

April 30, 2019

Dear reviewers,

Thank you very much for your comments on our manuscript “Evaluative adjective sentences: A question-based analysis of projection”. We have now resubmitted our manuscript to Glossa. This new manuscript has taken into consideration your comments, as we detail below (your comments in black, our responses in blue).

We have made several larger changes to the manuscript in response to the reviews:

- We have completely reorganized the manuscript, as a consequence of which it has become significantly more streamlined and shorter by over 6,500 words: whereas the main body of the previous manuscript was 20,803 words, it is now only 14,116 words.
- The current manuscript discusses the details of the corpus study in the appendices, and we have completely removed discussion of constraints from focus marking on the Current Question and the tentative evidence we had for those constraints from our corpus study.
- The new version of the manuscript brings out more clearly the larger implications of our question-based analysis of EAS: there is an interaction between projective contents that has not yet been observed for other projective content and our analysis incorporates a new constraint on the Discourse Question.

Again, thank you for your comments, which have greatly helped us in developing this manuscript (and improving it, we believe)!

Kind regards,

The authors

Review A:

Based on corpus and experimental data, this paper argues that the prejacent of EAS is not a lexical presupposition (as per most previous analyses) but rather its projectivity depends on what the authors call the Current Question (CQ). It is also argued that projection strength is inversely correlated with being at issue, relative to the CQ. Below, I list the major problems that I see, including questions about the main contribution, experimental design, data, the account, and the redundancy of the prejacent of EAS. I do not believe the paper is suitable for publication in its current form, so I recommend Revise & Resubmit.

1. Main contribution unclear

This paper argues -- based on corpus and experimental work -- that the prejacent of EAS need not always project. So I take it the empirical results are the strongest focus of the paper. Beyond that, though, I struggled to understand what the major contribution of the

paper actually is. Why should we care about EAS, what do we learn from them? If the goal is to demonstrate that the projection properties of an implication may not be a matter of lexical semantics but rather may depend on the CQ, this is not new and has already been discussed in work on soft presupposition triggers/semifactives, as cited in the paper (e.g. Simons 2007). If, on the other hand, the idea is to study EA constructions per se, we need to see a comparison e.g. to similar constructions with expletive subjects (It was stupid of him to dance on the table), differences between various evaluative adjectives, Jackendoff's 1972 manner/subject-oriented adverb distinction (e.g. John clumsily dropped his cup of coffee could mean "The manner in which John dropped his cup of coffee was clumsy" or "It was clumsy of him to drop his cup of coffee"), etc. Either of those would be honorable goals, but in its current form the paper seems too narrowly construed as looking into a construction showing properties that we already knew other constructions have.

We now clarify in the introduction (section 1) what the larger implications of our discussion of the interpretation of EAS are: as mentioned above, the projective content of EAS shows an interaction not yet observed with EAS, and our question-based projection analysis incorporates a novel constraint on the Discourse Question.

2. Experimental design potentially introduces noise

The procedure of Experiment 1 glosses over an important issue, one that threatens to put the conclusions into question. In this experiment participants were asked whether the speaker is certain the prejacent of the EAS holds, which however presupposes that participants find the presented discourses coherent. But if indeed non-projecting readings of NEAS without *enough* are available in only 20-30% of the cases, one would expect that a lot of participants did not find the discourses exemplifying non-projection meaningful to start with. What is the reaction of such participants expected to be? The main worry is that in a majority of cases a low certainty rating was selected only because the discourse as a whole was difficult to parse, thus introducing a tremendous amount of noise into the results. I thus wonder why the authors chose as a target group American English speakers, given that (if I understand correctly) these are exactly the type of speakers that do not allow for non-projecting readings of the prejacent in NEAS (without *enough*). As far as I can tell, Experiment 2 in Section 4 suffers from the same problem.

We agree that it is important to keep in mind that not all native speakers of American English would **produce** NEASs in which the prejacent does not project. However, given that NEASs in which the prejacent does not project are part of American English, we assume that all native speakers of American English are **able to retrieve the intended interpretations** of NEASs in which the prejacent does not project and that we can investigate how the interpretations arise. We have revised p.2 in section 1 to clarify our position.

Relatedly, on p.2 the authors write: "of the 94 self-reported native speakers of American English that participated in the study, about 20-30% judged negated evaluative adjective sentences without *enough* to be acceptable under a non-projecting interpretation of the prejacent." I wonder what the assumed noise threshold here is, and whether it is in line

with the experimental literature. For example, would non-projecting interpretations have also been considered available if the acceptability levels were, say, at 15-20%? And even if assumed to be real, why are non-projecting interpretations strongly dispreferred overall and so difficult to access? The question is where to draw the line between lexical presuppositions and derived inferences, and the authors offer no answer.

