Bidāyat al-Ḥikmah

THE ELEMENTS OF ISLAMIC METAPHYSICS

ʻALLĀMAH
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the All-beneficent, the All-merciful

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Introduction to the Translation

A WORD of caution should preface this work. From its title, one would get the impression that the text provides an introduction for the uninitiated to Islamic philosophy, for the word *bidāyah* means the start or beginning, and *ḥikmah*, although its literal meaning is wisdom, refers to philosophy in the Islamic tradition. However, it is much more a synopsis than an introduction. Western readers might view it as a kind of curriculum outline, rather than a standard introductory text. If one had a teacher trained in Islamic philosophy, this book could serve as a guide to subjects to be discussed with the teacher. After such training one could begin a more detailed course of study based on the author's longer *Nihāyat al-Ḥikmah*, *The End of Philosophy*. For most readers of the English translation, this sort of training is not available. Even for many Western specialists in Islamic philosophy, much to be found here will seem obscure. Nevertheless, the book is an important one, and its translation will be a valuable tool for those who desire to gain some appreciation of twentieth century Islamic philosophy in Iran.

The book is important for two reasons: because it signals a new approach to the teaching of philosophy in the Islamic seminaries, and because of the tremendous stature of its author.

The author, 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'ī (1892-1981), is best known for his exegesis of the Qur'ān, *Al-Mīzān*, a monumental work of twenty volumes (in the original Arabic), notable for its discussions of philosophical, social, historical and ethical topics, but he is also revered as a powerful philosopher, profound mystic, and an extraordinarily humble and virtuous man. He was born in Tabriz, in the Northwestern Iranian province of Azerbaijan. His mother died when he was five, and his father, a religious scholar, died when he was nine. He devoted himself to Islamic studies in Tabriz, and at the age of thirty-three traveled to Najaf, Iraq, to attend further classes with Ayatullah

Muḥammad Ḥusayn Isfahānī, Ayatullah Nā'īnī and others. He studied Islamic philosophy under Sayyid Ḥusayn Bādkūbe'ī, who taught works of Sabzavārī, Mulla Ṣadrā, Ibn Sīnā, the *Ethics* of Ibn Miskawayh and the theoretical mysticism of Ibn Turkah. During this period he also studied mathematics.

After ten years in Najaf, because of financial difficulties, he was forced to return to Tabriz, where he took up farming as a means of support. He was only able to resume his scholarly activities eleven years later, when he was invited to come to Qom to teach. This would have been shortly after the second world war, the beginning of the period after Ayatullah Burūjerdī (d. 1961) became director of the Islamic seminaries in Qom. The seminaries, in the 40's were a conglomeration of seven major schools (*madrasah,* pl. *madāris*) attended by less than a thousand students. By the time Ayatullah Burūjerdī passed away, the number of students had swelled to more than ten thousand students.

In Qom, the 'Allāmah introduced public lessons in philosophy, which previously had only been taught privately. At first, Ayatullah Burūjerdī was opposed to this, but later he resigned himself to it, as the 'Allāmah argued that the novices at the seminary needed to be armed with Islamic philosophy if they were to be able to meet the challenge of Marxism, which was popular among many young people at that time. The fight against Marxism was taken up by the 'Allāmah alongside his favorite student, the martyr Murtaḍā Muṭahharī, with whom he collaborated in writing *Uṣūl-e Falsafah va Ravish-e Reālīsm* (*The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism*), a work designed to present Islamic philosophy as a superior alternative to Marxism.

Many of the most important teachers of philosophy in Iran were students of 'Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā'ī, including, Ayatullah Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, Ayatullah Javādī Āmulī and Ayatullah Ḥasan Zādeh Āmulī in the seminaries of Qom, Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī in Mashhad, and Dr. Dīnānī, at the university of Tehran. Among the martyrs of the Islamic Revolution, in addition to Shahīd Muṭahharī, mentioned above, Shahīd Beheshtī, and Mustafa Khomeini were also his students. Other famous stu-

dents include the presumably martyred Lebanese scholar Mūsā Ṣadr and the former president of Iran, Mahdavī Kanī. Among the scholars outside Iran, Dr. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Henry Corbin, and William Chittick also benefited from lessons or collaboration with the ‘Allāmah.

In addition to philosophy, ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī was also deeply interested in both theoretical and practical mysticism. His most famous student in this area was the prolific and highly revered Ayatullah Ḥusaynī Tehranī (d. 1996). The ‘Allāmah’s own training in spiritual wayfaring (*sayr o sulūk*) and personal ethics was under the direction of Ḥājj Mīrzā ‘Alī Qāḍī.[i]

When the ‘Allāmah was teaching in Qom, the seminaries were in a state of some turbulence. Many of the most brilliant scholars of the seminaries, including Imam Khomeini and Shahíd Muṭahharí were calling for reform. The old teaching methods seemed inadequate to the new challenges facing the clergy. One step toward reform was made with the founding of the Madrasah Muntaṣiriyah, later known as Madrasah Ḥaqqānī, which remains in operation today as Madrasah Shahīdayn (Two Martyrs School), named after the two martyrs, Quddūsī (the ‘Allāmah’s son-in-law) and Beheshtī who taught there. The management of this school decided that philosophy (and other subjects) should be included in the curriculum, in addition to the standard core of Arabic and Islamic jurisprudence and its principles. For this purpose, the ‘Allāmah was requested to write two philosophy texts for the beginning and intermediate students. The fulfillment of this request was realized with *Bidāyah al-Ḥikmah* and *Nihāyah al-Ḥikmah*.

It is said that when the ‘Allāmah completed the first draft of *Bidāyat al-Ḥikmah,* he requested that Ayatullah Javādī Āmulī teach the book and suggest whatever corrections he thought necessary. Ayatullh Javādī complied by corresponding with ‘Allāmah during the course of his teaching the book. In the correspondence questions were posed and suggested revisions were discussed. Only after this, and a final review by the au-

[i] See ‘All¡mah Sayyid Mu¦ammad °usayn °usayn¢ ±ehr¡n¢, *Mehr-e T¡b¡n* (Mashhad: Intish¡r¡t ‘All¡mah ±ab¡§ab¡’¢, 1417/1996).

thor, was the text sent to press in the Rajab of 1390 A.H. (September, 1970). *Nihāyah al-Ḥikmah* followed five years later.

If the *Bidāyat al-Ḥikmah* remains a difficult text, it is still much easier than Sabzavārī's *Sharḥ al-Manẓūmah*, which had been the standard textbook of Islamic philosophy prior to 'Allāmah's work.[i] These sorts of texts are taught sentence by sentence. First, a sentence or so of the Arabic is read, and then it is translated and discussed in Persian. Great attention is paid to the precise phrasing of the text. The discussion of a particularly difficult sentence might take an hour. In order to assist students with the text, two Arabic and three Persian commentaries have been published, and the author of one of the Persian commentaries, Dr. 'Alī Shīrvānī, has graciously assisted with the preparation of this preface.

The 'Allāmah's work is designed in such a way that there is at least an allusion to all the major topics discussed by Muslim philosophers in the school of Mullā Ṣadrā, but the author by no means blindly accepts whatever Mullā Ṣadrā taught. Not only does the 'Allāmah introduce his students to all the most important topics of Islamic philosophy, he also offers them his own considered opinions. Although he does not explicitly criticize Mullā Ṣadrā, the subtle differences between his own views and those of Mullā Ṣadrā and Sabzavārī are evident to those familiar with the details of their teachings.

English speaking students of Islamic philosophy will welcome the translation of this important work by such an able translator as 'Alī Qulī Qarā'ī.

Ḥajj Muḥammad Legenhausen
Qum
Shawwāl 1421/January 2001

[i] See Mehdi Mohaghegh and Toshihico Izutsu, trs., *The Metaphysics of Sabzavari* (Tehran: Iran University Press, 1983).

Translator's Preface

A PHILOSOPHICAL tradition is part and parcel of the intellectual universe of a civilization and shares its general features. The development of philosophical thought in the Islamic world occurred in the context of a religious tradition whose intellectual character was determined to a large extent by the contents of the Qur'ānic revelation and the prophetic teachings. However, philosophical thought is by nature independent of religious doctrine and differs from theology (*kalām*), which depends on revelation and tradition. A salient feature of the Islamic intellectual tradition has been the conviction that there can be no conflict between faith and reason, or, as they say, between *Qur'ān, burhān* and *'irfān*, that is, between revelation, reason, and mystical intuition. Philosophical thought in the Islamic world has never faced the kind of crisis that occurred in the Western world due to the contrary demands imposed by reason and faith. In the course of its development, philosophical thought in the Islamic world has been in deep harmony with religion while seeking to find a solid rational foundation for metaphysical speculations.

An overview of the development of theological thought (*kalām*), philosophy, and theoretical *'irfān* reveals some interesting features. In the course of its effort to develop a sound conceptual foundation for its discourses and debates, *kalām* has become more and more philosophical. Theoretical *'irfan*—since Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī, and in the writings of his disciples—also became more philosophical in the effort of the great mystics to bring their teachings to a larger audience through expositions couched in a language familiar to philosophers and students of philosophy, while philosophy itself—

perhaps as the result of the writings of the proponents of theoretical *'irfān*—has taken long strides towards *'irfan* in the thought of Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn, who sought to establish the findings of *'irfan* on sound rational foundations. As contemporary philosophy in Iran stands, the discourses of Muslim philosophers may be said to constitute a passage to the higher teachings of theoretical *'irfān*, which may be regarded as a meta-philosophy.

Personally it is my growing conviction that some knowledge of metaphysics in its Islamic form is essential for every properly educated religious person desiring to outgrow the inadequate popular conceptions of the Divine. It also constitutes a necessary intellectual means for anyone seeking to understand the teachings of the great mystics of Islam, which represent an indispensable key to any profound understanding of the Qur'ān and the prophetic teachings.

Hence Islamic philosophy is a sacred branch of learning. Starting from the some universal concepts and propositions it gradually moves from the corporeal to the world of immateriality, from the transitory to the eternal and the timeless, and this intellectual journey ultimately terminates in issues relating to what is variously referred to as the First Cause, the Necessary Existent, and Absolute Being.

This is a revised version of the translation of the *Bidāyat al-Ḥikmah* which first appeared in the quarterly journal *Al-Tawḥīd* (in 8 parts, from vol. 8, no. 3 to vol. 10, no. 4). When it appeared, *The Metaphysics of Sabzavari*, a difficult book even for professional students of philosophy, was, so far as I know, the only work in the English language that served as an introduction to post-Ṣadrā philosophical thought in Iran. Soon afterwards *Al-Tawḥīd* serialized Dr. Muḥammad Legenhausen's translation of Āyatullāh Miṣbāḥ Yazdī's *Āmozish-e Falsafeh*, under the title *An Introduction to Muslim Philosophy* (in 11 parts, from vol. 11, nos. 3&4 to vol. 14, no. 2). The complete translation has been published separately under the title *Philosophical Instructions*.

Some of the footnotes I had written have been retained here as endnotes, and a glossary of Arabic terms has been placed at the end of the book. Once again I wish to acknowledge with gratitude my debt to Ḥujjatul Islām Fayyāḍī, one of the ablest teachers of

philosophical texts at the *ḥawzah ʿilmiyyah* of Qum, from the tapes of whose lectures on the *Bidāyah* I have benefited greatly in the course of preparing this translation. However, the responsibility for any errors and inconsistencies that might have remained is entirely my own.

I dedicate this work to the memory of the late Prof. Sayyid Waheed Akhtar, a major Urdu poet and literary critic, who as Head of the Department of Philosophy at the Aligarh Muslim University was keenly interested in reviving the study of Islamic philosophy at Aligarh. May God grant peace to his soul and raise him with his august ancestors on the day of resurrection.

Sayyid ʻAlī Qulī Qarāʾī
Qum
15 Shaʻbān, 1422/Nov. 1, 2001

Introduction

In the Name of God, the All-beneficent, the All-merciful.
All praise belongs to God and to Him refers all eulogy in its reality.
May benedictions and peace be upon Muḥammad,
His Apostle and the best of His creation,
and upon the Pure Ones of his family and progeny.

The Definition, Subject and End of Ḥikmah

Metaphysics (*al-ḥikmat al-ilāhiyyah*, literally, 'divine wisdom') is a discipline that discusses being (*mawjūd*) *qua* being. Its subject deals with the essential properties of being *qua* being. Its end is to achieve a general knowledge of existents and to distinguish them from that which is not really existent.

To explain, when man considers himself, he finds his own self as possessing a reality. He also finds that there is a reality lying beyond his self that is within the reach of his knowledge. Accordingly, when he seeks something, that is because it is what it is, and when he avoids something or runs away from something, that is because it is what it is. For instance, an infant groping for its mother's breast seeks real not imaginary milk. Similarly, a man running away from a lion, runs away from what he considers to be a real wild beast, not something imaginary.

However, at times he may mistakenly regard something unreal as existing in external reality; for instance, luck and giants. Or at times, he may consider something existing in external reality as unreal; for instance, the immaterial soul (*al-nafs al-mujarradah*) and the immaterial Intellect (*al-'aql al-mujarrad*). Hence it is necessary, first of all, to recognize the characteristics of being *qua* being in order to distinguish it from that

which is not such. The science that discusses these matters is metaphysics.

Metaphysics is the science that discusses the characteristics of being *qua* being. It is also called the First Philosophy and the Higher Science (*al-ʿilm al-aʿlā*). Its subject is being *qua* being and its end is to distinguish real existents from that which is not real, and to recognize the higher causes (*al-ʿilal al-ʿāliyah*) of existence, especially the First Cause (*al-ʿillat al-ūlā*), in which terminates the entire chain of existents, and Its most beautiful Names and sublime Attributes; that is, Allah, exalted is His Name.

CHAPTER ONE
The General Principles of Existence

1.1. THE SELF-EVIDENT CHARACTER OF THE MEANING OF EXISTENCE

THE concept of 'existence' is a self-evident one and needs no mediating terms. Hence it has no explanatory terms (*muʿarrif*) in the form of a definition (*ḥadd*) or description (*rasm*), because its meaning is more obvious than that of any explanatory term. Such definitions as ''Existence is what subsists in reality,'' or ''Existence is that which allows of predication'' are explications of the word, not true definitions.

Moreover, as will be explained later,[i] existence has neither any genus (*jins*), nor differentia (*faṣl*), nor any proprium (*khāṣṣah*) in the sense of one of the five universals (*al-kulliyyāt al-khams*). As all explanatory terms are based on these, existence can have no definition or description.

1.2. THE CONCEPT OF EXISTENCE IS UNIVOCAL

Existence is predicated of different existents in a single sense, i.e., univocally (*ishtirāk maʿnawī*).

A proof of it is that we divide existence into its different categories, such as the existence of the Necessary Being (*wujūd al-wājib*) and the existence of the contingent being (*wujūd al-mumkin*). Again, the existence of the contingent is divided into that of substance (*wujūd al-jawhar*) and that of accident (*wujūd al-mumkin*). The existence of substance and the existence of accident are again divided into their various kinds. It is evident that the validity of a division depends on the unity of what is

[i] See 1.7.

being divided and on its presence in all its divisions.

Another proof of it is that after positing the existence of something, at times we have doubts about its essential characteristics. For instance, after affirming the existence of a creator for the world, we may have doubts as to whether the creator is a necessary (*wājib*) or a contingent (*mumkin*) being, or as to whether or not he is characterized with quiddity (*māhiyyah*). Or, for instance, after affirming that man has a soul (*nafs*), we may have doubts as to whether it is material (*māddī*) or immaterial (*mujarrad*), a substance (*jawhar*) or an accident (*ʿaraḍ*). Hence, if 'existence' were not univocal in the different instances and were it an equivocal or homonymous term with disparate meanings (*mushtarak lafẓī*), its meaning would necessarily vary from one subject of which it is predicated to another.

Another proof is that non-existence (*ʿadam*) is the contradictory of existence (*wujūd*). Non-existence is univocal, because there are no distinctions (*tamāyuz*) in non-existence. Hence, existence, which is the contradictory of non-existence, is also univocal, for otherwise it would imply the a violation of the law of contradiction, which is impossible.

Those who have held that 'existence' is equivocal in relation to different existents, i.e. in relation to the Necessary Being and contingent beings, have done so in order to avoid the conclusion that there is a similarity (*sinkhiyyah*) between cause and effect,[i] or between the Necessary Being and contingent existents.[ii] However, such a position stands refuted, because it amounts to suspending the intellect's cognitive faculties. To elaborate, if in the statement, 'The Necessary Being exists,' we understand 'existence' to mean the same as what it means in a statement asserting the existence of a contingent being, it implies that 'existence' is univocal (*mushtarak maʿnawī*). If what is understood in the former statement [by 'existence'] were the opposite of that which is understood in the latter, being the contradictory of the latter, the statement, 'The Necessary Being

[i] That is, in accordance with the belief that the term 'existence' is equivocal in regard to the instances to which it applies.

[ii] That is, in accordance with the belief that the term 'existence' is equivocal in relation to the Necessary Being and contingent beings.

exists,' would amount to the negation of Its existence. Thirdly, if nothing were understandable from it, that would amount to a suspension of the intellect's cognitive faculties, which is not however the state in which we find ourselves.

1.3. EXISTENCE IS ADDITIONAL TO QUIDDITY

A thing's existence is additional to its quiddity, in the sense that each of them [i.e. 'existence' and 'quiddity'] signifies something not understandable from the other. From existence, the intellect first abstracts [or divests] quiddity, which is represented by the answer to the question, 'What is it?' Then the intellect considers it in isolation and attributes existence to it. This is what is meant by predication [*'urūḍ*, i.e. ascription of existence to quiddity]. Hence existence is neither identical with quiddity nor a part of it.

A proof of it is that one may properly negate existence in relation to quiddity. Had it been identical with quiddity, or a part of it, such a negation would have been invalid, for it is impossible to negate something in regard to a thing which is identical with it or a part of it.

Also, a proof is required if existence is to be predicated of a quiddity; therefore, it is neither identical with quiddity nor a part of it, because a thing's essence (*dhāt*) and its essential characteristics [i.e. genus and differentia] are self-evident and do not stand in need of a proof.

Moreover, quiddity is in itself indifferent *(mutasāwiyat al-nisbah,* lit. 'equally related') to existence and non-existence. Were existence identical with quiddity or a part of it, it would be impossible to attribute to it non-existence, which is its contradictory.

1.4. THE FUNDAMENTAL REALITY OF EXISTENCE

We have no doubt that there are real things out there in external reality possessing certain real properties (*āthār*), and that they are not illusory. In regard to each of the things that we observe—which is a single reality in the external world—we form

two concepts different from one another, though they pertain to a single thing. These two concepts are 'existence' and 'quiddity.' For instance, in regard to a person existing in external reality, we posit his/her quiddity as a 'human being' and that he/she exists.

The philosophers (*ḥukamā'*) have differed as to which of the two concepts is fundamental (*aṣīl*). The Peripatetics (*al-Mashshā'ūn*) hold existence to be fundamentally real (*aṣālat al-wujūd*). The belief in the fundamentality of quiddity (*aṣālat al-māhiyyah*) has been ascribed to the Emanationists (*al-Ishrāqiyyūn*). The view that both of them may be regarded as fundamentally real is one which no one has held, for that would imply that every thing is two things, which is logically inadmissible.

The Peripatetics are right in holding existence to be fundamentally real. A proof of it is that quiddity as such is indifferent to [or stands in equal relation to] existence and non-existence, and were it capable by itself of emerging from this state of indifference [or neutrality] and assuming existence along with its properties (*āthār*), that would amount to a violation of the law of identity (*inqilāb;* lit. mutation), which is impossible. Hence it is existence that brings quiddity out of its state of indifference and is fundamentally real.

As to that which some have said, that quiddity emerges from its state of indifference to assume reality through the relation that it acquires with the Maker, such an argument stands refuted. Because the difference in the state of quiddity after its relation with the Maker amounts to existence, though it should be called 'a relation with the Maker.' And should there occur no difference in its state, and should existence nevertheless be predicated of it, that would amount to a violation of the law of identity, as mentioned.

Another proof is that quiddities are the source of multiplicity and diversity. Had existence not been fundamentally real, there would have been no real unity, nor any union between two quiddities [in one thing]. As a consequence, there would be no predication, which signifies unity in existence [as in a proposition of the type, 'A is B'], and logical necessity requires the

contrary of it. Hence existence is fundamentally real, existing by itself, and quiddity exists through it.

Another proof is that when quiddity exists externally, it possesses the properties (*āthār*) expected of it. But when quiddity exists through mental existence (*wujūd dhihnī*) (which will be dealt with later on), it does not possess any of these properties. So if existence were not real, and were quiddity—which is there in both the modes of being—real, there would be no difference between these two modes. Since this consequent premise is invalid, the antecedent must also be such.

Another proof is that quiddity as such is indifferent in its relation to priority (*taqaddum*) and posteriority (*ta'khkhur*), strength (*shiddah*) and weakness (*ḍa'f*), actuality (*fi'l*) and potentiality (*quwwah*). However, things existing in external reality differ in regard to these characteristics. Some of them are prior and strong, such as the cause (*'illah*), and some are the opposite of that, such as the effect (*ma'lūl*). Some of them have actuality and some of them possess potentiality. Were existence not fundamentally real, the difference in respect to these characteristics would be attributable to quiddity, which is indifferent in relation to all of them. This involves a contradiction. There are other proofs besides the ones given here and they are mentioned in detailed works.

Those who believe in the fundamental reality of quiddity and consider existence to be derivative (*i'tibārī*), have offered certain infirm arguments, like the one which says, 'If existence were fundamentally real, it would exist externally; from which it follows that it has an existence, and that existence again has another existence, and so on ad infinitum. This involves an infinite regress, which is inadmissible.'

The answer to such an argument is that existence does indeed exist; but it exists by itself, not by another existence. So the matter does not lead to an infinite regress.

In the light of what has been said, the infirmity of another view, ascribed to Dawwānī,[1] also becomes evident. That view ascribes fundamental reality to existence with respect to the Necessary Being, and to quiddity with respect to contingent beings. According to it, existence is attributable to the Neces-

sary Being in the sense that It is existent by Itself and to quiddities in the sense that they have only a relation with being, such as the relation between the 'milkman' (*lābin*) and 'milk' (*laban*) and the 'date seller' (*tāmir*) and 'dates' (*tamr*). However, in accordance with the doctrine endorsed by us, existence exists by itself (*bi dhātih*) and quiddity exists accidentally (*bi al-'araḍ*).

1.5. EXISTENCE IS ONE GRADATIONAL REALITY

The believers in the fundamental reality of existence disagree amongst themselves. Some of them regard existence as a single gradational reality *(ḥaqīqah mushakkakah wāḥidah*). This view is ascribed to the Fahlaviyyūn, philosophers of [ancient] Iran. Existence, according to them, is self-manifesting and makes other things—i.e. quiddities—manifest. It may be likened to sensible light, which is self-manifesting and makes other things, such as opaque bodies, manifest to vision.

Sensible light is a single species. Its reality is that it is self-manifesting and manifests things other than itself. This feature applies to all the different grades of light and shade with their multiplicity and diversity. Hence a strong light shares its luminous nature with a weak light, and a weak light shares its luminous nature with a strong one. Neither the strength of a strong light is the constituting differentia (*juz' muqawwim*) of its luminous nature, so as to negate the luminous character of weak light, nor is it an accident extraneous to its reality. Neither does the weakness of a weak light negate its luminous nature, nor is it a compound of light and darkness, for darkness is non-existence of light. The intensity of a strong light inheres in its luminous nature, and so does the weakness of a weak light. Light possesses a wide range in accordance with its various degrees of intensity and weakness, and there is a wide range associated with each of its degrees depending on the varying receptivity of opaque bodies [as in reflection and refraction].

Similarly, existence is one reality with various degrees dif-

ferentiated by intensity and weakness, priority and posteriority, etc. That which differentiates these degrees of existence is exactly that which is common to them, and that which makes them different is exactly that which makes them one. Hence the particularity of any of these degrees is not a constituting differentia of existence, by virtue of the simplicity (*basāṭah*) of existence—as will be explained later on[i]—nor is it anything extraneous to it. This is because the fundamental reality of existence precludes that there should be anything other than it or external to it. Rather, the particularity of every degree is what constitutes that degree itself and is not something other than it.

The multiplicity in existence pertains to its various vertical (*ṭūlī*) degrees, beginning from the weakest of degrees—represented by prime matter, which exists on the verge of non-existence—where it has no actuality except the absence of actuality. From there it rises in degrees[ii] to the level of the Necessary Being, which has no limit except the absence of limit. Also, existence has a horizontal (*'araḍī*) multiplicity particularized by the various quiddities, quiddity being the source of multiplicity.

A group of Peripatetics have held the view that existence

[i] See 1.7.

[ii] To explain, when we consider a certain degree of this reality, starting from its weaker degrees, the degree that lies above it is stronger and more intense. The third degree that lies above the second is stronger than the one below it, and this strength goes on increasing until it reaches the highest degree, which is above them all.

Moreover, when we consider a certain intermediate degree and compare it with the one above it, the higher degree will be found to contain all the perfection (*kamāl*) of the lower degree and something in addition to it. Hence the lower degree is limited in relation to the one above it, for it does not possess all the perfection of the higher degree. However, when the higher degree is compared with one above it, it will be found to be limited in relation to the latter. This gradation continues until it reaches the highest degree, in relation to which all the degrees below it are limited, while it is itself absolute, without any limit of privation (*ʿadam*). One may say that "its limit is the non-existence of any limit."

As to the lowest degree, it possesses all kinds of limits signifying non-being (privation), and has no perfection except the capacity to receive perfection. That is prime matter (*al-hayūlā al-awwal*).

consists of entities essentially disparate—disparate in their entirety—from each other (*ḥaqā'iq mutabāyinah bi tamāmi dhawātihā*). They are disparate because their properties are disparate. The disparity is essential and complete, by virtue of the simplicity of their essences. On the basis of this position, the predication of existence in regard to these entities becomes, of necessity, something accidental and extrinsic to them (for, were it intrinsic to them, it would be a constituent, and this contradicts simplicity).

The truth is that existence is one graded reality. Were it not one reality, entities would have been disparate from one another with the totality of their essences (*dhawāt*). That would entail that the concept of existence, which is a single concept, as said,[i] has been abstracted from disparate things *qua* disparate things [having no unifying aspect]. This is impossible. To explain, there is an essential unity between a concept and that to which it refers. The factor of disparity lies in existence being mental or external. Were something which is one, *qua* one, capable of being abstracted from that which is many, *qua* many, one *qua* one would be the same as many *qua* many, which is impossible.

Also, suppose that a single concept were abstracted from a multiplicity of referents *qua* disparate things. If the concept represented a certain characteristic of one referent, it would not be predicable of a second referent. If the concept represented some characteristic of the second referent, it would not correspond to the first referent. If the characteristics of both the referents were represented in it, it would not correspond to either of the referents; and should none of these two characteristics be taken into consideration and the concept were to represent that which is common to the two referents, such an abstraction could not have been possible from different things *qua* different things, but from their unifying aspect, such as the abstraction of universals from the common aspect shared by all individuals covered by that universal. This, however, contradicts the assumption.

[i] See 1.2.

As to existence being a gradational reality, since it manifests various real perfections that make up the distinctive attributes that are not extraneous[i] to the single reality of existence, such as intensity and weakness, priority and posteriority, potentiality and actuality, etc., existence is a single reality multiple in its essence, wherein all that makes existents differ refers to what is common to them, and vice versa. This is what is called gradation (*tashkīk*).

1.6. THAT WHICH PARTICULARIZES EXISTENCE

Existence is particularized in three aspects: (1) as a single fundamental reality in itself, which is self-subsistent [unlike quiddity]; (2) in accordance with the characteristics of its degrees, which are not extraneous to it; (3) in accordance with the different quiddities to which existence appertains and which differentiate it accidentally in accordance with their difference.

The manner in which existence appertains to quiddity and gives it subsistence (*thubūt*) is not the kind peculiar to categories [like accidents in relation to substance], wherein the subsistence of a quality depends on the prior subsistence of its subject. That is because the meaning of existence of quiddity is its subsistence through existence. This follows from the fundamental reality of existence and the derivative (*i'tibārī*) character of quiddity. It is the intellect which by virtue of its familiarity with quiddities supposes quiddity to be the subject to which it predicates existence. However, the matter is the inverse of this predication in concrete reality.

This explanation serves to answer the well-known objection concerning the predication of existence in relation to quiddity. It is said that in accordance with the Rule of Subordination (*qā'idat al-far'iyyah*) the subsistence (*thubūt*) of some quality (q) of a thing (A), is subordinate to that thing's subsistence, which makes it necessary that the thing of which the property is posited subsist prior to the quality posited of it. Hence the sub-

[i] For were they extrinsic to the reality of existence, they would be a vacuity, because fundamental reality belongs exclusively to existence.

sistence of existence in relation to quiddity depends on the prior subsistence of quiddity. For should the subsistence of quiddity be the same as the subsistence of existence, that would imply something being prior to itself; and should it be different, the subsistence of existence in relation to quiddity would depend on another subsistence of quiddity, and so on. This results in an infinite regress.

This objection has forced some of the philosophers to admit an exception to the rule in the case of subsistence of existence in relation to quiddity. Some of them have been forced to change posteriority into concomitance. They state: 'The truth is that the subsistence of one thing [quality] in relation to another [subject] is concomitant with the subsistence of the subject, though it be through the subsistence of the former. The subsistence of existence in relation to quiddity is concomitant with the subsistence of quiddity through this existence itself. Hence there remains no room for an objection.''

Some of them have been compelled by this objection into holding that existence has no entity or subsistence, either in the mind or in external reality. 'Being' has a simple meaning represented in Farsi by the word *hast* ('is'). This derivation [of a substantive from a verb] is merely verbal, and existence has no subsistence at all so as to depend on the subsistence of quiddity.

Some others have been led to hold that 'existence' has nothing but a general meaning, signifying existence in general and its parts, which is the same general meaning appended to quiddity, in the sense that the conditioning is internal while the condition is external. The individual, which is the totality of the conditioned, the conditioning, and the condition, has no subsistence.

These attempts to solve the difficulty are invalid,[i] like the earlier one. The correct solution is the one suggested by the foregoing discussion, that the Rule of Subordination applies to

[i] The foregoing discussions spare us from proving the invalidity of these replies.

the subsistence of a thing in relation to another thing (*thubūtu shay'in li shay'*), not to a thing's subsistence (*thubūtu al-shay'*). In other words, the rule applies to composite propositions [e.g., 'A has the quality q.'], not to simple propositions [e.g., 'A exists.'], as is the matter in the present case.

1.7. NEGATIVE PROPERTIES OF EXISTENCE

One of these properties is that it has no 'other.' Since its reality exhausts all fundamental reality, this necessitates the essential vacuity of anything that may be supposed as being alienated from it or besides it.

Another of these properties is that it has no second, for the oneness of its fundamental reality and the vacuity of anything else that may be supposed, precludes its possessing any ingredient within it or appended to it. It is absolute (*ṣirf*), and a thing in its absoluteness does not yield to duplication or repetition. Any second that may be assumed for it would be either identical with the first, or differ from it due to something intrinsic or extrinsic that is other than it, and the supposition (that there is nothing except existence) negates any other.

Another of these properties is that existence is neither substance nor accident. It is not substance, because substance is a quiddity that does not require a subject to subsist in external reality, while existence is not of the order of quiddity. As to its not being an accident, that is because an accident subsists through its subject and existence is self-subsisting and everything else subsists through it.

Another of these properties is that existence is not a part of anything, because the other supposed part will be something other than existence, while existence has no other.

As to the statement that 'every contingent existent (*mumkin*) is a duality composed of quiddity and existence' [which apparently implies that existence is a part of something], that is merely one of the intellect's constructs (*i'tibār 'aqlī*) representing the necessary relation between contingent existence and quiddity. It does not mean that it is a compound made up of two parts possessing fundamental reality.

Another of these properties is that existence has no constituents. Constituents may be: (i) conceptual, such as genus and differentia; (ii) external, such as matter and form; or (iii) quantitative, such as length, area, and volume. Existence possesses none of these parts.

As to the absence of conceptual constituents in existence, were there a genus and differentia for existence, the genus would be either existence or something else. If the genus were existence, its differentia, which divides the genus, would be constituting it, for the differentia in relation to the genus actualizes the genus [through species]; it does not constitute the essence of the genus itself. Existence, however, actualizes itself. The genus cannot be something other than existence, because existence has no other.

As to external constituents, i.e. matter and form, they are genus and differentia, though like genus and differentia they are not predicable of each other. The negation of genus and differentia in regard to existence necessarily implies the negation of these also.

As to quantitative constituents, magnitude is a property of bodies, which are composed of matter and form. Since existence has neither matter nor form, it follows that it has neither bodiness, nor, as consequence, magnitude.

From what has been said, it become evident that existence has no species either, for a species is actualized by individuation, and existence is actualized by itself.

1.8. THE MEANING OF 'THE DOMAIN OF FACTUALITY'

From what has been said above,[i] it becomes clear that existence has reality and actuality by itself, or, rather, existence is reality and actuality itself. Quiddities—which are represented by the reply to the question 'What is it?'—either occur as external existence, in which case they possess certain properties, or as mental existence, in which case they do not possess those properties. They obtain reality and actuality through existence,

[i] See 1.4.

not by themselves, though the two of them, existence and quiddity, are united in external reality.

The derivative (*i'tibārī*) concepts formulated by the intellect, e.g. existence, unity, causality and the like, are those that have not been abstracted from external reality. The intellect formulates them through a kind of analysis into which it is forced by necessity. Moreover, these concepts have a kind of subsistence (*thubūt*) by virtue of the subsistence of the instances to which they refer, although they are not abstracted from their instances in the way quiddities are abstracted from their individual instances and their limits.

Subsistence in general, including the subsistence of existence, quiddity, and *i'tibārī* concepts, is called 'fact' (*nafs al-amr*). It is that to which a proposition must correspond in order to be true, as when one says, ''The case is such and such in fact."

To explain, some propositions pertain to external reality, as when we say, ''The Necessary Being exists," or when we say, ''The townspeople have left the city,'' or when we say, ''Man is potentially risible (capable of laughing).'' The truth of these propositions depends on their correspondence to external reality.

There are other propositions that pertain to the mind, in that they pertain to the mind's formulations, even if they should involve concepts abstracted from external reality, such as the propositions, ''A universal is either essential or accidental," and ''Man is a species." The criterion of truth in these cases is their correspondence to the mind, wherein they find subsistence. In each of the above cases, truth depends on correspondence to 'fact.' Hence 'fact' is more general than external or mental subsistence (*al-thubūt al-dhihnī wa al-khārijī*).

Some philosophers have said that 'fact' is an immaterial intellect (*'aql mujarrad*), which contains the general forms of the intelligibles. True judgements relating to propositions pertaining to the mind and external reality correspond to its intelligible forms.

This is not admissible, for when we shift our discussion to the immaterial Intellect and its intelligible forms, we see that they are also judgements which in order to be true stand in need of

correspondence of their contents to what is external to it.

1.9. Thingness and Existence

Thingness (*shay'iyyah*) is identical with existence, and non-existence has no entity, being sheer vacuity with no subsistence whatsoever. Hence subsistence (*thubūt*) means existence, and 'negation' (*nafy*) means non-existence.

According to the Mu'tazilah, 'subsistence' (*thubūt*) is more general than existence. They regard some non-existents—namely, 'non-existent contingents' (*al-ma'dūm al-mumkin*)—as possessing a kind of subsistence. Hence, according to them, 'negation' has a narrower meaning than non-existence, not including anything except impossible non-existents (*al-ma'dūm al-mumtani'*).

