Public Pressure Campaigns and Bureaucratic Policymaking

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Table of Contents

# List of Key Terms

* **Astroturf** campaigns are a form of outside lobbying intended to create a deceptive appearance of public support. The group organizing the campaign is only doing so because they are being paid. The individuals mobilized are often either deceived (e.g., intentionally misled about the policy or its likely effects) or financially incentivized to participate. In the extreme, astroturf campaigns may use the names of fake or non-consenting individuals. In contrast, a more grassroots campaign may also require funding, but groups would choose to use resources for such a campaign even without the quid pro quo, and individuals are mobilized based on some pre-existing interest or belief. While grassroots campaigns may involve simplification, spin, and even mild deception, it is not decisive.
* A **coalition** is a group of actors pursuing the same aims in the same policy fight. Because coordination is difficult to measure, my empirical definition includes individuals and organizations that identify themselves as coordinated and advocate for the same policy outcomes regardless of overt coordination. A coalition may include organizations lobbying for the same policy outcome for different reasons (e.g., “bootleggers and baptists” coalitions).
* **Going public** describes the choice to pursue an “outside” strategy to influence policy outcomes that aims to expand the scope of conflict and involve more actors than would be involved if the lobbying organization only employed an “inside” lobbying strategy involving professional policy influencers and focused on the policymakers.
* **Lobbying influence** implies a causal effect between an effort to influence policy and a policy outcome.
* **Lobbying success** describes a situation where a group that sought to influence policy got the outcome they sought without implying a causal relationship between their effort and the policy outcome.
* A **mass commenting campaign** is a type of public pressure campaign focused on mobilizing public comments. Cmments mobilized by such campaigns are often called “mass comments.” For analytic purposes, I define a mass comment in Chapter 2.3.3 as any comment sharing a substantial amount of text with 99 other comments or uploaded in a batch of 100 or more by the same organization.
* A **membership organization** is a type of organization formed to serve the interests of a defined membership. Membership organizations may serve their members’ narrow material interests or their members’ broader visions of the public interest. Some membership organizations are more directly governed by their members than others.
* **mobilizing groups/organizations** recruit people to take an action (e.g., to sign a petition or submit a public comment).
* An **organization** is usually incorporated as a business, government, or nonprofit. Public comments *from* organizations represent the position of the organization as an incorporated entity. I only consider a comment to be on behalf of an organization if it claims to represent the organization. An employee using letterhead is insufficient. Letters from elected officials are only considered to represent their institution if they are in a position to do so (e.g., a governor, attorney general, or committee chair) and claim to do so.
* A **public interest group** is a type of organization that *primarily* advocates for some vision of the public good, not the private material interest of its owners or members. Policy conflicts may involve competing visions of the public interest and thus multiple public interest group coalitions.
* A **public pressure campaign** is an effort to influence policy by mobilizing a segment of the public to pay attention to and express their opinions to decision-makers. It can be an astroturf campaign or grassroots campaign on behalf of public or private intersts.
* **Responsiveness** is observable attention that government officials pay to public input. This can be either discursive influence (similar to what ([**Balla2020?**](#ref-Balla2020)) call “proceedural responsiveness”) or substantive policy influence.

# Citations to Primary Documents

I extensively cite public records, including policy documents and public comments. Most of these documents have government-issued identification numbers. Citations to documents published in the Federal Register include an agency acronym, the year the document was published, and a document number (usually five digits, e.g., “CFPB-2020-14935”). If citing a specific paragraph, the citation will appear as “CFPB-2020-14935/p-134.” Federal Register documents can be accessed by appending “federalregister.gov/d/” to the id number, for example, “federalregister.gov/d/2020-14935/p-134.” Citations to documents posted to regulations.gov begin with a docket number, including an agency acronym and the year the rulemaking docket began, followed by a unique document number (e.g., “IRS-2016-0015-0125”). Regulations.gov documents can be accessed by appending “regulations.gov/document/” to the docuement id number, for example, “regulations.gov/document/IRS-2016-0015-0125”)

# Introduction

Does civic engagement through public pressure campaigns affect agency rulemaking? I examine who participates in public pressure campaigns and why, whether they affect congressional oversight, and whether they affect policy. Answering these questions informs our understanding of bureaucratic politics and interest group lobbying, organizing, and mobilizing tactics. If ordinary people have a voice in bureaucratic policymaking, I argue, it is through public pressure campaigns. Thus, understanding the nature and effects of these campaigns is key to understanding modern democracy.

Large democracies face two big problems. First, they are vulnerable to fleeting passions and demagogues. To combat this, many decisions are left to experts who, ideally, exercise judgment loosely guided by the public. Second, everyone cannot vote on every decision. We thus delegate power to representatives (who then delegate it to deputies), create temporary mini-publics, or solicit input from those most affected or moved by a public decision.[[1]](#footnote-22) Most policy is then made by bureaucrats, supposedly guided indirectly through elected representatives and directly by limited public input. Of the thousand of policies that the institutoins of government make each year, direct public input tends to be limited to only the very most contentious policy debates.

Both of these problems converge in the bureaucracy. Bureacracies are run by experts who are deputized by elected officials (or by their deputy’s deputy’s deputy). Many bureacracies also have procedures that create opportunities for public input, and it is far from clear how bureaucratic decisions are to balance expertise, accountability to elected officials, and responsiveness to public input in decisionmaking.

With the rise of the administrative state, U.S. federal agencies have become a major site of policymaking and political conflict. By some estimates, upward of 90% of legally binding U.S. federal policy is now written by agencies. Agency rules are revised much more frequently than statutory law ([W. Wagner et al. 2017](#ref-Wagner2017)). In the years or decades between legislative enactments, federal agencies make legally-binding rules interpreting and reinterpreting old statutes to address emerging issues and priorities. Examples are striking: Many effects of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act were largely unknown until the specific regulations were written, and it continues to change as these rules are revised. Congress authorizes billions in grants, subsidies, and leases for public lands, but who gets them depends on agency policy. In the decades since the last major environmental legislation, agencies have written thousands of pages of new environmental regulations and thousands more changing tack under each new administration. These revisions significantly shape lives and fortunes. For example, in 2006, citing the authority of statutes last amended in the 1950s, the Justice Department’s Bureau of Prisons proposed a rule restricting eligibility for parole. In 2016, the Bureau withdrew this rule and announced it would require fewer contracts with prison companies, precipitating a 50% loss of industry stock value. Six months later, a new administration announced these policies would again be reversed, leading to a 130% increase in industry stock value. Agency rulemaking matters.

Less clear, however, is how the new centrality of agency rulemaking fits with democracy. In addition to the bureaucracy’s complex relationships with the president and Congress, agencies have complex and poorly understood relationships with the public and advocacy groups. Relationships with constituent groups may even provide agencies with a degree of “autonomy” from their official principals ([D. P. Carpenter 2001](#ref-Carpenter2001)).

Participatory processes like public comment periods, where government agencies must solicit public input on draft policies, are said to provide political oversight opportunities ([Steven J. Balla 1998](#ref-Balla1998); [Mathew D. McCubbins and Schwartz 1984](#ref-McCubbins1984)), democratic legitimacy ([Croley 2003](#ref-Croley2003); [Rosenbloom 2003](#ref-Rosenbloom2003)), and new technical information ([S. W. Yackee 2006](#ref-Yackee2006JPART); [Nelson and Yackee 2012](#ref-Nelson2012)). While recent scholarship on agency policymaking has shed light on the sophisticated lobbying by businesses and political insiders, we know surprisingly little about the vast majority of public comments which are submitted by ordinary people as part of public pressure campaigns.

In 2018, the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) identified mass commenting as a top issue in administrative law. In their report to ACUS, [Sant’Ambrogio and Staszewski](#ref-SantAmbrogio2018) ([2018](#ref-SantAmbrogio2018)) conclude, “The ‘mass comments’ occasionally submitted in great volume in highly salient rulemakings are one of the more vexing challenges facing agencies in recent years. Mass comments are typically the result of orchestrated campaigns by advocacy groups to persuade members or other like-minded individuals to express support for or opposition to an agency’s proposed rule.” Mass comment campaigns are known to drive significant participation of ordinary people in Environmental Protection Agency rulemaking ([Judge-Lord 2019a](#ref-Judge-Lord2019); [Potter 2017a](#ref-Potter2017); [Steven J. Balla et al. 2018](#ref-Balla2018)). [Cuéllar](#ref-Cuellar2005) ([2005](#ref-Cuellar2005)), who examines public input on three rules, finds that ordinary people made up the majority of commenters demonstrating “demand among the mass public for a seat at the table in the regulatory process.”

Activists frequently target agency policymaking with letter-writing campaigns, petitions, protests, and mobilizing people to attend hearings, all classic examples of “civic engagement” ([Verba and Nie 1987](#ref-Verba1987)). As I show in @ref{why-results}, most comments submitted to regulations.gov are form comments, more akin to petition signatures than sophisticated lobbying. Indeed, approximately 40 million out of 50 million (80%) of these public comments mobilized by just 100 advocacy organizations. Yet civic engagement remains poorly understood in the context of bureaucratic policymaking.

These occasional bursts of civic engagement in bureaucratic policymaking raise practical and theoretical questions for the practice of democracy. These questions, in turn, hinge on unanswered empirical questions: Do these campaigns affect policy? If so, by what mechanisms? Existing research finds that commenters believe their comments matter ([S. W. Yackee 2015](#ref-Yackee2015JPART)) and that the number of public comments varies across agencies and policy processes ([Judge-Lord 2019a](#ref-Judge-Lord2019); [Libgober 2018](#ref-Libgober2018); [Emily H. Moore 2017](#ref-Moore2017)), but the relationship between the scale of public engagement and policy change remains untested. Indeed, we have much to understand about the causes and effects of these campaigns before we are in a position to ask if they are a mechanism for groups to influence policy. Most critically, we must understand who mobilizes public pressure campaigns and why.

## Motivation

Leading models of influence in bureaucratic policymaking focus on two key political forces: sophisticated interest group lobbying and political oversight. As bureaucrats learn about policy problems and balance interest-group demands, public comment processes allow lobbying organizations to provide useful technical information and inform decisionmakers of their preferences on draft policies. Agencies may then update policy positions within constraints imposed by their political principals.

While this may describe most cases of bureaucratic policymaking, these models neither explain nor account for the contentious politics that occasionally inspire millions of ordinary people to respond to calls for public input on draft agency policies. Mass engagement in bureaucratic policymaking has thus largely been ignored by political scientists, leaving a weak empirical base for normative and prescriptive work. Like other forms of mass political participation, such as protests and letter writing campaigns, mass public comments on draft agency rules provide no new technical information. Nor do they wield any formal authority to reward or sanction bureaucrats, as comments from a Members of Congress might. The number on each side, be it ten or ten million, has no legal import for an agency’s response.

How, if at all, should scholars incorporate mass engagement into models of bureaucratic policymaking?

I take up a part of this question in each of the following chapters. Each draws on different but overlapping literatures to better understand bureaucratic policymaking. Chapter 1 brings in literature on public opinion and the attention of parties to different issues over time, zooming out to the broadest relationships between mass politics and policy outputs. Chapter 2 brings the focus to specific policy fights, bringing in literature interest-group mobilization to understand why public pressure campaigns target agencies in the first place. Chapter ?? focuses squarely on the classic bureaucratic politics question of interest group influence in policymaking but expanded to account for public pressure campaigns. Chapter (ej) then zooms out again, this time bringing in literature on social movement pressure. As these chapters address literatures on public opinion, party politics, interest groups, lobbying, and social movements in turn, my review of these literatures in this introdcution is brief. My aim is to provide a general foundation.

TODO: intro to pol-sci lit that is too broad for elsewhere?

## Rulemaking

The theories about the drivers of public participation and the mechanisms by which it may effect policy that I advance and test in following chapters may apply to many contexts where public pressure is aimed at decisionmakers. My empirical terrian, however, is policymaking by U.S. federal agencies, specifically a policymaking process called Notice-and-comment rulemaking perscribed in the Administrative Proceedures Act. The APA governs the process by which federal agencies develop and issue legally-binding policy. It requires agencies to publish proposed (draft) and final policies (rules) in the Federal Register and provide opportunities for the public to comment on draft rules.

TODO: General into to scholarship on rulemaking, [S. W. Yackee](#ref-Yackee2019) ([2019](#ref-Yackee2019)), [Potter](#ref-Potter2016) ([2017b](#ref-Potter2016)), [Potter and Shipan](#ref-PotterShipan2019) ([2019](#ref-PotterShipan2019))

### 0.0.1 Presidential Agendas and Oversight

TODO: General overview of the president’s role in rulemaking, [Ferejohn and Shipan](#ref-Ferejohn1990) ([1990](#ref-Ferejohn1990)), [Potter et al.](#ref-Potter2019) ([2019](#ref-Potter2019))

### 0.0.2 Congressional Agendas and Oversight

TODO: General overview of Congress’s role in rulemaking, [Mathew D. McCubbins and Schwartz](#ref-McCubbins1984) ([1984](#ref-McCubbins1984)), [Mathew D. McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast](#ref-McCubbins1987) ([1987](#ref-McCubbins1987)), [Huber and Shipan](#ref-Huber2002) ([2002](#ref-Huber2002)), [Macdonald and Mcgrath](#ref-Macdonald) ([n.d.](#ref-Macdonald)), [Feinstein](#ref-Feinstein2017) ([2017](#ref-Feinstein2017)), [Lowande](#ref-Lowande2018JOP) ([2018](#ref-Lowande2018JOP)), [Lowande](#ref-Lowande2017) ([2017](#ref-Lowande2017)), [Clinton, Lewis, and Selin](#ref-Clinton2014AJPS) ([2014](#ref-Clinton2014AJPS))

#### 0.0.2.1 Judicial Review

TODO: General overview of judicial review, [Judge-Lord](#ref-judgelord2016MPSA) ([2016](#ref-judgelord2016MPSA)), [Ferejohn and Shipan](#ref-Ferejohn1990) ([1990](#ref-Ferejohn1990)),

In contrast to political scientists, legal scholars have long debated what to make of mass commenting in rulemaking. Many focus on reforms to help agencies collect more useful information ([Cynthia R. Farina et al. 2011](#ref-Farina2011); [Cynthia R. Farina, Newhart, and Heidt 2014](#ref-Farina2014); [Rauch 2016](#ref-Rauch2016)). In 2018, “Public engagement” was main project of the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) committee on Rulemaking: The project

“explores agency strategies to enhance public engagement prior to and during informal rulemaking. It seeks to ensure that agencies invest resources in a way that maximizes the probability that rulewriters obtain high-quality public information.”

Among other things, this committee is debating how best to gather “quality public information,” how “to get new people/groups into the real or virtual room” ([Cynthia R. Farina 2018](#ref-Farina2018)), and whether broad engagement is even desirable on all rules ([White 2018](#ref-White2018)).

Administrative law scholars have explored these questions theoretically for decades, but only a few offer empirical analysis. [Mendelson](#ref-Mendelson2011) ([2011](#ref-Mendelson2011)) finds that agencies often discard non-technical comments but argues that they should be given more weight. Others worry that mass commenting distracts agencies from good policy and the broader public interest ([Coglianese 2006](#ref-Coglianese2006)). [Cynthia R. Farina et al.](#ref-Farina2012) ([2012, 112](#ref-Farina2012)) claims that “[Mass] comments typically are neither factually informative nor reliable indicators of citizens’ informed value preferences.” Some even call them “spam” ([Steven J. Balla et al. 2018](#ref-Balla2018); [Noveck 2004](#ref-Noveck2004)). In this prevailing view, “high-quality” and “relevant” mean novel technical information, not opinions. [Herz](#ref-Herz2016) ([2016, 208](#ref-Herz2016)) concludes “The goal of e-rulemaking is to more fully capture such credible, specific, and relevant information, not to solicit the views of random, self-nominating members of the public.” Similarly, [Dmitry Epstein, Heidt, and Farina](#ref-Epstein2014) ([2014, 4](#ref-Epstein2014)) dismiss mass comments as “effectively, votes rather than informational or analytical contributions. Rulemaking agencies are legally required to make policy decisions based on fact-based, reasoned analysis rather than majority sentiment; hence, even hundreds of thousands of such comments have little value in the rulemaking process.” Notably, the ACUS draft recommendations on “Mass and Fake Comments in Agency Rulemaking” suggests that “effective comments” give “reasons rather than just reactions” ([ACUS 2018, 33](#ref-ACUS2018)). If true, most public reactions to proposed rules such as those expressed in mass comments would have no effect in rulemaking.

Early optimism among legal scholars that the internet would “change everything” ([Johnson 1998](#ref-Johnson1998)) and that “cyberdemocracy” would enable more deliberative rulemaking has faded. While commenting and mobilizing others to comment has become easier, [Coglianese](#ref-Coglianese2006) ([2006](#ref-Coglianese2006)) finds that little else has changed. The prediction that the internet would primarily facilitate more of the same kind of engagement among the like-minded (i.e. mass-commenting) ([Sunstein 2001](#ref-Sunstein2001)) has largely been correct. In this sense, the “quality” of discourse has not improved.

Even scholars who suggest reforms aimed at “regulatory democracy” aim to increase the “sophistication” of ordinary peoples’ comments ([Cuéllar 2014](#ref-Cuellar2014); [Johnson 2013](#ref-Johnson2013)). For example, Beth Simone Noveck ([Noveck 2004](#ref-Noveck2004)) is critical of “notice and spam,” arguing instead for “participative practices—methods for ‘doing democracy’ that build the skills and capacity necessary for citizens, experts, and organizations to speak and to be heard. Rulemaking, after all, is a communicative process involving a dialogue between regulators and those affected by regulation” [Noveck](#ref-Noveck2005) ([2005, 3](#ref-Noveck2005)).

This scholarship has improved the theory and practice of policy learning in rulemaking. But a focus on sophisticated deliberation and technical information overlooks the potential role of political information.[[2]](#footnote-25) Whereas administrative law scholars have focused on “how technology can connect the expertise of the many to the power of the few” ([Noveck 2009](#ref-Noveck2009)), I ask whether it may also connect the power of the many to the decisions of the few.

## Outline of the book

This dissertation explores the effects of public pressure campaigns on agency rulemaking, a technocratic policy process where “public participation” is usually limited to sophisticated lobbying but occasionally includes millions of people mobilized by public pressure campaigns. Public comment periods on proposed policies purport to provide democratic accountability. Yet theories of bureaucratic policymaking largely ignore the occasional bursts of civic engagement that generate the vast majority of public comments on proposed rules. To fill this gap, I build and test theories about the role of public pressure in policymaking. I collect and analyze millions of public comments to develop the first systematic measures of civic engagement and influence in bureaucratic policymaking.

**Chapter 1 “Agency Rulemaking in American Politics”** situates agency rulemaking in the context of American politics. Tracing broad trends over the past 40 years, I show that rulemaking has become a major site of policymaking and political conflict.

**Chapter 2 “Why Do Agencies (Sometimes) Get So Much Mail?”** addresses who participates in public pressure campaigns and why. Are public pressure campaigns, like other lobbying tactics, primarily used by well-resourced groups to create an “astroturf” impression of public support? Or are they better understood as conflict expansion tactics used by less-resourced “grassroots” groups? I find that mass comment campaigns are almost always a conflict expansion tactic. Furthermore, I find no evidence of negativity bias in public comments. While most comments opposed proposed rules during the Trump administration, most comments supported proposed rules during the Obama administration. This is because public comments tend to support Democratic policies and oppose Republican policies, reflecting the asymmetry in mobilizing groups.

**Chapter 3 “Do Public Pressure Campaigns Influence Policy?”** leverages a mix of hand-coding and computational text analysis methods to assess whether public pressure campaigns increase lobbying success. To measure lobbying success, I develop computational methods to identify lobbying coalitions and estimate their effect on each rule posted for comment on regulations.gov. I then validate these methods against a random sample of rules, hand-coded for whether each lobbying coalition got the policy outcome they sought. Finally, I assess potential mechanisms by which mass public engagement may affect policy. I focus on congressional oversight as a mediator in policy influence, i.e., the extent to which public pressure campaigns affect policy indirectly through their effects on legislators’ oversight behaviors.

**Chapter 4 “The Environmental Justice Movement and Technocratic Policymaking”** examines the discursive effects of environmental justice claims both qualitatively and quantitatively. I write about the role of Native activists and environmental groups in shaping federal environmental regulations. Looking across over 20,000 draft regulations that failed to address environmental justice issues, I find that agencies are more likely to add language addressing environmental justice in their final rules when public comments raise environmental justice concerns.

**Chapter 5 “Reforming the Policy Process”** reviews dominant ways of thinking about public comment periods and proposed reforms to participatory processes in light of the empirical evidence in the previous chapters. I start with a sketch of the various positions staked out by administrative law scholars, each rooted in different theories of democracy. I then review several specific challenges and proposed reforms to the policy process.

# 1 Agency Rulemaking in American Politics

## 1.1 Introduction

Do the issues that dominate political discourse translate into actual policy? To the extent that broad theories of American politics go beyond the results of elections and attempt to explain the resulting policies, they generally focus on landmark legislation and items at the top of presidential agendas. Yet as the administrative state and our understanding of it have grown, political scientists are increasingly paying attention to policy outputs both for their own sake and how policy outputs shape politics.

Agency rules and regulations are where the rubber hits the road for both legislation and presidential agendas ([J. W. Yackee and Yackee 2009b](#ref-Yackee2009bush)). Ninety percent of U.S. law is now written by agencies rather than Congress ([West and Raso 2013](#ref-West2013)), and the real impact of most new statutes and executive orders is largely unknown until the ink is dry on the agency rules and regulations that implement them. Legally binding regulations give specific meaning and force to legislation and presidential agendas.

As the substantive outputs of policy processes, if changes in public attention or opinion and the priorities of elected leaders matter for policy, we should expect to see these changes borne out in the number and type of agency rules published. Changes in outputs may reflect changes in the substantive inputs—sometimes called the “issue structure” —or changes in how issues are filtered and activated by the institutional structures of policymaking.

This chapter martials data on federal agency policymaking from 1980 to 2020 to sketch broad trends in federal policymaking. Broad theories of American politics suggest three types of predictions: (1) patterns in the substantive issues addressed by policy, (2) patterns in the relationship between partisan control and issue attention, and (3) patterns in the pace of policy change. The systematic data on agency rulemaking that I introduce here permit us to assess the extent to which broad theories of American politics explain the substance, timing, and volume of policy outputs.

This exercise has two purposes. First, I aim to introduce a large new dataset on federal policymaking and situate these data in the broader context of American politics. Second, I contrast the hard data with broad political science theories. This assessment is descriptive and intended to be provocative—an attempt to stretch the conceptual ground of theories of American politics to include the massive, yet often-neglected, volume of concrete policy outcomes. The extent to which the match between theory and data is unsatisfying may point toward opportunities for theorizing, a narrow portion of which I take up in the following chapters that focus squarely on expanding theories of bureaucratic policymaking.

## 1.2 Theory

### 1.2.1 The Policy Agenda

TODO: how congressional enacting legislation, president’s priorities, and the bureaucracy’s lag time in writing rules interface with these larger agenda issues. Should we expect to see this type of direct translation into the agency’s rulemaking production without congressional mediation? Why or why not?

There are many causal pathways between public opinion and attention and policy outcomes, but most are long and complex. Before exploring the extent to which these shifts observed in public opinion polls and party agendas show up in policy outputs is the subject of the present investigation, we must consider what we know about the pathways by which this may or may not occur.

#### 1.2.1.1 Congressional Enactments and Bureaucratic Policymaking

TODO: ([**GoldenXXXX?**](#ref-GoldenXXXX)) finds punctuated progress on issues after congressional authorizations

#### 1.2.1.2 Presidential Priorities and Bureaucratic Policymaking

TODO

#### 1.2.1.3 Interest Group Attention and Bureaucratic Policymaking

TODO

### 1.2.2 Party Control and Policy Issues

The role that parties play in the making of regulations is unclear. Parties may have the greatest effect on agency rules through presidential platforms and agendas ([J. W. Yackee and Yackee 2009b](#ref-Yackee2009bush)). Still, partisan control of Congress also matters ([J. W. Yackee and Yackee 2009a](#ref-Yackee2009RegGov)), especially when Congress is making policy ([West and Raso 2013](#ref-West2013)) or when agencies fear that a hostile Congress will override their policies ([Potter 2017b](#ref-Potter2016)). We may think of agency policymaking as consistently affected by presidential agendas, with Congress providing shocks and constraints.

#### 1.2.2.1 Policymaking Under Unified and Divided Government

TODO: Discuss [Potter and Shipan](#ref-PotterShipan2019) ([2019](#ref-PotterShipan2019))

#### 1.2.2.2 Issue Ownership and the Politics of Attention

Concerning the anticipated level of attention paid to different policy areas, theories of American politics that focus on substance can be lumped into two types: (1) those that generally predict that both parties pay attention to the same issues at the same time (theories of partisan alignment (e.g., Sundquist) and (2) those that generally predict that parties pay attention to different issues (including both theories of party ideologies ([Gerring](#ref-Gerring1998) ([1998](#ref-Gerring1998))) and theories of party coalitions ([D. Schlozman 2015](#ref-Schlozman2015)). In each case, the particular issues may vary more or less dramatically depending on how sharply one defines historical periods (compare the issue evolution perspectives ([Carmines and Stimson 1989](#ref-Carmines1989)) with critical elections perspectives ([Key 1961](#ref-Key1961))). Indeed as Shafer (2016) notes, some periods may end quickly and others slowly. Given the limited time period of this paper, I focus on the dominant policy issues, their relationship to party control, and the pace of policymaking rather than the timing or pace of transition between periods.

These two types of theories generate broadly contrasting predictions about what we expect the government to do under various configurations of party control.

For partisan alignment theories, we would expect to see agency policymaking dominated by the major issues of the day under both parties. Parties may have opposite positions on these issues leading the agencies to be pulled in opposite directions by political leaders, but the agencies’ set of dominant policy issues demanding attention will remain largely the same. Indeed, the push and pull should lead to sustained high volumes of policy, as presidential administrations and congresses reverse policies made by their predators or by other branches. Occasionally, an agency with somewhat overlapping authority may be given control of a program taken from an adjacent agency ([D. P. Carpenter 2001](#ref-Carpenter2001)), but the broad policy area should be the same.

In contrast, for theories of party ideologies and party coalitions, party control should determine the issues to which government attends. Thus, partisan control should have a much larger effect on which agencies are making more policy. This may occur through positive agenda control that the president has to direct agency policymaking or negative agenda control through the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs review ([Haeder and Yackee 2015](#ref-Haeder2015); [Potter 2017b](#ref-Potter2016)). Negative agenda control is likely to dominate in Congress ([Cox and McCubbins 2005](#ref-Cox2005)), but the threat of Congressional action may be sufficient to influence agency policymaking ([Potter 2017b](#ref-Potter2016)).

#### 1.2.2.3 The Implications of Partisan Alignment

Partisan alignment theories necessarily identify dominant issue dimensions where each party is doing the opposite of the other. In Sundquist’s model, realignment can occur slowly or rapidly, whereas Manza and Brooks emphasize how social structures, and thus issues, change slowly. However, almost all prominent alignment theories identify 1980 through the present as one period (indeed, most see 1936 as the critical election that has oriented the modern era). Thus instead of engaging realignment theories on the issue of realignment, I draw on them for the issues that they claim constitute the dimension of the current alignment. By these theories, the dimensions of substantive conflict and thus the distribution of agency policymaking should be relatively stable over the period considered in this paper.

Realignment theories suggest that certain policy areas consistently dominate all others and, while the direction of policy will likely change, the issues will vary little with changes in partisan control. Presidential transitions may be marked by withdrawal or reversal of policies made under the previous administration, and Congress may overturn agency rules. Still, the relevant agencies will be the same, generally those dealing with social welfare.

#### 1.2.2.4 The Implications of Issue Ownership and Party Coalitions

The second type focuses on the differences of party ideologies, and its predictions are less clear. Gerring identifies distinct and consistent ideologies in both parties. Rather than a dominant dimension of conflict where parties respond to each other (as in alignment theories) or an underlying dimension of issue structure (e.g., Claggett and Shafer 2010), for Gerring, party ideologies are the policy agendas of party elites. “Party constituencies were generally conservative forces, whereas party elites were the agents of change” ([Gerring 1998](#ref-Gerring1998), pg. 272).

In the current era, Gerring argues, Republicans are driven by Neoliberalism and Democrats by Universalism. Like others, Gerring sees social values (behavioral norms) playing a prominent role in Republican policy agendas from 1980 to when the book was published in 1996 (see pg. 277). Yet, he argues, the platform’s core was neo-liberal opposition to the welfare state and promotion of free markets. In contrast, Gerring identifies the Democratic platform in this period as consistently emphasizing broad unifying issues like Medicare and education. While this more clearly suggests the policy areas likely to receive attention under Democrats than Republicans, it does generally imply that the policy agendas will be different, not simply opposite.

Under theories emphasizing party ideologies and interests, the volume of policymaking at different agencies may very well change substantially when a different party captures the presidency. Specifically, if [Gerring](#ref-Gerring1998) ([1998](#ref-Gerring1998)) correctly identified the party ideologies of the current era, we would expect significantly more civil rights and welfare policymaking under Democratic administrations and more neoliberal economic policy under Republican administrations, especially when presidents’ co-partisans have majorities in Congress. Gerring’s distinction between Democrats statism and Republicans anti-statism may also suggest more rulemaking overall in Democrat administrations.

Perspectives focusing on interest groups and coalitions also suggest that issues will vary with party control. If parties contain coalitions of intense policy demanders ([Cohen et al. 2008](#ref-Cohen2008); [DiSalvo 2012](#ref-DiSalvo2012)), the issues to which they attend will reflect these different coalitions. Disalvo shares Gerring’s conclusion regarding the anti-statism of the Republican party. Most clearly, [D. Schlozman](#ref-Schlozman2015) ([2015](#ref-Schlozman2015)) links Democratic politics and labor groups. While Schlozman emphasizes that labor groups frequently fall short of their goals within the Democratic coalition, no other group is a stronger anchor. We thus expect much more labor policy under Democratic administrations. As the interest groups Schlozman identifies anchoring the Republican party are focused on behavioral norms where policymaking is less concentrated in certain agencies, these predictions are less relevant. Again these co-partisans in Congress ought to increase these effects.

The above perspectives emphasize party difference, either on ideology (on the same issues for Sundquist, on different issues for Gerring) or anchoring interests. However, the observable implications are different. If party alignment theories explain policy outputs, the volume of agency rules will concentrate on the same agencies and issues, even as parties change. In contrast, if issue ownership and party coalition theories explain policy outputs, the volume of agency rules at different agencies should vary by partisan control.

### 1.2.3 Policymaking and Policy Outcomes On Different Issues

*The American Political Pattern: Party Balance, Ideological Polarization, and Substantive Conflict, 1932-2016* (Shafer 2016) attempts to integrate the issue structure of politics and party control of the government. Patterns of the substance of conflict and balance of party control produce patterns of policymaking. Most clearly, Shafer observes a pattern of consistent major policymaking between 1980 and 1992 and a pattern of punctuated equilibrium after 1992. Such patterns of policymaking should be visible in patterns of rulemaking. Importantly, *The American Political Pattern* discusses not only landmark policies and agendas but also identifies distinct patterns of policymaking. The “Era of Divided Government” (1969-1992) saw a steady flow of major policies, especially regarding the economy and the environment, and was dominated by social welfare and cultural values and cross-partisan coalitions, suggesting that the volume of policy outputs should be concentrated on social policy and civil rights be fairly consistent across configurations of party control.

In contrast, the “Era of Partisan Volatility” (1992 through the present) is characterized by periods of policy stability and punctuation. This chapter aims to assess the extent to which patterns of agency policymaking fit these patterns.[[3]](#footnote-41) Schafer characterizes this era by long stretches of policy stasis punctuated by spikes of activity. If these broad patterns explain policy outputs, we would expect to see a pattern of lulls and spikes in rulemaking. Furthermore, party control may lead to different types of policymaking moving together depending on partisan control. The observation of punctuated equilibrium in legislative policymaking could also suggest a pattern where, in the absence of new legislation, the president may have a larger effect over patterns of agency rulemaking.

Scholarship thus gives us predictions regarding the issues that dominate American politics and how party control will affect the translation of issues into policy. However, the two-fold space for disagreement raises a problem for studying policy outputs in the present analysis. If we do not see policymaking on an issue, it could be evidence that the issue was not as important as claimed or that the party in power deemphasized it. Only by assuming a certain issue structure or a certain theory of party effects could we say that an absence of policymaking supports one perspective or another regarding issues or institutional structure. The evidence is sufficient, however, to rule out some explanations. The remainder of the chapter focuses on consistencies and inconstancies between the evidence and theories, with no claim that consistency means the theory is correct.

### 1.2.4 Observed Patterns in Policy Issues

Following Mayhew (1991, 2008), Claggett and Shafer (2010) argue that the policy issues driving American politics vary over time. Drawing on public opinion polls and presidential platforms, they distinguish four broad categories of political issues: welfare, international relations, civil rights, and cultural issues. These categories are constructed to have policy-relevant content. Still, they do not perfectly align with how the government is organized, limiting our ability to categorize agency rules by their conceptual scheme. Nevertheless, their findings regarding the issue structure of American politics have observable implications for the quantity and substance of federal rulemaking.

Claggett and Shafer (2010) find that National Security was a major issue in 1984 but then faded until it emerged as the dominant issue of the 2004 election. Regarding their relationship with partisan control of the government, opinions on Foreign Engagement reversed the direction of correlation with presidential vote, suggesting that the first Bush and Clinton administrations may be more similar in their attention to foreign policy than the second Bush administration.