Corpus examples already provide evidence that NEASs with non-projecting prejacent are acceptable and part of American English. And, as mentioned in (what is now footnote 1), we have met several native speakers of American English who judge such NEASs to be perfectly acceptable. The acceptability rating study reported on in Appendix A merely provides more quantitative evidence for the existence of such speakers. We leave the question of why many native speakers of American English prefer to realize non-projecting interpretations with *enough* (or another variant) for future research. As for the question of where to draw the line between lexical presuppositions and question-based projectivity, we now address this more explicitly at the beginning of section 2.

3. Main data issue

The two examples in (18) on p.12 seem to be the crucial data that the authors draw in support of the claim that the prejacent project to the extent that it is not at-issue. My worry is specific to the exchange in (18b), where A's question already presupposes the prejacent, due to the follow-up assertion that the prices would go down, so after hearing the question we conclude that Sam did buy a ticket even though she should probably have waited. Given that, in B's answer we cannot interpret the prejacent in the scope of negation as this would contradict the presupposition of the question. This example then only shows that -- when not at issue -- the prejacent can project, not that it has to project. I would try the same question with "price would have gone up", which would not presuppose the prejacent, or somehow manipulate the question so that it problematizes the generalization without presupposing the prejacent of the answer.

We agree with your point about (what used to be) example 18b. We have replaced the example (which is now example 14b) with one where A's utterance does not already imply the truth of the prejacent, to better illustrate that the prejacent projects when is not at-issue.

(14) b. A: You keep criticizing Sam for doing some not-so-smart things. I'm not sure I agree. Can you give me an example (of something not-so-smart that Sam did)?

B: Sure! Remember the rock show we talked about? Sam wasn't smart to buy a ticket the day they went on sale. The price went down a couple of days later.

We also note that it is not just the examples in 14 that support our main claim, that the prejacent projects when not at-issue: the experiments in section 3 also provide evidence for our analysis (as do the previous studies mentioned at the beginning of that section).

4. Account fuzzy and not general enough

I found the semantic account of EAS too sketchy, in fact to the point where I'm not even sure what predictions it makes. The main data that the authors attempt to cover is as follows: In NEAS, when the prejacent projects, the negation negates the evaluative inference (1). However, when the prejacent doesn't project, the evaluative inference turns into a counterfactual statement (2).

1. (1) Feynman wasn't stupid to dance on the table.
→ Feynman danced on the table.
→ It wasn't stupid of him that he did.
2. (2) I wasn't fortunate (enough) to live close to my parents.
→ I don't live close to my parents.
→ It would have been fortunate to live close to my parents.

The way I understand the account is as follows. EAS have two lexical entailments, the prejacent and the generalization (a conditional-like statement), as shown in (3). The evaluation is then derived from these two through, I assume, a Modus Ponens rule. When the generalization projects past negation, we get to feel its hypothetical nature; but when the prejacent projects, the generalization is negated, from which we derive negation of the evaluation (I'm less sure as to why in this case the evaluation is tensed).

(3) Feynman was stupid to dance on the table.

Prejacent: Feynman danced on the table.

Generalization: In dancing on the table, Feynman is/would be stupid.

→ Evaluation: Feynman was stupid to dance on the table.

We have completely rewritten our presentation of the analysis in section 2. We now make clearer that our analysis of the projective content of EASs builds on previous analyses, as presented in Simons et al 2017. The new version of the manuscript only makes reference to the prejacent and the generalization (which we continue to argue are lexical entailments of EASs) and does not consider the evaluation anymore because previous analyses of EASs can be assessed without naming and discussing this content.

I now comment on the many problems and/or unclarities I see with this account. The first concerns the nature of the generalization inference. Is this indeed some sort of a conditional statement, and if so is it indicative or counterfactual? If not a conditional, what kind of inference is it? We started with an EAS, and the authors went one step further to split its meaning into two lexical entailments. But one of the entailments, the generalization, is stated informally and we don't know how to analyze it or make sense of it. The authors should be much more specific about the generalization inference; at a minimum, they should provide some basic logical formula, so the account is actually able to generate specific predictions.

Thank you for asking us to precisify our account and especially the prejacent and the generalization, which we now do in section 2.2. As mentioned above, the evaluation is not discussed anymore.

Second, I wonder how the semantic composition is supposed to work? How can negation selectively target the prejacent or the generalization if presumably both triggers are in its

syntactic scope? Without providing at least a sketch, this remains a mystery. In addition, the authors themselves note that entailment-canceling operators other than negation produce generalization inferences. The proposed semantics should at least suggest how projection works with some randomly selected modal, otherwise this is not much of an account.