According to some of them, there is a middle stage between existents and non-existents which they call 'state' (*ḥāl*), which is the attribute of a being that is neither existent nor non-existent, such as 'knowledgeability' (*'ilmiyyah*), 'fatherhood,' and 'strength,' which are abstracted qualities that have no independent existence. Hence they may not be said to exist, though existents possess these [relations and qualities]. Neither may they be said to be non-existent. As to subsistence (*thubūt*) and negation (*nafy*), they are contradictories, there being no intermediary between them.

Such ruminations are mere fancies. The self-evident judgement based on sound natural sense that non-existence is vacuity and has no entity, suffices to refute them.

1.10. Absence of Distinction and Causal Relationship in Non-Existence

As to the absence of distinction (*tamāyuz*), distinction is something that derives from subsistence and being, while non-existence has no existence or being. Of course, at times, [absolute] non-existence is distinguished from the non-existence related by the mind to certain faculties and kinds of existents, such as non-existence of vision or hearing, or non-existence of

Zayd and ‘Amr. However, there are no distinctions in absolute non-existence.

As to the absence of causality in non-existence, that is on account of its vacuity and nonentity. As to such statements as, ‘‘The non-existence of cause is the cause of non-existence of the effect,” they involve loose and metaphoric expression.[i] Hence when it is said, for instance, that ‘‘There were no clouds, and therefore there was no rain,’’ it means that the causal relation between the existence of clouds and the existence of rain did not materialize. This case, as has been pointed out, is similar to the application of the classification of affirmative propositions to negative ones, which are classified as ‘‘negative predicative propositions’’ and ‘‘negative implicative propositions,’’ and so on, although they involve the negation of predication and implication, respectively.

1.11. ABSOLUTE NON-EXISTENCE ALLOWS OF NO PREDICATION

From what was said earlier[ii] it becomes clear that non-existence is sheer vacuity, without any kind of entity, and only an entity can be predicated of an entity.

However, a doubt has been raised here by those who state that the statement, ‘‘Non-existence allows of no predication,’’ is self-contradictory, for non-predicability is predicated of it. This argument stands refuted on the basis of the forthcoming discussion on unity and multiplicity.[iii] To mention it briefly here, predication is either in tensional (*al-ḥaml al-awwalī al-dhātī*, lit. ‘primary essential predication’) or extensional (*al-*

[i] An objection that might arise here is that, if such were the case, the examples given of propositions where the subject is a rational construct (*al-maf*h*£¸m al-i‘tib¡r¸ al-‘aql¸*) also involve loose and metaphoric expression.

The answer is that the examples were offered in relation to statements of fact (*qa¤¸iyyat al-nafs al-amriyyah*), and the approximate and metaphorical character of predication in a proposition neither invalidates it nor makes it a pseudo-proposition. The meaning of the statement in the example given is, “The relation of causality between clouds and rain did not materialize,” which is also a proposition capable of being true or false.

[ii] See 1.9.

[iii] See 8.3.

ḥaml al-shā'i' al-ṣinā'ī, lit. 'common technical predication'). In intensional predication, the subject and predicate are intensionally (*mafhūman*) one [as is the case with all tautologies and definitions], though they are different from the viewpoint of conceptual consideration (*i'tibāran*), as when we say, 'Man is man.' In extensional predication, the two are united in concrete reality (*wujūdan*) but differ intensionally (*mafhūman*), as when we say, 'Man is a risible being.' Absolute non-existence is absolute non-existence from the viewpoint of intensional predication and does not allow of any predication, but is not absolute non-being from the viewpoint of extensional predication, but a [conceptual] entity present in the mind of which unpredicability is predicated. Hence no contradiction is involved here.

In the light of this explanation, ambiguity is removed from a number of propositions that have been imagined to be paradoxical, e.g. 'The particular is particular,' 'A deity besides God is impossible,' and 'A thing is either subsistent in the mind or non-subsistent in it.' One may point out that the particular is a universal in that it applies to a multiplicity of objects, that 'a deity besides God' is an intelligible in the mind and has an entity there, that 'what is non-subsistent in the mind' subsists in the mind, which apprehends it.

These apparent paradoxes are resolved when we recognize that the particular is a particular from the viewpoint of intensional predication and a universal from the viewpoint of extensional predication. 'A deity besides God' is such from the viewpoint of intensional predication and a creature of God and a contingent being [existing in the mind] from the viewpoint of extensional predication. The 'non-subsistent in the mind' is such from the viewpoint of intensional predication, and subsistent in the mind from the viewpoint of extensional predication.

1.12. WHAT HAS CEASED TO EXIST DOES NOT COME BACK ITSELF

The philosophers have held that something that has ceased to exist cannot come back itself. Some theologians have followed them in this belief, but most of them consider it possible.

Ibn Sīnā considered the impossibility of the return of what has ceased to exist to be self-evident, for the intellect regards what has ceased to exist as a nonentity and vacuity, which cannot be characterized with return

Others [who do not consider the impossibility as self-evident], considering it to be based on inference, have offered certain arguments in this regard.

(i) One of their arguments is that if it were admitted that something that has ceased to exist in a certain period of time can itself return in another period of time, non-existence would intervene between the thing and itself, which is impossible, because then it would exist in two periods separated by non-existence.

(ii) Another argument is that if the return of a thing after its ceasing to exist were possible, we would also have to allow the possibility of a thing having another entity identical to itself in all respects during the first and the second periods, which is impossible. To explain, there is a rule that all identical things are to be judged equally with regard to what is possible for them and what is impossible for them. There is no difference in any respect between a thing's 'double' in the first period and its returning counterpart in the second period, because they are supposedly identical to the first thing in all aspects. However, the coexistence of two existents identical in all respects necessarily implies the absence of distinction between them. This amounts to oneness of many *qua* many, which is impossible.

(iii) Another argument is that the return of a thing that has ceased to exist requires that the returning counterpart be identical with the first thing, which is impossible because it implies a violation of the law of identity and a contradiction. To explain, the return of a thing that has itself ceased to exist entails that the returning counterpart should be the same as the first thing in respect of quiddity and all its individualizing qualities, even time, so that the returning thing be identical with the first, which involves a violation of the law of identity and a contradiction.

(iv) Another argument is that if the return of a thing that has ceased to exist were admissible, there would be no definite lim-

it to the number of returns. Then there would be no difference between the first, second, and the consecutive returns *ad infinitum*, in the same way as there is supposedly no difference between the first thing and its returning counterpart. However, determinate number is a necessary condition for the existence of an individual thing.[i]

Those who regard such a comeback as admissible advance the argument that should the coming back of a thing after ceasing to exist be impossible, that impossibility must inhere either in its quiddity or in a proprium associated with its quiddity. Evidently, if the case were such, the thing would not come into existence in the first place. Should the impossibility be due to a separable accident (*'araḍ mufāriq*), the impossibility would disappear on its disappearance.

This argument is refutable on the ground that the impossibility is inherent in the thing's existence and ipseity, not in its quiddity, as is evident from the above-mentioned arguments.

The main reason that has led the believers in the possibility of a thing's return after ceasing to exist is their belief that the doctrine of resurrection preached by the true heavenly religions involves belief in the return of things after their having ceased to exist.

Such a notion is refutable on the ground that death is a kind of progression (*istikmāl*), which does not involve extinction and cessation of existence.[ii]

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[i] There are no grounds for preferring some of these numbers to others. Hence, the conclusion is that determinateness, i.e. individuality, is necessary for existence, for that which is not determinate does not exist.

[ii] If it is said, "That is true if death is regarded as development of both the soul and the body—something that is uncertain. But should it involve the development of only the soul, the problem remains as it is, because the return of the body amounts to return of what has ceased to exist."

In reply to this it may be said that a human being's identity derives from its soul, not from the body, which is always in a state of perpetual change. The human being returning on the Day of Resurrection is the same human being that existed in the world with respect to the soul and the body, irrespective of whether death is solely a progression for the soul and the body it returns with on resurrection is a new body, or if it is both a development of the soul and the body and the returning body is

the same that it possessed in the world albeit in a developed form. Hence in respect to soul and body the resurrected human being is the same as the one that existed in the world.

CHAPTER TWO
The Division of Existence into External and Mental

THE prevalent view among the metaphysicians is that quiddities, besides their external existence (*al-wujūd al-khārijī*), wherein they possess the properties (*āthār*) expected of them, have another existence called 'mental existence.'[i] However, they do not possess those properties in their mental mode of existence. For instance, the human being exists in external reality and, being a substance, it exists there without the need of a subject (*mawḍū'*). As a body (*jism*), it is valid to ascribe to it three dimensions. Moreover, as a 'living thing,' 'animal,' and 'human being' it manifests the properties and characteristics of these genera and differentiae. However, the human being existing in the mind, though it fulfils the definition of 'human being,' does not possess any of these external properties.

However, some of them hold that what we know (the so-called 'mental existence') is a resemblance (*shabah*) of the quiddity, not the quiddity itself. It is an accident ('*araḍ*) and a quality (*kayf*) subsisting through the soul (*nafs*). In its essence (*dhāt*) it differs from the external thing known, only resembling it and representing some of its characteristics. It is like the picture of a horse painted on a wall that represents the horse existing in external reality. Such a view in fact boils down to a denial of the possibility of knowledge, for it totally closes the door to the knowledge of external reality.[ii]

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[i] By 'properties' (*ʾthʾr* lit. effects) here is meant the perfection of a thing, irrespective of whether it is an essential property that makes a thing essentially what it is, such as 'animality' and 'rationality' for man, or a secondary perfection that characterizes a thing after its quiddity is consummate, such as risibility and the feeling of wonder in the case of man.

[ii] Were there an absolute difference between the intelligible form and the external reality, (there being no middle position) there would be ab-

Some others have been led to deny mental existence all together, holding that the soul's knowledge of an external object is a special relation between it and the soul. Such a position is refuted by the knowledge of anything non-existent; for the soul's relation to something non-existent is meaningless.

Those who believe in mental existence have advanced the following arguments in its favour.

(i) We make affirmative judgements concerning non-existents, as about a ''sea of mercury,'' or posit such propositions as ''The co-existence of two contradictories (*naqīḍayn*) is different from the co-existence of two contraries (*ḍiddayn*)'' and the like.[i] Affirmation means to posit the subsistence of something. The affirmation of one thing (B) in regard to another thing (A) is subordinate to the subsistence of A. Hence subjects that are non-existent [in external reality] have an existence. Since they have no existence in external reality, they must have an existence somewhere else, that is, the mind.

(ii) We conceptualize certain notions possessing universality (*kulliyyah*), such as the universals 'man' and 'animal.' A concept is a rational pointer that has no significance unless it points to an existent. Since the universals *qua* universals do not exist in external reality, they must have existence somewhere. That somewhere is the mind.

(iii) We can conceive every reality in the state of absolute simplicity wherein it is divested of everything that may be mixed with it or appended to it [in external reality]. For instance, there is the concept of 'whiteness,' which is divested of

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solutely no knowledge. This is sophism, or denial of the possibility of knowledge.

[i] Some may object here, pointing out that a proof in favour of mental existence must aim to affirm a mental existence for the essences. That which is essentially impossible (such as co-existence of two contradictories) has no essence. It is a conceptual formulation by the intellect of something that is essentially invalid, for instance, God's partner, co-existence of two contradictories, etc.

The answer to this objection is that these formulations of the intellect relate to something that subsists, as shown by the fact that it forms a subject of predication. Since the subject does not exist in the external world, it subsists somewhere else. That somewhere is the mind.

everything other than whiteness. Every thing in its absoluteness (*ṣirf al-shay'*) does not allow of duality and multiplicity. It is one and encompasses in its unity every thing of its kind. A reality with such a characteristic does not exist in the external world. Hence it must exist in another locus, which we call 'the mind.'

A SUPPLEMENTARY DISCUSSION

Certain objections have been raised against the notion of existence of quiddities in the mind, in the sense that they exist there by themselves.

First Objection

The view that quiddities exist in the mind by themselves implies that a single thing should be both a substance and an accident at the same time, which is impossible. To explain, the substance (*jawhar*) intellected by the mind is a substance in accordance with the principle of retention of the essentials (*ḍhātiyyāt*). However, the same substance is also an accident (*'araḍ*), because it subsists through the soul in much the same way as an accident subsists through its substratum (*ma'rūḍ*). This is self-contradictory, because it implies that a thing be both independent of a subject (*mawḍū'*) and depend on a subject at the same time.

Second Objection

The mental quiddity belongs to the category (*maqūlah*) of quality (*kayf*),[i] in accordance with the view that the intelligible forms (*al-ṣuwar al-'ilmiyyah*) are qualities of the soul (*kayfiyyāt nafsāniyyah*). When we conceive a substance, that conception would fall under the category of substance, on the basis of the principle of retention of the essentials (*dhātiyyāt*). At the same time, as said, it falls under the category of quality, while the categories are mutually exclusive.[ii] This implies a contra-

[i] Quality is an accident that does not allow of division or relation.

[ii] For were they not different with all their quiddities, their quiddities would have something in common, in which case it would mean that

diction in the essence of the mental existent. Similarly, when we conceive something belonging to a category other than that of substance, the conceived quiddity would fall under two categories. This is true also when the conception is that of a sensible quality (*kayf maḥsūs*), for it will fall under the category of sensible quality as well as that of psychic quality (*kayf nafsāni*). In all these cases, a single thing falls under two mutually exclusive categories, which is logically impossible.

The philosophers who believe in mental existence admit that the second objection poses a greater difficulty than the first one. Because the idea that a single thing may be a substance as well as an accident does not pose much of a difficulty, because the essential difference between the categories is the one between substance, quality, quantity, and so on. For the notion of accident—as something that subsists through its subject—is a general one that applies to the nine categories. It may validly include mental substance as well and apply to it. Moreover, in accordance with the definition of substance as 'a quiddity which does not require a subject to exist externally,' it may validly subsist in the mind through a subject, for it is while existing externally that it does not require a subject. However, the falling of a single quiddity under two categories—such as substance and quality, quantity and quality, is necessarily impossible, for the categories are mutually exclusive with respect to essence.

The Attempts to Address the Two Objections

In view of the above and similar objections, some (*viz.* al-Rāzī)[2] have been led to an outright denial of mental existence, holding that knowledge is a relation between the soul and external reality. Accordingly, that which is known falls solely under the category of external entities. However, we have shown the inadmissibility of such a position. Some others have been led to hold that external quiddities existing in the mind are resemblances (*ashbāḥ*), not the quiddities themselves. A

there is a genus above them. However, the assumption is that they are the highest genera and that there is no genus above them. Hence they are simple and mutually exclusive essences.

thing's resemblance is something other than and different from the thing itself. Hence the intellected forms are qualities of the soul, which do not retain the character of the external categories, and no difficulty arises on the basis of this view.

However, we have shown that this position implies a denial of the possibility of knowledge.

Several other attempts have been made to resolve the above-mentioned difficulties, which are as follow:

(i) Some of them (*viz.* al-Qawshajī)[3] have said that knowledge (*'ilm*) is different from the known (*ma'lūm*). The cognition (*ḥuṣūl*) of an external quiddity by the mind involves two things. One is the intellected quiddity itself as it was in external reality. That is the known, and it does not subsist through the soul but is self-subsisting, being present in the mind like a thing present in space and time. The other is a quality present in the soul and subsisting through it. That is knowledge, and it is by virtue of it that ignorance is removed from the soul. Accordingly, the known—whether substance, quantity or something else—falls under an external category, whereas knowledge is a quality of the soul. Thus understood, the difficulty posed by coincidence of two categories or two kinds of one category does not arise.

However, such a description is contrary to what self-introspection reveals to us during cognition. The form of something present in the soul during cognition is exactly what relieves the soul of ignorance and afford us the knowledge of that thing.

(ii) Some others who believe in the fundamental reality of quiddity (*viz.* al-Sayyid al-Sanad Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī)[4] have been led to hold that the forms intellected by the mind are divested from their corresponding external quiddities and transformed into qualities. To explain, since the external existence of quiddity is prior to the [mental existence of] quiddity itself, aside from existence there will be no quiddity at all. Mental existence and external existence are different from one another with a real difference, so that when existence is transformed through an external existent becoming a mental existent, there is no reason why quiddity too should not be transformed by the

transformation of substance, quantity, or any other category into the category of quality. Hence a thing itself has no definite reality with regard to itself. Rather, when a mental quality occurs in the external world it is either substance or some other category, and when an external substance occurs in the mind it becomes transformed into a mental quality. Given the difference between mental and external quiddities (as a result of the above-mentioned transformation), the claim that things themselves come into the mind requires that there should be a common principle between the two. To conceive such a principle, it is sufficient for the intellect to conceptualize something indefinite and common between the two—like the conception of a matter common to a material body and its disintegrated form—so that what is in the mind should correspond to what is in external reality.

The above theory is fruitless, firstly because the belief in the transformation of quiddity and of a real difference between the two modes of existence (external and mental) is inconsistent with the doctrine subscribed to by its proponent, that quiddity is fundamentally real and existence is a derivative construct.

Secondly, since it implies an essential difference between the mental form and the external object known, it boils down to a theory of resemblances and skepticism.

(iii) Some others (*viz*. al-Dawwānī) have stated that since knowledge is essentially identical with the object of knowledge, it belongs to the same category as the known object. Thus if the latter happens to be a substance, the former is also a substance, and if the latter is a quantity it is also a quality, and so on. As to naming knowledge a 'quality' by the philosophers, it is based on a somewhat loose expression, similar to the common usage wherein an attribute representing a substance is called a quality when applied to something else. With this is overcome, they claim, the second difficulty concerning the falling of other categories under the category of quality.

As to the first difficulty, that a single thing should be a substance and accident simultaneously, its solution—as mentioned earlier—is that 'accident' in its general sense includes the nine accidental categories as well as mental substance. Hence it does

not constitute any difficulty.

The difficulty inherent in this view is that the mere applicability of the concept of one of the categories to a thing, as we shall explain later, does not justify its being classed under that category.

Moreover, the philosophers are explicit in their statement that 'acquired knowledge' (*al-ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī*) is a psychic quality that really falls under the category of quality and there is no looseness of expression involved.

(iii) Then there is the theory of Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn[5]—may God's mercy be upon him—which has been set forth by him in his books. The theory is based on a distinction between two forms of predication (*ḥaml*): 'primary essential predication' and 'common predication.'[6] It is the second kind of predication that implies that the intelligible form falls under an external category. To explain, the mere inclusion of a generic or specific concept in the definition of a thing and its applicability to it does not require that thing to be classed under that genus or species. Such a classification depends on the thing's possessing the properties possessed externally by that genus or species.

Hence the mere inclusion of the concepts of 'substance' or 'body,' for instance, in the definition of the human being (according to which the human being is defined as 'a substance that is a growing, sensate body capable of voluntarily motion and possessing rationality) does not entail its falling under the category of substance, or under the genus 'body,' unless it occurs as a concrete substance, without needing a subject, or as a body possessing three dimensions.

Similarly, the inclusion of 'quantity' and 'continuity' in the definition of 'surface' (which is defined as 'a static, two-dimensional continuous quantity') does not necessitate its inclusion under 'quantity' and 'continuous extension,' unless as a concrete quantity it is susceptible to division and possesses the property of continuity.

Were the mere correspondence of a concept to a thing require its inclusion under the category of that thing, then every universal would itself be an individual, as it applies to itself through primary predication. Hence inclusion under a category

requires the possession of external properties and it is obvious that such properties exist in external existence not in mental existence.

This shows that mental forms do not fall under the categories to which they correspond, for they do not possess the [external] properties expected of them. However, though the mental form does not possess the properties of the corresponding external object known, as a state (*ḥāl*) or habit (*malakah*)[7] present for the soul, from which it dispels ignorance, it is an 'external' existent existing for the soul, which possesses it as an attribute, and the definition of quality is applicable to it through common predication, as quality is defined as ''an accident which is not subject to division or relation.'' Hence the mental form as such falls under the category of quality, though from the viewpoint of its being a mental existent corresponding to external reality it does not fall—due to the absence of external properties—under any category except perhaps under the category of quality-by-accident.

The above explanation reveals the inadmissibility of the objection of some thinkers who have taken exception to the statement that knowledge is an essential quality (*kayf bi al-dhāt*) and the mental form an accidental quality (*kayf bi al-'araḍ*). Their argument is that the very existence of those forms and their existence for the soul are one and the same. They argue that the existence and manifestation of the mental forms for the soul are nothing additional to their existence, so that they may be a quality in the soul, because their externality has ceased in its entirety, and because their quiddities in themselves each belong to a particular category, while with regard to their mental existence they are neither substances nor accidents. Moreover, their manifestation for the soul is nothing but that quiddity and that existence, since the manifestation of a thing is not something additional to it, otherwise it would have a manifestation of itself, whereas there is nothing else. As to quality, it is of such a nature that it is predicated of its subject by inherence. If manifestation and existence for the soul were a categorical relation, the quiddity of knowledge would be relation not quality. But since it is an emanative relation (i.e. the crea-

tive relation between a cause and its effect) originating in the soul, it is existence. Therefore, knowledge is light and manifestation (*ẓuhūr*), and the latter are both existence, and existence is not quiddity.

This objection is not valid because though the cognitive form is existent for the soul and manifest for it, that is not on account of its being a mental existent corresponding to an external reality without possessing its properties, but due to its being a state or 'habit' for the soul that dispels privation (i.e. ignorance) from it, and as such it is a perfection (*kamāl*) for the soul, additional to it, and possessed by it as an attribute. That is an extraneous effect produced on the soul. Since the soul is the subject for the cognitive form and independent of it in itself, the latter is its accident and the definition of quality is applicable to it. Hence the claim that there is nothing additional to the soul, which is united with it, is inadmissible.

Therefore, it is clear that the cognitive form, being a state or habit of the soul, is a quality in essence, and it is a quality by accidence due to its being a mental existent.

Third Objection:

The doctrine of mental existence and presence of the very (quiddities of) things in the mind implies that the soul, while conceiving heat and cold, width and length, motion and rest, triangle and rectangle, etc., should simultaneously become hot and cold, wide and long, triangular and rectangular, and so on. That is because we do not call to mind anything hot or cold, wide or long, and so on, without the soul acquiring these opposite attributes, which subsist through it.

The answer is that such external notions like heat and cold and the like become present in the mind with their quiddities, not with their actual existences, and correspond to them in the sense of primary predication, not common predication. That which necessitates things becoming attributed with these qualities is by acquiring them with their external existences and subsisting through their subjects, not by conceiving their quiddities and their subsistence in the sense of primary predication.

Fourth Objection

We conceive things that are essentially impossible, such as 'God's partner' (*sharīk al-Bāri*), the simultaneous co-existence or non-existence of two contradictories, and the negation of a thing's identity with itself. Should things be themselves present in the mind, such essential impossibilities would obtain subsistence.

The answer is that the essential impossibilities are present in the mind in the sense of primary predication, not in that of common predication. Hence 'God's partner' is 'God's partner' in the mind in the sense of primary predication, but from the viewpoint of common predication it is a contingent (*mumkin*), a quality of the soul, and a creature of God. The same applies to other impossibilities.

Fifth Objection

We do conceive the earth with its great expanse, its plains, mountains, continents and oceans, as well as the great distances of space together with the planets and the stars with their huge dimensions. The impression of these huge dimensions in the mind, or in a part of the nervous system—to mention what the physiologists say—amounts to the impression of something big in something small, which is impossible. That which is said in response to this objection—that the receiving agent is infinitely divisible—is inadmissible, because a small area about that of one's palm, though it should be infinitely divisible, cannot contain a mountain.

The answer to this objection is that the particular perceived forms are in fact immaterial, as will be discussed later on.[i] Their immateriality is imaginal (*mithālī*), wherein such material properties as dimension, geometric form, etc., are retained, but not matter itself. Hence they are present in the soul on the plane of imaginal immateriality (*tajarrud mithālī*)[8] without being imprinted on a bodily organ or a faculty related to it. As to the actions and reactions that occur on a material plane during the process of sensation or perception, they are the prepara-

[i] See 11. 1 and 11.2.

tory means for the soul for apprehending the particular imaginal cognitive forms.

Sixth Objection

The physiologists state that sensation and perception involve the formation in the sense organs of impressions (*ṣuwar*) of physical bodies with all their external relations and characteristics. The sense organs modify the impressions in accordance with their particular nature and convey them to the brain. Man cognizes their sizes, dimensions, and shapes through a kind of comparison between the parts of the impressions apprehended. This description does not leave any room for the belief in presence of external quiddities themselves in the mind.

The answer is that the physiologists do indeed speak of certain physical actions and reactions involved in perception. However, these physical impressions, which differ from the external things perceived, are not what constitute the perceived form itself. Rather they constitute a preparatory stage that prepares the soul for the presence before it of the external quiddities with an imaginal (*mithālī*), not a material, existence. Otherwise the disparity between the impressions in the organs of sensation and perception and the external objects represented by these impressions will amount to negation of the possibility of knowledge.

In fact this is one of the strongest proofs of the immaterial presence of the quiddities themselves for the mind. That is because should we assume them to have some kind of material existence—in whatever manner—that cannot get rid of disparity between the apprehended forms and the external realities they represent, thus necessarily implying a denial of the possibility of knowledge.

Seventh Objection

The doctrine of mental existence implies that a single thing should simultaneously be a particular and a universal. This is obviously inadmissible. To explain, the intellected quiddity of 'man,' for instance, is a universal in so far as it is applicable to a multiplicity of persons. At the same time it is a particular in

so far as it is present in a particular soul through which it subsists, thus becoming particularized through its particularity, being different from the quiddity of 'man' intellected by other souls. Hence it is simultaneously a particular and a universal.

The answer is that there are two different aspects (*jihāt*) involved here. The intellected quiddity is a universal in so far as it is a mental existent corresponding to external reality and applicable to a multiplicity of objects. And in so far as it is a quality of the soul—aside from its correspondence to external reality—it is a particular.

CHAPTER THREE
The Division of Existence into Existence-in-itself and Existence-in-something-else, and of Existence-in-itself into Existence-for-itself and Existence-for-something-else

3.1. EXISTENCE-IN-ITSELF AND EXISTENCE-IN-SOMETHING-ELSE

EXISTENCE is either existence-in-something-else or its opposite [i.e. existence-in-itself]. To explain, when we consider a true proposition, for instance, 'Man is a biped,' we find that there is something in it [i.e. the verb ''to be'' used as a copula] besides the subject and the predicate that relates them to each other. This relation is absent when we consider solely the subject or the predicate, or when each of them is conceived along with some other thing. Hence that something has existence. Moreover, its existence is not something additional to the existence of the two sides, or something situated between them and existing independently of them, for otherwise it would require two other copulas to relate it to each of the two sides. Then the three will become five and the five would similarly become nine and so on ad infinitum.

Hence its existence inheres in the two sides and depends on them, not being extraneous to or independent of them. It has no independent meaning of its own as a concept. We call it ''copulative existence'' (*al-wujūd al-rābiṭ*). That which is not such—such as the existence of the subject and that of the predicate—and has an independent meaning as a concept, is called ''substantive existence'' (*al-wujūd al-maḥmūlī,* lit. predicative existence) or ''independent existence'' (*al-wujūd al-mustaqil*).

Hence existence is divisible into independent and copulative as stated.[9]

From what has been said, it becomes clear that:

(i) copulative existents have no quiddity; for the quiddity of a thing is what is mentioned in answer to the question, 'What is it?' Quiddity has a substantive existence and independent meaning as a concept. Copulative existence is not such.

(ii) Secondly, the occurrence of a copulative existent between two things necessitates a unity between them, for it is united with them and is not external to their existence.

(iii) Thirdly, the copulative existent occurs in facts corresponding to ''composite propositions'' (*al-halliyyāt al-murakkabah*, i.e. propositions of the type 'A is B') wherein a thing is affirmed of another thing. As to ''simple propositions'' (*al-hilliyyāt al-basīṭah*, i.e. propositions of the type 'A is' or 'A exists'), in which merely the subsistence of the subject is affirmed, there occurs no copulative existence in the corresponding fact, for there is no sense in a thing's relation with itself.

3.2. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COPULATIVE AND INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE

The metaphysicians differ concerning the character of the difference between copulative and independent existence, as to whether it is a specific difference. That is, is copulative existence a relational concept inconceivable as a substantive and independent notion, in the sense that it is impossible to divest it of this character by conceiving it as a substantive after its being a non-substantive notion (*maʿnī ḥarfī*). Or is it the case that there is no specific difference between it and independent existence?

The truth lies with the latter position, for as will be seen later on in the chapter on cause and effect,[i] the existence of the effect is copulative (*rābiṭ*) in relation to its cause, although, as we know, effects consist of substances and accidents, both of which have predicative and independent existence. They are

[i] See 7.4.

copulative existents when viewed in relation to their causes, but are independent existents when considered by themselves.[10]

It becomes clear from what has been said that every concept is subject in the independence of its meaning, or the lack of it, to the existence from which it is abstracted, and is in itself indefinite.

3.3. EXISTENCE-IN-ITSELF-FOR-ITSELF AND EXISTENCE-IN-ITSELF-FOR-SOMETHING-ELSE[11]

By 'existence for something else' is meant an existent by itself that in addition to dispelling non-being from its own quiddity, removes a non-being from another thing, though not from its essence and quiddity; for otherwise one existent will possess two quiddities, which implies the multiplicity of what is one. Hence the non-being removed is one that is extraneous to the thing's essence and quiddity, having a kind of association with it. An example of it is knowledge, whose existence, in addition to removing non-being from its quiddity, removes ignorance from its subject, ignorance being a kind of non-being associated with the subject. Similar is ability, which in addition to removing non-being from its own quiddity removes disability from its subject.

The evidence for this kind of existents is provided by accidents (*a'rāḍ*), each one of which dispels a kind of non-being from its subject, in addition to dispelling non-being from its own quiddity. The same is true of each of the substantial specific forms (*al-ṣuwar al-naw'iyyah al-jawhariyyah*), which in a way actualize their matters (*mawādd*), complete them and dispel their substantial deficiency. This is the kind of removal of non-being that is meant by 'existence for something else' (*al-wujūd li ghayrih*) and its being 'attributive.'

It stands opposed to what is called 'existence for itself' (*wujūd li nafsih*), which dispels non-being solely from itself, like the various kinds of complete specific substances, such as man, horse, etc.

Often metaphysicians divide existence for itself further into that which is existence by itself and existence by something

else, but this division relates to causality, which will be discussed later.[i]

[i] Chapter Seven.

CHAPTER FOUR
The Three Modes: Necessity, Contingency and Impossibility

4.1. THE THREEFOLD MODES AND THEIR DEFINITIONS

EVERY idea when considered from the viewpoint of existence is either necessary (*wājib*), impossible (*mumtani'*), or contingent (*mumkin*), i.e. neither necessary nor impossible. In the first case, existence is a necessity; in the second, non-existence is a necessity; in the third, neither existence nor non-existence is a necessity.

The meaning of these three modes is self-evident and they are so pervasive that no idea is devoid of any one of them. Hence they cannot be defined, and the definitions that have been offered are circular (like the one that defines the necessary as ''a thing the supposition of whose non-existence entails an impossibility,'' the impossible as ''that whose non-existence is necessary'' or ''that which is neither possible nor necessary,'' and the contingent as ''that whose existence or non-existence is not impossible'').

4.2. THE SUB-DIVISIONS OF EACH OF THE MODES

Each of the three modes is divisible into three kinds: (i) essential (*bi al-dhāt*), i.e., that which is such (i.e. necessary, contingent or impossible) by-itself, (ii) accidental (*bi al-ghayr*), i.e., that which is such by something else, and (iii) relative (*bi al-qiyās ila al-ghayr*), i.e., that which is such in relation to something else. An exception here is the 'contingent,' for which there is no such subdivision as 'contingent by something else.'

The exalted Necessary Being, whose existence is necessary by itself, without standing in need of anything else, represents

essential necessity.

By accidentally contingent is meant the contingent whose existence becomes necessary on the existence of its cause.

Relative necessity applies to the existence of each of two correlatives (*mutaḍā'afayn*), whose existence is necessary in relation to that of the other correlative, like the higher one and the lower one, the existence of each of which is necessary in relation to that of the other, apart from the necessity arising from their cause.

Examples of the essentially impossible are such essential impossibilities as God's partner (*sharīk al-Bārī*) and the coming together of two contradictories (*ijtimā' al-naqīḍayn*). An example of accidental impossibility is the impossibility of the existence of an effect arising from the non-existence of its cause, and the impossibility of its non-existence on the existence of its cause. An example of relative impossibility is the impossibility of the existence of one of the two correlatives in relation to non-existence of the other, and that of its non-existence in relation to existence of the other correlative.

As to essential contingency (*imkān dhatī*), it applies to the contingent quiddities, which in themselves are neither necessarily existent nor necessarily non-existent. As to relative contingency, it applies to two hypothetical necessary beings each of which is essentially necessary, because the supposition of one of them does not preclude the existence or non-existence of the other, for there is neither any relation of causality between them, nor are they effects of a third cause.

As to accidental contingency, it is impossible; for if we assume something that is accidentally contingent, it should itself be either: (i) essentially necessary, or (ii) essentially impossible, or (iii) essentially contingent, for here the modes are confined to these three. The first two assumptions entail a violation of the law of identity, and the third leads to the absurdity of considering what is essentially contingent as being accidentally contingent.

4.3. QUIDDITY AND THE NECESSARY BEING

The essence of the Necessary Being is Its existence, in the sense that It has no quiddity besides Its particular existence; for were It to have a quiddity besides Its particular existence, its existence would be additional and accidental to Its essence. Since everything accidental is necessarily caused (*ma'lūl*), Its existence too would be something caused, its cause being either Its quiddity or something else.

Were Its quiddity Its cause, that quiddity would precede It in existence, as the cause is necessarily prior to its effect in terms of existence. This priority of Its quiddity to Its existence would be either with this existence or with another existence. The first alternative necessarily entails a thing being prior to itself, which is impossible. As to the second, leads to an infinite regress when the same argument is shifted to it.

Were Its cause something other than Its quiddity, It would be an effect of something else, which contradicts Its essential necessity.[12]

The above discussion reveals that essential necessity is a characteristic derived from the very reality of the Necessary Being, which shows that It is absolute existence, at the extreme of splendour, without possessing any aspect of privation (non-being). For did It possess any kind of privation, it would be devoid of the existential perfection that stands opposed to such a privation, and Its essence would be limited by the absence of that perfection and, consequently, it would not be essentially necessary and absolute, possessing every kind of perfection.

4.4. THE NECESSARY BEING IS NECESSARY IN ALL RESPECTS

If the Necessary Being were to have a relation of non-necessity with anything pertaining to Its possible perfections, It would have an aspect of contingency in relation to it. That is, in Itself It would be devoid of it, being indifferent to its existence and non-existence. This entails a limit involving privation for Its essence, which is impossible as shown in the preceding section.

4.5. A THING DOES NOT EXIST UNLESS IT BECOMES NECESSARY

There is no doubt that the contingent, which is indifferent to both existence and non-existence, depends for its existence on that which is called the 'cause,' without which it cannot exist.

Does the existence of the contingent depend on being necessitated by its cause, which makes it accidentally necessary, or does it come into existence by merely emerging out of the state of indifference (to existence and non-existence) without reaching the limit of necessity? The same question can be framed in regard to its non-existence. The 'theory of preponderance' (*awlawiyyah*) upholds the latter view. Its proponents classify 'preponderance' into essential and accidental. The former is said to be what is required by the quiddity and essence of a contingent. They further divide each of these kinds into that which is sufficient to actualize the contingent and that which is insufficient.

