

IMMANUEL KANT

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*Critique of the  
power of judgment*

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*First Introduction*  
*to the*  
*Critique of the Power of Judgment*

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[This introduction to Kant's Third Critique - the Critique of the Power of Judgment - provides a good overview of the system that links the three Critique's together (1. *Critique of Pure Reason*; 2. *Critique of Practical Reason*; 3 *Critique of the Power of Judgment*). As such, it is a good starting point for an overview of Kant's philosophy. I have selected those passages that focus on the system as a whole, even though this remains an introduction to the third *Critique* and as such the system is described from the perspective of the power of judgment. Given the special role the power of judgment has in uniting the three Critique's, this is not a real obstacle, but it is good to keep in mind while reading this section. MB]

## I.

### On philosophy as a system.

If philosophy is the **system** of rational cognition<sup>a</sup> through concepts, it is thereby already sufficiently distinguished from a critique of pure reason, which, although it contains a philosophical investigation of the possibility of such cognition, does not belong to such a system as a part, but rather outlines and examines the very idea of it in the first place.

The division of the system can at first only be that into its formal and material parts, of which the first (the logic) concerns merely the form of thinking in a system of rules, while the second (the real<sup>b</sup> part) systematically takes under consideration the objects which are thought about, insofar as a rational cognition of them from concepts is possible.

Now this real system of philosophy itself, given the original distinction of its objects and the essential difference, resting on them, of the principles of a science that contains them, cannot be divided except into **theoretical** and **practical** philosophy; thus, the one part must be the philosophy of nature, the other that of morals,<sup>c</sup> the first of which is also empirical, the second of which, however (since freedom absolutely cannot be an object of experience), can never contain anything other than pure principles *a priori*.

However, there is a great misunderstanding, which is even quite disadvantageous to the way in which the science is handled, about what should be held to be **practical** in a sense<sup>d</sup> in which it deserves to be taken up into a **practical philosophy**. Statesmanship and political economy, rules of good housekeeping as well as those of etiquette, precepts for good health and diet, of the soul as well as of the body (indeed why not all trades and arts?), have been believed to be able to be counted as practical philosophy, because they all contain a great many practical propositions. But while practical propositions certainly differ from theoretical ones, which contain the possibility of things and

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<sup>a</sup> *Vernunftkenntnis*

<sup>b</sup> *reale*

<sup>c</sup> *Sitten*

<sup>d</sup> *Bedeutung*

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their determination, in the way in which they are presented, they do not on that account differ in their content, except only those which consider **freedom** under laws. All the rest are nothing more than the theory of that which belongs to the nature of things, only applied to the way in which they can be generated by us in accordance with a principle, i.e., their possibility is represented through a voluntary<sup>a</sup> action (which belongs among natural causes as well). Thus the solution to the problem in mechanics of finding the respective lengths of the arms of a lever by means of which a given force will be in equilibrium with a given weight, is of course expressed as a practical formula, but it contains nothing other than the theoretical proposition that the length of the arms is in inverse proportion to the force and the weight if these are in equilibrium; only this relation, as far as its origin is concerned, is represented as possible through a cause whose determining ground is the **representation** of that relation (our choice). It is exactly the same with all practical propositions that concern merely the production of objects. If precepts for the promotion of one's happiness are given, and, e.g., the issue is only what one has to do in one's own case in order to be susceptible to happiness, then all that is represented are the inner conditions of the possibility of such happiness – in contentment, in moderation of the inclinations so they will not become passions, etc. – as belonging to the nature of the subject, and at the same time the manner of generating this equilibrium as a causality possible through ourselves alone, hence all of this is represented as an immediate consequence from the theory of the object in relation to the theory of our own nature (ourselves as cause): hence the practical precept here differs from a theoretical one in its form, but not in its content, and thus a special kind of philosophy is not required for insight into the connection of grounds with their consequences. – In a word: all practical propositions that<sup>b</sup> derive that which nature can contain from the faculty of choice as a cause collectively belong to theoretical philosophy, as cognition of nature; only those propositions which give the law to freedom are specifically distinguished from the former in virtue of their content.<sup>c</sup> One can say of the former that they constitute the practical part of a **philosophy of nature**, but the latter alone ground<sup>d</sup> a special **practical philosophy**.

<sup>a</sup> *willkürlich*

<sup>b</sup> Here Kant crossed out the words: “are also possible through empirical determining grounds (e.g., those of the theory of happiness).”

<sup>c</sup> Here Kant crossed out the words: “and are determining grounds only in so far as they are *a priori* grounds.”