Our proposal is that content that is not at-issue with respect to the Discourse Question projects. As we noted (previously in footnote 10), several analyses make this assumption have given different answers to the question of why not at-issue content projects. Potts (2005), for instance, proposed that not-at-issue content projects because it is contributed to a separate dimension of meaning. Simons et al (2010) proposed that it projects because operators target at-issue content. And Abrusán (2011) proposed that it projects because it is backgrounded. As we now say in the main body of the paper (section 2.2), we follow Abrusán's proposal here.

My last and most serious worry is that the shape of the projection explanation seems rather ad hoc and specific to semifactives/EAS, given that regular entailments whose triggers are placed under entailment-canceling operators do not seem to project under any circumstances. The simplest way to make the point is to take a conjunction under an entailment-canceling operator where only one of the conjuncts answers the CQ; in such cases no projection arises. Consider a minimally different answer in (18b), where the answer has a conjunction under a negative operator instead of a NEAS. The second conjunct in the scope of *doubt* does not project even though it is not at-issue. We get an infelicity or perhaps a rejection of A's assumption that Sam bought a ticket. This pattern is quite general, as (4) shows, so similar examples can be easily generated. It seems that the prejacent of NEAS projects because it has the "propensity" to project, i.e. because it is conventionally marked as projective, although in some weak sense (similarly to the complements of know or discover). But then the prejacent of EAS cannot be a regular entailment, contrary to the authors' main premise of the analysis.

(18b') A: Was Sam smart to buy a ticket for the show the day the tickets went on sale?
The price would have gone down after a few days!
B: I doubt Sam was smart and bought a ticket the day they went on sale.

(4) A: Did Maria pass the exam?
B: She probably did and called her dad.

We of course agree with you that regular entailments don't project. Crucially, the previous version of the manuscript did not claim that the prejacent and the generalization are regular entailments: rather, they are entailments that may project, which we now make clear in section 2. In this regard, the prejacent and the generalization of EAS are similar to the content of the complement of factive predicates, which are taken to be entailed from affirmative sentences, but may project (as we now note explicitly in footnote 4). The idea that entailed content that is backgrounded may project is also found in Abrusán's (2011, 2016) and Anand & Hacquard's (2014) discussion of projection, as we now also mention.

5. Non-redundancy and at-issue content

There is some potential confusion about whether Non-redundancy singles out at-issue content. On p.17 the authors write: “We assume here that an utterance of an indicative sentence is informative if its at-issue content is not already entailed by the common ground of the interlocutors prior to the utterance of the sentence. No such requirement exists for not-at-issue content: some not-at-issue content, like presuppositions, may be entailed by the common ground prior to utterance and other not-at-issue content, like conventional implicatures, may even be required to not be entailed, as argued in Potts 2005.” I don’t understand how conventional implicatures differ from asserted content, if both are required to not be entailed by the common ground, i.e. both are required to be informative.

The Non-Redundancy Principle cited in (32) then cannot single out at-issue content and should include conventional implicatures as well. If content *c* is entailed by the common ground, then indeed *c* is not the at-issue content of the utterance. But the opposite is false: just because *c* is not the at-issue content of the utterance, it doesn’t mean that *c* is entailed by the common ground, as *c* could be a conventional implicature.

Right, asserted content and conventional implicatures share the property of having to be informative; Potts (2005) calls this the ‘anti-backgrounding requirement’ of conventional implicatures. But asserted content and conventional implicatures differ with respect to at-issueness: asserted content is at-issue but conventional implicatures are never at-issue. So, yes, the ‘Non-redundancy principle for at-issue content’ only predicts that content that is entailed by the common ground is not at-issue. This predicts that when the prejacent or the generalization are part of the common ground, they are not at-issue. It is right that the ‘Non-redundancy principle for at-issue content’ does not predict that conventional implicatures are not at-issue. But this is not a problem for our account because, as we now clarify in footnote 12, we follow Potts (2005) and Murray (2014) in assuming that conventional implicatures are conventionally specified as not at-issue.

The gradient version in (33) of this principle falls prey to the same criticism: conventional implicatures are highly likely non-redundant but very unlikely entailed by the common ground. But that doesn’t mean conventional implicatures fall under the at-issue content of the utterance. So redundancy is more specific than at-issueness: redundant content is highly likely not at-issue, but not at-issue content may or may not be redundant. As far as I can tell, this is not crucial to the analysis, but the authors give the impression that redundancy and not-at-issueness are correlated in both directions, which seems wrong.