However, the idea of preponderance with all its divisions is a false notion.

As to 'essential preponderance,' the quiddity of a thing prior to its existence is a vacuity having no entity, so as to require any preponderance, sufficient or insufficient, in favour of its existence. In other words, quiddity as such is neither existent nor non-existent, nor is it anything else. As to accidental preponderance, which derives from the cause, it cannot bring the contingent out of its state of indifference as long as it does not reach the point of necessity. By itself it cannot determine the contingent's existence or non-existence,[i] and the question as to why this has actualized instead of that remains open, and that proves that the cause is not yet complete.

To sum up, preponderance solely lies in the cause necessitating the existence or non-existence of the effect, in the sense that when the cause determines its existence its non-existence is impossible, and when the cause necessitates non-existence of the contingent, its existence does not become necessary. Hence a thing—that is a contingent—does not exist unless necessitated.

[i] There being no intermediary stage between the equality of the two sides and the determination of any of them.

Conclusion

The aforementioned necessity is one that the contingent derives from its cause. It has another necessity attending its existence or non-existence. This necessity is called 'necessity imposed by the predicate' [i.e. existence or non-existence, in the present case]. Thus a contingent is bracketed by two kinds of necessity: prior and attendant.

4.6. SOME OTHER MEANINGS OF IMKĀN

The *imkān* discussed above is in the sense of non-necessity of existence or non-existence in relation to quiddity when taken as such. It is called *al-imkān al-khāṣṣ or al-khāṣṣī* (special possibility).

(i) However, the word *imkān* is also used in the sense of negation of necessity in relation to the contrary of something, irrespective of whether it be necessary or not. For example, when it is said that such and such a thing is possible, what is meant is that it is not impossible. In this common usage, *imkān* has a wider meaning than contingency. Hence it is called *imkān āmm* or *āmmī* (general possibility).

(ii) The word *imkān* is also used in a narrower sense than that of contingency to mean absence of the threefold logical necessities *(ḍarūrah*): essential (*dhātiyyah*), attributive (*waṣfiyyah*), and time-bound (*waqtiyyah*). For instance, in the statement, 'Man may be a writer,' being human does not necessarily require the ability to write, nor a quality that may entail that such a necessity is subsumed in the subject, nor a particular time is associated with it that may entail such a necessity. Possibility, in this sense, arises in a proposition on account of a conceptual consideration wherein the predicate is related to the subject; it does not negate the actualization of necessity in the external world due to the actualization of the cause. Possibility in this sense is called *al-imkān al-akhaṣṣ* (more special possibility).

(iii) *Imkān* is also used in the sense of absence of necessity imposed by predication and the absence of the three kinds of necessity mentioned above, as in the statement 'Zayd may be a writer tomorrow.' It pertains to circumstances pertaining to the

future that have not yet occurred so that necessity imposed by the predicate may apply to them. This kind of possibility derives from conjecture and from inattention to the fact that every future event is either necessary or impossible because of its dependence on the presence or absence of its causes. This kind of possibility is called *al-imkān al-istiqbālī* (future possibility).'

(iv) The word *imkān* is also used in two other senses. One of them is the so-called *al-imkān al-wuqū'ī* (possibility of occurrence), which applies to a thing the assumption of whose occurrence does not entail an impossibility. That is, it is neither impossible in itself nor by virtue of something else. It involves a negation of impossibility in regard to the affirmative side of the proposition (e.g. in the proposition 'A's existence is possible,' impossibility is negated in regard to A's existence), whereas 'general possibility' involves a negation of necessity in regard to the converse side (in the above proposition, the negation of necessity will be in regard to A's non-existence).

(v) The second is *al-imkān al-isti'dādī* (potential), which, as mentioned by metaphysicians, is essentially a thing's potential (e.g., the seed's potential to become a tree), differing from it only in respect of consideration. The potential of a thing for becoming another thing can be considered in two ways: (i) in relation to the thing possessing that potential and (ii) in relation to that which it has the potential to become. In the first case, it is called 'potential.' Hence one may, for instance, say, 'The embryo has the potential to become a human being.' In the second, it is called 'possibility by virtue of potential (*al-imkān al-isti'dādī*).' Hence, in the above example, one may say, 'It is possible for a human being to come forth from the embryo.'

Following are some points of difference between this kind of possibility and essential contingency (*al-imkān al-dhātī*), which will be discussed in the next section:

(i) Essential contingency is a rational analytic concept (*i'tibār taḥlīlī 'aqlī*) associated with quiddity *qua* quiddity, whereas 'possibility by virtue of potential' is an existential quality associated with an existing quiddity. Hence essential contingency is associated with man's quiddity conceived as such, whereas

possibility by virtue of potential is associated with the embryo in the process of becoming a human being.

(ii) Accordingly, possibility by virtue of potential is subject to various degrees of strength and weakness, as this possibility is greater in a developed fetus than one in the early stages, unlike essential contingency, which does not vary.

(iii) Also, possibility by virtue of potential can disappear with the disappearance of the potential after the thing actually becomes what it had the potential for, unlike essential contingency, which clings to quiddity and remains with it even when it is actualized.

(iv) Furthermore, possibility by virtue of potential is found in 'matter,'[i] in its most general sense. This possibility determines the end product of the potential, like the human form determined by the potential of the matter (in the form of the embryo). On the contrary, essential contingency, which is associated with quiddity, does not determine its existence or non-existence.[13]

The difference between 'possibility by virtue of potential' and 'possibility of occurrence' is that the former relates solely to material beings, while the latter applies to material as well as immaterial things.

4.7. CONTINGENCY IS ESSENTIAL TO QUIDDITY

Contingency is a conceptual construct (*i'tibār 'aqlī*), for it is associated with quiddity as conceived by the intellect without taking existence or non-existence into account. Quiddity conceived in this manner is undoubtedly a conceptual construct; hence that which is associated with it is also undoubtedly a mental construct. However, its being a conceptual construct does not preclude quiddity's existence or non-existence in ac-

[i] "Matter" in the most general sense includes "matter" in the more special sense of a substance (*jawhar*) that receives the forms imprinted in it, like the "matter" of the elements, as well as that which is associated with the immaterial soul, like the body associated with the rational soul. It also includes that which forms the subject of accidents, like body, which forms the subject of accidents, such as quantities and qualities.

tual fact, and its being bracketed by two necessities or impossibilities.

As to contingency being inseparable from quiddity, when we conceive quiddity as such, without taking into account anything else, we do not find in it either the logical necessity of existence or that of non-existence. Contingency is nothing except negation of the two necessities. Hence quiddity is contingent in its essence. Although there are two negations involved here, the intellect substitutes them with their implication—that is, equality of relation to existence and non-existence—and thus contingency becomes a positive concept (*ma'nā thubūtiyyan*) despite the negative import of the two negations.[14]

4.8. THE CONTINGENT'S NEED FOR A CAUSE

The contingent's need for a cause is one of the primary self-evident propositions, wherein the mere conception of the subject and the predicate is sufficient to affirm its validity. For if one were to conceives the contingent quiddity, which is equally related to existence and non-existence, and its dependence on something else for drawing it from this state of equality toward one of the two sides, one would affirm its need for a cause.

However, what is it that makes the contingent require a cause? Is it contingency, or is it coming into existence after being non-existent *(ḥudūth)*? The truth is that it is contingency, and this is the view of the philosophers.

An argument in favour of this view is that quiddity is necessarily existent when considered in relation to its existence and it is necessarily non-existent when considered in relation to its non-existence, each of these necessities being conditioned by predicate, and *ḥudūth* is nothing except one of these necessities followed by the other, for *ḥudūth* means a thing's coming into existence after being non-existent. It is obvious that necessity is the criterion for the absence of need for a cause. Hence so long as quiddity is not conceived with its contingency, necessity does not disappear and the need for a cause does not actualize.

Another argument is that a quiddity does not come into existence unless brought into existence by the cause. Its being

brought into existence by the cause depends on the quiddity's existence becoming necessary, which again depends on its being necessitated by the cause.[15] From what was said earlier, it becomes clear that the cause's making its existence necessary depends on the quiddity's need for it and the quiddity's need for it depends on its contingency. For were it not contingent, and were it necessary or impossible, of necessity it would not need any cause. Hence its need depends necessarily on its contingency. Moreover, if it were to depend as well on its *ḥudūth*, i.e., its coming into existence after non-existence, that would entail a thing being prior to itself. To explain, irrespective of whether we consider *ḥudūth* as the cause and contingency as a condition, or *ḥudūth* as the cause and non-existence of contingency as an obstacle, or whether *ḥudūth* is considered as forming a part of the cause with contingency as the other part, or whether we consider contingency as the cause and *ḥudūth* as a condition, or contingency, or something else, as the cause and the non-existence of *ḥudūth* as an obstacle, every one of these cases necessitates a thing preceding itself by several stages. The same is true of the case when its necessity or the cause's necessitating it is assumed to be the reason for its need for a cause.

Hence there remains no alternative except to consider contingency as the sole ground of its need, for in this interlinked sequence there is no rational stage prior to the need except that of quiddity and its contingency.

On this basis, the argument offered by some theologians that the ground of the need for cause is *ḥudūth* and not contingency, stands refuted. Their argument is that if the need for cause were due to contingency, the existence of entities without a beginning or end in time (*al-qadīm al-zamānī*) would be admissible. The assumption of their eternal existence exempts them from the need for a cause, for it is never non-existent so as to be brought into existence by a cause.

The answer to this objection is as follows. The assumption is that it is a thing's essence that is the source of the need for a cause, and it retains this essence throughout its eternal existence. If it is assumed to exist eternally, its need for a cause,

which inheres in its essence, will be eternal, though given the condition of existence, by way of necessity conditioned by the predicate (*al-ḍarūrah bi sharṭ al-maḥmūl*), it would not require a cause, in the sense of removal of the need for it.

Moreover, as will be discussed later on,[i] the existence of an effect (*wujūd al-ma'lūl*), irrespective of whether it is eternal or comes into existence after being non-existent, is a relative existence (*wujūd rābiṭ*), essentially dependent on its cause, with no independence of its own. Hence the need for a cause is essential to it and inseparable from it.

4.9. THE CONTINGENT NEEDS A CAUSE EVEN IN CONTINUANCE

The reason for the contingent's need for a cause is contingency, which is inseparable from quiddity, and that need remains with it in the state of continuance in the same way that it accompanies it while coming into existence (*ḥudūth*). Hence it needs the cause for coming into existence as well as for continuance, being dependent on it in both the states.

Another proof of it is that the existence of the effect, as mentioned repeatedly earlier and as will be explained further later on,[ii] is a relative existence, essentially dependent on the cause and subsisting through it, having no independence of its own. Hence its state of need for the cause is the same in coming into existence as well as continuance, being inseparable from it.

Those who consider the contingent's need for a cause to lie in its *ḥudūth* have argued by advancing such commonplace analogies as that of a building and its builder, suggesting that the building needs the builder for coming into existence, but once it is built it does not need him for continuing to exist.

But the fact is that the builder is not the creative cause of the building. Rather the movements of his hands are the preparatory causes for bringing together the parts of the building. The bringing together of the parts is the cause for the coming into existence of the building's form. Thereafter its continuance for

[i] See 7.3.
[ii] See 7.3.

any considerable period of time depends on its rigidity and resistance to destructive elements such as moisture, etc.

Conclusion

It becomes clear from the above discussions that necessity, contingency and impossibility are threefold modes for propositions and that necessity and contingency are existential features. That is because modal propositions completely correspond to external reality in respect of their mode. Hence the two are existent but their existence is implicit in their subject, not something separate and independent. Therefore, they are like other philosophical concepts, such as unity and multiplicity, *qidam* and *ḥudūth*, potentiality and actuality, and so on, which are existential attributes that relate to absolute existence, in the sense that the attribution is there in external reality and their predication occurs in the mind. They are called 'secondary' intelligibles or concepts (*ma'qūlāt al-thāniyyah*) in the terminology of philosophy.

Some thinkers have held that necessity and contingency exist externally as separate and independent existents. No serious notice need be taken of this opinion. This was concerning necessity and contingency; as to impossibility, there is no doubt that it is derives from non-existence.

The entire discussion above was from the viewpoint of the intellect's consideration of quiddities and concepts as subjects in judgements. However, from the viewpoint of existence with its fundamental reality being the subject, necessity means: the being of existence at its ultimate strength, self-subsisting, and absolutely independent in itself, as pointed out earlier.[i] Also contingency means: the essential dependence of an existent on something else that sustains it, as in the case of quiddities. Hence necessity and contingency are two qualities that depend on existence, and they are not extraneous to the essence of their subjects.

[i] See 4.3.

CHAPTER FIVE
Quiddity and Its Properties

5.1. QUIDDITY QUA ITSELF IS NOTHING BUT ITSELF

THE quiddity of a thing is that which is mentioned in answer to the question, 'What is it?' As it is capable of accepting such attributes as 'existent' or 'non-existent,' 'one' or 'many,' 'universal' or 'particular,' and yields to other such opposite descriptions, it is devoid of all opposite attributes in the definition of its essence.

Hence quiddity *qua* itself is nothing but itself. It is neither existent nor non-existent, nor is it anything else. Hence the statement of the philosophers: ''Both the contradictories are negated at the plane of quiddity.'' It means that nothing pertaining to any of the contradictories is subsumed in the concept of quiddity, though in the external world, of necessity, quiddity cannot be devoid of either of them.

Thus the quiddity of man, for instance, is 'rational animal,' and it is either existent or non-existent. These two attributes cannot be affirmed or negated of it simultaneously. However, the notion of existent or non-existent is not subsumed in the concept of 'man,' and hence 'man' has a meaning that is different from that of 'existence' or 'non-existence.' The same applies to accidental characteristics, even those that are predicable of quiddity. Hence the quiddity of 'man,' for instance, is one concept, and contingency, with which it is characterized, is another concept. 'Four,' for instance, is a concept different from that of 'evenness,' with which the former is characterized.

That which can be concluded from the above statements is that quiddity is predicated of itself with primary predication (*al-ḥaml al-awwalī*; as in the statement, 'Man is a rational animal') and in respect of this predication everything else is ne-

gated of it.

5.2. DIFFERENT CONSIDERATIONS (I'TIBĀRĀT) OF QUIDDITY

Quiddity can be considered in three different ways in relation to anything else that may be conceived as being associated with it. It may be considered either as being conditioned by something (*bi sharīi shay'*), or with a negative condition (*bi sharṭi lā*, i.e. with the condition of being dissociated from something), or conceived in a non-conditioned manner (*lā bi sharṭ*). This division is exhaustive.

In the first consideration it is taken along with some associated qualities so that it corresponds to the aggregate of them, such as where the quiddity of 'man' in combination with the attributes of a particular individual Zayd corresponds to him.

In the second consideration, there is a condition that it should not to be accompanied with anything else. There are two kinds of this consideration. In the first, one's view is confined to quiddity *qua* itself and as nothing but itself. It was in this negatively conditioned sense (*al-māhiyyah bi sharṭi lā*) that we dealt with quiddity in the preceding chapter. In the second consideration, quiddity is taken alone, in the sense that any other assumed concept accompanying it would be extraneous and additional to it, whereupon quiddity would be part of the whole and 'matter' for it and incapable of being predicated of it (i.e. the whole).[16]

In the third consideration, no condition accompanies quiddity, and it is taken in an absolute manner, wherein something may or may not accompany it.

In the first consideration, quiddity is called 'mixed' quiddity (*makhlūṭah*), or 'quiddity conditioned by something.' In the second, it is called 'divested quiddity' or 'negatively conditioned quiddity' (*mujarradah*). In the third, it is called 'absolute quiddity' or 'non-conditioned quiddity' (*muṭlaqah*). The quiddity of which these three kinds are sub-classes is the 'natural universal' (*al-kullī al-ṭabī'ī*), which possesses universality in the mind and is capable of corresponding to a multiplicity of things. It exists in the external world, for two of its divisions,

that is, 'mixed' and 'absolute,' exist there, and a class is preserved in its sub-classes and exists where its sub-classes are found.

However, its existence in any individual to which it corresponds is not numerically other than its existence in other individuals. For if something that is one were to exist, despite its unity, in all individuals, what is one would be many, and what is numerically one would possess opposite qualities, both of which are impossible.

5.3. THE MEANING OF 'ESSENTIAL' AND 'ACCIDENTAL'

The concepts which enter into the definition of a certain quiddity, without which the quiddity cannot be conceived, are called its 'essential parts' or 'essentials' (*al-dhātiyyāt*; i.e. its genus and differentia). Any besides these are 'accidental qualities' (*'araḍiyyāt*), which may be predicated of it. If their abstraction from a subject and their predication depends on their union with the subject, they are called 'predicates by way of union' (*maḥmūlāt bi al-ḍamīmah*), such as when 'hotness' is abstracted from a hot body and predicated of it by relating hotness to it. Otherwise they are called 'extraneous to the subject' (*al-khārij al-maḥmūl*), such as 'high' and 'low.'

There are certain properties that distinguish the 'essentials' from whatever is not such.

One of these properties is that the 'essentials' are self-evident and do not require any intermediary terms in order to be affirmed of that to which they belong.

A second property is that they do not require any cause (*sabab*), in the sense that they need no cause in addition to the cause of that to which they pertain. Hence the cause of a quiddity's existence is itself the cause of its essentials.

A third property is that the essentials are prior to that to which they belong.

An objection has been set forth to the priority of the essentials. It says, ''The parts are the same as the whole; how can they be prior to themselves?'' It is refuted on the ground that the difference is that of consideration (*i'tibār*); hence the parts

taken individually are prior to parts when taken collectively and as making the whole. Moreover, they have been named 'parts' because each one of them is a part of the definition; otherwise, each of them is identical with the whole, of which it is an essential part.

5.4. GENUS, DIFFERENTIA AND SPECIES

A complete quiddity—i.e., one which possesses certain real special properties, e.g. 'man,' 'horse,' etc.—is called species (*naw'*).

We find that there are some essential concepts shared by several species, such as the concept of 'animal' which is common to 'man,' 'horse' and other animals. Also, there are essential concepts that are special to each of the species, such as 'rationality,' which is specific to man. That which is common to several species is called genus (*jins*) and that which is specific to each of them is called differentia (*faṣl*). Genus and differentia are divided into 'proximate' and 'remote' and, similarly, genus and species are divisible into 'highest,' 'middle,' and 'lowest,' as is discussed in detail in books on logic.

Furthermore, when we consider the quiddity 'animal,' for instance, which is shared by several species, and conceive it as 'a growing, sensate body capable of voluntary movement,' it may be conceived in isolation so that any concept associated with it would be additional and extraneous to its essence. Then it would be different from the aggregate and incapable of becoming its predicate as well as that of anything associated with it and additional to it, and the supposed quiddity would be 'matter' in relation to that which is associated with it and the 'material cause' of the aggregate.

We may conceive this quiddity in comparison to a number of species, as when we conceive the quiddity 'animal,' which may be either 'man' or 'horse' or 'cow' or 'sheep.' Then it would be an incomplete quiddity, which is not actualized until we unite

the differentia of one of these species with it. When that is done, it would be actualized in a complete species and become identical with that species. The supposed quiddity when considered in this manner is the genus and that which actualizes it is the differentia.

These two considerations pertaining to the common part apply in an identical manner to the specific 'part,' which in view of the first consideration is called 'form' (*ṣūrah*), in which case it is a 'part' that cannot be predicated either of the whole or the other part. In view of the second consideration, it is called 'differentia,' which actualizes the genus and completes the species and is predicated of it with a primary predication.

From what has been said, the following points become clear:

Firstly, genus is undetermined species and differentia is determinate species. The species is a complete quiddity without taking into view determination or non-determination.

Secondly, each of genus and differentia is predicable of the species with primary predication. However, as to the relation between the two, the genus is a 'general accident' (*'araḍ 'āmm*) in relation to the differentia, and differentia is a 'special accident' or proprium (*khāṣṣah*) in relation to the genus.

Thirdly, it is impossible that there should be two genera or two differentiae at one level, for that implies that one species should be two.

Fourthly, genus and 'matter' are one is essence, being different from the viewpoint of consideration (*i'tibāran*). Thus when 'matter' is conceived in a non-conditioned sense it becomes genus, and genus when conceived in a negatively conditioned manner becomes 'matter.' The same applies to 'form' which when conceived in a non-conditioned manner is differentia, and the differentia when conceived in a negatively conditioned manner is 'form'.

It should be known that 'matter' in 'material substances' exists in the external world, as will be discussed later.[i] As to the accidents, they are simple and non-composite in external reality. That is because what they share in (*mā bihi al-ishtirāk*) is

[i] See 6.4.

identical with that by which they are distinguished from one another (*mā bihi al-imtiyāz*). However, the intellect finds common and specific aspects in them and conceives them as genus and differentia. Then it views them in a negatively conditioned manner, turning them conceptually into 'forms' and 'matters.'

5.5. SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF DIFFERENTIA

According to one classification, differentia is classified into two kinds: logical (*manṭiqī*) and derivative (*ishtiqāqī*).

The logical differentia consists of one of the more special and well-known properties associated with a certain species. It is taken and substituted in definitions for the real differentia often due to the difficulty of obtaining the real differentia that gives subsistence to a species. Examples of logical differentiae are 'rational' (*nāṭiq;* derived from *nuṭq* which means 'speech' as well as 'rationality') for man and 'neighing' for the horse. However, if by '*nuṭq*,' for instance, is meant speech, it is an audible quality, and if what is meant by it is 'rationality' in the sense of the faculty of cognition of universals, it is regarded by the philosophers as one of the 'psychic qualities.' Quality, of whatever kind, is an accident, and an accident does not give subsistence to a substance. The same applies to 'neighing' as the differentia of 'horse,' defined as a 'neighing animal.' Often such more special properties are more than one, and they are together substituted for the real differentia, as is the case with 'sensate' and 'voluntarily mobile' which are taken together as the differentia of 'animal.' But had they been the real differentia, they would not have been more than one, as stated in the preceding section.

The 'derivative' differentia (*al-faṣl al-ishtiqāqī*) is the source of the logical differentia. It is the real differentia that gives subsistence to the species, like the 'rational soul' in the case of 'man' and the 'neighing soul' in the case of the horse.

The reality of a species is realized by its ultimate differentia, for the differentia that gives subsistence to a species is the one that actualizes it, and that which is subsumed in its other genera and differentiae in an undetermined manner is subsumed in it in

a determined way.

A corollary to the above is that the identity of a species is due to the ultimate differentia by which its specificity (*naw'iyyah*) is maintained, and should any of its genera undergo a change, or should its form—that is, differentia negatively conditioned—separate from its 'matter'—that is, genus negatively conditioned—the species maintains its specific identity, as in the case of the rational soul on separation from the body.

Further, the differentia does not fall under its genus, in the sense that genus is not subsumed in its definition; otherwise it would require a differentia to give it subsistence and that, on transferring our argument to it, results in an indefinite regress requiring an infinite number of differentiae.

5.6. SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF SPECIES

The parts of a specific quiddity (*al-māhiyyat al-naw'iyyah*) exist in external reality with a single existence, for the predication between each of them and the species is of the primary kind and the species exists with a single existence. However, in the mind they are distinguished from each other by being indefinite and determinate, and hence each of the two, genus and differentia, is an accident in relation to the other and additional to it, as explained earlier.[i]

Hence the metaphysicians state that there exists a mutual need between the parts in the 'real composites' (*al-murakkabāt al-ḥaqqiyyah*), that is, the material species, which are composed of 'matter' and 'form,' so that they may join and unite to form a single entity. They consider this as a self-evident truth that does not stand in need of a proof.

The 'real composites' are distinguished from other kinds of composites by a real union wherein two constituents, for instance, combine to produce a third entity different from either of the two and possessing properties different from those belonging to each. An example of this kind of union is provided by chemical compounds, which possess properties different

[i] See 5.4 above.

from their constituent elements. It is not like the composition of an army, which is made up of individual soldiers, nor like that of a house, which is made up of bricks, mortar, etc.

This lends weight to the opinion that the combination of matter and form is a union, not a composition, as will be explained later.[i]

Furthermore, there are some specific quiddities that have a multiplicity of individuals, like the species associated with matter, e.g. 'man.' There are some of them that are confined to a single individual, such as the immaterial species (*al-anwā' al-mujarradah*), which are completely immaterial (i.e. in essence and in act), e.g. the Immaterial Intellects (*'uqūl*). That is because a species has a multiplicity of individuals either as a result of multiplicity constituting the totality of its quiddity, or a part of it, or its proprium, or a separable accident. In the first three assumptions, individuation is never realized, as multiplicity will be necessary in anything that corresponds to it. Yet multiplicity cannot be realized without individuals and the impossibility of individuation contradicts the assumption. Since the above three assumptions are inadmissible, multiplicity must arise in separable accidents (*'arāḍ mufāriq*) and their association or absence of association with the quiddity. However, in this case it is necessary that there exists the capacity (*imkān isti'dādī*) for such association in the species, and such a capacity is not realized except in matter, as will be explained later on.[ii] Hence every species with a multiplicity of individuals is material. From this follows the converse that immaterial species, which are devoid of 'matter,' do not have a multiplicity of individuals.

5.7. THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PARTICULAR AND THEIR MODES OF EXISTENCE

Some have thought that the universal and the particular are two different modes of cognition. In sense perception (*al-idrāk al-*

[i] See 6.6.
[ii] See 6.4.

ḥissī), they say, due to its being strong and vivid, a thing is perceived in such a way that it is absolutely distinguished from anything else. However, in rational cognition (*al-idrāk al-ʿaqlī*), due to its being weak and vague, a thing is apprehended in such a way that it is not absolutely distinguishable and so is capable of corresponding to more than one thing. It is like an apparition seen from a far distance which may be either Zayd or ʻAmr or the stump of a tree or something else, but is definitely only one of them, or like an abraded coin which may resemble different coins of its type.

This view stands refuted, for it implies that the universals, such as 'man,' for instance, do not really correspond to more than one member of their class and that universal laws, such as, 'All fours are even' and 'Every contingent needs a cause to exist,' which apply to an unlimited number of their instances be false except only in one of those instances. Both of these implications are false prima facie. The truth is that the universal and the particular are two different modes of existence of quiddity.

5.8. DISTINCTION AND INDIVIDUATION

The distinction (*tamayyuz*) between one quiddity and another lies in its being different from others, so that two of them do not correspond to one thing, like the distinction of 'man' from 'horse' by virtue of the former's 'rationality.' Individuation (*tashakhkhuṣ*) means quiddity's being such that its correspondence to a multiplicity of individuals be impossible, like the individuality of a particular man Zayd.

From this the following points become clear.

Firstly, distinction is a relative attribute of a quiddity, as opposed to individuation, which is due to itself and non-relative.

Secondly, distinction is not incompatible with universality, for appending one universal to another does not lead to particularity (*juz'iyyah*), not even when the process of adding further universals is repeated indefinitely. This is not the case with individuation.

Furthermore, the distinction between two quiddities can possibly be conceived as arising in one or more of the following

four ways. (i) Either with the totality of their essential parts, as in the case of the highest simple genera (i.e. substance and the accidents); for if two highest genera were to have common essential parts, there would be a genus above them, and this contradicts the supposition that the two genera are the highest ones.

(ii) Or the distinction between them is by virtue of one of their essential parts, as is the case when they have a common genus and are made distinct by two differentiae, for instance, 'man' and 'horse.'

(iii) Or the distinction is by virtue of something extraneous to their essence, as when they share a common specific quiddity and are distinguished from one another by virtue of separable accidents like 'tall man' distinguished from 'short man' on account of height.

(iv) There is a fourth kind of distinction believed in by those who consider gradation (*tashkīk*) in quiddity as permissible. Gradation is a distinction introduced in a species due to strength and weakness, priority and posteriority, and so on, while that which is common to it is maintained. But the truth is that there is no gradation except in existence from which this kind of difference and distinction derives.

As to individuation, it may pertain to material and immaterial species. In immaterial species, it is implied in its specificity, for, as we have seen, an immaterial species is confined to one individual, and this is what is meant by the statement of the metaphysicians that ''All they require is the agent, and their mere essential contingency is enough to bring them into existence.''

As to the material species, such as the elements, individuation arises in them by the associated accidents (*al-a'rāḍ al-lāḥiqah*), which are mainly: 'where,' 'when,' and 'position,' and these are what individualize the species by being associated with it (e.g. 'Man in such and such a place and in such and such a time' as the description of a certain individual). This is the prevalent view among the metaphysicians.

However, the correct view, as held by Fārābī, who was followed therein by Ṣadr al-Mut'allihīn, is that individuation is

produced by existence; for the annexation of a universal to another does not produce particularity, and the so-called 'individuating accidents' are inseparable implications of individuation and its signs.

CHAPTER SIX
The Categories

6.1. DEFINITIONS OF SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT AND THE NUMBER OF THE CATEGORIES

QUIDDITY is divided in the first classification into substance and accident. That is, it is either such that, when existing externally, it does not exist in a locus that has no need of it for existing.'' This is irrespective of whether it does not exist in a locus at all (as in the case of self-sustaining Intellectual substances), or exists in a locus that needs it for existing (as in the case of the elemental forms impressed in the 'matter,' which sustains them). Or it is such that, when existing externally, it exists in a locus that does not need it for existing,'' such as the quiddities of 'nearness' and 'remoteness' between bodies, and 'standing' and 'sitting,' 'facing' and 'having one's back towards something' for man.

The existence of these two kinds is necessary, and one who denies the existence of the substance is forced to consider accidents as substances, thus unwittingly admitting its existence.

The accidents are nine. They are categories and constitute the highest genera. Their common name 'accident' is a general accident for them and there is no genus above them,[i] in the same way as the concept 'quiddity'[ii] is a general accident for all the ten categories, which do not have a genus.

The nine accidental categories are: 'quantity,' 'quality,' 'place,' 'time,' 'position,' 'possession,' 'relation,' 'action' and 'affection.' This is the opinion of the Peripatetics concerning

[i] Otherwise the categories would be confined to two. The 'occurrence' of an accident is its subsistence through some other thing that does not need it in order to exist. Hence it is a mode of existence.

[ii] It is that which is said in reply to the question, 'What is it?'

the number of the categories and inductive evidence forms its basis.

Some philosophers have held the accidents to be four. They put the relative categories, the last seven, into one group. Suhrawardī held them to be five, adding the category of motion to these four.[i]

The discussions concerning the categories and their classification into the kinds that fall under them are very elaborate and here we will give a summary based on the prevailing opinion amongst the Aristotelians, while referring to the other positions.

6.2. THE CLASSIFICATION OF SUBSTANCE

The metaphysicians first divide substance into five kinds: 'matter' (*māddah*), 'form' (*ṣūrah*), 'body' (*jism*), 'soul' (*nafs*) and 'intellect' (*'aql*). Inductive evidence for the existence of these substances forms the basis of this classification.

'Intellect' is a substance devoid of 'matter' both in its essence and in act. 'Soul' is a substance devoid of 'matter' essentially but associated with it in act. 'Matter' is a substance that possesses potentiality. 'Bodily form' (*al-ṣūrat al-jismiyyah*) is a substance that gives actuality to 'matter' in respect to the three dimensions. 'Body' is a substance extended in three dimensions.

The inclusion of 'bodily form' in this classification is an accidental one, for 'form' is differentia negatively conditioned and the differentiae of substances do not fall under the category of substance, though the term substance may be predicable of it (in the sense of technical predication), as was seen in the discussion on quiddity.[ii] The same applies to 'soul.'[iii]

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[i] The categories in his opinion are: substance, quantity, quality, relation and motion.

[ii] See 5.5.

[iii] The 'soul' as such is 'form' for a substantial species and the differentiae of substances do not fall under the category of substance.

6.3. Body

There is no doubt that there are various bodies sharing in bodiness as substances extended in three dimensions. Hence body *qua* body is divisible in the supposed dimensions and is perceived as having a continuous unity by the senses. But is it really a single continuum as it appears to the senses or a collection of particles separated by interstices, contrary to what is perceived by the senses?

If it is a continuous unit, are its potential divisions finite or infinite? If it is a collection of discrete particles, are its actual divisions—i.e. the smallest particles which represent a limit to division, not being susceptible to further division externally—capable of further division in the imagination on account of their being small bodies with a certain volume? Or are they incapable of any further division, externally as well as in the imagination, due to not possessing any volume, though they are capable of being pointed at sensibly? Further, in the last case, is their number finite or infinite? Each of these alternatives has had supporters.

In all there are five theories.

(i) According to one of the views, bodies are in fact continuous units as they appear to the senses and consist of potentially finite parts. This view is ascribed to Shahristānī.

(ii) According to a second view, bodies are really continuous units they appear to be to the senses and susceptible to an indefinite number of divisions. When actual division stops due to the smallness of size and the inadequacy of cutting instruments, they can be divided in the imagination, and when imagination fails as a result of extreme smallness, they are susceptible to division by the intellect in accordance with its universal judgement that whenever anything is divided into parts, the resulting parts are divisible as they possess volume and two distinct sides. Thus there is no end to this process, for division does not exhaust volume. This opinion has been ascribed to the philosophers.

(iii) According to a third view, a body is a collection of small unbreakable particles that are not devoid of volume. They are

susceptible to division in the imagination and the intellect though not in external reality. This theory has been ascribed to Democritus.

(iv) A fourth view is that bodies are composed of parts that are indivisible, externally as well as in the imagination and the intellect. They are susceptible to being pointed at sensibly and are finite, separated by interstices through which the cutting instrument passes. This opinion is ascribed to a majority of the theologians (*mutakallimūn*).

(v) According to a fifth view, bodies are composed as described in the fourth theory, with the difference that it holds the particles to be infinite in number.

The fourth and the fifth views stand refuted on the ground that if the indivisible particles they hypothesize do not have any volume, their aggregate, of necessity, cannot produce a body possessing volume, and if they possess volume, they are of necessity susceptible to further division by the imagination and the intellect if, supposedly, their external division is not possible due to extreme smallness.

Further, if the particles were infinite in number, the body formed by their collection would also necessarily have an infinite volume. Other arguments have been advanced against the theory of indivisible particles in elaborate works.

As to the second theory, it is unacceptable due to the weakness of reasons advanced to prove that simple bodies[i] are substances consisting of a single continuum without interstices, as they appear to be to the senses. In recent times physicists have accepted after extensive experiments that bodies are composed of small atomic parts, which are themselves constituted by other particles and have a nucleus possessing mass at their centre. However, this is a premise derived from disciplines outside philosophy.

The first view is also unacceptable as it is prone to the objections that arise against the second, fourth and fifth views, for it believes in the actual continuity of a body and its potential di-

[i] It is a body not composed of bodies of different 'natures,' such as bodies made up of the elements.

visibility into a finite number of parts whereat division ceases absolutely (i.e. externally as well in the imagination and the intellect).

Hence the existence of 'body' as a continuous substance extended in three dimensions is undoubtedly affirmed, but this conception corresponds only to the fundamental particles possessing extended mass, into which all specific bodies are reducible, as pointed out above. This is same as the view of Democritus with some modification.

