1 Pre-analysis

1.1 SIMULATED DATA

To illustrate my planned analysis, I simulate data for each variable described above.

Dependent variable: Coalition success is drawn from a descrete distribution {-1, -.5, 0, .5, 1}.

Explanatory variables: Coalition size (a count) is drawn from a Poisson distribution. Business coalition is binomial. In reality, business coalitions are more common than non-business coalitions, but here I estimate a balanced sample. I set rule pages constant at 85 and draw comment lengths from a Poisson distribution. While in reality, less than one percent of coalitions lobbying in rulemaking opt for a mass-comment campaign, I aim to gather a balanced sample, so half of the simulated data are assumed to have no mass comment campaign (comments = 1, log(comments) = 0) and the other half have a number of comments drawn from a Zero-Truncated Poisson distribution, which is then transformed to a log scale.

```
coalition_success <- sample(x = c(-1, -.5, 0, .5, 1), 1000, replace = T, prob = <math>c(0.1, 0)
coalition_size <- rtnorm(1000, mean = 5, sd= 10, lower = 1) %>% round()
coalition_business <- sample(x = c(0,1), 1000, replace = T, prob = c(0.5, .5))
comment_length <- round(rpois(1000, 10)/85 *100, 1)</pre>
comments <- c(rtnorm(500, mean = 10000, sd = 100000, lower = 100),
              rep(1, 500)) %>%
  sample() %>% round()
cong\_support \leftarrow c(rtnorm(500, mean = 1, sd = 5, lower = 0),
                  rep(0, 500)) \%>\%
  sample() %>% round()
d = tibble(coalition_success,
           coalition_size,
           coalition_business,
           comment_length,
           comments,
           cong_support)
# if there is one coalition, it must be unnopposed
d1 <- d %>% mutate(rule_id = sample(1:1000),
                    coalition_id = sample(1:1000),
                    coalitions = 1,
```

Table 1: Simulated data


rule_id	coalition_id	coalition_success	coalition_size	coalition_business	comment_length	comments	cong_support	coalitions	coalition_unopposed
723	275	-0.5	2	1	9.4	16336	0	1	1
1676	1214	-0.5	12	1	20.0	1	0	2	0
1203	2514	0.5	7	1	10.6	1	1	2	0
1367	2712	-0.5	11	0	8.2	1	3	2	0
1994	2513	0.5	13	1	11.8	55090	3	2	0
1657	1275	-1.0	14	1	11.8	132318	0	2	0
1392	1066	-1.0	7	1	16.5	41854	0	2	0
183	671	-0.5	5	0	14.1	1	0	1	1
1247	1217	-0.5	9	0	11.8	1	3	2	0
1161	2025	0.5	23	0	7.1	47768	0	2	0

```
coalition_unopposed = 1)
# if there are two coalitions, I assume they are opposing (for simulation only)
d2 <- d %>% mutate(rule_id = sample(1001:2000),
                     coalition_id = 1001:2000,
                     coalitions = 2,
                     coalition_unopposed = 0)
d3 <- d %>% mutate(rule_id = sample(1001:2000),
                     coalition_id = 2001:3000,
                     coalitions = 2,
                     coalition_unopposed = 0)
d <- full_join(d1,d2) %>% full_join(d3)
d %>% sample_n(10) %>% dplyr::select(rule_id, coalition_id, everything()) %>% knitr::kab
                               1500 -
                                                         300
     1000
                               1000
   count
                             count
                                                      control 200
      500
                                500
                                                         100
        0
                                                           0
                                   0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
          -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5
                                                                   20
                                                                       30
                                                                10
                                                                Coalition size
           Coalition Success
                                    Business Coalition
     400
                                             1500
     300
                                             1000
                                          count
     200
                                              500
     100
                                                0
                               20
                                                          1e+05
                                                                  2e+05
                                                 0e+00
                                                                          3e+05
        Comment length/proposed rule length
                                                          Log(comments)
```

1.2 SIMULATED RESULTS

Unsurprisingly this model yields no significant results. With lobbying success as the dependent variable, the coefficient on the main variable of interest would be interpreted as a one-unit increase in the logged number of comments corresponds to a $\beta_{logmasscomments}$ increase in the five-point influence scale.

OLS model of coalition lobbying sucess with simulated data



To assess congressional support as a mediator in the influence of public pressure campaigns on rulemaking, I estimate the average conditional marginal effect (ACME, conditional on the number of comments from Members of Congress) and average direct effect (ADE) of mass comments using causal mediation analysis.

```
library(mediation)

# model predicting mediator
model.m <- lm(cong_support ~ log(comments) + comment_length + coalition_business+ coal

# model predicting DV
model.y <- lm(coalition_success ~ log(comments) + cong_support + comment_length + coalit

med.cont <- mediate(model.m, model.y, sims=1000, treat = "log(comments)",
mediator = "cong_support")

summary(med.cont)</pre>
```

```
## Causal Mediation Analysis
##
## Quasi-Bayesian Confidence Intervals
##
                  Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value
##
## ACME
                  -0.000180
                              -0.000485
                                                0.00
                                                       0.086 .
## ADE
                  -0.000405
                              -0.004452
                                                0.00
                                                       0.850
## Total Effect
                                                0.00
                                                       0.772
                  -0.000585
                              -0.004608
## Prop. Mediated 0.038652
                              -1.153032
                                                       0.790
                                                 1.47
## ---
## Signif. codes: 0 '*** 0.001 '** 0.01 '* 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' 1
##
## Sample Size Used: 3000
##
##
## Simulations: 1000
```