

0

1.0357143

1.0357143

30

176

11-100

11-100

Supports rule

Newport News

OSHA-H005C-2006-0870

southern company

public

5

FALSE

0

15

3.000000

0

0.6666667

0.6666667

15

224

11-100

11-100

Supports rule

Southern Company

PHMSA-2012-0082

sierra club

public

7

FALSE

0

24

5.000000

0

-1.2272727

-1.2272727

330381

11-100 More than 100 Supports rule Sierra Club PHMSA-2012-0082 american petroleum institute private 7 FALSE 0 209 1.563380104 -0.4956522-0.495652221419 More than 100 More than 100 Opposes rule American Petroleum Institute

TREAS-DO-2007-0015

other banks private 20 FALSE 0 13 2.384615 9 0.38461540.384615413 193 11-100 11-100 Opposes rule Other Banks TREAS-DO-2007-0015 greyhound racing industry private

20

0

FALSE

7

1.000000

7

-0.8000000

-0.8000000

7

114

2-10

2-10

Opposes rule

Greyhound Racing Industry

 ${\tt USCBP-2007-0064}$

bbp

public

3

FALSE

0

20

1.550000

7

-1.2000000

-1.2000000

38 11-100 11-100 Opposes rule Bbp USCBP-2007-0064ebaa public 3 FALSE 0 5 2.6000003 -1.2000000 -1.2000000 5 84 2-10 2-10 Opposes rule

Ebaa USCG-2010-0990boatus public 3 ${\rm FALSE}$ 0 5 2.333333 2 -1.0000000 -1.0000000 6 43 2-10 2-10 Opposes rule Boatus USCG-2010-0990 nmma

3

public

FALSE 0 3 4.0000001 2.00000002.0000000 4 180 2-10 2-10 Supports rule Nmma USCIS-2010-0017ncapa public 3 FALSE 0

4.500000

0

2.0000000 2.0000000 2 167 2-10 2-10 Supports rule Ncapa

USCIS-2010-0017

dpe afl-cio

public

3

FALSE

0

2

1.000000

0

-2.0000000

-2.0000000

2

79

2-10

2-10 Opposes rule Dpe Afl-Cio WHD-2011-0001 congresswoman lucille roybal-allard public 3 FALSE 0 1 4.0000000 NaN NaN 1 66 1 1 Supports rule Congresswoman Lucille Roybal-Allard

WHD-2011-0001

governor terry e. branstad

public 3 FALSE 0 1 1.000000 0 NaN NaN 1 111 1 1 Opposes rule Governor Terry E. Branstad WHD-2019-0001 epi public 6 FALSE

0

1.000000

0

-1.0000000

-1.0000000

60

93

11-100

11-100

Opposes rule

Epi

WHD-2019-0001

wfca

private

6

FALSE

0

54

4.981482

0

1.5000000

1.5000000

217

254

11-100

11-100

Supports rule

Wfca

 $WHD \hbox{--} 2019 \hbox{--} 0003$

epi

public

3

FALSE

0

40

1.000000

0

-1.9756098

-1.9756098

44391

93

11-100

More than 100

Opposes rule

Epi

```
WHD-2019-0003
```

 shrm

public

3

FALSE

0

23

5.000000

1

0.9600000

0.9600000

25

218

11-100

11-100

Supports rule

Shrm

Histograms of coalition variables

```
d <- coalitions_coded

ggplot(d, aes(x = coalition_success)) +
   geom_histogram() +
   labs(x = "Coalition Success")</pre>
```

```
ggplot(d, aes(x = coalition_size)) +
  geom_histogram() +
  labs(x = "Coalition size")
```




Figure 2: Hand-coded Data by Coalition

Number of comments

```
#TODO

#ggplot(d, aes( x= comment_length)) + geom_histogram()+ labs(x = "% (Comment length/pr

ggplot(d, aes( x= log(comments))) +

geom_histogram() +

labs(x = "Log(comments)")
```




Figure 3: Number of Comments Linked to Hand-Coded Coalitions

Number of comments from members of Congress

(just from the hand-coded sample; I have more from the full sample to merge in.)

```
#TODO

#ggplot(d, aes( x= comment_length)) + geom_histogram()+ labs(x = "% (Comment length/pr

ggplot(d, aes( x= coalition_congress)) +

geom_histogram() +

labs(x = "Comments from Members of Congress")
```




Figure 4: Number of Comments from Members of Congress Linked to Hand-Coded Coalitions

Coalitions by type (public interest vs. private interest)

```
ggplot(d %>% drop_na(coalition_type)) +

aes(x = as.numeric(coalition_business)) +

geom_histogram(stat = "count") +

labs(x = "Businesses per coalition",

    title = "Number of Businesses by Coalition Type") +


facet_wrap("coalition_type")#, scales = "free_x")

ggplot(coalitions_coded %>% filter(!is.na(coalition_type)), aes(x = Coalition_size)) +
    geom_histogram(stat = "count")+
```


```
coalitions_coded %>%
  drop_na(coalition_type, Coalition_Position) %>%
  distinct(coalition_comment, coalition_type, coalition_size, coalition_success, comment
  ungroup() %>%
  ggplot() +
  aes(y = coalition_success, x = log(comments), color = coalition_type) +
  geom_jitter(aes(size = coalition_size), alpha = .5) +
  geom_smooth(se = FALSE, method = "lm")+
  facet_grid(Coalition_Position ~ .)

coalitions_coded %>%
  drop_na(coalition_type, Coalition_Position) %>%
  distinct(coalition_comment, coalition_type, coalition_size, coalition_success, comment
  mutate(comments = comments) %>%
  ungroup() %>%
  ggplot() +
```