Welfare was also a top issue in 1984 but continued to be salient and the dominant issue in several subsequent elections. If politics affects the volume of policymaking, agency policymaking (e.g., the number of agency rules) should reflect this finding that social welfare is a major feature of American politics (Sundquist 1968, Claggett and Shafer 2010).

Claggett and Shafer found civil rights to be mildly salient in 1988, 1992, and 2000 but not elsewhere. They find cultural issues (operationalized through a concept of “Behavioral Norms”) to be highly salient from 1992 to 2000. Unfortunately, what Claggett and Shafer call behavioral norms is either so distant from policy (e.g., women’s roles) or so fragmented across agencies (e.g., school prayer and abortion) that it is not possible to make predictions of the location of policymaking from patterns on this issue.

TODO: Citations for environmental policy salience steadily decreasing in the 80s and 90s, uptick starting around 2010 or so.

In sum, if the issue structure of politics shapes policy, past scholarship suggests that social welfare should be the leading policy type over all periods and for both parties. Social welfare is identified as a dominant dimension of party alignment and issue structure in public opinion.

## 1.3 Data

This exercise compares research on the social structure and political behavior of the American public and political elites with what government actually does. Agency rulemaking is driven in part by laws passed by Congress and in part by the president’s agenda. Discrepancies may indicate either a true disconnect between electoral politics and executive action or that executive policymaking was constrained by other political forces.

Connecting broad theories of the American political landscape to the nuanced daily actions of government is not easy. I focus on relatively fine-grain policy outputs, final rules published by agencies in the Federal Register and reported to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. This approach has the advantage of capturing the making of law as it is, not how it is framed by elites or thought of by the electorate. The disadvantage is its distance from policy inputs. While public opinion and attention can be connected to voting patterns, it is much more difficult to say how they affect the lawyers sitting at desks in the federal bureaucracy writing the minutiae of the law. The subsequent chapters of this dissertation take up the task of more directly linking policy change to public attention and expressed opinion through public pressure campaigns, congressional oversight, and social movements.

For this exercise, I use the Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions. These data reflect the magnitude of different types of policymaking but not the direction. As the name suggests, many rules may be reversing a previous rule. However, it does indicate that attention and resources are being devoted to the policy area and thus that it is a salient issue for policymakers. Whether these policy issues align with the issues that are salient to the mass public and political elites is the subject of the present investigation.

These data were compiled from two sources published by the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. Since the Reagan administration, agencies have been required to report their rulemaking activities for semi-annual publication in the Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions. Separately, ORIA issues annual reports from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regarding the rules it has reviewed. OMB only reviews significant rulemakings (generally those with significant economic impact or affecting other areas of government), but their data helps correct reporting errors and gaps in the Unified Agenda, ensuring that at least significant rules are included and correctly dated. Together these sources yield a dataset of 56,304 unique rulemaking projects as identified by a Regulation Identification Number (RIN). RINs allow us to track a rule from the publication of a draft to the eventual publication of a final rule (or withdrawal).

Regulation Identification Numbers are allocated by agency, allowing me to disaggregate the OIRA reports by policy area. I generally followed the policy areas identified by the Policy Agendas Project (Baumgartner et al., 2016). The first two numbers of a RIN generally signify the department, and the next two, the bureau within the department. Many issue areas, like welfare and foreign affairs, cross multiple entire departments while others, like civil rights, are the domain of only a few sub-bureaus.

#### 1.3.0.1 Limitations

TODO: APA exempts foreign affairs and defense. Civil rights policy is often made in other ways and poorly captured given the structure of government.

## 1.4 Methods

I visually present rulemaking activity over time in three different ways. The simplest visualization is a histogram in Figure 1.1. In these plots, red lines mark transitions to a new Republican president, and blue lines mark transitions to a new Democratic president.



Figure 1.1: Number of Final Rules Published per Year

### 1.4.1 Scatterplots of Rulemaking

In addition to histograms of the number of rules, we can see patterns in rulemaking by plotting the date a rule is finalized or withdrawn on a scatterplot. On the y-axis is the Regulation Identification Number (RIN). RIN numbers are assigned in temporal order within each bureau or sub-agency. For example, the lower half of 1.2 shows a high and steady rate of rulemaking by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid, and the upper half shows a very modest rate of rulemaking at the Social Security Administration until the passage of the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act, which gave it a more prominent role in administering Medicare.



Figure 1.2: Number of Final Rules Publishded per Year

Other major political events can be seen in the scatterplots of agency rulemaking. For example, the gap in rulemaking activity between 1995-1996 reflects the government shutdown. We also see the abrupt end of agencies and departments, including those in the Department of Justice and Department of Transportation, reflecting their reorganization into the Department of Homeland Security after the attacks of September 11, 2001. This included the Coast Guard and Transportation Security Administration from the Department of Transportation and several agencies, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service from the Department of Justice (see scatterplots in the Appendix).

There is a stark increase in the number of rules being withdrawn across policy areas beginning with the election of George W. Bush and continuing into the Obama administration. Withdrawals may indicate that the draft regulations started by the previous administration are being canceled, that new legislation is passed, or, more likely, that there is simply a more systematic practice of reporting withdrawals.

In any of these figures, one can observe the general rate of rulemaking in each bureau as the slope of the line of black squares. Points below the line are rules that took longer than usual to finalize. Thus, these figures allow us to see the relative rate of rule finalization and withdrawal as well as the variance in how long agency rules take to work through the policy process.

### 1.4.2 The Likelihood of Rulemaking over Time

Finally, we can estimate statistical trend lines for different policy types. While many statistical approaches may be appropriate, I opt to use a proportional hazard model. This method estimates a baseline hazard rate–the likelihood a rule will be published given the number of days since a draft was released. I then estimate the effect of calendar time on this baseline hazard rate. The effect of calendar time on the likelihood of rule finalization is fit using a smoothing spline for every two years (every Congress) in the dataset. These splines estimate a cubic polynomial function that best captures the effect of a given date on the likelihood of rulemaking over the spline interval (a Congress) while also smoothly connecting to the intervals on either side. This gives us a smoothed function estimating the likelihood of rulemaking over time (Figure 1.3).



Figure 1.3: Smoothed Likelihood that a Rule is Published on a Given Day 1980-2020

By including the date that the draft rule was published, this approach captures two things not well-captured by histograms and scatterplots. First, it accounts for the pace of rulemaking (i.e., the time it takes from draft to completion). Second, it accounts for the likelihood that long-delayed rules will be finalized. Both of these indicate that the issue is politically salient. Compared to the raw number of rules finalized in a year, looking at the likelihood that a rule is finalized accounts for the denominator—the number of rules in progress and yet to be finalized in a given policy space.

Two notes are important for interpreting these figures. First, in 1994, President Clinton issued an executive order making only significant rules subject to ORIA review. Unfortunately, this coincides with the dramatic 1994 election that broke Democratic control of Congress, so inferences about this time are limited. It may be safest to assume that the universal dip in the likelihood of policymaking around 1994 is an artifact of this executive order and thus to imagine trend lines going forward from 1994 shifted up to have a mean of the value at 1994 to account for the increase in rules omitted from OIRA data. Second, this method is sensitive to outliers at the ends of the distribution. We should be especially cautious in making inferences from the first years that agencies were required to report these data as they may have been inconsistent. Thus, it is safest to look at the period between 1985 and 2015.

## 1.5 Policy Substance in Regulations

This section presents selected figures and brief commentary on the extent to which patterns observed in rulemaking fit or conflict with those observed elsewhere in the American political system.

### 1.5.1 Social Policy, Economic Policy, and Foreign Policy

I start with the broadest categorizations of social policy and economic policy. My social policy category is not equivalent to “social issues” as described by Shafer and Spady (2014) or Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner (2012). Social policy is also broader than welfare. I include not only Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, and food and housing assistance but also public education, labor, and civil rights. More specifically, I combine the departments of Education, Health and Human Services, Labor, Veterans Affairs, and Justice, as well as the Social Security Administration, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid, and a variety of other departments dealing with health, poverty, and civil rights. My economic policy category includes the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, Energy, Transportation, Agriculture, and Interior.

The likelihood plots in Figure 1.4 are not clear evidence for or against theories that suggest Democrats and Republicans should differ in their emphasis on these two broad categories. On the one hand, the patterns are not noticeably different before the 2000 election, and both George W. Bush and Barack Obama appear to have made more economic policy in their first term than in their second. On the other hand, there is a marked increase in the likelihood of social policy under the Obama administration, as suggested by the party ideology perspective put forward by Gerring (1998) and others. Social policy will be disaggregated to more specifically consider welfare, labor, and civil rights policymaking in the subsections below, but first, I turn to a third broad category of policymaking, foreign policy.



Figure 1.4: Social and Economic Policy Final Rules Published per Year 1980-2020

The histogram for foreign affairs (the Department of State and International Trade Administration) in Figure 1.5 differs from the Department of Defense, but the only clear pattern is the increased rulemaking after 1996, predating the dramatic increase in its budget after 2001 and significantly predating the 2004 election when Claggett and Shafer (2010) identify national security as emerging as an issue. The likelihood plot suggests partisan effects with two peaks occurring during the 103rd and 111th Congresses, the only periods where Democrats had control of both houses and the presidency. This aligns with findings by [Farhang and Yaver](#ref-Farhang2016) ([2016](#ref-Farhang2016)) that rulemaking is more likely to be concentrated in a single agency rather than fragmented across agencies under a unified government. There are smaller bumps that appear to correspond to the reelection of these two presidents when facing an oppositional Congress (but also no longer thinking about reelection).



Figure 1.5: Social and Economic Policy Final Rules Published per Year, 1980-2020

### 1.5.2 Labor and Welfare

A connection between labor and the Democratic party ([D. Schlozman 2015](#ref-Schlozman2015)) is not obvious in the volume of Department of Labor regulations. If anything, Republican administrations seem to make more labor policy. Looking at the scatterplot in Figure 1.6, policymaking appears remarkably constant across sub-agencies within the Department of Labor, barring a marked pulse of rule withdrawals in 2001.



Figure 1.6: Labor Policy Final Rules Published per Year, 1980-2020

Clear peaks in welfare rulemaking (Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid) reflect the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act and the 2010 Affordable Care Act. The histogram in Figure 1.7 suggests that policymaking both increased and became more variable after 2000. This pattern is most consistent with Shafer’s characterization of the Era of Partisan Volatility. We do not see clear patterns associations with party balance, but this may be because we are looking at the amount of policy rather than its direction. The scatterplot shows significant numbers of rules withdrawn after 2001, which may indicate partisan disagreement.



Figure 1.7: Welfare Policy (Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid) Final Rules 1980-2020

### 1.5.3 Civil Rights

Among others, Mayhew (1991) and Claggett and Shafer (2010) identify civil rights as one of the major new issues on the post-war American policy agenda. Rulemaking, however, likely presents a poor measure of this policy issue, and classifying rules by agency only makes this problem worse. Only a few sub-agencies unambiguously address only civil rights issues. The figures below reflect the Department of Agriculture Office of Civil Rights, The Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity bureau, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, none of which make many regulations. Little can be said about so little data, but rulemaking activity does appear to peak near the beginning of the Clinton administration and remain nearly non-existent since the beginning of the George W. Bush administration.[[4]](#footnote-53) It is possible that civil rights, anti-discrimination policy issues are meaningful for structuring votes and local policy but still poorly reflected in the volume of federal rules.



Figure 1.8: Civil Rights Policy Final Rules, 1980-2020

### 1.5.4 Environment

The cleanest way to capture environmental issues is to focus only on the Environmental Protection Agency. This is what the plots in Figure 1.9. However, environmental issues are also spread throughout the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, Defense, and, increasingly, state. Claggett and Shafer (2010), among others, identify environmental issues as anomalous or off-dimension issues that may not cluster well with other issues. Shafer 2016 identifies environmental issues as a major policy issue until the 1990s. The rulemaking data in Figure 1.9, especially the histogram, do not contradict these interpretations. Unlike any other policy areas, the peak of environmental rules in this timeframe is when Reagan took office (probably capturing the end of the era of new landmark environmental legislation) and declines dramatically by the end of his term to a much lower level for the next three decades.



Figure 1.9: Environmental Policy Final Rules, 1980-2020

The likelihood plot in Figure 1.9 does show peaks in the 103rd and 111th Congresses, suggesting partisan effects. However, this partisan association could be as much an artifact of the agency as the issue. For example, Republicans may be inclined to pursue environmental protection through the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, or Defense in which they may have more trust or better policy vehicles to serve their constituents (see Appendix for additional plots). Alternatively, policymaking in the EPA may be indicative of policymaking in other venues where Democrats may also pay more attention to environmental issues. Future research could analyze the abstracts of rules in more multi-issue agencies to better determine their content. The most pronounced peak may reflect Barack Obama’s executive actions in his second term (for example, his executive order on climate change adaptation (Obama 2013)).

## 1.6 Conclusion

While this exercise did not reveal conclusive evidence regarding the patterns of U.S. policymaking, it does offer some insights. First, welfare is one of the largest topics of executive policymaking, rivaled only by defense. Both of these areas increased dramatically in volume and variability in what Shafer (2016) calls the Era of Partisan Volatility. In contrast, civil rights and environmental policy have seen marked decreases over the same period. In 1980, environmental policy was a top area of executive policymaking, but it was overtaken by defense in 1996. Civil rights, where no year saw more than five rules by my measure, raises the question of what it means for a major issue in mass politics to have few explicit policies (at least within dedicated bureaus). Part of the story may well be that civil rights policy is being made in venues other than the federal agencies. Interestingly, Department of Labor policymaking does not seem to have the partisan linkages one would suspect—another area where this exercise raises questions for future research and theory.

Future research could also augment these data on regulations with data on agency budgets, which may reveal different patterns and may better reflect the role of Congress in agencies’ policy agendas ([Judge-Lord 2017](#ref-Judge-Lord2017)). It should nevertheless be noted that a great deal of spending is directed by rulemaking. Furthermore, rule publication dates may capture the timing of policy decisions better than other measures of policy priorities ([Potter 2017b](#ref-Potter2016)). Looking at budgets alone, as many scholars have done, risks attributing decisions made in the past to the politics of the present. In the end, the relationships between rulemaking and the nature of change in public opinion and party power over time demands more detailed study. Linking macro-level politics to the concrete substance of policy is not an easy task, but the fruits of such research are critical to understanding which of American politics’ many moving parts most affect the concrete laws that govern daily life and, in many cases, feedback to reshape the terrain of American politics.

The following chapters in this dissertation focus on one narrow piece of this broad project to incorporate bureaucratic policymaking into theories of American politics. They use similar data but approach the problem from the other side. I start with theories of bureaucratic policymaking and begin to incorporate theories of civic engagement, pressure politics, legislative behavior, and social movement power in order to explain and account for the occasional bursts of public attention and engagement in agency rulemaking. In these policy fights, the politics of agency rulemaking begins to look more like the American politics described above—dominated by durable yet shifting coalitions of social movements, organized interests, politicians, and the attentive public.

# 2 Public Pressure: Why Do Agencies (sometimes) Get So Much Mail?

#### Abstract

I examine who participates in public pressure campaigns and why. Scholars of bureaucratic policymaking have focused on the sophisticated lobbying efforts of powerful interest groups. Yet agencies occasionally receive thousands, even millions of comments from ordinary people. How, if at all, should scholars incorporate mass participation into models of bureaucratic policymaking? Are public pressure campaigns, like other lobbying tactics, primarily used by well-resourced groups to create an impression of public support? Or are they better understood as conflict expansion tactics used by less-resourced groups? To answer these questions, I collect and analyze millions of public comments on draft agency rules. Using text analysis methods underlying plagiarism detection, I match individual public comments to pressure-group campaigns. Contrary to other forms of lobbying, I find that mass comment campaigns are almost always a conflict expansion tactic rather than well-resourced groups creating an impression of public support. Most public comments are mobilized by public interest organizations, not “astroturf” campaigns. However, resources do limit who can use public pressure tactics to larger policy advocacy organzations. Over 80% of the 48 million comments on proposed rules posted to regulations.gov were mobilized by just 100 organizations, 87 of which lobby in coalitions with each other. Contrary to other forms of political participation, I find no evidence of negativity bias in public comments. Indeed, from 2005 to 2017, most comments supported proposed rules. This is because public comments tend to support Democratic policies and oppose Republican policies, reflecting the asymmetry in mobilizing groups.

## 2.1 Introduction

Participatory processes like public comment periods on draft policies are said to provide democratic legitimacy ([Croley 2003](#ref-Croley2003); [Rosenbloom 2003](#ref-Rosenbloom2003)), political oversight opportunities ([Steven J. Balla 1998](#ref-Balla1998); [Mathew D. McCubbins and Schwartz 1984](#ref-McCubbins1984)), and new technical information ([S. W. Yackee 2006](#ref-Yackee2006JPART); [Nelson and Yackee 2012](#ref-Nelson2012)). The extent to which participatory processes serve these democratic, accountability, or technocratic goals depends on who participates and why.

In civics classrooms and Norman Rockwell paintings, raising concerns to government is an individual affair. Scholars, too, often focus on studying and improving the ability of individuals to participate in policymaking ([Cuéllar 2005](#ref-Cuellar2005)). But in practice, the capacities required to lobby effectively on matters of national policy are those of organized groups, not individual citizens.

Bureaucratic policymaking, in particular, is the ideal context for powerful organized interests to dominate. Policies made by specialized agencies are likely to have concentrated benefits or costs that lead interest groups, especially businesses, to dominate ([T. Lowi 1969](#ref-Lowi1969); [Theodore J. Lowi 1972](#ref-Lowi1972)). Agency policymakers are generally experts who are deeply embedded in the professional and epistemic networks of the industries they support and regulate ([Dmitry Epstein, Heidt, and Farina 2014](#ref-Epstein2014)). Organizations with superior resources often flood policymakers with technical information that is valued both by the specific legal context of bureaucratic policymaking and by technocratic rationality more broadly ([Wendy E. Wagner 2010](#ref-Wagner2010)). Agencies are generally framed as “implementers” rather than “makers” of policy. Even the most value-laden policy documents that are re-written under each subsequent president are framed as derivative of (often decades-old) legislative statutes. All of these features empower legal and technical experts and thus the organizations with the resources to hire them.

And yet, activists frequently target agency policymaking with letter-writing campaigns, petitions, protests, and mobilizing people to attend hearings—all classic examples of “civic engagement” ([Verba and Nie 1987](#ref-Verba1987)). While recent scholarship on agency policymaking has shed light on sophisticated lobbying, especially by businesses, we know surprisingly little about the vast majority of public comments, which are submitted by ordinary people as part of public pressure campaigns. As I show below, most comments submitted to regulations.gov are part of organized campaigns, more akin to petition signatures than “deliberative” participation or sophisticated lobbying. Importantly, however, nearly all comments are mobilized to support a more sophisticated lobbying effort. Without a systematic understanding of the scale and impact of public participation–*group-mediated* participation–in rulemaking, it is impossible to answer normative questions about how participatory processes like public comment periods may enhance or undermine various democratic ideals.

Surely, those who tend to engage are far from representative of the broader public ([Verba and Nie 1987](#ref-Verba1987)). Still, in many ways, they must be more representative than the handful of political insiders who participate in most policy processes. If the usual participants have “an upper-class accent” ([E. Schattschneider 1942](#ref-Schattschneider1942)), does adding thousands of more voices dilute this bias? The answer depends on how people are mobilized. If the “usual suspects” mobilize public pressure to create an impression of public support, it may merely legitimize the demands of the same group of powerful interest groups that would dominate without broader engagement.

While practitioners and administrative law scholars have long pondered what to make of letter-writing campaigns targeting the bureaucracy, political scientists have had surprisingly little to say about this kind of civic participation and the role of public pressure in bureaucratic policymaking. Much of our knowledge about civic participation beyond voting comes from surveys (e.g., [Verba and Nie 1987](#ref-Verba1987)) and qualitative studies of particular groups. Models of bureaucratic policymaking focus on the participation of sophisticated lobbying groups and neither explain nor account for public pressure campaigns. Civic engagement in general and organized public pressure in particular thus remain poorly understood in the context of bureaucratic policymaking.

Political scientists’ neglect of public pressure campaigns is surprising given that most people are only aware of bureaucratic policymaking when it is the target of a public pressure campaign.[[5]](#footnote-60) While most policy processes receive little public attention, the ease of online mobilizing and commenting has, like other forms of participation ([Boulianne 2018](#ref-Boulianne2018)), created exponential increases in the number of rules in which thousands and even millions of people engage. The general failure to explain and account for public pressure campaigns in models of bureaucratic policymaking is also striking in light of how agencies advertise public comment periods as an opportunity for a voice in government decisions. The Regulations.gov homepage solicits visitors to “Make a difference. Submit your comments and let your voice be heard” and “Participate today!” (Figure 2.1. A blue “Comment Now!” button accompanies a short description of each draft policy and pending agency action. Public comment periods on proposed agency rules are described as “an important part of democracy” (WSJ 2017), “often held out as the purest example of participatory democracy in actual American governance” ([Herz 2016](#ref-Herz2016)). [Rossi](#ref-Rossi1997) ([1997](#ref-Rossi1997)) finds that “courts, Congress, and scholars have elevated participation in rulemaking to a sacrosanct status…greater participation is generally viewed as contributing to democracy.” (pg. 2)



Figure 2.1: Regulations.gov Solicits Public Comments on Draft Agency Rules

To fill this gap, I bring scholarship on policy advocacy groups[[6]](#footnote-62) into theories of bureaucratic policymaking. Doing so reveals competing intuitions about the drivers of public participation, which I assess using a large new dataset of participation in federal agency rulemaking.

First, I develop and assess two theories of who should mobilize public pressure campaigns and why. Each theory has observable implications for which types of groups will run campaigns in different contexts. One stems from leading theories of bureaucratic decision-making and interest group lobbying. It predicts that groups with more resources will dominate all forms of lobbying, including public pressure campaigns. The other emerges from democratic theories. It predicts that groups with fewer material resources but more popular support will more often use public pressure campaigns. The extent to which public comment periods serve the functions and provide the normative benefits that proponents assert depends on who participates. To begin to make sense of public participation in bureaucratic policymaking, I develop a typology of different kinds of participation, with implications for the normative value of participatory institutions. Because political participation is often a collective affair, this includes a typology of public pressure campaigns.

To the extent that public pressure campaigns drive participation, the normative value of participatory processes like public comment periods depends on who organizes these campaigns. Suppose public pressure campaigns follow the usual patterns of interest group lobbying, where the groups with the most resources dominate. In that case, the procedural legitimacy they provide is merely a veneer masking the influence of powerful political insiders. Instead of encouraging political oversight, they would discourage it. Instead of diversifying the available information, they would merely reinforce powerful insiders’ claims and issue frames. We would expect a pressure campaign to push policy further in the direction desired by the most powerful insiders. On the other hand, if the usual suspects do not dominate public pressure campaigns, participatory processes may yet improve the democratic credentials of American policymaking, expand political oversight, and diversify the information available to policymakers. To the extent that public pressure tactics empower groups who are usually left out of the policy process, pressure campaigns may blunt the influence of powerful insiders. Thus, to understand the empirical effects or normative value of participatory processes like public comment periods, we first need to know who participates and why. To the extent that public participation is mobilized by campaigns, we need to know who is behind them.

Second, I offer a synthetic theory about the conditions under which we should see private and public interest group campaigns. I argue that public interest groups more often have incentives to launch public pressure campaigns than private interests. However, the resources required to run a campaign will lead a few large public interest groups to dominate. I argue that private interests have incentives to sponsor campaigns (including astroturf campaigns) under much more limited conditions. Pressure campaigns from private interests should thus be less common than campaigns from public interest groups.[[7]](#footnote-63)

To assess these theories, I assemble a new dataset of thousands of public pressure campaigns that collectively mobilized millions of public comments across three administrations from 2005 to 2020. Using a mix of qualitative hand-coding and computational text analysis, I identify the coalitions of groups behind each campaign and the type of interest group they represent.

I find that mass participation in bureaucratic policymaking is better explained by theories of democratic institutions and conflict expansion rather than existing theories of bureaucratic policymaking. Participation is overwhelmingly driven by the policy advocacy efforts of a few public interest groups. Indeed, just 100 advocacy organizations mobilized over 80% of public comments (40 out of 50 million). Traditional membership organizations and individuals account for a smaller portion, and “astroturf” campaigns are rare, almost exclusively arising in opposition to a large public interest group campaign, as predicted by my theory.

I proceed in the following steps. Section 2.2 reviews the literature on civic engagement, democratic politics, and bureaucratic politics and then develops hypotheses about the causes of public engagement in bureaucratic policymaking. Section 2.3.3 introduces a novel dataset systematically capturing public participation in federal agency rulemaking. Section 2.3.3 outlines methods to assess my hypotheses using comments as large-n observational data. Section 2.4 reviews the results of this analysis.

## 2.2 Theory

### 2.2.1 Forms and Drivers of Civic Participation

Civic engagement includes participation in letter-writing campaigns, petitions, protests, hearings ([Verba and Nie 1987](#ref-Verba1987)). Importantly, [Verba and Nie](#ref-Verba1987) ([1987](#ref-Verba1987)) distinguish “citizen-initiated contacts” from “cooperative activity” (pg. 54). Political behavior survey research tends to forcuse on the political behavior of individuals. Activities like letter-writing are thus often studied as what [Verba and Nie](#ref-Verba1987) ([1987](#ref-Verba1987)) call “citizen-initiated contacts.” Administrative law scholarship often discusses individual participants in rulemaking in a similar light. [Cuéllar](#ref-Cuellar2005) ([2005](#ref-Cuellar2005)) finds that members of the “lay public” raise important new concerns beyond those raised by interest groups. He advocates for institutional reforms that would make it easier for individuals to participate and increase the sophistication of individual comments on proposed policies.

Cooperative activities are coordinated and mediated through an organization. By coordinating political action, public pressure campaigns expand civic participation in policymaking.[[8]](#footnote-65)

Self-selection may not be ideal for representation, but opt-in participation—whether voting, attending a hearing, or writing a comment—may often be one of the few heuristics decisionmakers have about public preferences. Campaigns inform agencies about the distribution and intensity of opinions that are often too nuanced to estimate a priori. However limited and slanted, this information is directed at policymakers who may often be unclear how the public and other political institutions will react to their policy decisions. Many questions that arise in rulemaking lack analogous public opinion polling questions, making mass commenting a unique source of political information. As with public opinion on most specific policy issues, most members of the public and their elected representatives may only learn about the issue and take a position as a result of a public pressure campaign ([Hutchings 2003](#ref-Hutchings2003)).

TODO: PLURALIST THEORIES AND GROUP MEDIATION

Forms of civic participation beyond voting, such as protests and petitioning, offer unique opportunities for minority interests. Protests to be an effective mechanism for minority interests to communicate preferences to policymakers when electoral mechanisms fail to do so. Policymakers learn and take informational cues from political behaviors like protests ([Gillion](#ref-Gillion2013) ([2013](#ref-Gillion2013))). [D. Carpenter](#ref-CarpenterPetitions) ([2021](#ref-CarpenterPetitions)) finds similar potential for petitions to serve as a channel to raise “new claims” and influence policy beyond elections: “Petition democracy offer another model of aggregation, where numerical minorities could still make a case of quantitive relevance” (pg. 479). Numbers matter for protests and petitions, regardless of whether they represent a majority. These modes of preference aggregation often claim to represent a substantial segment of the public, perhaps a larger portion than those as passionately opposed to them.

### 2.2.2 The Role of Organized Groups

Interest groups play a critical role in American politics.

Mobilizing citizens and generating new political information (information about the distribution and intensity of policy preferences and demands) are key functions of interest groups in a democracy ([J. J. Mansbridge 1992](#ref-Mansbridge1992); [Mahoney 2007b](#ref-Mahoney2007)).

TODO: Review Truman, Dahl, Mansbridge

As Hacker and Pierson (Forthcoming) observe,

" [The United States’] institutional terrain advantages political actors with the capacity to work across multiple venues, over extended periods, and in a political environment where coordinated government action is difficult, and strategies of evasion and exit from regulatory constraints are often successful. These capacities are characteristic of organized groups, not individual voters."

#### 2.2.2.1 Businesses

Businesses and their associations are particularly influential organizations.

TODO: The dominance of business lobbying in Congress and the executive branch. [Golden](#ref-Golden1998) ([1998](#ref-Golden1998)) [J. W. Yackee and Yackee](#ref-Yackee2006JOP) ([2006](#ref-Yackee2006JOP))

#### 2.2.2.2 Membership Organizations

TODO: [March and Olsen](#ref-March1984a) ([1984](#ref-March1984a)), industry associations, unions, etc

“The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (”AFSCME“) represents 1.6 million state and local government, health care and child care workers and we write to express our strong support of the proposed rule” ([IRS-2016-0015-0133](https://www.regulations.gov/comment/IRS-2016-0015-0133))

Some membership organizations join to form larger federations.

“The Coalition on Human Needs, which represents more than 100 national member organizations and maintains a network of tens of thousands of individuals and groups nationwide, strongly supports the proposed rule” ([IRS-2016-0015-0131](https://www.regulations.gov/comment/IRS-2016-0015-0131))

Membership organizations often claim to represent more than their membership.

While political science theories often assume that membership organizations advocate on behalf of somewhat exclusive private interests, they also lobby for their members’ broader public preferences ([**CITE?**](#ref-CITE)). For example, healthcare worker unions frequently lead policy campaigns focused on public health and even issues like climate change.

“As a leading representative of the nation’s 28 million small business owners, Small Business Majority is writing to comment on the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s proposed rule on Inversions and Related Transactions.” ([IRS-2016-0015-0127](https://www.regulations.gov/comment/IRS-2016-0015-0127))

TODO SECOND-ORDER REPRESENTATION DISCUSSION HERE AS TRANSITION?

#### 2.2.2.3 Advocacy Organizations and the Mobilization of Interest

TODO pressure groups, policy advocacy groups, citizen groups ([Berry 1999](#ref-Berry1999)), policy change organizations ([**McNutt2005?**](#ref-McNutt2005)), petitions ([D. Carpenter 2021](#ref-CarpenterPetitions))

Organizations may use phone banks, targeting strategies, and direct-mail techniques to drum up and channel public support ([**Cooper1985?**](#ref-Cooper1985)).

Advocacy organizations work together on campaigns. For example, “Save our Environment,” which collected signatures from hundreds of thousands of people, is a small nonprofit with a simple WordPress website almost entirely dedicated to mobilizing public comments. It is run by The Partnership Project, a coalition of 20 of the largest environmental advocacy organizations in the US, including the Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council, Greenpeace, and the World Wildlife Fund, with the aim of “harnessing the power of the internet to increase public awareness and activism on today’s most important environmental issues.”

Advocacy organizations often claim to represent a large number of “members and supporters” (e.g. [FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0007-47165](https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0007-47165)) For example, in its comment on proposed regulations on internet gambling, the Poker Players Alliance claimed to represent “more than 840,000 poker enthusiast members” (TREAS-DO-2007-0015-0118). Many of these people became “members” when they signed up to play a free online poker game. However, the organization did claim to have mobilized over 150,000 letters to members of Congress, which, if true, would indicate a somewhat active membership.

The potential for “cheap talk” in claims of representation is a problem for the ability of groups to communicate credible political information.

To mobilized broader support, advocacy organizations often engage smaller organizations to mobilize their members as well. For example, in a campaign targeting fishing regulations, in addition to mobilizing thousands of individuals, the Pew Charitable Trusts mobilized members of the New York Underwater Photography Society and hundreds of restaurants that serve sustainable seafood. These smaller organizations did not identify themselves as part of Pew’s campaign, but their letters used almost identical language.

### 2.2.3 Group Conflict in Democratic Theory

TODO [R. A. Dahl](#ref-Dahl1985) ([1985](#ref-Dahl1985)), [E. E. Schattschneider](#ref-Schattschneider1975) ([1975](#ref-Schattschneider1975)), [Kollman](#ref-Kollman1998) ([1998](#ref-Kollman1998))

Organized groups play at least two key functions in a large democracy: (1) organizing and mobilizing people around ideas and interests and (2) sophisticated lobbying to affect policy.

An organization and can reshape the political environment by expanding the scope of conflict ([E. E. Schattschneider 1975](#ref-Schattschneider1975)).

Political actors bring new people into a political fight through press releases, mass mailing, and phonebanking–strategies known as “going public” ([Kollman 1998](#ref-Kollman1998)).  
“Going public,” “outside lobbying,” or an “outside strategy” contrasts with insider lobbying. Political actors “go public” when they expand the scope of conflict beyond the usual cadre of political actors. This strategy is used by Presidents ([Kernell 2007](#ref-Kernell2007)), Members of Congress ([Malecha and Reagan 2012](#ref-Malecha2012)), interest groups ([Walker 1991](#ref-Walker1991); [Dür and Mateo 2013](#ref-Dur2013)), and even Lawyers and Judges ([**Davis2011?**](#ref-Davis2011)). For example, organizations may use phone banks, targeting strategies, and direct-mail techniques to drum up and channel public support ([**Cooper1985?**](#ref-Cooper1985)). For example, when presidents are in difficult negotiations with Congress, they often use their bully pulpit to mobilize segments of the public to pressure elected representatives. Likewise, interest groups mobilize segments of the public to policymakers as part of their lobbying strategy. The ability to mobilize a large number of people can thus be a valuable political resource.

The dual mobilizing and lobbying functions of many interest groups have mostly been studied in congressional policymaking. REVIEW CONGRESS PRESSURE GROUP LOBBYING LIT.

