

# The information-structural source of projection variability

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## Abstract

Projective content has long been observed to vary in its projectivity, i.e., in how robustly speakers are taken to be committed to it (e.g., Karttunen 1971; Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 1990; Simons 2001; Abusch 2010). The empirical observation of projection variability presents a challenge for approaches to projectivity that assume that projective content is derived from a conventionally specified requirement of such content to be entailed by or satisfied in the common ground of the interlocutors (e.g., Heim 1983; van der Sandt 1992). Simons et al. (2010), on the other hand, proposed that projective content projects if and only if it is not at-issue with respect to the Question Under Discussion (e.g., Roberts 2012) addressed by the utterance that contributes the projective content. This proposal predicts that the projectivity of projective content is influenced by its information-structural status and, hence, that variable not-at-issueness may lead to variable projectivity. This paper presents the results of two pairs of experiments that provide empirical evidence for projection variability and the influence of the information-structural status of such content on projectivity. These findings thus provide empirical support for Simons et al.'s (2010) proposal and further substantiate the empirical challenges for conventionalist approaches to projective content.

## 1 Introduction

Projective content is utterance content that the speaker may be taken to be committed to even when the expression that contributes the content occurs in the syntactic scope of an entailment-canceling operator (see, e.g., Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 1990). The speaker of (1), for instance, is taken to be committed to the content of the complement of *discover*, that Mike visited Alcatraz, since this content is entailed by the utterance. The so-called Family-of-Sentences variants of (1) given in (2a-d) do not entail this content because *discover* is embedded under entailment-canceling operators: negation in (2a), the polar question operator in (2b), the epistemic possibility modal *perhaps* in (2c) and the antecedent of a conditional in (2d). Since speakers who utter the sentences in (2a-d) may nevertheless be taken to be committed to the content of the complement, this content, by virtue of being able to ‘project’ over the entailment-canceling operators, is considered projective content.

- (1) Felipe discovered that Mike visited Alcatraz.
- (2)
  - a. Felipe didn’t discover that Mike visited Alcatraz.
  - b. Did Felipe discover that Mike visited Alcatraz?
  - c. Perhaps Felipe discovered that Mike visited Alcatraz.
  - d. If Felipe discovered that Mike visited Alcatraz, he’ll get mad.

Why does projective content project? According to mainstream approaches, projective content projects because it is conventionally specified to do so, for instance, by being required to be entailed by or satisfied in the common ground of the interlocutors (e.g., Heim 1983; van der Sandt 1992; Geurts 1999). On such ‘conventionalist’ approaches, the lexical entry of *discover* specifies that the content of its clausal complement is required to be entailed by or satisfied in the common ground of the interlocutors, thereby ensuring that the speaker is taken to be committed to the content. Since conventionalist approaches only distinguish projective and non-projective content, such approaches are challenged by the long-standing observation that some projective content projects less robustly than other such content. In the early 1970s already, Karttunen (1971) pointed out that the content of the complement of *regret* in (3a) is more robustly projective than the content of the complement of *discover* in (3b); following Karttunen 1971, predicates like *discover* have since been referred to as ‘semi-factive’, in contrast to their ‘factive’ counterparts like *regret* (and ‘non-factive’ predicates like *believe*). In Schlenker 2010, the predicate *announce* was referred to as a ‘part-time trigger’ because the content of its complement may, but often does not, project.

- (3) a. John didn’t discover that he had not told the truth.  
 b. John didn’t regret that he had not told the truth. (Karttunen 1971:63)

Similarly, Simons (2001:432) noted, partially based on examples from Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 1990 and Geurts 1994, that the projection of “some – but crucially, not all” projective content to the common ground of the interlocutors may be suppressed in explicit ignorance contexts. Example (4a), for instance, shows that the projective content of *win* in the antecedent of the conditional, that John participated in the race, need not be part of the common ground of the interlocutors, i.e., need not project. On the other hand, the existential implication of the cleft in (4b), that there is an individual who read the letter, must be part of the common ground of the interlocutors, i.e., must project. Expressions like *win* are referred to as ‘soft triggers’, in contrast to ‘hard triggers’, like the cleft (see also, e.g., Abusch 2010).

- (4) a. I have no idea whether John ended up participating in the Road Race yesterday. But if he won it, then he has more victories than anyone else in history. (Abusch 2010:39)  
 b. #I have no idea whether anyone read that letter. But if it is John who read it, let’s ask him to be discreet about the content. (Abusch 2010:40)

Experimental research has also provided preliminary evidence for projection variability. Xue and Onea (2011) observed that the content of the complement of German *wissen* ‘know’ is less projective than the content of the complement of *erfahren* ‘find out’, both of which are less projective than the relevant projective contents of sentences with *auch* ‘too’ (that a parallel event is contextually salient) and *wieder* ‘again’ (that the relevant event has happened before). Similarly, Smith and Hall (2011) found that the projective contents of *win* and *know* are less projective than the content implication of English definite noun phrases (e.g., for *the queen*, that the referent is a queen). Interestingly, they also found that the existential implication of cleft sentences, considered a hard trigger, was (numerically) less projective than the relevant contents of the soft triggers *win* and *know*. Thus, the (sparse) experimental evidence confirms some but not all of the intuitions about projection variability reported in the literature.

Observations about projection variability challenge conventionalist approaches to projection because such approaches do not offer an explanation for why some projective content seems to project less robustly than other such content. After all, under such approaches, any expression that contributes projective content lexically specifies that the relevant content is required to be entailed by or satisfied in the common ground of the interlocutors. The lexical specifications of expressions like *regret*, *discover*, *win*, clefts and definite noun phrases thereby predict that their relevant contents can project, but do not predict differences in how robustly the contents project. Referring to triggers of projective content as ‘semi-factive’ or ‘soft’, as opposed to

‘factive’ or ‘hard’, serves to remind of projection variability but does not address the challenge that this variability poses for conventionalist approaches to projection.

One possible explanation for projection variability is that projectivity derives from a property that projective content shares, but shares to varying degrees. Simons et al. (2010) proposed that this property is ‘at-issueness’, i.e., the ability of content to address the Question Under Discussion (QUD; e.g., Roberts 2012). Specifically, Simons and her colleagues proposed that utterance content projects if and only if it is not at-issue with respect to the QUD addressed by the utterance. Although Simons et al. (2010) did not consider projection variability, their proposal predicts such variability. For instance, their proposal predicts that the content of non-restrictive relative clauses (NRRCs) projects more robustly, by virtue of being not at-issue (Potts 2005), than the content of the complement of *discover*, which can be at-issue and not-at-issue (Simons 2007). Consider the question-answer pairs in (5): the example in (5a) shows that the content of the NRRC in B’s utterance cannot be used to address A’s question, and hence is not at-issue; the example in (5b) shows that the main clause content of B’s utterance can address A’s question and hence is at-issue. The content of the complement of *discover*, on the other hand, can be not-at-issue, as shown in (6a), but it can also be at-issue, as shown in (6b).<sup>1</sup> Thus, if the content of NRRCs is more robustly not-at-issue than the content of the complement of *discover*, the former is predicted by Simons et al.’s (2010) proposal to project more robustly than the latter.