Number of Businesses by Coalition Type



Coalition Size by Coalition Type



Number of Comments by Coalition Type



```
aes(y = coalition_success, x = log(comments), color = coalition_type) +
geom_jitter(aes(size = coalition_size), alpha = .5) +
geom_smooth(se = FALSE, method = "lm") +
#facet_wrap("president") +
facet_grid(Coalition_Position ~ president)
```




Figure 6: Lobbying Success by Number of Supportive Comments

1.2.2.1 Number of supportive comments

1.2.2.2 Coalition Size (number of supportive organizations)

```
coalitions_coded %>%
 drop_na(coalition_type, Coalition_Position) %>%
 distinct(coalition_comment, coalition_type, coalition_size, coalition_success, comment
 ungroup() %>%
 ggplot() +
 aes(y = coalition success, x = coalition size, color = coalition type) +
 geom_jitter(aes(size = comments ), alpha = .5) +
 geom_smooth(se = FALSE, method = "lm") +
 facet grid(Coalition Position ~ .)+
 scale size continuous(labels = comma)
coalitions_coded %>%
 drop_na(coalition_type, Coalition_Position) %>%
 distinct(coalition_comment, coalition_type, coalition_size, coalition_success, comment
 ungroup() %>%
 ggplot() +
 aes(y = coalition_success, x = coalition_size, color = coalition_type) +
 geom jitter(aes(size = comments ), alpha = .5) +
 geom smooth(se = FALSE, method = "lm") +
 #facet wrap("president") +
 facet_grid(Coalition_Position ~ president)+
 scale_size_continuous(labels = comma)
```

1.2.2.3 The correlation between coalition size and the total number of comments The total number of form-letter comments is highly correlated with the number of organizations in a coalition.

The total number of comments excludes organization comments.




Figure 7: Lobbying Success by Number of Supportive Comments

```
coalitions_coded %>%
  mutate(comments = comments - coalition_size) %>%
  ggplot() +
  aes(x = coalition_size, y = comments) +
  geom_point() +
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")

coalitions_coded %>%
  mutate(comments = comments - coalition_size) %>%
  ggplot() +
  aes(x = log(coalition_size), y = log(comments)) +
  geom_point() +
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")
```




Figure 8

1.3 Comments from legislators

One mechanism by which campaigns may influence policy is by mobilizing members of Congress. Thus, I identify comments submitted by members of Congress and count the number of legislators in each lobbying coalition.

```
load(here::here("data", "comments_congress.Rdata"))
comments_congress$Year %<>% as.numeric()
breaks \leftarrow seq(2000, 2020, by = 2)
comments_congress %>%
  as_tibble() %>%
  filter(Year %>% as.numeric() > 2000,
         Year %>% as.numeric() < 2021) %>%
  add_count(agency, name = "agency_n") %>%
  filter(agency_n > 88) %>%
  count(Year, Chamber, agency, sort = TRUE) %>%
  ggplot() +
  aes(x = Year, y = n, fill = Chamber) +
  geom_col(position = "stack") +
  facet_wrap("agency", scales = "free") +
  labs(x = "" ,
       y = "Number of Rulemaking Comments from Members of Congress") +
  scale_x_continuous(breaks = breaks) +
  theme(axis.text.x = element_text(angle = 90),
        axis.ticks.x = element_blank(),
        panel.grid.major.x = element_blank())
# table
# elected comments by type
comments_coded %>%
 filter(comment_type == "elected") %>%
```

mississippi

```
mutate(org_type = str_remove(org_type, "-.*|;.*| .*")) %>%
  count(org_type, sort =T) %>%
  rename(elected_type = org_type) %>%
 kablebox()
elected\_type
n
house
33
senate
18
congress
5
gov
5
florida
4
governor
4
maryland
4
mayor
4
```

4

representative

4

NA

4

alaska

3

illino is

3

senator

3

senators

3

state

3

texas

3

 ${\rm california}$

2

city

2

oklahoma

2

attorney

1

 ${\bf baltimore}$

1

berkeley

1

carbondale

1

carver

1

elected

1

georgia

1

iowa

1

jersey

1

kentucky

1

linda

1 ma 1 member 1 missouri 1 mt 1 nebraska 1 new 1 north 1 ohio 1 pennsylvania 1 representatives

1

rosemead

1

santa

1

south

1

tennessee

1




Figure 9: Number of Rulemaking Comments from Members of Congress per Year, 2005-2020

Challenges for inference

Non-independence

Organizations lobbying in coalitions The hand-coded sample includes 4923 hand-coded documents representing 3.387147×10^6 comments. However, many of these comments belong coalitions and are thus not independent. When Friends of Earth and the Sierra Club lobbying together on a rule, the success of each depends on the other. Thus, I group comments into coalitions. The hand-coded sample includes 297 "coalitions," 149 of which are single organizations (not really coalitions), leaving 148 true coalitions of groups lobbing together.

