

# TOWARDS CERTIFIABLE AI IN AVIATION

A Framework for Neural Network Assurance Using Advanced Visualization and Safety  
Nets






## Motivation





- AI already vital in many domains
- AI in aviation to reach \$10 billion by 2030, CAGR >35 %
- Safety in other domains often tread lightly
- Manual inspection still essential, requires tooling



- AI will severely impact future aviation
- Safety is paramount



# EASA Roadmap for Safe AI in Aviation



## Learning Assurance

“All [...] actions [...] that error[s] [...] have been identified and corrected such that the AI/ML constituent [...] provides sufficient generalisation and robustness capabilities.”

- EASA AI Roadmap and Concept Papers
- Way towards safe Artificial Intelligence in aviation
- Emphasize a clear and transparent approach



# Operational Design Domain



- Developed by SAE International
- Designed for autonomous systems
- Clearly defines environmental conditions
- Enforces boundaries of operation
- Required by EASA for all AI applications

## OPERATIONAL DESIGN DOMAIN

- Scenery
  - Geography = Above land
- Dynamic Elements
  - Intruder
  - ...
- Environmental Conditions
  - Wind = 0 kn to 40 kn

“Operating conditions under which a given driving automation system [...] is specifically designed to function, including [...] **environmental**, **geographical**, and time-of-day restrictions, and [...] **traffic** or **roadway** characteristics.”



# Collision Avoidance



- Collision Avoidance is crucial for safety
- TCAS II is the current standard

## Problem

TCAS II not fit for future


## Solution

LUTs too large

ACAS X

Not on current hardware

Neural Networks



Images based on [8]

[8] Kyle D. Julian and Mykel J. Kochenderfer. "Guaranteeing Safety for Neural Network-Based Aircraft Collision Avoidance Systems". In: 2019 IEEE/AIAA 38th Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC). IEEE, Sept. 2019




# HCAS: A Horizontal Collision Avoidance System



Advisory	Description
COC	clear of conflict
WL	weak left
WR	weak right
SL	strong left
SR	strong right



  

Variable	Unit	Description
$\rho$	ft	Distance to intruder
$\theta$	°	Bearing angle to intruder
$\psi$	°	Relative heading angle
$v_{\text{own}}$	$\text{ft s}^{-1}$	Ownship's true airspeed
$v_{\text{int}}$	$\text{ft s}^{-1}$	Intruder's true airspeed
$\tau$	s	Time to closest point of approach
$s_{\text{adv}}$	-	Previous advisory





# Ground Truth and Learned Neural Networks



HCAS with  $\psi = -1^\circ$ ,  $\tau = 5 \text{ s}$ , and  $s_{\text{adv}} = \text{COC}$ .

[6] RTCA, Inc. DO-386 Volume 1 & 2. Tech. rep. Washington, DC, USA: GlobalSpec, Dec. 17, 2020

[8] Kyle D. Julian and Mykel J. Kochenderfer. "Guaranteeing Safety for Neural Network-Based Aircraft Collision Avoidance Systems". In: 2019 IEEE/AIAA 38th Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC). IEEE, Sept. 2019



- Combination of Neural Networks and Lookup Tables
- Lookup Tables save correction data


## Training

1. Train Neural Network
2. Save correction data in Lookup Table

## Inference

1. Query Lookup Tables
2. If input vector not in Lookup Table,  
infer Neural Networks
3. Return correct output

Datatype	Size	Precision
Lookup Table	large	100 %
Neural Network	small	$\leq 100\%$
SafetyNet	small	100 %





# Feasibility of Calculation



- 100 % assurance only via brute-force calculation
- Using double/f64 precision:

$$n_{\text{input, HCAS}} \approx (2^{64})^4 \cdot 5 \approx 6 \cdot 10^{77}$$

$$n_{\text{input, VCAS}} \approx (2^{64})^4 \cdot 9 \approx 10^{78}$$

✗ Not feasible

- Using discretization:

$$n_{\text{input, HCAS, disc}} \approx 1.3 \cdot 10^{12}$$

$$n_{\text{input, VCAS, disc}} \approx 8.5 \cdot 10^{11}$$


✓ Feasible in < 24 h



# SafetyNet Manifest



- No open-source implementation available
- Reference implementation
- Use-case independent (with limitations)
- Human-readable and machine-parsable  
⇒ JSON Schema
- JSON Schema allows for automatic validation
- Business logic to be implemented separately



xkcd: Standards (<https://xkcd.com/927/>)