<sup>d</sup> Here Kant crossed out “belong to.”

## Remark

It is very important to determine the parts of philosophy precisely and to that end not to include among the members of the division of philosophy, as a system, that which is merely a consequence or an application of it to given cases, requiring no special principles.

Practical propositions are distinguished from theoretical ones either in regard to principles or to consequences. In the latter case they do not constitute a special part of the science, but belong to the theoretical part, as a special kind of its consequences. Now the possibility of things in accordance with natural laws is essentially distinct in its principles from that in accordance with laws of freedom. This distinction, however, does not consist in the fact that in the latter case the cause is placed in a will, but in the former case outside of the will, in the things themselves. For even if the will follows no other principles than those by means of which the understanding has insight into the possibility of the object in accordance with them, as mere laws of nature, then the proposition which contains the possibility of the object through the causality of the faculty of choice may still be called a practical proposition, yet it is not at all distinct in principle from the theoretical propositions concerning the nature of things, but must rather derive its own content from the latter in order to exhibit the representation of an object in reality.

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Practical propositions, therefore, the content of which concerns merely the possibility of a represented object (through voluntary action), are only applications of a complete theoretical cognition and cannot constitute a special part of a science. A practical geometry, as a separate science, is an absurdity, although ever so many practical propositions are contained in this pure science, most of which, as problems, require a special instruction for their solution. The problem of constructing a square with a given line and a given right angle is a practical proposition, but a pure consequence of the theory. And the art of surveying (*agrimensoria*) cannot in any way presume to the name of a practical **geometry** and be called a special part of geometry in general, but rather belongs among the scholia of the latter, namely the use of this science for business.\*

\* This pure and for that very reason sublime science seems to forgo some of its dignity if it concedes that, as elementary geometry, it needs *tools*, even if only two, for the construction of its concepts, namely the compass and the ruler, which construction alone it calls geometrical, while those of higher geometry on the contrary it calls mechanical, since for the construction of the concepts of the latter more complex machines are required. But what is

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Even in a science of nature, insofar as it rests on empirical principles, namely in physics proper, the practical procedures for discovering hidden laws of nature, under the name of experimental physics, can in no way justify the designation of a practical physics (which is likewise an absurdity) as a part of natural philosophy. For the principles in accordance with which we set up experiments must themselves always be derived from the knowledge of nature, hence from theory. The same is true of practical precepts, which concern the voluntary production of a certain state of mind in us (e.g., that of the stimulation<sup>a</sup> or restraint of the imagination, the gratification or weakening of the inclinations). There is no practical **psychology** as a special part of the philosophy of human nature. For the principles of the possibility of its state by means of art must be borrowed from those of the possibility of our determinations from the constitution of our nature and, although the former consist of practical propositions, still they do not constitute a practical part of empirical psychology, because they do not have any special principles, but merely belong among its scholia.

In general, practical propositions (whether they are pure *a priori* or empirical), if they immediately assert the possibility of an object through our faculty of choice, always belong to the knowledge of nature and to the theoretical part of philosophy. Only those which directly exhibit the determination of an action as necessary merely through the representation of its form (in accordance with laws in general), without regard to<sup>b</sup> the means<sup>c</sup> of the object that is thereby to be realized, can and must have their own special principles (in the idea of freedom); and, although they ground the concept of an object of the will (the highest good) on these very principles, still this belongs only indirectly, as a consequence, to the practical precept (which is henceforth called moral). Further, there can be no insight into its possibility through the knowledge of nature (theory). Thus only those propositions alone belong to a special part of a system of rational cognitions, under the name of practical philosophy.

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All other propositions of practice, whatever science they might be attached to, can, if one is perhaps worried about ambiguity, be called

meant by the former is not the actual tools (*circinus et regula*), which can never give those shapes with mathematical precision, rather they are to signify only the simplest kinds of exhibition of the imagination *a priori*, which cannot be matched by any instrument.

<sup>a</sup> *Bewegung*

<sup>b</sup> Crossed out: "a determinate."

<sup>c</sup> Cassirer suggests "matter" (*Materie*).