Multiple coalitions lobbying on the same rule The fact that several coalitions may lobby on the same rule creates a less problematic form of dependence among observations. One coalition's lobbying success is correlated with another coalition's lobbying success to the extent that they are asking for the same or contradicting things. Because we have grouped organizations into coalitions, the causally-related asks (those organizations lobbying because another organization is) are largely accounted for.

2 Descriptives

The hypotheses set out in Chapter 2 are largely descriptive.

Hypothesis 2.1. Most people engage in national policy processes as a result of organized public pressure campaigns.

Yes, large majorities of both the hand-coded sample of comments and full dataset are form letters.

The hand-coded sample generally excludes individuals who are not clearly associated with a mass comment campaign. However, these excluded comments are a minority of the

5095101 comments on the hand-coded rules. Even without looking at the excluded comments (many of which may also be part of pressure campaigns), most commenters are part of organized campaigns.

n elected
138
individual
556
mass
3383085

org

comment_type

3238

NA

0

Comments that I have thus far attributed to mass comment campaigns are also a majority of the full data. In addition, many of the comments that I have yet to classify are also part of mass comment campaigns.

```
# massive undercount of mass
#TODO include new, further collapsed data
comments_min %>%
  mutate(mass = number_of_comments_received > 99) %>%
  group_by(mass) %>%
  tally(number_of_comments_received)%>%
  kablebox()
```

mass

n

FALSE

13639400

TRUE

69515059

Hypothesis 2.2. Public pressure campaigns are organized by *coalitions* that include groups that engage in sophisticated technical lobbying.

Nearly all mass comments in the hand-coded rules were mobilized by a group

that also engaged in sophisticated lobbying.

44

Organizations (if any) affilitated with different types of comments in the hand-coded data:

```
comments coded %>%
  group_by(docket_id, coalition, coalition_comments, coalition_type) %>%
  mutate(comment type = comment type %>% as.factor()) %>%
  count(comment type) %>%
  ungroup() %>%
  drop_na(comment_type) %>%
  filter(!comment type %in% c("NA", "coalition", "mass")) %>%
  pivot wider(names from = comment type, values from = n) %>%
  arrange(-coalition comments) %>%
 kablebox()
docket\_id
coalition
coalition comments
coalition_type
org
elected
individual
FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0097
Center For Biological Diversity
856518
public
```

NA
8
FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0007
Defenders Of Wildlife
702687
public
73
NA
1
FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0006
Defenders Of Wildlife
440844
public
78
NA
1
CEQ-2019-0003
Partnership Project
400089
public
100
2

8 PHMSA-2012-0082 Sierra Club 330381 public 22 NA NA NOAA-NMFS-2013-0101Pew Charitable Trusts 168293 public 18 NA NA NOAA-NMFS-2012-0059Pew 102875 public 16 NA

NA

NOAA-NMFS-2013-0050Pew 74818 public 9 NA NA BSEE-2018-0002Earthjustice 71627 public 16 3 1 $BSEE \hbox{-} 2017 \hbox{-} 0008$ Center For Biological Diversity 59410 public 17 2 2

FWS-HQ-NWRS-2012-0086

Defenders Of Wildlife
53271
public
11
NA
NA
WHD-2019-0003
Epi
44391
public
36
5
NA
IRS-2016-0015
Americans For Tax Fairness
29853
public
1
NA
NA
NOAA-NMFS-2018-0035
Gulf Restoration Network

28488
public
10
NA
NA
OFCCP-2014-0004
Aclu
7152
public
8
NA
NA
PHMSA-2012-0082
NA
3084
NA
3
NA
NA
FEMA-2016-0003
Pew
2982

public
37
NA
185
CEQ-2019-0003
Liuna
2892
private
116
1
NA
NOAA-NMFS-2013-0101
American Sportfishing Association
1542
private
4
NA
NA
BSEE-2012-0005
Pew
1530
public

ICEB-2015-0002

NA

183

NA

NA

243

NA
182
CFPB-2019-0022
Naacp
177
public
87
4
2
CFPB-2016-0025
Webe
148
public
118
7
7
PHMSA-2012-0082
Barrington And Illinois Trac Coalition
125
public
115
9

1 FWS-R9-ES-2008-0093 Earthjustice 122 public 95 6 20 CFPB-2016-0025Axcess Financial 112 private 68 4 11 ICEB-2015-0002Nafsa 109 public 54

1

2

BSEE-2013-0011 Shell 90 private 28 4 NA CFPB-2019-0006 Naca 77 public 57 8 1 FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0006National Endangered Species Act Reform Coalition 76 private 75 1 NA NPS-2018-0007

Aclu
76
public
53
1
7
FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0007
National Endangered Species Act Reform Coalition
74
private
73
NA
NA
CFPB-2016-0025
Naacp
70
public
31
22
2
CFPB-2019-0022
Aca International

private	
66	
NA	
NA	
CFPB-2016-0025	
Ncua	
66	
public	
65	
NA	
NA	
WHD-2019-0001	
Epi	
60	
public	
52	
8	
NA	
WHD-2019-0001	
Wfca	
54	

private
54
NA
NA
FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0097
Farm Bureau
53
private
47
1
2
FWS-R9-ES-2008-0093
National Endangered Species Act Reform Coalition
53
private
52
NA
1
CFPB-2019-0006
True
47
private