# Connection between SafetyNet and ODD



```
{  
  "version": "1.0.0",  
  "datatype": "float32",  
  "inputs": [  
    {  
      "index": 0,  
      "id": "alt",  
      "minimum": 0,  
      "maximum": 60000,  
      "unit": "ft",  
      "ranges": [  
        {  
          "minimum": 0,  
          "maximum": 1000,  
          "stride": 10  
        },  
      ]  
    },  
  ]  
}
```

## OPERATIONAL DESIGN DOMAIN

### Scenery

- Geography = Above land
- Airspace

▪ Altitude = {0 ft to 60 000 ft}

### Dynamic Elements

- Intruder
  - ...

### Environmental Conditions

- Wind = 0 kn to 40 kn



# Business Logic



- Not all necessary validations and implementations can be covered by the JSON schema
- Alignment between files (e.g., data types, inputs, and outputs)
- Four categories of guidelines:

G General

M Manifest


L Lookup Table

N Neural Networks

ID	Name
G-001	Available Files
G-002	Datatype Coherence
G-003	Input Coherence
G-004	Input Coverage
G-005	Output Number
G-006	Output Type
G-007	Ensured Responsibility
G-008	Single Responsibility
G-009	Condition Limits
G-010	Wildcard Conditional
M-001	Versioning
M-002	Compatible Versioning
L-001	Correct Output
L-002	Known Format
L-003	Relayed Responsibility
N-001	Correct Output
N-002	Known Format




# openCAS





# openCAS Demo






## Summary and Outlook



- SafetyNets used to detect and prevent incorrect AI behavior
- Common SafetyNet format ensures interoperability
- SafetyNet JSON Schema and business logic for verification and validation
- openCAS reduces input dimensionality, helps understanding AI behavior
- Investigate SafetyNets for other domains
- Provide a 100 % correct SafetyNet for ACAS Xu

- Manual inspection is still essential but requires proper tooling
- SafetyNets can detect and prevent incorrect AI behavior



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# References



- [1] Precedence Research. *Artificial Intelligence in Aviation Market Size, Share, and Trends 2024 to 2034*. Research rep. 1748. Precedence Research, May 2022
- [2] European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). *Artificial Intelligence Roadmap 2.0*. Tech. rep. Version 2.0. Postfach 10 12 53, 50452 Cologne, Germany: European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), May 2023
- [3] European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). *EASA Concept Paper: Guidance for Level 1 & 2 Machine Learning Applications*. Tech. rep. Version Issue 02. Postfach 10 12 53, 50452 Cologne, Germany: European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), Apr. 19, 2024
- [4] RTCA, Inc. *DO-185B*. Tech. rep. Washington, DC, USA: GlobalSpec, June 19, 2008
- [5] RTCA, Inc. *DO-385*. Tech. rep. Washington, DC, USA: GlobalSpec, Oct. 2, 2018
- [6] RTCA, Inc. *DO-386 Volume 1 & 2*. Tech. rep. Washington, DC, USA: GlobalSpec, Dec. 17, 2020
- [7] Kyle D. Julian et al. "Policy compression for aircraft collision avoidance systems". In: *2016 IEEE/AIAA 35th Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC)*. IEEE, Sept. 2016
- [8] Kyle D. Julian and Mykel J. Kochenderfer. "Guaranteeing Safety for Neural Network-Based Aircraft Collision Avoidance Systems". In: *2019 IEEE/AIAA 38th Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC)*. IEEE, Sept. 2019



## Imprint



Topic:	<b>Towards Certifiable AI in Aviation</b> A Framework for Neural Network Assurance Using Advanced Visualization and Safety Nets
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