- (5) a. A: Did Mike visit Alcatraz?  
       B: #Mike, who visited Alcatraz, is interested in the history of prisons.
- b. A: What is Mike interested in?  
       B: Mike, who visited Alcatraz, is interested in the history of prisons.
- (6) a. A: Why is Henry in such a bad mood?  
       B: He discovered that Harriet had a job interview at Princeton.
- b. A: Where was Harriet yesterday?  
       B: Henry discovered that she had a job interview at Princeton. (Simons 2007:1035)

This paper has two goals, which are explored on the basis of two pairs of experiments. The first goal (Experiments 1a and 1b) is to explore projection variability for a broad range of projective content, in order to better understand the extent to which projection variability presents a challenge for conventionalist approaches to projection. The second goal (addressed through Experiments 1a and 1b, as well as Experiments 2a and 2b) is to test the proposal put forth in Simons et al. 2010, that the projectivity of utterance content is influenced by at-issueness, i.e., the information-structural status of such content. These two goals jointly serve to assess the empirical adequacy of conventionalist and Simons et al.’s (2010) approaches to projection and projection variability.

In pursuing our first goal, we expand and improve on previous experimental research on projection variability. In Xue and Onea 2011 and Smith and Hall 2011, projection variability was explored for 4 German and 6 English expressions that contribute projective content, respectively. Experiments 1a and 1b significantly broaden our understanding of projection variability by considering the projective content of 19 expressions (which are introduced in section 2). Our experiments also take into consideration that the prior plausibility of content may influence projection: a speaker might, for instance, be more likely to be taken to be committed to the content that Alexander flew to New York than to the content that Alexander flew to the moon, simply because people are more likely to fly to New York than the moon. In other words, the content of the projective content of an expression<sup>2</sup> may matter for how robustly the projective

<sup>1</sup>Syrett and Koev (2015) show that the content of NRRCs can be the target of direct denial, which may be taken to suggest that this content can be at-issue. We return to this matter in section 5.

<sup>2</sup>In this paper, we use ‘content’ to refer to the content of an expression and ‘projective content’ to refer to an abstract characterization of the projective content of an expression. For instance, in B’s utterance in (6a), the relevant expression is *discover*,

content is taken to be a commitment of the speaker and how likely the projective content is to address the QUD. The projective content of the 6 expressions explored in Smith and Hall 2011 was only instantiated by one content each and a distinct content instantiated each projective content; similarly, the projective content of the 4 expressions explored in Xue and Onea 2011 was instantiated by three distinct contents each. Our experiments, in contrast, included a total of 37 contents and the projective content of each expression was instantiated by up to 20 contents. Furthermore, to facilitate comparison across the different projective contents (and the expressions that contribute them), the projective contents of distinct expressions were instantiated with the same contents: overall, each of the 37 contents instantiated up to 12 projective contents.

Our second goal – to explore the hypothesis that the information-structural status of projective content influences its projectivity – also builds on previous experimental work. Using a direct dissent diagnostic for at-issueness, Amaral et al. (2011) found that speakers of British English judged direct dissent with the projective content of *only* (the prejacent) to be more acceptable than direct dissent with the projective content of *continue* and *stop* (the pre- and post-state implications, respectively). These findings suggest that the prejacent of *only* is more at-issue than the post- and pre-state implications of *continue* and *stop*. (See also Cummins et al. 2012.) Xue and Onea (2011) found that speakers of German were more likely to directly dissent with the content of the complement of *wissen* ‘know’ than with the content of the complement of *erfahren* ‘find out’ and, in turn, more likely to directly dissent with these contents than with projective contents of *auch* ‘too’ and *wieder* again’. These results suggest that the content of the complement of *wissen* ‘know’ is more at-issue than the content of the complement of *erfahren* ‘find out’, which in turn are comparatively more at-issue than the relevant contents of *auch* ‘too’ and *wieder* again’. Interestingly, comparing the relative projectivity and not-at-issueness of the contents across their two experiments, Xue and Onea (2011:180) point to “a clear correlation between projection and not-at-issueness”, in line with the proposal made in Simons et al. 2010 that we explore further here. Our Experiments 1a and 1b improve on Xue and Onea’s (2011) study by exploring the projectivity and the not-at-issueness of projective content as within-item and within-participant factors. The design of Experiments 1a and 1b allows us to quantify the influence of not-at-issueness on the projectivity of utterance content but also to assess item- and participant-variability. Since different diagnostics have been used in the literature to diagnose (not-)at-issueness (for discussion, see, e.g., Tonhauser 2012 and section 3), the second pair of experiments, Experiments 2a and 2b, explore the not-at-issueness of the contents of the first pair of experiments, Experiments 1a and 1b, using a different diagnostic for at-issueness. The results of the two pairs of experiments thus also allow for a comparison of two diagnostics for at-issueness.

The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we characterize the projective contents explored in this paper. Section 3 addresses the two goals of the paper on the basis of Experiments 1a and 1b, and section 4 extends our investigation of the second goal on the basis of Experiments 2a and 2b. In section 5, we discuss the implications of our findings for conventionalist and Simons et al.’s (2010) approaches to projection and projection variability. Section 6 concludes the paper.

## 2 The projective contents explored in the experiments

This section introduces properties of the projective contents explored in the two pairs of experiments. These projective contents are contributed by 19 expressions, henceforth referred to as ‘triggers’, but without making any commitment to these expressions conventionally specifying the projectivity of the relevant content.

The 9 projective content triggers included in Experiment 1a are syntactically heterogeneous, as shown in (7), whereas the 12 triggers included in Experiment 1b are all attitude predicates, as shown in (8). Since some expressions can contribute multiple projective contents (Tonhauser et al. 2013), we specify, for each

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the projective content is the content of its clausal complement, and the content (of the projective content) is that Harriet had a job interview at Princeton.

trigger, the projective content investigated in our experiments: e.g., in (7a), ‘sentence-medial NRRCs’ identifies the trigger and ‘content of the NRRC’ identifies the projective content. Experiments 2a and 2b explored not-at-issueness for the same trigger/projective content pairs as Experiments 1a and 1b, respectively. Since the projective content of the attitude predicates *annoyed* and *discover* was explored in both pairs of experiments, a total of 19 trigger/projective content pairs were explored.