### 2.2.4 Theories of Bureaucratic Policymaking

Theories of bureaucratic policymaking have focused more on the lobbying than mobilizing functions of interest groups. Foundational scholarship on rulemaking ([Scott. R. Furlong and Kerwin 2005](#ref-Furlong2005); [S. R. Furlong 1997](#ref-Furlong1997), [1998](#ref-Furlong1998); [Kerwin and Furlong 2011](#ref-Kerwin2011)) focuses on interest group lobbying. Theoretical models focus on how agencies learn about policy problems, negotiate or avoid accountability to various principals, or balance interest-group demands.[[9]](#footnote-76)

TODO TRANSITION TO CONCLUSION

The key insight from this scholarship is that technical information is the currency of insider lobbying. Figure 2.2 illustrates the classic causal model of insider lobbying that describes most rulemakings and nearly all scholarship on lobbying in bureaucratic policymaking to date.[[10]](#footnote-77)



Figure 2.2: The ‘Classic Model’ of Interest Group Lobbying in Bureaucratic Policymaking

To the extent that scholars address the input of ordinary people at all, both existing theory and empirical scholarship suggest skepticism that non-sophisticated actors merit scholarly attention. (By “ordinary” people, I simply mean people who are not professional policy influencers.) Empirical scholarship finds that economic elites and business groups dominate American politics in general [Gilens and Page](#ref-Gilens2014) ([2014](#ref-Gilens2014)) and rulemaking in particular. While some are optimistic that requirements for agencies to solicit and respond to public comments on proposed rules allow “civil society” to provide public oversight ([Michaels 2015](#ref-Michaels2015); [Metzger 2010](#ref-Metzger2010)), most studies find that participants in rulemaking often represent elites and business interests ([Seifter 2016](#ref-Seifter2016UCLA); [Crow, Albright, and Koebele 2015](#ref-Crow2015); [Wendy E. Wagner, Barnes, and Peters 2011](#ref-Wagner2011); [West 2009](#ref-West2009); [J. W. Yackee and Yackee 2006](#ref-Yackee2006JOP); [S. W. Yackee 2006](#ref-Yackee2006JPART); [Golden 1998](#ref-Golden1998); [Haeder and Yackee 2015](#ref-Haeder2015); [Cook 2017](#ref-Cook2017); [Libgober and Carpenter 2018](#ref-LibgoberCarpenter2018)).

The contentious politics of mobilizing and countermobilizing that inspires most public engagement in policymaking have no place in leading models of bureaucratic policymaking and have largely been ignored by political scientists.

### 2.2.5 Incorporating Political Information

How, if at all, should scholars incorporate public pressure into models of bureaucratic policymaking? Because the role that public pressure may play in policymaking depends on who mobilized it and why, the first task is to develop testable theories about the drivers of public participation.

In this section, I first develop two theories about the drivers of public participation in bureaucratic policymaking, one rooted in theories of group conflict and democratic politics and the other rooted in existing theories of interest-group lobbying in bureaucratic policymaking. I then offer a synthetic theory that specifies the conditions under which we should see different kinds of public pressure campaigns. I argue that mass engagement produces potentially valuable political information about the coalition that mobilized it. To the extent that groups aim to influence policy, public pressure is a compliment, not a substitute to sophisticated lobbying. Public pressure supports sophisticated lobbying. This can take several forms.

#### 2.2.5.1 “Ususal Suspects” or “Underdogs”

Political information may play two distinct roles in policymaking with opposite effects depending on who mobilized it. The normative and empirical import of public pressure campaigns thus turns on who is behind them.

To the extent that well-resourced groups (the “usual suspects”) use public pressure campaigns to create a misleading impression of public support (often called “astroturf”), their role is to strengthen and legitimize demands of the same powerful interests that dominate bureaucratic policymaking. Here, just as groups with superior resources use them to flood policymakers with technical information ([Wendy E. Wagner 2010](#ref-Wagner2010)), astroturf campaigns convert economic resources into political information in the form of an impression of public support generated by signatures or form letters. Even groups with few members or a narrow or non-existent base of support among the public may create the appearance of public support by sponsoring pressure campaigns. If the powerful business groups that dominate other forms of lobbying also dominate public pressure campaigns, these campaigns (and perhaps public comment periods themselves) are normatively suspect, merely providing a democratic veneer to economic power. Empirically, we would then expect public pressure campaigns to further advantage the most well-resourced interests.

Alternatively, to the extent that public interest groups use public pressure campaigns are used as conflict expansion tactics by less-resourced groups (“underdogs”), their role is the opposite: to push back against powerful interests that dominate bureaucratic policymaking. The political information created by conflict expansion can reveal existing and potential support among attentive segments of the public. Through public pressure campaigns, groups that lack financial resources can convert latent public support into concrete political information that may cause policymakers to update their beliefs and change their behavior.  
If mass commenting is mainly a vehicle for public interest groups to convert a latent base of public support into influential political information supporting their representational claims or shining light on the policy process, public comment periods may yet serve some of the informing, balancing, and democratic functions that practitioners and normative theorists desire. Empirically, we would then expect public pressure campaigns to disadvantage well-resourced interests that dominate most policy processes.

#### 2.2.5.2 The Conditions Under Which Public and Private Interests Mobilize

This section offers a synthesis of theory on interest group lobbying and conflict expansion and hypotheses to explain variation in mass engagement. First, I offer a framework for assessing the causes of mass engagement. Next, I argue that organizations may mobilize large numbers of people for several reasons with observable implications for observed patterns of mass engagement and theoretical implications for predicted effects on policy.

#### 2.2.5.3 Public Pressure as a Resource

An organization’s ability to expand the scope of conflict by mobilizing a large number of people can be a valuable political resource [Kollman](#ref-Kollman1998) ([1998](#ref-Kollman1998)). In contrast to scholars who focus on the deliberative potential of public comment processes, I focus on public engagement as a tactic aimed at gaining power. Scholars who understand mobilization as a tactic ([S. R. Furlong 1997](#ref-Furlong1997); [Kerwin and Furlong 2011](#ref-Kerwin2011)) have focused on how organizations mobilize their membership. I expand on this understanding of mobilization as a lobbying tactic to include the broader audiences that are often mobilized by policy advocacy organizations and pressure groups. The broader audiences mobilized through public pressure campaigns are more akin to the concept of an attentive public ([Key 1961](#ref-Key1961)) or issue public ([Converse 1964](#ref-Converse1964)).

Here I build on three insights. First, [S. R. Furlong](#ref-Furlong1997) ([1997](#ref-Furlong1997)) and [Kerwin and Furlong](#ref-Kerwin2011) ([2011](#ref-Kerwin2011)) identify mobilization as a tactic. The organizations that they surveyed reported that forming coalitions and mobilizing large numbers of people are among the most effective lobbying tactics. Studies of rulemaking stress the importance of coalitions ([J. W. Yackee and Yackee 2006](#ref-Yackee2006JOP); [Dwidar 2019](#ref-Dwidar2019)). Scholars have measured coalitions of organized groups but have yet to attribute citizen comments to the coalition that mobilized them.

Second, [Nelson and Yackee](#ref-Nelson2012) ([2012](#ref-Nelson2012)) identify political information as a potentially influential result of lobbying by different business coalitions. While they focus on mobilizing experts, I argue that [Nelson and Yackee](#ref-Nelson2012) ([2012](#ref-Nelson2012)) describe a dynamic that can be extended to public pressure campaigns:

“strategic recruitment, we theorize, mobilizes new actors to participate in the policymaking process, bringing with them novel technical and political information. In other words, when an expanded strategy is employed, leaders activate individuals and organizations to participate in the policymaking process who, without the coordinating efforts of the leaders, would otherwise not lobby. This activation is important because it implies that coalition lobbying can generate new information and new actors—beyond simply the ‘usual suspects’ —relevant to policy decisionmakers.”

Regarding political information, I extend this logic extends to non-experts. The number and distribution of ordinary supporters may matter because it suggests a *public* consensus, at least among some segments of the attentive public. Instead of bolstering *scientific* claims, a perceived public consensus bolsters *political* claims. To understand why groups organize public pressure campaigns, we must understand mass mobilization can be a tactic aimed at producing political information.

While most scholars have emphasized the lack of useful technical information in mass comments, a few have raised their role in creating political information. [Cuéllar](#ref-Cuellar2005) ([2005](#ref-Cuellar2005)) calls on agencies to pay more attention to ordinary peoples’ expressions of preference and [Rauch](#ref-Rauch2016) ([2016](#ref-Rauch2016)) suggests that agencies reform the public comment process to include opinion polls.

I build from a similar intuition that public pressure campaigns currently function like a poll or, more accurately, a petition, capturing the intensity of preferences among the attentive public—i.e., how many people are willing to take the time to engage. Indeed, many campaigns use the language of public opinion and petitioning. For example, a campaign by the World Wildlife Federation provided language explicitly claiming to have public opinion on their side. Their model comment cited an opinion poll, stating that “Along with 80% of the American people, I strongly support ending commercial trade in elephant ivory in the U.S.” This suggests that public pressure campaigns aim to signal information about public opinion. A coalition led by another environmental group, Oceana, framed its mass mobilization effort to curb the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management’s 2017 Proposed Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing Program as a “petition signed by 67,275 self-proclaimed United States residents,” suggesting that organizations consider some mass-comment campaigns to effectively be petitions. In the same statement, Oceana also claimed the support of “more than 110 East Coast municipalities, 100 Members of Congress, 750 state and local elected officials, and 1,100 business interests, all of whom oppose offshore drilling,” suggesting that claims of public and elected official support aim to provide similar kinds of political information.

Public pressure campaigns reveal the intensity of passions in attentive segments of the public. Pressure campaigns may presage or co-occur with other efforts like protests and lobbying Congress, thus offering information about other likely political developments.

Building on theories of group conflict in democratic politics, I consider public demands to be a latent factor in my model of policymaking (Figure 2.3. Public demands shape the decisions of groups who lobby. If they believe the attentive public could be rallied to their cause, groups may attempt to reveal this political information to policymakers by launching a public pressure campaign. That is, the extent to which latent public demands align with a group’s demands will affect its lobbying strategy, specifically whether it decides to launch a public pressure campaign.

Figure 2.3 amends the “Classic Model” of interest group lobbying (Figure 2.2) to incorporate public pressure campaigns and political information about the attentive public. *In addition to* providing technical information through sophisticated comments, an organization may mobilize supporters to produce political information. This is a key feature of the model: political information is mobilized *in support of* a lobbying coalition’s sophisticated legal or technical lobbying effort, not as an alternative to sophisticated lobbying.

The more latent public support a group has, the more successful this mobilization effort will be. The public response to the campaign (observed as the sale of public engagement in the policy process) depends on the extent that the attentive public is passionate about the issue. A broader and more passionate attentive public will yield a larger scale of mass engagement than a narrower, less passionate segment base of public support. Thus the observed scale of mass engagement on a given side of a conflict can reveal political information about segments of the public. Large-scale engagement may produce several types of relevant political information. The most direct and obvious is the expressed “public opinion” that policymakers observe.[[11]](#footnote-82)

The causal process visualized in Figure 2.3 may only operate under certain conditions. For example, the success of a mobilizing effort depends on whether a group’s perception of latent public demands (the diagonal arrow between “Latent Public Demands” and “Lobbying Strategy”) reflects the public response to a mobilizing effort (the horizontal arrow between “Latent Public Demands” and “Mass Engagement”). Additionally, policymaking institutions have different mechanisms for processing and incorporating technical and political information (the arrows between “technical information” or “political information” and “policy response”).



Figure 2.3: Incorporating Political Information into Models of Bureaucratic Policymaking

Because lobbying organizations likely have some idea of the level of public support for their positions, one observable implication of this model is that lobbying organizations will be more likely to launch a public pressure campaign when they have more public support (i.e., where latent public support is a resource).

Instead of a public pressure campaign aimed at mobilizing supporters, a lobby organization may attempt to bypass mass engagement by producing fake evidence of public support. However, as I describe below, this is a risky strategy.

#### 2.2.5.4 Second-order Representation

When lobbying during rulemaking, groups often make dubious claims to represent broad segments of the public ([Seifter 2016](#ref-Seifter2016UCLA)). If agency staff do not trust an organizations’ representational claims, engaging actual people may be one of the few credible signals of a broad base of support. This is especially true when organizations claim to represent people beyond their official members; comments may be the best way to support those claims. For example, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), a top mobilizer of public comments, often claims to represent “3 million members and online activists” (<https://www.nrdc.org/about>), presumably including anyone who has donated to or participated in one of its campaigns. Mobilizing comments is one way that NRDC can demonstrate actual support for their position on any given issue.

Furthermore, if advocacy group decisions are primarily made by D.C. professionals, these advocates themselves may be unsure how broadly their claims resonate until potentially attentive publics are actually engaged.

Theorists debate whether signing a petition of support without having a role in crafting the appeal is a meaningful voice and whether petitions effectively channel public interests, but, at a minimum, engaging a large number of supporters may help broader interests to distinguish themselves from truly narrower ones. It suggests that the organization is not entirely “memberless” ([Skocpol 2003](#ref-Skocpol2003)) in the sense that it can demonstrate some verifiable public support. An organization mobilizing its members or supporters to take some action lends weight to representational claims that might otherwise be indistinguishable from cheap talk claims that groups often make to represent broad constituencies.

The credibility of the signal that mass engagement provides may be complicated by “astroturf” campaigns, where organizations aim to evoke the image of a larger base of support than they really have. To the extent that support can be effectively faked or inflated using “astroturf” tactics, the political information that pressure campaigns provide will be less accurate and thus valuable to decisionmakers.

Astroturf campaigns that utilize faked evidence of mass support (e.g., faked petition signatures) bypass the public pressure and mass engagement step entirely, manifesting false political information. However, in a model where political information is a compliment to technical information, supporting a sophisticated lobbying effort, utilizing fake political information is a risky strategy. Organizations lobbying in repeated interactions with agencies, and an organization’s reputation–critical to its ability to provide credible technical information–may be severely harmed if policymakers lean that an organization provided false political information. One observable implication is thus that astroturf campaigns will often be used anonymously or by organizations that do not also engage in sophisticated lobbying in order to provide sophisticated lobbying organizations plausible deniability. Because policymakers may rationally discount petitions submitted anonymously or by groups that lack reputations for credibility, fraudulent campaigns have little hope of influencing policy in this model and may thus be fairly rare compared to a model where political information is not mediated by groups that also engage in sophisticated lobbying.

### 2.2.6 Types of Pressure Campaign Motivations

The effects of public pressure campaigns depend, in part, on the aims of a campaign. Campaigns may pursue four distinct aims: (1) to win concessions by *going public*, (2) to *disrupt a perceived consensus*, or (3) to satisfy some audience other than policymakers by *going down fighting* when they anticipate losing or (4) to satisfy some audience other than policymakers by *credit claiming* when they anticipate winning. Going public and disrupting a perceived consensus are, respectively, forms of proactive and reactive outside lobbying. Going down fighting and credit claiming to describe situations where the organization mobilizes for reasons other than influencing policy, like engaging or recruiting members. In many cases, “going public” as a lobbying strategy is simultaneously an opportunity to engage and recruit members, so organizations **going public** to influence policy and engage in power-building tactics, especially *credit claiming*. For example, Sierra club organized several campaigns around thanking the Obama EPA for new draft environmental policies and the agency to not back down, thus simultaneously engaging members, implying that the Sierra Club had advanced its policy agenda, and pressure policymakers to hold course or strengthen policy rather than bend to countervailing industry pressures.

**Going public.** Coalitions “go public” when they believe that expanding the scope of conflict gives them an advantage. As coalitions that “go public” should believe they have more intense public support, mass engagement is likely to skew heavily toward this side.

Going public is likely to be used by those disadvantaged (those [E. E. Schattschneider](#ref-Schattschneider1975) ([1975](#ref-Schattschneider1975)) calls the ‘losers’) in a policy process with less public attention. Indeed, looking at a sample of rules from the Environmental Protection Agency, [Potter](#ref-Potter2017) ([2017a](#ref-Potter2017)) finds that advocacy group-driven campaigns mobilize far more people on average than industry-driven campaigns. Additionally, many people may be inspired indirectly (e.g., through news stories) or to engage with more effort (e.g., writing longer public comments) than people mobilized by the side with less public support. This is important because political information may be especially influential if decisionmakers perceive a consensus. For example, the level of consensus among interest groups ([Golden 1998](#ref-Golden1998); [S. W. Yackee 2006](#ref-Yackee2006JPART)), especially business unity ([J. W. Yackee and Yackee 2006](#ref-Yackee2006JOP); [Haeder and Yackee 2015](#ref-Haeder2015)), predicts policy change.^[It is not clear if the power of coalition unity is a result of strategic calculation by policymakers, a perceived obligation due to the normative power of consensus (e.g., following a majoritarian logic ([Robert A. Dahl 1989](#ref-Dahl1989); [Mendelson 2011](#ref-Mendelson2011))), or simply that unified demands are easier to process than opposing demands.

**Disrupting a perceived consensus.** I theorize that when coalitions with less public support mobilize, it is a reaction to their opponents. Because the impression of consensus is potentially powerful, when a coalition goes public, an opposing coalition may countermobilize. Because these are coalitions with less intense public support, and their aim is to prevent a perceived consensus, I expect such campaigns to engage fewer people, less effort per person, and yield a smaller portion of indirect engagement. In the extreme, these campaigns are astroturf, relying on various forms of deception to compensate for their lack of genuine public support.

**Credit claiming** and **going down fighting**. Finally, campaigns may target supporters rather than policymakers. When they expect to win, organizations may launch a campaign in order to draw attention to and associate themselves with a positive policy development. When they expect to lose, organizations may “go down fighting” to fulfill supporters’ expectations. Both of these “performative” reasons for organizing a mass comment campaign may help engage existing members and recruit new members. For example, [D. Carpenter](#ref-CarpenterPetitions) ([2021](#ref-CarpenterPetitions)) finds that many anti-slavery petitions were this type of campaign, where “the most important readers of a petition are its signatories” rather than the policymakers to whom they are addressed. “Credit claiming” and “going down fighting” campaigns are rooted in logics that are internal to the organization, including member retention or recruitment [[D. Carpenter and Moore](#ref-Carpenter2014b) ([2014](#ref-Carpenter2014b)); [D. Carpenter](#ref-CarpenterPetitions) ([2021](#ref-CarpenterPetitions)), fundraising, or satisfying a board of directors. For example, as Figure 2.4 shows, the Sierra Club uses campaigns to collect contact information of supporters and potential members. Given the executive-branch transition between 2010 when the rule was initiated and 2017 when it was delayed, the Sierra Club may have had little hope of protecting methane pollution standards, but for members of the public who wanted to voice their opinion, the Sierra Club created an easy way to do so, as long as users consented to “receive periodic communication from the Sierra Club.”



Figure 2.4: The Sierra Club Collects Contact Information Through Public Pressure Campaigns

While more performative campaigns may engage many people, they are unlikely to affect policy or inspire countermobilization.

When a lobbying coalition with more intense public support successfully mobilizes for reasons other than influencing policy, opposing coalitions with less public support have little reason to countermobilize. Thus, member-funded public interest groups should be more common than campaigns sponsored by narrow private interests, simply because they have more occasions where mobilizing has benefits. Most campaigns sponsored by narrow private interest should occur in opposition to another campaign, but public interest groups have reasons to launch a campaign when policy is unlikely to move, and thus private interests are unlikely to oppose them.

The extent to which a campaign genuinely aims to influence policy or is pursuing other logics may be difficult to distinguish in the observed public response. Indeed, multiple motivations may drive most campaigns, and members of the public may poorly understand the different chances of success in each case. However, lobbying organization do likely know their chances of success and should thus invest less in providing technical information when they see little opportunity to affect policy. By identify cases where coalitions engage in large public campaigns without corresponding investment in Technica, we may be able to assess whether countermobilization and is indeed less likely in these cases. Table 2.1 specifies the general pattern of engagement suggested by each of the above-described driver mass-comment campaigns.

Table 2.1: Observable Differences in Lobbying Strategies

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Inside lobbying (e.g., technical information provided) | Outside lobbying (e.g., the number of comments from a public pressure campaign) |  |
| “Normal” lobbying | High | None |  |
| “Going public” | High | High |  |
| “Disrupting consensus” | High | Low |  |
| “Credit claiming” or Going down fighting" | Low | High |  |

As Table 2.1 suggests, the relevant statistic distinguishing patterns is the *relative* level of technical and political information provided by an organization or coalition. Even among rules targeted by campaigns, salience varies significantly, and thus “high” and “low” numbers of comments will differ across rules.

#### 2.2.6.1 Public and Private Aims

TODO: MORE ABOUT PUBLIC VS PRIVATE COALITIONS TO SET UP HYPOTHESES. ESP. ADD MORE ABOUT PRIVATE COALITIONS’ RESOURCES

While lobbying coalitions may form around various material and ideological conflicts, those most likely to be advantaged by going public, credit claiming, or going down fighting are public interest groups—organizations primarily serving a broad idea of the public good rather than the narrow material interests of their members. And indeed, [Potter](#ref-Potter2017) ([2017a](#ref-Potter2017)) finds that advocacy group-driven campaigns mobilize far more people on average than industry-driven campaigns. Thus, I theorize that mass mobilization is most likely to occur in conflicts of public versus private interests or public versus public interests (i.e., between coalitions led by groups with distinct cultural ideals or desired public goods), provided they have sufficient resources to run a campaign. If true, one implication is that mass mobilization will systematically run counter to concentrated business interests where they conflict with the values of public interest groups with sufficient resources to mobilize.

Classifying coalitions as primarily driven by private or public interest provides analytic leverage, but scholars have not converged on a single approach to do so. [Potter](#ref-Potter2017) ([2017a](#ref-Potter2017)) distinguishes “advocacy groups” from “industry groups.” [Berry](#ref-Berry1999) ([1999](#ref-Berry1999)) calls these groups “citizen groups” and emphasizes conflict over cultural issues. Some public interest groups focus on conservative or progressive cultural issues, like religious education, immigration, or endangered species. Others are more focused on the public provision or protection of public goods such as national parks, consumer product safety standards, air quality, drinking water, and public safety. Types of membership organizations that are both broad and focused on material outcomes for their members (such as labor unions) are difficult to classify. [Potter](#ref-Potter2017) ([2017a](#ref-Potter2017)) puts unions in the “Industry” category. I take a different approach based on the coalition with whom such groups lobby. If a union lobbies alongside businesses (see [Mildenberger 2020](#ref-Mildenberger2020)), I classify this as a private interest-driven coalition. If a union lobbies with public interest groups on public health or safety issues, I classify this as a public interest group coalition.

Another challenge for classifying public and private interest groups is that appeals to the government are almost always couched in the language of public interest, even when true motivations are private ([E. E. Schattschneider 1975](#ref-Schattschneider1975)). Public pressure campaigns are no exception, and mobilizing organizations almost always evoke some version of the public interest.

### 2.2.7 Types of Public Engagement

I classify supporters into three types: minimal supporters, passionate supporters, and inspired supporters. The number and ratios of each describe key pieces of political information. In the context of public comments, minimal supporters submit comments that are exact copies of a form letter, essentially a petition signature. It is the minimal effort required to participate in a campaign. Commenters that also take time to add their own text to a form letter indicate more intense preferences. For example, 37,127 commenters mobilized by EarthJustice submitted the same form, but 6,837 of them also added additional personalized comments. Mobilizing organizations often encourage their supporters to write personalized comments and emphasize the number of people who took the time to write personalized comments in their own comments.

Finally, commenters who express solidarity in similar but distinct phrases indicate they were inspired indirectly, perhaps by a news story or a social media post about the campaign, as campaign messages spread beyond those initially targeted.[[12]](#footnote-91)

The size of each group offers political information to policymakers, including coalition resources, the intensity of sentiment, and the potential for conflict to spread. The first two types signal two kinds of intensity or resolve. First, they show the mobilizers’ willingness to commit resources to the issue. Second, costly actions show the intensity of opinions among the mobilized segment of the public ([Dunleavy 1991](#ref-Dunleavy1991)). The number of people engaged by a campaign is not strictly proportional to an organization’s investment. The less people care, the more it costs to mobilize them. The third type indicates potential contagion. Indications that messages spread beyond those initially targeted may be especially powerful ([Kollman 1998](#ref-Kollman1998)).

Public pressure campaigns thus produce information about organizational resolve, the intensity of public demands, and the potential of the campaign or movement to grow.

### 2.2.8 Hypotheses About the Drivers of Mass Mobilization

The observable implications of the theory described above suggest several testable hypotheses.

First, national politics in the United States is the terrain of organized groups. While observers frequently talk about ordinary people engaging in policymaking as individuals, political science theory suggests that the participation of individuals who are not professional policy influencers will almost always be mediated by an organized group.

Hypothesis 2.1 Most people engage in the policy process as a result of organized public pressure campaigns.

I argue that public pressure tactics are a compliment, not a substitute for sophisticated technical lobbying. Whereas some previous studies compare mass comment campaigns to technical lobbying efforts, I argue that the relevant unit of analysis is the lobbying coalition and that public pressure is a compliment, not a substitute for sophisticated technical lobbying.

Hypothesis 2.2 Public pressure campaigns are organized by *coalitions* that include groups that engage in sophisticated technical lobbying.

When policymaking pits broad public interests against narrower private interests, it is the public interest groups more often incentives to launch public pressure campaigns, both for policy and organizational reasons. Hypothesis 2.3 posits a conditional logic in the decision to mobilize. If resources drive outside lobbying, business-driven coalitions should often dominate, as they do elsewhere. However, I argue, because outside lobbying can alter the decision environment, those who have the advantage in the usual rulemaking process (where a more limited set of actors participate) have little incentive to expand the scope of the conflict. Additionally, I argue, public interest groups have greater incentives than businesses to launch public pressure campaigns for reasons other than influencing policy.

Hypothesis 2.3 Public interest group coalitions mobilize *more often* than private interest group (e.g., business-led) coalitions.

Hypothesis 2.3 may be evaluated in absolute terms–whether most public pressure campaigns are launched by public interest groups–or relative terms–whether public interest groups are more likely to lobby with the backing of a public pressure campaign than private interests.

The converse could also be true. For example, business groups that are already advantaged in the policy process may decide to leverage their superior resources further to mobilize support to alter a bad reputation or bolster claims that they represent more than their private interest. If mobilization most often takes this “astroturf” form, this would be evidence against 2.3 and Schattschneider’s argument that it is the disadvantaged who seek to expand the scope of the conflict.

If the success of a mobilization effort is moderated by latent public support, as my theory asserts, broader public interest group coalitions ought to mobilize more people, more effort per person, and more people indirectly for the same amount of mobilization effort (e.g., spending or solicitations). That is, the scale and the intensity of public engagement depend on preexisting support for the proposition that people are being asked to support.

Hypothesis 2.4 Public interest group coalitions mobilize *more successfully* than private interest group (e.g., business-led) coalitions.

Following the typology developed above, indicators of success include (1) the number of comments supporting a coalition, (2) the effort per comment, and (3) the number of comments mobilized indirectly.

Notwithstanding the incentive structure between coalitions advancing broad public interests and narrow private interests, resources and capacity are still necessary conditions to run a campaign. Most organizations that are disadvantaged in the policy process also lack resources to launch mass mobilization campaigns.

Hypothesis 2.5 Public pressure campaigns targeting national policy are most often run by large national policy advocacy organizations.

If private interest groups like businesses primarily use public pressure campaigns to counter a message of public consensus advanced by an opposing lobbying coalition, we should rarely see private interest groups lobbying unopposed. Hypothesis 2.6 would be supported by evidence that public interest group coalitions more often lobby unopposed than private interest groups.

Hypothesis 2.6 If narrow private interest groups (e.g., businesses) lunch public pressure campaigns, it is a response to an opposing campaign.

## 2.3 Testing the Theory

I focus on public comments in federal agency rulemaking, but the theories and methods here may also apply to other kinds of political engagement such as through social media or protests as well as to other political decisions, including state-level rulemaking.[[13]](#footnote-107)

### 2.3.1 Data

To assess my hypotheses about which groups should mobilize public participation in bureaucratic policymaking, I collected a corpus of approximately 99 million public comments via the regulations.gov API. 76 million of these comments are on rulemaking dockets. I then linked these comments to other data on the rules from the Unified Agenda and Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs Reports on draft rules sent to them for review. Summary statistics for these data are available in the Appendix.

From 2005 to 2020, agencies posted 130,135 rulemaking dockets to regulations.gov. and solicited public comments on 127,824. Only 2,119 rulemaking dockets received more than 100 comments, but these rules garnered 99.78%, or 76,065,254, of the comments. The top 10 rulemaking dockets account for 43.53% (33,182,975), of the comments.

Table 2.2: Rulemaking Dockets by Number of Comments on regulations.gov, 2005-2020

| docket\_id | docket\_title | comments |
| --- | --- | --- |
| EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 | Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing So... | 8,722,467 |
| EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0660 | Greenhouse Gas New Source Performance Standard for Electric Generating... | 5,313,771 |
| EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0495 | Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationa... | 4,214,489 |
| EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0505 | Oil and Natural Gas Sector -- New Source Performance Standards, Nation... | 3,377,345 |
| CFPB-2016-0025 | Payday, Vehicle, Title and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans | 2,827,572 |
| EPA-HQ-OW-2011-0880 | Definition of "Waters of the United States" Under the Clean Water Act | 2,246,777 |
| EPA-HQ-OAR-2017-0355 | Repeal of Carbon Dioxide Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary S... | 1,876,577 |
| FWS-HQ-ES-2013-0073 | Removing the Gray Wolf from the List of Endangered and Threatened Wild... | 1,611,111 |
| EPA-HQ-OAR-2016-0004 | Renewable Fuel Standard Program: Standards for 2017 and Biomass-Based ... | 1,513,149 |
| EPA-HQ-OW-2017-0203 | Definition of “Waters of the United States” – Recodification of Pre-Ex... | 1,479,717 |
| BLM-2013-0002 | Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands | 1,348,563 |
| FWS-HQ-IA-2013-0091 | Revision of the Special Rule for the African Elephant | 1,315,513 |
| CEQ-2019-0003 | Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of th... | 1,145,571 |
| EPA-HQ-OA-2018-0259 | Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science | 993,463 |
| FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0097 | Removing the Gray Wolf (Canis lupus) from the List of Endangered and T... | 837,647 |
| EPA-HQ-OPP-2011-0184 | Pesticides: Agricultural Worker Protection Standard Revisions | 786,866 |
| EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234 | National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Coal- and... | 729,196 |
| EBSA-2010-0050 | Definition of the Term Fiduciary; Conflict of Interest Rule - Retireme... | 728,539 |
| EPA-HQ-OAR-2015-0111 | Standards for the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program for 2014, 2015... | 675,700 |
| EPA-HQ-OW-2018-0149 | Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States” | 661,692 |

Figure 2.5 shows a sample of rules matched to Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs coding for major and non-major rules 

Importantly, even campaigns that achieve very low public response rates appear in these data. Because campaigns aim to collect thousands of comments, it is implausible that even the most unpopular position would achieve no supportive responses. For example, [Potter](#ref-Potter2017) ([2017a](#ref-Potter2017)) found Poultry Producers averaging only 319 comments per campaign. While this is far from the Sierra Club’s average of 17,325 comments per campaign, it is also far from zero.

Figure 2.6 shows an exponential increase in the number of comments per rule over time. Note that comments per rule are on a logarithmic scale on the y-axis. Proposed rules that have attracted the most public attention have been published by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC, omitted from this plot), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Interior (DOI), the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). Increasingly, a large number of people are paying attention to agency policymaking.



Figure 2.6: Comments per Proposed Rule 2005-2020 (log scale)

### 2.3.2 The Observable Implications of Various Forms of Public Engagement

The different forms of participation asserted or assumed in the literature have empirically observable patterns.

#### 2.3.2.1 Individuals

The solicitation on regulations.gov–“Let your voice be heard”–suggests that individuals are expressing themselves directly. Indeed, anyone can write a letter or type a comment in the text box on regulations.gov, and many people do. Individuals acting on their own submit content ranging from obscenities and memes to detailed personal accounts of how a policy would affect them and even poetry aimed at changing officials’ hearts and minds. Comments submitted by individuals acting along should not have a large share of text copied from elsewhere. They should not reference an organization or be mailed or uploaded in bulk by an organization.

In contrast, the remaining forms of participation are all mediated through an organization’s pressure campaign–what [Verba and Nie](#ref-Verba1987) ([1987](#ref-Verba1987)) call a “cooperative activity.” Comments from people mobilized as part of a campaign differ from those of individuals acting on their own in two observable ways: they often mention the name of the organization that mobilized them, and the text is often similar or identical to other comments in the campaign, reflecting coordination through form or template letters. These features eliminate the novel informational value that [Cuéllar](#ref-Cuellar2005) ([2005](#ref-Cuellar2005)) and others seek to locate in individual comments. If comments reference an organization that mobilized them, they likely have little to offer than that the more sophisticated organization has not already provided. If comments are identical, they certainly provide no new information.

#### 2.3.2.2 Membership Organizations

If most commenters are members of membership organizations as [Kerwin and Furlong](#ref-Kerwin2011) ([2011](#ref-Kerwin2011)) suggest, a large campaign of, say one million people, would generally require a large collection of membership organizations. Very few organizations have a million members. Those who do are unlikely to mobilize all of them, so mobilizing many people through membership organizations will usually require a large coalition of membership organizations. We would expect commenters to identify themselves as members of these many organizations.