2
NA
NA
CFPB-2019-0006
True
47
public
41
NA
1
CFPB-2019-0006
True
47
NA
1
NA
NA
FEMA-2016-0003
Nema
44
public
44

NA
NA
CEQ-2019-0003
Association Of American Indian Affairs
43
private
43
NA
NA
MSHA-2011-0001
Wyoming Mining Association
41
private
41
NA
NA NA
NA
NA BSEE-2012-0005
NA BSEE-2012-0005 Offshore Operators Committee
NA BSEE-2012-0005 Offshore Operators Committee 38

NA
FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0097
Congressional Sportsmen's Foundation
37
private
31
1
2
FEMA-2016-0003
Nreca
36
public
33
3
NA
CFPB-2019-0022
Nafcu
34
private
34
NA
NA

DOT-OST-2018-0068
NA
31
NA
31
NA
NA
OSHA-H005C-2006-0870
Newport News
30
public
26
2
NA
BSEE-2018-0002
American Petroleum Institute
28
private
17
NA
NA
CFPB-2019-0006

NA
28
NA
24
1
1
CFPB-2019-0022
American Bar Association
28
public
27
1
NA
WHD-2019-0001
Ppwo
27
public
24
2
NA
FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0097
Hunters

25 private 20 1 1 WHD-2019-0003 Shrm 25 public 24 1 NA WHD-2019-0003 Acg 24 private 23 1 NA FEMA-2016-0003 Iaem-Usa 23

public
23
NA
NA
USCBP-2007-0064
Bbp
23
public
18
2
3
ED-2016-OESE-0032
Public Schools
22
public
2
NA
NA
CFPB-2016-0025
NA
21
NA

NOAA-NMFS-2008-0096

NOAA-NOS-2013-0091

National Marine Sanctuary Foundation

20

11

NA

NA

19

15

public

public

Environmental Community

1
3
CFPB-2019-0006
Thrifty Loans
18
private
11
6
NA
DOT-OST-2011-0044
Cma
17
public
17
NA
NA
DOT-OST-2011-0044
NA
17
NA
NA
NA

17 ED-2016-OESE-0032 NA 16 NA 14 1 NA FEMA-2016-0003 Aasa 16 public 16 NA NA OSHA-H005C-2006-0870Southern Company 15 public 15 NANA

WHD-2019-0001 Ncpa 15 private 15 NA NA DOI-2015-0005 Blanket Crew 14 public 12 1 1 ${\rm USCIS\text{-}2010\text{-}0017}$ NA 14 NA 1 NA 13 $BSEE \hbox{-} 2013 \hbox{-} 0011$

Pew
13
public
12
NA
1
FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0006
National Congress Of American Indians
13
public
13
NA
NA
NOAA-NMFS-2008-0096
Commercial Fishers And Processors
13
private
9
NA
NA
NPS-2018-0007
NA

NA

NA

12

FEMA-2016-0003

NA
NA
NA
12
NOAA-NMFS-2012-0059
Fishing Industry
12
private
12
NA
NA
NOAA-NMFS-2012-0059
West Coast Seafood Processors Association
12
private
12
NA
NA
OCC-2020-0026
Mla
12
private

12
NA
NA
WHD-2019-0001
Ancor
12
private
12
NA
NA
DOI-2015-0005
Support And Assist
11
public
10
NA
NA
FEMA-2016-0003
Nrdc
11
public
11

NA
NA
FEMA-2016-0003
Usrc
11
public
11
NA
NA
ED-2016-OESE-0032
National Education Association
10
public
2
NA
NA
CFPB-2019-0006
Nafcu
9
private
9
NA

NA
DEA-2018-0005
Hsca
9
public
9
NA
NA
FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0007
National Congress Of American Indians
9
public
public 9
9
9 NA
9 NA NA
9 NA NA NOAA-NMFS-2012-0059
9 NA NA NOAA-NMFS-2012-0059 New England Fishery Management Council
9 NA NA NOAA-NMFS-2012-0059 New England Fishery Management Council 9
9 NA NA NOAA-NMFS-2012-0059 New England Fishery Management Council 9 public

NOAA-NMFS-2012-0059Regional Councils 9 public 9 NANA USCBP-2007-0064NA 9 NA 9 NA NA DOI-2015-0005 Big Autonomy 8 public 7

NOAA-NMFS-2008-0096

NA

Regional Fishery Management Councils

8

public

7

1

NA

BSEE-2017-0008

American Petroleum Institute

7

private

7

NA

NA

Hypothesis 2.3. Public interest group coalitions mobilize *more often* than private interest group (e.g., business-led) coalitions.

Yes, public interest coalitions use public pressure campaigns more often, both in the absolute number of campaigns and the share of lobbying efforts that involve a pressure campaign.

```
coalitions_coded %>%

mutate(mass_comment_campaign = coalition_comments > 99) %>%

count(coalition_type, mass_comment_campaign) %>%

drop_na(coalition_type) %>%

kablebox()
```

```
coalition\_type
mass\_comment\_campaign
\mathbf{n}
private
FALSE
94
private
TRUE
4
public
FALSE
108
public
TRUE
24
```

Hypothesis 2.4. Public interest group coalitions mobilize *more successfully* than private interest group (e.g., business-led) coalitions.

```
Yes, by far.
```

coalition_type

```
total_comments
average_comments

private

5822

59.40816

public

3377839

25589.68939
```

Hypothesis 2.5. Public pressure campaigns targeting national policy are most often run by large national policy advocacy organizations.