6.4. PRIME MATTER AND BODILY FORM

Body *qua* body—i.e., that which primarily and essentially possesses extended mass—has an actuality, and it has a potentiality insofar as it can receive specific forms (*al-ṣuwar al-naw'iyyah*) and their properties. The mode of actuality is different from the mode of potentiality, for actuality is marked by possession and potentiality by non-possession. Hence there is a substance in body with the potentiality for receiving specific forms, and it is such that it has no actuality except sheer potentiality and that is its mode of existence. The 'bodiness' by virtue of which it has actuality is a form that gives subsistence to that potentiality. This shows that 'body' is composed of 'matter' and 'bodily form,' and 'body' is the aggregate composed of the two.

This 'matter' is present in all bodily existents and is called 'prime matter' (*al-māddat al-ūlā* or *hayūlā*). Moreover, 'prime matter' along with 'bodily form' constitutes a 'matter' for receiving 'specific forms,' and is called 'second matter' (*al-māddat al-thāniyah*).

6.5. SPECIFIC FORMS

The bodies existing in the external world differ manifestly from one another in respect of their properties and actions. These actions must inevitably originate in some substance that cannot be prime matter, for its main feature is receptivity and affection, not action. Neither can it be their common bodiness, for it

is a feature in which they share while the actions are multiple and various. Hence they must originate in different sources. If these sources were different accidents, they would yield different substances, and, as said, the cause of variance cannot be bodiness, which is common to them all. Hence it is the variety of substances that produces the variety of bodies. These substances are called 'specific forms.'

The first variety of material substances, following their common bodiness, is the one produced by specific forms, which give rise to the elements. The elements then form 'matters' for other forms that unite with them. The ancients considered the elements to be four, and the metaphysicians took it as an extra-philosophical postulate. Recent research has brought the number of elements to more than a hundred.

6.6. THE INSEPARABILITY OF MATTER AND FORM

Prime matter and form are inseparable from each other. Matter cannot be without form, because prime matter is potentiality in all aspects. It is not found but as subsisting by the means of the actuality of a substance united with it, for an existent is not actualized except with actuality, and the actual substance that possesses this feature is form. Q.E.D.

As to the forms that are inherently associated with matter, they cannot be dissociated from it, for none of the kinds accessible to perception and experience is without the potential for change and affection—a postulate derived from the natural sciences—and that which possesses potentiality and potential for change is not devoid of matter.

6.7. MUTUAL NEED BETWEEN MATTER AND FORM

To explain this briefly, the composition of matter and form is a real composition by the way of union, possessing a real unity, and, as explained earlier,[i] there is a mutual need between the parts of a real composite (*al-murakkab al-ḥaqīqī*).

[i] See 5.6.

To give a more elaborate explanation, form needs matter for its determination, for its species is determined by the prior potential (*isti'dād*) carried by matter, which is again associated with its prior form. The same is true of the prior form, and so on and so forth.

Also, form needs matter for its individuation, that is, for existing as a particular individual with its accompanying accidents, called 'individuating accidents' (*al-'awāriḍ al-mushakhkhiṣah*), such as shape, position, place, time, etc.

For coming into existence and for continuing to exist, the existence of matter depends on some form or another from among the forms that it assumes and which it sustains. The form is neither a 'complete cause' nor an 'efficient cause' of matter, for it itself needs matter for its determination and individuation. The efficient cause is one that acts with its actual existence. Accordingly, the 'agent' responsible for bringing matter into existence is an immaterial substance, immaterial in all aspects. Hence it is an immaterial Intellect that creates matter and preserves it through consecutive forms it creates therein.

Thus form is part of the complete cause and a participant in the cause of matter, as well as the condition for the actuality of its existence. The sustaining of matter by the immaterial Intellect through some form or another has been likened to keeping a tent erect while changing its poles: whenever a pole is removed, another replaces it.

An objection has been raised here. It is pointed out the metaphysicians hold prime matter of the world of elements to be a numerical unity. They make form, which is a 'general unity' participate in its cause, thus making a general unity the cause of a numerical unity, although the latter is stronger in respect of existence than a general unity, and the cause must necessarily be stronger than its effect.

Moreover, even if the above difficulty is overlooked, there is no doubt that the change of forms necessitates the disappearance of a preceding form and the appearance of the succeeding one in its place. However, when form is supposed to be part of matter's complete cause, the disappearance of the preceding form necessitates the disappearance of the whole, the complete

cause, which leads to the disappearance of matter. Hence taking form as a participant in the cause of existence of matter leads to its negation.

The answer to this objection is that, as will be explained in the chapter on potentiality and actuality,[i] the change of forms in material substances is not by the way of coming into existence and going out of existence and through the disappearance of a certain form and the appearance of another form. Rather, the changing forms exist through one fluid existence in which the material substance moves. Each of the forms is a limit along the course of this substantial movement. Hence the forms make up a continuum that is a 'particular unity,' though that unity is ambiguous in proportion to the essential ambiguity of matter, which is pure potentiality. As to the statement that form, which is a 'general unity,' participates in the cause of matter, that generality is cast upon it due to the multiplicity introduced by division of what is a single continuum.

6.8. SOUL AND INTELLECT

The soul is a substance essentially devoid of matter but dependent upon it in action. We find in human souls the property of knowledge, and—as will be explained later on in the chapter on the knower and the known[ii]—the intelligible forms are immaterial, existing for the knower and present for him. If the knower were not immaterial by virtue of his being devoid of potentiality and his possession of sheer actuality, there would be no sense in anything being present for him. Hence the intelligent human soul is immaterial. It is a substance because it is the form of a substantial species, the form of substance being a substance, as mentioned above.[iii]

As will be explained later on,[iv] the soul on the plane of the material intellect (*al-ʿaql al-hayūlūnī*) is something in potentia in relation to its intelligible forms. That which gives it actuality

[i] See 10.11.
[ii] See 11.1 &11.2.
[iii] See 6.2 above.
[iv] See 11.5.

in their respect cannot be the soul itself while it is in potentia, nor can it be anything material that may be supposed. Hence that which produces intelligible forms in the soul is a immaterial substance free from potentiality, and that is the Intellect.

Also that which gives actuality to the material species, by creating matter and form and preserving matter through form, is a immaterial Intellect.

There are many other proofs for existence of the soul and the intellect, and later on we will refer to some of them.

Conclusion

Of the properties of substance is that there is no contrariety (*taḍādd*) in it, for the condition for contrariety is the existence of a locus (*mawḍū'*) that alternates between two contraries, and substance has no locus.

6.9. QUANTITY, ITS KINDS AND PROPERTIES

Quantity is an accident that is essentially susceptible to division in the imagination.[i] The metaphysicians divide it in a first classification into continuous and discrete.

A continuous quantity is that which can be supposed to have parts with a common boundary. The common boundary is that which if considered the extremity of one of the two parts can be considered to be the extremity of the other part as well, such as a point between two parts of a line, a line between two parts of a plane, a plane between two parts of a three-dimensional geometrical form, and an instant between two parts of time.

A discrete quantity is the contrary of a continuous quantity, and is represented by integers, such as 5, which if divided into 3 and 2 does not have a common boundary. Otherwise, if the common boundary be a unit from among them, the rest would be four, while if it be a unit from outside, the whole would be 6. But both cases would contradict our original supposition.

The discrete quantity is a number obtained through the repetition of 'one,' although 'one' itself is not a number because the

[i] As to external division, it exhausts quantity.

definition of quantity (as something essentially susceptible to imaginary division) does not apply to it. The metaphysicians have counted every one of the numbers as a separate species due to their different characteristics.

The continuous quantity is divided into 'static' (*qārr*) and 'non-static' (*ghayr qārr*). A static quantity is one all of whose supposed parts coexist, e.g. a line. A 'non-static' quantity is its contrary and is represented by time, for each of its supposed parts comes into being when its preceding part has elapsed and its subsequent part has not yet come into being.

The static continua are of three kinds: three-dimensional geometrical form overlapping a natural body divisible in the three dimensions; plane, which is the extremity of a three-dimensional geometrical body divided in two directions; line, which is the extremity of a plane divided in one direction.

Those who believe in the existence of vacuum, in the sense of a space devoid of any existent that may occupy it, question the existence of static continuous quantities. But it is difficult to establish the existence of vacuum in this sense.

Quantity has certain properties.

(i) There is no contrariety (*taḍādd*) between any of its kinds, for they do not pertain to the same object (*mauḍū'*), and a condition of contrariety is that there should be a common object.

(ii) It accepts actual imaginary division, as mentioned earlier.

(iii) It has a unit of measurement, i.e. something that exhausts it on repetition. The source of a discrete quantity is the 'unit,' which measures all kinds of it, though some of them measure some others, e.g. 'two' is a measure for 'four' and 'three' for 'nine.' As for a continuous quantity, it is divisible into parts and a part of it serves as the measuring unit for the whole.

(iv) Equality and non-equality are characteristics of quantity, which also apply to anything marked by quantity.

(v) The same is true of finiteness and infiniteness.

6.10. QUALITY

Quality (*kayfiyyah*) is an accident essentially unsusceptible to division or relation. The metaphysicians divide it in a primary

classification into four kinds.

(i) The psychic qualities (*al-kayfiyyāt al-nafsāniyyah*), e.g. knowledge, will, cowardice, courage, hope and despair.

(ii) The qualities associated with quantities (*al-kayfiyyāt al-mukhtaṣṣah bil-kammiyyāt*), e.g. straightness, curvature, figure (shape) and whatever is associated with continuous quantities, as well as qualities associated with numbers and discrete quantities, such as evenness and oddness.

(iii) The 'qualities of potency' (*al-kayfiyyāt al-isti'dādiyyah*), also referred to as 'potency' (*quwwah*) and impotency (*lā quwwah*), such as the receptivity associated with plasticity and the absence of it associated with rigidity. In fact one may include among these absolutely all the potencies that are sustained by matter. The relation of this potency to the substantial potentiality represented by prime matter is similar to the relation between a three-dimensional geometrical body, as the actuality of extension in three dimensions, to a physical mass possessing the potential for it.[i]

(iv) The sensible qualities (*al-kayfiyyāt al-maḥsūsah*), which are perceived through the five senses. If transitory—as in the case of a blush arising from bashfulness, or a paleness resulting from fear—they are called 'affections' (*infi'ālāt*). But if they are stable, such as the yellowness of gold and the sweetness of honey, they are called 'dispositions' (*infi'āliyyāt*).

Nowadays natural scientists have cast doubts on the belief held earlier that the sensible qualities exist externally in the manner they appear to exist to the senses. The related details can be found in their books.

6.11. THE RELATIVE CATEGORIES

These are: 'place,' 'time,' 'position,' 'possession,' 'relation,' 'action,' and 'affection.'

'Place' is a mode that arises from a thing's relation to place.

'Time' is a mode that arises from a thing's relation to time and its being in it, both when it is in a duration of time, as is the

[i] See also to 10.1 & 10.13.

case with all motions, and when it is instantaneous, as in the case of such instantaneous events as reaching, separating, touching and the like. Further, it includes both its being by way of correspondence, as in the case of 'traversing motion' (*al-ḥarakat al-qaṭ'iyyah*) and otherwise, as in the case of 'mediating motion' (*al-ḥarakat al-tawassuṭiyyah*).[i]

'Position' is a mode of being which arises from the relation of a thing's parts to each other and the relation of the aggregate to its external surroundings, e.g. 'standing' which is a mode that arises for a man due to the particular relation it brings about between his bodily members themselves and between them and the external surroundings, due to his head being above and his feet being below.

'Possession' (*jidah*, also called *mulk*) is a mode that arises due to a thing's being surrounded by something else, so that the thing that surrounds it moves along with it, whether the envelopment is complete, as in the case of a woman wearing chādor, or incomplete, as with someone wearing a shirt or shoe.

'Categorical relation' (*iḍāfah*) is a mode of being that arises from the reciprocity of relation (*nisbah*) between two things, for a mere relation is not necessarily categorical. It means that the referent is related to the relatum, which in turn is related to the referent; e.g. a father's relation to his son.

Relations are either symmetrical (e.g. the relation between two brothers) or asymmetrical (e.g. the relation between a father and son, and the relation between something higher and something lower).

A property of the categorical relation is that there is a parity between the referent and the relatum (together referred to as *muḍāfayn*) in terms of existence and non-existence, actuality and potentiality, and they do not differ in respect of existence and non-existence, actuality and potentiality.

It should be known that the term *muḍāf* is also applied to the relation itself, e.g. that of fatherhood and sonhood, whereat it is called *al-muḍāf al-ḥaqīqī*. The term is applied as well to the referent and relatum—father and son, in the example—whereat

[i] For an explanation of these two kinds of motion see 10.4.

it is called *al-muḍāf al-mashhūrī*.

‘Action’ is a mode that arises in something affecting something else as long as it continues to affect the latter, like the act of heating by a heater, as long as it continues to heat.

‘Affection’ is a mode that arises from being affected, as long as the thing affected continuous to be affected, such as the being heated of something as long as it continues to be heated. The ‘gradualness’ (*tadrīj*, i.e. a process extended in time) which is subsumed in the definitions of ‘action’ and ‘affection’ is for the sake of excluding ‘creative action’ and ‘creative affection,’ such as the action of the exalted Necessary Being in bringing into existence the immaterial Intellect from non-existence, and the ‘affection’ of the Intellect in emerging from non-existence into existence solely by virtue of its essential contingency.

CHAPTER SEVEN
The Cause and the Effect

7.1. CAUSALITY INHERES IN EXISTENCE

IT was mentioned earlier that quiddity is contingent in its essence, i.e. indifferent to existence and non-existence,[i] and that it needs something else in order to incline it towards one of these two sides. It was noted earlier that there is a kind of figurative usage involved in speaking of quiddity as needing something other than itself in its non-existence,[ii] for need resides in existence. Hence it is the existence of quiddity that depends on something other than itself.

That dependence also inevitably relates to the existence of the other thing, for a non-existent as such has no entity (*shay'iyyah*, thingness). The existent on which the existence of quiddity depends is called the 'cause' (*'illah*), and the quiddity whose existence depends on it is called the 'effect' (*ma'lūl*, lit. caused).

Furthermore, that which the cause brings about and the result it leaves on the effect is either (i) the existence of the effect, or (ii) its quiddity, or (iii) its quiddity's becoming existent. But it is impossible that what is caused be the quiddity, for, as mentioned earlier,[iii] it is derivative (*i'tibārī*), whereas what is caused by the cause is something fundamental, because that in which the need of the effect-quiddity resides and which is related to the cause is the existence of the quiddity, not it essence (*dhāt*).[iv]

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[i] See 4.7.

[ii] See 1.10.

[iii] See 1.4.

[iv] That is because quiddity in itself is what it is without being related to anything beyond itself.

Also it is impossible that what is caused by the cause be the quiddity's *becoming* (*ṣayrūrah*) existent, for becoming is a relative concept that depends on its two sides and it is impossible that something fundamental with an external reality should depend on two sides that are derivative (*i'tibārī*) and non-fundamental (*ghayr aṣīl*). Hence what the cause brings about in respect to the effect and the outcome produced by the cause in it is the existence of the effect, neither its quiddity nor its quiddity's becoming existent.

7.2. Kinds of Causes

Causes are classified into complete and incomplete. If a cause includes all the prerequisites on which the existence of the effect depends, so that the effect cannot fail to exist when it is there, it is a complete cause. If a cause includes only some of those prerequisites it is an incomplete cause. The two differ in the respect that the existence of a complete cause necessitates the existence of the effect, and its non-existence the non-existence of the effect. But the existence of an incomplete cause does not necessitate the effect's existence, though its non-existence does necessitate the effect's non-existence.

Similarly, causes are classified into 'single' (*wāḥid*) and 'multiple' (*kathīr*) and into 'simple' (*basīṭ*) and 'composite' (*murakkab*). A simple cause is one that has no parts, and a composite cause is its contrary. A simple cause is either simple in respect of external reality such as the Immaterial Intellect and the accidents, or it is simple from the viewpoint of the intellect, i.e. neither composed of matter and form in external reality nor of genus and differentia in the intellect. The simplest of entities is that which is not composed of existence and quiddity, and that is the Necessary Being, exalted is His Name.

Causes are also classified into 'proximate' and 'remote.' A proximate cause is one in which there is no intermediary term between it and its effect. A remote cause, such as the cause of a cause, is its contrary.

Causes are also classified into 'internal' and 'external.' The internal causes (*al-'ilal al-dākhiliyyah*, also called *'ilal al-*

qiwām, i.e., the constituting causes) are matter and form, whereby the effect is constituted and sustained. The external causes (*al-ʿilal al-khārijiyyah*, also called *ʿilal al-wujūd*, the causes of existence) are the 'agent' (*al-fāʿil*, i.e. efficient cause) and the 'end' (*al-ghāyah*, i.e. the final cause). The agent is sometimes called '*mā bihi al-wujūd*' (that on which the effect's existence depends) and the end is called '*mā li ajalihi al-wujūd*' (the raison d'être).

Cause are also classified into 'real' (*al-ʿilal al-ḥaqīqiyyah*) and 'preparatory' causes (*al-muʿiddāt*). There is a kind of figurative usage involved in naming the preparatory factors as 'causes,' for they are not real causes. They are only facilitating factors (*muqarribāt*) that bring matter closer to efficient action by the agent, such as the entry of a moving thing into a certain stage of its track which brings it closer to its entry in the succeeding stage, or the passage of intervals of time which brings an expected event closer to the actuality of its existence.

7.3. Mutual Necessity between Cause and Effect

When the complete cause exists, the existence of its effect becomes necessary; otherwise its non-existence would be admissible despite the existence of the cause, which implies that the non-existence of the effect, which is caused by the non-existence of the cause, actualizes without a cause.

Also, when the effect exists, the existence of its cause becomes necessary; otherwise its non-existence would be admissible despite the effect's existence. As mentioned above, the non-existence of the cause, whether complete or incomplete, necessitates the non-existence of the effect.

From this it becomes clear that the existence of the effect is inseparable from that of its cause, in the same way as the complete cause is inseparable from its effect.

Hence if the effect is temporal and exists in time, its cause should also necessarily exist in the same time, for the existence of the effect depends on the cause's being in that time; for it is in that (particular) time that the cause bestows existence upon it. If the cause were to exist in some other period of time, being

non-existent during the period of existence of the effect, which receives its existence from the existence of the cause, it would be giving existence to the effect while it is itself non-existence, and this is impossible.[i]

Another Proof

The need of the effect-quiddity for the cause is nothing except the need of its existence for the cause, and that need is not separate from its existence. Rather, the need resides within the very essence of its existence, and hence its existence is need and relation per se. Hence the effect is a 'relative existence' (*wujūd rābiṭ*) in relation to its cause. It does not possess any independence of its own and in isolation from the cause, which sustains it. Something that is such cannot exist without being sustained by its cause and without depending on it. Hence when the effect exists, it is necessary for its cause also to exist.[17]

7.4. THE RULE OF THE ONE

Nothing except 'one' can emanate from 'one.' That is because it is necessary that there be an essential affinity (*sinkhiyyah*) between the cause and the effect, which none of them shares with something else. Otherwise any thing could be the cause of any thing, and any thing could be the effect of any thing. Hence there is an aspect of affinity between the cause and its effect that particularly marks the latter's emanation (*ṣudūr*) from the former. Hence, if multiple effects, as multiple and disparate entities whose multiplicity is irreducible to any single aspect whatsoever, were to emanate from a cause which is 'one,' which in itself has only a single ontological aspect, it would imply that something which has a single aspect should incorporate multiple aspects within itself, and this is impossible.

From this it follows that a cause from which multiple effects *qua* multiple entities emanate, possesses an aspect of multiplic-

[i] The difference between this issue and the other issue that 'a thing does not come into existence unless it becomes necessary' is that by 'necessity' here is meant 'necessity-in-relation-to-something-else' whereas in the other issue it means 'necessity-by-something-else.'

ity in its essence. It also follows from the above that multiple causes do not give rise to an effect that is 'one.'

7.5. Impossibility of an Infinite Regress and Vicious Circle in Causality

A vicious circle (*dawr*)—which means a thing's dependence for its existence on something whose existence depends on it—may be either with or without an intermediary. If there is no intermediary, it is called an 'overt circle' (*al-dawr al-muṣarraḥ*), and if there are one or more intermediaries it is called a 'covert circle' (*al-dawr al-muḍmir*). It is considered logically impossible because it necessarily implies the dependence of a thing's existence on itself, which implies a thing's preceding itself existentially, for the existence of the cause necessarily precedes the existence of the effect.

As to the impossibility of an infinite regress—which means an endless series of causes dependent on one another—the most conclusive of arguments concerning it is the one offered by Ibn Sīnā in his work *al-Shifā',* in the part on metaphysics. The gist of this argument is that when we consider an effect, its cause, and the cause of its cause, we find that there is a necessary rule that applies specifically to each term of this set. The supposed effect is solely an effect; its cause is the cause of its subsequent term and the effect of its preceding term. The cause of the cause is solely a cause and not an effect of anything. Hence that which is solely an effect stands on one side and that which is solely a cause stands on the other side. That which is both a cause and an effect lies between the two sides. Now when we assume a set of four consecutive terms, the rule applicable to the two sides in the above case will apply to the two sides in this case also. The rule applicable to the middle terms will apply to both the middle terms in this case. That is, as intermediary terms, they will be both causes and effects. When the number of terms in the supposed set is increased indefinitely, the same rule will continue to apply; the group between the two extreme sides, which consists of terms each of which is both a cause and an effect, will make up the middle and share in the

rule applicable to middle terms.

But when we assume a series of infinite number of causes, the entire group of an infinite number of causes will make up a middle that has no side except the last effect and this is impossible.

This argument applies to every series of consecutive causes whose existence is not separable from the existence of the effect, irrespective of whether they are complete or incomplete causes (though it does not apply to preparatory causes).

The necessity of the finiteness of the series of complete causes is particularly borne out by the remark made earlier[i] that the existence of an effect is relative in relation to its cause. If an infinite causal series were not to end in a cause that is not an effect, it would mean that relative existents can actualize without needing a self-subsisting and independent existent that might sustain them, and this is impossible.

The metaphysicians have offered other proofs in favour of the impossibility of an infinite regress that are mentioned in elaborate works.

7.6. THE EFFICIENT CAUSE AND ITS KINDS

The efficient cause, i.e. one that gives existence to the effect, has various kinds. According to the metaphysicians, the 'agent' has either knowledge of its action or it does not. In the latter case, the agent is either such that its action accords with its 'nature' or it does not. In the first case, it is called an 'agent by nature,' and in the second an 'agent by constraint.' An agent that has knowledge of its action is either such that its action is willed by it, or it is not.

If it is not, it is an 'agent by coercion.' If its action is willed by it, either (i) its knowledge of its action coincides with its action or, rather, is the same as its action, in which case it is an 'agent by agreement;' or (ii) its knowledge of its action precedes its action. In the latter case, its knowledge is either linked to an additional 'motive,' in which case it is an 'agent by inten-

[i] See 7.3 above.

tion,' or it is not linked to such an additional 'motive,' i.e. the very active knowledge of the action[i] is the source of emanation of the effect. In this case, either that knowledge is something additional to the essence (*dhāt*) of the agent, or it is not. If it is, then the agent is an 'agent by foreknowledge;' if not, it is an 'agent by manifestation.' In the foregoing, if the agent is associated with its action in such a manner that itself and its action are actions of another agent, it is an 'agent by subjection.'

Thus there are eight kinds of agents.

(i) The 'agent by nature' (*al-fā'il bi al-ṭab'*) is one which has no knowledge of its action though it accords with its nature. An example of it is the soul on the plane of its natural bodily faculties: it performs its actions in accordance with its nature.

(ii) The 'agent by constraint' (*al-fā'il bi al-qasr*) is one which has no knowledge of its action and its action does not accord with its nature. An example of it is the soul on the plane of its faculties at the time of illness, during which its actions are disoriented from their healthy course due to constraining factors.

(iii) The 'agent by coercion' (*al-fā'il bi al-jabr*) is one which has knowledge of its action but carries it out unwillingly. An example of it is a person who is forced to do something he does not want to do.

(iv) The 'agent by agreement' (*al-fā'il bi al-riḍā*) is one which has will, and its detailed knowledge of its action is the same as its action. Before the action it does not possess any except a non-detailed knowledge of it, a knowledge that the agent possesses by virtue of its own essence. Divine creativity is of this kind in the view of the Emanationists.

(v) The 'agent by intention' (*al-fā'il bi al-qaṣd*) is one which has will and foreknowledge of its action along with an additional motive for acting. An example of it is man in his voluntary actions.

(vi) The 'agent by foreknowledge' (*al-fā'il bi al-'ināyah*) has will and a foreknowledge of its action additional to the agent's essence. The very intelligible form (*al-ṣūrat al-'ilmiyyah*) is the source of emergence of the action without there being any addi-

[i] See 12.5.

tional motive. An example of it is a man standing on a high tower, the very idea of falling being sufficient to make him fall to the ground. Divine creation is of this kind in the opinion of the Peripatetics.

(vii) The 'agent by manifestation' (*al-fā'il bi al-tajallī*) has detailed foreknowledge of its action, a foreknowledge that is the same as the 'simple' knowledge that it possesses of its essence. An example of it is the immaterial human soul, which, being the ultimate form for its species, despite its simplicity, is the source of all its perfections and properties that it possesses in its essence. Its immediate knowledge (*'ilm ḥuḍūrī*) of itself is a detailed knowledge of its perfections, though they are not distinguished from one another. Another example is the exalted Necessary Being in accordance with that which will be mentioned later on,[i] that the Necessary Being possesses an undifferentiated knowledge that at the same time discloses details (*'ilman ijmāliyyan fī 'ayn al-kashf al-tafṣīlī*).

(viii) The 'agent by subjection' (*al-fā'il bi al-taskhīr*) is one whose action is ascribed to it from the point of view that the agent itself is an act of another agent, on which the agent itself and its action depend. Therefore such an agent is subject in its action to the higher agent. Examples of it are the physical, vegetative and animal faculties subject to the human soul in their actions, and the cosmic agents subject in their actions to the Necessary Being.

However, we have reservations in regarding 'agent by coercion' and 'agent by foreknowledge' as being different in kind from 'agent by intention,' as implied by the above division.

7.7. THE FINAL CAUSE

It is its ultimate perfection (*kamāl*) towards which the agent is oriented in its action. If the agent's knowledge has a role in its efficiency, the end is the agent's purpose in his action. Alternately, one may say that his purpose is the action for the sake of reaching the end. Hence it is said that end precedes action

[i] See 12.5.

conceptually but follows it externally. But if knowledge has no role in the agent's efficiency, the end is that in which the action ultimately terminates. To explain, a thing's perfection has a permanent relationship with it, and it requires that perfection. Restraining it from attaining that requirement of its nature either always (i.e., through a permanent restraint) or through most of its lifespan (i.e. through a major restraint) contradicts Divine Providence, which makes every contingent attain the perfection that it seeks. Hence every thing has an end that is the ultimate perfection it requires. As to a minor restraint (which restrains a thing from attaining perfection during a minor part of its life), it is a minor evil that is compensated by an abundance of good. Moreover, this restraint, in cases where it is present, occurs only in the realm of matter due to disparate conflicting factors.

7.8. The Universality of the Final Cause

At times it is imagined that physical agents have no end in their actions. It is presumed that an end necessarily involves conscious purpose on the agent's part. However, as we have seen, the idea of end is more general than that, and the end of physical agents in their actions is that in which their motions terminate.

Sometimes it is imagined that many voluntary actions have no end, such as children in play, wherein their movements have no final goal. Other instances of it are such acts as stroking one's beard, breathing, the listless movements of a sick person in sleep turning from one side to another, the interruption of an object's movement in the middle of its journey towards its destination.

Actually none of these agents are devoid of an end. To explain, there are three causal sources involved in voluntary actions. The proximate source of action is the motor faculty present in the muscles. Then there is the intermediate source, which precedes the first one. It is desire, followed by will and execution. The remote causal source is ideation, which entails the formation of the particular idea of the action in the mind,

which is also often accompanied by a judgement that the action entails some benefit for the agent.

Every one of these sources possesses an end. Often there is a coincidence of ends in one or more of these sources, and at times there is no such coincidence.

Hence if the first stage involves ideation, which is knowledge, the voluntary action will have a ideated end. But if it involves only imagination, without there being any forethought, and is followed by desire and motor action of the muscles, the action is called a 'capricious act.' This happens in the case of play, where a child first fancies some activity, then its desire is aroused to perform it, whereat it proceeds to carry it out. That in which the movements terminate is then the end of all the three causal sources.

At times, imagination is accompanied with disposition and habit, as in the case of stroking one's beard. Then the act resulting is called 'habitual' (*'ādah*). At times, imagination is accompanied with nature (*ṭabī'ah*), as in the case of voluntary breathing. At other times, imagination is accompanied by a disturbed condition of health, as in the case of the actions of a sick person, in which case it is called 'action by natural intention.' In each of these actions there are causal sources with ends, and they all correspond to that in which the action terminates. As to a ideated end, these actions do not have an ideational causal source that may have such an end.

When the end is not realized for any of these causal sources due to the interruption of the action by some hindrance that stops it short of its end, the action is named 'vain' (*bāṭil*) in relation to the end. The interruption of action due to a hindrance that keeps it from reaching its end is something other than the agent not possessing an end in its action.

7.9. REFUTATION OF CHANCE

At times it is conjectured that there are some ends that are unwittingly achieved by an agent's action without being aimed at by it. This is illustrated by the example of a man who digs a well for water but comes upon a treasure trove. Finding a treas-

ure is not consequential to one's digging a well. These kinds of occurrences are called cases of 'good luck.' Another example is the case of a man who takes shelter under a roof for the sake of its shade and is killed due to the roof collapsing upon him. Such occurrences are called incidents of 'bad luck.'

Some natural philosophers have based their view of the universe on this conjecture, holding that the world of physical bodies was composed of small atomic particles scattered in an infinite space in which they were in constant motion. By chance a group of them collided and collocated to form the bodies, of which those that are capable of enduring endure while others are subject to rapid or gradual annihilation.

The truth is that there is no chance in the world of existence. Here it will be beneficial to give a brief introduction for the sake of explanation. We can conceive phenomena as falling into four classes. A group of them occurs invariably. Another group of them consists of those that occur most of the time. Some are those that occur half of the time (like someone's standing or sitting), while there are others that occur only rarely (like the possession of a sixth finger in one's hand).

Those which occur most of the time differ from those which occur always due to the occasional existence of a conflicting factor, as in the case of the number of fingers in the hand, which are most of the time five. However, occasionally, the fashioning principle of the fingers (in the fetus) comes upon a surplus matter possessing the capacity to assume the form of a finger and it shapes that into a finger. From this it is known that the fingers' being five is conditional upon the non-existence of surplus matter, and this phenomenon with this condition occurs invariably, not most of the time. That which occurs rarely will also occur invariably and always on condition of presence of the conflicting factor. Hence if the phenomena that occur mostly or rarely in fact occur invariably on the presence of the requisite conditions, the case of the phenomena that occur half of the time is quite obvious. Hence all phenomena involve causal invariability and follow a fixed system that neither changes nor is violated.

Such being the case, if we suppose a certain perfection to be

unalterably and inexorably consequential to the action of an agent, the natural and self-evident judgement of the intellect is that there exists an existential relationship implying a kind of existential union between the agent and that perfection. That perfection is what the agent aims at by its action, and this is what 'the end' means.

If we may entertain a doubt concerning the existence of relationship between ends of actions and their agents despite what has been said concerning the invariability of this relationship, we may as well doubt concerning the relationship of actions to their agents and the dependence of events and phenomena upon efficient causes, for here too there is nothing except an invariable association and a mutual existential necessity between the agent and its action. It is for this reason that many of those who believe in chance have denied the existence of the efficient cause in the same way as they have rejected the final cause, confining causality exclusively to material causes, as will be pointed out in the next section.

From the above discussion it becomes clear that the rare outcomes that are reckoned as instances of chance are invariable and essential ends of their causes, which are only accidentally ascribed to something else. Hence one who digs the ground under which a treasure lies invariably finds the treasure, and that is an essential end of his action, though it is accidentally ascribed to one digging for water. Similarly, a roof that possesses all the prerequisites for collapsing collapses invariably over someone under it, and that is the essential end of his action, though it is accidentally reckoned as the end of one seeking shelter from the sun. On the basis of this, the belief in chance arises from ignorance of causes.

7.10. Formal and Material Cause

The formal cause (*al-ʿillat al-ṣūriyyah*) is the 'form,' which makes a thing what it is in actuality. It is a 'cause' in relation to the species, which is a composite of form and matter, for the existence of species necessarily depends upon it. However, in relation to 'matter' it is 'form' and a participant in the efficient

cause, as mentioned earlier.[i] There are other meanings of the term 'form' with which we are not concerned here.

The material cause (*al-'illat al-māddiyyah*) is 'matter' in relation to the species, which is a composite of it and 'form,' for the existence of species necessarily depends upon it. However, in relation to the 'form' it is 'matter,' which receives it and is its effect, as mentioned earlier.[ii]

A group of natural philosophers have confined causation to matter, but the above-mentioned principles refute such a view. That is because matter, whether 'prime' or 'secondary' (e.g. sperm or seed), is the bearer of potentiality, which necessarily entails 'privation' (*fuqdān*), and it is self-evident that it is not sufficient to give actuality to the species and bring it into existence. (Thus if the role of the efficient, final and formal causes is denied), the only alternative that remains is to admit that actuality comes into being without a cause, which is impossible.

Moreover, as mentioned earlier, a thing does not come into existence until it is necessitated, and there remains no ground for deriving such a necessity except matter, whose mode of being is receptivity and potentiality. Therefore, there must be something beyond matter that necessitates the thing and brings it into existence. And if the nexus of necessity between the cause and the effect or between two effects of a third cause be eliminated from things, every thing would be the cause of every thing else, the law of causality would be invalid and one could not take recourse in any fixed law. Such a position is contrary to what is regarded as self-evident by the intellect. There are other meanings of the term 'matter' with which we are not concerned here.

7.11. THE BODILY CAUSE

The bodily causes have a limited efficiency from the viewpoint of number, duration, and existential intensity (of the effects they can produce). The metaphysicians hold that bodily species

[i] See 6.7.
[ii] See 6.7.

are in substantial motion (*al-ḥarakat al-jawhariyyah*); hence their specific forms and faculties are divisible and analyzable into limits and stages, each of which is bracketed by two non-beings. They are finite in themselves as well as in their external effects.

Also, bodily causes do not act without there being a special configuratation between them and the matter of the thing affected. The metaphysicians state that since the bodily cause needs matter for its existence, it also needs matter for bringing something else into existence. Its need for matter in bringing into existence lies in its attaining through matter a special position in relation to the thing affected. Hence proximity and remoteness and special configurations interfere in the effectiveness of bodily causes.

CHAPTER EIGHT
The Division of Existence into One and Many

8.1. THE MEANING OF 'ONE' AND 'MANY'

THE truth is that the concepts of unity (*waḥdah*) and multiplicity (*kathrah*)—like the concepts of existence, contingency and the like—are general concepts, which are impressed on the mind with a primary impression (i.e. without the mediation of any intermediary concepts). Hence such definitions of them as have been suggested—such as, ''The one is that which is indivisible, from the aspect of its indivisibility,'' and ''The many is that which is divisible, from the aspect of its divisibility''—are verbal definitions. For it they were taken to be true definitions, they would not be free from defect due to the dependence of the concept of 'one' on that of 'what is divisible,' which is the same as 'many,' and the dependence of the concept of 'many' on that of 'divisible,' which is identical with it. In a word, unity is the mode of indivisibility and multiplicity that of divisibility.