**(7) Trigger/projective content pairs in Experiments 1a and 2a**

1. Sentence-medial NRRCs / content of the NRRC  
e.g., *Martha, who has a new BMW, drives fast*; content: ‘Martha has a new BMW’
2. Sentence-medial nominal appositives / appositive content  
e.g., *Martha’s new car, a BMW, was expensive*; content: ‘Martha has a BMW’
3. Possessive noun phrases / possession implication  
e.g., *Martha’s new car is a BMW*; possession implication: ‘Martha has a new car’
4. *annoyed* / content of the clausal complement  
e.g., *Martha’s neighbor was annoyed that Martha has a new BMW*; content: ‘Martha has a new BMW’
5. *discover* / content of the clausal complement  
e.g., *Mary discovered that her daughter has been biting her nails*; content: ‘Mary’s daughter has been biting her nails’
6. *know* / content of the clausal complement  
e.g., *Billy knows that Martha has a new BMW*; content: ‘Martha has a new BMW’
7. *only* / prejacent  
e.g., *Martha only likes blueberries*; prejacent: ‘Martha likes blueberries’
8. *stop* / pre-state implication  
e.g., *Martha stopped smoking*; pre-state implication: ‘Martha smoked in the past’
9. *stupid* / prejacent  
e.g., *Martha was stupid to buy that TV*; prejacent: Martha bought that TV

**(8) Trigger/projective content pairs in Experiments 1b and 2b**

1. *be amused* / content of the clausal complement
2. *be annoyed* / content of the clausal complement
3. *know* / content of the clausal complement
4. *be aware* / content of the clausal complement
5. *see* / content of the clausal complement
6. *discover* / content of the clausal complement
7. *find out* / content of the clausal complement
8. *realize* / content of the clausal complement
9. *learn* / content of the clausal complement
10. *establish* / content of the clausal complement
11. *confess* / content of the clausal complement
12. *reveal* / content of the clausal complement

In what follows, we characterize the properties of the 19 trigger/projective content pairs explored in the experiments.

**Projectivity** The 19 projective contents share the property of being projective, i.e., being able to be taken to be a commitment of the speaker even when the trigger is embedded under an entailment-canceling operator. The 9 expressions included in Experiments 1a and 2a differ in how robustly their contents have been reported to project: the content of NRRCs, nominal appositives and of the emotive ‘factive’ predicate *annoyed* are typically taken to project more robustly than, e.g., the prejacent of *only*, the pre-state implication of *stop* and the complement of the cognitive ‘semi-factive’ predicate *discover* (e.g., Karttunen 1971; Simons 2001; Potts 2005; Abusch 2010; Beaver 2010). The 12 triggers included in Experiments 1b and 2b include both ‘factive’ and ‘semi-factive’ predicates, and were also chosen to denote different types of attitudes: emotive ‘factive’ predicates (*be amused*, *be annoyed*), cognitive ‘factive’ predicates (*know*, *be aware*), sensory ‘factivities’ predicates (*see*), cognitive ‘semi-factivities’ predicates (*discover*, *find out*, *realize*, *learn*, *establish*) and communication ‘semi-factivities’ (*confess*, *reveal*). The predicates *be annoyed* and *discover* were included in both Experiments 1a and 1b (and 2a and 2b) to be able to directly compare the results of the experiments.

**JT: Do all attitude predicates entail the content of the complement? Need experiment!**

**Strong Contextual Felicity** A property shared by the 19 trigger/projective content pairs is that they do not impose a Strong Contextual Felicity constraint on the utterance context (Tonhauser et al. 2013). What this means is that utterances with the triggers included in the experiments are judged to be acceptable in contexts in which the projective content is not already part of the common ground of the interlocutors when the trigger is uttered. For instance, B’s utterance in (5b), repeated below, is acceptable even if A did not previously know the content of the NRRC, that Mike visited Alcatraz. A trigger/projective content pair that is associated with a Strong Contextual Felicity constraint is the pronoun *they* and the projective content that there is a uniquely salient plurality of individuals (to which the pronoun refers). Use of *they* in (9) is judged to be unacceptable because the projective content of the pronoun is not part of the common ground of the interlocutors, i.e., the utterance context does not entail the existence of a uniquely salient plurality of individuals to which the pronoun could refer.

(5b) A: What is Mike interested in?

B: Mike, who visited Alcatraz, is interested in the history of prisons.

(9) At a bus stop, one woman asks another one, with no other people around:

#Did they visit Alcatraz?

Including in our experiments only trigger/projective content pairs not associated with a Strong Contextual Felicity constraint was motivated by our goal of exploring the relative projectivity and not-at-issueness of the triggers. It is well-known that the context in which a projective content trigger occurs influences whether the projective content projects (see, e.g., the examples in (4), but also, e.g., Simons 2001; Beaver 2010). In our experiments, all of the projective content triggers were therefore presented in the same contexts, namely ones that clarified the situation in which the trigger was uttered but that minimized the extent to which the context might influence the projectivity or not-at-issueness of the relevant content. Including trigger/projective content pairs associated with a Strong Contextual Felicity constraint would have forced us to present the triggers in different contexts, thereby hampering cross-trigger comparison.<sup>3</sup>

**Obligatory Local Effect** The 19 trigger/projective content pairs differ in whether they have Obligatory Local Effect (Tonhauser et al. 2013), the property that distinguishes trigger/projective content pairs based on whether the projective content is obligatorily contributed to an attitude holder’s belief state when the trigger

<sup>3</sup>As discussed in section 3, the minimal contexts in which the stimuli were presented also have the property of not plausibly licensing ‘local accommodation’ (Heim 1983; van der Sandt 1992), the process that allows conventionalist approaches to projection to account for projective content not projecting.

occurs in the complement of a belief-predicate. The examples in (10) illustrate that the content of NRRCs does not have Obligatory Local Effect, in contrast to the content of the complement of *discover*, which does. In (10a), where the NRRC occurs in the complement clause of *believe*, the attitude holder (Sarah) need not be committed to the content of the NRRC, that Mike visited Alcatraz, as shown by the acceptability of the continuation. In contrast, in (10b), where *discover* occurs in the complement of the belief-predicate, Sarah must be committed to the same content (that Mike visited Alcatraz), as shown by the unacceptability of the same continuation.

- (10) a. Sarah believes that Mike, who visited Alcatraz, is interested in the history of prisons, ... but she doesn't know that Mike has already visited Alcatraz.  
 b. Sarah believes that Felipe discovered that Mike visited Alcatraz, ... #but she doesn't know that Mike has already visited Alcatraz.