Yes.

Hypothesis 2.6. If narrow private interest groups (e.g., businesses) launch public pressure campaigns, it is a response to an opposing campaign.

TBD: In these data (high salience rules), almost all coalitions are opposed.

```
coalitions_coded %>%
count(coalition_type, coalition_unopposed) %>% drop_na(coalition_type)
```

```
## # A tibble: 4 x 3
##
     coalition_type coalition_unopposed
                                               n
##
     <chr>>
                     <lgl>
                                          <int>
## 1 private
                     FALSE
                                              97
## 2 private
                     TRUE
                                               1
## 3 public
                     FALSE
                                             131
## 4 public
                                               1
                     TRUE
```

3 Models of lobbying success

$3.1 ext{ DV} = \text{Comments from members of Congress}$

Hypothesis 3.1. The scale of public engagement moderates elected officials' engagement in agency rulemaking engagement.

Preliminary finding: The size of the lobbying coalition (the number of organizations) is positively correlated with the number of members of Congress who engage. When we account for variation in coalition size, there is no evidence that the total number of comments is related to the number of comments from members of Congress.

The simplest model of the relationship between congressional attention and public attention is a model estimating the count of legislator letters as a function of features of the rulemaking, including the total number of public comments. The number of letters from members of congress would be a count process; this would be a Poisson or negative binomial regression.

In equation (3.1), y_j is a count of the number of legislator comments on a proposed rule j, β_1 is the effect of a one-unit increase in the logged number of public comments on proposed rule j, and η is a vector of coefficients on other factors (X_j) that may lead legislators to comment.

$$y_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log(\text{Public comments})_j + \eta X_j + \epsilon_j$$

Alternatively, if we want to control for legislator characteristics that may make them more or less likely to comment on a rule, we can make members of Congress the unit of analysis. The dependent variable is now whether or not a given legislator i commented on the proposed rule j. The relationship between public engagement and legislator engagement can be modeled by Equation (3.1), where $Pr(Comment_{ij})$ is the probability that legislator i comments on a proposed rule j, β_1 is the effect of a one-unit increase in the logged number of public comments on proposed rule j, and η is a vector of coefficients on other factors (X_{ij}) that may affect whether a legislator engages.

$$logit(Pr(Legislator comment_{ij})) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 log(Public comments)_{ij} + \eta X_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}$$

Hypothesis 3.2. Public pressure campaigns attract oversight from allies. The more comments supporting a position, the more likely principals holding that position are to engage.

Hypothesis 3.3. Public pressure campaigns reduce oversight from opponents. The more comments opposing a position, the less likely principals holding that position are to engage.

The simplest model of the relationship between congressional attention and public support or opposition to a proposed rule would be to model the net count of legislator letters supporting and opposing the proposed as a function of features of the rulemaking, including the net number of public comments supporting and opposing. As the number of letters from members of congress would be a count process, this would be Poisson or negative binomial regression.

The model is the same as equation (3.1) except that y_j is now the *net* number of legislator comments supporting a proposed rule j, and β_1 is now the effect of a one-unit increase in the logged *net* number of public comments supporting proposed rule j.

With a measure of the likely position on each rule (for example, if promulgated by a copartisan administration), the individual legislator can be the unit of analysis. The probability that legislator i will comment on rule j, given their position p_{ij} on a proposed rule j ($Pr(Comment_{ij}i|p_{ij})$), is modeled in equation (3.1). Hypothesis 3.2 implies that β_1 is positive and Hypothesis 3.3 implies that β_2 is negative.

 $logit(Pr(\text{Legislator Comment}_{ij}|p_{ij})) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Comments supporting } p_{ij} + \beta_2 \text{Comments opposing } p_{ij} + \eta X_{ij} - \eta X_{$

3.2 Results: Lobbying success

I assess the relationship between lobbying success and mass comments by modeling coalition i's lobbying success in a rulemaking j, y_{ij} as a combination of whether the coalition is unopposed, the coalition's size, whether it is a business coalition, and the logged number of mass comments. I estimate these relationships using OLS regression.

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_1 \log(\mathbf{Comments})_{ij} + \beta_2 \mathrm{Size}_{ij} + \beta_3 \mathrm{Unopposed}_{ij} + \beta_3 \mathrm{Coalition} \ \mathrm{Type}_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}$$

I use two related measures of coalition type. Models 1 and 3 use my classification of coalitions as primarily public or private interests. Models 2 and 4 below use a related measure: the share of coalition members that are businesses or trade associations. Models 3 and 4 include interacting each measure of the coalition's type with a dummy for president Trump rather than President Obama's administration. Bush-era rules are dropped from these models for simplicity.

3.2.1 Coalition Success as the Dependent Variable

Note: these models include coalitions of 1 (organizations lobbying alone), but results are similar if I exclude them, except that coalition size has a much weaker correlation with success.

NOTE: At this time, the sample mostly rules that received an unusual number

of comments, so these results are based on variation with high-salience rulemakings.