**technical** rather than practical propositions. For they belong to the **art** of bringing about that which one wishes should exist, which in the case of a complete theory is always a mere consequence and not a self-subsistent part of any kind of instruction. In this way, all precepts of skill belong to **technique**<sup>\*1</sup> and hence to the theoretical knowledge of nature as its consequences. However, we shall in the future also use the expression “technique” where objects of nature are sometimes merely **judged**<sup>a</sup> as if their possibility were grounded in art, in which cases the judgments are neither theoretical nor practical (in the sense just adduced), since they do not **determine** anything about the constitution of the object nor the way in which to produce it; rather through them nature itself is judged,<sup>b</sup> but merely in accordance with the analogy with an art, and indeed in subjective relation to our cognitive faculty, not in objective relation to the objects.<sup>c</sup> Now here we will not indeed call the judgments themselves technical, but rather the power of judgment, on whose laws they are grounded, and in accordance with it we will also call nature technical; further, this technique, since it contains no objectively determining propositions, does not constitute any part of doctrinal philosophy, but only a part of the critique of our faculty of cognition.

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\* This is the place to correct an error which I committed in the *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*. For after I had said that imperatives of skill command only conditionally, under the condition of merely possible, i.e., *problematic*, ends, I called such practical precepts problematic imperatives, an expression in which a contradiction certainly lurks. I should have called them *technical* imperatives, i.e., imperatives of art. The *pragmatic* imperatives, or rules of prudence, which command under the condition of an *actual* and thus even subjectively necessary end, also stand under the technical imperatives (for what is prudence other than the skill of being able to use for one’s intentions free human beings and among these even the natural dispositions and inclinations in oneself?). Only the fact that the end which we ascribe to ourselves and to others, namely that of our own happiness, does not belong among the merely arbitrary ends justifies a special designation for these technical imperatives; for the problem does not merely, as in the case of technical imperatives, require the manner of the execution of an end, but also the determination of that which constitutes this end itself (happiness), which in the case of technical imperatives in general must be presupposed as known.

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<sup>a</sup> *beurtheilt*

<sup>b</sup> *beurtheilt*

<sup>c</sup> Here Kant crossed out the following marginal note: “Now since such judgments are not cognitive judgments at all, it can be understood why the concept of technical judgments lies outside the field of the logical division (into theoretical and practical) and can find its place only in a critique of the origin of our cognition.”

## II.

On the system of the higher cognitive faculties,  
which grounds philosophy.

If the issue is not the division of a **philosophy**, but of our **faculty of *a priori* cognition through concepts** (of our higher faculty of cognition), i.e., of a critique of pure reason, but considered only with regard to its faculty for thinking (where the pure kind of intuition is not taken into account), then the systematic representation of the faculty for thinking is tripartite: namely, first, the faculty for the cognition of the **general<sup>a</sup>** (of rules), **the understanding**; second, the faculty for the **subsumption of the particular** under the general, **the power of judgment**; and third, the faculty for the **determination** of the particular through the general (for the derivation from principles), i.e., **reason**.

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The critique of pure **theoretical** reason, which was dedicated to the sources of all cognition *a priori* (hence also to that in it which belongs to intuition), yielded the laws of **nature**, the critique of **practical** reason the law of **freedom**, and so the *a priori* principles for the whole of philosophy already seem to have been completely treated.

But now if the understanding yields *a priori* laws of nature, reason, on the contrary, laws of freedom, then by analogy one would still expect that the power of judgment, which mediates the connection between the two faculties, would, just like those, add its own special principles *a priori* and perhaps ground a special part of philosophy, even though philosophy as a system can have only two parts.

Yet the power of judgment is such a special faculty of cognition, not at all self-sufficient, that it provides neither concepts, like the understanding, nor ideas, like reason, of any object at all, since it is a faculty merely for subsuming under concepts given from elsewhere. Thus if there is to be a concept or a rule which arises originally from the power of judgment, it would have to be a concept of things in **nature insofar as nature conforms to our power of judgment**, and thus a concept of a property of nature such that one cannot form any concept of it except that its arrangement conforms to our faculty for subsuming the particular given laws under more general ones even though these are not given;<sup>b</sup> in other words, it would have to be the concept of a purposiveness of nature in behalf of our faculty for cognizing it, insofar as for this it is required that we be able to judge<sup>c</sup> the particular as

<sup>a</sup> *des Allgemeinen*. The term *allgemein* can be translated as either “general” or “universal”; we will generally use the former where there is a contrast with “particular,” and the latter when a claim to the assent of all is contrasted to an idiosyncratic or private judgment.

<sup>b</sup> The remainder of the paragraph was added in the margin.