In addition to the projective content of NRRCs, the projective contents of appositives and of possessive noun phrases do not have Obligatory Local Effect. The remaining 16 trigger/projective content pairs, including that of *discover*, have Obligatory Local Effect.

In sum, the 9 projective content triggers explored in Experiments 1a and 2a are syntactically heterogeneous, have been reported to differ in how robustly the projective content projects and include 3 that have Obligatory Local Effect and 6 that don't. The 12 projective content triggers explored in Experiments 1b and 2b are all attitude predicates, i.e., syntactically comparatively homogenous, and all have Obligatory Local Effect, but also differ in how robustly their projective contents have been reported to project.

### 3 Experiments 1a and 1b

Experiments 1a and 1b were designed to explore the projectivity of the 19 projective contents, to better understand projection variability (the first goal of the paper) and to test Simons et al.'s (2010) proposal that the projectivity of utterance content is influenced by at-issueness, i.e., the information-structural status of such content (the second goal of the paper). In these experiments, the projective content triggers were embedded in polar questions.

To examine the influence of at-issueness on projectivity, we collected judgments about the projectivity and the at-issueness of the projective content in a within-item and within-participant design. Consider, for instance, Patrick's polar question with the nominal appositive in (11). The relevant projective content here is the appositive content, i.e., that Martha's new car is a BMW. The 'certain that' response question in (11a) assesses the extent to which Patrick is taken to be committed to the projective content, i.e., the extent to which the content projects from Patrick's polar question. The 'asking whether' response question in (11b) assesses the extent to which Patrick is asking about the projective content, i.e., the extent to which the projective content is at-issue in Patrick's polar question. (For other uses of this diagnostic of at-issueness see, e.g., Amaral et al. 2007 and Tonhauser 2012.)

- (11) Patrick asks: *Was Martha's new car, a BMW, expensive?*  
 a. 'certain that' question: Is Patrick certain that Martha's new car is a BMW?  
 b. 'asking whether' question: Is Patrick asking whether Martha's new car is a BMW?

In Experiments 1a and 1b, each participant was asked to respond to both the 'certain that' and the 'asking whether' response questions for each experimental item they were presented with.

### 3.1 Experiment 1a

Experiment 1a was designed to explore the projectivity and at-issueness of the 9 projective contents in (7), i.e., the content of NRRCs and nominal appositives, the possession implication of possessive noun phrases, the prejacent of *only* and *stupid*, the pre-state implication of *stop* and the contents of the complements of *annoyed*, *discover* and *know*.

#### 3.1.1 Methods

**Materials.** The 9 projective contents explored in this experiment were instantiated by 17 contents, which are shown in (12) together with the label used to refer to the content. Recall that we use the term ‘projective content’ to refer to the abstract characterization of the projective content of an expression (e.g., for *discover*, the content of the clausal complement) and the term ‘content’ to refer to the content with which the projective content is instantiated (see footnote 2).

(12) 17 contents used in Experiment 1a and 2a

1. muffins: these muffins have blueberries in them
2. pizza: this pizza has mushrooms on it
3. play: Jack was playing outside with the kids
4. vegetarian: Don is a vegetarian
5. cheat: Raul cheated on his wife
6. nails: Mary’s daughter has been biting her nails
7. ballet: Ann used to dance ballet
8. kids: John’s kids were in the garage
9. hat: Samantha has a new hat
10. bmw: Martha has a new BMW
11. boyfriend: Betsy has a boyfriend
12. alcatraz: Mike visited Alcatraz
13. aunt: Janet has a sick aunt
14. cupcakes: Marissa brought the cupcakes
15. soccer: the soccer ball has a hole in it
16. olives: this bread has olives in it
17. stuntman: Richie is a stuntman

Each of the 9 projective contents was instantiated by 3-8 of these 17 contents, as shown in Table 1, where ‘NomApp’ abbreviates ‘nominal appositive’ and ‘possNP’ abbreviates ‘possessive noun phrase’. As mentioned in section 1, different projective contents were instantiated by the same contents (e.g., the content ‘muffins’ instantiates the projective content of NRRCs and *only*) to increase cross-trigger comparability. As shown in Table 1, each content instantiated between 2 and 4 projective contents.



content	Projective content triggers								
	NRRC	NomApp	possNP	discover	know	annoyed	stop	only	stupid
muffins	✓							✓	
kids								✓	✓
pizza				✓		✓		✓	
play				✓	✓		✓		
nails				✓			✓		✓
ballet		✓					✓		
cheat					✓				✓
stuntman		✓							✓
bmw		✓	✓		✓	✓			
vegetarian	✓	✓							
hat			✓		✓	✓			
boyfriend	✓		✓						
aunt	✓		✓		✓				
alcatraz	✓			✓	✓				
soccer	✓			✓	✓	✓			
olives						✓			
cupcakes	✓				✓				

Table 1: Contents instantiating the projective contents of the 9 triggers in Experiments 1a and 2a

Table 1 also shows that there were 3-8 target stimuli per projective content trigger in Experiment 1a. The target stimuli were polar questions, like those in (13a) and (13b), in which the content ‘stuntman’ instantiates the projective contents of a nominal appositive and of *stupid*, respectively:

- (13) a. Did Richie, a stuntman, break his leg?  
b. Is Richie stupid to be a stuntman?

The experiment also included 17 control stimuli, which were polar questions formed from the 17 contents in (12): for example, the control stimulus formed from the content ‘stuntman’ is shown in (14). The control stimuli were included to confront participants with contents that are neither projective nor at-issue, and to assess whether participants were attending to the task.

- (14) Is Richie a stuntman?

The full set of stimuli of Experiment 1a is provided in Appendix A.

For each participant, a set of 15 polar question stimuli was randomly created: each set contained a target polar question for each of the 9 projective content triggers (each instantiated by a unique content) and 6 control polar questions (with unique contents as well, for a total of 15 unique contents from (12)). Each participants’ 15 polar question stimuli were presented twice: once (in a random order) in the ‘certain that’ block in which participants responded to ‘certain that’ questions to assess projectivity, as shown in (11a), and once (in a random order) in the ‘asking whether’ block in which participants responded to ‘asking whether’ questions to assess at-issueness, as shown in (11b). Thus, each participant responded to questions about 30 polar question stimuli. Block order was random across the participants.