TODO: Add specification with agency fixed effects?

```
m_business <- lm(coalition_success ~</pre>
          log(comments) +
          #comment_length +
          coalition_business +
          log(coalition_size) +
          coalition unopposed,
        data = coalitions coded)
m <- lm(coalition_success ~</pre>
          log(comments) +
          #comment_length +
          coalition_type +
          log(coalition_size) +
          coalition_unopposed,
        data = coalitions_coded)
m_business_president <- lm(coalition_success ~</pre>
          log(comments) +
          #comment_length +
          coalition_business*president +
          log(coalition_size) +
          coalition_unopposed,
        data = coalitions_coded %>% filter(president != "Bush"))
```

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Intercept)	-0.256	-0.269**	-0.535*	0.071
	(0.191)	(0.130)	(0.323)	(0.194)
$\log(\text{comments})$	-0.156***	-0.140***	-0.146***	-0.148***
	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.053)
coalition_typepublic	0.302		0.893**	
	(0.224)		(0.360)	
$\log(\text{coalition_size})$	0.222**	0.265**	0.223**	0.261**
	(0.102)	(0.108)	(0.105)	(0.112)
$coalition_unopposedTRUE$	-1.744	-1.731	-1.465	-2.071
	(1.564)	(1.586)	(1.532)	(1.561)
coalition_business		-0.003		-0.016
		(0.012)		(0.013)
presidentTrump			0.619	-0.504**
			(0.378)	(0.221)
$coalition_typepublic \times presidentTrump$			-1.476***	
			(0.488)	
$coalition_business \times presidentTrump$				0.042*
				(0.023)
Num.Obs.	208	260	167	215
R2	0.051	0.034	0.120	0.076
R2 Adj.	0.032	0.019	0.087	0.050
AIC	780.1	982.9	617.6	807.2
BIC	800.1	1004.3	642.6	834.2
Log.Lik.	-384.056	-485.472	-300.805	-395.593
F	2.700	2.260	3.632	2.866

^{*} p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

My preferred model is model 3:




Figure 10: OLS Model of Coalition Lobbying Sucess with Hand-coded Data

3.2.1.1 Modeling Congressional Support as a Mediator of Lobbying Success

To assess congressional support as a mediator in the influence of public pressure campaigns on rulemaking, I estimate the average conditional marginal effect (ACME, conditional on the number of comments from Members of Congress) and average direct effect (ADE) of mass comments using mediation analysis. Model 3 in table 1 replaces the dependent variable (lobbying success) with the mediator variable (the number of supportive members of Congress). Model 1 is the same as Model 1 above. Model 2 is the same but includes the proposed mediator, the number of supportive comments from members of Congress.

#TODO add headers, cut out demands, add political information box, shift principal com
#TODO add outcome model
knitr::include_graphics(here::here("figs", "causal-oversight-1.png"))




Figure 11: The Mediator Model: The Relationship Between Public Pressure and Congressional Oversight

3.2.1.1.1 Mediator model (3.2.1.1.1):

Congressional support_{ij} = $\beta_0 + \beta_1 log(Comments_{ij}) + \beta_{2-n} X_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}$

```
summary(m_congress)
##
## Call:
## glm(formula = coalition congress ~ log(comments) + coalition type +
      log(coalition size) + coalition unopposed, family = "poisson",
##
      data = coalitions_coded %>% filter(!is.na(coalition success)))
##
##
## Deviance Residuals:
##
      Min
                1Q
                   Median
                                 3Q
                                         Max
## -1.5228 -0.3207 -0.1368 -0.0764
##
## Coefficients:
##
                          Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
## (Intercept)
                           -6.6229
                                       1.1128 -5.952 2.65e-09 ***
## log(comments)
                          -0.2302
                                       0.1516 -1.518 0.1290
## coalition typepublic 1.1648
                                       0.6522 1.786
                                                       0.0741 .
## log(coalition size) 1.3653
                                       0.3018 4.524 6.06e-06 ***
## coalition unopposedTRUE -9.6796 2103.3628 -0.005
                                                       0.9963
## ---
## Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
##
## (Dispersion parameter for poisson family taken to be 1)
##
##
      Null deviance: 105.931 on 207 degrees of freedom
## Residual deviance: 66.115 on 203 degrees of freedom
     (52 observations deleted due to missingness)
## AIC: 93.978
```

```
##
## Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 14
# model predicting mediator
```

	Members of Congress in Coalition (OLS)	Members of Congress in Coaliti
(Intercept)	-0.073	-6.623***
	(0.053)	(1.113)
$\log(\text{comments})$	-0.022	-0.230
	(0.014)	(0.152)
$coalition_type public$	0.062	1.165*
	(0.062)	(0.652)
$\log({\rm coalition_size})$	0.099***	1.365***
	(0.028)	(0.302)
$coalition_unopposedTRUE$	0.073	-9.680
	(0.430)	(2103.363)
Num.Obs.	208	208
R2	0.075	
R2 Adj.	0.056	
AIC	242.8	94.0
BIC	262.8	110.7
Log.Lik.	-115.412	-41.989
F	4.086	

^{*} p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

```
# FIXME include = TRUE when more obs
model.m %>%
  tidy(conf.int = TRUE) %>%
  filter(term != "(Intercept)") %>%
  ggplot() +
  geom_hline(yintercept = 0, color = "grey") +
  aes(x = term,
```

```
y = estimate,
ymin = conf.low,
ymax = conf.high) +
geom_pointrange() +
coord_flip() +
labs(y = "Number of Legislator Comments",
x = "")
```

```
#TODO label "Public Pressure" and "Oversight" portions.
knitr::include_graphics(here::here("figs", "causal-oversight-2.png"))
```