TODO: ADD EXAMPLE: For example, if membership groups mobilize most comments, we would expect …

#### 2.3.2.3 Policy Advocacy Organizations: From Grassroots to Astroturf

Mobilizing people just for a particular policy fight requires a significant organizing capacity.[[14]](#footnote-113) ([**McNutt2007?**](#ref-McNutt2007)) calls these formations “policy change organizations.” In contrast to membership organizations, they exist more to organize public pressure toward a set of policy goals than to serve a defined membership.

There is a spectrum of organizing the unorganized. The poles might be labeled “grassroots” and “astroturf.” On the grassroots end, engagement is driven by a combination of passionate volunteerism and a supportive, attentive segment of the public. In practice, most campaigns on the grassroots end of the spectrum in federal rulemaking are not pure volunteerism but are organized by policy change organizations like MoveOn and Organizing For American on the left and Americans for Prosperity on the right. These organizations have large mailing lists and media operations, providing the capacity to mobilize large numbers of people for a particular policy fight. Membership organizations like the Sierra Club often mobilize “members and supporters” beyond their official membership base, thereby taking the form of a policy change organization as well. Like people mobilized through their membership organizations, people mobilized by policy change organizations will often cite the mobilizing organization. Unlike those mobilized through membership organizations, mobilization by policy change organizations is more likely to be concentrated in a few large organizations with the specific resources for running campaigns that engage passionate or interested but unaffiliated or loosely affiliated segments of the public.

Toward the astroturf end of the spectrum, well-funded efforts gather signatures from a much less passionate and attentive population. Where grassroots organizing relies on existing underlying interests that merely need to be given an opportunity to engage, people engaged by astroturf campaigns are generally disinterested in the policy and engage merely because of paid ads or petition gathering, often involving some deception (e.g., intentionally misled about the policy or its likely effects) to get people to take action on an issue that they would not take if the issue were presented more clearly. Likewise, the organizations collecting the signatures would have no interest in doing so if they were not paid. The aim is to give an appearance of support. To the extent they mobilize real people, astroturf campaigns are thus a form of outside lobbying intended to create a deceptive appearance of public support. In the extreme, astroturf campaigns may use the names of fake or non-consenting individuals—inside lobbying discussed as outside lobbying.

For example, in 2016, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management received several USB drives with hundreds of thousands of comments on its National Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program from Joe Jansen. Jansen did not disclose who he worked for. These form letters, each identical except for the signature, resembled press releases from the American Petroleum Institute (API), the main industry association for oil and gas companies. According to a LinkedIn profile and [Congressional Directory](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CDIR-2011-12-01/pdf/CDIR-2011-12-01-OH-H-1.pdf), Joe Jansen was a former legislative director for a Republican member of Congress who now worked in Government Relations. Unlike more “grassroots” campaigns, no information was provided about who the signatories were or why they cared about oil and gas leasing. Joe Jansen, however, is also associated with other campaigns targeting the EPA and Department of State, several of which identified themselves as organized by the groups “Energy Citizens” and “Energy Nation.” These organization’s websites are paid for by the American Petroleum Institute. The photos they post on social media almost exclusively show employees handing out shirts, hats, and water at fairs, bars, and conferences in exchange for signatures.[[15]](#footnote-115) Though Energy Citizens and Energy Nation submitted slightly different comments as separate organizations, most of the individual signatories were the same on both sets of comments, and many were submitted twice in order to inflate the number of pro-API comments on the rule. Energy Citizens has attracted media attention for bussing in paid protesters and attendees at town halls,[[16]](#footnote-117) paying actors to pose as concerned citizens, and skirting Facebook’s policy against deceptive advertising.[[17]](#footnote-119)

In a more complex example, Axcess Financial and other payday lending companies sponsored several campaigns targeting a regulation proposed by Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in 2016. First, Axcess Financial had storefront employees solicit comments from customers, which Axcess then uploaded to regulations.gov. The customer comments suggest that they had not been told much about the rule, which limited interest rates and the number of times short-term loans could be compounded. Most customers wrote some version of “Do not close this store” or “I have been told that payday loans would not exist in my community if the government’s proposed regulations went into effect.”—a few even complained about exactly the issues that CFPB’s regulation aimed to address. One customer wrote, “Although some of the fees are a bit high, it should be my choice whether to get a loan or not” (Access Financial Comment 91130). Another wrote, “I need to keep receiving my Check’n’Go loans so I can have the time to start paying them back in the next 1 1/2 to 2 years” (Axcess Financial Comment 91130), indicating that Check’n’Go (a subsidiary of Access Financial) was engaged in serial re-lending that put this customer deeper in debt. In their own comments, Axcess claimed that it did not do this. To the extent that this campaign relied on deception and not the customer’s genuine interests (even as the customers understood them), this would count as astroturf. Second, Axcess sponsored an effort to gather petition signatures at churches. Finally, Axcess and other payday loan companies uploaded supportive notes from community organizations to which they had given money. Like the churchgoers, these people had no reason to comment except that they had received money from the potentially regulated companies.

As the American Petroleum Institute and Axcess Financial examples demonstrate, spotting astroturf in the wild can be difficult by design and involve complex judgment calls about the level of deception involved. However, the clear observable result is often a large number of comments advocating on behalf of narrow private interests. Large businesses or industry associations are the organizations with the resources and incentives to sponsor astroturf campaigns, and they do ([**Lyon2005?**](#ref-Lyon2005)).

Not all public pressure campaigns on behalf of private interests fall decisively on the astroturf side of the spectrum. In a cover letter to a batch of comments opposing the regulation of glyphosate herbicides, major glyphosate manufacture, Monsanto, specified how they collected the letters:

“These letters were collected during the 2016 Farm Progress Show from US farmers, agriculture professionals, and general consumers who use glyphosate and value its benefits. We think it is important that these voices be heard as part of EPA’s review of glyphosate.” ([EPA-HQ-OPP-2009-0361-0891](https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OPP-2009-0361-0891))

Monsanto may have, like Energy Citizens, given out shirts in exchange for many of these signatures, but the context and transparency make it more plausible that the signators genuinely opposed regulation on glyphosate. Similarly, Shell Oil sponsored a campaign to open the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf to oil and gas drilling and provided a template letter with a place to insert a company or group:

“On behalf of [enter company or constituents], I am writing to demonstrate my strong support of oil and gas development in the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)…I support Shell’s plan to explore its leases in the Chukchi Sea in 2015. The company has invested significant time and resources in the advancement of safe and prudent Arctic exploration. Shell should be allowed to realize the promise of the leases it purchased, and I encourage the BOEM to expeditiously approve its Exploration Plan.”[[18]](#footnote-122)

Though Shell’s private interests stood to benefit from the rule, the signatories of this petition were mostly companies and workers in the oil and gas sector. Several elected officials also used Shell’s form letter (e.g. [BSEE-2013-0011-0033](https://www.regulations.gov/comment/BSEE-2013-0011-0033) and [BSEE-2013-0011-0094](https://www.regulations.gov/comment/BSEE-2013-0011-0094)). I found no evidence of deception or payments from Shell. These companies and workers plausibly had a genuine interest in Shell’s access to offshore oil. The form letter’s transparency about who stood to benefit further increases the plausibility that signers genuinely supported Shell’s lobbying effort.

### 2.3.3 Methods: Measuring Public Pressure and Political Information

In this section, I develop methods to identify public pressure campaigns and measure the kinds of political information they create. These measures capture similar statistics to questions posed by [Verba and Nie](#ref-Verba1987) ([1987, 9](#ref-Verba1987)): “How much participation is there, what kind is it, and from what segments of society does it come?” Specifically, I assess the extent to which public comments are mobilized by pressure campaigns, which organizations are behind these campaigns, which campaigns are more successful in mobilizing, and which campaigns go unopposed.

#### 2.3.3.1 Identifying Organizations and Coalitions

To identify whether a pressure campaign mobilizes a given comment, I use several strategies. I first use textual similarity to identify clusters of similar comments, reflecting formal and informal coalitions. Comments with identical text indicate a coordinated campaign.

To link individual comments and public pressure campaigns to the more sophisticated lobbying efforts that they support (if any), I identify the lobbying coalition(s) (if any) to which each comment belongs. Some individual commenters and organizations are unaffiliated with a broader lobbying coalition, but, as I show below, most people and organizations lobbying in broader coalitions.

##### 2.3.3.1.1 Identifying Coalitions Using Text Reuse

For all comments on a docket, I identify the percent of words it shares with other comments using a 10-word (or “10-gram”) moving window function looping over each possible pair of texts to identify matches.[[19]](#footnote-127) When actors sign onto the same comment, it is clear that they are lobbying together. However, various businesses, advocacy groups, and citizens often comment separately, even when they are aligned. Text-reuse (using the exact same ten-word phrases) captures this alignment.

Figure 2.7 shows the percent of shared text for a sample of 50 comments on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s 2016 Rule regulating Payday Loans. Comments are arranged by the document identifier assigned by regulations.gov on both axes. The black on the diagonal indicates that each document has a perfect overlap with itself. Black squares off the diagonal indicate additional pairs of identical documents. For example, 100% of the words from Comment 95976 are part of some tengram that also appears in 95977 because the exact same comment was uploaded twice. The block of grey squares indicates a coalition of commenters using some identical text. Comments [91130](https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-2016-0025-91130) through [91156](https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-2016-0025-91154) are all partial or exact matches. Most are part of a mass comment campaign by Access Financial. The percent of the identical text is lower than many mass-comment campaigns because these are hand-written comments, but the n-gram method still picks up overlap in the OCRed text in the header and footer.



Figure 2.7: Percent of Matching Text in a Sample of Public Comments

##### 2.3.3.1.2 Hand-coded Organizations and Coalitions

Second, I hand-code several samples of comments. One sample contains at least one comment from each cluster (coalition) of 100 or more similar comments. This census of form-letter comments allows me to make valid observations about public pressure campaigns across agencies and over time. The second sample includes nearly all comments on a random sample of rules. The third sample includes nearly all comments on another random sample of rules, weighted by the number of comments they received. These last two samples allow me to make inferences about lobbying coalitions that do and do not use public pressure campaigns.

Through an iterative process of hand-coding and computational methods, I then identify the organization submitting or responsible for mobilizing each comment (if any). I identify the organization responsible for over 40 million comments, including all organizations responsible for mobilizing 100 or more comments with repeated text–either identical text or partially unique texts that contain shared language. I then searched comment texts for mentions of these organizations’ names to complete missing information on the mobilizing organization.

I classify all organizations that appear in the hand-coded sample as businesses, industry associations, other nonprofits, governments, or individual elected officials and a range of sub-types within these broader categories.

#### 2.3.3.2 Classifying Public and Private Interests

I code each coalition as primarily advancing an idea of the public interest or more narrow private interests. Public interest coalitions are almost always entirely nonprofits and governments, and private interest coalitions tend to be companies and industry associations. Still, some nonprofits lobby on behalf of companies, and some companies join forces with public interest groups. These can create “hard” cases. For example, a coalition of environmental groups mobilized recreational fishing businesses ([NOAA-NMFS-2012-0059-0185](https://www.regulations.gov/comment/NOAA-NMFS-2012-0059-0185)) and sustainable seafood restaurants to help push for stricter commercial fishing regulations. We know environmental groups mobilized the restaurants because they used a form letter from a nonprofit called the Gulf Restoration Network. I coded this as a public interest coalition. If, instead, the businesses had led this lobbying effort and enlisted a few nonprofits to help protect their business interests, I would have coded this as a private interest coalition. The vast majority of coalitions were much more straightforward to code as public or private.

#### 2.3.3.3 Coding Policy Positions

To assess whether organizations and their broader coalitions lobby in opposition to other interests or unopposed, I code the position of each organization on each proposed policy (Figure 2.8). For example, if the ideal point of the commenter is the current policy () or close to it, they will oppose any change. If the ideal point of commenter is the new proposed policy () or closer to it, they likely support the proposal. While incompatible with a monotonic model of preferences, commenters do occasionally oppose a policy change for moving insufficiently in their preferred direction (e.g., describing the proposal as “too little” or “insufficient” to gain their support). Such positions are likely the result of the repeated game nature of policymaking, where commenters believe that rejecting a small change in their preferred direction now is likely to result in a larger change later.




Figure 2.8: Coding the Spatial Position of Commeners on Proposed Policy Changes

Having identified the coalitions lobbying on each proposed rule, I assign the position of the coalition as the position of the lead organization. For robustness, I also calculate the coalition’s average position as the average position of its members. Coalition members usually have nearly identical positions, but occasionally, some take more extreme positions than others. For example, while all coalition members may have the same policy demands, some may ask for additional changes. I only consider such mildly diverging interests to be one coalition if the asks are entirely compatible with the position of organizations that did not ask for them.

#### 2.3.3.4 Measuring Intensity of Prefrences

Finally, I develop computational methods to measure the intensity of preferences expressed by those mobilized by public pressure campaigns. To measure the mobilizing success of each campaign, I measure the scale and intensity of support and potential for the movement to grow. To measure intensity, I examine the ratio of high-effort and low-effort comments. To measure the potential to grow, I measure the number of comments mobilized indirectly by the campaign (i.e., those that support a campaign but do not include text provided by the campaign). The result is several new measures of participation in bureaucratic policymaking.

#### 2.3.3.5 Differences with Prior Studies

This approach is significantly different than that employed in previous studies of mass comment campaigns in at least two ways. First, my methods allow me to identify coalitions consisting of multiple organizations. Previous studies measure mass comment campaigns at the organization level. For example, ([**Balla2020?**](#ref-Balla2020)) analyzes “1,049 mass comment campaigns that occurred during 22 EPA rulemakings”—an average of nearly 50 “campaigns” per rule. By “campaign,” ([**Balla2020?**](#ref-Balla2020)) mean an organization’s campaign rather than a coalition’s campaign. Especially on EPA rules, there are rarely more than two or three coalitions engaging in public pressure campaigns–one of the environmental advocacy groups and their allies, another of regulated industry groups and their allies. This is important because many comments that might be attributed to a small business, nonprofit, or membership organization are part of a campaign sponsored by a larger coalition led by industry associations or public interest groups. It would be inaccurate to credit a small organization with little capacity for organizing a campaign when they merely allowed their name and mailing list to be used by a larger group. Using organizations as the unit of analysis means that observations are far from independent. An analysis that counts one coalition’s campaign as 40 smaller “campaigns” with the same policy demands and response would count this one campaign as 40 observations. My methods allow me to measure levels of public pressure per organization *and* per coalition.

The second major difference between my approach and previous research is that I do not compare sophisticated comments to mass comments. Rather, I *attribute* mass comments to organizations and coalitions that also submit sophisticated technical comments. This difference is less important to the present analysis of the drivers of public pressure campaigns, but the set of comparisons one makes is critical to any study of responsiveness or policy influence. Researchers may reach different conclusions if they compare different things. Consider a study comparing how agencies respond to Sierra Club form letters to how they respond to the Sierra Club’s sophisticated comments. Now consider a study that compares responsiveness to the Sierra Club’s sophisticated comments between rules where they did and did not run a mass comment campaign. A study comparing the average influence of form-letter comments to the average influence of sophisticated comments is very different from a study that compares the influence of two sets of sophisticated comments with different *levels* of public pressure behind them. By measuring comments per coalition, both through hand-coding and text reuse, I capture different levels of public pressure than we would see if we were to look only at comments per organization.

### 2.3.4 Measuring the Volume, Intensity, and Potential Contagion of Public Engagement

I measure variation in engagement in three ways, corresponding to the three types of comments described above.

**Volume.** First, I measure the total number of comments per organization, coalition, and rule. Commenting results from multiple processes. First, a group must decide to lobby. Then, a group must decide to mobilize public pressure. Finally, the resulting number of comments depends on the response to the campaign. There may be many cases where groups may have had success mobilizing but never reached the choice of whether to mobilize or not. For example, relevant groups may have been unaware of the draft rule or lacked the resources to launch a campaign. Once the decision to mobilize has been reached and made, the response to mobilizing is a count process. I thus expect the count of comments across rules to follow a zero-inflated negative binomial distribution.

**Effort.** I measure effort per comment by the number of words people write, omitting any text longer than ten words that is not unique to that comment, usually because a mobilizing organization provided it. For example, the Sierra Club mobilized more than 47,710 people to submit the same text on the delay of the methane pollution rule, but 7,452 people also took the time to write a personalized comment in addition to the text provided (see Figure 2.4). Organizations often encourage “personalized notes” because the number of additional words shows the individual was willing to exert additional effort. As [Verba and Nie](#ref-Verba1987) ([1987](#ref-Verba1987)) note, signing a form letter requires “some” effort, whereas writing an original letter to a government official requires “a lot.” The longer the letter, the more effort required. Unique comments (those that do not copy text from a form letter) generally indicated high levels of effort.

While effort, as measured by the number of words people write, may be normally distributed, the low end of the observed distribution is truncated. This is because we will not observe people who have low levels of passion for the issue; they either do not meet the threshold required to participate or opt to write nothing more than the form letter.

**Contagion.** Mass-comment campaigns have wildly different results. Some organizations submit a clean 10,000 copies of (signatures on) the same comment.[[20]](#footnote-141) Others “go viral”—inspiring a mess of further engagement where the original messages are translated through social media posts and news stories. To identify people who were plausibly mobilized indirectly by a campaign, I count the number of people who use a similar distribution of words to that of the form letter but fewer than ten words matching any other comment. This is a regular count process. In the hand-coded sample, these people are coded as “individual” members of the coalition. Though perhaps officially unaffiliated, they were clearly inspired by the campaign indirectly.

TODO: Align this with my terminology in the previous section.

## 2.4 Results: Patterns of Public Engagement in Rulemaking

### 2.4.1 Most Comments Result from Public Pressure Campaigns

In line with Hypothesis 2.1, most people engage in the policy process due to organized public pressure campaigns. Indeed as Figure 2.9 shows, every year since 2008, most people who comment on draft regulations did so as a result of a public pressure campaign.[[21]](#footnote-144)

![Figure 2.9: Public Comments 2005-2020](data:application/pdf;base64,)

Figure 2.9: Public Comments 2005-2020

TODO show this more clearly

### 2.4.2 Most Comments and Campaigns are Mobilized by Public Interest Coalitions

In line with Hypothesis 2.2, public pressure campaigns are organized by coalitions that include groups that engage in sophisticated technical lobbying.

Just 100 organizations mobilized over 80% of comments on proposed rules posted to regulations.gov. These top 100 mobilizing organizations each mobilized between 55 thousand and 4.2 million comments.

Table 2.3: Organizations Mobilizing the Most Public Comments 2005-2020

| org\_name | comments | rules | campaigns | percent | average |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Center For Biological Diversity | 2,160,804 | 522 | 79 | 15.1% | 27,352 |
| World Wildlife Fund | 1,511,290 | 64 | 5 | 7.8% | 302,258 |
| Sierra Club | 1,371,978 | 498 | 34 | 6.8% | 40,352 |
| Natural Resources Defense Council | 1,191,110 | 362 | 19 | 5.2% | 62,690 |
| Credo Action | 520,828 | 28 | 8 | 28.6% | 65,104 |
| Defenders Of Wildlife | 505,725 | 174 | 11 | 6.3% | 45,975 |
| Friends Of The Earth | 467,526 | 88 | 11 | 12.5% | 42,502 |
| Earthjustice | 448,052 | 194 | 11 | 5.7% | 40,732 |
| Humane Society | 432,783 | 268 | 13 | 4.9% | 33,291 |
| Endangered Species Coalition | 258,436 | 20 | 4 | 20.0% | 64,609 |
| Greenpeace | 255,010 | 61 | 4 | 6.6% | 63,752 |
| Environmental Action | 247,962 | 17 | 10 | 58.8% | 24,796 |
| Consumer Energy Alliance | 242,434 | 48 | 7 | 14.6% | 34,633 |
| Wildlife Conservation Society | 238,085 | 41 | 4 | 9.8% | 59,521 |
| Humane Society International | 227,328 | 28 | 3 | 10.7% | 75,776 |
| Mandate Media | 186,544 | 1 | 1 | 100.0% | 186,544 |
| Preventobesity.net | 181,675 | 2 | 2 | 100.0% | 90,838 |
| American Petroleum Institute | 177,490 | 396 | 1 | 0.3% | 177,490 |
| Environment America | 173,418 | 22 | 7 | 31.8% | 24,774 |
| Oceana | 171,788 | 186 | 4 | 2.2% | 42,947 |

Is civic engagement resulting from public pressure campaigns better understood as “astroturf” or “grassroots” participation? In short, I find much more evidence of grassroots participation than astroturf participation.

In line with Hypothesis 2.3, nearly all of these top mobilizing organizations lobby together in public interest coalitions, especially on environmental issues. These coalitions include organizations that engage in sophisticated lobbying. Indeed, many of the most prolific organizers of public pressure engage in sophisticated lobbying themselves. Public pressure is a compliment, not an alternative to sophisticated technical lobbying. Table 2.3 shows the top organizers of comments posted to regulations.gov.

TODO: MORE ON ORG TYPES. 1. Update with 2019-2020 data 2. ADD TABLE OF TOP ORGS AND DESCRIPTIVES ABOUT HOW MANY ARE MEMBERSHIP VS ADVOCACY ORGS 3.BRING IN HAND-CODED SAMPLE

TODO: In line with Hypothesis 2.3, XX percent of public pressure campaigns are led by public interest coalitions. In line with Hypothesis 2.4 and [Potter](#ref-Potter2017) ([2017a](#ref-Potter2017)), the average number of comments for a public interest campaign is XXXX. In contrast, the average number of comments for a private interest campaign is XXX.

In line with Hypothesis 2.5, large national policy advocacy organizations are responsible for most pressure campaigns targeting national policy.

### 2.4.3 Private Interests Rarely Use Public Pressure

Only a few of the top mobilizing organizations lobby in coalitions that focus on narrow material interests. The most prolific is a coalition of oil and gas companies led by the American Petroleum Institute (API). This coalition includes national policy advocacy organizations funded by the oil and gas industry, including Consumer Energy Alliance, Energy Citizens, and Energy Nation. It also includes industry associations in adjacent sectors, such as the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America and Association of Oil Pipe Lines, and state-level industry associations, such as The Alaska Oil and Gas Association (AOGA). API lobbied on over 400 rulemaking dockets, but it only launched public pressure comment campaigns on a few rules on which environmental groups ran much larger and more successful campaigns. API only attached their name to one of these campaigns. On non-rulemaking issues related to electricity production (specifically, the Obama EPA’s Clean Power Plan), this coalition included America’s Electric Cooperatives, an industry association for electric utilities.

The only other private-interest coalition leader among the top 100 mobilizing organizations is Axcess Financial. Axcess led only one campaign in opposition to the CFPB’s Payday Loans rule.

In line with Hypothesis 2.6, private interest coalitions are less likely than public interest coalitions to lobby unopposed, suggesting that they often launch pressure campaigns in response to an opposing campaign.

TODO: SUMMARIZE DATA ON THIS.

As Table 2.3 shows, the most prolific mobilizers are environmental groups. On five out of the top ten dockets (Figure 2.10 including rulemaking and non-rulemaking dockets), a similar coalition of groups mobilized most public comments. In part, this is because the Environmental Protection Agency produces a large share of the substantive rules posted to regulations.gov. However, it is notable that nearly all of the top mobilizers generally lobby together.

America’s Energy Cooperatives (AEC) mobilized significantly on the Clean Power Plan but not on the subsequent Clean Power Plan repeal. If public interest group mobilizing on the Clean Power Plan was an example of “going public” to pressure the Obama administration and then “going down fighting” in the face of the Trump administration’s repeal, industry counter-mobilization responding to the first, but not the second aligns with Hypothesis 2.6. If AEC found their policy goals in the Clean Power Plan rulemaking threatened by the political information being generated by environmental groups, it would make sense to devote resources to their own public pressure campaign to disrupt any perceived consensus. Likewise, if AEC were not concerned that environmental group mobilizing would affect the Clean Power Plan repeal, sponsoring a public pressure campaign would be a poor investment. Thus, while public interest groups had incentives to mobilize public comments in both cases, the private interests only had incentives to mobilize to in one. This mirrors the broader trend.

### 2.4.4 Most Comments Occur on a Small Number of Salient Rules

One consequence of the dominance of a few national policy advocacy organizations is that public pressure campaigns target a narrow subset of the wide range of issues addressed by agency rulemaking. Public engagement in rulemaking is highly clustered on a few rules made salient by these campaigns. Just ten rulemaking dockets account for 43.53% (33,182,975), of the comments (Figure 2.10). Because public pressure requires resources and capacity, policy issues of interest to organizations with the resources and capacity to launch a campaign receive disproportionate amounts of public attention.



Figure 2.10: Top 10 Dockets Receiving the Most Comments on regulations.gov and the top 20 Mobilizers

### 2.4.5 Partisan Asymmetry

Of the top 100 mobilizing organizations, 97 lobby in public interest coalitions. Only one organization, the National Association for Gun Rights, is aligned with the political right.

Figure 2.11 shows that many of these comments appear to support proposed agency rules. A rough measure of support (whether the comment text includes " support " or " oppose “) shows that many more comments mention support, until 2018 when there is a fairly dramatic reversal in the share of comments mentioning”support" compared to those mentioning “oppose” (Figure 2.11. This may be a function of the changing regulatory agenda due to the change in the presidential administration. However, “support” and “oppose” are noisy signals. These words are not used in all comments and do not always indicate support for or opposition to a rule.



Figure 2.11: Comments on Draft Rules Posted to Regulations.gov 2006-2018

## 2.5 Conclusion

As suggested by the solicitations on Regulations.gov—most comments are ordinary people voicing opinions on a proposed policy. They do not provide useful technical information or suggest specific edits to policy texts like the interest group comments that have thus far captured the attention of political scientists. If they add information to rulemaking, it is a different, more political flavor of information.

The political information generated by public pressure campaigns is not a substitute for sophisticated with technical information; public pressure campaigns almost always explicitly support a more sophisticated lobbying effort.

A few public interest organizations mobilize the vast majority of civic engagement in bureaucratic policymaking. Most campaigns are not astroturf or even advancing narrow private interests. Compared to the usual suspects found lobbying, especially in rulemaking, both the participants and the groups that mobilized them represent broader segments of the public.

However, because public pressure campaigns require resources and specialized capacities, they shine a light on a fairly narrow set of policy issues that interest the few large national policy advocacy groups with the capacity to mobilize large numbers of people.

Public pressure campaigns targeting the bureaucracy are primarily a tool used by left-aligned lobbying coalitions. The constituencies utilizing public pressure do not alternate under different presidents, as some theories would predict. Instead, organizations with the capacity to mobilize public pressure do so under both Democrat and Republican administrations, generally supporting the policies of the former and opposing the policies of the latter.

# 3 Policy Influence: Do Public Pressure Campaigns Influence Bureaucratic Policymaking?

See the preanalysis plan for this chapter [*here*](https://github.com/judgelord/dissertation/blob/master/04-influence/preanalysis.pdf).

#### Abstract

I assess whether public pressure campaigns increase lobbying success in agency rulemaking using a mix of hand-coding and computational text analysis methods. To measure lobbying success, I develop computational methods to identify lobbying coalitions and estimate lobbying success for all rules posted for comment on regulations.gov. These methods are validated against a random sample of rules that I hand-code for whether each coalition got the policy outcome they sought. I then assess potential mechanisms by which mass public engagement may affect policy. Each mechanism involves a distinct type of information revealed to decisionmakers. Of primary interest is the extent to which public pressure campaigns affect agency decisionmakers directly or indirectly through their effects on elected officials’ oversight behaviors. I assess whether legislators are more likely to engage in rulemaking when advocacy groups mobilize public pressure. I then assess congressional oversight as a mediator for the policy effects of public pressure campaigns.

## 3.1 Introduction

There is little overlap between scholarship on interest group influence and scholarship on mass public pressure. Studies and models of interest group lobbing rarely include pubic pressure as a tactic. Studies of public pressure rarely include specific policy outcomes as their dependent variable. When they do, the tend to focus on landmark policies.

TODO

### 3.1.1 Interest Group Influence

TODO For studies attempting to study interest group influence, measuring lobbying success is a major challenge ([**RashinXXXX?**](#ref-RashinXXXX)).

“A client agency will have to struggle mightily to avoid having its work influenced by the single, organized group with which it must deal on a daily basis. Many do not succceed, a few do not even try.” ([Wilson 1989, pg.79](#ref-Wilson1989))

### 3.1.2 Public Pressure

TODO Review theory section.

Social movements and activist pressure occasionally lead to the creattion of new agencies, but these agencies may be left voulerable when pressure wanes.

Public engagement in rulemaking is highly clustered on a few rules made salient by public pressure campaigns. It is plausible that at least some of the time, these campaigns aim to influence policy. It is also plausible that thousands of people engaging may alter the politics of these policy processes, but this hypothesis remains untested.

To address this gap, I assess the relationship between the number of public comments and the amount of change between draft and final policy texts. Next, I assess the relationship between the number of people mobilized by each campaign and whether the campaign achieved its policy goals. Finally, I theorize and test four mechanisms by which public input may affect bureaucratic policymaking. Each mechanism involves a distinct type of information that pressure campaigns may relay to policymakers: technical information, information about the likelihood of political consequences, information about the preferences of elected officials, or information about the preferences of the attentive public. Because scholarship on bureaucratic policymaking has focused on the power of technical information, where insider lobbying is most likely to matter and where outside strategies are least likely to matter, political scientists have largely overlooked public pressure campaigns as a lobbying tactic.

I find evidence consistent with the observable implications of mass comment campaigns influencing policymaking through [non-null results] but no evidence that mass engagement affects rulemaking processes or outcomes through [null results].

## 3.2 Theory

Scholars of bureaucratic policymaking have focused either on the sophisticated lobbying efforts of powerful interest groups such as business coalitions or principal agent dynamics, especially with respect to congress. In this section is first discuss the “classic model” of interest group influence and then amend it to incorporate public pressure campaigns. I then do the same with a simiple principal-agent model. The result is one model of interest group influence that includes interactions among sophisiticated lobbying strategies, political principals, and public pressure capaigns.

The first model focuses on interest group lobbying. A key insight from this scholarship is that technical information is the currency of insider lobbying. Figure 3.1 illustrates the classic causal model of insider lobbying that describes most rulemakings and nearly all scholarship on lobbying in bureaucratic policymaking to date. Diamonds indicate observable choices, ovals indicate latent preferences, and rectangles indicate information–the mechanism of influence in this model.

The first broadly observable step in the ruemaking process is usually the publication of a draft rule in the Federal Register. While organized groups certianly shape the content of draft policies, the public portion of the policy process begins when the draft is officially published. Organized groups’ latent policy prefrences then take the form of concrete demands for changes the draft policy document. These demands lead to an lobbying strategy that a research may, in theory, observrve. The provision of technical information is the the mechanism of policy influence on which scholars have thusfar focused. There are many reasons to beleive that this is a powerful, likely the primary way that organized groups can affect policymaking, especially in the bureaucracy. Finally, we observe the resutling policy. Inferences about the extent to which lobbying caused any changes (or lack of changes) between the draft and final rule are challenging, but studies of policy generally use observational data and thus require some assumptions linking policy success (a lobbying group getting their desired result) and policy influence (causeing a policy outcome). Groups inveset in providing information “relevant” to technocratic policymakers, and the policy response is assumped to be a function of this information.

Public pressure campaigns have no place in this model. I aim to fill this gap.



Figure 3.1: The ‘Classic Model’ of Interest Group Lobbying in Bureaucratic Policymaking

### 3.2.1 How Might Ordinary People Matter?

Skepticism rulemaking as a venue for collective action, has led most scholars to dismiss public pressure campaigns as epiphenomenal to bargaining among agency officials, their political principals, and interest groups. Indeed, almost all empirical studies of rulemaking discard unsophisticated comments from ordinary people. A comprehensive review of scholarship on “The Politics of Rulemaking” by [S. W. Yackee](#ref-Yackee2019) ([2019](#ref-Yackee2019)), who finds skepticism about citizen comments, but no studies analyzing public pressure campaigns as a lobbying tactic:

“[Kerwin and Furlong](#ref-Kerwin2011) ([2011](#ref-Kerwin2011)) point out that a citizen must know not only that a regulation is being formulated but also how and when to participate. This is a high bar for most Americans. Second, to be influential during rulemaking, commenters may require resources and technical expertise. As [Dmitry Epstein, Heidt, and Farina](#ref-Epstein2014) ([2014](#ref-Epstein2014)) suggest, agency rule-writers—who are often chosen because of their technical or policy-specific expertise—privilege the type of data-driven arguments and reasoning that are not common to citizen comments.” (p. 10)

For any particular lay commenter, this conclusion seems inescapable; individuals acting alone are unlikely to affect policy. While “ordinary” members of the public may occasionally provide novel and useful technical information to expert bureaucrats, such sophisticated means of influencing policy are out of reach for the vast majority of people. Thus, to investigate the potential role of ordinary people in bureaucratic politics I look elsewhere—not because ordinary people never provide novel and useful technical information, but because this is not how most people attempt to influence policy, nor, I argue, how we should expect ordinary people to have influence.

Most public comments do not provide useful technical information or suggest specific edits to policy texts like the interest group comments that have thus far captured the attention of political scientists. If they add information to rulemaking, it is a different, more political flavor of information.