**Procedure.** Participants were told to imagine that they are at a party and that, upon walking into the kitchen, they overhear somebody ask another person a question. Participants were then presented with their

15 polar question stimuli, either the ‘certain that’ or in the ‘asking whether’ block, and then with their 15 polar question stimuli again, in the other block. On each trial, participants read the polar question stimulus as well as the corresponding response question, and then gave their response on a slider marked ‘no’ at one end and ‘yes’ at the other, as shown in Figure 1 for a trial in an ‘asking whether’ block.

Figure 1: A sample (at-issueness) trial in experiment 1a

A ‘yes’ response to ‘certain that’ questions was taken to indicate that the person who uttered the polar question (e.g., Michelle in the sample trial) was committed to the relevant content, i.e., that the content projects, whereas a ‘no’ response was taken to indicate that the content did not project. For the ‘asking whether’ questions, a ‘yes’ response was taken to indicate that the speaker was asking about the relevant content, i.e., that it was at-issue, whereas a ‘no’ response was taken to indicate that the content was not at-issue.

After responding to their 30 polar question stimuli, participants completed a short survey about their age, their native language(s) and, if English is their native language, whether they are a speaker of American English (as opposed to, e.g., Australian or Indian English). To encourage them to respond truthfully, participants were told that they would be paid no matter what answers they gave in the survey.

**Participants.** 250 participants with U.S. IP addresses and at least 97% of previous HITs approved were recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform (ages: 18-74; median: 32). They were paid \$1 for participating in the experiment.

### 3.1.2 Results

The results about projection variability and the relation between at-issueness and projectivity that are discussed in this section are based on the data from 210 participants (ages: 19-68; median: 33). We excluded the data from 29 participants who did not self-identify as native speakers of American English. Inspection of the response means of the remaining 221 American English-speaking participants to the ‘certain that’ and ‘asking whether’ questions for the control polar questions revealed 11 participants whose response means were more than 3 standard deviations above the group means (which were 0.07 for ‘certain that’ and 0.04 for ‘asking whether’ questions). Closer inspection revealed that these participants’ responses to the control polar questions were systematically higher than the group means and involved 16 of the 17 contents, sug-

gesting that these participants did not attend to the task or interpreted the task differently. The data from these 11 participants were also excluded.<sup>4</sup>

### Projection variability **JT: Judith Degen writes up this bit**

**JT: Judith Degen commented: Interesting that in general, the variability appears to be in the response variance, not the response medians.**

Box plot showing projection variability:




Figure 2: Projection variability

### Influence of at-issueness on projectivity **JT: Judith Degen writes up this bit**

<sup>4</sup>Of the 210 participants, 116 first completed the ‘asking whether’ block and 94 first completed the ‘certain that’ block. To examine whether block order had an effect on participants’ responses, we fitted a linear mixed-effects model predicting response from **JT: Judith, I can’t figure out which kind of model is the most suitable to fit here; this starts on line 344 of the R script.**




Figure 3: Projectivity by not-at-issueness by trigger – not content?

### 3.1.3 Discussion

Experiment 1a was designed to explore variability in the projectivity of projective contents and the relation between the information-structural status of projective contents and their projectivity. The observed differences in projectivity challenge conventionalist approaches to projection that assume that projectivity derives from the conventionally specified requirement that the relevant projective contents be entailed by or satisfied in the common ground prior to utterance (e.g., Heim 1983; van der Sandt 1992). Experiment 1a shows that there is variability but this variability is not predicted by conventionalist approaches to projection, according to which all of the 9 triggers lexically specify that the content of their complement is required to be entailed by or satisfied in the common ground prior to utterance, which produces the effect of projection.

Local accommodation also doesn't help. One way would be to rely on the process of 'local accommodation', by which projective content can be accommodated in the scope of entailment-canceling operators, e.g., to avoid contradictions, un informativity or problems with binding (Heim 1983; van der Sandt 1992), and to argue that some projective content, like that of *win*, *announce* or *discover*, can more readily be locally accommodated than, e.g., the projective content of clefts or *regret*. This way forward, however, is contingent on a better understanding of local accommodation and the question of why some but not all projective content seems to resist local accommodation. (For relevant discussion see, e.g., Beaver and Zeevat 2007.) But in our experiments, there is no chance for local accommodation because we have minimal contexts.

Non-conventionalist approaches attempt to derive projectivity from independently-motivated properties of the meanings of the expressions that contribute projective content, such as *discover*, and their use in context (e.g., Stalnaker 1974; Wilson 1975; Simons 2001, 2004; Abusch 2010; Abrusán 2011; Simons et al. 2017). Atlas 2005, Boër & Lycan 1976, Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 1990, Kadmon 2001, Kempson 1975, Levinson 1983. Another way forward is to assume that some projective content is not conventionally specified to project, and therefore projects less robustly and in context-dependent ways (see, e.g., Simons 2001; Abusch 2010; Abrusán 2011; Simons et al. 2017).

At-issueness correlates with projection. This finding supports Simons et al. (2010).

some contents show much less variability than others

### 3.2 Experiment 1b

Experiment 1b was designed to explore the projectivity and at-issueness of the projective contents of the 12 predicates in (8), i.e., the contents of the complements of the emotive factives (*be amused*, *be annoyed*), the cognitive factives (*know*, *be aware*), sensory factives (*see*), cognitive semi-factives (*discover*, *find out*, *realize*, *learn*, *establish*) and the communication semi-factives (*confess*, *reveal*).

#### 3.2.1 Methods

**Materials.** The 12 projective contents explored in this experiment were instantiated by the 20 contents shown in (15). Each of the 12 projective contents was instantiated by each of these 20 contents, for a total of 200 target stimuli.

(15) 20 contents used in Experiment 1b

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. Raul was drinking chamomile tea     | 11. Carl wrote a poem for his wife          |
| 2. Jack played frisbee with the kids   | 12. Bea posted a family picture on Facebook |
| 3. John was hiding in the garage       | 13. Janet moved into a damp apartment       |
| 4. Mike visited the zoo                | 14. Samantha bought a fur hat               |
| 5. Zach dyed his hair purple           | 15. Don ate a chili dog                     |
| 6. Marissa brought almond cupcakes     | 16. Mary was biting her nails               |
| 7. Chad put up a swing in his backyard | 17. Richie jumped into the pool             |
| 8. Greg drove his car into a ditch     | 18. Martha came in her new BMW              |
| 9. Kate fell from her horse            | 19. Ann was dancing in the corner           |
| 10. Joyce got a poodle                 | 20. Sue was doing yoga in the yard          |

The target stimuli were (past and present tense)<sup>5</sup> polar questions formed from sentences with one of the 12 predicates, a clausal complement formed from one of the 20 contents in (15) and a proper name subject (the names used for the subjects did not occur in the clausal complements). Two sample target stimuli are given in (16):

- (16) a. Is Shirley aware that Raul was drinking chamomile tea?  
b. Did Samuel discover that Raul was drinking chamomile tea?