Thank you for this. We now clarify in footnote 13 that the ‘Non-redundancy principle for at-issue content’ is meant to be understood as a conditional, not a bi-conditional.

More importantly to the main claims of the paper, notice that the non-redundancy constraint actually argues against the idea that prejacent of EAS is a regular entailment. The reason is that the prejacent of EAS allows for being redundant/not being informative

while regular entailments do not (5)-(6). This again speaks against treating the prejacent as a regular entailment, in line with (18b') and (4) above. The prejacent rather seems to inherit the core discourse properties of (soft) presuppositions.

(5) Feynman danced on the table and he was smart to do so.

(6) # Feynman danced on the table and he danced on the table.

As mentioned above, the prejacent is not a regular entailment (if 'regular entailment' means that the content cannot project).

6. Structure of the paper

The paper is way too long and talky for my taste, which I feel results in a lack of clarity of what is achieved here, a point that goes back to the unclarity of its main contribution mentioned mentioned above. More specifically, the reader should not be made to wait until p.9 before they are told what the actual proposal is. I would try to sketch the proposal and the main claims in the opening section and make the paper more focused. We should probably see more details of the analysis, while the experimental results can be presented in a more concise form.

As mentioned above, we have completely reorganized and streamlined the paper, which is now much shorter than it was before.

Review B:

This manuscript seems to have a good potential to be a solid contribution to the relevant fields. I have some reservations and concerns, however, to be explicated below.

#1: The most crucial issue, for me, is that the argument in Section 3 is not clear enough. Take the following passage (p.16):

To illustrate how the Current Question constrains the Discourse Question, consider an utterance of the example in (30) *[[Sam] was smart to buy a ticket the day they went on sale.]*, which is presented with its focus alternative set. The Current Question, as a subset of this focus alternative set, entails that somebody bought a ticket the day they went on sale and that somebody buying a ticket the day they went on sale is smart. That is, when this utterance is made, what is already taken to be part of the common ground is that somebody bought a ticket the day they went on sale and that, in buying a ticket the day they went on sale, somebody was smart. Only some Discourse Questions are plausible, given this common ground information. In particular, both the Discourse Questions 'Who got a ticket?' and 'Did Sam get a ticket?' are plausible because both are unanswered given the entailments of the Current Question. On the other hand, Discourse Questions like 'How did Sam get a ticket?' and 'Was Sam smart to buy a ticket the day they went on sale?' are less plausible because what is common ground already answers these Discourse Questions.

This part confuses me a lot. How does the information: “somebody bought a ticket the day they went on sale and that [this same person’s] buying a ticket the day they went on sale is smart” answers the question: “How did Sam get a ticket?”? It is possible that, while Mary (or whoever) was smart to buy a ticket on the first day, Sam stupidly bought an overpriced ticket from a scalper in the last minute.

We have removed any discussion of how focus constrains the Current Question and thereby the Discourse Question from the paper, because the evidence we currently have for this constraint only comes from the corpus study, and therefore is less convincing than the constraint on the Discourse Question, for which we have experimental evidence.

Side note: The information that somebody was smart to buy a ticket on the first day appears to support the inference that if Sam bought a ticket on the first day, he was smart to do so. But this inference is not logically valid. Consider the following discourse segment:

(1) The Avengers were stupid to eat the poisoned food. Except for Hulk. He was aware that the food was poisoned, but he was also aware that his body would not be affected by any sort of poison. Hulk was not stupid to eat the poisoned food.
From “Somebody was stupid to eat the poisoned food”, it does not follow that if Hulk ate the poisoned food, he was stupid to do so. (End of side note)

I cannot make sense out of the paragraph starting with “Next consider an utterance of the example in (31), again presented with its focus alternative set. ...” for a parallel reason.

[See previous response.](#)

#2: I feel like, at the descriptive level, what’s going on is fairly straightforward. NEAS (2) is “ambiguous” and allows two interpretations, where one is a “flipped image” of the other.

(2) John was not fortunate to win the lottery.

1. “John was not fortunate to win the lottery. The money he earned ended up ruining his life.”

Interpretation #1 (this accords well to the traditional understanding of EAS’s; perhaps the default/unmarked one)

at-issue: John’s winning the lottery, if it takes place, is **not** to be characterized as fortunate

not-at-issue (projective): John won the lottery.

2. “John was not fortunate to win the lottery. He is still suffering from poverty.”

Interpretation #2 (the “problematic”, “puzzling”, or “unmarked” one) *at-issue*: John did **not** win the lottery.

not-at-issue: John’s winning the lottery, if it takes place, is to be characterized as fortunate.