### 3.2.2 Public Pressure: a Political Resource

An organization’s ability to expand the scope of conflict by mobilizing a large number of people can be a valuable political resource ([E. E. Schattschneider 1975](#ref-Schattschneider1975)). Public engagement and mobilization can be a tactic to gain power. Scholars who understand mobilization as a lobbying tactic ([S. R. Furlong 1997](#ref-Furlong1997); [Kerwin and Furlong 2011](#ref-Kerwin2011)) have focused on how organizations mobilize their membership. I expand on this understanding of mobilization as a lobbying tactic beyond to include the mobilizing of broader audiences–the “attentive public” ([Key 1961](#ref-Key1961)) or “issue public” ([Converse 1964](#ref-Converse1964)).

Here I build on three insights. First, [S. R. Furlong](#ref-Furlong1997) ([1997](#ref-Furlong1997)) and [Kerwin and Furlong](#ref-Kerwin2011) ([2011](#ref-Kerwin2011)) identify mobilization as a tactic. The organizations that they surveyed reported that forming coalitions and mobilizing large numbers of people are among the most effective lobbying tactics. Second, [Nelson and Yackee](#ref-Nelson2012) ([2012](#ref-Nelson2012)) identify political information as a potentially influential result of lobbying by different business coalitions. While they focus on mobilizing experts, I argue that [Nelson and Yackee](#ref-Nelson2012) ([2012](#ref-Nelson2012)) describe a dynamic that can be extended to mass commenting:

“strategic recruitment, we theorize, mobilizes new actors to participate in the policymaking process, bringing with them novel technical and political information. In other words, when an expanded strategy is employed, leaders activate individuals and organizations to participate in the policymaking process who, without the coordinating efforts of the leaders, would otherwise not lobby. This activation is important because it implies that coalition lobbying can generate new information and new actors—beyond simply the ‘usual suspects’—relevant to policy decisionmakers. Thus, we theorize consensus, coalition size, and composition matter to policy change.”

Concerning political information, this logic extends to non-experts. The number and distribution of ordinary supporters may matter because it suggests a *public* consensus. Instead of bolstering *scientific* claims, a perceived public consensus bolsters *political* claims. Finally, [S. R. Furlong](#ref-Furlong1998) ([1998](#ref-Furlong1998)), [S. W. Yackee](#ref-Yackee2006JPART) ([2006](#ref-Yackee2006JPART)), and others distinguish between direct and indirect forms of interest group influence in rulemaking. This distinction is especially important for political information, which may be most influential through indirect channels, such as through elected officials. In short, to understand how groups lobby in rulemaking, we must understand mass mobilization as a tactic aimed at producing political information that may have direct and indirect impacts on policymaking.

While most scholars have emphasized mass comments’ lack of useful technical information, a few have raised their role in creating political information. [Cuéllar](#ref-Cuellar2005) ([2005](#ref-Cuellar2005)) calls on agency officials to pay more attention to ordinary peoples’ expressions of preference and [Rauch](#ref-Rauch2016) ([2016](#ref-Rauch2016)) suggests reforms to the public comment process to include opinion polls. I build from a similar intuition that mass comment campaigns currently function like a poll or petition, capturing the intensity of preferences among the attentive public—i.e., how many people are willing to take the time to engage.[[22]](#footnote-162) Self-selection may not be ideal for representation, but opt-in participation—whether voting, attending a hearing, or writing a comment—may often be one of the few heuristics decisionmakers have about public preferences.

Mobilizing citizens and generating new political information are key functions of interest groups in a democracy ([J. J. Mansbridge 1992](#ref-Mansbridge1992); [Mahoney 2007b](#ref-Mahoney2007)). Campaigns inform agency officials about the distribution and intensity of opinions that are often too nuanced to estimate a priori. Many questions that arise in rulemaking lack analogous public opinion polling questions, making mass commenting a unique source of political information. As with public opinion on many specific policy issues, most members of the public and their elected representatives may only learn about the issue and take a position as a result of a public pressure campaign ([Hutchings 2003](#ref-Hutchings2003)). If a lobbying strategist believes the attentive public is on their side, they may attempt to reveal this political information to policymakers by launching a mass mobilization campaign. The public response to the campaign depends on the extent that the attentive public is passionate about the issue.



Figure 3.2: Incorporating Political Information into Models of Bureaucratic Policymaking

Figure 3.2 amends the “Classic Model” of interest group lobbying (Figure 3.1) to incorporate political information about the attentive public. In addition to providing technical information through sophisticated comments, an organization may mobilize supporters. The more latent public support a group has, the more successful this mobilization effort will be. Large-scale engagement may produce several types of relevant political information. The most direct and obvious is the expressed “public opinion” that policymakers observe.[[23]](#footnote-163)

TODO: more theorizing and literature development on the direct lobbying link.

The causal process visualized in Figure 3.2 may only operate under certain conditions. The success of a mobilizing effort depends on whether a group’s perception of latent public demands (the diagonal arrow between “Latent Public Demands” and “Lobbying Strategy”) reflects the public response to a mobilizing effort (the horizontal arrow between “Latent Public Demands” and “Mass Engagement”).

The influence of political information on policy (the arrow between “Political Information” and “Policy Response”) depends on the institutional processes by which agency officials receive and interpret information. We may only expect to observe mass mobilization influencing a particular policy only if the mobilization effort was aimed at influencing that policy, rather than using the public comment the period to build organizational membership or power more generally (see [D. Carpenter and Moore](#ref-Carpenter2014b) ([2014](#ref-Carpenter2014b))).

#### 3.2.2.1 Mass comment campaigns

Understanding civic participation in rulemaking as a mediated process aimed at generating political information posits a different role for mass comment campaigns than that posited by existing (albiet limited) literature on this topic.

TODO Critique of Balla et al., Review [Cook](#ref-Cook2017) ([2017](#ref-Cook2017))

Responding to public pressure campaings, agency officials often reject the notion that public pressure should inform their decisions.

“A rough estimate of pro and con submissions by individuals may provide insight as to public interest in a topic and to individual consumer experiences. However, under both the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Dodd-Frank Act, the Bureau must base its determinations in rulemaking on the facts and the law in the rulemaking record as a whole.” ([CFPB-2020-14935](https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2020-14935/p-134)

### 3.2.3 Incorporating Political Information into Formal Models of Rulemaking

Formally, political information requires several crucial amendments to existing information-based models of rulemaking. In the most sophisticated model of notice-and-comment rulemaking to date, [Libgober](#ref-Libgober2018) ([2018](#ref-Libgober2018)) posits a utility function for agency as where is the spatial location of the final policy, is the preference of a member of the public or “potential commenter” , and is a vector of "allocational bias"—i.e. how much the agency decisionmakers care about their own preferences relative to accommodating the preferences of others . Bureaucrats balance their own idea of their mission against their desire to be responsive. In Libgober’s model, is a fixed “taste” for responsiveness to each member of society, so agency decisions simply depend on their answer to the question “what do people want?” Including political information requires two additional parameters related to a second question “why would agency officials care?”

First, like other lobbying strategies, public pressure campaigns may shift the strategic environment, leading an agency to shift its allocation in favor of some groups and away from others. Let this strategic shift be a vector . Second, campaigns may directly persuade agency officials to adjust their allocational bias, for example by supporting claims about the number of people the group represents or the intensity or legitimacy of their policy demands. Let this direct shift be and immutable taste now be . Having decomposed an agency’s allocative bias into three parts (its fixed tastes, shifting strategic environment, and potential to be convinced), the agency’s utility function is now . If, after the comment period, the strategic environment is unchanged and officials remains unpersuaded about which segments of society deserve favor, and are 0, and the model collapses to the original information game based on fixed taste. This less plausible when groups go public and expand the scope of conflict.

Incorperating political information allows us to begin formalizing intuitions about mechanisms of influence. For example, [Libgober](#ref-Libgober2018) ([2018](#ref-Libgober2018)) asks “What proportion of commenting activity can be characterized as informing regulators about public preferences versus attempting to attract attention of other political principals?” (p. 29). Adding political information to the model allows us to formalize this question: Under what conditions does the decision to comment depend on an organization’s beliefs about versus beliefs about ? Empirically, we may often be able to infer that the difference in commenting can be attributed to group ’s beliefs about if the behavior of political principals varies but other observed parameter values are similar across rules at a given agency.

### 3.2.4 Congressional oversight as a mediator of interest-group influence

When George W. Bush replaced Bill Clinton as president, career bureaucrats at the Federal Trade Commission knew that this meant a change in policy priorities. Many rulemaking projects initiated under the Clinton administration were likely to be withdrawn or put on hold. They also knew that the new administration wanted to be perceived as advancing a new policy agenda, not merely undoing Clinton-era regulations. Entrepreneurs within the agency saw a political window of opportunity to initiate a new regulatory agenda aimed at curbing a growing volume of telemarketing calls. This initiative seemed likely to be popular with voters but, even with a supportive president, would be difficult to advance over the objections of the telemarketing industry whose campaign donations had earned them many powerful allies in Congress. Agency officials report being pessimistic about the FTC’s telemarketing effort succeeding over opposition from Congress.

When the draft “Telemarketing Sales Rule” (also known as the “Do Not Call” rule) was published, however, public support and engagement were overwhelming. The rule received thousands of supportive comments from frustrated members of the public who were encouraged to comment by advocacy groups like the Consumer Federation of America. Agency officials report that the volume of public response not only encouraged the agency and the administration but, more importantly, “scared off” Members of Congress who the industry was relying on to kill or reverse the rule (personal communication, 2018). Once it became clear that the public was paying attention and sufficiently mobilized to act on the issue, elected officials became much less willing to take unpopular positions supporting industry donors. Instead, Congress ended up codifying the agency’s authority to implement the Do Not Call regulations with legislation the following year.

The story of the Do Not Call rule suggests that public engagement in rulemaking may occasionally be influential because it affects the behavior of elected officials who have the power to provide key support or opposition to a proposed rule.

Other examples show that members of Congress know about and may be spurred to act by public pressure campaigns. For example, several members of Congress attached to their comments on CFPB’s Payday Loan rule (CFPB-2016-0025) mass mail or petitions from their constituents.

TODO: ADD EXAMPLES

James Q. Wilson notes a similar pattern with the FTC’s Funeral Industry Pracitice Rule and Used Car Rule:

“Undertaker sand used -care dealers were out raged by these proposed rules. Very quicly, members of Congress discovered just how many undertakers and car dealers they had in their districts and how well-connected they were. The FTC suddenly had activated large , hostile interests who were succesful in getting Congress to force the agency to back down.” ([Wilson 1989](#ref-Wilson1989), pg. 83)

Public pressure campaigns often seek to influence policy by informing them of constituent demands. Many campaigns collect the zip code of letter-signers so that they can forward constituent comments to their representatives. Some form letters include a line for signers to “CC” (carbon copy) their member of Congress (see, for example [EPA-HQ-OAR-2005-0161-2624](https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OAR-2005-0161-2624)).

Lobbying campaigns can also capture the attention of members of Congress on the opposite side of the issue. For example, in 2016, a group of Democratic legislators wrote encouraging words to Obama’s the Treasury Department: “We urge you not to yield to the intense lobbying against these regulations, directed both at Treasury and the Congress, but multinational business and its trade associations.”

#### 3.2.4.1 Principal-agent Relationships During Rulemaking

Political oversight of bureaucracies has long concerned both practitioners and theorists. Political scientists often model the relationship between elected officials and bureaucrats as a principal-agent problem. For example, an agency may have a preferred policy but may change the rule or delay its publication upon observing its principals’ preferences. Agencies may do this to avoid political consequences such as having their policies reversed ([Potter 2017b](#ref-Potter2016)) or because they perceive elected officials as representing public demands ([Cuéllar 2005](#ref-Cuellar2005)). While it is widely accepted that agency officials take their principals’ positions into account, the mechanisms by which this occurs and the empirical conditions for political control are debated.

Because I focus on influence in the period between the publication of draft and final rules, I focus on information about principals’ preferences revealed to the agency in this period. Oversight during rulemaking is a form of ex-post control ([David Epstein and O’Halloran 1994](#ref-Epstein1994)), in this case, after the proposed rule is published. Upon learning the content of a draft rule, an official with power over the agency may choose to signal their demands to the agency. There is an ongoing debate among scholars over how political oversight operates–i.e., how principals’ observable behaviors actually inform agency decisions.

[Mathew D. McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast](#ref-McCubbins1987) ([1987](#ref-McCubbins1987)) suggest two oversight mechanisms. Principals may proactively attend to agency activities, like a “police patrol,” or they may rely on bureaucrats’ fear of sanction when attentive interest groups alert principals about agency activities, more like a “fire alarm.” Administrative procedures like mandatory public comment periods thus offer opportunities for direct oversight and to be alerted to oversight opportunities ([Steven J. Balla 1998](#ref-Balla1998)).

### 3.2.5 Incorporating Political Information into Models of Political Oversight

In addition to interest groups directly alerting elected officials to oversight opportunities as in the “fire alarm” model, the political information signaled by public pressure campaigns may alert elected officials to political risks (like a “warning sign”) *or*, conversely, to encourage the agency to hold course (like a “beacon”) attracting positive attention and credit claiming opportunities for their oversight work. In the case of the FTC’s “Do Not Call” rule and subsequent legislation, mass engagement functioned more as a “warning” for would-be opponents and a “beacon” for potential allies, effectively enabling and empowering rather than restraining the agency as the classic “fire alarm” concept suggests. Agency officials credit the public support mobilized by mass comment campaigns with the political cover needed to hold course.



Figure 3.3: Incorporating Congressional Oversight into Model of Bureaucratic Policymaking

Public pressure campaigns in bureaucratic policymaking may affect the behavior of an agency’s principals because the shadow of public sanction hangs over elected officials ([Arnold 1979](#ref-Arnold1979); [Mayhew 2000](#ref-Mayhew2000)). [Emily H. Moore](#ref-Moore2018) ([2018](#ref-Moore2018)) finds that agencies that receive more comments per rule are also subject to more congressional hearings. When the public is more attentive, it is more important for officials to take popular positions and avoid unpopular ones. Thus, when a coalition goes public, especially if it generates a perceived consensus in expressed public sentiments, elected officials ought to be more likely to intervene on their behalf and less likely to intervene against them.

### 3.2.6 Hypotheses about the relationship between mass engagement and oversight

It may be the case that both principals and the majority of commenters hold the same position simply because it is popular. Thus, to assess the “fire-alarm,” “beacon,” and “warning sign” mechanisms, it is important to condition on principals’ existing policy positions and to control for their baseline rates of commenting. I estimate principals’ baseline rates of commenting using legislators’ comments on similar rules that did not receive a mass comment campaign.

**Hypothesis 2:** *Elected officials’ advocacy is moderated by mass engagement.*

**Hypothesis 3:** Mass commenting attract oversight from allies. The more comments supporting a position, the more likely principals holding that position are to engage.

**Hypothesis 4:** Mass commenting reduces oversight from opponents. The more comments opposing a position, the less likely principals holding that position are to engage.

Hypothesis 3 implies that is positive and Hypothesis 4 is negative in this statement: *Pr(Principal Comments Principal Position ) Comments supporting Comments opposing*

If Hypothesis 3 is correct, it would suggest an addendum to Hall and Miler’s (2008) finding that legislators are more likely to engage in rulemaking when they have been lobbied by a like-minded interest group: When interest groups lobby elected officials to engage in rulemaking, they may be more likely to engage when aligned with the majority of commenters than when opposed to them. If elected officials learn from political information, they will be even more likely to engage when lobbied by a coalition that includes public interest groups running a mass-comment campaign, and less likely to engage when opposed by a large mass comment campaign.[[24]](#footnote-173)

Alternatively, the effect of mass engagement on political principals may be asymmetric. Mass engagement may only mobilize or only demobilize. For example elected officials may be attracted to oversight opportunities but not dissuaded by mobilization on the other side because they assume their voters share their position. Or, if elected officials are risk adverse, they may avoid engaging in contentious rulemaking processes regardless of the balance of comments. Each of these results would be evidence against hypothesis 3 or 4 respectively.

I thus build on the classic model of political oversight in two ways. First, I suggest that elected officials’ comments are a particularly relevant oversight behavior and a mechanism by which bureaucrats learn and update beliefs about their principals’ demands. Second, I suggest that such oversight behaviors may be affected by public pressure because of the impressions of public opinion (i.e., the political information) it creates.

## 3.3 Testing the Theory

### 3.3.1 Data

I create an original dataset that combines several sources of data on U.S. federal agency rulemaking. The core data are the texts of draft and final rules and public comments on these proposed rules. This includes all 16 thousand proposed rules from 144 agencies (as defined by regulations.gov) that were open for comment on regulations.gov between 2005 and 2020, that received at least one comment from an organization, and that saw a final agency action between 2005 and 2020. There are over 50 million comments on this set of rules. I scrape draft and final rule texts from federalregister.gov and comments submitted as attachments or by mail from regulations.gov. I retrieve comments submitted directly on regulations.gov and metadata on rules and comments (such as the dates that the proposed rule was open for comment and whether the agency identified the organization submitting the comment) from the regulations.gov API. I add additional metadata on rules (such as whether the rule was considered “significant”) from the Unified Agenda published by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (reginfo.gov).

The combined dataset has over 50 million observations of one public or legislator comment on a proposed rule. I attempt to identify the organization(s) that submitted or mobilized each comment by extracting all organization names from the comment text. For comments that do not reference an organization, I am often able to identify organizations with an internet search using the comment’s text. I then identify lobbying coalitions by clustering comments that use similar phrases or word frequencies. Co-signed comments are always assigned to the same coalition. Likewise, form-letter comments are always assigned to the same coalition.[[25]](#footnote-176)

Because my hypotheses are about the influence of organizations and coalitions, for analysis, I collapse these data to one observation per organization or coalition per proposed rule and identify the main substantive comment submitted by each organization’s staff or lawyers, which are usually much longer than supporting comments like form letters. For hand-coding, I first select a random sample of 100 proposed rules with a mass-comment campaign. I then selected all comments that were likely to be from organizations.[[26]](#footnote-178) The hand-coding process included identifying the organization responsible for each comment submitted by an organization (e.g. a business, nonprofit, or government).

I then selecting a sample of 100 proposed rules on which the same organizations commented without a mass comment campaign. Matching prioritizes, presidential administration, policy area (following Policy Agendas Project coding), rule significance, department, agency, subagency, and proposed rule length, respectively.[[27]](#footnote-179) This hand-coded sample is several times larger than leading studies using hand-coding and includes rules with very large and small numbers of comments that previous studies exclude. The full sample is four hundred times larger.[[28]](#footnote-180)

The most direct way to assess the hypothesis that mass engagement increases lobbying success is to assess the magnitude of the relationship between the number of comments that a coalition mobilizes and its lobbying success. However, public pressure campaigns may only be effective under certain conditions. Thus, I first assess the main relationship and then assess evidence for or against different potential causal pathways of influence.

### 3.3.2 The Dependent Variable: Lobbying Success

The dependent variable is the extent to which a lobbying coalition got the policy outcome they sought, which I measure in several ways.

First, on a sample of rules, I hand-code lobbying success for each lobbying coalition, comparing the change between the draft and final rule to each organization’s demands on a five-point scale from “mostly as requested” to “significantly different/opposite than requested.” To do this, I first identify organizational comments. For each organization, I identify the main overall demand and the top three specific demands and the corresponding parts of the draft and final rule texts.[[29]](#footnote-182)  
I then code overall lobbying success and lobbying success on each specific demand for each organization and coalition. Both the overall score and average score across specific demands both fall on the interval from -2 (“significantly different”) to 2 (“mostly as requested”).

I trained a team of undergraduate research assistants to apply the codebook to a random sample of 100 rules with mass comment campaigns and 100 rules without a mass comment campaign, most of which had a draft and final rule. Several rules were double-coded by the shole team. Intercoder reliability was XX. I also double-coded all comments that were part of mass comment campaigns with more than XX comments.

Second, I use methods similar to automated plagiarism detection algorithms to identify changes between a draft and final rule that were suggested in a comment. Specifically, I count the number of words in phrases of at least ten words that appear in the comment and final rule, but not the draft rule. To do this, I first identify new or changed text in the final rule by removing all 10-word or longer phrases retained from the draft rule. I then search each comment for any 10-word or longer phrases shared with the new rule text and count the total number of shared words in these shared phrases. Finally, I normalize this count of “copied” words across shorter and longer comments by dividing it by the total number of words in the comment. This measure falls between 0 (zero percent of words from the comment added to the final rule) and 1 (100 percent of words from the comment added to the final rule). As a robustness check, I also use the non-normalized version of this variable, i.e. the raw number of “copied” words.

To assess the performance of these automated methods (text-reuse and word-frequency similarity), I calculate the correlation between these scores and my hand-coded 5-point scale for rules in the hand-coded sample where a final rule was published. As the automated methods apply at the organization-level, coalition scores are those from the lead organization–by default, the organization(s) with the longest comment. At the coalition level, the correlation between hand-coded influence is \_\_ with the text-reuse method.

### 3.3.3 The Main Predictor Variable

The number of supportive comments generated by a public pressure campaign (the main variable of interest) is a tally of all comments mobilized by each organization or coalition that ran a mass-comment campaign on a proposed rule. Because the marginal impact of additional comments likely diminishes, the number of comments is logged. This does not include the main substantive comments submitted by an organization’s staff or lawyers. Nor does it include comments that are not affiliated with the organization or coalition. If an organization mobilizes more than 1000 comments or 100 identical comments on a proposed rule, I code that organization, its coalition, and the proposed rule as having a mass comment campaign. Where organizational comments are not supported by a mass comment campaign *log mass comments* takes a value of 0.

### 3.3.4 Explanatory variables

Other predictors of lobbying success in the models below are the length of the (lead) organization’s comment, whether the coalition lobbies unopposed, the size of the lobbying coalition, and whether the coalition is business-led. *Comment length* is normalized by dividing the number of words in the comment by the number of words in the proposed rule, thus capturing the complexity of the comment relative to the complexity of the proposed rule. The number and type(s) of organization(s) is an attribute of each coalition (e.g. a *business-led* coalition with *N* organizational members). Coalition *size* is the number of distinct commenting organizations in the coalition (including those that co-sign a comment). For organizations lobbying alone, coalition *size* is 1. A coalition is *unopposed* when no opposing organizations comments. I code a coalition as *business-led* if the majority of commenting organizations are for-profit businesses, or if upon investigation, I find it to be primarily led or sponsored by for-profit businesses.[[30]](#footnote-187)

### 3.3.5 Examples of hand-coded lobbying success

**2015 Waters of the United States Rule:** In response to litigation over which waters were protected by the Clean Water Act, the Environmental Protection Agency and Army Corp of Engineers proposed a rule based on a legal theory articulated by Justice Kennedy, which was more expansive than Justice Scalia’s. The Natural Resources Defense Council submitted a 69-page highly technical comment “on behalf of the Natural Resources Defense Council…, the Sierra Club, the Conservation Law Foundation, the League of Conservation Voters, Clean Water Action, and Environment America” supporting the proposed rule:

“we strongly support EPA’s and the Corps’ efforts to clarify which waters are protected by the Clean Water Act. We urge the agencies to strengthen the proposal and move quickly to finalize it…”

I coded this as support for the rule change, specifically not going far enough. I also coded it as requesting speedy publication. NRDC makes four substantive requests: one about retaining language in the proposed rule (“proposed protections for tributaries and adjacent waters…must be included in the final rule”) and three proposed changes (“we describe three key aspects of the rule that must be strengthened”).[[31]](#footnote-190) These demands provide specific keywords and phrases for which to search in the draft and final rule text.

A coalition of 15 environmental organizations mobilized over 944,000 comments, over half (518,963) were mobilized by the four above organizations: 2421,641 by Environment America, 108,076 by NRDC, 101,496 by clean water action, and 67,750 by the Sierra Club. Other coalition partners included EarthJustice (99,973 comments) and Organizing for Action (formerly president Obama’s campaign organization, 69,369 comments). This is the upper tail end of the distribution. This coalition made sophisticated recommendations and mobilized a million people.

The final rule moved in the direction requested by NRDC’s coalition, but to a lesser extent than requested–what I code as “some desired changs.”" As NRDC et al. requested, the final rule retained the language protecting tributaries and adjacent waters and added some protections for “other waters” like prairie potholes and vernal pools, but EPA did not alter the exemptions for ditches and waste treatment systems.

Comparing the draft and final with text reuse allows us to count the number words that belong to 10-word phrases that appear in both the draft and final, those that appear only in the draft, and those that appear only in the final. For the 2015 Waters Of The U.S. rule, 15 thousand words were deleted, 37 thousand words were added, and 22 thousand words were kept the same. This means that more words “changed” than remained the same, specifically 69% of words appearing in the draft or final were part were either deleted or added.

For this coalition, the dependent variable, *coalitions success* is 1, *coalition size* is 15, *business coalition* is 0, *comment length* is 69/88, 0.78, and *log mass comments* is log(943,931), 13.76.

**2009 Fine Particle National Ambient Air Quality Standards:** In 2008, the EPA proposed a rule expanding air quality protections. Because measuring small particles of air pollution was once difficult, measurements of large particulates were allowed as a surrogate measure for fine particles under EPA’s 1977 PM10 Surrogate Policy. EPA proposed eliminating this policy, thus requiring regulated entities and state regulators to measure and enforce limits on much finer particles of air pollution.

EPA received 163 comments on the rule, 129 from businesses, business associations such as the American Petroleum Institute and The Chamber of Commerce, and state regulators that opposed the rule. Most of these were short and cited their support for the 63-page comment from the PM Group, “an ad hoc group of industry trade associations” that opposed the regulation of fine particulate matter. Six state regulators, including Oregon’s, only requested delayed implication of the rule until they next revised their State Implementation Plans (SIPs) for Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD). EarthJustice supported the rule but opposed the idea that the cost of measuring fine particles should be a consideration. On behalf of the Sierra Club, the Clean Air Task Force, EarthJustice commented: “We support EPA’s proposal to get rid of the policy but reject the line of questioning as to the benefits and costs associated with ending a policy that is illegal.” The EarthJustice-led coalition also opposed delaying implementation: “EPA must immediately end any use of the Surrogate Policy – either by”grandfathered" sources or sources in states with SIP‐approved PSD programs – and may not consider whether some flexibility or transition is warranted by policy considerations."

The final rule did eliminate the Surrate Policy but allowed states to delay implementation and enforcement until the next scheduled revision of their Implementation Plans. I code this as the EarthJustice coalition getting most of what they requested, but not a complete loss for the regulated coalition.

For the PM Group coalition, the dependent variable, *coalitions success* is -1, *coalition size* is 129, *business coalition* is 1, *comment length* is 63/85, 0.74, and *log mass comments* is 0.

For the State of Oregon’s coalition, the dependent variable, *coalitions success* is 2, *coalition size* is 6, *business coalition* is 0, *comment length* is 5/85, 0.06, and *log mass comments* is 0.

For the EarthJustice coalition, the dependent variable, *coalitions success* is 1, *coalition size* is 3, *business coalition* is 0, *comment length* is 7/85, 0.08, and *log mass comments* is 0.

### 3.3.6 Limitations

The two main limitations of this design both bias estimates of public pressure campaign influence toward zero.

First, lobbying success may take forms other than changes in policy texts. Agencies may speed up or delay finalizing a rule, extend the comment period, or delay the date at which the rule goes into effect. Indeed, commentors often request speedy or delayed rule finalization, comment period extensions, or delayed effective dates. I capture these potential outcomes in my hand-coding but not in the two automated methods, which apply only to observations with a final rule text. Likewise, there there is no change between draft and final rule, both automated methods necessarily record lobbying success as 0, even if a comment asks an agency to publish a rule without change.[[32]](#footnote-192)

Second, bureaucrats may anticipate public pressure campaigns when writing draft rules, muting the observed relationship between public pressure and rule change at the final rule stage of the policy process.

### 3.3.7 Modeling the direct relationship

For all three measures of lobbying success, I assess the relationship between lobbying success and mass comments by modeling coalition ’s lobbying success, as a combination of the relative length of the (lead) organizations comment, whether the coalition is unopposed, the coalition’s size, whether it is a business coalition, and the logged number of mass comments. I estimate OLS[[33]](#footnote-194) regression:

### 3.3.8 Modeling mediated relationships

To estimate mediated effects, I estimate the average conditional marginal effect (ACME) and the proportion of the total effect attributed to mediation through congressional support (comments or other communication from Members of Congress supporting the coalition’s position on the proposed rule). As developed by Imai et al. (2010), this involves first estimating a model of the proposed mediator as a combination of covariates, (*length*, *unopposed*, *size*, and *business*) and then the outcome as a combination of the mediator, *congressional support*, and covariates, .

Mediator model:

Outcome model:

### 3.3.9 A Census of Comments from Members of Congress in Agency Rulemaking

Through an iterative combination of automated search methods and hand-coding, I identify the comments submitted by elected officials.

Figure 3.4 shows the number of comments from members of Congress received during rulemaking by a sample of federal agencies. Oversight letters are frequently co-signed by multiple members from the Senate, House, or both chambers.



Figure 3.4: Number of Letters from Members of Congress Received During Rulemaking per Year

To assess the hypothesis that public pressure campaigns affect the engagement of political principals, I examine the relationship between mass commenting and the behavior of members of Congress, while attempting to control for other reasons that members of Congress may comment on a proposed rule. The bold arrow in figure 3.5 indicates the key relationship that I test in this step. I aim to test the relationship between mass public engagement and engagement from members of Congress, who may receive information about public opinion from mass engagement.



Figure 3.5: The Relationship Between Public Pressure and Congressional Oversight

I measure the dependent variables—legislator attention and support—in several ways. First, I count the number of times members of Congress engage the agency across rules and before, during, and after comment periods on rules where lobbying organizations did and did not go public. By engaging the agency, I mean that members of Congress raise a rule in personal correspondence or comments that members send to the agency. I then code each contact from the member of Congress and each coalition lobbying on the rule on the same three-point scale: are they asking for the rule to go further, be scaled back, or published as-is. This is similar to other hand-coding approaches to policy demands. Next, I use text analysis to compare the sentiment and rhetoric (phrases and word frequencies) used by legislators to the language used by each coalition.

### 3.3.10 Models testing the relationship between mass engagement and congressional oversight

There are several ways to test for a relationship between mass engagement and engagement by Members of Congress. The key explanatory variables of interest are the measures of mass engagement created in step 1 (how many and what types of comments). For simplicity, in the equations below, I only include measures related to the number of comments. Thus is the estimate for a rule with no public comments.

In Model 1, the dependent variable is the total number of comments from Members of Congress on the rule:  *= Total comments from Congress* zero-inflated negative binomial, with one observation per rule. Let be the the total number of public comments.

In Model 2, the dependent variable is the number of comments from Members of Congress on the rule that support the coalition or organizations in the coalition: = *Total comments from Congress supporting coalition*  negative binomial, with one observation per coalition per rule. Let be the total number of public comments supporting coalition .

In Model 3, the dependent variable is the share of Congressional comments supporting the coalition: = *Share of Members of Congress supporting coalition*  beta, with one observation per coalition per rule. Let be the *share* of public comments supporting coalition .

## 3.4 Results

### 3.4.1 Machine-coded Data

IN PROGRESS

**Dependent variable:** *The percent change in policy text*…

**Explanatory variables:** The *total number of comments*…

### 3.4.2 Hand-coded Data

IN PROGRESS

Currently, these data only include rules where there was a mass-comment campaign, which likely explains why business coalitions are less successful than public interest coalitions. I anticipate the sign on that coefficient to be positive in the sample of rules that did not see a mass comment campaign. The contentious nature of this sample also means that there is no variation in the coalition\_unopposed variable (no coalitions in the sample with mass comment campaigns lobbied unopposed).

**Dependent variable:** *Coalition success* is the mean of hand-coded lobbying success on a five-point scale ({-2, -1, 0, 1, 2}, recoded to {-1, -.5, 0, .5, 1} for more straightforward model interpretation).




**Explanatory variables:** *Coalition size* (a count) is the number of organizations lobbying together on the rule. *Business colation* is binomial. *Comments* is the total number of comments (including mass comments) mobilized by members of the coalition, which I transform to a log scale for modeling.

These hand-coded data include 3,528 unique comments, some of which have identical coppies for a total of 3,397,805 comments. These comments represent 212 distinct lobbying coalitions ranging in size from 2 to 223 organizations. Figure 3.6 shows that coalitions are fairly ballenced between thouse that succeed and fail to get the changes they seek in the final rule. 28% are business-led coalitions.

Table 3.1 shows a sample of coded data, summarized at the coalition level.