Figure 12: Integrating Public Pressure and Congressional Oversight into a Model of Lobbying in Bureaucratic Policymaking

3.2.1.1.2 Outcome model $(y_{ij} = \text{Lobbying success}_{ij})$ (3.2.1.1.2):

$$y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 log(\text{Comments}_{ij}) + \beta_2 \text{Congressional support}_{ij} + \beta_{3-n} X_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}$$

```
# model predicting DV
model.y <- lm(coalition success ~ log(comments) +</pre>
               coalition congress + #comment_length +
               coalition_type +
               log(coalition_size) +
               coalition unopposed,
             data = coalitions coded)
# Mediation
med.cont <- mediate(model.m, model.y,</pre>
                   sims=1000,
                   treat = "log(comments)",
                   mediator = "coalition congress")
summary(med.cont)
##
## Causal Mediation Analysis
##
## Quasi-Bayesian Confidence Intervals
##
##
                 Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
## ACME
                 0.00156
                              -0.01235
                                              0.02 0.832
## ADE
                 -0.15922
                              -0.26285
                                              -0.06 0.004 **
## Total Effect -0.15766
                              -0.26116
                                             -0.05 0.004 **
## Prop. Mediated -0.00432
                              -0.14650
                                              0.09
                                                     0.832
## ---
## Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
```

```
##
## Sample Size Used: 208
##
##
## Simulations: 1000
models <- list(</pre>
  "1" = m,
  "2" = model.y,
  "3" = model.m
)
rows <- tibble(</pre>
 term = c("Dependent Variable"),
  `1` = c("Lobbying Success"),
  `2` =c("Lobbying Success"),
  `3` = c("Members of Congress in Coalition")
)
# #broom::tidy(m_PR)
# cm = c("ej_commentTRUE" = "EJ Comment",
         "log(comments + 1)" = "Log(Comments+1)",
         "ej_comments_unique" = "Unique EJ Comments",
          "ej_commentTRUE:log(comments + 1)" = "EJ Comment*Log(Comments+1)")
#
attr(rows, 'position') <- c(0)</pre>
# paper table
modelsummary::modelsummary( models,
```

Table 1: Lobbying Success an	nd Congressional Support
------------------------------	--------------------------

	1	2	3
Dependent Variable	Lobbying Success	Lobbying Success	Members of Congress in C
(Intercept)	0.108	-0.259	-0.073
	(0.310)	(0.193)	(0.053)
$\log(\text{comments})$	-0.143***	-0.157***	-0.022
	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.014)
$coalition_typepublic$	0.004	0.305	0.062
	(0.255)	(0.226)	(0.062)
$\log(\text{coalition_size})$	0.146	0.227**	0.099***
	(0.118)	(0.105)	(0.028)
$coalition_unopposedTRUE$	NA	-1.741	0.073
	()	(1.568)	(0.430)
$coalition_congress$		-0.051	
		(0.256)	
Num.Obs.	136	208	208
R2	0.071	0.051	0.075
R2 Adj.	0.050	0.027	0.056
AIC	480.7	782.1	242.8
BIC	495.3	805.4	262.8
Log.Lik.	-235.345	-384.036	-115.412
F	3.385	2.158	4.086

^{*} p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Mediation analysis will require adding cases where coalitions lobbied unopposed, which we are much more likely to see in the sample of rules without mass comments.

The average effect of the logged number of comments, conditional on letters from members

of congress (the ACME) is 0, with a p value of 0.832.

The average direct effect (ADE) of the logged number of comments on lobbying success is -0.16, with a p-value of 0.004.

The Total Effect of a one-unit increase in the logged number of comments is -0.16, with a p value of 0. 0 of this is mediated through mobilizing congressional attention (p-value = 0.83).

3.2.2 Organization success as the Dependent Variable

While it would not be appropriate to compare the lobbying success of organizations within a rulemaking (because many organizations belong to the same coalition), it may be appropriate to compare the lobbying success within the same organization across rules. This limits the analysis to organizations that lobbying on multiple policies. The key variation of interest is when organizations lobby with a large amount of public support versus when they do not.

There is still a (lesser) problem with the i.i.d. assumption here because two organizations lobbying in a coalition on one rule may mobilize each other to lobby in coalition in a different rule (in my data, lobbying coalitions are at the policy-level, since they differ from policy to policy).

```
orgs <- comments_coded %>%
filter(comment_type == "org") %>%
distinct(org_name, docket_id, success, Position, coalition_size, coalition_comments, p
count(org_name, sort = T) %>%
filter(n >1, !is.na(org_name))
orgs %>% kablebox()
```

org_name

n
Natural Resources Defense Council
10
Earthjustice
9
Sierra Club
9
Oceana
7
Pew Charitable Trusts
7
National Audubon Society
6
National Wildlife Federation
6
American Bankers Association
5
American Petroleum Institute
5
Associated Builders And Contractors
5

Association Of Oregon Counties

5
Center For Biological Diversity
5
Chamber Of Commerce
5
County Of Siskiyou
5
Edison Electric Institute
5
Environmental Defense Fund
5
International Association Of Drilling Contractors
5
International Bancshares Corporation
5
Materion Brush Inc.
5
Naacp
5
National Association Of Home Builders
5
National Employment Law Project