Note

Unity coincides with existence from the viewpoint of extension (*miṣdāq*), but differs from it in respect of intension (*maſhūm*). Hence every existent *qua* existent is one, in the same way as every 'one' *qua* 'one' is existent.

An objection may be raised here which may be stated as follows: The division of unconditioned (*muṭlaq*) existence into 'one' and 'many' implies that what is 'many' should as well be existent like the 'one,' for it is a division of existence. It also implies that 'many' is other than 'one,' being different from it; for the two are divisions, and divisions necessarily exclude one another. It follows that some existents that are 'many' in re-

spect of their multiplicity are not 'one.' This contradicts the statement that ''every existent is one.''

The answer to this objection is that 'one' here possesses two different considerations (*i'tibār*). In one consideration it is considered in itself, without comparing it with 'many,' and this includes that which is 'many.' Therefore, 'many' *qua* existent is 'one,' and it has one existence. That is why it yields to enumeration, as when we say, for instance, one dozen, two dozens, and so on, or one set, two sets, three sets, and so on. There is another consideration for 'one' wherein it is opposed to 'many' and contrary to it.

To explain, at one time we consider existence in itself and as being opposed to absolute non-existence. In this consideration it becomes identical with 'externality' and the mode of possession of external properties (*āthār*). At another time we consider it in a manner wherein we either find it as possessing its external properties or as lacking these properties (though in the latter case, too, it possesses certain other properties). Accordingly, we consider this latter kind of existence when compared to external as 'mental,' which does not possess the external properties, and the existence to which it is compared as 'external existence,' which possesses the external properties. Yet this does not contradict the statement that 'existence coincides with reality and externality,' which is identical with the possession of properties.

In the same way, at times we take the concept of 'one' in a non-conditional and non-comparative sense, wherein we find it as coinciding with 'existence' extensionally. Hence everything that is existent is 'one' in respect of its existence. At other times, we view being as being marked with unity in a certain state and without being marked with it in another state (for instance, a numerically single man, and a number of men who make up a multitude when compared to one man, and make up a multitude in opposition to one, which is a unit of the multitude). This does not contradict the previous statement that 'one' coincides with non-conditioned existence, and 'one' here has a general and absolute meaning that is non-comparative.

8.2. THE KINDS OF 'ONE'[18]

'One' is either: (i) 'literal' *(ḥaqīqī*), or: (ii) 'figurative' (*ghayr ḥaqīqī*). The 'literal one' is something which is itself qualified with unity, without needing the mediation of an intermediary in such qualification, e.g. an individual human being. The 'figurative one' is the contrary of it, e.g. man and horse when reckoned as 'one' by virtue of their being animals.

The 'literal one' is either: (ia) such that its essence (*dhāt*) is qualified with unity, or: (ib) its essence is unity itself. The first kind of 'literal one' (ia) is called 'non-true one' (*al-wāḥid ghayr al-ḥaqq*), e.g. one man. The second (ib) is called 'true unity' (*al-waḥdat al-ḥaqqah*), such as the unity of anything taken in its absoluteness, whereat unity becomes identical with its essence. Therefore, one and unity are one thing in it.

The one with a non-true unity is either: (ia1) a 'particularized one,' or: (ia2) a 'generalized one.' The first is what is numerically one, and it is that which forms a number through repetition. Instances of the second are one species and one genus.

The 'particularized one' is either: (ia1a) such that it is indivisible from the aspect of the nature qualified with unity, apart from being indivisible from the aspect of its unity, or: (ia1b) it is divisible. Of the first is: (ia1a1) the concept of unity and indivisibility itself or (ia1a2) something else. That something else either (ia1a2a) has a spatial location, e.g. a (geometric) point, or (ia1a2b) it does not e.g. something, which is immaterial. That which is immaterial is either: (ia1a2b1) attached in some manner to matter, e.g. the soul, or (ia1a2b2) it is not, e.g. the Intellect.

The second (i.e., ia1b), which accepts division from the aspect of its nature (qualified with unity), either (ia1b1) yields to division by itself, e.g. a unit quantity, or (ia1b2) yields to it accidentally, e.g. a natural body from the aspect of its quantity.

The 'generalized one' (ia2) is either: (ia2a) a generalized one in terms of concept, or is: (ia2b) generalized in terms of exis-

tential expanse. The first is either: (ia2a1) specific (such as the unity of 'man'), or (ia2a2) generic (such as the unity of 'animal'), or (ia2a3) accidental (such as the unity of 'walker' and 'laugher').

The 'generalized one in the sense of existential expanse' is the all-pervading existence.

As to that which is one figuratively—i.e. that which is qualified by unity accidentally through something else—it has a kind of union with that which is literally one, e.g. Zayd and 'Amr, who are one in respect of belonging to the species 'man,' or man and horse, which are one in respect of belonging to the genus 'animal.' The terms for the figurative one differ in accordance with the aspect of the accidental unity. Thus unity in the sense of belonging to a certain species is called 'homospecific' (*tamāthul*), in the sense of belonging to a genus 'homogeny' (*tajānus*), with respect to quality 'similarity' (*tashābuh*), with respect to quantity 'equality' (*tasāwī*), with respect to position 'homology' (*tawāzī*), and with respect to relation 'symmetry of relation' (*tanāsub*). It is evident that every one of these divisions exists. This is how the philosophers have described this classification.

8.3. Predication

Identity (*al-huwa huwiyyah*, lit. it-is-itness) is one of the characteristics of unity, in the same way as otherness (*ghayriyyah*) is among the characteristics of multiplicity.

Further, identity signifies unity in a certain aspect by the side of difference in some other aspect. This is what predication is, and it implies that predication is correct between any two different things that have some kind of unity between them. Common usage has however restricted predication to two cases wherein unity is subsequent to difference.

One of them is when the subject and the predicate are one in respect of intension and quiddity, but differ in respect of some consideration, such as the difference of brevity and elaborateness in such statements as 'man is a rational animal.' Here the defining term and the term defined are identical in meaning,

but differ only in respect of brevity and elaborateness. Another example is the difference involved in such statements as 'man is man,' wherein any doubt concerning the violability of the law of identity is dispelled. This kind of predication is called 'primary essential predi

cation' (*al-ḥaml al-dhātī al-awwalī*).[i]

The second kind of predication occurs in statements where two terms differ in meaning but are united in respect to existence, e.g. the statement 'Man is risible' or 'Zayd is standing.' This kind of predication is called 'common technical predication.'[ii]

8.4. KINDS OF COMMON PREDICATION

Common predication is classified into 'non-derivative' (*ḥaml hū hū*, also called *ḥaml al-muwāṭāt*) and 'derivative' (*ḥaml dhī hū*). In non-derivative predication, the predicate is predicated to the subject without the use of any additional expression (such as a proposition), e.g. 'Man is risible.' In derivative predication the agreement of the predicate with the subject depends on the use of an additional element or a derivative.[19]

Predication is also classified into 'actualized' (*battī*; lit. definite) and 'non-actualized' (*ghayr battī,* lit. non-definite). In an actualized predication, the subject refers to actual individual instances to which the term representing the subject applies, e.g. 'Men are risible' and 'Horses are quadrupeds.' In non-actualized predication individuals subsumed in the subject are non-actualized, as in such statements as 'All absolute non-existents are predicateless' and 'The co-presence of two contradictories is impossible.'

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[i] It is called 'essential' (*dhātī*) because the predicate in it represents the essence (i.e. quiddity) of the subject. It is called 'primary' (*awwalī*) because it is a primarily self-evident proposition, whose verification does not rest on anything beyond the mere conception of the subject and the predicate.

[ii] It is called 'common' (*shā'i'*) because it is prevalent in common usage, and 'technical' because it is common in sciences and crafts.

Predication is also classified into 'simple' (*basīṭ*) and composite (*murakkab*). In simple predication, the predicate signifies the existence of the subject, e.g. 'Man is existent.' In composite predication, the predicate denotes one of the properties of the subject, e.g. 'Man is risible.'

On the basis of the above discussion we can refute an objection which is raised on the basis of the Rule of Subordination (which states that the affirmation of a quality for something is subordinate to the subsistence of the thing of which the quality is posited) may be refuted. The objection states that the statement 'Man is existent,' for instance, is a corollary to the prior subsistence of man, which implies that 'man' has existence prior to the affirmation of his existence in accordance with the Rule of Subordination, and this involves an indefinite regress.

The refutation of this objection is that the said rule applies to cases where one thing is affirmed of another, whereas the import of a simple predication is the affirmation of a thing's subsistence, not affirmation of one thing in regard to another. Hence the Rule of Subordination does not apply in such a case.[i]

8.5. OTHERNESS AND OPPOSITION

We said above that otherness (*ghayriyyah*) is a characteristic of multiplicity. Otherness is classified into 'innate' (*dhāṭī*) and 'extrinsic' (*ghayr dhātī*). 'Innate otherness' is one that arises between a thing and something else by virtue of its essence—such as the otherness between existence and non-existence. It is

[i] This is the reply given to this objection by ¯adr al-Muta'allihcn—may God's mercy be upon him. Dawwcnc tried to evade the objection by replacing subordination by implication. "Affirmation of something in relation to something else," he stated, "necessitates the subsistence of that of which it is affirmed. Hence there remains no difficulty in simple propositions (*al-haliyyat al-basc§ah,* i.e. statements of the type 'A exists'), for the affirmation of a quiddity's existence implies the subsistence of the quiddity by this existence." Such a solution for the problem admits the validity of the objection against the rule. Fakhr al-Dcn Rizc tried to solve this difficulty by considering *al-haliyyat al-basc§ah* an exception to the rule. But this amounts to admitting exceptions to a rational principle.

also called 'opposition' (*taqābul*). 'Extrinsic otherness' is one that derives from a cause extrinsic to a thing, like the difference between sweetness and blackness. It is also called disparity (*khilāf*).

The metaphysicians define opposition, i.e. innate otherness, as the impossibility of co-presence of two entities in one place, in one aspect, and at one time. It is classified into four kinds, as the opposites are either (i) both 'positive' (*wujūdī*), or (ii) one of them is 'positive' and the other 'negative' (*'adamī*), there being no opposition between two negatives.

(ia) In the first case, if each of them is conceivable only in relation to the other, such as highness and lowness, the opposites are called 'correlatives' (*mutaḍā'ifān*) and the opposition is said to be that of 'correlation' (*taḍāyuf*).

(ib) If they are not such—e.g. blackness and whiteness—the opposites are called 'contraries' (*mutaḍāddān*), and the opposition is said to be one of 'contrariety' (*taḍādd*).

(iia) In the second case, if there is a locus (*mawḍū'*) that accepts each of them—e.g. blindness and eyesight in a person—the opposition is called 'the opposition of privation and possession' (*taqābul al-'adam wa al-malakah*).

(iib) If there is no such locus involved, as in the case of affirmation and negation, they are called 'contradictories' (*mutanāqiḍān*) and their opposition is said to be one of contradiction (*al-tanāquḍ*). This is how the metaphysicians have described opposition and the opposites.

One of the properties of opposition in general is that it occurs between two sides, for it is a kind of relation between the opposites, and a relation requires two sides.[i]

8.6. CORRELATION

One of the properties pertaining to correlation is that there is a parity between the correlatives in respect of existence and non-existence, potentiality and actuality. Accordingly, if one of

[i] Although by virtue of its meaning opposition as such includes correlation as well as the other kinds of opposition, extensionally it falls under the category of correlation.

them is existent the other is also necessarily existent, and if one of them is non-existent, the other is also necessarily non-existent. Furthermore, when one of them is in the state of actually, or when it is in the state of potentiality, the other is also necessarily such. It follows from this that they are concomitants and none of them precedes the other, neither in the mind nor in external reality.

8.7. Contrariety

Contrariety, in accordance with the above classification, arises between two existing entities that are not correlatives and which are intrinsically different from one another or mutually exclusive.

One of the properties pertaining to contrariety is that there is no contrariety between any of the highest genera pertaining to the ten categories, for more than one of them are present in one place (e.g. quantity, quality, etc. in bodies) and various kinds of each of these categories is found in association with the kinds of other categories. So also are some genera that fall under each of them, which occur in association with some others, e.g. colour and taste. Hence contrariety, as revealed by induction, occurs between the ultimate species falling under the proximate genus, e.g. blackness and whiteness, which fall under colour. So have the metaphysicians stated.

Another property pertaining to contrariety is that there is a locus (*mauḍū'*) where they occur alternately; for if there is no common particular locus, their simultaneous occurrence will not be impossible, such as the existence of blackness in one body and of whiteness in another body

It follows from the above that there is no contrariety between substances, for they do not need a locus for existing and that contrariety is found only in accidents. Therefore, some philosophers have substituted 'place' (*maḥall*) for 'locus' (*mawḍū'*) in order to include the 'matter' of substance. In accordance with such a notion, contrariety occurs between substantial forms (*al-ṣuwar al-jawhariyyah*) assumed by matter.

Another property pertaining to contrariety is that there should

be an extreme difference between the contraries. Hence if there were a range of existent entities (*amrān wujūdiyyān*) of which some are closer to some than others, the contraries will be at the extremities, between which there is utmost distance and difference, like blackness and whiteness, between which there are other intermediate colours, some of which are closer than others to one of the two extreme sides, such as yellow, for instance, which is closer to white than red.

The above discussion clarifies the meaning of the definition of contraries as ''two existent entities that alternately occur to a single locus (or subject) and which fall under the same proximate genus, and between which there is an extreme difference.''

8.8. THE OPPOSITION OF PRIVATION AND POSSESSION

This kind of opposition is also called '*taqābul al-'adam wa al-qunyah*.' The opposites in this case consist of a positive quality generally possessed by a certain locus by virtue of its nature, and the absence of that quality in the locus. An example of it is eyesight and blindness, the latter being privation from sight in a subject whose general nature is to possess it.

If the locus possessing the quality is taken to be individual nature, or the nature of the species or genus, whose general character it is to possess the quality regardless of a particular time, the opposites are called 'real' privation and possession. Thus the absence of sight in the scorpion is blindness and a privation due to its being an animal by genus and hence a locus capable of sight, though its species be incapable of it, as alleged. Similarly, beardlessness in a man before the age of beardedness is an instance of privation, though his age group be incapable of possessing beard before the age of puberty.

If the locus is taken to be individual nature along with a condition of time of qualification, the opposites are called 'privation and possession in accordance with common usage,' according to which the absence of sight in a blind-born person and beardlessness in a child are not reckoned to be instances of privation and possession in any manner.

8.9. CONTRADICTION

Contradiction (*tanāquḍ*) is an opposition involving affirmation and negation, in the sense that what is negated is exactly what is affirmed. Though basically it occurs in propositions, it may occur in terms when they implicitly bear the import of a proposition. Thus it is said that there is a contradiction between a thing's existence and its non-existence, or that the contradictory of anything is its 'negation' (*raf'*).[i]

A property of the contradictories—i.e. affirmation and negation—is that both of them cannot be true or false, as in a 'factual disjunctive' proposition.[20] This is one of the primary self-evident axioms on which rests the truth of every conceivable proposition, whether self-evident or inferred, for there can be no knowledge of a proposition's truth without the knowledge of the falsity of its contradictory. For instance, the truth of the statement 'Every four is even' can only be ascertained only when we know that the statement 'Every four is not even' is false. Hence the law of contradiction has been called 'the most primary of the primary principles' (*ūla al-awā'il*).

Another property of contradiction is that absolutely nothing lies outside the purview of the contradictories. Hence everything that can be conceived is either Zayd or non-Zayd, white or non-white, and so on.

As to that which was mentioned earlier in the chapter on quiddity,[ii] that 'both the contradictories are removed on the plane of essence' (*dhāt*), as when it is said 'Man *qua* man is neither existent nor non-existent,' it is not in fact a case of removal of both the contradictories in any manner. Rather, what it signifies is that both the contradictories (viz., existence and non-existence) are irrelevant on the plane of quiddity; for

[i] What is meant by a thing's 'negation' (*raf'*) is its repudiation (*ʃard*) and invalidation (*ibʃʃi:l*); thus the 'negation' of 'man' is 'non-man,' in the same way as the 'negation' of 'non-man' is 'man.' It is not true, as imagined by some, that a thing's 'negation' is its negative (*nafy*), that the contradictory (*naqeض*) of 'man' is 'non-man,' that the contradictory of 'non-man' is 'non-non-man,' and that 'man' is implied by the contradictory (non-non-man) and is not the same as the contradictory itself.

[ii] See 5.1.

'man' is neither defined as 'a rational animal that exists' nor as 'a rational animal that does not exist.'

Another of its properties is that it applies to propositions on condition of the presence of the well-known eightfold unities mentioned in the books on logic. To these Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn—may God's mercy be upon him—has added the unity of predication: that predication in both the cases (i.e. affirmation and negation) should either be of the primary or the common type, difference of predication being inadmissible. Hence there is no contradiction between the statement, 'The particular is particular,' that is, from the viewpoint of intension (*mafhūman*), and the statement 'The particular is not particular,' that is, from the viewpoint of extension (*miṣdāqan*).

8.10. The Opposition of One and Many

The philosophers have differed concerning the opposition between one and many, as to whether it is innate (*bi al-dhāt*) or not. Of those who consider it innate, some have held them to be correlatives and some as contraries, while some others have held their opposition to be of a fifth kind, different from the four kinds mentioned above.

The truth is that the difference between one and many is not an opposition of any kind in the technical sense of the word, because the difference pertaining to unconditioned existence by virtue of its division into 'one' and 'many' is a difference of gradation (*tashkīk*) in which the differentiating factor is the same as the common factor, like the division of existence into external and mental, actual and potential, whereas otherness in all the four kinds of opposition is not one that is reducible to the common factor. Hence between one and many there is no opposition from among the four kinds of opposition.

Note

The opposition between affirmation and negation is not an actual opposition in external reality, but relates to the intellect and is mentally posited. That is because opposition involves a certain relation between the opposites, and relations between

existents depend on two actual and existing sides, whereas one of the sides in contradiction is negation, which involves non-being and non-entity. However, the intellect posits the negation as a side opposed to the affirmation and judges their co-presence to be inadmissible.

As to the opposition of privation and possession, the non-being therein has some kind of entity, for it is absence of a quality possessed by the subject in the normal course. This measure of abstract existence is sufficient for the occurrence of a relation.

CHAPTER NINE
Priority and Posteriority, Qidam and Ḥudūth

9.1. THE MEANING OF PRIORITY, POSTERIORITY AND COEXISTENCE

PRIORITY (*sabq*) and posteriority (*luḥūq*) are among the characteristics of existents *qua* existents. That is because two entities often share, as existents, a relation to a source of existence that is not the same for each of them. An example of it is the relation of 'two' and 'three' to 'one;' 'two' being closer to 'one' than 'three' is called prior and antecedent, and 'three' is called posterior and subsequent. At times the common relation is the same for both the things, in which case they are called 'coexistent' and their condition is called 'coexistence' (*ma'iyyah*).

The metaphysicians have mentioned several kinds of priority and posteriority derived through induction.

(i) Temporal priority (*al-sabq al-zamānī*), in which the prior and the posterior are not contemporaneous. An example of it is the priority of some parts of time to other parts, such as that of yesterday to today and the priority of events of a preceding period to those of a subsequent period. Its opposite is temporal posteriority (*al-luḥūq al-zamānī*).

(ii) Priority by nature (*al-sabq bi al-ṭab'*) is the priority of the incomplete cause to the effect, like the priority of two to three.

(iii) Priority by causality (*al-sabq bi al-'illiyyah*) is the priority of the complete cause to its effect.

(iv) Priority by virtue of quiddity (*al-sabq bi al-māhiyyah*, also called *al-taqaddum bi al-tajawhur*) is the priority of the constituting causes of quiddity to their effects, like the priority of the parts of a specific quiddity (i.e. genus and differentia) to

the species. The priority of a quiddity to its propria (*lawāzim*), such as the priority of four to evenness, has also been considered as belonging to this kind. Its opposite is posteriority by virtue of quiddity (*al-luḥūq bi al-māhiyyah* or *al-ta'khkhur bi al-tajawhur*).

The above three kinds, viz., priority by nature, priority by causality, and priority by virtue of quiddity, are called 'priority by virtue of essence' (*al-sabq bi al-dhāt*).

(v) Priority by virtue of literality (*al-sabq bi al-ḥaqīqah*). In this kind, what is 'prior' has a quality that is accidentally (i.e. figuratively) ascribed to what is 'posterior.' An example of it is water flowing in a channel: water literally possesses the flow, and this flow is ascribed accidentally to the channel in which it flows. Its opposite is posteriority by virtue of literality. This kind has been added by Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn.

(vi) Meta-temporal priority (*al-sabq bi-dahr*) is the priority of the necessitating cause over its effect, though not in respect of its necessitating the existence of the effect and bringing it into being, as mentioned under priority by causality, but in the respect that its existence is separate and detached from the existence of the effect. (By virtue of the cause existing on a higher existential plane than the effect), the effect is non-existent at the existential plane of the cause, such as the priority of the immaterial world of the Intellect over the world of matter. Its opposite is meta-temporal posteriority (*al-ta'akkkhur al-dahrī*).

This kind has been added by Mīr Dāmād, may God's mercy be upon him, on the basis of his conception of meta-temporal *ḥudūth* and *qidam*, which will be explained later on.[i]

(vii) Priority by rank (*al-sabq bi al-rutbah*), which occurs in hierarchies based on nature, position and convention. An example of the first kind is the hierarchy of genera and species. If one were to begin at the highest genus, a higher genus will be prior to the one below it, which in its turn will be prior to the one below it until the ultimate species is reached. But if one were to begin at the ultimate species, the order of priority will be reverse.

[i] See 9.3 below.

The imam or the prayer leader and those who follow him in a congregational prayer offer an example of the second kind. If one were to begin at the prayer niche, the imam will be seen to be prior to those in the row behind him, and those in the first row will be prior to those in the second, and so on and so forth. But if one were to begin from the last row, the order of priority and posteriority will be reverse. Opposed to this kind of priority is posteriority in terms of rank.

(viii) Priority by virtue of superiority (*al-sabq bi al-sharaf*). This kind of priority depends on worth and merit, such as the priority of a knowledgeable person over an ignorant one, and a courageous person over a coward.

9.2. THE CRITERION OF PRIORITY

It is something that is common to the prior and the posterior and by virtue of which priority exists.

The criterion in temporal priority is the relation to time, regardless of whether what is prior is time itself or something existing in it. The criterion in priority by nature is the relation to existence. In priority by causality, it is necessity. In priority by quiddity it is the constitution of the quiddity. In priority by virtue of literality, it is realization in general, including the literal and the metaphorical. In meta-temporal priority, it depends on an entity's situation in the existential context. In priority by rank, it depends on the point of reference, such as the niche or the mosque entrance in the example pertaining to a sensible hierarchy, and the highest genus or the ultimate species in a conceptual hierarchy. In priority by virtue of superiority, it is merit and advantage.

9.3. QIDAM AND ḤUDŪTH, AND THEIR KINDS

In common usage the words *qadīm* (lit. old) and *ḥādith* (lit. new or recent) were originally applied to two contemporaneous things. When the period of existence of one of them was greater than that of the other, the one which had existed for a longer period was called *qadīm* and the one which had existed for a

shorter period was called *ḥādith* or *ḥadīth*. Hence they were relative attributes, in the sense that a single thing could be *ḥādith* in relation to one thing and *qadīm* in relation to another. That which was implied in the concept of *ḥudūth* was the prior non-existence of a thing in a certain period of time, and *qidam* implied that a thing was not preceded by non-existence in a given period of time.

Then a more general meaning was given to these two words by giving 'non-existence' (*'adam*) a more general sense that included non-existence as opposed to existence—that is non-existence in time, which does not cohabit with existence—as well as the non-existence that cohabits with existence. The latter of kind of non-existence is a thing's essential non-being that accompanies its existence after its being brought into existence by the cause.

Thus the meaning of *ḥudūth* became 'existence posterior to non-existence' and the meaning of *qidam* 'non-precedence of existence by non-existence.' These two concepts are essential (*dhātī*) characteristics of existence in general, for an existent *qua* existent is either preceded by non-existence or it is not. Thereupon, these concepts became fit for philosophical discussion.

(i) Thus one kind of *ḥudūth* is 'temporal *ḥudūth*' or *ḥudūth* in terms of time (*al-ḥudūth al-zamānī*), which means a thing's existence being posterior to its non-existence, such as today's being posterior to its non-existence yesterday, or the posteriority of today's events to their non-existence yesterday. Opposed to it is *qidam* in terms of time (*al-qidam al-zamānī*), which is a thing's not being posterior to non-existence in time, like the *qidam* of time itself which is neither preceded by a time nor anything temporal, for otherwise it would imply the subsistence of time when it does not exist, and this involves a contradiction.

(ii) Another kind of *ḥudūth* is 'essential *ḥudūth'* (*al-ḥudūth al-dhātī*), which means non-existence's being prior to the existence of a thing at the plane of its essence, as is the case with all contingent existents, which owe their existence to a cause beyond themselves and there is nothing in their quiddities and

essences except non-existence.

One may raise an objection here that quiddity in itself does not possess anything but contingency. That means the equality of its relation to existence and non-existence and its being devoid of both of them. That means its being devoid of non-existence, as mentioned.

The answer is that it is true that quiddity by itself is devoid of existence and non-existence. In order to assume one of these it stands in need of something to tilt the scale one way or the other, the non-existence of such a preponderant and cause is sufficient to make it non-existent. In other words, its being devoid in itself of existence and non-existence and its being divested of these two is in the sense of primary predication (i.e. as a concept). That does not contradict its being characterized with non-existence in the sense of common predication (i.e. in external reality).

The opposite of *ḥudūth* in this sense is 'essential *qidam*' (*al-qidam al-dhātī*), which means non-precedence of a thing by non-existence at the plane of its essence (*dhāt*). That is only true of an entity whose essence is the very reality of existence, an entity that dispels non-existence by its very essence. That is the Necessary Being, whose essence is Its existence.

(iii) A third kind of *ḥudūth* is 'meta-temporal *ḥudūth'* (*al-ḥudūth al-dahrī*), mentioned by Mīr Dāmād—may God's mercy be upon him. It means the posteriority of the existence of an existential plane to its non-existence at a higher plane in the vertical hierarchy of existence. That kind of non-existence does not cohabit (*ghayr mujāmi'*) with existence, though it is non-temporal. An instance of it is the posteriority of the material world to its non-existence at the plane of the imaginal world (*'ālam al-mithāl*). Opposed to it is 'meta-temporal *qidam*.'

CHAPTER TEN
Actuality and Potentiality

THE existence of a thing in external reality, wherein it possesses the external properties *(āthār*) expected of it, is called 'act,' and it is said to exist in actuality (*bi al-fi'l*). The potential that precedes its actualization is called 'potentiality' (*quwwah*), and, before it has actualized, it is said to be in potentiality. For instance, water has the potential to change into vapour. As long as it is water, it is water in actuality and vapour potentially. However, when it has changed into vapour, it becomes vapour in actuality and the potentiality is annulled. Hence there is existence in actuality and existence in potentiality, and these two divisions are discussed in this chapter.

10.1. A TEMPORAL ḤĀDITH IS PRECEDED BY POTENTIALITY

Everything that comes into existence in time (*ḥādith zamānī*) is preceded by a potentiality for existence. For before it actualizes, it is necessary that its existence be contingent, that is, it should be capable of being qualified with existence or non-existence. For if it were impossible, its actualization would not be possible. Similarly, if it were necessary, it would not fail to exist. This potential is something other than the agent's power over it, for its potential for existence is an attribute of it with reference to its own existence, not to something else, such as the agent.

This potential is something external and not a derivative concept (*i'tibār 'aqlī*) associated with the thing's quiddity, for it is characterized with strength and weakness, proximity and remoteness. For instance, an embryo possessing the potential to become a human being is closer to humanity than a lump of food, which possesses the potential for changing into an embryo, and the potential possessed by the former is greater than

what is possessed by food.

It is obvious that this potential, which is something existing in external reality, is not something substantial (*jawhar*) subsisting by itself. Rather, it is an accident that subsists through something else. We will call it 'potentiality' (*quwwah*) and its substratum, 'matter' (*māddah*). Thus everything that comes into existence in time consists of a 'matter' that precedes it and carries the potentiality of its existence.

It is necessary that a 'matter' should not be unreceptive to the actuality whose potential it bears. Hence it is in itself the potentiality for receiving the actuality whose potential it bears. For if matter were to have an actuality of its own, it would refuse to accept any other actuality. Thus it is a substance (*jawhar*) whose intrinsic actuality is the potentiality for things. However, in order to be a substance endowed with potentiality it subsists through another actuality. When the actuality for which it has the potentiality comes into being, the earlier actuality disappears giving its place to the new actuality. An example of it is water. When it changes into vapour, its aqueous form, which earlier sustained the matter that now bears the form of vapour, disappears and is replaced by the gaseous form through which the matter that earlier bore the potential to become vapour is now sustained.

The matter of the new emergent actuality and that of the earlier defunct actuality is one, for otherwise, we would have to regard it as coming into being with the emergent actuality. This would necessitate another potential and another matter, and this entails an indefinite regress. Thus a single emergent thing would require an infinite number of potentials and matters, and this is inadmissible. A similar difficulty arises if we consider matter as having come into existence in time (*ḥādith zamānī*).

From the above discussion it becomes clear that, firstly, everything that comes into existence in time has a 'matter' that bears the potentiality for its existence.

Secondly, the matter of things that come into existence in time is one and common to them.

Thirdly, the relation between the 'matter' and the potentiality it bears for becoming something is one that exists between a

physical body and its three-dimensional geometrical form (*al-jism al-ta'līmī*). Hence, the potentiality for a particular thing delimits the indefinite potentiality of matter, in the same way as a three-dimensional geometrical form defines the indefinite threefold dimensions of a physical mass.

Fourthly, the existence of entities that come into existence in time is inseparable from the change in their forms if they are substances, and in their states if accidents.

Fifthly, potentiality always subsists through actuality, and matter subsists continually through a form that sustains it. Thus when a new form takes the place of an earlier one, the subsequent form takes the place of the preceding one in sustaining matter.

Sixthly, it becomes clear from what has been mentioned that potentiality temporally precedes only a particular actuality; otherwise actuality when taken in an absolute manner precedes potentiality in respect of all forms of priority: causal, temporal, by nature, etc.

10.2. THE KINDS OF CHANGE

We have seen that a thing's motion from potentiality to actuality entails change, either in its essence or its states. Change is either instantaneous or gradual. Gradual change is called motion (*ḥarakah*), which is a thing's gradual mode of existence (i.e. extended over time). As it relates to a mode of being, it deserves to be a subject of metaphysical study in this respect.

10.3. THE DEFINITION OF MOTION

It was said above that motion is a thing's transition from potentiality to actuality in a gradual manner. One may also call it 'gradual change.' (Gradual transition is a self-evident concept, whose formation in the mind is assisted by sense-experience). Aristotle defined it as ''the first perfection (*kamāl awwal*) for that which is in a state of potentiality *qua* something in potentiality.'' To explain, the acquisition of what a thing may possibly acquire is a perfection for it. For a thing in its movement to-

wards a certain state—for instance, a body moving towards a certain location to become situated in it—its movement as well as its establishment in the location towards which it moves are perfections for that body, with the difference, however, that its movement is the first perfection and its establishment in that location the second perfection. Hence, when it starts its movement, a perfection is realized for it, though not absolutely but in the sense that it is still in a state of potentiality in relation to its second perfection, which is establishment in the sought destination. Thus motion is a first perfection for that which is in a state of potentiality in relation to the two perfections, in the respect that it is in a state of potentiality in relation to the second perfection.

From this it becomes clear that motion depends for its actualization on six things: (i) the origin (*mabdaʾ*) from which motion starts, (ii) the end (*muntahā*) towards which motion is directed, (iii) the moving subject (*mauḍūʿ*) or 'the moved' (*mutaḥarrik*), (iv) the 'agent' that causes the motion, or the 'mover' (*muḥarrik*), (v) the course (*masāfah*) of motion, (vi) and the time to which motion corresponds in some manner. These will be explained below.

10.4. Mediating and Traversing Motion

There are two conceptions of motion. In one of them, the moving thing is conceived as being between the origin and the end, in the sense that if it is supposed to be at a certain limit in the middle, it is neither before it nor after it: it is a simple static state which is indivisible and is called 'mediating motion' (*al-ḥarakah al-tawassuṭiyyah*).

In the second conception, it is the above-mentioned state of being between the origin and the end, along with its relation to the limits of the course of motion, the limit that it has left and the one that it has not reached, or the potentiality transformed into actuality and the potentiality that still remains in its state and which the moving subject seeks to transform into actuality. Implied in this conception of motion is division into parts and gradual transition and passage, as it is a gradual transition from

potentiality to actuality. It is called 'traversing motion' (*al-ḥarakah al-qaṭ'iyyah*), and both of these meanings exist in external reality, for they correspond to it with all their characteristics.

However, as to the picture that imagination derives of motion, by taking one limit after another from motion and combining them in the form of a continuous aggregate divisible into parts, it is something purely mental having no existence in external reality, because co-presence of parts is impossible in motion, for otherwise it would be something static, not dynamic.

From this, it becomes clear that motion—i.e., traversing motion—is a fluid mode of existence, divisible into parts, wherein potentiality and actuality intermingle, in the sense that every one of its assumed parts is actuality for its preceding part and potentiality for the succeeding part, terminating on one side in potentiality unaccompanied with actuality and on the other in actuality unaccompanied with potentiality.

10.5. THE ORIGIN AND END OF MOTION

We saw that motion is essentially subject to division. However, it should be noted that this division does not stop at any limit like the division in static continuous quantities, as in the case of geometric line, plane and body. For were it to stop at a limit, that would result in an indivisible part, whose inadmissibility was mentioned earlier.[i]

Furthermore, it is a division that is potential, not actual, for were it actual there would be no motion due to the division leading up to instantaneous parts.

From this it becomes clear that there is no beginning or end of motion, in the sense that it should have a first, or last, indivisible part from the aspect of motion, as mentioned above. That is because a part in this sense is something instantaneous not gradual, and so the definition of motion as something essentially gradual would not apply to it.

[i] See 6.3.

As to that which was mentioned above,[i] that motion ends in two sides—on the one side in a potentiality unaccompanied with actuality and on the other in an actuality unaccompanied with potentiality—that is a delimitation of it by something external to it.

10.6. THE SUBJECT OF MOTION

We saw above[ii] that motion is the gradual transition of a thing from potentiality to actuality. We also noted that it is necessary that this potentiality be borne by and subsist through something substantial. We further noted that that which is in potency is a potential perfection for the matter and united with it. So when potentiality changes into actuality, actuality becomes united with the matter in the place of potentiality. An example of this is the matter of water, which is potentially vapour. Another is that of a sour body, e.g., an apple, which is potentially sweet. When water changes into vapour and sourness into sweetness, the matter of water assumes the form of vapour and that of the sour body the form of sweetness. Hence there is a subject in every motion that is qualified with motion and in which motion occurs.

It is necessary that the subject of motion be something enduring that undergoes motion. Otherwise that which possessed potentiality would be something other than that which assumes actuality, in which case motion, which is a thing's transition from potentiality to act, would not be realized.

It is also necessary that the subject of motion should not be something that has actuality in all respects, such as an immaterial Intellect, for there can be no motion without some kind of potentiality. Hence that which has no potentiality has no motion. Also, it should not be in potentiality in all respects, for that which is such has no existence. Hence, it should be some-

[i] See10.4 above.
[ii] 10.3 and 10.1

thing that is potential in some aspect and actual in some aspect, such as prime matter, which possesses the potentiality for all things and whose actuality is its potentiality, or a body that is secondary matter, which possesses the potentiality for various specific forms and accidents along with the actuality of bodiness and some specific form.