Table 3.1: A Sample of Hand-Coded Summarized by Coaltion

| docket\_id | coalition\_id | coalition\_comment | coalition\_unopposed | cong\_support | coalition\_size | coalition\_business | coalition\_success | comments | n |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| BSEE-2012-0005 | 46 | environmental | FALSE | 0 | 4 | FALSE | 1.5000000 | 1,530 | 1 |
| BSEE-2012-0005 | 44 | energy industry | FALSE | 0 | 38 | TRUE | 0.8620690 | 38 | 1 |
| BSEE-2013-0011 | 44 | energy industry | FALSE | 0 | 91 | TRUE | -1.2941176 | 91 | 1 |
| BSEE-2013-0011 | 46 | environmental | FALSE | 0 | 13 | FALSE | -0.7500000 | 13 | 1 |
| BSEE-2017-0008 | 46 | environmental | FALSE | 0 | 24 | FALSE | -2.0000000 | 59,410 | 1 |
| BSEE-2017-0008 | 44 | energy industry | FALSE | 0 | 7 | TRUE | 0.2857143 | 7 | 1 |
| BSEE-2018-0002 | 46 | environmental | FALSE | 0 | 27 | FALSE | -1.8947368 | 71,627 | 1 |
| BSEE-2018-0002 | 44 | energy industry | FALSE | 0 | 28 | TRUE | 0.2222222 | 28 | 1 |
| CEQ-2019-0003 | 123 | Sierra Club | FALSE | 0 | 78 | FALSE | -1.7333333 | 400,024 | 1 |
| CEQ-2019-0003 | 74 | LIUNA | FALSE | 0 | 42 | TRUE | 0.6428571 | 2,814 | 1 |
| CFPB-2016-0025 | 84 | NAACP | FALSE | 0 | 42 | FALSE | 1.3333333 | 42 | 1 |
| CFPB-2016-0025 | 27 | Church Folk | FALSE | 0 | 14 | FALSE | 1.0000000 | 14 | 1 |
| CFPB-2019-0022 | 4 | ACA International | FALSE | 0 | 19 | FALSE | 0.1666667 | 19 | 2 |
| CFPB-2019-0022 | 4 | ACA International | FALSE | 0 | 19 | TRUE | 0.1666667 | 19 | 2 |
| DOI-2015-0005 | 18 | BLANKET CREW | FALSE | 0 | 14 | FALSE | 2.0000000 | 14 | 1 |
| DOI-2015-0005 | 130 | SUPPORT AND ASSIST | FALSE | 0 | 11 | FALSE | 2.0000000 | 11 | 1 |
| ED-2016-OESE-0032 | 7 | Advocates for Children of New York | FALSE | 0 | 1 | FALSE |  | 1 | 1 |
| ED-2016-OESE-0032 | 9 | AFT | FALSE | 0 | 1 | FALSE |  | 1 | 1 |
| ED-2016-OESE-0032 | 20 | California Down Syndrome Advocacy Coalition | FALSE | 0 | 1 | FALSE |  | 1 | 1 |
| ED-2016-OESE-0032 | 41 | Education Coalition | FALSE | 0 | 1 | FALSE |  | 1 | 1 |
| ED-2016-OESE-0032 | 63 | Global Education Coalition | FALSE | 0 | 1 | FALSE |  | 1 | 1 |
| ED-2016-OESE-0032 | 86 | Naitonal Down Syndrome Congress | FALSE | 0 | 1 | FALSE |  | 1 | 1 |
| ED-2016-OESE-0032 | 90 | National Parent Teacher Association | FALSE | 0 | 1 | FALSE |  | 1 | 1 |
| ED-2016-OESE-0032 | 134 | The Coalition for Comuninty Schools | FALSE | 0 | 1 | FALSE |  | 1 | 1 |
| FEMA-2016-0003 | 114 | Pew | FALSE | 0 | 223 | FALSE | -1.8918919 | 2,982 | 1 |
| FEMA-2016-0003 | 97 | NEMA | FALSE | 0 | 44 | FALSE | 1.0000000 | 44 | 1 |
| FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0006 | 37 | Defenders of Wildlife | FALSE | 0 | 108 | FALSE | -1.6666667 | 440,844 | 1 |
| FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0006 | 88 | National Endangered Species Act Reform Coalition | FALSE | 0 | 76 | TRUE | 0.2222222 | 76 | 1 |
| FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0007 | 37 | Defenders of Wildlife | FALSE | 0 | 98 | FALSE | -1.6938776 | 702,687 | 1 |
| FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0007 | 88 | National Endangered Species Act Reform Coalition | FALSE | 0 | 74 | TRUE | 1.9629630 | 74 | 1 |
| FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0097 | 48 | environmentalists | FALSE | 0 | 62 | FALSE | -1.3255814 | 856,517 | 1 |
| FWS-HQ-ES-2018-0097 | 55 | farmers | FALSE | 0 | 53 | TRUE | 1.9166667 | 53 | 1 |
| FWS-HQ-NWRS-2012-0086 | 37 | Defenders of Wildlife | FALSE | 0 | 13 | FALSE | 0.6363636 | 53,271 | 1 |
| FWS-HQ-NWRS-2012-0086 | 11 | Alaska Oil and Gas Association | FALSE | 0 | 5 | TRUE | -0.4000000 | 5 | 1 |
| FWS-R9-ES-2008-0093 | 38 | Earthjustice | FALSE | 0 | 58 | FALSE | -1.7826087 | 58 | 1 |
| FWS-R9-ES-2008-0093 | 88 | National Endangered Species Act Reform Coalition | FALSE | 0 | 21 | TRUE | 0.2857143 | 21 | 1 |
| ICEB-2015-0002 | 85 | NAFSA | FALSE | 0 | 108 | FALSE | 1.1607143 | 108 | 1 |
| ICEB-2015-0002 | 8 | AFL-CIO | FALSE | 0 | 5 | FALSE | 0.8000000 | 5 | 1 |
| IRS-2016-0015 | 14 | Americans for Tax Fairness | FALSE | 0 | 8 | FALSE | 2.0000000 | 8 | 1 |
| IRS-2016-0015 | 30 | congressmen | FALSE | 1 | 1 | FALSE | -2.0000000 | 1 | 1 |
| IRS-2016-0015 | 124 | small businesses | FALSE | 0 | 1 | FALSE | 2.0000000 | 1 | 1 |
| MSHA-2011-0001 | 161 | Wyoming Mining Association | FALSE | 0 | 41 | TRUE | -1.4500000 | 41 | 1 |
| MSHA-2011-0001 | 153 | United Mine Workers of America | FALSE | 0 | 4 | FALSE | 0.0000000 | 4 | 1 |
| NOAA-NMFS-2008-0096 | 47 | environmental community | FALSE | 0 | 20 | FALSE | -0.9090909 | 20 | 1 |
| NOAA-NMFS-2008-0096 | 28 | commercial fishers and processors | FALSE | 0 | 13 | TRUE | -0.2857143 | 13 | 1 |
| NOAA-NMFS-2011-0117 | 46 | environmental | FALSE | 0 | 6 | FALSE | -1.0000000 | 12,887 | 1 |
| NOAA-NMFS-2011-0117 | 58 | fishing industry | FALSE | 0 | 2 | TRUE | -2.0000000 | 2 | 1 |
| NOAA-NMFS-2012-0059 | 46 | environmental | FALSE | 0 | 39 | FALSE | -1.6666667 | 102,874 | 1 |
| NOAA-NMFS-2012-0059 | 58 | fishing industry | FALSE | 0 | 12 | TRUE | -1.1666667 | 12 | 1 |
| NOAA-NMFS-2013-0050 | 46 | environmental | FALSE | 0 | 12 | FALSE | -1.3333333 | 74,818 | 1 |
| NOAA-NMFS-2013-0050 | 29 | commercial fishing | FALSE | 0 | 7 | TRUE | 0.8571429 | 7 | 1 |
| NOAA-NMFS-2013-0101 | 46 | environmental | FALSE | 0 | 121 | FALSE | -0.5625000 | 168,281 | 1 |
| NOAA-NMFS-2013-0101 | 117 | recreational fishing | FALSE | 0 | 5 | TRUE | 0.0000000 | 1,542 | 1 |
| NOAA-NMFS-2018-0035 | 45 | environment | FALSE | 0 | 19 | FALSE | -1.9000000 | 29,140 | 1 |
| NOAA-NMFS-2018-0035 | 117 | recreational fishing | FALSE | 0 | 6 | TRUE | -2.0000000 | 6 | 1 |
| NOAA-NOS-2013-0091 | 46 | environmental | FALSE | 0 | 19 | FALSE | 2.0000000 | 19 | 1 |
| NOAA-NOS-2013-0091 | 106 | ocean industries | FALSE | 0 | 2 | TRUE | -2.0000000 | 2 | 1 |
| NPS-2018-0007 | 6 | ACLU | FALSE | 0 | 74 | FALSE | 1.9666667 | 74 | 1 |
| NPS-2018-0007 | 125 | Smithsonian | FALSE | 0 | 2 | FALSE | 2.0000000 | 2 | 1 |
| OCC-2020-0026 | 6 | ACLU | FALSE | 0 | 77 | FALSE | -1.9523810 | 222 | 1 |
| OCC-2020-0026 | 82 | MLA | FALSE | 0 | 12 | FALSE | 2.0000000 | 12 | 2 |
| OCC-2020-0026 | 82 | MLA | FALSE | 0 | 12 | TRUE | 2.0000000 | 12 | 2 |
| OFCCP-2014-0004 | 6 | ACLU | FALSE | 0 | 166 | FALSE | -2.0000000 | 7,151 | 1 |
| OFCCP-2014-0004 | 150 | U.S. Chamber of Commerce | FALSE | 0 | 13 | TRUE | 1.6923077 | 13 | 1 |
| OSHA-H005C-2006-0870 | 99 | Newport News | FALSE | 0 | 28 | FALSE | 1.0357143 | 28 | 1 |
| OSHA-H005C-2006-0870 | 128 | Southern Company | FALSE | 0 | 15 | FALSE | 0.6666667 | 15 | 1 |
| PHMSA-2012-0082 | 46 | environmental | FALSE | 0 | 47 | FALSE | -1.2272727 | 330,381 | 1 |
| PHMSA-2012-0082 | 115 | rail industry | FALSE | 0 | 213 | TRUE | -0.5175439 | 213 | 1 |
| TREAS-DO-2007-0015 | 108 | other banks | FALSE | 0 | 12 | TRUE | 0.3333333 | 12 | 1 |
| TREAS-DO-2007-0015 | 54 | Family Research Council | FALSE | 0 | 6 | FALSE | 2.0000000 | 6 | 1 |
| TREAS-DO-2007-0015 | 79 | MasterCard | FALSE | 0 | 6 | TRUE | -1.3333333 | 6 | 1 |
| USCBP-2007-0064 | 16 | BBP | FALSE | 0 | 20 | FALSE | -1.2000000 | 20 | 1 |
| USCBP-2007-0064 | 40 | EBAA | FALSE | 0 | 5 | FALSE | -1.2000000 | 5 | 1 |
| USCG-2010-0990 | 19 | BoatUS | FALSE | 0 | 6 | FALSE | -1.0000000 | 6 | 1 |
| USCG-2010-0990 | 100 | NMMA | FALSE | 0 | 4 | FALSE | 2.0000000 | 4 | 1 |
| WHD-2011-0001 | 31 | Congresswoman Lucille Roybal-Allard | FALSE | 0 | 1 | FALSE |  | 1 | 1 |
| WHD-2011-0001 | 65 | Governor Terry E. Branstad | FALSE | 0 | 1 | FALSE |  | 1 | 1 |
|  | 14 | Americans for Tax Fairness | TRUE | 0 | 1 | FALSE |  | 29,845 | 1 |






Figure 3.9: Number of Comments Linked to Hand-Coded Coalitions

### 3.4.3 Results

The results of this model (Figure 3.10, Table ??) show that \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_. With lobbying success as the dependent variable, the coefficient on the main variable of interest would be interpreted as a increase in the five-point influence scale of lobbying success for each one-unit increase in the logged number of comments.





Figure 3.10: OLS model of coalition lobbying sucess with hand-coded data

To assess congressional support as a mediator in the influence of public pressure campaigns on rulemaking, I estimate the average conditional marginal effect (ACME, conditional on the number of comments from Members of Congress) and average direct effect (ADE) of mass comments using mediation analysis. Model 3 in table ?? replaces the dependent variable (lobbying success) with the mediator variable (the number of supportive members of Congress).



Mediation analysis will require adding cases where coalitions lobbied unopposed, which we are much more likely to see in the sample of rules without mass comments.

The average effect of the logged number of comments, conditional on letters from members of congress (the ACME) is round(med.cont$d.avg, 2), with a p value of round(med.cont$d0.p, 2).

The average direct effect (ADE) of the logged number of comments on lobbying success is round(med.cont$z0, 2), with a p-value of round(med.cont$z0.p, 2)

The Total Effect of a one-unit increase in the logged number of comments is round(med.cont$tau.coef, 2), with a p value of round(med.cont$tau.p, 2). round(med.cont$n0, 2) of this is mediated through mobilizing congressional attention (p-value = round(med.cont$n0.p, 2)).

### 3.4.4 Preliminary findings

I find that more public pressure correlates with more congressional oversight. This includes comments from legislators both for and against proposed rules. For example, when the Department of the Treasury published draft rules implementing the Unlawful Internet Gambling Act of 2006, the proposal generated unusually high levels of public attention. As a result, two bipartisan groups of legislators submitted comments on the rule. One, led by the chair of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, raised concerns about the Department’s implementation of the Administrative Procedures Act. The other group of legislators, led by Senator Mike Pence, pushed back against interest-group opposition to the rule and urged the Department to implement the rules. This case illustrates several broader trends that I observe. Members of Congress are more likely to engage in oversight when interest groups and the public pay more attention to an issue. When legislators do engage in rulemaking, they often engage on both sides of the issue, raising process or policy concerns that may push agencies in multiple directions.

## 3.5 Conclusion

TODO

# 4 The Environmental Justice Movement and Technocratic Policymaking

See the working paper version of this chapter [*here*](https://judgelord.github.io/research/ej/).

#### Abstract

Social movements play a critical role in advancing landmark statutes recognizing new rights and social values. Likewise, a lack of movement pressure is a leading explanation for the failure of policy efforts. Yet, we have little systematic evidence about the impact of social movements on policy. To what extent do movements shape the thousands of policies that governments make every year? I examine how social movements affect policymaking by assessing the environmental justice movement’s impact on 25,000 policy documents from 40 U.S. federal agencies from 1,993 to 2,020. Leveraging a new dataset of 42,000,000 public comments on these policies, I find that when public comments raise environmental justice concerns, these concerns are more likely to be addressed in the final rule. Effect sizes vary across agencies, possibly due to the alignment of environmental justice aims with agency missions The magnitude of public pressure also matters. When more groups and individuals raise environmental justice concerns, policy texts are more likely to change, even when controlling for overall levels of public attention. These findings suggest that distributive justice claims and levels of public attention and pressure systematically affect policymaking.

## 4.1 Introduction

Social movements like the civil rights movement and the environmental movement are understood to have played a critical role in advancing landmark statutes recognizing new rights and social values. Likewise, a lack of movement pressure is a leading explanation for the failure of policy efforts to address issues like climate change ([Skocpol 2013](#ref-Skocpol2013)). Yet, we have little systematic evidence about the impact of social movements on modern policymaking. To what extent do movements shape the thousands of policies the government makes every year? I examine how social movements affect policymaking by assessing the environmental justice movement’s impact on 25 thousand policy processes in 40 U.S. federal agencies from 1993 to 2020. Environmental justice concerns focus on unequal access to healthy environments and protection from harms caused by things like pollution and climate change ([Bullard 1993](#ref-Bullard1993)). The environmental justice movement illustrates how activists attempt to inject ideas directly into the policymaking process. Systematic data on how policy documents address (or fail to address) environmental justice allow empirical tests of theories about when institutions will address claims raised by activists.

I focus on the environmental justice movement because it offers a broad but tractable scope for analysis and illuminates what is at stake in the politics of agency policymaking. Policies have distributive consequences. How policy documents address distributive issues highlights how policy processes construct communities of “relevant” stakeholders and “appropriate” criteria to evaluate policy consequences. Raising environmental justice concerns in policy debates is an example of how social movement organizations mobilize norms and evaluative frameworks that interact with organizational identities, mission, and reputations and, thus, impact policy decisions ([D. P. Carpenter 2001](#ref-Carpenter2001)).

Tracing ideas like environmental justice (EJ) through policy processes reveals the mechanisms by which social movements succeed or fail to influence policy. If draft policies do not mention EJ concerns, but activists raise EJ concerns and policymakers then address in the final policy, this may be evidence that public pressure mattered. Likewise, when draft policies *do* address EJ, if groups comment on it and then policymakers change how the final policy addresses EJ, this may be evidence that public pressure mattered.

I assess the impact of the EJ movement qualitatively and quantitatively. Tracing the evolution of EJ analyses through several policy processes shows that the concept is hotly contested and rarely addressed by agencies in ways that activists find acceptable. Activist pressure affected how policies addressed EJ in some cases but failed to affect other policies.

Examining all rules published by 40 agencies to regulations.gov between 1993 and 2020, I find that activist mobilization affected policy discourse, even under administrations that were explicitly hostile to their cause. When public comments raise EJ concerns, these concerns are more likely to be addressed in policy documents. Specifically, the number of comments mobilized (both overall and by EJ advocates specifically) is positively correlated with agencies adding language addressing EJ to policies where the draft policy did not mention EJ. When comments raise EJ concerns, sections of policies that do address EJ are also more likely to change. Furthermore, the correlation between EJ activist mobilization and policy changes is largest for agencies with missions focused on “environmental” and distributive policy—the kinds of policymakers we may expect to have institutional and cognitive processes primed to be most responsive to EJ concerns.

## 4.2 Theory

Participatory processes like public comment periods, where policymakers must solicit public input on draft policies, are said to provide democratic legitimacy ([Croley 2003](#ref-Croley2003); [Rosenbloom 2003](#ref-Rosenbloom2003)), new technical information ([S. W. Yackee 2006](#ref-Yackee2006JPART); [Nelson and Yackee 2012](#ref-Nelson2012)), and political oversight opportunities ([Steven J. Balla 1998](#ref-Balla1998); [Mathew D. McCubbins and Schwartz 1984](#ref-McCubbins1984)). While recent scholarship on agency policymaking has shed light on sophisticated lobbying by businesses, we know surprisingly little about the vast majority of public comments on proposed agency rules, which are submitted as part of public pressure campaigns.[[34]](#footnote-219) Activists frequently target agency policymaking with letter-writing campaigns, petitions, protests, and mobilizing people to attend hearings, all classic examples of “civic engagement” ([Verba and Nie 1987](#ref-Verba1987)). Yet civic engagement remains poorly understood in the context of bureaucratic policymaking. While practitioners and administrative law scholars have long pondered what to make of activists’ mass comment campaigns, political scientists have had surprisingly little to say about this kind of civic participation.

### 4.2.1 Social Movements and Policy Change

Social movement pressure is a major driver of policy change (Dahl 1956; Piven & Cloward 1977; Lipsky 1968; Tarrow 1994; Andrews 1997; McAdam 1982, 2001; McAdam & Su 2002, McCammon et al. 2011; Cress & Snow 2000; Weldon 2002). This is especially true for policies that redistribute wealth or other social privileges. “From the very beginning, redistributive policies have been associated with social classes and social movements” ([T. J. Lowi and Nicholson 2015](#ref-Lowi2015)). The organizational forms that mobilize and channel movement pressure (often called social movement organizations by those who study their organization and advocacy organizations or pressure groups by those who study their effects) are essential features of modern politics and lawmaking ([Baumgartner and Leech 2001](#ref-Baumgartner2001); [Coglianese 2001](#ref-Coglianese2001)). Conversely, the lack of broad-based support for and movement pressure can be the failure of a policy effort ([Skocpol 2013](#ref-Skocpol2013)).

Scholars have also shown the effect of specific pressure tactics. For example, protests affect policy ([Gillion 2013](#ref-Gillion2013)). Activists reshape political parties to enact new policy agendas ([E. Schattschneider 1942](#ref-Schattschneider1942); [Cohen et al. 2008](#ref-Cohen2008); [D. Schlozman 2015](#ref-Schlozman2015); [Skocpol and Williamson 2016](#ref-Skocpol2016)). Petition campaigns, in particular, can both build the organizational capacity and political coalitions required to to affect policy and place issues on national agendas. As [D. Carpenter](#ref-CarpenterPetitions) ([2021](#ref-CarpenterPetitions)) finds, both of Indigenous governments and activists have long used opportunities to build coalitions and raise concerns to the fedral goverment:

Because they assisted in recruiting tribal communities and allies to Indigenous causes, these petitioning moments enhanced organizational democracy. They also advanced procedural democracy by effectively placing Indigenous issues on local, ecclesiastical, tribal, state, and national agendas." ([D. Carpenter 2021](#ref-CarpenterPetitions), pg. 119)

Protests to be an effective mechanism for minority interests to communicate preferences to policymakers when electoral mechanisms fail to do so. Policymakers learn and take informational cues from political behaviors like protests ([Gillion](#ref-Gillion2013) ([2013](#ref-Gillion2013))). [D. Carpenter](#ref-CarpenterPetitions) ([2021](#ref-CarpenterPetitions)) finds similar potential for petitions to serve as a channel to raise “new claims” and influence policy beyond elections: “Petition democracy offer another model of aggregation, where numerical minorities could still make a case of quantitive relevance” (pg. 479). Numbers matter for protests and petitions, regardless of whether they represent a majority.

Still, most studies of social movements tend to explain social movement emergence rather than specific impacts (see reviews by [Meyer](#ref-Meyer2004) ([2004](#ref-Meyer2004)) and [Mcadam](#ref-Mcadam2017) ([2017](#ref-Mcadam2017))). Reviews of the social movement literature find “limited research on [social movement] influence” ([Andrews and Edwards 2004](#ref-Andrews2004)).

Studies that do focus on policy influence tend to focus on landmark policies like the Civil Rights Act ([Gillion 2013](#ref-Gillion2013)) or case studies of local policy issues (e.g., [Bullard 1993](#ref-Bullard1993); [Rochon and Mazmanian 1993](#ref-Rochon1993)). Reviewing the specificity of measures used to assess the impact of advocacy campaigns, [Burstein](#ref-Burstein2020) ([2020](#ref-Burstein2020)) concludes that “In contrast to those studying opinion and policy, however, researchers studying advocacy and policy rarely discuss levels of specificity.” In addition to measures of advocacy and influence, there are issues with case selection. [Leech](#ref-Leech2010) ([2010](#ref-Leech2010)) argues that the influence of advocacy campaigns is overstated because scholars focus on issues where impact is especially likely–issues characterized by a lot of advocacy and recent or impending policy change. [Lowery](#ref-Lowery2013) ([2013](#ref-Lowery2013)) voices the opposite concern, that high-salience issues that scholars select are the cases least likely to observe advocacy success. In short, studies often select cases on the dependent variable. While large-scale and longitudinal studies have become more common ([Hojnacki et al. 2012](#ref-Hojnacki2012)), the dependent variable is rarely systematic impact across the thousands of non-landmark policies that governments make every year.

To address this gap, I focus on systematic impacts on specific policy documents over time. Specifically, I assess the impact of the environmental justice movement on bureaucratic policymaking.

### 4.2.2 Technical Information: the Currency of Lobbying

Dominant theories of bureaucratic policymaking have little room for social movements and political pressure. Instead, they focus on how agencies learn about policy problems and solutions ([Kerwin and Furlong 2011](#ref-Kerwin2011)). Leading formal models are information-based models where sophisticated lobbying groups affect policy by revealing information to the agency ([Gailmard and Patty 2017](#ref-Gailmard2017); [Libgober 2018](#ref-Libgober2018)), and empirical studies support the conclusion that information is the currency of lobbying in rulemaking ([S. W. Yackee 2012](#ref-Yackee2012); [Cook 2017](#ref-Cook2017); [Gordon and Rashin 2018](#ref-Gordon2018); [Walters 2019](#ref-Walters2019)).

Agency rulemaking is an especially technocratic and legalistic form of policymaking that explicitly privileges scientific and legal facts as the appropriate basis for decisions. Procedural requirements to consider relevant information create incentives for lobbying groups to overwhelm agencies with complex technical information, making rulemaking obscure to all but the most well-informed insiders ([Wendy E. Wagner 2010](#ref-Wagner2010)). As [S. W. Yackee](#ref-Yackee2019) ([2019](#ref-Yackee2019)) notes:

“to be influential during rulemaking, commenters may require resources and technical expertise. As Epstein, Heidt, and Farina (2014) suggest, agency rule-writers–who are often chosen because of their technical or policy-specific expertise–privilege the type of data-driven arguments and reasoning that are not common to citizen comments.” (p. 10)

The result is that rulemaking is dominated by sophisticated and well-resourced interest groups capable of providing new technical or legal information. Empirical scholarship finds that economic elites and business groups dominate American politics in general ([Jacobs and Skocpol 2005](#ref-Jacobs2005); [Soss, Hacker, and Mettler 2007](#ref-Soss2007); [Hertel-Fernandez 2019](#ref-Hertel-Fernandez2019); [Hacker 2003](#ref-Hacker2003); [Gilens and Page 2014](#ref-Gilens2014)) and rulemaking in particular. While some are optimistic that requirements for agencies to solicit and respond to public comments on proposed rules allow “civil society” to provide public oversight ([Michaels 2015](#ref-Michaels2015); [Metzger 2010](#ref-Metzger2010)), most studies find that participants in rulemaking often represent elites and business interests ([Seifter 2016](#ref-Seifter2016UCLA); [Crow, Albright, and Koebele 2015](#ref-Crow2015); [Wendy E. Wagner, Barnes, and Peters 2011](#ref-Wagner2011); [West 2009](#ref-West2009); [J. W. Yackee and Yackee 2006](#ref-Yackee2006JOP); [S. W. Yackee 2006](#ref-Yackee2006JPART); [Golden 1998](#ref-Golden1998); [Haeder and Yackee 2015](#ref-Haeder2015); [Cook 2017](#ref-Cook2017); [Libgober and Carpenter 2018](#ref-LibgoberCarpenter2018)). To the extent that scholars address public pressure campaigns, both existing theory and empirical scholarship suggest skepticism that it matters. For example, [Steven J. Balla et al.](#ref-Balla2018) ([2018](#ref-Balla2018)) find that “legal imperatives trump political considerations.”

### 4.2.3 Political Information

While social movement organizations do engage in fights over technical reports and scientific studies, the information that activists provide is often more overtly political. [Nelson and Yackee](#ref-Nelson2012) ([2012](#ref-Nelson2012)) identify political information as a potentially influential result of groups expanding their lobbying coalition. While they focus on mobilizing experts, [Nelson and Yackee](#ref-Nelson2012) ([2012](#ref-Nelson2012)) describe a dynamic that can be extended to mobilizing public pressure:

“strategic recruitment, we theorize, mobilizes new actors to participate in the policymaking process, bringing with them novel technical and political information. In other words, when an expanded strategy is employed, leaders activate individuals and organizations to participate in the policymaking process who, without the coordinating efforts of the leaders, would otherwise not lobby. This activation is important because it implies that coalition lobbying can generate new information and new actors—beyond simply the ‘usual suspects’ —relevant to policy decisionmakers.”

I argue that, concerning political information, this logic extends to non-experts in at least two ways. First, mobilizing new actors to participate in the policymaking process may yield information about a policy’s disparate effects. Second, levels of public pressure can be a political resource, allowing groups to change policymakers’ perceptions of their political environment and the political consequences of their decisions.

#### 4.2.3.1 Information About a Policy’s Disparate Effects

First, while specific *data* on disparate impacts of policy may require expertise, anyone can highlight a community of concern or potential distributive effects of a policy. Just as [Nelson and Yackee](#ref-Nelson2012) ([2012](#ref-Nelson2012)) found regarding the mobilizing of diverse experts, mobilizing diverse communities affected by a policy may introduce new claims from new actors about how the communities that a policy may benefit or harm should be constructed. Indeed, telling a policymaker how a particular set of stakeholders will be affected or what they think is a lobbying tactic. Instead of bolstering *scientific* claims, such comments focusing on a policy’s disparate impacts bolster *political* claims about who counts and even *who exists* as a distinct, potentially affected group that deserves policymakers’ attention.

The political construction of policy-relevant groups through the policy process has long interested administrative law scholars. [Gellhorn](#ref-Gellhorn1972) ([1972](#ref-Gellhorn1972)) argues that “individuals and groups willing to assist administrative agencies in identifying interests deserving protection” (p. 403) improve the policy process. [Seifter](#ref-Seifter2016UCLA) ([2016](#ref-Seifter2016UCLA)) argues that policymaker’s beliefs about who is lobbying them and who those groups represent ought to be (and likely is) key to how they respond.

The politics and outcomes of policymaking depend on how the relevant groups are defined ([Theodore J. Lowi 1964](#ref-Lowi1964)). The power of groups to affect policy depends on their recognition by formal and informal institutions. Public comment periods in agency rulemaking are formally more “identity neutral” than policy processes with procedural rights reserved for certain interests ([Feinstein 2021](#ref-Feinstein2021)). This means that the political construction of relevant groups depends on who participates and the identities they mobilize or claim to represent. As [S. W. Yackee](#ref-Yackee2019) ([2019](#ref-Yackee2019)) and others note, the information costs mean that individuals rarely participate. Instead, groups claim to represent various constituencies. “Because the costs of individualized participation in policy decision making are often excessive, informal representatives are prevalent as a form of participation in agency decisions” ([Rossi 1997](#ref-Rossi1997), pg. 194).

Bureaucratic policymaking in the United States is dominated by cost-benefit analysis, which requires defining groups that are benefited or harmed by a policy and may even weigh or prioritize benefits or costs to certain groups. Agencies have many reasons to consider the distributional effects of policy and often do. For example, president Biden issued a memorandum instructing the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to propose recommendations for “procedures that take into account the distributional consequences of regulations.” Thus, comments raising distributive concerns provide potentially influential political information.

This distributive information raises claims of distributive justice. Public comment periods are celebrated as “a crucial way to ensure that agency decisions are legitimate, accountable, and just” ([Bierschbach and Bibas 2012](#ref-Bierschbach2012)). “Public participation can force agencies to rethink initial inclinations” ([Seifter 2016](#ref-Seifter2016UCLA))—for example, which social groups are relevant or deserve special attention. Courts purportedly review policy decisions made through rulemaking with a particular eye toward whether they foster “fairness and deliberation” (*United States v. Mead Corp.*, 533 U.S. 218 2001), though empirical evidence suggests skepticism about the importance of policy processes for judicial review ([Judge-Lord 2016](#ref-judgelord2016MPSA)).

#### 4.2.3.2 Public pressure as a political resource

Second, the number of supporters may matter because it indicates support among relevant communities or the broader public. Again, instead of bolstering *scientific* claims, perceived levels of public support bolster *political* claims.

Like other forms of political participation, such as protests and letter-writing campaigns, public pressure campaigns provide no new technical information. Nor do they wield any formal authority to reward or sanction bureaucrats. The number on each side, be it ten or ten million, has no legal import for an agency’s response.

However, an organization’s ability to expand the scope of conflict by mobilizing a large number of people can be a valuable political resource ([E. E. Schattschneider 1975](#ref-Schattschneider1975)). [S. R. Furlong](#ref-Furlong1997) ([1997](#ref-Furlong1997)) and [Kerwin and Furlong](#ref-Kerwin2011) ([2011](#ref-Kerwin2011)) identify mobilization as a tactic. The organizations they surveyed believed that forming coalitions and mobilizing large numbers of people were among the most effective lobbying tactics. While [S. R. Furlong](#ref-Furlong1997) ([1997](#ref-Furlong1997)) and [Kerwin and Furlong](#ref-Kerwin2011) ([2011](#ref-Kerwin2011)) focused on how organizations mobilize their members, I expand on this understanding of mobilization as a lobbying tactic to include a campaign’s broader audience, more akin to the concept of an attentive public ([Key 1961](#ref-Key1961)) or issue public ([Converse 1964](#ref-Converse1964)).

While scholars have generally distinguished the participation of groups from individual citizens (see [S. W. Yackee](#ref-Yackee2019) ([2019](#ref-Yackee2019)) for a review), “it can be difficult to distinguish an individual’s independent contribution from an interest-group-generated form letter” ([Seifter 2016](#ref-Seifter2016UCLA), pg. 1313). I argue that we should view the participation of individuals as a direct result of interest group mobilization. As ([Rossi 1997](#ref-Rossi1997), pg. 194) argues, “individuals are most likely to participate in agency decisions by virtue of their membership in interest groups.” Indeed, nearly all individual comments on proposed policies are mobilized by interest groups ([Judge-Lord 2019b](#ref-judgelord2019SPSA)). The small number of unaffiliated individuals, disconnected from any organized lobbying effort, can be safely ignored empirically. Interest groups are the unit of analysis, and individual participants are best understood as measuring an amplitude of support for their efforts.

Because many politically active groups are “memberless” or run by professionals who lobby with little input from their members ([Baumgartner and Leech 2001](#ref-Baumgartner2001); [Skocpol 2003](#ref-Skocpol2003); [K. L. Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012](#ref-Schlozman2012)), evidence of an actual constituency is valuable political information. Petition signatures and form letters are among the only ways that a pressure group can demonstrate an engaged and issue-specific constituency on whose behalf they claim to advocate. While lobbying disclosure requirements could provide other information about how well groups represent the constituencies they claim to represent ([Seifter 2016](#ref-Seifter2016UCLA)), letter-writing campaigns are one of the only strategies currently available to demonstrate issue-specific congruence between the positions of groups and the people they claim to represent ([Judge-Lord 2019b](#ref-judgelord2019SPSA)).

Finally, expanding the scope of conflict by mobilizing public attention to rulemaking may shift policymakers’ attention away from the technical information provided by the “usual suspects” and toward the distributive effects of policy. The “fire alarm” role that interest groups play in the policy process ([Mathew D. McCubbins and Schwartz 1984](#ref-McCubbins1984)) may have different effects when sounding the alarm also involves “going public” ([Judge-Lord 2019b](#ref-judgelord2019SPSA)).

### 4.2.4 Hypotheses

The existing literature on bureaucratic policymaking in general—and EJ advocacy in particular—presents competing intuitions about the effect of EJ activists and the broader public in rulemaking. From the above discussion political information, I distill five hypotheses —three about distributive information and two about public pressure. I posit hypotheses in the direction that these advocacy groups do affect rulemaking while also noting equally plausible intuitions for the opposite conclusions. Because of the general skepticism and empirical work that has found that advocacy groups and public pressure campaigns have little to no effect on rulemaking, I set the empirical bar low: do EJ advocates and public pressure campaigns have *any* effect at all on policy documents.

