

Trusted Execution Environment – Concept, Major Security Problem & Examples

Eom, Hyeonsang (엄현상)

Department of Computer Science & Engineering
Seoul National University (SNU)

2022.5.24

서울대학교 우리은행 교육과정 핀테크 산업 응용 3차시 강의

©Copyrights 2022 Eom, Hyeonsang All Rights Reserved



Index


- Risk Factor in the Public Cloud
- Trusted Execution Environment
- Enclave
- SGX
- Problems (Side-channel Attack)
- SCONE & Opaque

Risk Factor in the Public Cloud

- Public cloud




Risk Factor in the Public Cloud (Cont'd)



- Cloud is dark and full of terrors
 - But, hardware enclaves can help

Trusted Execution Environment

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs)






Enclave

- Secure enclave

- ☐ A hardware component
- ☐ Protected by locked-down hardware in the CPU that safeguards data being processed from attack and attempted access outside the TEE (Trusted Execution Environment)
- ☐ Making it difficult for attackers to unscramble private data without legitimate approval even with the physical access to the infrastructure


Enclave (Cont'd)

- Enclaves shield application from privileged adversaries




Enclave (Cont'd)

- Enclaves shield application from privileged adversaries




Enclave (Cont'd)

- Run unmodified applications inside enclaves by using a LIB OS




Intel SGX (Software Guard Extensions)

- Isolated user-mode environment
- Commodity CPUs
- Small trusted computing base
 - CPU
 - Enclave's code and data
 - Confidentiality
 - Integrity



Intel SGX (Software Guard Extensions) (Cont'd)



- App is built with trusted and untrusted parts
- App runs and creates the enclave, which is placed in trusted memory
- Trusted function is called, and execution is transitioned to the enclave
- Enclave sees all process data in the clear; external access to the enclave is denied
- Function returns; enclave data remains in trusted memory
- Normal execution resumes


Question

Can we execute
any x86 application
inside **enclaves**?




Problems (Side-channel attack)

- Memory-mapped files in SGX




Problems (Side-channel attack) (Cont'd)

■ Memory-mapped files in SGX



Problems (Side-channel attack) (Cont'd)

- Insecure: in-enclave handler



Problems (Side-channel attack) (Cont'd)


■ OS-level attacker

- Induces page faults
- Tracks faulted address
- Infer secrets content that depends on page address pattern

- Control-dependent accesses
- Data dependent accesses

Original

Recovered




Xu, Y., Cui, W. and Peinado, M., 2015.

Controlled-Channel Attacks:

Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems.

Problems (Side-channel attack) (Cont'd)

- Example : HunsPELL – hash table




Problems (Side-channel attack) (Cont'd)

■ Example : HunsPELL – hash table


Input: side channel **attack**

```
while (word) {  
    n = hash(word);  
    listnode = table[n];  
  
    while (listnode) {  
        if (equal(listnode, word))  
            break;  
        listnode = listnode->next;  
    }  
  
    if (listnode) success(); else failure();  
    word = get_next();  
}
```



Page faults:

4 7 1 5 6 3 5




Problems (Side-channel attack) (Cont'd)

- HunsPELL – hash table

- ~96% accuracy for novel, "The Wizard of Oz"

Problems (Performance)


- Inefficient: in-enclave handler



Problems (Performance) (Cont'd)

- Inefficient: in-enclave handler

Enclave





SCONE

■ SCONE


- Uses Intel SGX to protect a container process
- Intel SGX protects the process from not only malicious programs but also malicious OS

■ Problem

- Intel SGX might not be good enough
 - Possible access pattern side-channel attack

Opaque


- Opaque: An Oblivious and Encrypted Distributed Analytics Platform
 - NDSI' 17



Overall architecture of Opaque

Keystone: An Open Framework for Architecting Trusted Executions




Keystone Architecture and Trust Model






Page Table Protection in Keystone

Memory Management in Keystone

 = untrusted  = page table  = management



- ☐ Enclave self resource management (e.g., dynamic memory resizing)
- ☐ Various memory protection mechanisms



Thank You!

Eom, Hyeonsang (엄현상)

hseom@snu.ac.kr

Department of Computer Science & Engineering
Seoul National University



References

- Autarky: Closing controlled channels with self-paging enclaves, EuroSys 2020
- CoSMIX: A compiler-based system for secure memory instrumentation and execution in enclaves, ATC 2019
- Keystone: An Open Framework for Architecting Trusted Execution Environments, EuroSys 2020
- Opaque: An Oblivious and Encrypted Distributed Analytics Platform, NSDI 2016
- SCONE: Secure Linux Containers with Intel SGX, OSDI 2016