<sup>c</sup> *beurtheilen*



contained under the general and subsume<sup>a</sup> it under the concept of a nature. 20: 203

Now such a concept is that of an experience **as a system in accordance with empirical laws**. For although experience constitutes a system in accordance with **transcendental laws**, which contain the condition of the possibility of experience in general, there is still possible such an **infinite multiplicity** of empirical laws and such a **great heterogeneity of forms** of nature, which would belong to particular experience, that the concept of a system in accordance with these (empirical) laws must be entirely alien to the understanding, and neither the possibility, let alone the necessity, of such a whole can be conceived. Nevertheless particular experience, thoroughly interconnected in accordance with constant principles, also requires this systematic interconnection of empirical laws, whereby it becomes possible for the power of judgment to subsume the particular under the general, however empirical it may be, and so on, right up to<sup>b</sup> the highest empirical laws and the forms of nature corresponding to them, and thus to regard the **aggregate** of particular experiences as a **system** of them; for without this presupposition no thoroughly lawlike interconnection,<sup>\*</sup> i.e., empirical unity of these experiences can obtain.

\* The possibility of an experience in general is the possibility of empirical cognitions as synthetic judgments. It therefore cannot be drawn **analytically** from mere comparison of perceptions (as is commonly believed), for the combination of two different perceptions in the concept of an object (for the cognition of it) is a **synthesis**, which does not make an empirical **cognition**, i.e., experience, possible otherwise than in accordance with principles of the synthetic unity of the appearances, i.e., in accordance with principles through which they are brought under the categories. Now these empirical cognitions constitute, in accordance with what they necessarily have in common (namely those transcendental laws of nature), an analytic unity of all experience, but not that synthetic unity of experience as a system in which the empirical laws, even with regard to what is different in them (and where their multiplicity can go on to infinitude), are bound together under a principle. What the category is with regard to each particular experience, that is what the purposiveness or fitness of nature to our power of judgment is (even with regard to its particular laws), in accordance with which it is represented not merely as mechanical but also as technical; a concept which certainly does not determine the synthetic unity objectively, as does the category, but which still yields subjective principles that serve as a guideline for the investigation of nature.<sup>c</sup> 20: 203  
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<sup>a</sup> Here Kant crossed out “so” and “consequently,” having originally written “and so subsume, consequently,”.

<sup>b</sup> Here Kant crossed out “yet higher, likewise to”.

<sup>c</sup> This footnote appears to be an addition to the fair copy.

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This lawfulness, in itself (in accordance with all concepts of the understanding) contingent, which the power of judgment presumes of nature and presupposes in it (only for its own advantage), is a formal purposiveness of nature, which we simply **assume** in it, but through which neither a theoretical cognition of nature nor a practical principle of freedom is grounded, although a principle for the judging<sup>a</sup> and investigation of nature is given, in order to seek for particular experiences the general rules in accordance with which we have to arrange them in order to bring out that systematic connection which is necessary for an interconnected experience and which we have to assume *a priori*.

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The concept which originally arises from the power of judgment and is proper to it is thus that of nature as **art**, in other words that of the **technique** of nature with regard to its **particular** laws, which concept does not ground any theory and does not, any more than logic, contain cognition of objects and their constitution, but only gives a principle for progress in accordance with laws of experience, whereby the investigation of nature becomes possible.<sup>b</sup> But this does not enrich the knowledge of nature by any particular objective law, but rather only grounds a maxim for the power of judgment, by which to observe nature and to hold its forms together.<sup>c</sup>

<sup>d</sup>Philosophy, as a doctrinal system of the cognition of nature as well as freedom, does not hereby acquire a new part; for the representation of nature as art is a mere idea, which serves as a principle, merely for the subject, for our investigation of nature, so that we can where possible bring interconnection, as in a system, into the aggregate of empirical laws as such, by attributing to nature a relation to this need of ours. On the contrary, our concept of a technique of nature, as a heuristic principle in the judgment<sup>e</sup> of it, will belong to the critique of our faculty of cognition, which indicates what occasion we have to

<sup>a</sup> *Beurtheilung*

<sup>b</sup> Here Kant crossed out “for us” (*uns*).

<sup>c</sup> Here Kant crossed out the following paragraph:

Philosophy, as a real **system of cognition of nature a priori** through concepts, thus does not acquire a new part; for that consideration belongs to its theoretical part. But the critique of the **pure faculties of cognition** does indeed acquire such a new part, and indeed one that is very necessary, by means of which, first, judgments about nature whose determining ground could easily be counted among the empirical ones are separated from these, and, second, others, which could easily be taken for **real** and held to be determination of the objects of nature, are distinguished from these and cognized as **formal**, i.e., rules for mere reflection on things in nature, not for the determination of these in accordance with objective principles.