#### 4.2.4.1 Distributive Information Hypotheses

*Distributive Information Hypothesis*: Policymakers are more likely to change whether or how policies address distributive justice when commenters raise distributive justice concerns.

As discussed above, agency policymakers have incentives to address distributive concerns, especially environmental justice, due to E.O. 12898 and judicial review of compliance with the Administrative Procedures Act. By raising EJ concerns, commenters draw attention to the distribution of policy impacts—who a policy may affect. Asserting definitions and categories of stakeholders and affected groups is one type of policy-relevant information.

*Repeated Information Hypothesis*: Policymakers are more likely to change whether or how policies address concerns when more commenters raise them.

Scholarship on lobbying in rulemaking emphasizes the value of repeated information and coalition size ([Mendelson 2011](#ref-Mendelson2011); [Nelson and Yackee 2012](#ref-Nelson2012)). This implies that the more unique comments raise EJ concerns, the more likely the coalition will influence policy.[[35]](#footnote-225)

Competing intuitions and other prior studies oppose both the *Distributive and Repeated Information Hypotheses*. Formal models and empirical scholarship on lobbying in rulemaking emphasize the importance of novel science and technical information—things unknown to agency experts ([Wendy E. Wagner 2010](#ref-Wagner2010)). Furthermore, scholarship finds business commenters are influential, and public interest groups are not ([J. W. Yackee and Yackee 2006](#ref-Yackee2006JOP); [Haeder and Yackee 2015](#ref-Haeder2015)). Furthermore, policymakers may be more likely to anticipate EJ concerns when they are more salient to interest groups. This would mean that rules where commenters raise EJ concerns may be the *least* likely to change whether or how EJ is addressed because policymakers are more likely to have already considered these issues and stated their final position in the draft rule.

*Policy Receptivity Hypothesis*: Policymakers that more frequently address concerns like environmental justice will be more responsive to commenters raising those concerns.

Bureaucracies are specialized institutions built to make and implement certain kinds of policies based on certain goals and types of facts. Each agency’s distinct norms and epistemic community determine whether policymakers see issues as “environmental” and whether they have disparate impacts that demand consideration of distributive “justice.” Some policymakers may see their policy area as more related to environmental justice than others and thus be more receptive to commenter concerns.

The competing intuition to the *Policy Receptivity Hypothesis* is that policymakers familiar with EJ concerns are the *least* likely to respond to EJ concerns because they anticipate these concerns—they are not novel to them. If so, agencies that rarely consider EJ may be more easily influenced by commenters who present somewhat novel information and concerns. These policymakers may be less likely to have preempted EJ critiques in the draft policy.

#### 4.2.4.2 Public Pressure Hypotheses

*General Pressure Hypothesis*: Policies are more likely to change when they receive more public attention (e.g., more public comments).

If policymakers respond to public pressure, policy should be more likely to change when more people comment on a draft policy. This follows the intuition that policy is most likely to move in high-salience policy processes ([Leech 2010](#ref-Leech2010)).

The competing intuition against the *General Pressure Hypothesis* is again that large numbers of comments indicate policy processes that were already salient before the public pressure campaign. Policymakers anticipate public scrutiny and are thus more likely to have stated their final position in the draft policy. If this is the case, policies with more public comments should be *less* likely to change. Public attention could also be unrelated to policy change, meaning that policymakers are neither anticipating nor responding to public attention in writing or revising policy documents.

*Specific Pressure Hypothesis*: Policies are more likely to address an issue when they receive more public attention (e.g., more public comments) *and* at least one comment raises that issue.

This hypothesis asserts that the overall level of public attention will condition policy responses to specific claims–it is the interaction between the number of total public comments and at least one of those comments raising EJ concerns that makes policy more likely to address EJ.

The competing intuition against the *Specific Pressure Hypothesis* is again that large numbers of comments indicate high-salience rulemakings where policymakers are more likely to anticipate public scrutiny, including how they did or did not address specific issues like environmental justice. If policymakers anticipate public scrutiny, they may be more likely to preempt EJ concerns and state their final position in the draft policy.

## 4.3 Testing the Theory

### 4.3.1 “Environmental Justice” as a Boundary-drawing Tool

The politics of environmental justice has several convenient properties for studying the policy impact of social movements. First, discourse around policies framed as “environmental” issues are, unlike issues like civil rights and immigration, inconsistently racialized and, unlike issues like taxes and spending, inconsistently focused on *distributions* of costs and benefits. This means that policies may or may not be framed in environmental justice terms. Despite policy almost always having disparate impacts, an “environmental” frame often creates a human-environment distinction and shifts attention to non-human objects such as air, water, food, or landscapes and away from the distribution of access to them or protection from them when they are contaminated. By focusing on distributions of costs and benefits, fights over EJ analyses differ from more traditional utilitarian or preservationist analyses.

Second, compared to other ideas around which people mobilize, “environmental justice” is a fairly distinctive phrase. Most people who use this phrase share a general definitional foundation. Even attempts to reframe the term (e.g., to focus on class rather than race or jobs rather than health) come about as dialectical moves related to the term’s historical uses. Thus, when “environmental justice” appears in a text, it is rarely a coincidence of words; its appearance is a result of the movement or reactions to it.

Third, this phrase appears frequently when the idea is discussed. There are few synonyms. Groups raising equity concerns on “environmental” issues commonly use the phrase “environmental justice.” Those who use narrower, related terms–including the older concept of “environmental racism” and the newer concept of “climate justice”–almost always use “environmental justice” in their advocacy as well.

Finally, the term is relevant to rulemaking records in particular because Executive Order 12898 issued in 1994 by President Clinton—“Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations”—directs all agencies to consider EJ implications of their actions and policies. Executive Orders from Presidents Obama and Biden and statements from agency heads in every administration have since interpreted and reinterpreted parts of this Order, all with direct implications for rulemaking. This does not mean that all draft or final rules address EJ, but they tend to cite Executive Order 12898 and explicitly discuss environmental justice when they do. For the same reason, commenters who critique draft rules also cite this Executive Order and use this language. Again, this is true both for movement activists and reactionary efforts to redefine the term. While EO 12898 does not itself create a right to sue agencies, courts may strike down rules for failing to comply with procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) if the agency fails to “examine the relevant data” or “consider an important aspect of the problem” (*Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 1983). This can include an agency’s 12898 EJ analysis: “environmental justice analysis can be reviewed under NEPA and the APA” (*Communities Against Runway Expansion, Inc. v. FAA*, 2004). The legal salience of the phrase “environmental justice” means that advocates attempting to frame policies in distributive terms tend to use the phrase, and agencies also tend to use it if they respond to these concerns.

### 4.3.2 Data

To examine whether EJ activists and public pressure campaigns shape policy documents, I collect the text of all draft rules, public comments, and final rules from regulations.gov. Then, I select rulemaking documents from agencies that published at least one rule explicitly addressing EJ from 1993 to 2020. This yields over 25,000 rulemaking dockets from 40 agencies. 12,257 of these have both a proposed and final rule.[[36]](#footnote-231)

Despite E.O. 12898, most rules do not address EJ. Figure 4.1 shows that most draft and final rules (about 90%) do not mention “environmental justice.” Interestingly, the total number of final rules and the percent of the total addressing EJ have remained relatively stable for the period where regulations.gov data are complete (after 2005). From 2006 to 2020, these agencies published between 2000 and 3000 final rules per year, of which between 200 and 300 addressed EJ.



Even at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), where most policies are clearly framed as “environmental” issues, a consistent minority of rules address EJ. Many agencies that make policy with apparent EJ effects almost never address EJ. These include the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the Office of Surface Mining (OSM). A majority of rules addressed EJ only in a few years at a few agencies that publish relatively few rules, including the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), Army Corps of Engineers (COE), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Forest Service (FS), and several Department of Transportation agencies (the Federal High Way Administration (FHWA), Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), and Federal Transit Administration (FTA)). Figure 4.3 shows the number of rulemaking projects over time by whether they ultimately addressed EJ at agencies that either published more than ten rules addressing EJ or receiving over 100 comments raising EJ concerns.



Figure 4.3: Number of Proposed and Final Rules Addressing Environmental Justice at the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), Army Corps of Engineers (COE), Department of Transportation (DOT), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Federal High Way Administration (FHWA), Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Forest Service (FS), Federal Transit Administration (FTA), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), National Highway Transportation Saftey Administration (NHTSA), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and Office of Surface Mining (OSM)

#### 4.3.2.1 Comments

Figure 4.4 shows the number of comments on each proposed rule published between 1993 and 2020. Light red circles indicate rules where no commenters raised EJ concerns. Dark blue Triangles indicate rules where they did. The bottom row shows the subset of rules where “environmental justice” appeared in neither the draft nor the final rule. The middle row shows rules where “environmental justice” appeared in the final but not the draft. My first analysis compares these two subsets. The top row shows rules where “environmental justice” appeared in both the draft and final rule. My second analysis assesses change in this subset of rules. Predictably, commenters most often raised EJ concerns on rules in the first row, but many rules that did not initially address EJ still received comments raising EJ concerns.



Figure 4.4: Number of Comments on Proposed and Final Rules and Whether Comments Raised Environmental Justice Concerns

#### 4.3.2.2 Interest Groups and Second-order Representation

When lobbying during rulemaking, groups often make dubious claims to represent broad segments of the public ([Seifter 2016](#ref-Seifter2016UCLA)). Thus, to interpret substantive results or the normative import of any findings in this analysis, it is insufficient to know which groups participate. We also need to know who these groups claim to represent and whether those people are actually involved in the organization’s decisions. As Seifter argues:

“the expertise a group claims is often based on its ability to convey a particular constituency’s perspective, experience, or concerns…A group that does not have or engage with a membership cannot reliably convey those sorts of constituency-based insights. Moreover, even when a group’s assertions seem independent of a constituency—say, the results of a scientific study—information about second-order participation matters. Understanding the group’s sources, funding, and potential biases is important to assessing the reliability of its information and its contribution to agency expertise” ([Seifter 2016](#ref-Seifter2016UCLA), pg. 1306).

Examining second-order representation is thus required to assess “what contemporary participation does and does not achieve” ([Seifter 2016](#ref-Seifter2016UCLA), pg. 1306)—for example, the extent to which EJ concerns (and any potential policy response) indicate genuine social movement advocacy and influence. Recall that EJ is a contested concept used to evoke different distributive claims by different groups. The prevalence and impact of EJ concerns in the policy process is only meaningful against the backdrop of who exactly is using EJ rhetoric.

I examine who is raising EJ concerns in two ways. First, I identify the top organizational commenters such as tribes, businesses, and nonprofits using EJ language and investigate whom these groups represent. Second, for comments where a commenter signed their name, I compare surnames to their racial and ethnic identity propensities in the U.S. Census. Together these two pieces of information allow me to comment on “second-order” representation, i.e., the extent to which public comments are representative of the groups they claim to represent ([Seifter 2016](#ref-Seifter2016UCLA)).

##### 4.3.2.2.1 Which Organizations Most often Raise EJ Concerns?

To explore who raises EJ concerns, I first identify the organization behind each comment through a mix of hand-coding and text analysis. This includes organizational comments on signed letterhead and individuals who use the text of a form letter provided by an organization. I then investigated the top 20 organizations that mobilized the most comments (form letters) mentioning “environmental justice” and all organizations that raised EJ concerns on more than one policy.

The top mobilizer of comments mentioning “environmental justice” between 1993 and 2020 was the Sierra Club, with over 340,000 comments mentioning EJ on dozens of rules. The Sierra Club a membership organization whose members pay dues, elect the leaders of local chapters, and have some say in local advocacy efforts. However, its policy work is directed by a more traditional national advocacy organization funded by donations, including over $174 million from Bloomberg Philanthropies that funded several of the public pressure campaigns in these data. The Sierra Club does have a major program arm dedicated to Environmental Justice that works with local partners “to foster the growth of the environmental justice movement so that oppressed communities will find justice and everyone can experience the benefits of a healthy and sustainable future.” The extent to which those individuals have a formal say in the national organization’s lobbying decisions varies across campaigns. The National Board of Directors adopted a statement on social justice in 1993 and principles on environmental justice in 2001. The national website does contain regular Spanish language content. As a federated organization with many local efforts, it is difficult to generalize about second-order representation.

The second most prolific organizer of EJ comments was Earthjustice, with over 175,000 comments on many of the same rules that the Sierra Club lobbied on. Earthjustice is primarily engaged in litigation on behalf of environmental causes. Their website boasts 2.2 million supporters, but it is not clear who they are or if they play any role in the advocacy strategy. A search on the website returns 360 results for “Environmental Justice,” with the top results from staff biographies who work on more local or targeted campaigns, such as environmental conditions for the incarcerated. The EJ language used on the main page is relatively vague. For example, “We are fighting for a future where children can breathe clean air, no matter where they live.” ([Earthjustice 2017](#ref-Earthjustice2017)). The website does contain some Spanish language content.

The Natural Resources Defense Council is similar to Earthjustice–a national nonprofit funded by donations and focused on litigation–but they also lobby and organize public pressure campaigns, including over 160,000 comments mentioning environmental justice.

CREDO Action and MoveOn are more generic progressive mobilizers who lack a systematic focus on EJ issues, but occasionally leverage their vast membership and contact lists to support EJ campaigns led by others.

The Alliance for Climate Protection is more of an elite political group founded by former Vice President Al Gore.

We Act and Communities for a Better Environment both have environmental justice in their central mission statement. Community leaders founded We Act in Harlem, New York, to advocate against environmental racism and poor air quality ([WEACT 2017](#ref-WEACT2017)). Communities for a Better Environment has projects throughout California but is particularly active in Oakland ([CBECAL 2017](#ref-CBECAL2017)). Much of the content of their website is in both English and Spanish. Both organizations focus primarily on “low-income communities of color” and frame their work primarily in terms of race and class. While both organizations participated in national policymaking, We Act is more focused on communities in Harlem and New York, whereas Communities for a Better Environment casts a broader frame: “CBE’s vision of environmental justice is global–that’s why the organization continues to participate in such international efforts as the Indigenous Environmental Network and the Global Week of Action for Climate Justice” ([CBECAL 2017](#ref-CBECAL2017)).

While not a large portion of EJ comments, companies repeatedly raise research about the unequal impacts of policy to frame these issues as a legitimate but unresolved scientific debate that is not yet conclusive enough to base regulations on, mirroring the way tobacco and fossil fuel companies have emphasized scientific uncertainty in their lobbying efforts.<!-TODO CITE–> For example, in one comment, the Southern Company wrote:

“People with lower SES are exposed to almost an order of magnitude more traffic near their homes (Reynolds et al., 2001), and live closer to large industrial sites and are exposed to more industrial air pollution (Jerrett et al., 2001). Legitimate health concerns must be addressed. But adopting standards with a scientific basis so uncertain that health improvement cannot be assured is not sound public health policy.”

Like many companies, they claim to represent their customers: “electric generating companies and their customers are expected to bear much of the burden” of regulations ([Hobson 2004](#ref-Hobson2004)). Yet, customers have little say in companies’ decisions.

Overall, regarding second-order representation, it appears that the groups most often using the language of environmental justice may do so sincerely but generally represent affected communities in a surrogate capacity ([J. Mansbridge 2003](#ref-Mansbridge2003)). Several groups representing local communities and led by community leaders have participated, but not nearly as often or with the same intensity as the “big greens.” The domination of large advocacy organizations highlights the importance of resources as a condition for lobbying and mobilizing. Not all groups who may benefit from generating political information can leverage it because they lack the resources to fund a campaign or even comment on relevant policies. However, smaller, more member-driven groups may partner with national groups that have more resources to mobilize on their behalf. Finally, a third, much less common type of commenter raises EJ issues to reframe them as ongoing debates and thus undermine their urgency. I call this reason for engaging an attempt to “break a perceived consensus.” In a way, the fact that energy companies felt compelled to acknowledge and question EJ concerns suggests their importance for policy outcomes.

##### 4.3.2.2.2 Commenter Race

To estimate the racial distribution of commenters using EJ language, I select commenters who signed with a surname appearing in census records. Figure 4.5 shows a probabilistic racial distribution of commenters who raise EJ concerns in their comments based on the distribution of self-reported racial identities associated with surnames as recorded in the 2010 census.[[37]](#footnote-238) I estimate this distribution using the proportion of people with a given surname identified as belonging to each racial category (from this limited set of options). This approach does not assign specific individuals to racial categories. Instead, it represents each commenter as a set of probabilities adding up to 1. The estimated racial distribution of the sample is the sum of individual probabilities.



Figure 4.5: Estimated Racial Distribution from Census Surnames of Commenters raising “Environmental Justice” Concerns in Rulemaking

Compared to the overall distribution in the 2010 census, this sample of commenters appears to be disproportionately Black and less than proportionately Latinx or Asian, with just slightly fewer Whites relative to the national population. This distribution makes sense given that environmental justice African Americans have led theorizing and activism ([Bullard 1993](#ref-Bullard1993)).

### 4.3.3 Tracing Ideas Through Rulemaking: “Environmental Justice” as a Contested Concept

Using an environmental justice frame does not always imply the same communities of concern. Environmental justice emerged from movements against environmental racism, especially the disposal of toxic materials in predominantly Black neighborhoods ([Bullard 1993](#ref-Bullard1993)). However, the term quickly took on other meanings, encompassing various marginalized groups. President Clinton’s 1994 Executive Order on Environmental Justice required all parts of the federal government to make “addressing disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations” a core aspect of their mission. This meant considering disproportionate effects of policies by race and income during rulemaking.

In 2005, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) political appointees reinterpreted the Order, removing race as a factor in identifying and prioritizing populations. This move was criticized by activists and two reports by EPA’s own Office of Inspector General.

President Obama’s EPA Administrators reestablished race as a factor. They named EJ as one of their top priorities, but they also faced criticism from activists for paying lip service to environmental racism without adequate policy changes.

In an October 2017 proposed rule to repeal restrictions on power plant pollution, the Trump EPA acknowledged that “low-income and minority communities located in proximity to [power plants] may have experienced an improvement in air quality as a result of the emissions reductions.” Because the Obama EPA discussed EJ when promulgating the Clean Power Plan rule— stating that “climate change is an environmental justice issue” —, the Trump EPA attempted to reframe rather than ignore environmental justice. The Trump EPA contended that the Obama EPA “did not address lower household energy bills for low-income households [and that] workers losing jobs in regions or occupations with weak labor markets would have been most vulnerable” (EPA 2017). Like regulated industry commenters, these statements frame the distribution of jobs and electricity costs as EJ issues to push back against policies that would equalize the distribution of health impacts from pollution.

The central conflict over the role of race in policy analyses is just one of many conflicts that the environmental justice movement has caused to be fought somewhat on its terms. The next section briefly reviews the decades-long policy fight over regulating Mercury pollution to illustrate how these definitional conflicts shape rules and rulemaking. This case and other examples in this article emerged from reading hundreds of rulemaking documents where agencies did and did not respond to comments raising EJ concerns. Their purpose is to assess whether the cases in the quantitative analysis are plausibly what they appear to be: that changes in rule text are, sometimes, causally related to public comments and that non-changes are cases of agencies disregarding comments, not some accident of the data or measures. The qualitative reading also confirmed other key assumptions, such as the fact that advocates do, in fact, use “environmental justice” when they raise distributional concerns, even on many rules that are not about issues traditionally considered “environmental.”

#### 4.3.3.1 The Evolving Distributional Politics of Mercury Pollution

Definitions of the public good and minority rights are implicit in most policy documents, including agency rules. The public comment process offers an opportunity to protest these definitions. Protest is one way that marginalized groups can communicate opinions on issues to government officials ([Gillion 2013](#ref-Gillion2013)). In the EPA’s Mercury Rules, two definitional issues were decisive. First, as with many forms of pollution, mercury-emitting power plants are concentrated in low-income and non-White communities. Second, some populations consume much more locally-caught freshwater fish, a major vector of Mercury toxicity. Studies inspired by the political controversy around the Mercury Rules found high risk among certain communities, including “Hispanic, Vietnamese, and Laotian populations in California and Great Lakes tribal populations (Chippewa and Ojibwe) active on ceded territories around the Great Lakes” (EPA 2012). Thus the standards that EPA chooses depend on whom the regulation aims to protect: the average citizen, local residents, or fishing communities. This decision has disparate effects based on race and class because of disparate effects based on geography and cultural practices.

In December 2000, when the EPA first announced its intention to regulate Mercury from power plants, the notice published in the Federal Register did not address EJ issues, such as the disparate effects of mercury on certain populations; it only discussed anticipated impacts in reference to “the U.S. population” (EPA 2000). When the first draft rule was published, it only discussed the effects of the rule on regulated entities, noting that

“Other types of entities not listed could also be affected” (EPA 2002).

Commenting on this draft, Heather McCausland of the Alaska Community Action on Toxics (ACAT) wrote:

“The amount of methyl-mercury and other bioaccumulative chemicals consumed by Alaskans (especially Alaskan Natives) could potentially be much higher than is assumed… [This could increase] the Alaskan Native mortality rate for babies, which according to the CDC, is 70% higher than the United States average. Indigenous Arctic & Alaskan Native populations are some of the most polluted populations in the world. Global transport & old military sites contaminate us too.”

By citing the CDC, McCausland’s comment provided both technical and distributive information. As allies mobilized, public pressure mounted to address the disparate impacts of mercury levels. After receiving hundreds of thousands of comments and pressure from tribal governments and organizations, a revised proposed rule echoed McCausland’s comment noting that

“Some subpopulations in the U.S., such as Native Americans, Southeast Asian Americans, and lower-income subsistence fishers may rely on fish as a primary source of nutrition and/or for cultural practices. Therefore, they consume larger amounts of fish than the general population and may be at a greater risk of the adverse health effects from Hg due to increased exposure” (EPA 2004).

After nearly a million additional public comments, a further revised proposed rule ultimately included five pages of analysis of the disparate impacts on “vulnerable populations” including “African Americans,” “Hispanic,” “Native American,” and “Other and Multi-racial” groups (EPA 2011). In the final rule, “vulnerable populations” was replaced with “minority, low income, and indigenous populations” (EPA 2012). The EPA had also conducted an analysis of sub-populations with particularly high potential risks of exposure due to high rates of fish consumption as well as additional analysis of the distribution of mortality risk by race.

Of this second round of comments, over 200 unique comments explicitly raised EJ issues. The Little River Band of Ottawa Indians expressed the Tribe’s

“frustration at trying to impress upon the EPA the multiple and profound impacts of mercury contamination from a Tribal perspective. Not to mention the obligations under treaties to participate with tribes on a ‘Government to Government’ basis. At present, no such meetings have occurred in any meaningful manner with EPA Region V, the EPA National American Indian Environmental Office, nor the State of Michigan’s Department of Environmental Quality…Although EPA purported to consider environmental justice as it developed its Clean Air Mercury Rule, it failed utterly. In this rulemaking, EPA perpetuated, rather than ameliorated, a long history of cultural discrimination against tribes and their members” (Sprague 2011).

Did comments like these play a role in EPA’s changed analysis of whom Mercury limits should aim to protect? Given the many potential sources of influence, it may be difficult to attribute causal effects of particular comments on a given policy. However, comments may serve as a good proxy for the general mobilization of groups and individuals around an administrative process, and it is not clear why the EPA would not address EJ in the first draft of a rule and then add it to subsequent drafts in the absence of activist pressure. Electoral politics does not offer an easy explanation. The notice proposing the Mercury Rule was issued by the Clinton administration, the same administration that issued the Executive Order on Environmental Justice, and the subsequent drafts that did address EJ issues were published by the Bush administration, which had a more contentious relationship with EJ advocates, while Republicans controlled both houses of Congress. The expansion of the analysis from one draft to the next seems to be in response to activist pressure.

### 4.3.4 Measuring Policy Change

Having shown how public comments and pressure can influence policy texts, I assess the general relationship between comments and policy texts across all rules. I use two indicators of responsiveness to model the effect of public comments on policy documents: *whether* a rule addresses EJ and change in *how* it addresses EJ, i.e., change in portions of the text discussing EJ. Both measures represent a relatively low bar, indicating whether the agency explicitly paid any attention to EJ. This is similar to measures of “proceedural responsiveness” used by ([**Balla2020?**](#ref-Balla2020)). The low empirical bar is appropriate given that prior research shows little to no effect of public comments from advocacy groups ([J. W. Yackee and Yackee 2006](#ref-Yackee2006JOP); [**Balla2020?**](#ref-Balla2020)) and low levels of attention to EJ concerns in particular [CITE].

Examples in the previous section illustrate how text mentioning “environmental justice” might be added or change. Carefully tracing a few rulemaking processes also helped to avoid analytic pitfalls. For example, one case where an agency did an EJ analysis and then appeared not to respond to a comment discussing EJ was, in fact, due to the fact that the commenter included an annotated version of the draft rule their comment, adding only “no comment” next to the 12898 section. To correct this, I removed text copied from the proposed rule from comments in pre-processing.

#### 4.3.4.1 Measure 1: Adding Text Addressing EJ to Final Rules

For the subset of draft rules that did not address EJ, I measure whether agencies added any mention of “environmental justice” in the final rule. Such additions usually take the form of an “E.O. 12898” section where the agency justifies its policy changes with respect to some concept(s) of environmental justice. The next most common addition occurs in the agency’s response to comments, explaining how the rule did not have disparate effects or that they were insignificant.

Agencies may both respond to a comment and add a 12898 section. For example, the EPA responded to several commenters, including Earthjustice, the Central Valley Air Quality Coalition, the Coalition for Clean Air, Central California Environmental Justice Network, and Central California Asthma Collaborative: “EPA agrees it is important to consider environmental justice in our actions and we briefly addressed environmental justice principles in our proposal.” As the commenters noted, the EPA had not, in fact, addressed environmental justice in the proposed rule, which approved California rules regulating particulate matter emissions from construction sites, unpaved roads, and disturbed soils in open and agricultural areas. EPA did add a fairly generic 12898 section to the final rule but did not substantively change the rest of the policy.

Less frequently, an agency may explicitly dismiss a comment and decline to add a 12898 section. For example, EPA responded to a comment on another rule, “One commenter stated that EPA failed to comply with Executive Order 12898 on Environmental Justice…We do not believe that these amendments will have any adverse effects on…minority and low-income populations…Owners or operators are still required to develop SSM plans to address emissions…The only difference from current regulations is that the source is not required to follow the plan” (71 FR 20445). As these examples illustrate, agencies may add text addressing environmental justice that would not satisfy critics. This measure merely indicates whether the agency engaged with the claims.

Most frequently, agencies neither responded to comments nor added a 12898 section.

#### 4.3.4.2 Measure 2: Changing Text Addressing EJ in Final Rules

Where draft rules did address EJ, I measured whether a rule changed *how* it discussed “environmental justice” between its draft and final publication.[[38]](#footnote-246) When an agency addresses EJ in the draft rule, it is almost always in a section about how it addressed E.O. 12898. In many cases, much of the text of final rules, including 12898 sections, remain exactly the same between draft and final versions. To measure change, I parse draft and final rules into sentences and identify sentences containing the phrase “environmental justice.” If an agency leaves these sentences unchanged between the draft and final rule and adds no new sentences mentioning EJ, this suggests that the agency did not engage with comments raising EJ concerns.[[39]](#footnote-247)


## 4.4 Results

### 4.4.1 Are final rules more likely to address environmental justice after comments do so?

Where environmental justice is not addressed in the draft rule, a higher percent of rules add EJ language when comments raise EJ concerns. Descriptively, there is a large difference in the rate of addressing EJ between rules where commenters and did (33%) and did not raise EJ concerns (4%). However, in most cases (67%), agencies did not respond at all when commenters raised EJ concerns.

Rates of adding EJ in rules without EJ comments decreased over time, leveling out at 3% during the Obama and Trump presidencies. Rates of adding EJ when commenters raised EJ concerns are consistently much higher, but it also decreases over time, from 57% under G.W. Bush to 26% under Trump. EPA had a relatively high baseline rate of change (10%), which increased to 52% when comments raised EJ concerns. Most other agencies also added EJ at a higher rate when comments raised EJ concerns; indeed, most agencies almost never do so when comments did not raise EJ concerns.

To account for differences across presidents, agencies, and the number of comments, I estimate logit regression. For models 1 and 2 in Table ??, the outcome is whether the agency added environmental justice to the final rule. The predictors are whether comments raised EJ concerns, the number of unique (non-form letter) comments addressing EJ, the total number of comments (including form letters), and the interaction between the total number of comments and whether any comments raised EJ concerns. Models 3 and 4 are the same as models 1 and 2, except that the outcome is whether the policy text changed how EJ is discussed (described in the next section). All models include fixed effects for the presidential administration. Models 2 and 4 also include fixed effects for agency. Thus, estimates in Models 1 and 3 include variation *across* agencies, whereas estimates in models 2 and 4 only rely on variation *within* agencies. All estimates rely on variation *within* each presidential administration. All predicted probabilities shown below include agency fixed effects, models 2 and 4.



#### 4.4.1.1 The Predicted Probability of Added Text

As logit coefficients are not easily interpretable, Figures 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 show the predicted probability of a final rule addressing environmental justice when the draft rule did not.

Controlling for average rates of policy change per agency and the number of comments, Figure 4.6 shows a large increase in the probability of policy change when comments raise EJ concerns. This supports the *Distributive Information Hypothesis.* When comments raise distributive justice concerns, they are more likely to be addressed in the final policy. Rates of adding EJ language decrease after the G.W. Bush Administration, but differences between presidents are small compared to the difference between rules that did and did not receive EJ comments. Other variables are held at their modal values: the EPA, zero additional EJ comments, and one comment total.[[40]](#footnote-252)



Figure 4.6: Probability that “Environmental Justice” is Added Between Draft and Final Rules by President

Figure 4.7 shows the probability that an agency will add EJ language given different total numbers of comments. At low numbers of comments, anyone comment raising environmental justice has a strong relationship with policy change. For rules with less than ten comments (most rules), one comment mentioning EJ is associated with a 30% increase in the probability that EJ will be addressed in the final rule. This supports the *Distributive Information Hypothesis*. However, the probability that an agency will add EJ language is still below 50%—even when comments raise EJ concerns, agencies tend not to address them.

As the number of comments increases, the probability that a rule will add text addressing EJ increases. This supports the *General Pressure Hypothesis*—policy change is more likely when there is more public attention to a policy process. Simultaneously, there is a negative interaction between the number of comments and EJ comments—the more comments, the smaller the relationship between comments raising EJ and agencies addressing EJ in the rule. In the small-portion of highly salient rules with 10,000 or more, the presence of comments raising EJ concerns no longer has a statistically significant relationship with agencies adding EJ to the text. With or without EJ comments, these rules have about the same probability of change as those with just one EJ comment, just under 50%. This is evidence against the *Specific Pressure Hypothesis*—the number of comments matters (i.e., the scale of public attention) matters regardless of whether these comments explicitly raise EJ concerns. However, as shown in Figure 4.4, few rules with 10,000 or more comments do not have at least one comment mentioning EJ, so we are highly uncertain about estimates of the impact of EJ comments with high levels of public attention. We can be much more confident about the relationship between comments raising EJ concerns and rule change at lower, more typical levels of public attention.

The probability of “environmental justice” appearing in the final rule also increases with the number of unique comments mentioning “environmental justice” in models 2, 3, and 4. Overall this supports the *Repeated Information Hypothesis*.



Figure 4.7: Probability Environmental Justice is Added Between Draft and Final Rules by Number of Comments

Figure 4.8 shows estimated variation in rates of adding EJ to final rules across agencies. Agencies with the largest average rates of adding EJ language are the agencies we would expect to be more receptive to EJ claims. While many agencies make policies that could be framed as “environmental,” and all policy decisions have distributive consequences, institutions have norms and procedures that lead policymakers to see problems in different ways. For example, some agencies have dedicated staff and prominent internal guidance on EJ analysis in rulemaking, including the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Transportation (which includes the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of Transportation, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)). These agencies are among the most responsive to commenters raising EJ concerns. However, differences among agencies are fairly uncertain due to the small number of rules where EJ was added at most agencies. Thus, there is more support for the *Policy Receptivity Hypothesis* than against it, but differences between agencies with different missions and institutional practices regarding EJ are not clear cut.



Figure 4.8: Probability Environmental Justice is Added Between Draft and Final Rules by Agency

### 4.4.2 Are rules more likely to change how they address environmental justice when comments mention it?

Turning to rules that do address EJ in the draft, we also see responsiveness to comments raising EJ concerns, now measured as whether any sentences containing “environmental justice” changed between draft and final rule. Models 3 and 4 in Table ?? are the same as Models 1 and 2, except that the dependent variable is now whether any sentences mentioning EJ changed between the draft and final rule.

Most rules that addressed EJ in the draft were published by the EPA. The EPA had a high rate of baseline change, which increased when comments raised EJ concerns. Other agencies had too few draft rules mentioning EJ to make strong inferences, but many changed how they discussed EJ 100% of the time when comments raised EJ concerns, while inconsistently doing so when comments did not.

#### 4.4.2.1 The Predicted Probability of Changed Text

Controlling for average rates of change per agency and the number of comments, Figure 4.9 shows little difference in baseline rates of changing EJ language across the Bush, Obama, and Trump presidencies. All are significantly lower than the Clinton administration’s rate, which could be related to Clinton’s Executive Order on environmental justice or simply an artifact of the limited sample of rules posted to regulations.gov before the mid-2000s.