10.7. The Agent of Motion, the Mover

It is necessary that the mover should be other than the moved, for if the moved itself were the creator of motion, that would imply a single thing being active (*fā'il*) and passive (*qābil*) in a single aspect. This is impossible, because the mode of action (*fi'l*) is the mode of possession, whereas the mode of receptivity is the mode of privation, and it is meaningless to say that a single thing is in possession and privation in the same aspect.

Moreover, the subject is in potentiality in relation to the actuality attained by it through motion, an actuality which it lacks, and that which is in potentiality cannot provide actuality. It is necessary that the proximate agent of motion should be something undergoing change and renewal, for if it were something stable in itself and without change and flux, that which it produces would also be stable in itself. As a result, no part of motion will give way to another part due to the stability of the cause and absence of change in its state, whereupon motion would not be motion, which is a self-contradiction.

10.8. The Relation of the Changeable to the Unchanging

It has been said that the necessity of dependence of something undergoing renewal and change on a cause subject to renewal and change like itself requires the dependence of the renewing and changing cause in its turn upon something else subject to renewal and change like itself, and so on and so forth. That implies either an indefinite regress or a vicious circle, or changeability in the First Source, whose exalted station lies beyond such an attribution.

The answer that has been given to this objection is that re-

newal and change originate in a substance that is essentially mobile. Renewal being essential to it, it is correct to ascribe it to an unchanging cause that brings it into existence, for its creation is the same as the creation of its changeability.

10.9. The Course of Motion

The 'course' of motion is the continuous flux of existence through which the moving subject passes. Unavoidably, it yields to the abstraction of some of the categories, though not from the aspect that it is a continuous changing unity, for that would entail the occurrence of gradation in quiddity, which is impossible. Rather, that is from the aspect that the course is divisible into instantaneously existing divisions, each of which is a species from among the species of the category and different from other species. An example of it is a growing body whose motion is in quantity. At every instant of its motion, it is affected by a species from among the species of continuous quantity, different from the species that affected it in a preceding instant, as well as those that will affect it in a succeeding instant.

Hence the meaning of a thing's motion in a certain category is that the subject is affected at every instant by a species from among the species of the category, which is different from the species that affect it at any other instant.

10.10. The Categories Wherein Motion Occurs

In accordance with the opinion prevailing amongst the earlier philosophers, belonging to the period before Mullā Ṣadrā, the categories in which motion occurs are four: place, quality, quantity, and position.

As to place, it is obvious that motion takes place in it, like the motion of bodies in respect to location. However, there are certain reservations in considering place as a category in its own right, though such a view has been commonly held. Rather, place is a kind of position, and, accordingly, a motion in place is a kind of motion in position.

As to quality, it is obvious that motion occurs in it, especially in non-active qualities, like the qualities associated with quantities, such as straightness and crookedness and the like; for a body moving in terms of quantity also moves in the qualities that depend on its quantity.

As to quantity, the motion in it is defined as gradual change in a body's quantity that is continuous, proportionate and orderly, such as in the case of biological growth, which is a gradual, continuous, and orderly increase in a body's volume.

An objection has been raised against this definition. It is pointed out that growth takes place through the annexation of parts from outside to the parts of the growing body. Thus the resulting larger quantity is an accident of the collection of the original and the annexed parts, whereas the previous smaller quantity was an accident of the original parts. These two quantities are separate and discontinuous due to the difference of their subjects. Hence, there is no motion but the disappearance of one quantity and the emergence of another.

The answer that has been given to this objection is that there is no doubt that there is an annexation of the annexed parts; however, the 'nature' (i.e. the specific form) transforms the annexed part after assimilation into the form of the original parts. It continues to transform and increase the bulk of the original parts gradually by assimilating parts from outside and changing them into the original parts. Thus the quantity accidental to the original parts increases in a gradual and continuous manner, and this is what motion is.

As to position, the occurrence of motion in it is obvious, such as the rotary motion of a sphere on its axis, as a result of which the relationship of any point on its surface changes with its surroundings. This is a gradual change in its position.

The philosophers were of the opinion that there is no motion in the remaining categories, which consist of action, affection, time, relation, possession and substance.

As to action and affection, gradualness is included in their conception. They do not have instantaneously existing individuals[21] and occurrence of motion in them requires division into instantaneously existing divisions, which they do not have.

A similar observation applies to the category of 'time,' which is defined as a mode resulting from a thing's relation to time. It is gradual and so precludes the occurrence of motion in it, which requires divisibility into instantaneously existing divisions.

As to relation, it is an abstraction dependent upon its two sides and, like motion, is not independently associated with a single thing. The same applies to 'possession,' any change wherein is dependent upon the change of its two subjects, like the change occurring in the shoe or the foot from their prior state.

As to substance, the earlier philosophers believed that the occurrence of change in it entails the actualization of motion in that which is not a fixed subject, and, as mentioned earlier,[i] the actualization of motion depends on a fixed subject that persists as long as motion continues.

10.11. CONTINUATION OF THE ABOVE DISCUSSION

Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn, may God's mercy be upon him, came to hold that motion occurs in the category of substance. Among the various arguments that he advanced in favour of this view, the most persuasive is that the occurrence of motion in the four accidental categories requires that motion occur in the category of substance, because the accidents are dependent upon the substance, depending upon it in the way an action depends upon its agent. Thus physical actions depend on the natures or specific forms, which are the proximate causes of them. As mentioned earlier,[ii] the proximate cause of motion is something gradual like it. Thus the natures and specific forms in bodies moving in respect of quantity, quality, place and position are changeable with a fluid existence like the accidents; otherwise there would not actualize any cause of these motions.

An objection against this argument states: If we transfer our argument to the renewing nature, the question still remains as

[i] See 10.6 above.
[ii] See 10.7 above.

to how something changeable can emanate from an unchanging source.

The answer to this is that since motion occurs within the substance of the changeable 'nature,' change and renewal are essential to it, and that which is essential to something does not stand in need of a cause. The 'maker' has made it changeable, not that he first made it and then made it changeable.

This answer may be contested with the following remark. The same thing may be asserted concerning the dependence of changeable accidents on the 'nature' without making the 'nature' changeable; hence changeability is essential to changeable accidents and the nature made the changeable accident; not that it made the accident and then caused it to change.

The answer to this is that accidents depend for their existence on the substance and are subject to it. Hence it is necessary that their essentiality should culminate in the substance.

Another objection that has been raised is that the relation between the changing accidents and the unchanging source—a nature or something else—can be explained in another manner. According to this explanation, change is produced in the accidents from outside, for instance, by the varying degrees of proximity and farness from destination in physical motions, by the changing states in coercive motions which are opposite to nature, and by the succession of particular acts of will produced in the soul at every stage of psychic motions whose source is the soul.

The answer to this is that, transferring our argument to these successive states, or acts of will, we may ask: What is it that makes them successive? For they unavoidably culminate, in the case of physical motions, in the nature. The same is true of coercive motions, for coercion culminates in the nature. The same applies to psychic motions, wherein the immediate agent of motion is the nature, as will be explained later on.[i]

One may also argue in favour of substantial motion on the basis of what was mentioned earlier,[ii] that the existence of the

[i] See 10.16 below.
[ii] See 2.3.

accident is a plane from among the planes of the existence of substance, in the respect that its existence-in-itself is identical with its existence-for-the-substance. Hence its change and renewal are change and renewal in the substance.

It follows from the above discussion, firstly, that the changing natural forms that appear one after another in matter are in reality a single substantial form in flux through which matter passes, and from each of whose limits is abstracted an idea different from what is abstracted from another limit.

This was concerning change in natural forms (e.g. water into vapour and vapour into water), which is change within a single form in flux. But there are other evolutionary substantial motions represented by the motion of prime matter towards physical form, followed by vegetative, animal, and human forms.

Secondly, in its substantial motion the moving substance moves with all its accidents, for, as mentioned, the existence of accidents is a plane of the existence of the substance, which is their substratum.

A consequence of this is that the motion of substance in the four—or the three[i]—categories is a kind of motion within motion. On this basis, these fourfold or threefold motions may be called 'secondary motions,' and the motions that relate absolutely to the accidents in subordination to the substance, not parallel to it, may be termed 'primary motions.'

Thirdly, the physical world with its one matter is a single reality in flux. With all its substances and accidents, it is a single caravan moving towards its fixed end of an absolute actuality.

10.12. THE SUBJECT OF SUBSTANTIAL MOTION AND ITS AGENT

It has been held by philosophers of the post-Ṣadrā period that the subject in this motion is the matter actualized in one or the other of successive forms united by continuity and flux. Thus the unity of matter and its individuality is preserved through one or the other of the changing forms. The unity of the chang-

[i] Three, if motion in place is included in motion in the category of position.

ing form, though indefinite, is preserved by an immaterial substance, which is the agent of matter. This agent preserves matter and its unity and individuality through some form or another. Thus the form, whatsoever, participates in the cause of matter and the matter actualized through it is the subject of motion.

This is similar to the opinion of those who reject substantial motion and believe in continuous coming into being and annihilation (*al-kawn wa al-fasād*). They state that the agent of matter is some form whatsoever, whose unity is preserved by a immaterial substance that creates the form, and matter through its mediation. Thus some form whatsoever participates in the cause in relation to matter and preserves its actualization and unity.

The correct position is that motion's need for a fixed subject remains as long as motion continues. Should a fixed subject be needed to preserve the unity of motion, in order that motion may not fall apart through divisibility and for the reason that its parts are not co-present in existence, it is the continuity of motion in itself and its divisibility in imagination, not in external fact, which is sufficient for its unity. And should the need for a fixed subject be for the reason that motion is something predicative that stands in need of an entity existent-in-itself, in order to exist for it and to characterize it—as in the case of accidents and substantial forms impressed in matter, which also stand in need of a substratum for which they may exist and which they may characterize—the subject of accidental motions is something other that is substantial, and the subject of substantial motion is motion itself. For we do not mean by 'subject of motion' anything except an entity through which motion may subsist and for which it may exist, and substantial motion, being a flowing and substantial entity, is subsistent through itself and for itself. Thus it is motion and the moving in itself.

Matter, which undergoes substantial forms in a continuous and flux-like manner, is referred to as 'subject' due to its union with the forms; otherwise, in itself it is devoid of all actuality.

10.13. Time

We find that events occurring as a result of motion are divisible into segments, of which no segment is co-present with another in respect of actual existence. For the actual existence of any posterior segment under consideration depends on the termination of the actual existence of the prior segment. Moreover, we find that the prior segment is itself divisible into similar segments none of which is co-present with the other. We can go on bisecting segments in this way, and whenever we reach a segment it would be divisible into two parts in the aforementioned manner without the division ever stopping at any limit.

This division is not possible without the application of quantitative extension to motion, by which motion becomes measurable and divisible. However, that extension does not represent the reality of motion itself, for it is something determinate whereas motion in itself has only an indeterminate extension, like the indefinite shape of a physical mass, which is defined by a three-dimensional geometrical form.

This extension, through which the extension of motion is determined, is a continuous quantity corresponding to motion, like a three-dimensional geometrical form through which the dimensions of a physical mass become determinate, with the difference that this quantity corresponding to motion is non-static and its parts are not co-present with one another, as opposed to a three dimensional geometrical form in which the parts are static and co-present.

This quantity is time, which corresponds to motion and constitutes its extent. Every part of it is prior in relation to the part that depends upon it, and it is posterior in relation to the part on whose termination it depends. The extremities that result from the division of time into segments are called ‘instants.’

The following conclusions follow from this discussion.

(i) For every motion there is a time particular to it, which is the extent of that motion. People have adopted ordinary time, which is the extent of diurnal motion, as a convention for the measurement of motions in general and for the determination of the relationships between them. This is because ordinary

time is commonly known and observable. They have divided it into centuries, years, months, weeks, days, hours, minutes, seconds, etc., in order to measure motions by their means.

For those who uphold substantial motion, the time that is relevant in temporal events is the time of substantial motion (not accidental motions, like the earth's rotation, for they are derived from substantial motion).

(ii) Priority and posteriority are essential to the parts of time, in the sense that the existence of time is flowing, non-static. This requires that it be divisible, if divided, into a part on whose termination depends the actual existence of another part, the former being prior and the latter posterior.

(iii) The instant, which is the extremity of a period of time and the dividing limit between two parts of it, if divided, is something unreal (i.e. imaginary), because the division is imaginary not real.

(iv) The succession of instants, which is the co-presence of two or more unreal limits without any intervening segment of time separating them, is obviously impossible. The same observation applies to succession of instantaneous events, which correspond to extremities of segments of time, e.g. reaching and separating.

(v) There is no beginning or end for time, in the sense that there may be an indivisible part at its beginning or end; that is because divisibility is essential to it.

10.14. Fastness and Slowness

If we consider two motions occurring in equal time, that which covers a longer course is the one that is faster.

If two motions cover an equal course, the one that takes lesser time is the faster. Thus fastness lies in covering a relatively longer distance in lesser time, and slowness is its opposite.

The philosophers state that slowness does not consist of intervening rests, so that one may say that a motion is slower because of a greater number of intervening rests, and faster when they are fewer. That is because motion is a continuity in which potentiality and actuality intermingle. Hence there is no room

for intervening rests in it.

They further state that fastness and slowness are opposites, in the sense of contrariety. That is because both of them are positive and the opposition between them is neither one of contradiction, nor that of possession and privation, nor are they correlatives; otherwise, whenever one of them exists the other would also exist, which is not the case. This does not leave any alternative except to consider them as contraries.

However, a difficulty that lies in this view is that a condition for the contraries is that there should be an extreme difference between them—something which is not present between fastness and slowness; for it is always possible to assume something faster than that which is fast, and, similarly, something slower than that which is slow.

The truth is that fastness (*sur'ah;* also means speed) and slowness (*buṭ'*) are relative attributes; what is fast in relation to a certain motion may be slow in relation to a third one. The same applies to slowness. *Sur'ah* (i.e., speed) in the sense of transition and flow is peculiar to all motion and is characterized by intensity and weakness. Relative fastness and slowness derive from comparison between different speeds.

10.15. REST

The term 'rest' is applied to a body's state of being devoid of motion, before or after being in motion. It is also applied to a body's remaining unchanged in its state. That which is opposed to motion is the first meaning. The second one is implied by it. Rest has the negative sense of absence of a quality from the subject, which is a body capable of possessing it. Thus it means absence of motion in something that generally moves. Hence the opposition between it and motion is that of privation and possession. A body, or anything physical, cannot be devoid of motion, except what is instantaneous, such as reaching the limit of a journey, separation of a thing from another, the formation of geometric figures,[22] and the like.

10.16. Divisions of Motion

Motion is divided into various kinds on the basis of the six factors that relate to it:

On the basis of origin and end; e.g., the motion from one place to another, the motion from one colour to another, and a plant's motion from a certain extent to another.

On the basis of the subject; e.g., the motions of a plant, the motions of an animal, the motions of a human being.

On the basis of category; e.g., motion in quality, motion in quantity, and motion in position.

On the basis of time; e.g. nocturnal motion, diurnal motion, summerly and winterly motion.

On the basis of agent; i.e. (i) natural motion, (ii) coercive motion, and (iii) voluntary motion. Related with these in a certain aspect is motion by accident. The basis for this threefold division is that the agent either possesses knowledge and will in relation to his act or he does not. In the first case, the agent is conscious (*nafsānī*) and so is the motion, e.g. the voluntary motions of a human being or an animal. In the second case, the motion either arises from the agent by itself, or due to some other agent, which compels it to move. In the first case, the agent is a natural agent and the motion a natural motion. In the second case, the agent is a coercive one and the motion is a coercive motion, e.g. a stone thrown upwards.

The philosophers state that the proximate agent in all these motions is the moving 'nature,' which moves either as a result of subjection to a soul, or by natural disposition, or under the compulsion of a coercing 'nature' that compels the coerced 'nature' to move. The immediate 'source' between the agent and the motion is the inclination that the agent produces in the moving 'nature.' The related details are given in works on traditional physics.

Conclusion

Some points may be noted here concerning the terms *quwwah* (potentiality) and *mā bil-quwwah* (the object possessing potentiality). In the same way as these terms are applied to the mode

of receptivity, they are also applied to the mode of action, when strong. In the same way as these terms are applied to the source of receptivity (*mabda' al-qabūl*, i.e. prime matter) through which receptivity subsists, they are also applied to the source of action (*mabda' al-fi'l*), as in the case of the faculties of the soul (*al-quwā al-nafsāniyyah*), by which are meant the 'sources' of the soul's properties, such as sight, hearing, imagination, etc, and the natural forces (such as gravity), which are 'sources' of natural phenomena.

This active *quwwah* (*al-quwwah al-fā'iliyyah*) when accompanied with knowledge and will is called *qudrat al-ḥayawān* (vital power), which is an efficient cause that stands in need of external factors, such as the presence of a receptive matter and proper implements of action, etc., for the completion of its causal efficiency and necessitation of action by it. When these are all present, it becomes a complete cause on whose presence the action becomes necessary.

The following points become clear in the light of the above discussion.

(i) The first point is the incorrectness of the definition advanced by some theologians for 'power' (*qudrah*) as something in whose presence the execution of an action or its omission is possible. For the execution of an action or its omission is contingent on the agent when the agent is only part of the complete cause, so that the action is not necessitated by the agent alone but through its agency as well as that of the remaining factors which make up the complete cause together. However, an agent whose efficiency is complete is a complete cause, as in the case of the exalted Necessary Being. Hence it is meaningless to characterize with contingency such an agent and its action or omission of action (i.e. to say that an agent that is a complete cause of its action may or may not carry out the action).

The necessary character of its action does not imply that the agent is compelled to carry it out and that it has no power over its own action; for this necessity, which inheres in the action, derives from the agent itself. The action is the agent's effect and cannot compel it to action, nor is there any other agent that may influence it and compel it to carry out the action.

(ii) It makes evident the invalidity of the view advanced by some theologians that the contingency of an action depends on its being preceded by temporal non-existence (*al-ʿadam al-zamānī*); hence an action that is not preceded by temporal non-existence is impossible. This view is based on the belief that the reason for a thing's need for a cause is its coming into existence (*ḥudūth*), not its contingency (*imkān*). We have refuted this belief earlier[i] and proved that the reason for the need for a cause is contingency, not *ḥudūth*. Moreover, their theory is invalidated by the instance of time itself (which is not *ḥādith*).

(iii) It discloses the invalidity of the view advanced by those theologians who have held that 'power' emerges along with action and that there is no power for an action prior to it. The inconsistency of this view is made evident by the fact that they themselves define 'power' as 'the capacity to act or not to act.' Now, if the agent ceases the action for some time to resume it again, it would be right to ascribe to it the capacity to act or not to act before the resumption of action. And this is what is 'power' according to their own definition.

[i] See 4.8.

CHAPTER ELEVEN
Knowledge, Knower, and the Known

IN the last chapter we saw that existence is divided into that which has potentiality and that which has (absolute) actuality, and that the former consists of matter and material things and the latter of immaterial (*mujarrad*) existents. Of the primary (i.e. essential) accidents of immaterial being is to be knowledge, knower, and known. For knowledge, as will be explained later on, consists of the presence (*ḥuḍur*) of an immaterial existent for another immaterial existent. Accordingly, it is proper to discuss it in metaphysics.

11.1. DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE AND ITS FIRST DIVISIONS

That we acquire a 'knowledge' of things is self-evident, and so is the concept of it. In this section our purpose is to identify its salient properties in order to differentiate between its various forms and their characteristics.

It was stated in the discussion on mental existence that we possess a certain knowledge of external things, in the sense that we cognize them and they are present for us with their quiddities, though not with their external existence and its accompanying external properties. This is one of the kinds of knowledge, called 'mediated knowledge' (*'ilm ḥuṣūlī,* lit. acquired knowledge).

Another kind of knowledge is the knowledge that each of us has of his own self, to which he refers as his 'I.' One cannot fail to be conscious of his own self in any circumstance, in solitude or in company, in sleep or in wakefulness, or in any other state.

This consciousness is not by virtue of the presence of the quiddity of the self for us; it is not present as a concept, or known through mediated knowledge. That is because a mental

concept, of whatever kind, is always capable of corresponding to a multiplicity of objects, and [when considered as referring to a particular object] its individuality is only due to the external existent [to which it corresponds]. Now what we cognize in relation to ourselves—i.e., what we refer to as 'I'—is something essentially individuated, incapable of corresponding to multiple things. Individuality is a property of existence; hence our knowledge of our selves is by virtue of their presence for us with their very external existence, which is the ground of individuation and external properties. This is another kind of knowledge, called 'immediate' knowledge (*'ilm ḥuḍūrī,* lit., 'knowledge by presence').

These two divisions of knowledge are exhaustive, for the cognition of the known by the knower is either through the former's quiddity or by its existence. The first is 'mediated' and the second is 'immediate' knowledge.

Furthermore, attainment of knowledge means apprehension *(ḥuṣūl*) of the known by the knower; for knowledge is identical with that which is known by itself, because we do not mean anything by knowledge except the apprehension of the known by us. And the apprehension of a thing and its presence is nothing except its existence, and its existence is itself.

The apprehension of the known by the knower does not mean anything except its union (*ittiḥād*) with the knower, whether the known is immediate or mediated. Thus if the immediately known is a substance subsisting by itself, its existence is for-itself (*wujūd li nafsih*) while at the same time it is for-the-knower, and hence the knower is united with it. If the immediately known is something existent-for-its-subject, as the known's existence is existence-for-the-knower, the knower is united with its subject. Moreover, an accident is one of the planes of the existence of its subject, not something extraneous to it. Hence it is likewise in relation to something united with its subject. Similarly, the mediated known is existent-for-the-knower, irrespective of whether it is a substance existing for-itself or something existent-for-other-than-itself. An implication of its existence for the knower is the knower's union with it.

This is because, as will be explained later on,[i] mediated knowledge in fact involves immediate knowledge.

Accordingly, apprehension (*ḥuṣūl*) by the knower is a property of knowledge, though not every kind of apprehension, but an apprehension of something that is in pure actuality and absolutely devoid of all potentiality. That is because we know intuitively that the known *qua* known has no potentiality to become another thing; it is not susceptible to change, nor can it become something other than what it is. Accordingly, it involves the apprehension of something that is immaterial and free from all traces of potentiality. This we call 'immediacy' (*ḥuḍūr,* literally, 'presence').

The immediacy of the known requires it to be something possessing complete actuality, free from any association with matter and potentiality that may make it deficient and incomplete in relation to its potential perfections.

Further, the immediacy of the known requires that the knower acquiring its knowledge should also possess complete actuality, not being deficient in any respect arising from association with matter. Hence, the knower is also immaterial and free from potentiality.

From the above discussion it becomes clear that knowledge is the 'presence' of an immaterial existent for an immaterial existent, whether what is apprehended is the same as that which apprehends—as in the case of a thing's knowledge of itself—or is something else—as in the case of thing's knowledge of quiddities external to it.

It also becomes clear, firstly, that the known, to which knowledge pertains, must necessarily be something immaterial. The meaning of knowledge of material things shall be explained below.

Secondly, the knower, through whom knowledge subsists, must also necessarily be immaterial.

[i] See 11.10 below.

11.2. THE DIVISION OF MEDIATED KNOWLEDGE INTO UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR

A universal (*kullī*) is that which is capable of corresponding to a multiplicity of instances, such as the knowledge of the quiddity of man. This kind of knowledge is called *ʿaql* or *taʿaqqul* (intellection). A particular (*juzʾī*) is that which is incapable of corresponding to a multiplicity of things, such as the knowledge of a particular person with some kind of association with a present matter, which is called 'sensory' knowledge (*al-ʿilm al-iḥsāsī*), or the knowledge of a human individual without there being any present matter. The latter kind is called 'imaginary' knowledge (*al-ʿilm al-khayālī*). These two kinds are considered incapable of corresponding to a multiplicity of referents only from the aspect of connection between the sense organs and the external object of knowledge, in the case of sensory knowledge, and for the reason of dependence of 'imaginary' knowledge on sensory knowledge. Otherwise, the mental impression itself (*al-ṣūrat al-dhihniyyah*), of whatever kind, is not incapable of corresponding to a multiplicity of objects.

On the basis of that which has been said above, both the kinds are immaterial due to the essential actuality of the cognitive form (*al-ṣūrat al-ʿilmiyyah*) and its being unsusceptible to change.

Also, the cognitive form, of whatever kind, is not incapable of corresponding to a multiplicity of objects, and anything that is material and individuated is incapable of corresponding to more than one individual.

Furthermore, had the sensory or the imaginal form been something material, impressed in some manner in a part of the body, it would have been divisible due to the divisibility of its location and would have been in space and time. However, such is not the case. Hence knowledge is neither susceptible to division nor capable of attribution to a physical location. Also it is not subject to time, for a sensory form cognized at a certain time remains valid and unchanged even after the passage of a long period of time, and had it been time-bound it would change with the passage of time.

There has been a misconception arising from the contiguity of the acquisition of knowledge to time. This contiguity (*muqāranah*) merely relates to the conditions for the attainment of the potential (*isti'dād*) for receiving knowledge, not to knowledge itself.

As for the mediating role of the sense organs in the apprehension of the sensible form and the dependence of the imaginary form on it, that merely pertains to the attainment of a specific capacity in the soul enabling it to evoke the cognitive form. The related details are to be found in works on traditional psychology (*'ilm al-nafs*).

There is a theory according to which the formation of concepts occurs through a process in which the known object is divested of matter and its characteristic material accidents, until there remains nothing except a quiddity stripped of its material shell (e.g. the concept of man stripped of all physical matter and its accompanying characteristics relating to time, space, position, and so on). This process is different from sense perception, wherein matter and its accompanying accidents and individuating features are present. It is also different from imagination, wherein the accidents associated with matter and its individuating features survive without the presence of matter itself. However, from the above discussion it becomes clear that such a theory can be justified only as a metaphorical aid to understanding. Otherwise, the perceived form is also immaterial; the requirement of the presence of matter and its accompanying individuating accidents is in order to prepare the soul for perception. The same applies to the requirement of accompanying particular features in imagination, as well as the requirement of 'divesting' in conception, wherein the imagination of more than an individual prepares the soul for conceiving the universal quiddity—a process referred to as 'the abstraction of the universal from individuals.'

From what has been said it also becomes clear that existence is divisible into three realms in respect of freedom from matter and its absence. One of them is the world of matter and potentiality. The second realm is the one in which matter is absent, though not some of its properties such as shape, quantity, posi-

tion, etc. It contains physical forms and their accidents and features of perfection without the presence of any matter possessing potentiality and passivity. It is called the 'imaginal' or the 'intermediate' world (*'ālam al-mithāl*, or *al-barzakh*), which lies between the world of the Intellect (*'ālam al-'aql*) and the world of matter (*'ālam al-māddah*). The third is the immaterial world (*'ālam al-tajarrud*), which is absolutely free from matter and its properties. It is called the world of the Intellect (*'ālam al-'aql*).

The metaphysicians have further divided the imaginal world into the 'macrocosmic' (or objective) imaginal world (*al-mithāl al-a'ẓam*), which is a self-subsisting realm by itself, and the 'microcosmic' (or subjective) imaginal world (*al-mithāl al-aṣghar*), which subsists through the soul, which governs it in any manner it wishes according to its motives, rightful or extravagant, producing at times real and healthy forms and, at other times, fantastic forms, which the soul creates for the sake of diversion.

These three worlds constitute a hierarchy. Amongst them the highest of them in rank and, existentially, the strongest and the prior-most, as well as nearest to the First Source, is the world of the immaterial Intellects (*'ālam al-'uqūl al-mujarradah*), due to the completeness of their actuality and freedom of their essences from all traces of matter and potentiality. Below it lies the (macrocosmic or objective) imaginal world, which is free from matter, though not some of its properties. Further below is the world of matter, the abode of all deficiency and evil. Knowledge does not pertain to that which is in it except through what corresponds to it in the imaginal world and the world of the Intellect.

11.3. ANOTHER DIVISION OF KNOWLEDGE INTO UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR

That which is meant by 'universal' knowledge here is the knowledge that does not change with the accidental object of knowledge (*al-ma'lūm bi al-'araḍ*). An instance of it is the form of a structure conceived by an architect in order to build

an actual one similar to it. The conceived form remains as it was before, during, and after the structure's construction, even though the actual structure should collapse or be razed to the ground. This kind of knowledge is called 'knowledge prior to multiplicity' (*'ilm mā qabl al-kathrah*) The knowledge acquired through the means of universal causes is of this kind, such as an astronomer's knowledge that a lunar eclipse would occur on a certain day at a certain time for a certain period during which there would occur an astronomical configuration in which the earth will intervene between the sun and the moon. In this case, his knowledge remains unchanged before, during, and after the eclipse.

By 'particular' knowledge here is meant the knowledge that changes with the change in the accidental object of knowledge. An example of it is our knowledge obtained through eyesight of Zayd's movements: when Zayd stops moving, the perceived impression changes from motion to rest. This kind of knowledge is called 'knowledge posterior to multiplicity' (*'ilm mā ba'd al-kathrah*).

Here someone may say that change does not occur without prior potentiality, which is borne by matter, and that requires that the object of particular knowledge be material, not immaterial. The answer is that knowledge of change is not change of knowledge. The changing object undergoes a fixed course of change, which does not change itself. The knowledge of it—that is, its presence before the knower—is from the aspect of its fixity not its change, for otherwise it would not be present and knowledge would not be the presence of an entity for another entity. This involves a contradiction.

11.4. KINDS OF INTELLECTION

The metaphysicians mention three kinds of intellection (*ta'aqqul*).

One of them is potential intellection (*al-'aql bi al-quwwah*), wherein the 'intellect' neither actually cognizes the intelligibles, nor does it apprehend any 'intelligibles in act' due to the soul's being devoid of all intelligibles.

The second is wherein the intellect intellects one or many intelligibles in act differentiating them from one another and conceiving them in an orderly manner. This is called 'detailed intellection' (*al-'aql al-tafṣīlī*).

In the third kind of intellection, the mind intellects many intelligibles in act without differentiating them from one another. It is a simple, undifferentiated form of intellection wherein all the details are contained. An example that has been given of it is when one is asked concerning several issues of which one has knowledge. The answer immediately comes to one's mind. At the very first moment one has the answer wherein one actually knows all of them for certain without sorting them out or their details from one another. The sorting out and the details come only in the process of answering, as if one had a store from which the details flow out. This kind of intellection is called 'non-differentiated intellection' (*al-'aql al-ijmālī*).

11.5. PLANES OF THE INTELLECT

The metaphysicians mention four planes of the intellect.

One of them is that which is in a state of potentiality in relation to all intelligibles. It is called the material intellect (*al-'aql al-hayūlānī*) on account of its similarity to prime matter (*hayūlā*) in being devoid of intelligibles and with respect to its potentiality in relation to all forms.

The second is the 'intellect by proficiency' (*al-'aql bi al-malakah*) which is the plane wherein it intellects self-evident concepts (*taṣawwurāt*) and judgements (*taṣdīqāt*); for the knowledge of self-evident matters (*badīhiyyāt*) precedes the knowledge of 'speculative' matters (*naẓariyyāt*).

The third is the 'intellect in act' which intellects speculative matters through the mediation of self-evident concepts and judgements, though some of them are based on the others.

The fourth is the intellect that partakes of all self-evident and speculative intelligibles corresponding to the realities of the

higher and the lower realms of existence by virtue of having all of them present before it and its actual consciousness of them. Thus it is a 'knowing world' similar to the external world and is called the 'acquired intellect' (*al-ʿaql al-mustafād*).

11.6. THE EMANATING SOURCE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE FORMS

As to the universal intelligible forms, which bring man, for instance, from potentiality to actuality, its source of emanation (*mufiḍ*) is an immaterial Intellect, which possesses all the universal intelligible forms. That is because, as we have seen, these forms constitute knowledge and are immaterial. Moreover, by virtue of their universality they are capable of corresponding to a multiplicity of objects, whereas everything impressed in matter is an individual incapable of such correspondence. Therefore, the intelligible forms are immaterial, created by an agent that is an immaterial source, for a material entity is existentially weak and incapable of producing something existentially stronger. In addition, the action of matter is conditioned by a particular [physical] configuration (*waḍʿ*) and an immaterial entity does not have a [physical] position or location.

This immaterial source is not the soul itself, which intellects these immaterial cognitive forms, for it is still in potentiality in relation to these forms and its mode is passive, not active, and it is impossible that something in potentiality should by itself make the transition from potentiality to actuality.

Therefore, the source of the intelligible form is an immaterial intelligent substance that possesses all the universal intelligible forms in the manner of non-differentiated knowledge. The soul possessing potential unites with it in order to intellect in accordance with its particular potential, whereupon the source of emanation creates in it the intelligible form for whose reception it possesses the potential.

A similar explanation in relation to particular intelligible forms would make clear that their source is an imaginal immaterial substance which possesses all the particular imaginal forms in the manner of non-differentiated knowledge and the

soul unites with them in accordance with its potential.

11.7. THE DIVISION OF MEDIATED KNOWLEDGE INTO CONCEPTION AND JUDGEMENT

The mere knowledge of the form (*ṣūrah*) of the known object, whether one or multiple, regardless of affirmation or negation, is called conception (*taṣawwur*), such as the concepts of 'man,' 'body,' and 'substance.' If the form of the known is accompanied by an affirmation or negation of something concerning something, such as in the sentence, 'Man is risible' or 'Man is not stone,' it is an 'assertion' (*taṣdīq*; lit. affirmation), and in consideration of the judgement that it contains is called '*qaḍiyyah*' (proposition).

Further, a proposition comprises of more than one part as it contains the affirmation or negation of something concerning something.

According to the prevalent view among metaphysicians, an affirmative proposition is comprised of a subject (*mawḍūʿ*), a predicate (*maḥmūl*), and the 'relation of judgement' (*al-nisbat al-ḥukmiyyah*), which is the predicate's relation to the subject, and the judgement (*ḥukm*) of the subject's oneness with the predicate. This is the case in 'composite statements' (*al-halliyyāt al-murakkabah*) wherein the predicate is not the existence of the subject. But in 'simple statements' (*al-ḥalliyyāt al-basīṭah*), in which the predicate is the existence of the subject—such as in the statement 'Man is existent'—there are three parts: the subject, the predicate and the judgement, because there is no sense in a relation—which is a copulative existent— intervening between a thing and itself.

Furthermore, a negative proposition is made up of a subject, a predicate, and an affirmative relation of judgement (*al-nisbah al-ḥukmiyyah al-ījābiyyah*). There is no judgement in it, not that there is a negative judgement in it, for a judgement consists of affirming something of something, and the withholding of judgement is the absence of it, not the positing of its absence.

The truth is that the need for conceiving the relation of judgement is only from the aspect of the judgement being an

act of the soul, not because it is part of the proposition. For a proposition consists only of the subject, the predicate, and the judgement, and the formation of a proposition as such does not require the conception of the relation of judgement. The need for conceiving it arises for the formation of judgement by the soul in identifying the subject with the predicate. This is also confirmed by the formation of the proposition in simple statements without the relation of judgement that relates the predicate to the subject.

It becomes clear from this discussion that, firstly, an affirmative proposition (*al-qaḍiyyah al-mūjibah*) consists of three parts: subject, predicate, and judgement. A negative proposition consists of two parts: subject and predicate, and the relation of judgement is needed by the soul in making the judgement, not for the formation of the proposition as such.