The experiment also included 20 control stimuli, which were (past tense) polar questions formed from sentences conveying the 20 contents in (15); a sample control polar question is shown in (17). The control stimuli were included to confront participants with contents that are neither projective nor at-issue, and to assess whether participants were attending to the task.

- (17) Was Raul drinking chamomile tea?

For each participant, a set of 20 polar question stimuli was randomly created: each set contained a target polar question for each of the 12 projective content triggers (each instantiated by a unique content) and 8 control polar questions (with unique contents as well, for a total of 20 unique contents from (15)). Each participants' 20 polar question stimuli were presented twice: once (in a random order) in the 'certain

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<sup>5</sup>Stimuli with *be amused*, *be aware* and *be annoyed* were realized in the present tense; stimuli with the other predicates were realized in the past tense.

that’ block to assess projectivity, and once (in a random order) in the ‘asking whether’ block to assess at-issueness. Thus, each participant responded to questions about 40 polar question stimuli. Block order was random across the participants.

**Procedure.** The procedure of Experiment 1b was the same as for Experiment 1a, described in section 3.1.1, except that participants responded to 20 ‘certain that’ and 20 ‘asking whether’ questions. (There are more trials in Experiment 1b than in Experiment 1a because each participant is judging the projectivity and at-issueness of 20 contents rather than 15 contents.)

**Participants.** 250 participants with U.S. IP addresses and at least 97% of previous HITs approved were recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform (ages: 18-74; median: 32). They were paid \$1 for participating in the experiment.

### 3.2.2 Results

The results about projection variability and the relation between at-issueness and projectivity that are discussed in this section are based on the data from 235 participants (ages 18-74; median: 33). We excluded the data from 3 participants who did not self-identify as native speakers of American English. Inspection of the response means of the remaining 247 American-English speaking participants to the ‘certain that’ and ‘asking whether’ questions for the control polar questions revealed 12 participants whose response means were more than 3 standard deviations above the group means (the group means were 0.08 for ‘certain that’ and 0.04 for ‘asking whether’ questions). Further inspection revealed that these participants’ responses to the control questions were systematically higher than the group means and involved all of the 20 projective contents, suggesting that these participants did not attend to the task or interpreted the task differently. The data from these 12 participants were also excluded.<sup>6</sup>

**Projection variability** [JT: Judith Degen writes this up](#)

**Influence of at-issueness on projectivity** [JT: Judith Degen writes this up](#)

### 3.2.3 Discussion

## 3.3 Summary and discussion of Experiments 1a and 1b

Potential shortcoming of these experiments: NAI was explored using a diagnostic that is very related to diagnostic for projectivity. One could think flipside. This was done because we wanted to explore projectivity and NAI on the same utterances. But does the correlation hold up when we diagnose NAI in a different way? That’s what Experiments 2a and 2b do.

---

<sup>6</sup>Of the 235 participants, 120 first completed the ‘asking whether’ block and 115 first completed the ‘certain that’ block. [JT: investigate block order effects](#)

## 4 Confirming the influence of information structure on projectivity

In the two experiments discussed in this section, Experiments 2a and 2b, the at-issueness of the projective contents explored in Experiments 1a and 1b, respectively, is explored using a different diagnostic for at-issueness. Whereas the diagnostic used in Experiments 1a and 1b relied on the assumption that the context set is more likely to be partitioned by at-issue content and its negation rather than not-at-issue content and its negation, the diagnostic used in Experiments 2a and 2b relies on the assumption that at-issue content is more likely to be the antecedent of a propositional anaphor than not-at-issue content (see, e.g., Potts 2005:54 and Tonhauser 2012). The 3-turn discourse in (18) illustrates the diagnostic for the appositive content of nominal appositives and the content of the complement of *discover*, respectively: the speaker of the first turn (Fred, in (18)) utters an indicative sentence with the relevant expression and the speaker of the second turn (Carla) responds with the question *Are you sure?*, which is taken to involve a propositional anaphor, as in *Are you sure about that?*. The speaker of the third turn, who is identical to the speaker of the first turn, utters an indicative sentence in which the content to be diagnosed as the content of the complement of *sure*.

- (18) Fred: Marthas new car, a BMW, was expensive.  
Carla: Are you sure?  
Fred: Yes, I am sure that Martha's new car is a BMW.

To diagnose whether the implicit propositional anaphor *that* in the second turn can be taken to target the relevant content, participants were asked whether the speaker of the first/third turn answered the question of the other speaker, e.g., in (18) whether Fred answered Carla's question. The assumption is that participants will take Fred to have responded to Carla's question if the relevant content can be at-issue, i.e., can be taken to be the antecedent of the implicit propositional anaphor in Carla's question, and participants will take Fred to not have responded to Carla's question if the relevant content cannot be at-issue, i.e., cannot be taken to be the antecedent of the implicit propositional anaphor in Carla's question.

Thus, the at-issueness diagnostic used in Experiments 2a/2b differs from the one used in Experiments 1a/1b in several ways: i) the projective content triggers are realized unembedded in assertions rather than in polar questions; ii) the diagnostic relies on the assumption that at-issue and not-at-issue content differ in the extent to which it can be the antecedent of a propositional anaphor, rather than in the extent to which the relevant content and its negation partition the context set; and iii) participants were asked to assess the appropriateness of a speaker's utterance, rather than what a speaker is asking about.

If the information-structural status of projective content influences its projectivity, we expect that the extent to which projective content is not-at-issue under this second diagnostic for at-issueness is related to the projectivity of the content.

### 4.1 Experiment 2a

Experiment 2a explored the at-issueness of the 9 projective content triggers that were already explored in Experiment 1a (see section 3.1) using the *Are you sure?* diagnostic.

#### 4.1.1 Methods

**Materials.** Stimuli consisted of 3-turn discourses between two individuals, as (18). In the target stimuli, the first turn of each discourse consisted of an indicative sentence that realized one of the 9 projective content triggers. The 9 projective contents explored in Experiment 2a were instantiated by the same 17 contents as in Experiment 1a, as described in section 3.1.1. Thus, there were a total of 43 indicative sentences with projective content triggers that realized the first turn of the target stimuli. The second turn of the target

stimuli consisted of a second speaker's *Are you sure?* question. In the third turn, the first speaker utters *Yes, I am sure that*, with the relevant projective content realized as the content of the complement of *sure*.

As in Experiment 1a, an additional 17 control discourses were formed with sentences that realize the 17 contents, as shown in (19).