(Karttunen et al. 2014 puts forth a somewhat more complicated picture, but it is not clear to me why the simple one in (2) would not suffice.)

Which interpretation a NEAS receives in a given context is affected by **how plausible each interpretation would be in the given context**. (This is a very general statement that applies to ambiguity in general.)

In (2a), the added comment “The money he earned ended up ruining his life” makes Interpretation #2 implausible, thereby singling out Interpretation #1. (2b), the added comment (“He is still suffering from poverty”), plus the common-sensical knowledge that winning a lottery is good thing and makes the winner rich, makes Interpretation #2 the only plausible option.

An explicitly asked question is part of the context, and thus it is not surprising at all that the choice of a preceding question affects the choice between the two interpretations.

3. (3) A: Did winning the lottery make John happy?
B: (Actually,) John was not fortunate to win. (**Interpretation #1**)
4. (4) A: Who is the lucky guy who won the lottery? Was it John? B: John was not fortunate to win. (**Interpretation #2**)

Obviously, (3B) on Interpretation #2 would be incongruent to (3A), its at-issue content not addressing the question. Likewise, (4B) on Interpretation #1 would be incongruent to (4A), its at-issue content not addressing the question.

I believe that the authors fully agree with all the things said above.

We agree with you that the pre-jacent of a NEAS can project or not, and that, therefore, a NEAS has at least two interpretations. If “having two interpretations” is all that is meant by the term ‘ambiguous’, then, yes, NEAS are ambiguous. We are, however, reluctant to follow Karttunen et al 2014 in attributing the two interpretations of NEAS to a lexical ambiguity. As discussed in section 1, there are conceptual worries with this kind of analysis, not the least that utterances of sentences with other projective content are generally not analyzed as ambiguous.

My concern is that the authors might be overplaying the roles of the CQ/DQ here. In the following discourse segments, the explicitly asked questions help disambiguation of the word *mole*.

- (6) A: What kind of pet did the Smiths have?
B: They had a mole [animal].
- (7) A: How come the terrorists knew the CIA’s plan? B: They had a mole [spy].

But this does not make us want to come up with a “question-based account” of word disambiguation, right?

The topic of conversation provides a cue to listeners about which meaning of ‘mole’ is intended, and Discourse Questions are also taken to provide the topic of conversation. So our analysis of the interpretation of EASs perhaps isn’t so far away from how one would want to think about the interpretation of ambiguous lexical items. Be that as it may, section 2.1 of the new manuscript now makes clearer, we hope, that question-based

analyses of projective content are well-established and that we are adopting one such analysis for EASs.

I am inclined to believe that “disambiguation” taking place in (3)/(4) and that taking place in (6)/(7) are ultimately of the same kind – and thus that it is misguided to link directly (i) the projectivity of a EAS prejacent on the one hand and (ii) the notion of the CQ on the other. Rather, it appears that a CQ is one of many factors that leads to disambiguation of (N)EAS’s. (I do not see how exactly their question-based analysis works in the first place, as explained in Comment #1. A better-explained version might resolve my doubts ...)

Right, topic of conversation (the Discourse Question) and the information structure (the Current Question) are constraints on the interpretation of EAS. The current version of the manuscript now focuses on the first constraint, and leaves consideration of the second to future research.

#3: On p.16 and elsewhere, the authors appear to suggest that focus on the subject (inevitably? – I am not clear about what the authors are committed to here) leads to the interpretation where the prejacent is at-issue. Cases like (8) conforms to this generalization.

(8) A: Who wasn’t able to buy a ticket?

B: [John]F was not smart to buy a ticket early enough. (*nonprojective*: ‘John bought a ticket early enough’)

But it is also possible to construct a case where the subject is in focus and yet the prejacent is *not* at-issue.

(9) A: Everyone ate the poisoned food. Everyone was stupid to do so -- except for one person.

B: Huh? Who are you talking about?

A: [Hulk]F was not stupid to do so. He is immune to poison. (*projective*: Hulk ate the poisoned food.)

I wonder if this poses a problem for the authors’ question-based account.

As noted above, we have removed the discussion about constraints from the Current Question on the interpretation of EAS from the paper, because the corpus-based evidence is quite tentative.

#4: I have serious doubts about Gradient Projection Principle, and the associated assumption that projectivity and at-issueness are gradient.

It is very much possible that, upon hearing a sentence like: *John was (not) fortunate to win the lottery*, people have different degrees of commitments (certainty) as to which component is at-issue. But a similar kind of “gradience” could easily be observed with a sentence like: *Those CIA agents had a mole*.

(10) Chris: Those CIA agents had a mole.

QUESTION 1: Is Chris certain that the CIA agents had a small animal?