Secondly, judgement is an act of the soul in the context of mental cognition, not a passive act of conception. When we say 'Zayd is standing,' for instance, the soul cognizes through sensory means a single entity which is 'the standing Zayd.' Then it analyzes it into two concepts 'Zayd' and 'standing' and stores them. Thereafter, when it wants to describe what it finds in external reality, it takes the forms of 'Zayd' and 'standing' from its memory as two different notions and combines them into a unity with a single existence. This is judgement, which we have described as the act of the soul, by means of which it represents external reality as it is.

Hence, judgement is an act of the soul and, at the same time, a mental form that represent something beyond itself. Were judgement a conception abstracted from outside, the proposition would not make a complete statement to which nothing needs to be added, as in the case of each part of a hypothetical proposition. Also, were judgement a concept formulated by the soul without recourse to external reality, it would not represent external reality.

11.8. DIVISION OF MEDIATED KNOWLEDGE INTO SELF-EVIDENT AND SPECULATIVE

Something is said to be 'self-evident' (*badīh*) that does not stand in need of reflection and speculative reasoning (*naẓar*) for the formation of its conception or for the making of a judgement concerning it, e.g. the concepts of 'thing,' 'unity,' and so on, or such assertions as, 'The whole is greater than any of its parts,' or 'Four is an even number.' A 'speculative' conception or judgement is one which depends on reflective effort, e.g. the conception of the quiddity of man and horse, or such assertions as, 'The three angles of a triangle equal two right angles,' or 'Man has an immaterial soul.'

The speculative sciences derive from self-evident knowledge effort and their elaboration rests on the basis of what is self-evident. Otherwise the matter would lead to an indefinite regress, and no knowledge will be possible, as explained in logic.

Self-evident assertions, as explained in logic, are many, and the foremost of them are the so-called the basic self-evident propositions (*awwaliyyāt*), which are propositions for whose confirmation the mere conception of the subject and the predicate is sufficient, e.g. such statements as, 'The whole is greater than any of its parts,' and 'A thing cannot be divested from itself.'

The foremost of the primarily self-evident propositions is the principle of contradiction, which is a proper disjunctive proposition: 'Either the affirmation of a proposition is true or its negation.' No self-evident or speculative proposition, even the primarily self-evident propositions, can do without it in order to bring knowledge. Thus the statement, 'The whole is greater than any of its parts,' brings knowledge only if its contradictory, 'It is not the case that the whole is greater than any of its parts,' is false.

Hence this principle is the most primary proposition to be affirmed, and no sane person can doubt it. All sciences are based upon it and were any doubt cast upon it, it would pervade to all sciences and judgements.

A Complementary Note

The sophist, who denies the possibility of knowledge, does not affirm the validity of the principle of contradiction; for his acceptance of it would amount to an admission that one out of every pair of contradictory propositions is true.

However, should the sophist who denies the possibility of knowledge and is skeptical of everything admit to be a skeptic, it means that he admits the possibility of at least some kind of knowledge and thereby affirms the principle of contradiction. Then it becomes possible to make him admit the possibility of knowledge of many things similar to his knowledge of being a skeptic, such as his knowledge that he sees, hears, has sensations of touch, taste and smell, that when he feels hungry he looks for something that would satisfy his hunger, or quench his thirst when he feels thirsty. When he accepts these, he can be led to admit that he possesses the knowledge of other things as well, for all knowledge, as said earlier,[i] terminates in sense-experience (*al-ḥiss*).

However, should he refuse to admit that he knows that he is a skeptic and declare that he is skeptical of everything, even of his own skepticism, and knows nothing, there can be no debate with him, and no argument will work upon him. This kind of person either suffers from a disease affecting his mental faculty, in which case he should see a physician, or he is one hostile to the truth, seeking to refute it. The latter should be chastened, made to feel pain, kept from what he desires and seeks and compelled to experience what he dislikes and detests, for he does not consider any of these to have reality.

Yes, often some persons of this kind who turn to the rational sciences without the necessary training in the principles of logic and the techniques of reasoning, on observing the contradictory opinions of thinkers on various problems and the arguments they advance in support of each of their mutually exclusive positions, cannot make a distinction between the true and the false due to the inadequacy of their intellectual means. Such a person concedes to each of the contradictory opinions on one

[i] See 11.2 above.

issue after another, and thereafter becomes suspect of all logic, claiming that the sciences are relative, not absolute, and the truth for every thinker is what his arguments lead him to.

The remedy for this kind of skeptics is to fully clarify for them the principles of logic and to demonstrate for him the self-evident principles which are beyond doubt in all circumstances, such as the principle of identity and so on. Utmost effort should be made to explain to them the elements of a proposition, and they should be directed to study the mathematical sciences.

There are two other groups of skeptics. One of them accepts man's perceptions but doubts what lies beyond them. ''We can know only what we perceive, and that which lies beyond our perceptions is uncertain,'' they declare. There is another group, which having noticed that the statement, ''*We* can know only what *we* perceive'' implies the admission of many other truths—namely, the existence of other persons and their experiences, which are external facts—re-state their position and say, ''*I* can be certain only of *my* perceptions. Anything that lies beyond them is uncertain.''

In refuting such a position it may be said that occasionally there do occur errors of cognition, as in cases of errors of vision and tactual sense, and errors of reasoning, but if there were no external realities beyond one's self and one's perceptions—realities which either correspond to these perceptions or do not—there would obviously be no room for error.

It may be said that the opinion of this group is not a total negation of knowledge. What they mean is that the forms presented to the senses may not exactly conform to external facts as they are. For instance, it has been pointed out that sound as it appears to hearing does not exist in external reality. Rather, when it reaches a certain frequency it becomes audible to hearing in the form of audible sound. Similarly, when the frequency of electromagnetic waves reaches a certain number it appears to vision in the form of visible light and colours. Hence, the senses, which are the source of perception, do not reveal the realities transcending them, and all other contents of cognition terminate in the senses.

However, if perception is assumed to be incapable of revealing the reality transcending it, where does this knowledge come from that there does exist such a reality beyond perception, a reality which perception fails to reveal? Who has cognized that external sound consists of vibrations of a certain frequency and visible light has such and such a frequency in external reality? Does man discover the real external facts except through the faculties of perception, the same external facts in perceiving which the senses make errors?

In view of what has been said above, the suggestion that perception may not conform absolutely to what lies beyond it only amounts to a denial of the possibility of knowledge. Then, even the statement, ''Our perceptions may not conform to anything in external reality'' will not be secure from failing to reveal anything in respect of the individual concepts and the judgement involved in it.

11.9. DIVISION OF MEDIATED KNOWLEDGE INTO ḤAQĪQĪ AND I'TIBĀRĪ

The term 'real' (*ḥaqīqī*) refers to concepts which [that is, whose referents], when existing externally, exist with their external properties, and which exists in the mind without those external properties. Such concepts pertain to quiddity (*māhiyyah*). Opposed to them are concepts that are denoted by the termed 'derivative' (*i'tibārī)*. It refers either to concepts the mode (*ḥaythiyyah*) of whose referent is externality only, such as 'existence' and its real characteristics, such as 'unity,' 'actuality' and so on. That which is denoted by such concepts does not enter the mind, for otherwise it would involve a violation of the law of identity (*inqilāb*). Or it refers to concepts the mode of whose referent is mental, such as the concepts of 'universal,' 'genus,' and 'species,' which are not to be found externally, for otherwise that will involve a violation of the law of identity.

The so-called *i'tibārī* concepts are formulated by the mind through a kind of contemplative effort and applied to their referents, though not in the way quiddity is applied to and predicated of its individuals and taken within their confines.

From what has been said it becomes clear, firstly, that the concepts which are predicated of the Necessary Being and contingent existents, such as existence and life, are *i'tibārī*; for otherwise the Necessary Being would have quiddity.

Secondly, the concepts which are predicated of more than one category, such as motion, are *i'tibārī*; for otherwise they would belong to two or more genera, and that is inadmissible.

Thirdly, the *i'tibārī* concepts do not have any definitions (i.e. genus and species), nor are they confined to any particular quiddity.

It is important to note that there are other meanings of the term *i'tibārī* which are not relevant to our discussion. (i) One of these is the sense of *i'tibārī* as opposed to 'fundamentally real' (*aṣīl*), such as quiddity in opposition to existence. (ii) Another sense of it is meant when *i'tibārī* is used for something which does not have an independent existence of its own, as opposed to something which exists independently, as in the case of a relation, which exists through the existence of its two sides, as opposed to substance, which exists by itself. (iii) Another meaning of *i'tibārī* is that which is applied to and predicated of subjects in a figurative and metaphorical sense with a practical end in view, such as the application of the word 'head' to Zayd as someone whose relation to his people is like the relation of the head to the body, because he manages their affairs, solves their problems and assigns to everyone his particular duties and tasks.

11.10. SOME MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES

That which is known through mediated knowledge is divisible into that which is known by itself (*ma'lūm bi al-dhāt*) and that which is known by accident (*ma'lūm bi al-'araḍ*). The known-by-itself is the form apprehended by the knower. The known-by-accident is the external object represented by the cognitive form; it is called the 'accidentally known' (*ma'lūm bi al-araḍ*) or the 'figuratively known' (*ma'lūm bi al-majāz*) due to its association with the known-by-itself.

Another issue is that, as said earlier, every intelligible is im-

material, in the same way as every intelligence is immaterial. Hence the concepts presented to the intellectual faculty, by apprehending which it acquires actuality, being immaterial, are existentially stronger than the intelligent soul, which develops through their means and is affected by them. Hence they are, in fact, immaterial existents that manifest themselves to the knowing soul through their external existence, and the soul unites with them when they are the forms of substances, and with their substrata if they are accidents. However, due to our contact with matter through the means of the sensory organs we imagine that the substratum of these forms is matter, and that we abstract them from matter and the material properties possessed by them in their material state, whereupon they become mental existents representing external things without bearing their external properties.

From this discussion it becomes clear that mediated knowledge, in fact, involves immediate knowledge.

It also becomes clear that immaterial Intellects do not possess any mediated knowledge due to their total separation from matter —a separation which is essential as well as actual.

11.11. EVERY IMMATERIAL BEING IS INTELLIGENT

That is because anything that is essentially and completely immaterial (*mujarrad tām dhātan*) has no association with potentiality. Therefore, its immaterial essence (*dhāt*) is present and existent for itself. That is so because by knowledge we do not mean anything except a thing's presence for a thing in the aforementioned sense.[i] This pertains to its knowledge of itself. As to its knowledge of entities other than itself, it is possible for it, by virtue of its essential immateriality, to intellect every immaterial being that can be intellected; and for an immaterial existent that which is possible is actual. Hence it intellects in actuality every immaterial existent, in the same way as every immaterial being is intelligible in actuality as well as intelligent in actuality.

[i] See 11.1 above.

If it is said that this implies that the human soul, being immaterial, intellects every intelligible, which is obviously not admissible. The answer is that the soul is immaterial essentially, not in actuality; by virtue of its essential immateriality it intellects its own essence in act, but its actual association [with matter] necessitates its gradual transition from potentiality to act in accordance with different degrees of preparedness. And when it attains to complete immateriality and is no more preoccupied with the regulation of the body's functions, it apprehends all knowables in the manner of non-differentiated knowledge, becoming an acquired intellect in act (*'aql mustafād bi al-fi'l*).

It is evident that this argument applies to immaterial essences which are substances and are existent-for-themselves, not to accidents, whose existence is for-other-than-themselves; that which intellects them is their substratum.

11.12. IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE IS NOT LIMITED TO SELF-KNOWLEDGE

It was said earlier that immaterial substances are in themselves present-for-themselves by virtue of their immateriality and actuality. However, is immediate knowledge confined to an entity's knowledge of itself? Or does it include a cause's knowledge of its effect and vice versa, when both of them are immaterial? The Peripatetics subscribe to the former position and the Emanationists subscribe to the latter view, which is the correct one.

That is so because the existence of the effect is dependent, as mentioned earlier,[i] on the existence of the cause, which sustains it. It is not independent of the cause. Hence, when the cause and the effect are immaterial, the effect is present with all its being for the cause, without there being any barrier between them. It is known with immediacy to the cause through its existence itself.

Similarly, when the cause and the effect are immaterial, the cause is present with its existence for its effect, which is sus-

[i] See 7.3.

tained by it, being independent through the independence of the cause, and there is no barrier separating them. Hence it is known to its effect with an immediate knowledge.

CHAPTER TWELVE
The Necessary Being, the Proofs of Its Existence, Its Attributes and Acts

12.1. THE PROOFS OF ITS EXISTENCE

THE reality of existence is necessarily existent, for it is fundamental (there being nothing fundamental except it) and absolute (*ṣirf*) (for it is not mingled with anything other than itself, as it has no other or second, as mentioned in Chapter One).[i] This is so because it is necessary for a thing to be what it is and impossible for it to be its own contradictory, which is non-existence in this case. Further, this necessity (*wujūb*) derives either from itself (*bi al-dhāt*) or from something else (*bi al-ghayr*). However, it is self-contradictory to regard this necessity as deriving from something else, for, in this case, there is no 'other,' nor a second. Hence it is necessarily existent-by-itself (*wājib al-wujūd bi al-dhāt*).

Another Proof

The quiddities, which are caused (*ma'lūl*) and contingent (*mumkin*) existents, also exist by necessity, for a thing does not come into being unless it is necessitated. However, their necessity is by virtue of something else; because were they necessary-by-themselves, they would not stand in need of a cause. Now the cause that necessitates their existence is also existent by necessity. This necessity is either by-itself or by-something-else, and this line of reasoning leads to that which is necessarily existent by-itself, because of the inadmissibility of a vicious

[i] See 1.4 and 1.7.

circle or an indefinite regress.

12.2. THE PROOF OF ITS UNITY

As the Necessarily Existent Being [*wājib al-wujūd*, henceforth referred to as "the Necessary Being"] is the reality of absolute existence (*al-wujūd al-ṣirf*), which has no other, this establishes Its unity, which is 'true unity' (*al-waḥdat al-ḥaqqah*) wherein it is impossible to assume any multiplicity. For if the reality of absolute existence were assumed to have a second, this second will turn out to be the first one due to the absence of any distinction, contrary to the case of numerical unity wherein a second, when assumed, makes it a duality, and so on and so forth.

Another Proof

If there were two or more Necessary Beings, each of them would be distinct from the other while sharing the quality of being necessarily existent. Now the factor that makes them distinct from one another has, of necessity, to be other than what they hold in common, and this entails that their essences be composed of what they hold in common and what makes them distinct from one another. This composition entails the need for parts—something that contradicts their being necessary-by-themselves [*wujūb al-dhātī,* henceforth translated as 'essential necessity'], a condition that is the criterion of absolute self-sufficiency (*al-ghinā al-ṣirf*).

A Supplementary Note

Ibn Kammūnah has formulated an objection that contests this proof. Why should it be inadmissible to suppose two simple entities (*huwiyyatān*) of unknown nature that differ from one another with all their quiddities, while each of them is a self-existing necessary being, so that the concept of existential necessity be abstracted from each of them in an accidental manner? The answer to this is that it is inadmissible because it involves the abstraction of a single concept from different entities *qua* different entities.

Moreover, this line of reasoning ascribes quiddity to the Nec-

essary Being, and it was established earlier[i] that Its quiddity is Its existence. Furthermore, it involves the derivation of existence from quiddity, whereas, as mentioned earlier, existence is fundamental (*aṣīl*) and quiddity is derived (*i'tibārī*), and the derivation of something fundamental from that which is derived makes no sense.

It follows from the unity of the Necessary Being—i.e., in this particular sense of unity—that Its existence is not limited by any limit of privation (*ḥadd 'adamī*) so as to exclude anything beyond It.

It also follows from it that Its essence is simple, without composition of any kind; for composition, whatever its form, does not occur without parts that make up the whole, whose actualization depends on the actualization of the parts that it needs, and need contradicts essential necessity.

12.3. THE NECESSARY BEING IS THE SOURCE OF EVERY BEING AND EVERY EXISTENTIAL PERFECTION

Every existent other than It is essentially contingent (*mumkin bi al-dhāt*). That is because essential necessity is exclusive to It. Every contingent being has a quiddity which is indifferent to existence and non-existence. Therefore, it needs a cause to exist. The cause necessitates its existence, whereupon it comes into being. If this cause be an existent necessary-by-itself, the argument ends there; but if it is necessary-by-something-else, the chain must ultimately terminate in that which is necessary-by-itself. Hence the Essentially Necessary Being (*al-wājib bi al-dhāt*) is that from which emanates the existence of every existent from among the quiddities.

Another Proof

As opposed to God, the Exalted, all contingent beings (*al-wujūdāt al-imkāniyyah*) are needy in themselves, dependent in their very essence. Hence they are relational existents (*wujūdāt rābiṭah*), which have no independence, neither for coming into

[i] See 4.3.

being nor for continuing to exist. They subsist through something other than themselves. This chain of dependence leads up to a being that is independent in itself, self-sufficient, free from need or dependence on anything. That being is the exalted and holy Necessary Being.

This shows that the Exalted Necessary Being is the source of emanation (*mufîḍ*) of everything else. In the same way that It is the source of their being, it is also the source of the properties (*āthār*) that subsist through them, as well as the relations and connections between them. That is so because the cause, which necessitates a thing and sustains its existence, is also the necessitating cause of its properties and their sustainer, as well as of the relations sustained by it.

Hence the Exalted Necessary Being is the sole originating source of everything else, its owner (*mālik*) and governor (*mudabbir*). Thus He is the Sustainer of the worlds and there is no sustainer besides Him.

A Supplementary Note

The dualists hold being to consist of good and evil, as two opposites that do not derive from a single source. They believe in two sources: a source of all that is good and a source of all that is evil.

Plato, in refuting them, has offered the following argument: All evil is non-being. That which is non-existent does not need a cause; rather, its 'cause' is absence of existence. He has illustrated the minor premise with examples, such as that of homicide, which is regarded as something evil. The evil in this case is not the killer's capacity to carry out the act of killing, for it is a perfection (*kamāl*) in him. Nor is it the sharpness of the sword, for instance, and its ability to cut, which is a perfection in it. Nor is it the passivity of the victim's neck in relation to the blow, which is a perfection in the body. Hence, there remains no evil except the ceasing of the victim's life as a result of the act. This is something involving non-being. The same reasoning applies to other instances of evil.

According to Aristotle, five possibilities are conceivable in this regard: (i) that which is purely good, (ii) that whose good

is greater than its evil, (iii) that whose good and evil are equal, (iv) that whose evil is greater than its good, and (v) that which is sheer evil. The first kind exists, such as the immaterial Intellects, which are wholly good. So also does the second kind, such as all the material existents, whose good is preponderant in view of the order of the universe. Had they not come into existence, a greater evil would have resulted. As to the three remaining possibilities, they do not exist. The creation of that whose good is equal to its evil would involve preponderance without a preponderant. As to that whose evil is greater than its good, its creation involves the preponderance of the non-preponderant over what is preponderant. As to that which is sheer evil, its matter is quite obvious. In summary, nothing except that which is purely good or predominantly good essentially derives from the Cause. As to that whose evil is lesser, it derives from the Cause together with the predominant good that accompanies it.

12.4. The Attributes of the Necessary Being and the Meaning of their Attribution

The Attributes of the Necessary Being are divided, firstly, into (i) the Attributes of Essence and (ii) the Attributes of Act. The Attributes of Essence are those that relate solely to the Essence, without the need to take into account anything extraneous to It, such as Its life and Its knowledge of Itself. The Attributes of Act are those which cannot be ascribed to It without taking into account what is extraneous to It, such as creation, giving life, and providing.

The Attributes of Act are many, which are abstracted in their multiplicity from Divine activity and are extraneous to the Divine Essence. Our discussion in these sections relates to the Attributes of Essence.

As we have seen above, the Exalted Necessary Being is the source of all existence and all existential perfections. It was established in the foregoing discussions that the creative cause of a thing possesses the reality of that thing to a higher and superior degree, for the giver cannot be devoid of what he gives.

Hence He, the Glorious One, possesses, in some way or other, certain attributes of perfection such as knowledge, power, and life.

As for the kinds of Attributes of Essence and His manner of possessing them, it may be observed that the Attributes are divided into (ia) the positive attributes (such as knowledge and power) and (ib) the negative attributes, the latter implying a negation. However, as we saw in the foregoing discussion, one may not negate any of the perfections in relation to God, the Exalted, for He is the source of all perfections. Hence His negative attributes signify the negation of deficiency (*naqṣ*) and need (*ḥājah*) in relation to Him, such as the negation of ignorance, incapacity, and substantiality. Since deficiency and need imply the negation of perfection, a negative attribute signifies negation of the negation of perfection, which is affirmation of perfection. Hence the negation of ignorance means negation of the negation of knowledge, which implies affirmation of knowledge.

Further, the positive Attributes are divided into (ia1) those that are 'intrinsic' (*ḥaqīqiyyah*; lit., real), such as 'the knowing,' and (ia2) those that are 'relative' (*iḍāfiyyah*), such as 'possessing power over' and 'possessing knowledge of.' The intrinsic Attributes are in turn divided into (ia1a) the 'absolutely intrinsic' ones (*ḥaqīqiyyah maḥḍah*), such as life, and (ia1b) the 'relatively intrinsic' ones (*ḥaqīqiyyah dhāt īḍāfah*), such as His knowledge of things other than Himself. There is no doubt that the relative Attributes are additional to the Divine Essence, for they are *iʿtibārī* concepts and are not applicable to the Exalted Essence. The negative Attributes derive from the positive intrinsic Attributes, and that which applies to the latter is also true of them.

There are various views concerning the intrinsic Attributes, including the absolutely intrinsic and the relatively intrinsic attributes.

One of these views is that they are identical with the Essence and each of them is identical with the other [in respect of its referent].

A second view is that they are additional to the Essence and

accompany It, being eternal like the Essence.

A third view holds that they are additional to the Essence, but not eternal.

A fourth view is that the meaning of the possession of the Attributes by the Essence is that Its acts are such as are performed by one who has these attributes. Thus the statement, 'He is knowing,' means that His acts, in respect of their perfection, purposefulness, and precision are like the acts of someone who acts with knowledge. The same applies to the other attributes. Hence the Essence is represented in the Attributes.

The first view, which is ascribed to the philosophers, is the right one. As we have seen, the Exalted Essence is the source of every existential perfection, and the source of perfection cannot be devoid of it. Hence His Essence possesses the reality of every perfection emanating from Him, and this is what is meant by the identity of the Attributes and the Essence.

Further, as each of His Attributes of perfection is identical with the Essence, which possesses all of them, It includes all the Attributes and is identical with them. Hence the Attributes differ from one another in regard to their meaning, but are one in respect to their referent, which is the Exalted Essence.

The view held by some that the cause of creation is His volition (*mashiyyah*) and will (*irādah*), not His Essence, is of no consequence. For if the will be an attribute of the Essence and identical with It, the ascription of creation to will amounts to its ascription to the Essence, and this view has nothing enlightening to offer. And if it be an attribute of Act *(ṣifat al-fi'l*), abstracted on the plane of Act, the Act would precede the will, and its dependence on the Act for coming into existence implies the precedence of the effect to the cause, which is impossible. Moreover, such a view implies that the ascription of creation and bringing into existence to God be metaphorical.

As to the second view, which is ascribed to the Ash'arites, the question arises whether or not these Attributes—which according to them are: life, power, knowledge, hearing, sight, will and speech—are caused by something. If they are not caused by anything and are self-existent and necessary in themselves, there would be eight necessary beings: the Essence and the

seven Attributes. Such a view stands refuted by the proofs of the Unity of the Necessary Being.

And if these are caused, they are either caused by the Essence or by something else. If caused by something else, they would be necessary-by-something-else, and this necessity ultimately leads up to a being that is necessary-in-itself, other than the Necessary Being of whom they are attributes. This conclusion, like the former one, is also refuted by the proof of the Unity of the Necessary Being. Moreover, it implies that the Necessary Being stands in need of something else to possess its attributes of perfection, which is impossible.

The second case [i.e. if the Attributes are supposed to have been caused by the Essence] implies that their cause precedes them in terms of causality while it is itself devoid of the perfections emanating from it, which is impossible.

Moreover, this view implies that the Essence of the Necessary Being is devoid of the attributes of perfection, whereas, as mentioned earlier, It is absolute existence, which is not devoid of existence or any existential perfection, and this involves a contradiction.

As to the third view, which is ascribed to the Karrāmiyyah, that the Attributes are additional and non-eternal, it implies that the Exalted Essence possesses a matter that receives these Attributes that come to exist in It. This implies that the Essence is composite—which is impossible—and in itself devoid of perfection—which is also impossible.

As to the fourth view—that the Essence is represented by the Attributes—which is ascribed to the Mu‘tazilah, it also implies that the Essence is devoid of them, whereas, as we have seen, It is absolute existence, which cannot be devoid of existence or any existential perfection. Hence this view involves a contradiction.

12.5. GOD’S KNOWLEDGE

It was mentioned earlier[i] that every immaterial being has

[i] See 11.11.

knowledge of itself, which is the presence of its essence for itself, which is self-knowledge.

It was also mentioned that the Exalted Essence is absolute existence not bounded by any limit, nor is it devoid of existence or any existential perfection. Hence all the details of creation, of existence and existential perfections, with their existential order, exist in It in their highest and noblest form without their being separate from one another. Hence he knows them with an undifferentiated knowledge, which at the same time discloses details (*'ilman ijmāliyyan fī 'ayn al-kashf al-tafṣīlī*).

Further, all existents, being Its effects, depend upon It with the dependence of something relative (*rābiṭ*) on that which is independent, and they are present for It with their existence. Hence It knows them with an immediate knowledge on the plane of their existences, the immaterial among them with their very being and the material ones through their immaterial forms.

This establishes that the Exalted Necessary Being has an immediate knowledge *('ilm ḥuḍūrī*) of Itself and a detailed immediate knowledge of the things before their creation on the plane of Its Essence, and that this knowledge is identical with Its Essence. It also has a detailed immediate knowledge of them on their own plane, extraneous to Its Essence. It is evident that Its knowledge of things implies also the knowledge of their knowledge [of themselves and other things].

A Supplementary Note

As hearing and seeing consist of the knowledge of that which is audible and visible, they are included in knowledge in general. Thus the attributes related to seeing and hearing have subsistence in God, the Exalted, who is the hearer and the seer in the same way as He is the knower.

Some Related Views

There are various views concerning Divine knowledge and we shall review some of the well known among them in the following.

(i) One of these views is that the Divine Being has knowledge

of Its own Essence, not of Its effects, because Its Essence is pre-eternal (*azalī*) and the existence of every effect is preceded by its non-existence (*ḥādith*).

This viewpoint, however, is not correct, because knowledge of the effect in pre-eternity does not imply that the effect existed in pre-eternity with it particular existence, as we saw above.

(ii) A second view, which is attributed to the Mu'tazilah, is that quiddities do have a kind of objective subsistence (*thubūt 'aynī*) during their non-existence (*'adam*), and it is to this that God's knowledge pertains before their coming into being.

However, as discussed earlier,[i] the notion of subsistence of non-existents is an invalid idea.

(iii) The third view, which has been ascribed to the Ṣūfīs, is that the contingent quiddities (*al-māhiyyāt al-mumkinah*) have an epistemic subsistence (*thubūt 'ilmī*) subsumed in the Names and the Attributes, and it is to this that God's knowledge pertains before creation.

However, the view that existence is fundamental and quiddities are derivative precludes the assumption of any kind of subsistence for quiddity prior to its particular external existence.

(iv) The fourth view is ascribed to Plato, who held that God's detailed knowledge of things consists of immaterial Ideas and divine archetypes that possess all the perfections of the species.

This view is also inadequate, because even if such archetypes are assumed to exist, that only helps in conceiving God's detailed knowledge of things on their own plane, not on the plane of the Essence, leaving It devoid of knowledge, whereas God is absolute existence, which is not without any existential perfection. Hence it leads to contradiction.

(v) The fifth view is attributed to Suhrawardī, who is followed by a number of authorities in holding it. According to it, all things, material and immaterial, are present with their very existence for God, the Exalted, not being hidden from Him, and this constitutes His detailed knowledge of things.

The problem with this view is that presence is inconsistent with materiality, as mentioned in the discussion on knowledge

[i] See 1.9.

and the known.[i] Moreover, it solely helps in conceiving God's detailed knowledge of things on their own plane, and, like the fourth theory, it leaves the Essence devoid of the perfection of knowledge.

(vi) The sixth view, which is ascribed to Thales of Miletus, holds that God knows the First Intellect, which is the first effect, by virtue of the presence of its essence for Him. Other things are known to Him through the reflection of their forms in the First Intellect.

The objections mentioned in relation with the previous theory apply to this view also.

(vii) The seventh view holds that God's essence has a detailed knowledge of the first effect and a non-detailed knowledge (*'ilm ijmālī*) of things below it. The essence of the first effect has a detailed knowledge of the second effect and a non-detailed knowledge of things below it, and so on.

The above-mentioned objections apply here also.

(viii) The eighth view, which has been attributed to Porphyry, is that God's knowledge is through His union (*ittiḥād*) with the known.

The problem with this theory is that it only explains the manner in which God's knowledge is realized, namely, that it involves union, not accidence (*'urūḍ*) or something of the kind. But it does not explain God's detailed knowledge of things prior to their creation. Hence it suffers from the inadequacy of the previous theories.

(ix) The ninth theory, which is ascribed to most of the later philosophers, is that God's knowledge of His own Essence is as well a non-detailed knowledge of things. Hence He knows all things in a non-detailed manner through His knowledge of His own Essence. His detailed knowledge of things is posterior to their existence, for knowledge is incident to the known and there is nothing to be known prior to the existence of the known.

This theory also suffers from the inadequacy of the previous theories. Moreover, as will be explained later on, it is inadmis-

[i] See 11.1 and 11.8.

sible to regard God's knowledge as *acquired,* and obtained through perceived forms.

(x) The tenth theory, which is ascribed to the Peripatetics, states that God's knowledge of things prior to their creation is by presence in His Essence of their quiddities, as per the existing order of being, not in the manner of a union (*ittiḥād*) or penetration (*dukhūl*), but as universals sustained by the Essence through a mental subsistence. It is universal in the sense that it does not change with the changes of the known thing. Hence it is a foreknowledge *('ilm 'inā'ī*) wherein cognitive apprehension is accompanied by its objective realization. This view is subscribed to by most of the theologians (*mutakallimūn*), though they have [erroneously] faulted it in respect of its assertion of universality in Divine knowledge [due to their misunderstanding of the term 'universal']. Thus they hold God's knowledge to be an acquired one prior to creation, remaining unchanged before and after the existence of things.

This theory suffers from the inadequacies of the previous ones, in addition to the fact that it ascribes acquired knowledge to an existent that is immaterial in essence and actuality. However, as mentioned in the discussions on knowledge and the known,[i] an existent that is immaterial in its essence and in actuality cannot have acquired knowledge. Moreover, this view posits mental existence without there being any external existent to which it should correspond, which entails another objective existence of the external existent prior to its particular objective existence separate from God, and hence it boils down to the fourth view mentioned above.

12.6. THE ATTRIBUTE OF POWER

As mentioned earlier,[ii] the attribute of power means that an entity be a knowing source of its acts. It is known that contingent existents derive from the Divine Essence, for there is nothing beyond contingent existents except the unconditioned Nec-

[i] See the Conclusion at the end of Chapter Ten.
[ii] See 11.10.

essary Being. Hence God is the source of everything and His knowledge is identical with His Essence, which is the source of contingent effects. Hence He has power and it is identical with His Essence.

Now if someone were to say that a human being's voluntary actions are a creation of the human soul, for they are incident to his will: he performs them if he likes and refrains from performing them if he so wills. Had they been created by God and determined by Him, man would be compelled (*mujbir*) in his acts, not a free actor who acts out of his free choice (*mukhtār*). Hence man's voluntary acts (*al-afʿāl al-ikhtiyāriyyah*) lie outside the ambit of Divine power, which does not encompass everything.

The answer to this is that the meaning of the voluntary character of an act is not that it remains neutral in its relation to existence and non-existence until its coming into being; for it is impossible for a contingent to come into being without there being a preponderant on the side of existence or that of non-existence. Rather, by virtue of its essential contingency, a voluntary action requires a complete cause for coming into existence. Hence when the cause exists it cannot fail to exist, for its relation to the cause is one of necessity. However, its relation to man, who is a part from among the parts of a complete cause, is one of contingency, similar to that of its other parts, such as a receptive matter, other temporal and spatial conditions, and so on.

Hence the voluntary act does occur without becoming necessary-by-something-else, like all other effects, and it is evident that something that is necessary-by-something-else does not actualize without ultimately terminating in that which is necessary-by-itself, and there is nothing necessary-by-itself except God, the Exalted. Hence His power is all-encompassing and includes even the acts of free will.

Considering the same problem from another angle, voluntary acts, like other contingents, are caused, and, as mentioned in the chapter on cause and effect,[i] the existence of an effect is

[i] See 11.3.

relative (*rābiṭ*) in relation to its cause, and is not realized except through dependence on something independent that may sustain it. There is nothing that is independent-in-itself except that which is necessary-in-itself. Hence God is the primary source of all effects dependent for their existence on a cause, and He has power over all things.

Now if someone were to say: If the acts of free will were subject to Divine power it would imply that they are compelled (*jabarī*); for it means that voluntary actions depend on the Divine will, which is never frustrated. Hence their occurrence is necessary, and, as a result, man is compelled in his voluntary acts, and not free.

Also, considering the issue from yet another angle, since God has prior knowledge of every act that takes place, its occurrence is necessary; for otherwise it would not be knowledge but ignorance, which is far from God's station. Hence the voluntary acts are compelled, not free.

Our answer is that the case is indeed not such, because the Divine will relates to man's actions as they are in themselves, and as such they remain attributed to the person who is part of the complete cause. Their being subject to the Divine will does not change what they are. Hence the subjection of the actions to the Divine will is through man's free choice, and it was God's will that man should perform such and such acts out of his own free will, and it is impossible for His will to be frustrated.

A similar answer may be given to the objection based on the subjection of voluntary acts to God's pre-eternal knowledge. For acts of free will are subject to God's knowledge as they are, that is, as voluntary actions which one can perform or refrain from performing, and the knowledge of something does not alter its reality. Hence, if the act were to occur without the exercise of free will, that would imply ignorance on God's behalf.

Someone might say that this explanation of Divine power—i.e. on the basis of the dependence of the existence of a contingent effect on its becoming necessary-by-something-else and the termination of this necessity in that which is necessary-in-itself—leads to a conclusion contrary to what was intended. That is because the necessity of God's acts implies that He is

compelled by necessity. In other words, His acts are forced upon Him by necessity and it is impossible for Him not to carry them out. In view of this, Divine omnipotence becomes meaningless.

The answer to this is that necessity, as we know, is abstracted from existence. In the same way as the effect's existence is derived from the cause, so also its necessity-by-something-else derives from the cause, and it is impossible that a property characterizing a thing's existence should in turn affect the existence of the cause that creates the property in it. Hence it is impossible that the necessity that God's acts derive from Him should in turn make the act necessary upon Him and deprive Him of His omnipotence, which is identical with His Essence.

From what has been said, it becomes clear that God, the Exalted, is a free actor by essence; for there can be no compulsion except from something extraneous to an agent that may force it to act contrary to its will, and there is nothing extraneous to God except His Act, which is in harmony with the agent. Hence, His Acts are what His Essence requires and chooses.