5
National Mining Association
5
Nature Conservancy
5
Nez Perce Tribal Executive Committee
5
Ocean Conservancy
5
Port Gamble S'klallam Tribe
5
Public Citizen
5
Quinault Indian Nation
5
Aca International
4
Afl-Cio
4
American Bird Conservancy
4
Center For Regulatory Effectiveness

4 Confederated Tribes Of Warm Springs 4 Consumer Bankers Association 4 Economic Progress Institute 4 Elko County 4 **Endangered Species Coalition** 4 Farm Bureau 4 Harney County Court 4 Independent Community Bankers Of America 4 Institute For Policy Integrity 4 Kentucky Equal Justice Center 4

Maryland Consumer Rights Coalition

4 Montezuma County 4 National Association Of Manufacturers 4 National Wild Turkey Federation 4 North Carolina Division Of Marine Fisheries 4 North Slope Borough 4 Northeast Seafood Coalition 4 Ocean Conservation Research 4 Offshore Operators Committee 4 Portland Cement Association 4 Safari Club International 4

Snoqualmie Indian Tribe

4 Southern Ute Indian Tribe 4 State Of Alaska 4 Summit Lake Paiute Tribe 4 U.s. Chamber Of Commerce 4 Union Of Concerned Scientists 4 Woodstock Institute 4 Aarp 3 Aircraft Owners And Pilots Association 3 American Staffing Association 3 Arizona Game & Fish Department 3

Associated General Contractors Of America

3 Association To Preserve Cape Cod 3 Baker County 3 Bank Policy Institute 3 Better Markets 3 Blue Water Fishermen's Association 3 Catholic Charities Usa 3 Chesapeake Bay Foundation 3 Citizens' Alliance For Property Rights 3 City Of Portland 3 Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission

3

Competitive Enterprise Institute

3 Confederated Tribes Of Grand Ronde 3 Conference Of State Bank Supervisors 3 Conocophillips 3 Consumer Federation Of America 3 Consumer Reports 3 Defenders Of Wildlife 3 Domestic Energy Producers Alliance 3 **Duchesne County** 3 Energy And Wildlife Action Coalition 3 Florida Fish And Wildlife Conservation Commission 3

Florida Wildlife Federation

```
3
Friends Of The Clearwater
3
Georgia Watch
3
Governor's Office
3
Harding County
3
Hr Policy Association
3
International Fund For Animal Welfare
3
Maine Center For Economic Policy
3
Maine Coast Fishermen's Association
3
Maine Equal Justice
3
Mcintyre & Lemon, Pllc
3
```

Mesa County

3

Minnesota Deaprement Of Natural Resources

3

405 organizations lobbied on more than one rule in the hand-coded data, some on as many as 10 rulemaking dockets. This yields a total of 1053 observations of an organization lobbying on a docket that also lobbied on some other docket. (Note: this is a undercount due to imperfect standardization of organization names).

At the organization level, the appropriate analysis is a difference-in-difference design. We know the success of each organization when it does and does not participate in a lobbying coalition that mobilizes public pressure (at least each organization that I can use for this analysis). The difference within an organization is now the key variation.

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_1 \mathbf{Comments}_{ij} + \gamma_i + \beta_2 \mathbf{Coalition} \ \mathbf{Size}_{ij} + \beta_3 \mathbf{Support}_{ij} + \beta_4 \mathbf{President}_j + \epsilon_{ij}$$

Where Y_{it} represents organization i's level of success. γ_{ij} is a fixed effect for the organization. This fixed effect accounts for the organization's characteristics that do not vary over time. This difference-in-difference design ensures that coefficient β_1 captures variation related to changes in levels of public pressure, not other factors that may vary across organizations.

 β_2 captures the effect of coalition size on lobbying success of organization i on rule j. β_3 captures the difference in the success of organization i when they support proposed policy j rather than oppose it. $President_j$ is a dummy for whether policy j was proposed by President Trump rather then-president Obama's administration.

Assuming that organizations have parallel trends in their level of success given a level of support, β represents the average effect of changing levels of public pressure on an organization's lobbying success.

Estimates in the table below show the results of this model. It suggests that the same organization was less effective when it mobilized more comments, more successful when

they supported the rule, and less successful under president Trump than President Obama.

The negative correlation between lobbying success and the number of mass comments is likely due to campaigns "going down fighting"—not trying to influence policy. The fact that organizations are more likely to get the outcome they seek when they already support the rule makes sense because the agency is more likely to be sympathetic to their requests. The fact that the average organization was less likely to see its desired policy changes under President Trump is likely due to asymmetry in mobilizing organizations, with more organizations on the left than the right in this sample of rules. (Note: this may change in the broader sample.)

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	Lobbying Success		
log(coalition_comments)	-0.110**		
	(0.044)		
coalition_size	0.002		
	(0.004)		
PositionSupports rule	0.509**		
	(0.255)		
presidentTrump	-0.603**		
	(0.246)		
Num.Obs.	1900		
R2	0.912		
R2 Adj.	0.384		
R2 Within	0.094		
R2 Pseudo			
AIC	6297.7		
BIC	15343.6		
Log.Lik.	-1518.846		
FE: org_name	X		
Std. errors	Clustered (org_name)		
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p <			
0.01			

References

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