QUESTION 2: Is Chris certain that the CIA agents had some sort of spy?

QUESTION 3: Is Chris certain that the CIA agents had a small animal, rather than some sort of spy? ...

Different respondents would show different reactions (“certainly yes”, “possibly no”, etc.) to QUESTIONS 1, 2, 3, But this should not be taken to mean that two senses of *mole* are gradient.

Likewise, people may say, “certainly yes”, “possibly no”, etc. when asked to rate a statement/question like “Americans are smart/Are Americans smart?” or “Trump is smart./Is Trump smart?”, partly due to the vagueness of *smart*. This kind of observation has led some to admit that the truth is a gradient, rather than binary, notion. But this move has its problems, and is far from being widely accepted (see e.g. Ch 2 of Wechsler’s 2015 *Word Meaning and Syntax*, Oxford University Press).

Admitting the gradience of projectivity/at-issueness is a rather radical (if not insensible) move, and the data discussed by the authors do not appear to lend direct support for it.

As we now make clearer in section 2, we adopt the Gradient Projection Principle from Tonhauser et al 2018 (*Journal of Semantics*); this paper also provides experimental evidence for the Gradient Projection Principle. Section 2 of the new version of the manuscript also discusses more explicitly why we take projectivity to be gradient, and how to think of variable projectivity and at-issueness.

#5: I find it rather interesting that (i) EAS’s and (ii) factive predicate sentences both show two—unmarked and marked—patterns of projection, and yet the “marked pattern” for the former is rather different from that for the latter.

With EAS’s, the “marked pattern” (= Interpretation #2) is a flipped image of the “unmarked pattern” (= Interpretation #1). In an NEAS, negation behaves like metalinguistic negation—observe the parallelism between (2b) and (11), where the canonically projective component becomes nonprojective and vice versa.

(11) John does NOT speak French TOO. He speaks only French.

“nonprojective (targeted by the negation)”: John does **not** speak some language other than French.

“projective”: John speaks French.

With factive predicate sentences, in my understanding, the “marked pattern” is such that the projective content simply disappears, rather than becomes nonprojective.

12. (12) unmarked pattern

(Mary was at Princeton, but told John that she was not.) John did not discover that Mary was at Princeton.

“nonprojective”: John did **not** come to believe that Mary was at Princeton.

“projective”: Mary was at Princeton.

13. (13) marked pattern

Was Mary at Princeton? -- John did some survey, but did not discover that Mary was at Princeton.

“nonprojective”: John did **not** come to believe that Mary was at Princeton.

“projective”: Mary was at Princeton.

Probably the authors are aware of this interesting contrast—I just thought fuller illustration of this would make a nice addition to the manuscript.

Thank you for this. The new manuscript is now much more explicit in section 1 already about the remarkable interaction in the projectivity of the two contents of EASs that can be at-issue (the prejacent and the generalization).

#5: Oshima compares the three “constructions” in (14), where the Adj+*to*+Inf construction corresponds to what the authors call the EAS sentence.

(14)

- a. John was wise to leave. [Adj+*to*+Inf construction]
- b. It was wise of John to leave. [Adj+*of*+NP construction]
- c. Wisely, John left. [Subject-Oriented Adv (SOAdv) construction]

He assumes that the Adj+*to*+Inf construction is semantically equivalent to the Adj+*of*+NP construction, while the SOAdv construction has the reversed assertion/presupposition (at-issue/non-at-issue) configuration.

Karttunen *et al.* (2014) mention (in fn.1) that for a Adj+*of*+NP construction, the prejacent appears to be invariably projective. This, along with other remarks by them and by the manuscript’s authors, suggests that Oshima’s characterizations are to be revised in the following way.

(15)

- a. John was (not) wise to leave. [Adj+*to*+Inf construction]
allows both Interpretations #1 and #2
- b. It was (not) wise of John to leave. [Adj+*of*+NP construction] **Interpretation #1 only**
- c. Wisely, John {left/did not leave}. [Subject-Oriented Adv (SOAdv) construction]
Interpretation #2 only

To me, the picture in (14) suggests that the unmarked projection pattern of the EAS pattern arises from polysemy at the level of conventionalized lexical or constructional meaning (a position taken by Karttunen *et al.*), rather than from some general mechanism regulating how CQ’s/DQ’s constrain what projects and what does not (a position taken by the authors). If the latter were the case, it would be difficult to explain why the Adj+*of*+NP construction never allows the “generalization” to project, and the SOAdv construction never allows the prejacent to project.