<sup>d</sup> This paragraph appears to have been added to the fair copy.

<sup>e</sup> *Beurtheilung*

make such a representation of it to ourselves, what origin this idea has, whether it is to be found in an *a priori* source, and also what the scope and boundary of its use are; in a word, such an inquiry will belong as a part to the system of the critique of pure reason, but not to doctrinal philosophy.

### III.

#### On the system of all the faculties of the human mind.

We can trace all faculties of the human mind without exception back to these three: the **faculty of cognition**, the **feeling of pleasure and displeasure**, and the **faculty of desire**. To be sure, philosophers who otherwise deserve nothing but praise for the thoroughness of their way of thinking have sought to explain this distinction as merely illusory and to reduce all faculties to the mere faculty of cognition.<sup>2</sup> But it can easily be demonstrated, and has already been understood for some time,<sup>3</sup> that this attempt to bring unity into the multiplicity of faculties, although undertaken in a genuinely philosophical spirit, is futile. For there is always a great difference between representations belonging to cognition, insofar as they are related merely to the object and the unity of the consciousness of it, and their objective relation where, considered as at the same time the cause of the reality of this object, they are assigned to the faculty of desire, and, finally,<sup>a</sup> their relation merely to the subject, where they are considered merely as grounds for preserving their own existence in it and to this extent in relation to the feeling of pleasure; the latter is absolutely not a cognition, nor does it provide one, although to be sure it may presuppose such a cognition as a determining ground.

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The connection between the cognition of an object and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure in its existence, or the determination of the faculty of desire to produce it, is certainly empirically knowable; but since this interconnection is not grounded in any principle *a priori*, to this extent the powers of the mind constitute only an **aggregate** and not a system. Now it is surely enough to produce a connection *a priori* between the feeling of pleasure and the other two faculties if we connect a cognition *a priori*, namely the rational concept of freedom, with the faculty of desire as its determining ground, at the same time subjectively finding in this objective determination a feeling of pleasure contained in the determination of the will.<sup>b,4</sup> But in this way the faculty

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<sup>a</sup> “finally” crossed out by Kant.

<sup>b</sup> Crossed out by Kant: “as in fact found to be identical with the former.”

of cognition is not combined with the faculty of desire **by means of** the pleasure or displeasure, for this does not precede the latter faculty,<sup>a</sup> but either first succeeds the determination of it, or else is perhaps nothing other than the sensation of the determinability of the will through reason itself, thus not a special feeling and distinctive receptivity that requires a special section under the properties of the mind. Now since in the analysis<sup>b</sup> of the faculties of the mind in general a feeling of pleasure which is independent of the determination of the faculty of desire, which indeed is rather able to supply a determining ground for that faculty, is incontrovertibly given, the connection of which with the other two faculties in a system nevertheless requires that this feeling of pleasure, like the other two faculties, not rest on merely empirical grounds but also on *a priori* principles, there is thus required for the idea of philosophy as a system (if not a doctrine then still) a **critique of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure** insofar as it is not empirically grounded.

Now the **faculty of cognition** in accordance with concepts has its *a priori* principles in the pure understanding (in its concept of nature), the **faculty of desire**, in pure reason (in its concept of freedom), and there remains among the properties of mind in general an intermediate faculty or receptivity, namely the **feeling of pleasure and displeasure**, just as there remains among the higher faculties of cognition an intermediate one, the power of judgment. What is more natural than to suspect that the latter will also contain *a priori* principles for the former?<sup>c</sup>

Without yet deciding anything about the possibility of this connection, a certain suitability of the power of judgment to serve as the determining ground for the feeling of pleasure, or to find one in it, is already unmistakable, insofar as, while in the **division of faculties of cognition through concepts** understanding and reason relate their representations to objects, in order to acquire concepts of them, the power of judgment is related solely to the subject and does not produce any concepts of objects for itself alone. Likewise, if in the general **division of the powers of the mind** overall the faculty of cognition as well as the faculty of desire contain an **objective** relation of representations, so by contrast the feeling of pleasure and displeasure is only the receptivity of a determination of the subject,<sup>d</sup> so that if the power of judgment is to determine anything for itself alone, it could not be

<sup>a</sup> Crossed out by Kant: "As inner perceptions exhibit in so many cases."

<sup>b</sup> Crossed out: "in inner observation."

<sup>c</sup> Question mark added.