- (19) Sandra: Martha has a new BMW.  
Carl: Are you sure?  
Sandra: Yes, I am sure that Martha has a new BMW.


As in Experiment 1a, a set of 15 stimuli was randomly created for each participant: each set contained a target stimulus for each of the 9 projective content triggers (each instantiated by a unique content) and 6 control stimuli (with unique contents as well, for a total of 15 unique contents). The full set of stimuli of Experiment 2a is provided in Appendix A.

**Procedure.** Participants were told to imagine that they are at a party and, upon walking into the kitchen, overhear a short conversation between two people. Participants were then presented with their 15 stimuli in random order and were asked to assess, for each stimulus, whether the speaker of the first/third turn answered the question of the speaker of the second turn. Participants gave their responses on a slider marked 'no' at one end and 'yes' at the other, as shown in Figure 4. A 'yes' response was taken to indicate that the relevant content was taken to be the antecedent of the implicit propositional anaphor, i.e., that the content was at-issue; a 'no' response was taken to indicate that the relevant content was not taken to be the antecedent of the implicit propositional anaphor, i.e., that the content was not at-issue. After responding to the 15 stimuli, participants completed the same survey as in Experiment 1a.

**Amy:** *"Martha's neighbor is annoyed that Martha has a new BMW."*  
**Dennis:** *"Are you sure?"*  
**Amy:** *"Yes, I'm sure that Martha has a new BMW."*

Did Amy answer Dennis's question?

no yes



Next

Figure 4: A sample trial in Experiment 2a

**Participants.** 250 participants with U.S. IP addresses and at least 97% of previous HITs approved were recruited on Amazon's Mechanical Turk platform (ages: 20-77; median: 30). They were paid 30 cents for their participation.



### 4.1.2 Results

The results about the relation between at-issueness and projectivity that are discussed in this section are based on the data from 238 participants (ages 20-77; median: 30). We excluded the data from 6 participants who did not self-identify as native speakers of American English. Inspection of the response means of the remaining 244 American-English speaking participants to the 6 control stimuli revealed 6 participants whose response means were more than 3 standard deviations above the group mean (which was 0.04). Further inspection revealed that these participants' responses were systematically higher than the group mean and involved 14 of the 17 contents, suggesting that these participants did not attend to the task or interpreted the task differently. The data from these 12 participants were also excluded.

#### JT: Judith Degen: analysis needed

The boxplots in Figure 5 illustrate the not-at-issueness of the nine expression/content pairs, which are again ordered by their mean (given by the blue dots), with the expression/content pairs with the lowest not-at-issueness on the left.




Figure 5: Boxplots of responses to nine expression/content pairs in *Are you sure?*-diagnostic; the blue dots show the mean responses

- `nai.1` shows that all contents significantly more NAI than main clauses
- `comp_nai` shows that significant differences among contents
  - only, stop, stupid, discover, know < annoyed
  - discover < know, NomApp, NRRC, possNP
  - stop, stupid < discover
  - stupid, only < know < NomApp, NRRC, possNP
  - only, stop, stupid < NomApp
  - only, possNP, stop < NRRC
  - only < possNP, only, stupid
  - stop, stupid < possNP
- Correlation of the two not-at-issueness diagnostics:
- Correlation of projectivity with the new not-at-issueness diagnostic:




Figure 6: Correlation of the means of the two not-at-issueness diagnostics (Experiments 1a and 2a)




Figure 7: Correlation of the mean projectivity with the two not-at-issueness diagnostics (Experiments 1a and 2a)

#### 4.1.3 Discussion

### 4.2 Experiment 2b

Experiment 2b was designed to explore, using the *Are you sure?* diagnostic, the at-issueness of the projective contents of the 12 predicates explored in Experiment 1b, i.e., the emotive factives (*be amused*, *be annoyed*), the cognitive factives (*know*, *be aware*), sensory factives (*see*), cognitive semi-factives (*discover*, *find out*, *realize*, *learn*, *establish*) and the communication semi-factives (*confess*, *reveal*).

### 4.2.1 Methods

**Materials.** As in Experiment 2a, the stimuli consisted of 3-turn discourses between two individuals. In the target stimuli, the first turn of each discourse consisted of an indicative sentence that realized one of the 12 predicates, as shown in (20). The contents of the complements of these predicates were instantiated by the same 20 contents as in Experiment 1b, as described in section 4.1.1. Thus, there were a total of 240 indicative sentences with projective content triggers that realized the first turn of the target stimuli. The second turn of the target stimuli consisted of a second speaker's *Are you sure?* question. In the third turn, the first speaker utters *Yes, I am sure that*, with the relevant projective content realized as the content of the complement of *sure*.

- (20) Sandra: Shirley is aware that Raul was drinking chamomile tea.  
Carl: Are you sure?  
Sandra: Yes, I am sure that Raul was drinking chamomile tea.

As in Experiment 1b, an additional 20 control discourses were formed with sentences that realize the 20 contents, as shown in (21).

- (21) Sandra: Raul was drinking chamomile tea.  
Carl: Are you sure?  
Sandra: Yes, I am sure that Raul was drinking chamomile tea.

As in Experiment 1b, a set of 20 stimuli was randomly created for each participant: each set contained a target stimulus for each of the 12 predicates (whose complements each was instantiated by a unique content) and 8 control stimuli (with unique contents as well, for a total of 20 unique contents).

**Procedure.** The procedure was the same as in Experiment 2a, described in section 4.1.1, except that participants responded to 20 stimuli, rather than just 15.

**Participants.** 250 participants with U.S. IP addresses and at least 97% of previous HITs approved were recruited on Amazon's Mechanical Turk platform (ages: 18-77; median: 29). They were paid 30 cents for their participation.

### 4.2.2 Results

The results about the relation between at-issueness and projectivity that are discussed in this section are based on the data from 238 participants (ages 18-77; median: 30). We excluded the data from 6 participants who did not self-identify as native speakers of American English. Inspection of the response means of the remaining 244 American-English speaking participants to the 8 control stimuli revealed 6 participants whose response means were more than 3 standard deviations above the group mean (which was 0.05). Further inspection revealed that these participants' responses were systematically higher than the group mean and involved 18 of the 20 contents, suggesting that these participants did not attend to the task or interpreted the task differently. The data from these 6 participants were also excluded.

**JT: Judith Degen: analysis needed**

The boxplots in Figure 8 illustrate the not-at-issueness of the contents of the complements of the twelve factive predicates, which are again ordered by their mean (given by the blue dots), with the factive predicate whose complement was least not-at-issue on the left.