Thank you for this comment! We argue in the manuscript that the prejacent of EAS/Adj+*to*-Inf constructions is not lexically specified as projective content, but it is not clear that this is the appropriate analysis for the other two constructions in 15. First, adverbs like *wisely* seem to be inherently speaker-oriented, a property that can be taken to be lexically specified, thereby rendering the projectivity of the prejacent insensitive to questions. Second, the adjective *wise* in EAS/Adj+*to*-Inf constructions occurs in a different syntactic frame than in Adj+*of*+NP constructions. It is possible, of course, to

argue that projection of the prejacent is lexically specified in Adj+of+NP constructions: precedent for the idea syntactic frames with the same expressions differ in their projective content comes from, for instance, Karttunen's 1971 ('Some observations on factivity') examples in (16); see his discussion thereof:

(16a) That his bride is not a virgin would bother Harry if he knew about it. (*Luckily she is a virgin.)

(16b) His bride's not being a virgin would bother Harry if he knew about it. (Luckily she is a virgin.)

We now state explicitly in footnote 3 that conventional specification of projection is, of course, motivated for other types of projective content, even if we do not take it to be motivated for the prejacent of EASs.

#6: As I understand, when Barker and Oshima said the prejacent of an EAS is (always) presupposed, they were wrong in two ways.

First, the prejacent is sometimes at-issue (asserted). Second, even when the prejacent is projective, it is still not presuppositional, in the sense that it is a "[-SCF (Strong Contextual Felicity)] projective content" in Tonhauser et al's (2013; "Towards a taxonomy of projective content", *Language* 89) terminology, and a "non-presuppositional CI" in Oshima's (2017; "The meanings of perspectival verbs and their implications on the taxonomy of projective content/conventional implicature", *Proceedings of SALT 26*) terminology.

The first point is clearly explained in the manuscript. The second point, on the other hand, is not. The authors might find the second point empirically controversial – it would be nice, anyhow, if they can clarify their take on this.

Yes, we assume that the prejacent of an EAS is not associated with a Strong Contextual Felicity constraint, in Tonhauser et al's 2013 terminology, but can be new information. We now say so explicitly in section 2.

#7: A minor point: While (22a) is the denotation (ordinary semantic value) of (21aM), (22b) is not the denotation but the focus semantic value of (21aJ) – shouldn't this be clarified in some way, e.g., using super- or subscript "f". It is problematic to say that (22b) is the meaning of (21aJ), because then (21aJ) ends up having "the same meaning" as *David likes Lebanese coffee*. Maybe I am just missing some terminological assumptions here.

Thank you for this suggestion. Because we have removed discussion of focus constraints on the Current Question, this bit isn't in the paper anymore.

#8:

What is the rationale of the random selection? One could use, say, the examples from the first 15 pages instead, or do a random selection from all the pages, to obtain whatever amount of examples desired.

For adjectives with more than 10 pages of results, we extracted all relevant examples from the first 10 pages and then extracted a random selection of examples from the remaining pages.

Right, we could have also selected examples in a different way. Our rationale for including a random selection from the other pages was that we did not want to just ignore examples from later pages. We assume that the way in which we selected examples does not influence the findings of the corpus study.

Review E:

Relying on a combination of corpus and experimental evidence, they authors argue that the status of the prejacent of evaluative adjective sentences is linked in a principled way to the question that the utterance is taken to address. Having individuated two crucial entailments of this type of sentences — the (truth of the) prejacent and the (truth of the) Generalization — the authors test three predictions of their proposal: (a) that the projectivity of the prejacent is influenced by the focus marking of the utterance; (b) that the stronger the inference to the truth of the generalization from the common ground, the less projective is the prejacent; (c) that the stronger the inference to the truth of the generalization from the common ground, the more at-issue is the prejacent. The first prediction is tested via a corpus study; the second and the third are tested via two experiments.

Overall, I find this submission quite strong. The topic is of high theoretical interest in the literature on projective content and secondary entailments; the methodology is sound and empirically rich; and the article is well written and well structured, even though I think the prose and the layout of the paper could use some reorganization. In sum, think this would make a good contribution to *Glossa*. I recommend that the article **be accepted with (moderate) revisions**.

My main suggestion concerns the organizational aspects of the paper. In particular, the article in its current form is quite long. While part of this is justified by the need to spell out in detail all the steps of a variety of different methodologies — which the authors do quite well — I also think that the prose could be made a bit more tight, improving the readability of the article.

As mentioned above, we have completely reorganized and streamlined the manuscript, which is now much shorter than it was before.

Here are some suggestions. Please keep in mind that these strictly reflect my own personal judgment, and are by no means *the only possible way* for shortening the article. I think it's more important that the authors find a way of tightening up the article than that they follow these specific recommendations to achieve this goal.