<sup>d</sup> Kant substituted "of the subject" for the phrase "of the state of mind" (*Gemüthsstandes*) in the fair copy, and then added the remainder of the sentence.

anything other than the feeling of pleasure, and, conversely, if the latter is to have an *a priori* principle at all, it will be found only in the power of judgment.<sup>5</sup>

#### IV.

#### On experience as a system for the power of judgment.

We have seen in the critique of pure reason<sup>a</sup> that the whole of nature as the totality of all objects of experience constitutes a system in accordance with transcendental laws, namely those that the understanding itself gives *a priori* (for appearances, namely, insofar as they, combined in one consciousness, are to constitute experience). For that very reason, experience, in accordance with general as well as particular laws, insofar as it is considered objectively to be possible in general, must also constitute (in the idea) a system of possible empirical cognitions. For that is required by the unity of nature, in accordance with a principle of the thoroughgoing connection of everything contained in this totality of all appearances. To this extent experience in general in accordance with transcendental laws of the understanding is to be regarded as a system and not as a mere aggregate.

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But it does not follow from this that nature even in accordance with **empirical** laws is a system that **can be grasped**<sup>b</sup> by the human faculty of cognition, and that the thoroughgoing systematic interconnection of its appearances in one experience, hence the latter itself as a system, is possible for human beings. For the multiplicity and diversity of empirical laws could be so great that it might be possible for us to connect perceptions to some extent<sup>c</sup> in accordance with particular laws discovered on various occasions into one experience, but never to bring these empirical laws themselves to the unity of kinship under a common principle, if, namely, as is quite possible in itself (at least as far as the understanding can make out *a priori*), the multiplicity and diversity of these laws, along with the natural forms corresponding to them, being infinitely great, were to present to us a raw chaotic aggregate and not the least trace of a system, even though we must presuppose such a system in accordance with transcendental laws.

For **unity of nature in time and space** and unity of the experience possible for us are identical, since the former is a totality of mere appearances (kinds of representations), which can have its objective

<sup>a</sup> Presumably this means the book, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but the words are not underlined in the fair copy.

<sup>b</sup> *faßliches*

<sup>c</sup> *theilweise*

reality only in experience, which, as itself a system in accordance with empirical laws, must be possible if one is to think of the former as a system (as must indeed be done). Thus it is a subjectively<sup>a</sup> necessary transcendental **presupposition** that such a disturbingly unbounded diversity of empirical laws and heterogeneity of natural forms does not pertain to nature, rather that nature itself, through the affinity of particular laws under more general ones, qualifies for an experience, as an empirical system.

20: 210 Now this presupposition is the transcendental principle of the power of judgment. For this is not merely a faculty for subsuming the particular under the general (whose concept is given), but is also, conversely, one for finding the general for the particular. The understanding, however, abstracts in its transcendental **legislation** for nature from all multiplicity of possible empirical laws; in that legislation, it takes into consideration only the conditions of the possibility of an experience in general as far as its form is concerned. In it, therefore, that principle of the affinity of particular laws of nature is not to be found. Yet the power of judgment, which is obliged to bring particular laws, even with regard to what differentiates them under the same general laws of nature, under higher, though still empirical laws, must ground its procedure on such a principle. For by groping about among forms of nature whose agreement with each other under common empirical but higher laws appeared entirely contingent to the power of judgment, it would be even more contingent if **particular perceptions** were luckily to be qualified for an empirical law; it would be all the more contingent if multiple empirical laws were to fit into a systematic unity of the cognition of nature in a possible experience **in their entire interconnection** without presupposing such a form in nature through an *a priori* principle.

All of the stock formulae: nature takes the shortest route – **she does nothing in vain** – **she makes no leaps in the manifold of forms** (*continuum formarum*) – **she is rich in species but sparing with genera**, etc.<sup>6</sup> – are nothing other than this very same transcendental expression of the power of judgment in establishing a principle for experience as a system and hence for its own needs. Neither understanding nor reason can ground such a law of nature *a priori*. For while it may readily be understood that nature should be directed by our understanding in its merely formal laws (by means of which it is an object of experience in general), with regard to particular laws, in their multiplicity and diversity, it is free from all the restrictions of our law-giving faculty of cognition, and it is a mere presupposition of the power of

<sup>a</sup> The word “subjectively” was added to the fair copy.

judgment, in behalf of its own use, always to ascend from empirical, particular laws to more general<sup>a</sup> but at the same time still empirical ones, for the sake of the unification of empirical laws, which grounds that principle. And one can by no means charge such a principle to the account of experience, because only under the presupposition of it is it possible to organize experiences in a systematic way.

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[...]