12.7. THE ATTRIBUTE OF LIFE

For us something 'living' means a conscious agent (*al-darrāk al-fa'āl*). That is, life is the source of consciousness and activity, or the source of knowledge and power, or anything associated with knowledge and power. If the predicate 'living' is applicable to us as human beings, while knowledge and power are additional to our essences, it is predicable, with greater reason, of the Essence of the Necessary Being, in whom they exist with their very reality. Hence God, the Exalted, is Life and is the Living One by virtue of His Essence.

Moreover, God, the Exalted, is the source of the life of every living being, and the giver of a thing cannot be devoid of it.

12.8. THE ATTRIBUTES OF WILL AND SPEECH

The metaphysicians state that God's will (*irādah*) is His knowledge of the best [possible] order of the universe. In other

words, it is His knowledge that a certain act is good. Hence, in the same way as His being the 'hearer' and the 'seer' (which mean His knowledge of that which is audible and visible) are two aspects of His knowledge, His will is also an aspect of His knowledge, which is identical with His Essence.

It is also said that speech, as we know it, consists of words, which signify meanings in one's mind. Hence a word is a 'conventional existent' (*mawjūd i'tibārī*), which by virtue of conventional signification (*dalālah waḍ'iyyah*) signifies another existent in the mind. And should there be a real existent that signifies another existent with a 'natural' signification (*dalālah ṭab'iyyah*)—such as an effect, which signifies its own cause—and should its attribute of perfection manifest the consummate perfection of its cause, then it can be called a 'word' (*kalām*) with greater reason due to the strength of its signification. If it were a being unitary in its essence (*aḥadī al-dhāt*),[23] whose essential attributes of perfection, which by virtue of the details of its perfection and its effects (*āṭhār*) manifest that unitary being, which is the Necessary Being, it is worthier of being called a 'speaker.' Hence He is the 'Speaker' (*mutakallim*) by virtue of the existence of His Essence for Himself.

I say: In this view, the concepts of Divine will and speech are reduced to an aspect of knowledge and power.[24] Accordingly, it is not necessary to consider them in separation from knowledge and power. As to the will and speech that are attributed to God, the Exalted, in the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah,* they refer to the attributes of Act, in the sense to be explained shortly, God willing.

12.9. THE DIVINE ACT AND ITS DIVISIONS

God's Act (i.e. creation), in the sense of existence emanating from Him, has various divisions in accordance with the conclusions of the previous discussions, such as its division into material and immaterial, changeable and unchangeable, and so on.

Our purpose here is to make a passing reference to that which

has already been mentioned,[i] that there are three realms: the realm of the Intellect (*ʻālam al-ʻaql*), the imaginal realm (*ʻālam al-mithāl*), and the material realm (*ʻālam al-māddah*).

The realm of the Intellect is immaterial and without matter and its properties (*āthār*).

The imaginal world is also devoid of matter without however being devoid of its properties, such as spatial dimension, shape, configuration, and so on. It contains bodily images (*ashbāḥ*) which are analogous in their characteristics to bodies in the material realm and with an order that is similar to their order in the material world. But they do not succeed one another in respect of existence, nor do they change from one form to another or from one state to another by passing from potentiality to actuality by motion, as is the case in the material world. Thus the imaginal forms in their succeeding one another are similar to the subjective imaginary forms in respect of change and motion. As knowledge is immaterial and there is no potentiality or change in it, it is knowledge of change, not change of knowledge.

The material world, together with its substances and accidents, is associated with matter.

These threefold realms stand in an existential hierarchy. Thus the realm of the Intellect existentially precedes the imaginal world, and the imaginal world existentially precedes the material world. That is because absolute actuality, without any trace of potentiality, is existentially stronger and powerful than that which has either pure potentiality or traces of potentiality in it. Hence that which is immaterial has existential precedence over that which is associated with matter.

Further, the immaterial Intellect is least bound by limits and conditions and is existentially more expansive and simpler than the immaterial imaginal form (*al-mithāl al-mujarrad*), and whenever an existent is stronger and more expansive, its precedence is greater in the graded hierarchy of existence and it is nearer to the First Source, which is absolute existence, without any limits and not lacking any perfection. Hence the world of

[i] See 11.2.

the Intellect existentially precedes all being, and below it is the imaginal world, below which is the material world.

From what has been said it becomes clear that the above-mentioned hierarchy is one based on causality. That is, the world of the Intellect is the emanating cause (*mufīḍ*) of the imaginal world and the imaginal world is the emanating cause of the material world.

It also becomes clear from that which was stated earlier—that the cause possesses the perfection of its effect to a higher and superior degree—that the threefold worlds correspond to one another. Thus the imaginal world has an imaginal order corresponding to the material order while being superior to it, and the world of Intellect has an order corresponding to it while being simpler and more undifferentiated (*ajmal*), and to it corresponds the divine order (*al-niẓām al-rabawī*) that exists in the knowledge of the Exalted Necessary Being.

12.10. THE IMMATERIAL INTELLECTS AND THE POSSIBLE MANNER OF THEIR MULTIPLICITY

It should be known that without association with matter quiddity is not subject to multiplicity in terms of individuation. The proof of it is that numerical multiplicity is either (i) by virtue of complete quiddity or (ii) part of it, or (iii) by virtue of a non-separable accident, or (iv) by a separable accident. It is impossible for a quiddity to have any individuals in the first three cases, for in each of these cases an individual would itself be multiple when found, and every multitude is composed of individuals. Thus each of the individuals would necessarily have to be a multiplicity in order to be an instance of its quiddity, whereas this multiplicity in turn would be comprised of individuals. This leads to an indefinite regress and does not yield an individual member. Therefore, its individual cannot actualize, and hence multiplicity, too, remains non-actualized. This involves a contradiction. Therefore, multiplicity does not occur except by virtue of a separable accident, which requires a receptive matter for its association with quiddity. Hence, every quiddity possessing a multiplicity of individuals is material,

and so, conversely, every immaterial quiddity, which is existentially immaterial, does not have multiple individuals.

Yes, there can be a multiplicity of individuals in the immaterial Intellects where an individual from a material species, such as man, develops by substantial motion from the plane of materiality and potentiality to the plane of immateriality and actuality, whereat its distinctive individual characteristics associated with its material origin accompany it.

Further, since it is impossible that there should be a multiplicity of individuals in the immaterial Intellect, any multiplicity therein would be a multiplicity of species, in the sense that each separate species of it will be confined to a unique individual. This is conceivable in two ways, vertical and horizontal. As to vertical multiplicity, it means that there be a definite number of Intellects each of which is the efficient cause of the succeeding Intellect of a different species. In horizontal multiplicity, there would be different multiple species none of whom is the cause or the effect of another and all of whom are effects of the Intellect above them.

12.11. The Vertical Intellects and the First of Them

Since the Necessary Being is one and simple in all respects, it is impossible for something multiple to emanate from It, irrespective of whether it is immaterial, such as the horizontal Intellects, or material, like the material species. That is because nothing except what is one can emanate from that which is one. Hence, the first to emanate from God is the Intellect that with its 'quasi unitary existence' (*wujūd al-wāḥid al-ḍillī*) reflects the existence of the Necessary Being in Its unity.

As its being the first means its existential precedence over other contingent existents, it is the intermediate cause between God and other entities to emanate from Him. In this there is no limiting of the absolute power of the Necessary Being, which is identical with its exalted Essence in accordance with the proof

mentioned earlier.[i] That is because, as mentioned before,[ii] it is impossible that something multiple *qua* multiple should emanate from something one *qua* one, and power relates only to that which is possible. That which is essentially impossible, being intrinsically void, has no reality to be the subject of Divine power—such as a thing's not being what it is, and the simultaneous truth or falsehood of two contradictories, for instance. Hence their impossibility of existence does not imply a limitation on God's power or its absoluteness.

Further, the First Intellect, though one in its being and simple in its emanation, has a quiddity—which is derivative and non-fundamental—by virtue of its contingency, for quiddity is the locus of contingency. Considering the matter from yet another angle, since the First Intellect intellects its own essence as well as the Necessary Being, it has multiple aspects, and for this reason it can be the source of more than a single effect.

However, the aspects (*jihāt*) existent in the imaginal world, which is below the world of the Intellect, are so numerous that the few aspects of the First Intellect are not sufficient to emanate it. Hence it has to bring into being the Second Intellect, then the Third Intellect and so on and so forth until the number of aspects of multiplicity reaches the number necessary for the creation of the imaginal realm below it.

From this, it becomes clear that there are multiple vertical Intellects (*al-ʿuqūl al-ṭūliyyah*), although there is no way of determining their number.

12.12. THE HORIZONTAL INTELLECTS

The Emanationists posit the existence of the horizontal Intellects (*al-ʿuqūl al-ʿaraḍiyyah*), between whom there is no relation of causality and which correspond to the material species in the material world, each of them governing its respective species. They are called the 'lords of the species' (*arbāb al-*

[i] See 12.6 above.
[ii] See 7.4.

anwā'), or Platonic Ideas, so called because Plato was persistent in his advocacy of them. The Peripatetics reject them and attribute their governing function to the last of the vertical Intellects, which they call 'the Active Intellect' (*al-'aql al-fa''āl*).

However, those who posit the reality of the horizontal Intellects, differ in their views concerning them. According to the soundest of them, as reported, at the outset of its existence each material species has an immaterial individual possessing all the possible perfections of that species in actuality. It attends to the material individuals of its species and governs them through the means of its specific form. Thus it develops them from potentiality to actuality by impelling them in their substantial motion by virtue of its subordinate accidental motions.

They have advanced various arguments in favour of their view. According to one of them the vegetative faculties (*al-quwā al-nabātiyyah*), such as those of nourishment, growth, and reproduction, are accidents in the bodies of the plants. These faculties undergo change with changes occurring in their bodies, and disintegrate with their disintegration. The plants have no consciousness or cognition, and it is impossible that they themselves should be the generative source of these varied compositions and activities, and the source of the beautiful shapes and graceful contours that accord with a precise and perfect order that confounds the human mind. Hence, there must be an immaterial intelligent substance that governs them and guides them towards their goal of perfection.

However, the problem with this view is that it is also possible to ascribe to something else the acts that they attribute to the 'lord of the species,' for the functions of every species depend on its specific form and, it may be said, that above it is the last vertical Intellect posited by the Peripatetics, which they call the 'Active Intellect.'

Another argument they have advanced is that the species found in this world of ours, with their constant and unchanging order, are not a creature of accident. Hence this permanent and unceasing order has real causes which are nothing but the immaterial substances that bring the species into being and attend to them and govern them, not as imagined by some people who,

on the basis of an unfounded conjecture, ascribe them to the actions and properties of the temperaments (*amzijah*) and the like. Rather, every species has a universal archetype (*mithāl kullī*) that governs it. What is meant by 'universality' here is not correspondence to a multiplicity of referents. What is meant is that, by virtue of its immateriality, the archetype has an equal relation to all the individuals of its species.

The difficulty with this view is that the actions and properties associated with every species derive from its specific form, and had it not been for this, the specificity of the species would not have actualized. Hence the accidents particular to every species are evidence that there exists a substantial form, which is their immediate source, in the same way as common accidents are evidence that there is a common substratum.

Hence the agent of the prevailing order in a species is the specific form, and the agent of the specific form, as mentioned earlier,[i] is an immaterial substance that brings it into being in a matter possessing potential (*isti'dād*). Hence the forms differ with the differing levels of potential. However, this argument is not sufficient to establish whether this immaterial substance that brings the species into being and governs it is an horizontal Intellect associated with a certain species, or if it is a vertical Intellect presiding over all the species.

Another argument that has been advanced by the proponents of this view rests on the basis of the 'principle of the nobler contingent' (*qā'idah imkān al-ashraf*). There is an established philosophical principle according to which whenever there exists a baser contingent (*al-mumkin al-akhass*), it is necessary for a nobler contingent (*al-mumkin al-ashraf*) to exist prior to it. There is no doubt that the immaterial man, for instance, who possesses all the perfections of humanity in act, is existentially nobler than the material human being, which is in potentiality in relation to most of its perfections. Hence, the existence of the material human being found in this world is the evidence of its archetype (*mithāl*) in the realm of the Intellect, which is the lord of its species.

[i] See 6.7.

However, the condition for the application of the principle of nobler contingent is that the baser and the nobler share a common specific quiddity so that the base existence of the baser may imply the possibility of the nobler in external reality in accordance with its quiddity. The mere applicability of a conception to something does not necessarily make its referent an individual of its species, in the same manner as the application of the conception of knowledge to immediate knowledge does not imply its being a psychic quality. Therefore it is possible that a universal Intellect *(ʿaql kullī*) from among the vertical Intellects may be the referent, for instance, of the conception of universal man intellected by us. That universal Intellect may possesses all the primary and secondary perfections of the material human species, so that the conception of 'man' may be applicable to it due to its possessing the existential perfection of man, though not because it is a member of the human species.

In short, the applicability of the concept of man, for instance, to the immaterial universal man intellected by us does not imply that the object of our intellection is an individual possessing the quiddity of man so that it be regarded as an archetype of the human species in the realm of the Intellect.

12.13. The Imaginal World

It is also called the 'intermediate realm' (*barzakh*, lit. barrier) due to its being situated between the immaterial realm of the Intellect and the realm of material substances. It is also referred to as *al-khiyāl al-munfaṣil* (lit. 'separate imagination,' that is an imaginal realm separate from and independent of an imagining subject) due to its being independent of animal imagination (*al-khiyāl al-ḥayawānī*), which is a subjective faculty.

As mentioned, it is a plane of immaterial existence possessing material properties. In it are particular substantial forms created by the last of the vertical Intellects—the 'Active Intellect' of the Peripatetics—or one of the horizontal Intellects of the Emanationists. They are a multitude in accordance with the multiplicity of aspects of the Intellect that emanates them.

These forms appear to others as different shapes without this difference of shapes compromising the individual unity of any of them.

12.14. THE MATERIAL WORLD

It is the world that we perceive, at the lowest and the basest plane of existence. The association with matter of the forms that exist in it and its association with potentiality (*quwwah*) and potential (*isti'dād*) distinguish it from the other realms. The perfections of every existent in it are in potentiality at the beginning, after which it advances by gradual motion towards actuality, from which obstacles often hamper it. Hence it is a world of interference and conflict.

Physical investigations and mathematical studies that have been carried out until the present have discovered many things about the parts of this world and their configurations and relations as well as their prevailing order, and, perhaps, that which remains unknown far exceeds what is known.

This world with the existential relation between its parts is essentially a unity in flux, moving with its substance and its accompanying accidents. Superimposed on this general motion are the particular substantial motions of plants, animals, and human beings. The final end, where this motion will cease, is complete immateriality, as mentioned in the chapter on actuality and potentiality.[i]

Since this world is in motion with its substance and essentially in flux, its essence is identical with renewal and change. Hence it is valid to consider it as deriving from a fixed cause. The fixed unchanging agent has created its renewing being, not that it first brought it into existence and then caused its being to undergo renewal. Such a picture avoids the problems that may arise from the notion of the dependence of the changeable on the unchangeable and the relation of something temporal *(ḥādith)* to the eternal (*qadīm*).

[i] See 10.11.

Here the book concludes, and all praise belongs to Allah. Its compilation was completed on the seventh day of Rajab in the year 1390 H./[September 8, 1970] in the sacred shrine of al-Imam al-Riḍā, may the best of salutations and blessings be upon him.

Translator's Endnotes

[1] Jal¡l al-D¢n Mu¦ammad b. As'ad al-K¡zer£n¢, known as 'All¡mah Daww¡n¢ (830-908/1431-1502), was one of the major Iranian thinkers of the period following the Mongol invasion. His works in philosophy, logic, ethics and *kal¡m* include: *Shar¦ Hay¡kil al-N£r, Risal¡h fi Ithb¦t al-W¡jib*, *Ris¡lah fi Ta'r¢f 'Ilm al-Kal¡m*, *al-Ta¥awwuf wa al-'Irf¡n*, *Akhl¡q-e Jal¡l¢* or *al-Ishr¡q fi Mak¡rim al-Akhl¡q, Ris¡lah fi al-Jabr wa al-Ikhtiy¡r, Ris¡lah fi al-Taw¦¢d, Ris¡lah fi Af'¡l All¡h, Unm£dhaj al-'Ul£m* on physical science, and glosses on such works as *Tahdh¢b al-Man§iq, Shar¦ al-Ma§¡li' fi al-Man§iq, Shar¦ al-'A¤udi*, *°ikmat al-'Ayn,* al-Jurj¡n¢'s *al-Mu¦¡kam¡t,* two glosses on al-Qawshaj¢'s *Shar¦ al-Tajr¢d*, and *Shar¦ al-Shamsiyyah*.

[2] Mu¦ammad b. 'Umar Fakhr al-D¢n al-R¡z¢ (d. 606/1209), one of the most famous theologians and commentators of the Qur'¡n, was among the first to systematize *kal¡m* on a philosophical basis. Sabzav¡r¢ in *Shar¦ Ghurar al-Far¡'id* ascribes the view to R¡z¢ that knowledge is a relation between the knowing subject and the known object. However, Shah¢d Murta¤¡ Mu§ahhar¢, in *Shar¦-e Mabs£§-e Man¨£meh*, vol. i, p. 273, traces this view to Ab£ al-°asan al-Ash'ar¢ (d. *circa* 330/941). Mu§ahhar¢ is of the view that the problem of mental existence was first posed by R¡z¢ and after him by Khw¡jah Na¥¢r al-D¢n al-±£s¢ (597-672/1201-1274). Hence the theologians first posed the problem before it entered the discussions of Muslim philosophers. However, after ±£s¢ the problem became one of the most controversial issues hotly debated by philosophers and theologians. Before the problem was dealt with in a satisfactory manner by Mull¡ ¯adr¡, it developed in the thought and writings of the philosophers of the Shiraz school such as Jal¡l al-D¢n al-Daww¡n¢, Sayyid ¯adr al-D¢n al-Dashtak¢ (d. 903/1497), known as al-Sayyid al-Sanad, his son Ghiy¡th al-D¢n al-Dashtak¢ (d. 948/1541), and Shams al-D¢n al-Khufr¢ (d. *circa* 960/1553).

As Martyr Mu§ahhar¢ points out, the problem of mental existence was never posed in Greek philosophy and was first raised by Muslim philosophers. For instance, there is no mention of the term 'mental existence'

(*al-wuj£d al- dhihnø*) in the works of F¡r¡bø, to say nothing of a chapter under this head. Ibn Sønå discusses the problem of knowledge in his books, but does not discuss any problems associated with the conception of mental existence. The problem was raised and discussed by ±£sø in his work *al-Tajrød*. Shahød Mu§ahharø considers him to be the first philosopher to deal with the problem (*Shar¦-e Mabs£§-e Man¨£meh*, vol. i, p. 288). He points out that the notion of mental existence was implicit in the writings of Ibn Sønå, where it did not receive any elaborate attention. ±£sø not only dealt with the problem but also advanced a proof in favour of mental existence. He made the following statement in this regard: "Existence is classified into mental and external existence. Otherwise (that is, if we do not include mental existence in this division and reject the concept of mental existence) all factual propositions (*al-qa¤iyyat al-¦aqøqiyyah*) would be void."

To explain, Muslim logicians classify propositions into 'external' (*kh¡rijiyyah*), 'factual' (¦*aqøqiyyah*), and 'mental' *(dhihniyyah*) propositions. According to Martyr Mu§ahharø (*Shar¦-e Mabs£§-e Man¨£meh*, vol. i, p. 288), it was Ibn Sønå who first recognized the distinction between 'factual' and 'external' propositions. An external proposition is a universal categorical proposition in which something is asserted of a class of existents in external reality (e.g. 'All persons now living on the earth's surface are under the age of 150 years). 'Factual' propositions are universal categorical propositions in which something is asserted of a class on the basis of its universal nature, irrespective of whether the individuals belonging to it exist in external reality or not and irrespective of whether their existence pertains to the past, the present, or the future (e.g. 'Iron expands as a result of being heated'). In a factual proposition, that which is asserted of a thing depends on its essence, and the scope of the assertion is obviously greater than the class of its existing members. That is, while it includes the actual instances of it occurring in external reality, it also includes all its possible instances.

In view of the above explanation, ±£sø's argument can be put as follows: If the essences of things did not exist in the mind, factual propositions would be impossible. Since the mind is capable of making assertions of a scope wider than that of external reality, it proves that these essences exist in the mind which makes such assertions about them as are represented by factual propositions.

[3] 'Al¢ b. Mu¦ammad 'Al¡' al-D¢n al-Samarqand¢, known as F¡¤il Qawshaj¢ (d. 879/1474), was one of the celebrated theologians and a mathematician and astronomer as well. His commentary on the *Tajr¢d al-kal¡m* of Na¥¢r al-D¢n al-±£s¢ is considered one of the major works of Kal¡m. In it he anticipates Mull¡ ¯adr¡'s theory of substantial motion (*al-¦arakat al-jawhariyyah*).

[4] This refers to Mu¦ammad b. Ibr¡h¢m ¯adr al-D¢n al-°usayn¢ al-Sh¢r¡z¢ al-Dashtak¢ (d. 903/1497), known as al-Sayyid al-Sanad, a famous theologian-philosopher. He wrote a gloss on Qawshaj¢'s commentary on *Tajr¢d al-kal¡m* and a gloss on Qu§b al-D¢n al-R¡z¢'s commentary on *al-Shamsiyyah*, a work on logic.

[5] ¯adr al-D¢n Mu¦ammad b. Ibr¡h¢m b. Ya¦y¡ al-Shir¡z¢ (d. 1050/1640), known as Mull¡ ¯adr¡ and ¯adr al-Muta'allih¢n (the Head of the Divine Philosphers), was one of the greatest of Muslim philosophers and the greatest thinker of the ¯afavid era. He founded the school of *a¥al¡t al-wuj£d* (the fundamentality of existence) and advanced the theory of substantial motion, which have influenced all philosophical thought in Iran until the present.

[6] The meaning of 'primary' and 'common' modes of predication may be made further explained by likening them to the concepts of 'intension' (or connotation) and 'extension' (or denotation) in logic. This is how one writer explains the meaning of intension and extension: "The subject and predicate in a proposition are called the terms of the proposition. A term may be viewed in two ways, either as a class of objects (which may, in cases, have only one member), or as a set of attributes or characteristics which determine the objects. The first aspect is called the denotation or extension of the term, while the second is called the connotation or intension. Thus the extension of the term 'philosopher' is 'Socrates,' 'Plato,' 'Thales,' and the like; its intension is 'lover of wisdom,' 'intelligent,' and so on. . . . Why a term is applied to a set of objects is indicated by its intension, the set of objects to which it is applicable constitutes its extension." The term 'primary predication' refers to the intensional aspect of a universal, whereas 'common predication' refers to its extensional aspect and the set of objects to which it is applicable.

[7] Though the author is not explicit as to what he is referring to by ¦¡l (state) and *malakah* (habit), he appears to refer to percepts and concepts, respectively, by these terms. That is, a percept, while it is present before

the mind during sensory perception, is a 'state' of the soul, while a concept or idea present in the intellect is a 'habit' for it. The former is passing and transitory, while the latter is, relatively, enduring.

[8] *"alam al-mith¡l*, the Imaginal world is the realm of imaginal forms, which though immaterial and above the realm of matter have certain characteristics common with material bodies such as geometric form, size, and spatial dimensions. Besides the objective imaginal realm, there is the subjective realm of imaginal forms. Thus all visual forms, whether perceived or imagined by the mind or seen in dreams are immaterial and possess an immateriality (*tajarrud*) which is 'imaginal' (*mith¡l¢*).

[9]Martyr Mu§ahhar¢ in *Shar¦-e Mabs£§-e Man¨£meh*, vol. iii, pp. 24-31, considers this division of 'existence' into 'existence-in-itself' and 'existence-in-something-else' as one relating to the concept of existence and to language, rather than to existence itself. Apparently, it refers to the two uses of the word 'to be' in statements of the type 'Zayd is' (in the sense of 'Zayd is existent,' which may be stated in Arabic as '*Zaydun mawj£dun*'; wherein Zayd is the subject and *mawj£d* is the predicate signifying the existence of Zayd. Here the word 'is' signifies an independent meaning of 'existence' and hence the term 'predicative existence' for 'existence-in-itself') and 'Zayd is standing.' In the latter statement, 'is' does not have a meaning independent of 'Zayd' and 'standing' and serves only to relate 'Zayd' and 'standing.' Hence the term *al-wuj£d al-r¡bi§,* or copulative existence, for 'existence-in-something-else.'

[10] Martyr Mu§ahhar¢ (in *Shar¦-e Mabs£§-e Man¨£meh*, vol. iii, pp. 28-31) has pointed out that the classification of existence into 'existence-in-itself' and 'existence-in-something-else' is a subjective one relating to the concept of existence, whereas the divisions of existence into 'for-itself' and 'for-something-else,' and into 'by-itself' and 'by-something-else,' relate to the world of objective reality. He is of the opinion that '*r¡bi§*" (copulative) here means something different from '*r¡bi§*" in the context of Mull¡ ¯adr¡'s statement that all things have a *r¡bi§* (relative) existence and only God's existence is independent. That is, the very being of an effect is the causal relation with its cause. It is not the case that such an entity has a separate being and that being has a relation with its cause; rather its very being is the relation and connection with the cause. Hence, in this translation, we have translated '*r¡bi§*" when used in the first sense as 'copulative' and when used in the second sense as 'relative.'

According to Martyr Mu§ahhar¢ there is a confusion in Sabzav¡r¢'s *Shar¦ Ghurar al-Far¡'id* between the two meanings of *r¡bi§,* which has found way into the present work which is based on Sabzav¡r¢'s. Martyr Mu§ahhar¢ refers to the following passage of Sabzav¡r¢ in his criticism: "Our considering the accident as existent 'in itself for-something-else,' and the substance as existent 'in-itself, for itself by-something-else,' does not contradict what has been established in its proper place; namely, that the 'existence' of whatever is not the One and the Unique is sheer copulative existence, because what is being dealt with here concerns the relations between 'contingent' things themselves. Otherwise, all of them are sheer 'copulatives,' having no self-subsistence in relation to Him. They are nothing but phantoms and images; by themselves. They are all 'nothing' and 'unrealities.' " (*The Metaphysics of Sabzav¡r¢,* translated by Mahdi Mohaghegh and Toshihico Izutsu, Tehran: Iran University Press, 1983, p. 99).

Moreover, as Martyr Mu§ahhar¢ points out (in *Shar¦-e MukhtaΥar-e Man¨£meh*, vol. i, p. 230) this classification of "existence" into "existence-in-itself" and "existence-in-something-else" is unrelated to the second classification of "existence-in-itself" into "for-itself" and "for-something-else."

[11] According to Martyr Mu§ahhar¢, this classification—as opposed to the foregoing one, which relates to language and meaning—is related to the world of objective reality.

[12] The author follows the sequence in Sabzav¡r¢'s presentation in *Shar¦ Ghurar al-Far¡'id.* Martyr Mu§ahhar¢ (*Shar¦-e MukhtaΥar-e Man¨£meh*, vol. i, pp. 43-45) is of the opinion that this issue properly belongs in a later chapter on theology and it is not appropriate to raise it here. He further points out (p. 45, footnote) that the argument offered here is 'extraordinarily weak,' for it is based on the doctrine of fundamental reality of quiddity, which regards existence as something accidental that 'occurs' to quiddity.

[13] In *Shar¦ Ghurar al-Far¡'d*, Sabzav¡r¢ mentions six points of difference between 'essential contingency' and 'possibility by virtue of potential.' Martyr Mu§ahhar¢, after discussing these in *Shar¦-e Mabs£§-e Man¨£meh*, vol. iii, pp. 234-241, remarks that the question whether essential contingency is essentially different from possibility by virtue of potential has not been adequately dealt with by Muslim philosophers. He further re-

marks that Mull¡ ¯adr¡'s statements regarding this matter are difficult to reconcile. Martyr Mu§ahhar¢ suggests that the question is answerable on the basis of the doctrine of *a¥¡lat al-wuj£d*. His own conclusion is that the two concepts are closely related though different on two points:

(i) In accordance with the theory of *a¥¡lat al-wuj£d*, if we ascribe essential contingency to quiddity, that ascription is accidental (*bi al-'ara¤*) and figurative, in the sense that essential contingency is ascribed to quiddity due to its association with existence. That is, when we say that quiddity has possibility of existence, what is meant is that quiddity has the possibility of coming into existence accidentally because of its association with existence. One the other hand, possibility by virtue of potential is an actual possibility pertaining to a specific thing B which may come into existence as a result of A's possessing the potential for it.

(ii) The second difference is that essential contingency is ascribed to quiddity as an abstract general concept, whereas possibility by virtue of potential is not ascribed to a concept but relates to a particular thing at a specific time.

[14] Martyr Mu§ahhar¢ points out (*Shar¦-e Mabs£ʃ-e Man¨£meh*, vol. iii, p. 253) that in accordance with the theory of fundamental reality of existence quiddity cannot possess contingency in the sense ascribed to it here. It is existence which is cause or effect, and quiddity as such lies outside the domain of causality. Quiddity *qua* quiddity is neither existent nor non-existent in itself, and being or non-being is ascribed to it due to its association with existence. Hence the discussion in this chapter is inspired by the notion of fundamental reality of quiddity, according to which it is quiddity which assumes existence or non-existence. From the viewpoint of the theory of fundamental reality of existence, quiddity represents no more than the limits of a finite existent.

[15] According to Muslim metaphysicians, there are several conceptual stages involved in conceiving quiddity as coming into being: (1) the conception of quiddity (*taqarrur*), (2) the affirmation of its contingency (*imk¡n*), (3) its need for a cause (*i¦tiyj*), (4) the cause's necessitating it (*¢j¡b*), (5) the becoming necessary of the caused (*wuj£b*), (6) the cause's bringing the caused into existence (*¢j¡d*), (7) the existence of the caused (*wuj£d*), (8) the coming into existence of quiddity after being non-existent (*¦ud£th*). These conceptual stages are expressed by the statement: "*Al-shay'u qurrira fa amkana, fa a¦t¡ja fa awjaba, fa wujiba fa awjada, fa wujida fa*

¦*adatha*."

[16] For example, in the conception of man as a 'rational animal,' 'rational' accompanies 'animal.' 'Animal' is regarded as 'matter' for the rational soul, which represents the 'form.'

[17] A salient feature of Islamic metaphysics is its conception of cause. The efficient cause stands on a higher existential plane than the effect. In other words, the cause-effect relationship is a vertical one, not horizontal. Some modern Western philosophers appear to conceive the First Cause as standing on the same existential plane as that of the world of material phenomena, as if the First Cause were first by virtue of its being first in a temporal causal sequence. For instance, Bertrand Russell writes: "The First-Cause argument is simple. It points out that everything finite has a cause, which in turn has a cause, and so on. This series of previous causes cannot, it is maintained, be infinite, and the first term in the series must itself be uncaused, since otherwise it would not be the first term. There is therefore an uncaused cause of everything, and this is obviously God... The First-Cause argument rests in the assumption that every series must have a first term, which is false; for example, the series of proper fractions has no first term." (*History of Western Philosophy*, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1975, p. 568)

These remarks show that Russell considers the concept of the First Cause to be the result of the denial of the possibility of a series without a first term! However, he has misconstrued the First-Cause argument, for it does not state that every series must have a first term, but that the character of the terms involved in the present series, which consists of effects, requires that it must have a first term, a cause that is not an affect. Moreover, it is not a temporal series in which subsequent terms are effects of antecedent causes. The metaphysical conception of causality involved here should not be confused with the common-sense conception of causation, nor with the scientific notion of it (as the determination of an event by antecedent events). Further, Muslim philosophers have generally held the universe to be beginning-less, thus positing the admissibility of a series of physical events which has no first term. Therefore, the First-Cause argument does not rest on a lack of mathematical imagination, as implied by Russell.

The priority of the First Cause derives from its being the absolute source of all existence. Formless and without quiddity, It transcends be-

coming, time and space, wherein the lower forms of being enfold. The very existence of the effects, for coming into existence as well as for their continued existence, depends on their attachment to the cause, which is not separate from the being of the effects. The effect cannot exist for a moment in separation from its cause.

[18] For a criticism of these divisions, see the footnotes (nos. 210-213) by ªyatull¡h Mi¥b¡¦ Yazdø under a parallel chapter in the *Nih¡yat al-°ikmah* (pp. 292-293), where he also suggests an alternate classification.

[19] This classification relates to language rather than philosophy. For example, in translating the sentence 'Zayd is just' into Arabic, we may say '*Zaydun [dh£.] 'adlin*' or '*Zaydun ¡dilun*.' In the former sentence, *dh£.,* meaning 'possessor of,' is assumed and implicit, whereas in the second *¡dil* (just) is an adjective derived from *'adl*, justice.

[20] Traditional logicians call propositions of the type 'Either A is B, or C is D' as 'disjunctive' propositions (*qa¤iyyah munfa¥ilah*). However, according to modern logic such propositions are in fact compound propositions of the 'alternative' kind wherein the constituents are themselves propositions. Traditional logic recognizes three kinds of 'disjunctive' propositions which can be stated as 'alternative' propositions of the following three types.

The three kinds of 'disjunctive' propositions are: (1) *munfa¥ilah ¦aqiqiyyah* (factual disjunctive), (2) *munfa¥ilah m¡ni'at al-khul£*, and (3) *munfa¥ilah m¡ni'at al-jam'*. (2) may be stated as an 'alternative' proposition of the type '*p* or *q*' (stated symbolically as *p* v *q*,) which is true if at least one of the constituent propositions is true. The equivalent of (3) in the 'alternative' form is: 'It is not that both *p* and *q*' (symbolically: ~[*p* . *q*]. Here *p* and *q* are mutually exclusive. If one is true, the other must be false. Both cannot be true, though both may be false.

The equivalent of (1) in the 'alternative' form would be 'Either *p* or *q*, but not both' or 'Either *p* and *not-q*, or *q* and *not-p*' (symbolically: [*p* . ~ *q*] v [~*p* . *q*]). Here *p* and *q* are mutually exclusive, and both cannot be true or false at the same time.

[21] What is meant by 'instantaneously existing divisions' of movement here are parts of it corresponding to infinitesimally short periods of time. 'Instant' here should be understood in the sense of an infinitesimal period of time. For if we take 'instant' to mean a point in time, the division of something continuous—such as time or motion—cannot lead to

points or instants. Moreover, there can be no movement in an instant, and hence there cannot be any 'instantaneously' existing divisions of movement.

[22] What is meant by the formation or completion of geometric figures as occurring in an instant is that while drawing, for instance, a circle with a compass, the point of the compass tracing out the circle reaches the starting point in an instant of time. The circle is drawn in time but its completion is instantaneous, occurring at the extremity of the period of time taken to draw the circle.

[23] In a parallel passage in the *Nih¡yat al-°ikmah*, vol. ii, p.357, the author uses the expression *basø§ al-dh¡t min kulli wajh* (i.e. possessing an essence that is simple in all respects), instead of *a¦adø al-dh¡t*. Accordingly, what is meant by *a¦adø al-dh¡t* is an essence that is simple in all respects and absolutely devoid of any kind of multiplicity and composition.

[24] In a footnote on a similar remark in the *Nih¡yat al-°ikmah*, vol. ii, p. 357, footnote no. 449), ªyatullah Mi¥b¡¦ Yazdø points out that in fact such an interpretation of Divine speech reduces all the Attributes to 'Speech' (*kalªm*) and the Essence to 'Speaker' (*mutakallim*).