1- Do we really need a whole section for Experiment 1? As far as I understand, this study merely shows that not all prejacent of EAs project to the same degree. It's definitely an

important starting point, but it seems to me that it could be presented as part of a background literature review, rather than as a stand alone study. After all, this experiment is setting up the stage by presenting a puzzle to Karttunen's original theory; it does not test the predictions of the novel account, which is outlined in Section 3. While I understand the importance of providing a detailed discussion, I think these findings could be condensed in a shorter background section that explains why K's theory falls short of explaining the behavior of evaluative adjective sentences. In my view, this would be sufficient to show the need for a novel account, allowing for a smooth transition to section 3.

Thank you for this suggestion. We now present the figure in at the beginning of section 2, to make the point that the preajcent is not highly projective. The details of the experiment have been moved to an appendix.

2- I think Section 3 can be made more coincide. In particular, I am not sure I entirely follow why the authors linger on the discussion of prosody on page 15. To be sure, it's very true that prosodic factors represent a crucial window into the discourse status of any sentence. But, as the authors themselves admit, none of the studies manipulate prosody as a factor, and neither is prosody central too any of the three central theoretical predictions (except for (a); see below for further comments). Again, I think this digression takes away from the flow of the paper; perhaps it could be reduced to an extended footnote. If, by contrast, I am underestimating the importance of this part to the take away message of the paper, I would suggest that the authors be more explicit about the role of prosody in their theoretical claims.

Thank you for this. We have taken your suggestion to heart and removed our discussion of focus constraints on the Current Question from the paper, precisely because our empirical evidence for such constraints only came from the corpus study, and hence were quite tentative, especially in comparison to (what used to be) experiments 2 and 3 (and are now experiments 1 and 2).

3- While I think experiment 2 and 3 are convincing, I'm a little hesitant to say the same for the corpus study. To put it better: all the considerations and suggestions made by the authors are reasonable; but as they admit, it is hard to collect definitive evidence without a proper comprehension and/or production study, one that ideally also takes prosodic factors into consideration. As it stands, I think that section 4.1, if properly reduced, could be fruitfully incorporated into a good "Avenue for further research" section. This would allow the authors to emphasize the contribution of the two experiments, while making the paper easier to follow.

See the comment above. We now only mention in the conclusions that an investigation of focus constraints on the interpretation of EAS is a fruitful avenue for future research.

Finally, on a conceptual level, I think the paper could benefit from more engagement with big picture issues about entailments and projective content. In particular, I was left wondering about the amenability of the proposed analysis to be extended to other cases of

prejacent that have been previously claimed to be presupposed by the embedding verb. For example, how does this connect to the current debate on the status of the complements of emotive factives? (e.g., *I'm happy that p.*) Would a notion like the Generalization be helpful to shed light on these cases as well? It seems to me that, in principle, it could yield crucial insights, especially with respect to the puzzle of mood selection under such predicates (indicative vs. subjunctive in Spanish, Italian and Greek, see Giannakidou and Mari 2016). Based on these, it seems to me that the more focused the adjective, the more likely it is the preadjacent to be in the indicative; and the more focused the preadjacent, the more likely it is to be in the subjunctive. Of course, I do not expect the authors to engage with this issue specifically. But this is just an example of how the proposed theory could be extended to other domains. It would be good to walk away from the paper with a clearer sense of how the theory outlined in the article could be used to think about other domains. This would definitely make the paper stronger in my view.

[We have rewritten section 1 to make clearer what the larger implications of this work are.](#)

Other comments:

- p.23: The authors write: "in losing her wallet, Katie was fortunate". I believe it should be *unfortunate* here; a minor typo which could severely impair the understanding of the experimental predictions! :-)

[The generalization is determined from the EAS, so the generalization of "Sue was traveling in France. She wasn't fortunate to lose her wallet." is "In losing her wallet, Sue was fortunate". This, of course, is the negation of what follows from world knowledge, namely that nobody is fortunate to lose their wallet! The current version of the manuscript now explicitly reminds the reader of how the generalization is determined, to avoid confusion.](#)

- Figure 7 is a little overinformative. Perhaps it can be broken down into two figures: one showing the average for the two conditions, and one showing the difference between the specific predicates.

[Thank you for this comment. We have considered what to do, and have decided to stick with this way of representing the results. However, given this comment and the one below, we decided to visualize the data from both experiments in the same way and hope that the added prose will help with reading the figures.](#)

- In general, I was a bit confused by the visualization of the data. While I do think that the differences between predicates are important, it would be useful to get a sense of the average across predicates for the manipulated condition. This was only shown for Experiment 3, though.

[See previous response.](#)