## XI.

Encyclopedic introduction  
of the critique of the power of judgment  
into the system of the critique of pure reason.

Any introduction of a discourse is either that of a proposed doctrine or of the doctrine itself into a system, in which it belongs as a part. The former precedes the doctrine, the latter should properly only constitute its conclusion, in order to assign it, in accordance with fundamental principles,<sup>c</sup> its place in the body of doctrines with which it is interconnected by common principles. The former is a **propaedeutic** introduction, the latter can be called an **encyclopedic** one.

Propaedeutic introductions are the customary ones, preparing the way for a doctrine that is to be presented by adducing the precognition which is necessary for that from doctrines or sciences already to hand, in order to make the transition possible. If they are aimed at carefully distinguishing the principles proper to the new doctrine (*domestica*)

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<sup>c</sup> *Grundsätze*

from those which belong to another one (*peregrinis*),<sup>a</sup> then they serve for determining the boundaries between sciences, a precaution which cannot be too highly commended, since without it no thoroughness is to be hoped for, especially in philosophical cognition.

An encyclopedic introduction, however, presupposes not some related doctrine which prepares the way for the newly announced one, but the idea of a system which will first become complete through the latter. Now since such a system is not made possible by rummaging about and gathering up the many things that have been found during the course of inquiry, but is possible only if one is in a position to present completely the subjective or objective sources of a certain sort of cognition, through the formal concept of a whole that at the same time contains in itself *a priori* the principle of a complete division, one can readily grasp why encyclopedic introductions, useful as they may be, are yet so unusual.

Since that faculty whose unique principle is here to be sought and discussed (the power of judgment) is of such a special kind that by itself<sup>b</sup> it does not produce any cognition at all (neither theoretical nor practical) and, despite its *a priori* principle, provides no part of transcendental philosophy as an objective doctrine, but only constitutes the connection between two other higher faculties of cognition (the understanding and reason), I may be allowed, in the determination of the principles of such a faculty, which is not susceptible of any doctrine but only of a critique, to depart from the order which is otherwise necessary everywhere else and to go ahead with a short encyclopedic introduction to it, not in the system of the **sciences** of pure reason but merely in the **critique** of all faculties of the mind that are determinable *a priori*, insofar as they constitute among themselves a system in the mind, and in this way to unite the propaedeutic introduction with the encyclopedic one.

20: 243 The introduction of the power of judgment into the system of the pure faculties of cognition through concepts rests entirely on its transcendental principle, which is peculiar to it: that nature [in] the specification of the transcendental laws of understanding (principles of its possibility as nature in general), i.e., in the manifold of its empirical laws, proceeds in accordance with the idea of a system of their division for the sake of the possibility of experience as an empirical system. – This is what first gives us the concept of an objectively contingent but subjectively (for our faculty of cognition) necessary lawfulness, i.e., a purposiveness of nature, and indeed does so *a priori*.

<sup>a</sup> of a foreigner

<sup>b</sup> für sich



Now although this principle does not, of course, determine anything with regard to the particular forms of nature, but the purposiveness of the latter must always be given empirically, the judgment about these forms nevertheless wins a claim to universality and necessity, as merely reflective judgment, through the relation of the subjective purposiveness of the given representation for the power of judgment to that *a priori* principle of the power of judgment, of the purposiveness of nature in its empirical lawfulness in general, and thus an aesthetic reflecting judgment can be regarded as resting on a principle *a priori* (although it is not determining), and the power of judgment in it can be justified in finding a place in the critique of the higher pure faculties of cognition.

But since the concept of a purposiveness of nature (as a technical purposiveness, which is essentially distinct from practical purposiveness), if it is not to be a merely surreptitious substitution of **what we make out of nature** for what **nature is**, is a concept separate from all dogmatic philosophy (theoretical as well as practical), which is grounded solely on that principle of the power of judgment that precedes all empirical laws and first makes possible their agreement in the unity of a system, it can be seen from this that of the two kinds of use of the reflecting power of judgment (the aesthetic and the teleological) that only the judgment which precedes all concepts of the object, hence the aesthetic reflecting judgment, has its determining ground in the power of judgment, unmixed with any other faculty of cognition, while the teleological judgment, although it uses the concept of a natural end in the judgment itself only as a principle of the reflecting, not of the determining power of judgment, nevertheless cannot be made except through the combination of reason with empirical concepts. Hence the possibility of a teleological judgment about nature can easily be shown, without having to ground it in a special principle of the power of judgment, for this merely follows the principle of reason. By contrast, the possibility of an aesthetic judgment which is nevertheless a judgment of mere reflection grounded on a principle *a priori*, i.e., a judgment of taste, if it can be shown that this is really justified in its claim to universal validity, absolutely requires a critique of the power of judgment as a faculty with its own special transcendental principles (like understanding and reason), and only in this way is it qualified to be included in the system of the pure faculties of cognition; the ground for which is that the aesthetic judgment, without presupposing a concept of its object, nevertheless ascribes purposiveness to it, and indeed does so with universal validity, the principle for which must therefore lie in the power of judgment itself, while the teleological judgment presupposes a concept of the object which reason brings under the