Figure 4.9: Predicted Change in *How* Environmental Justice is Addressed Between Draft and Final Rules by President

For draft rules that already addressed EJ, the relationship between the total number of comments and policy change is in the opposite direction posited by the *General Pressure Hypothesis*. The logged total number of comments is inversely related to change in the final rule text. The more comments on a proposed rule, the less likely it is to change. Rules are more likely to change when they receive *fewer* comments. Thus, the total number of comments has the opposite relationship to *how* rules that already addressed EJ changed as it did to *whether* rules added any EJ text. While the *General Pressure Hypothesis* explained adding EJ text where none existed in the draft, the opposite is true for changing a text that already addressed EJ. Instead, this result supports the competing intuition that more salient rules may be harder to change because the agency has anticipated public scrutiny. Their position stated in the draft is more likely to be the position of the final rule.

As shown in Figure 4.10, EJ comments have a small but discernable relationship to the probability of rule change at typical (low) numbers of comments. As the total number of comments increases, the estimated difference between policies that did and did not receive EJ comments increases. When no comments mention EJ, a rule that receives 10,000 comments is much less likely to change than a rule that received 10,000. When comments do raise EJ concerns, more public attention has a smaller impact on the probability of policy change.



Figure 4.10: Predicted Change in *How* Environmental Justice is Addressed Between Draft and Final Rules by Number of Comments

## 4.5 Conclusion

This analysis presents a rare, systematic account of a social movement’s impact on specific policy outcomes across institutions and over time. It illustrates the importance of ideas in policymaking and how social movements can affect policy, even in technocratic processes like rulemaking, where most U.S. law is now made.

When activists raise issue frames like environmental justice, there is a higher probability that policymakers engage in discourse that highlights the distributive effects of policy. However, baseline rates of addressing environmental justice in rulemaking are so low that, even when activists raise EJ concerns, most policy documents pay no explicit attention to EJ. We see this general lack of attention across agencies and across the G.W. Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations. Indeed, I find surprisingly small differences across administrations in both baseline rates of considering EJ and the relationship between public pressure and policy change.

There is a great deal of variation across agencies, suggesting that policy receptivity and responsiveness to public input are conditional on an institutional factors.

The policy outcomes suggested by an environmental justice analysis depend on how the populations of concern are defined. In some cases, those raising environmental justice concerns present it as an economic inequality issue, leading policy to account for disparate impacts on low-income populations. In other cases, groups raise claims rooted in cultural practices, such as fish consumption among certain tribes. As occurred in the Mercury Rule, the analysis in subsequent drafts of the policy used evaluative criteria specific to these communities. Thus, policy outcomes will depend on the specific environmental justice concerns raised. Future research should assess the relationship between specific EJ claims and corresponding policy changes.

Which communities and concerns are raised by activist campaigns depend on second-order representation—who makes decisions in the organizations that mobilize public pressure. Examining which groups raise environmental justice concerns and second-order participation in these organizations’ advocacy decisions validates some of the skepticism about who is able to participate and make their voice heard. Elite groups dominate policy lobbying, even for an issue like environmental justice. National advocacy organizations frequently request that regulators protect “all people” or even “low-income communities of color.” However, this more generic advocacy may not lead to the same outcomes as participation b groups that can present more specific local environmental justice concerns unique to a community. In between generic progressive advocacy organizations and community-based organizations are high-capacity organizations like the Sierra Club and Earthjustice, which frequently partner with local organizations for more place-based litigation and campaigns and may be more likely to raise these local concerns in national policymaking. Given the importance of federal policy for local environmental outcomes, and advocacy organizations’ potential to draw policymakers’ attention to environmental justice issues, future research should examine the quality of partnerships between frontline communities and national advocacy organizations.

In the end, the above analysis offers some clarity on two poorly understood and rarely linked features of American politics: the policy impact of social movements and the role of public pressure in bureaucratic policymaking. It offers some hope that policymakers may address concerns raised through direct democracy mechanisms like public comment periods. At the same time, it highlights how policymakers rarely explicitly address the disparate impacts of policy, even when directly confronted with distributive justice concerns. Social movements do affect policy, but there are steep odds to overcome.

# 5 Reforming the Policy Process

Each week, students in my public policy class must write to an elected official or comment on a proposed agency rule and then post about it in the class forum.

But college students should not be the target demographic for notice and comment rulemaking–they are too informed and have too much time to write thoughtful comments. If we wish to realize the ideals of the APA, we must broaden participation. Can we do this? Is it worthwhile? Many scholars assume not, but the data offer some hope.

This chapter reviews dominant ways of thinking about public comments and proposed reforms to participatory processes in light of the empirical evidence in the previous chapters. I start with a sketch of the various positions staked out by administrative law scholars, each rooted in different theories of democracy. I then review several specific challenges and proposed reforms to the policy process.

## 5.1 Re-thinking Public Participation in Bureaucratic Policymaking

Understanding mass commenting as a form of petitioning, as presented it in chapters 2, ??, and ?? runs against how it is often discussed by scholars and agencies. With a few notable exceptions (e.g., [Cuéllar](#ref-Cuellar2005) ([2005](#ref-Cuellar2005)); [Mendelson](#ref-Mendelson2011) ([2011](#ref-Mendelson2011)); [Rauch](#ref-Rauch2016) ([2016](#ref-Rauch2016))), administrative law scholars imply that mass commenting is misguided and potentially harmful spam of the techoncratic process.

“Many fear a surging wave of electronic mass submissions will overwhelm and thus delay agencies with limited resources. Furthermore, some warn us that electronic rulemaking may already have instantiated a sense that rulemaking decisions are akin to a plebiscite.” - Stuart W. Shulman (EPA-HQ-OEI-2004-0002-0015)

In a 2020 meeting, Reeve T. Bull, Research Director, Administrative Conference of the United States, summed up the dominant attitude of legal professionals:

"What are the fundamental goals that the agency and the APA are trying to accomplish by creating this mechanism for public participation?…[W]hen somebody files a comment with an agency, the comments sort of fall into two broad categories…the first type of comment are those expressing fact—providing data to the agency, either supporting the position that it wants to take or opposing the position that it wants to take–and trying to influence the agency’s decision making accordingly.

The second broad type of [public comments] are those expressing opinions. Now obviously there’s extensive overlap between the two. Pretty much every comment is going to express an opinion one way or the other. But as Steve’s data shows, sometimes a comment is nothing but an opinion. It’s ‘I support this policy’ or ‘I don’t support the policy’… the law is very, very clear that with respect to the fact, with respect to data, the agency is legally required to take that into account… With respect to opinion though, the law is much less clear. Indeed it’s not clear whether the agency has to take opinion into account or conversely whether the agency is even permitted to take opinion into account. …[Agencies] have been very, very consistent in saying the rulemaking process is not a plebiscite. It’s not a vote. We’re not tabulating the number of comments in favor or against. …On the part of the public though, I think the perception is quite a bit different. And I think that people really considered it problematic from their perspective that the agency might take a position that is different from what the vast majority of commenters might have preferred. And with respect to that latter aspect – the democratic aspect if you will – that’s where I think a lot of the problems potentially start to arise.

I don’t think it’s ever legitimate in a mass comment campaign for the agency to tabulate the number of comments received and say we got this number of this percentage in favor or against. Even if the comments are 99 percent in one direction or the other. I think that the agency should certainly consider mass comments. They should certainly consider the relevant information – the facts contained in those comments. But I don’t think that the overall number or percentage should ever matter." - Reeve T. Bull, Research Director, Administrative Conference of the United States

In response to public pressure campaigns, agencies often assert that rulemaking is not a plebicite.

At the same time, agencies frequently do tally up comments on each side. In a 2008 rule regulating boarder crossing by private aircraft, The U.S. Customs cited the scale of public engagment as providing information on “public sentiment”: >based on the ample number of comments received by the end of the original comment period, CBP believed that public sentiment was accurately captured.” ([CBP-E8-26621/p-61](https://www.federalregister.gov/d/E8-26621/p-61))

In the preamble to the 2015 Waters of the United States Rule, EPA evoked both majoritian and pluralist justifications:

“This final rule reflects the over 1 million public comments on the proposal, the substantial majority of which supported the proposed rule, as well as input provided through the agencies’ extensive public outreach effort, which included over 400 meetings nationwide with states, small businesses, farmers, academics, miners, energy companies, counties, municipalities, environmental organizations, other federal agencies, and many others.” ([2015-13435/p-67](https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2015-13435/p-67))

EPA administrator Gina McCarthy testified that EPA “received over one million comments, and 87.1 percent of those comments…are supportive of this rule” (XXXX). When the EPA issued a new rule under the Trump administration, it noted “a number of comments” in favor of the new definition but “a significant number of comments” in favor of the 2015 definition. While not going so far as to explicitly state that a supermajority of commenters opposed the new policy, it is still remarkable that the agency would choose to note quantative opposition to the policy.

Agencies also regularly refer to form comments as petitions. When the Bureau of Land Managment received 6,948 identical emails that did not cite an organization, they labeled these comments a “Pro Fracking Petition” ([LM-2013-0002-5720](https://www.regulations.gov/comment/BLM-2013-0002-5720)) This text was nearly idential was signed by “Oil and Gas industry individuals” ([BLM-2013-0002-5688](https://www.regulations.gov/comment/BLM-2013-0002-5688)). Another batch of 1,289 nearly identical emails submitted through the social networking website Care2.org was labled “Anti Fracking Petition” ([BLM-2013-0002-5721](https://www.regulations.gov/comment/BLM-2013-0002-5721))

The organizations running public pressure campaigs are even more explicit that they consider mass comments to be petition signatures, frequnelty citing mass comments as “Letters in support of [our organization’s] Comments” ([NOAA-NMFS-2012-0059-0023](https://www.regulations.gov/comment/NOAA-NMFS-2012-0059-0023)), a “petition from World Wildlife Fund-US (WWF-US), signed by 271,893 WWF-US supporters” ([BOEM-2016-0003-2556](https://www.regulations.gov/comment/BOEM-2016-0003-2556)), The files containing comments collected by organizations are often named “signatures.”

## 5.2 Reforms

### 5.2.1 The Debate in Administrative Law

Scholars vary significantly in both the value they place on political information and the extent to which they believe that meaningfully engaging large numbers of people is possible.

#### Participatory democracy optimists

Optimists see notice and comment as the “purest example of participatory democracy in actual American governance.” [CITE] The process is technically open to anyone with an opinion to offer, and agencies are, to an extent, required to respond to substantive ideas. This optimism is rooted in a volunteerism idea of democracy and a value for inclusive and substantive discourse. It assumes that those who “ought” to be included do not have large barriers beyond the formal rules of the institution. It also assumes that meaningful discourse among those who show up is possible and likely to occur.

#### “Regulatory democracy” reformers

A related camp is slightly less rosy about the current institutions and practices but is nevertheless optimistic that reforms can at least improve the quality of discourse and thus policy. For these scholars, democracy is more a function of procedure than inclusion. “issues and contributions, information and reasons” [Cuéllar](#ref-Cuellar2014) ([2014](#ref-Cuellar2014)) argues that rulemaking could be more discursive. [Mendelson](#ref-Mendelson2011) ([2011](#ref-Mendelson2011)) found that agencies often discard non-technical comments but argues that they shouldn’t because mass comments contain valuable information. For this camp, the quality of the public debate is more important than the total number of people, their affiliations, or their biases. They emphasize the transformative power of discourse.

#### Pluralist reformers

A different brand of reformer focuses less on discourse and more on interest group representation. Reform-oriented scholars building on pluralist ideas of representation argue that lobbying groups should be required to disclose their membership, funding, and decision-making processes ([**Seifter2016?**](#ref-Seifter2016)). In this view, organized groups, not individuals, are the central actors in public comment processes. However, because agencies often lack information about groups, it is difficult to know how well they represent the people they claim to. Interest groups’ faithful representation of their members is crucial to pluralist ideas of democracy. Howevever reforms requiring groups to disclose information about their funding and membership only go part way to assess groups’ representationsal claims, which often extend well beyond their membership.

#### Rational pluralists

Another group of scholars sees organized interest groups and experts that can provide credible information. In this view, random or self-selecting members of the general public are not appropriate participants. “The goal of e-rulemaking is to more fully capture such credible, specific, and relevant information, not to solicit the views of random, self-nominating members of the public” (Herz 2016). Speaking on the topic of mass comment campaigns, Oliver Sherouse, a regulatory economist at the Small Business Administration, expressed the same sentiment:

“It’s worth remembering why we have a public comment process in the first place, which is that the public has knowledge that regulators do not have and that they need to do their jobs well…how do the poor quality mass comments affect small businesses in the comment process? The most obvious problem would be if legitimate small business concerns are just lost in the flood.” (GSA 2019a, p. 31-32)

Sharehouse raised an additional concern that mass-comment campaigns might distract people from writing their own, more informative comments. While recognizing that “not everyone who does not sign onto that kind of [mass] comment would be willing to write a high-quality one,” the tradeoff of a few “quality” comments for many “poor quality” comments is worthwhile. (GSA 2019a, p. 32)

However, Sherouse was also wary about dismissing mass comments. > “A good point is not less of a good point because 10,000 people happen to agree with it.” (GSA 2019a, p. 32)

#### Skeptics

The most skeptical camp goes even further, arguing that open solicitations to the general public should be abolished.

### 5.2.2 Challenges

#### Fraud

(The Wall Street Journal](<https://www.wsj.com/articles/many-comments-critical-of-fiduciary-rule-are-fake-1514370601>) reported that 40% of comments on one Department of Labor rule used fraudulent identities.

#### 5.2.2.1 Astroturf

TODO

### 5.2.3 Reforms

Can the unwashed masses provide useful information to agencies? My answer is yes. Will this information be biased? Yes, but all information provided by lobbying groups has a bias, the task is to make biases transparent, and reforms could do this.

1. First, we must dispense with the idea that agencies merely implement the law. The APA provides for public participation because the ideal of direct democracy might affect the important substantive policy made by agencies. Indeed, agencies are often seeking comment on revisions to rules based on authority delegated decades ago. Agency must make policy to satisfy their mandates. The present question is one of process. Calling for greater congressional oversight or presidential control sidesteps the issue–by what process should agencies make policy? (Indeed, [Potter et al.](#ref-Potter2019) ([2019](#ref-Potter2019)) shows us that agencies often sidestep oversight, making their procedural rules all the more important.)
2. Critics may argue that opening the door wider to petition campaigns lets in biases. Indeed we know that people who opt to participate are disproportionately privileged. In an unequal society, we have unequal participation, but higher barriers to entry only make this worse. More problematic is the idea that a well-funded group who typically dominates rulemaking ([J. W. Yackee and Yackee 2006](#ref-Yackee2006JOP)) will sponsor astroturf campaigns, thus creating a false impression of public support. This is a real concern. If dark money can secretly drive impressions of support for a policy, the case for expanding participation is weekend. Hopefully, my analysis suggests that this is uncommon. the fast The fact that we do not observe it now does not mean it will not occur, but agencies could b

Reforms along the lines have been suggested. \_\_\_ would like polls. Nationally representative polling may be a good investment for some rules, but we know from polling research that individuals do not always have clearly formed opinions, and much depends on question wording. The reality is that American politics is animated through groups–people rely on organizations they trust to keep them informed and engaged. In classic pluralist fashion, organizations claim to represent segments of the population in rulemaking. <1–Because these organizations

Raso suggests similar reforms.

#### Aims of reform

**Lower barriers to participation.**

The main barrier to participation in rulemaking is information. Even people with relatively high social capital, like small business owners, rarely participate because they do not know about the opportunity or lack the time necessary to engage.

“they might only find out about a proposed regulation when they’re presented with one of these mass comments. And they might not have time to go back and investigate and then write a full comment letter right before the comment period is going to close. Because there aren’t a lot of small business owners who read the Federal Register every day…writing a detailed comment letter is hard work.” - Oliver Sherhouse (GSA 2019a, p. 33)

**Increase transparency.**

**Reduce the cost of extracting information from comments.** Reformers often highlight the value of linking comments to particular questions or sections of a draft rule. Technology can certainly improve sophisticated debates about a rule’s technical provisions. Indeed, sophisticated commentors have adopted track-changes technology to provide marked-up versions of draft rules.

New technologies may provide an even more important role in gleaning political information from the “torrents of email” and “vexing challenge” posed by mass comment campaigns.

**Gaurd against fraud.**

#### Parsing the questions

Agencies often specifically ask questions and solicit comments on specific topics in an NPRM. These topics offer an initial structure to allow commenters to self-identify the topics of their comments. The American Bar Association’s Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice recommends “technology that would allow agencies to identify categories that commenters could select when submitting comments.” To stay open to new ideas, lobbying groups should be allowed to petition the agency to add topics to the menu or ask additional questions.

For example, agencies may encourage groups to mobilize in support of the groups’ answers to the questions that agencies ask. Given past trends, this will likely take the form of petition campaigns, and agencies should have a mechanism to receive those comments as such.

#### Offering answers

Agencies could also lower the bar to participation by posting answers to their questions from different organizations and allow people to co-sign them or disagree with them. This is both easier for participants and requires less work for agencies to interpret where the commenter stands.

1. The risk of astroturf is real under any public comment system (including the current one), but transparency requirements can go a long way. Organizations or individuals acting in their professional capacity as organizations (not individuals) should be required to disclose where the money they paid for them to produce their comments came from. Likewise, organizations running campaigns should disclose the sources of funding for the campaigns and how much they spent mobilizing public support. These numbers will provide a helpful denominator for agencies to gauge public enthusiasm.

#### ACUS Report

#### Increasing transparency and public participation (GSA-2019-02)

On January 30th, 2020, the Government Services Administration held a hearing on the topic of mass comments. The three invited speakers represented the National Association of Manufacturers, the Small Business Administration, and MITRE. A federally funded technology research and development. These three guests embody important aspects of how public comment is seen. First, public comment is most often utilized by business groups like NAM (“power users of the regulatory process,” as Hedern put it) and thus represents the users for whom public comment technology is designed. NAM does not sponsor mass comment campaigns. Perhaps they have a stake in delegitimizing mass comment campaigns that occasionally mobilized on the opposing side, but the reason they are on this panel is simply that they are the archetypical user. Second, agencies like the Small Business Administration are the ones who must deal with the “challenge” of mass comment campaigns. Third, technology consultants represent the way in which mass comment campaigns are primarily viewed as a technological challenge.

Another important feature of this policy area is its tight-knit epistemic community. As observed by Mr. Hedren:

“it’s a little alarming to me in some respects to see that, looking out into the crowd, I think I know about half of you on a first-name basis. So, we probably need a little bit more fresh blood in this regulatory nerd community.” - Patrick Hedren, National Association of Manufacturers.

#### Gaurding against fraud

As with any form of public participation, fraud merits attention. If organizations submit comments on behalf of people who do not exist or did not consent, this is akin to fraudulent petition signatures or fake constituent letters being sent to Members of Congress.

**Authentication.** Matt Cutts (acting director of the U.S. Digital Service) suggests CAPTCHAS, email confirmations, and multi-factor authentication. If comments are allowed to be collected by third parties like the Sierra Club, the government can encourage, but *may not be able to enforce the use of CAPTCHAS*. Requiring confirmation or authentication by email or phone alone would be a barrier to participation. Requiring both could be prohibitive.

The most secure approach that allows third parties to gather comments may be to authenticate each comment by asking each commenter to provide an email address or phone number at which to receive a message asking them to confirm the text of their comment.

Asking for a second interaction with the agency raises the cost of participation but may also make participation a slightly richer experience (as Dan Walters suggested on Twitter). People may be more likely to feel that their voice was heard. Of course, many people will fail to confirm their authenticate their comment, but like mass comments themselves, the number of people willing to take the time to authenticate offers information on the intensity of genuine support. Unauthenticated comments need not be discounted, but authenticated comments may indicate stronger preferences.

More importantly, authentication guards against identity theft. It is difficult to provide a large number of fake phone numbers, and real phone numbers used fraudulently would likely generate complaints, alerting the agency that the campaign may be engaging in fraud. Again, fraud complaints need not discount an entire campaign. Opponents of a campaign by the Sierra Club, for example, could submit fraudulent comments through their system in order to complain when asked to authenticate and thus cast doubt over the campaign. However, a legitimate campaign will also have a portion that will authenticate, allowing rough estimates of the scale of true support versus fraud.

Some means of authentication, such as email, may be slightly more open to fraud than others, like texts, but the benefits to lower barriers to participation may outweigh the greater risk of fraud.

Because mass comment campaigns include a fairly large number of individuals, especially if the barriers to participation are lower, there are many opportunities to identify fraud of any significant scale, and the stakes of a few fraudulent comments slipping through the cracks are low.

**Should agencies accept anonymous comments?**

There are good reasons to accept technical information from anonymous sources. For example, they may fear retaliation. However, anonymous comments should not be used to infer political information. This distinction supports two tracks with distinct requirements. An agency may want to allow sophisticated anonymous comments to be co-signed by large numbers of authenticated supporters, thus allowing insiders with the necessary knowledge to make sophisticated arguments, but also much to lose to put ideas into public and the agency to gauge public reaction to those ideas.

## 5.3 Conclusion

The legitimacy of bureaucratic policymaking is said to depend on the premise that rulemaking provides for public voice [Rosenbloom](#ref-Rosenbloom2003) ([2003](#ref-Rosenbloom2003)). Yet we lack an empirical base necessary to evaluate whether any legitimacy the public comment process may provide is deserved. If input solicited from ordinary people has little effect on policy outcomes, directly or indirectly, it may be best understood as providing a veneer of democratic legitimacy on an essentially technocratic and/or elite-driven process. I have made a few initial steps toward better understanding actual public engagement in bureaucratic policymaking. If public pressure campaigns do shape agency decisions, a new research program will be needed to investigate who exactly these campaigns mobilize and represent.

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1. As imagined by [Robert A. Dahl](#ref-Dahl1989) ([1989](#ref-Dahl1989)), mini-publics are representative, selected at random, and deliberative. Besides juries, however, randomly selected deliberative bodies are rare. Instead, citizens more often engage in government decisions when given opportunities to opt-in, such as hearings, petitions, and public comment periods. These mechanisms of engagement generate a different, more contentious flavor of public input than the discourse imagined by scholars who focus on deliberation. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
2. But see insights from [Golden](#ref-Golden1998) ([1998](#ref-Golden1998)), [Nelson and Yackee](#ref-Nelson2012) ([2012](#ref-Nelson2012)), [Rauch](#ref-Rauch2016) ([2016](#ref-Rauch2016)), and [Potter](#ref-Potter2017) ([2017a](#ref-Potter2017)) on political information, [Cuéllar](#ref-Cuellar2014) ([2014](#ref-Cuellar2014)) on participation and voice, and [Reich](#ref-Reich1966) ([1966](#ref-Reich1966)) and [Seifter](#ref-Seifter2016UCLA) ([2016](#ref-Seifter2016UCLA)) on representation, which I review elsewhere. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
3. Shafer is clear that his periods are characterized by their policy process, not policy outputs. Nevertheless, given a certain intersection of dominant issues and type of policy process, we should expect to see a pattern of policy outputs. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
4. Future research could search for additional activity using keywords in rule abstracts. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
5. Some of the most contentious recent public controversies involve bureaucratic policymaking. For example, along with 50 thousand protesters in Washington D.C., the State Department Received 1.2 million comments on the Environmental Impact Statement for the Keystone Pipeline. Similarly, along with the thousands of protesters supporting the Standing Rock Sioux protest to the Dakota Access Pipeline, the Army Corps of Engineers received hundreds of thousands of comments. Alongside protest actions that included shutting down many websites, the Federal Communications Commission’s open internet rule received 22 million comments. While some of these comments appear fake, the scale of public engagement is remarkable given how little attention political scientists have paid to it. Fake public comments also raise the question of why an organization would bother to generate fake public input if it did not matter, as its omission from theories of bureaucratic policymaking would seem to imply. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
6. Organizations that mobilize people to engage in policy debates (e.g., through letter-writing campaigns) go by many names, each with slightly different connotations. These include pressure groups, policy advocacy groups ([Potter 2017a](#ref-Potter2017)), citizen groups ([Berry 1999](#ref-Berry1999)), policy change organizations ([**McNutt2005?**](#ref-McNutt2005)). TODO: NAIL DOWN MY NOMENCLATURE. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
7. However, astroturf campaigns are most likely to occur precisely when public pressure is most decisive, so they may still present a normative concern. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
8. I follow [Verba and Nie](#ref-Verba1987) ([1987](#ref-Verba1987)) in defining “civic participation” as “acts aimed at influencing governmental decisions” ([Verba and Nie 1987, 2](#ref-Verba1987)). However, some argue that participation only counts if it is deliberative, which mass comment campaigns are not, at least not at the individual level. Other criteria posed by normative theorists that participation should be “genuine,” “informed,” or “reasoned” are more difficult to assess. Normative theorists debate whether deliberation among a small number of people is preferable to a large number of people simply expressing their preferences. But empirically, public participation in bureaucratic policymaking is much more the latter ([Shapiro 2008](#ref-Shapiro2008b)). [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
9. On learning, see [Kerwin and Furlong](#ref-Kerwin2011) ([2011](#ref-Kerwin2011)) and empirical studies by [S. W. Yackee](#ref-Yackee2012) ([2012](#ref-Yackee2012)), [Cook](#ref-Cook2017) ([2017](#ref-Cook2017)), [Gordon and Rashin](#ref-Gordon2018) ([2018](#ref-Gordon2018)), and [Walters](#ref-Walters2019) ([2019](#ref-Walters2019)). See [Gailmard and Patty](#ref-Gailmard2017) ([2017](#ref-Gailmard2017)) and [Libgober](#ref-Libgober2018) ([2018](#ref-Libgober2018)) for information-based models where comments reveal information to the agency. On accountability to elected officials, see [S. R. Furlong](#ref-Furlong1997) ([1997](#ref-Furlong1997)), [Nou and Stiglitz](#ref-Nou2016) ([2016](#ref-Nou2016)), [Potter](#ref-Potter2016) ([2017b](#ref-Potter2016)), [Woods](#ref-Woods2018) ([2018](#ref-Woods2018)), and [J. W. Yackee and Yackee](#ref-Yackee2009RegGov) ([2009a](#ref-Yackee2009RegGov)). [Potter](#ref-Potter2014dis) ([2014](#ref-Potter2014dis)) develops a signaling model where agencies propose and principals veto rules depending, in part, on their beliefs about interest group preferences. On interest-group balancing, see [J. W. Yackee and Yackee](#ref-Yackee2006JOP) ([2006](#ref-Yackee2006JOP)), [S. W. Yackee](#ref-Yackee2006JPART) ([2006](#ref-Yackee2006JPART)), and [Kerwin and Furlong](#ref-Kerwin2011) ([2011](#ref-Kerwin2011)). A key assumption of Libgober’s (2018) model is that bureaucrats have a distribution of preferences over interest group positions, about which they are uncertain unless groups reveal their preferences through commenting. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
10. Diamonds indicate observable choices, ovals indicate latent preferences, and rectangles indicate information. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
11. I address other types of political information that mass engagement may create elsewhere. For an expanded model, see Figure ??. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
12. It is possible that some people in this latter category engage purely on their own initiative, but any impact they have likely comes from their alignment with a coalition. Furthermore, as I show below, wholly original comments are rare. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
13. Social media engagement may be especially important if agencies implement the recommendations of [ACUS](#ref-ACUS2018) ([2018](#ref-ACUS2018)) that “Agencies should consider using social media before or in connection with direct final rulemaking to quickly identify whether there are significant or meaningful objections” (p. 34). [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
14. I use “mobilizing” rather than “organizing” because “organizing” often implies that people are organized in a way that is more enduring than signing a single petition or writing a single letter. Mobilizing implies an activation, but not necessarily enduring structure. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
15. <https://www.flickr.com/photos/energycitizens/18274218500/in/photostream/> [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
16. <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/19/business/energy-environment/19climate.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
17. <https://www.propublica.org/article/how-big-oil-dodges-facebooks-new-ad-transparency-rules> [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
18. Some of Shell’s supporters neglected to fill in the blanks in the template letter. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
19. For more about this method and comparisons with related partial matching methods such as the Smith-Waterman algorithm, see [Casas, Denny, and Wilkerson](#ref-Casas2017) ([2017](#ref-Casas2017)) and [Judge-Lord](#ref-Judge-Lord2017) ([2017](#ref-Judge-Lord2017)). [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
20. For example, Americans For Prosperity’s campaign on the XXXX rule. TODO [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
21. At least for agencies participating in regulations.gov. See section 2.3.3 and the online appendix for my definition and methods for identifying mass comments. [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
22. For example, a campaign by the World Wildlife Federation provided language explicitly claiming to have public opinion on their side. Their model comment stated that “Along with 80% of the American people, I strongly support ending commercial trade in elephant ivory in the US.” This suggests that mass comment campaigns aim to signal information about public opinion. [↑](#footnote-ref-162)
23. I address other types of political information that mass engagement may create elsewhere. For an expanded model, see Figure ??. [↑](#footnote-ref-163)
24. Of course, if Members of Congress receive signals about the distribution of comments from their districts, the distribution of opinions in their district constituency may be more important. Figure 2.4, shows that the Sierra Club requires zip code information from commenters. Mass-mobilizers may often send such information to elected officials. [↑](#footnote-ref-173)
25. The same comment text is attributed to each signatory of a comment. For more on how I identify organizations and coalitions, see [Chapter 2, “Why Do Agencies (Sometimes) Get So Much Mail?”](https://judgelord.github.io/dissertation/whyMail.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-176)
26. Through an itterative process, I developed a method to select comments submitted by organizations. For example, I include all comments submitted as file attachments rather than typed into the textbox. [↑](#footnote-ref-178)
27. For more on policy area coding, see Chapter 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-179)
28. Except for comment texts and attachments, these data are available separately and combined on github.com/judgelord/rulemaking. [↑](#footnote-ref-180)
29. This does not capture rule changes on which an organization did not comment. The codebook is available [here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1o1hi0z9O-G9xsgkspOFG2VWzh0wQKjiezzoVpItaCxU/edit?usp=sharing). See examples of coded cases [here](https://judgelord.github.io/dissertation/influence_coding_examples.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-182)
30. For more on how I identify types of organizations and coalitions, see [Chapter 2, “Why Do Agencies (Sometimes) Get So Much Mail?”](https://judgelord.github.io/research/whymail/). [↑](#footnote-ref-187)
31. These three aspects are: (1) “The Rule Should Categorically Protect Certain “Other Waters” including Vernal Pools, Pocosins, Sinkhole Wetlands, Rainwater Basin Wetlands, Sand Hills Wetlands, Playa Lakes, Interdunal Wetlands, Carolina and Delmarva Bays, and Other Coastal Plain Depressional Wetlands, and Prairie Potholes. Furthermore, “Other ‘Isolated’ Waters Substantially Affect Interstate Commerce and Should be Categorically Protected Under the Agencies’ Commerce Clause Authority.” (2) “The Rule Should Not Exempt Ditches Without a Scientific Basis” (3) “The Rule Should Limit the Current Exemption for Waste Treatment Systems” [↑](#footnote-ref-190)
32. Time allowing, I will hand-code a larger sample of proposed rules where no final rule was published so that these cases can be included in the analysis. Likewise, I will identify cases where organizations requested rules to be published as-is and recode these cases by hand. [↑](#footnote-ref-192)
33. See [OLS model estimates with simulated data](https://judgelord.github.io/dissertation/preanalysis.pdf). I also estimate hand-coded lobbying success with beta regression and ordered logit, which are more appropriate but less interpretable. For the automated measures of lobbying success, I estimate beta regression models with the same variables. [↑](#footnote-ref-194)
34. As shown in [Judge-Lord](#ref-judgelord2019SPSA) ([2019b](#ref-judgelord2019SPSA)), most comments submitted to regulations.gov are part of organized campaigns, more akin to petition signatures than “deliberative” participation or sophisticated lobbying. Indeed, approximately 40 million out of 50 million (80%) of these public comments on rulemaking dockets between 2004 and 2019 were mobilized by just 100 advocacy organizations. [↑](#footnote-ref-219)
35. I distinguish unique comments from mass comments. The number of unique comments approximates a coalition’s size regarding the number of different groups, each submitting a unique text. The total number of comments, including signatures on identical form letters, indicates public attention and pressure. [↑](#footnote-ref-225)
36. Some final rules are published without a draft, and some proposed rules are withdrawn or never finalized. Additional descriptives on each type of rule are available in the online appendix. [↑](#footnote-ref-231)
37. I recode “Hispanic” as “Latinx” [↑](#footnote-ref-238)
38. Occasionally, there is more than one version of a proposed or final rule on a rulemaking docket. Here I opt for an inclusive measure of change that counts change from *any* proposed to *any* final rule. If the change occurred between the first and second draft of a proposed rule, I count it as a change. This best captures the concept of rule change. However, estimates are similar if we only count cases where a change occurred between *every* version of the rule. [↑](#footnote-ref-246)
39. An alternative approach would be to parse documents by section and assess whether E.O.12898 sections are identical. Parsing by sentences has three advantages: it is computationally faster, it avoids problems with section numbering and other frustrations with section matching, and it captures attention to EJ outside of this section, especially in the section responding to comments. If an agency is paying attention to EJ issues, sentence matching will likely detect it. However, other measures, such as the percent of EJ sentences changed, the percent of words in a 12898 section that changed, or the change in topic proportions ([Judge-Lord 2017](#ref-Judge-Lord2017)), could be useful in future work. [↑](#footnote-ref-247)
40. All predicted probability plots below also show probabilities at the modal values for other variables: President Obama, the EPA, zero additional EJ comments, and the median number of total comments (one comment for models 1 and 2; four comments for models 3 and 4) unless otherwise specified. [↑](#footnote-ref-252)