Correlation of projectivity with the new not-at-issueness diagnostic:




Figure 8: Boxplots of responses to the contents of the complements of the twelve attitude predicates in *Are you sure?*-diagnostic; the blue dots show the mean responses




Figure 9: Correlation of the means of the two not-at-issueness diagnostics (Experiments 1b and 2b)

### 4.2.3 Discussion

## 4.3 Summary and discussion of Experiments 2a and 2b

## 5 Discussion

- NRRCs: Syrett and Koev 2015 show that NRRCs and nominal appositives differ in at-issueness depending on position. We only had sentence-medial NRRCs and nominal appositives, but they were more not-at-issue on our diagnostic than on their diagnostic.

Different diagnostics lead to different findings. DGfS talk.

- Other refs on ps: Schwarz 2007; Chemla 2009; Tiemann et al. 2011. Zeevat 1992 distinguishes resolution and lexical triggers based on whether they can be globally accommodated; see Amaral and Cummins 2015 for experimental investigation of that difference.




Figure 10: Correlation of the mean projectivity with the two not-at-issuence diagnostics (Experiments 1b and 2b)

- These experimental findings provide empirical support for Simons et al's projection hypothesis. Furthermore, they constitute a problem for accommodation-based theories of presupposition projection: since the minimal discourse context in which the stimuli in Exp 1a were presented does not license local accommodation, such theories wrongly predict robust presupposition projection, i.e., cannot account for the observed projection variability.

## 6 Conclusions

### A Stimuli used in Experiments 1a and 2a

The stimuli used in Experiments 1a are grouped here by the 17 contents they realize. For each content, the first line provides the identifier of the content (e.g., 'muffins', for the first content). The second line ('Content') identifies the content that instantiated the projective contents of the relevant projective content triggers. The remaining lines of each of the 17 contents identify the projective content triggers that were instantiated by the content (e.g., 'muffins' instantiated control stimuli, NRRCs and *only*). In Experiment 2a, indicative sentence variants of the polar questions were used.

1. muffins:  
 Content: these muffins have blueberries in them  
 Control stimulus: Do these muffins have blueberries in them?  
 NRRC: Are these muffins, which have blueberries in them, gluten-free and low-fat?  
*only*: Do these muffins only have blueberries in them?
2. pizza:  
 Content: this pizza has mushrooms on it  
 Control stimulus: Does this pizza have mushrooms on it?  
*only*: Does this pizza only have mushrooms on it?

*annoyed*: Is Sam annoyed that this pizza has mushrooms on it?  
*discover*: Did Sam discover that this pizza has mushrooms on it?

3. play:

Content: Jack was playing outside with the kids  
Control stimulus: Was Jack playing outside with the kids?  
*stop*: Did Jack stop playing outside with the kids?  
*know*: Does Daria know that Jack was playing outside with the kids?  
*discover*: Did Paula discover that Jack was playing outside with the kids?

4. veggie:

Content: Don is a vegetarian  
Nominal appositive: Is Don, a vegetarian, going to find something to eat here?  
NRRC: Is Don, who is a vegetarian, going to find something to eat here?  
Control stimulus: Is Don a vegetarian?

5. cheat:

Content: Raul cheated on his wife  
Control stimulus: Did Raul cheat on his wife?  
*know*: Does Daria know that Raul cheated on his wife?  
*stupid*: Was Raul stupid to cheat on his wife?

6. nails:

Content: Mary's daughter has been biting her nails  
Control stimulus: Has Mary's daughter been biting her nails?  
*discover*: Did Mary discover that her daughter has been biting her nails?  
*stop*: Has Mary's daughter stopped biting her nails?  
*stupid*: Is Mary's daughter stupid to be biting her nails?

7. ballet:

Content: Ann used to dance ballet  
Control stimulus: Did Ann use to dance ballet?  
Nominal appositive: Is Ann, a former ballet dancer, limping?  
*stop*: Did Ann stop dancing ballet?

8. kids:

Content: John's kids were in the garage  
*only*: Were John's kids only in the garage?  
Control stimulus: Were John's kids in the garage?  
*stupid*: Were John's kids stupid to be in the garage?

9. hat:

Content: Samantha has a new hat  
Control stimulus: Does Samantha have a new hat?  
Possessive NP: Was Samantha's new hat expensive?  
*know*: Does Daria know that Samantha has a new hat?  
*annoyed*: Is Joyce annoyed that Samantha has a new hat?

10. bmw:

Content: Martha has a new BMW  
Control stimulus: Does Martha have a new BMW?

Possessive NP: Was Martha's new BMW expensive?  
Nominal appositive: Was Martha's new car, a BMW, expensive?  
*annoyed*: Is Martha's neighbor annoyed that Martha has a new BMW?  
*know*: Does Billy know that Martha has a new BMW?

11. boyfriend:

Content: Betsy has a boyfriend  
Control stimulus: Does Betsy have a boyfriend?  
NRRC: Is Betsy, who has a boyfriend, flirting with the neighbor?  
Possessive NP: Is Betsy's boyfriend from around here?

12. alcatraz:

Content: Mike visited Alcatraz  
Control stimulus: Did Mike visit Alcatraz?  
NRRC: Is Mike, who visited Alcatraz, a history fan?  
*discover*: Did Jane discover that Mike visited Alcatraz?  
*know*: Does Jane know that Mike visited Alcatraz?

13. aunt:

Content: Janet has a sick aunt  
Control stimulus: Does Janet have a sick aunt?  
NRRC: Is Janet, who has a sick aunt, very compassionate?  
*know*: Does Melissa know that Janet has a sick aunt?  
Possessive NP: Has Janet's sick aunt been recovering?

14. cupcakes:

Content: Marissa brought the cupcakes  
Control stimulus: Did Marissa bring the cupcakes?  
NRRC: Is Marissa, who brought the cupcakes, a good baker?  
*know*: Does Max know that Marissa brought the cupcakes?

15. soccer:

Content: the soccer ball has a hole in it  
Control stimulus: Does the soccer ball have a hole in it?  
NRRC: Was the soccer ball, which has a hole in it, a gift from Uncle Bill?  
*annoyed*: Is Mandy annoyed that the soccer ball has a hole in it?  
*discover*: Did Mandy discover that the soccer ball has a hole in it?  
*know*: Does Mandy know that the soccer ball has a hole in it?

16. olives:

Content: this bread has olives in it  
Control stimulus: Does this bread have olives in it?  
*annoyed*: Is Barbara annoyed that this bread has olives in it?

17. stuntman:

Content: Richie is a stuntman  
Control stimulus: Is Richie a stuntman?  
Nominal appositive: Did Richie, a stuntman, break his leg?  
*stupid*: Is Richie stupid to be a stuntman?

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