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principle of a connection to an end, only this concept of a natural end is used by the power of judgment merely in reflecting, not in determining judgment.

It is therefore properly only in taste, and especially with regard to objects in nature, in which alone the power of judgment reveals itself as a faculty that has its own special principle and thereby makes a well-founded claim to a place in the general critique of the higher faculties of cognition, which one would perhaps not have entrusted to it. However, once the capacity<sup>a</sup> of the power of judgment to institute *a priori* principles for itself is granted, then it is also necessary to determine the scope of this capacity, and for this completeness in critique it is required that its aesthetic faculty be recognized<sup>b</sup> as contained in one faculty together with the teleological and as resting on the same principle, for the teleological judgment about things in nature also belongs, just as much as the aesthetic, to the reflecting (not the determining) power of judgment.

But the critique of taste, which is otherwise used only for the improvement or confirmation of taste itself, discloses, when treated from a transcendental point of view, by the way in which it fills in a gap in the system of our cognitive faculties, a striking and in my view very promising prospect for a complete system of all the powers of the mind, insofar as they are related in their vocation<sup>c</sup> not only to the sensible but also to the supersensible, yet without upsetting the border posts which a strict critique has imposed on the latter use of them. Perhaps it may help the reader to gain a more perspicuous overview of the interconnection between the following investigations if I here sketch an outline of this systematic connection, which, to be sure, like the whole present section, should properly have its place only at the conclusion of the treatise.

The faculties of the mind, namely, can all be reduced to the following three:

**Faculty of cognition**  
**Feeling of pleasure and displeasure**  
**Faculty of desire**

The exercise of all of them, however, is always grounded in the faculty of cognition, although not always in cognition (since a representation belonging to the faculty of cognition can also be an intuition, pure or empirical, without concepts). Thus, insofar as the issue is the faculty of

<sup>a</sup> *Vermögen*

<sup>b</sup> *erkannt*

<sup>c</sup> *Bestimmung*

cognition in accordance with principles, the following higher powers take their place beside the powers of the mind in general:

<b>Faculty of cognition</b>	<b>Understanding</b>
<b>Feeling of pleasure and displeasure</b>	<b>Power of Judgment</b>
<b>Faculty of desire</b>	<b>Reason</b>

It turns out that the understanding contains its own special principles *a priori* for the faculty of cognition, the power of judgment only for the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, but reason merely for the faculty of desire. These formal principles ground a necessity which is partly objective, partly subjective, but partly also, just because it is subjective, at the same time of objective validity, in accordance with which, by means of the higher faculties that stand beside them, they determine these corresponding powers of the mind:

<b>Faculty of cognition</b>	<b>Understanding</b>	<b>Lawfulness</b>
<b>Feeling of pleasure and displeasure</b>	<b>Power of judgment</b>	<b>Purposiveness</b>
<b>Faculty of desire</b>	<b>Reason</b>	Purposiveness that is at the same time law ( <b>Obligation</b> )

Finally, the following are associated with the adduced *a priori* grounds of the possibility of forms, as their products: 20: 246

<b>Faculty of the mind</b>	<b>Higher cognitive faculties</b>	<b><i>A priori</i> principles</b>	<b>Products<sup>a</sup></b>
<b>Faculty of cognition</b>	<b>Understanding</b>	<b>Lawfulness</b>	<b>Nature</b>
<b>Feeling of pleasure and displeasure</b>	<b>Power of judgment</b>	<b>Purposiveness</b>	<b>Art</b>
<b>Faculty of desire</b>	<b>Reason</b>	Purposiveness that is at the same time law ( <b>Obligation</b> )	<b>Morals<sup>b</sup></b>

Thus **nature<sup>c</sup>** grounds its **lawfulness** on *a priori* **principles** of the **understanding** as a **faculty of cognition**; **art<sup>d</sup>** is guided *a priori* in its **purposiveness** in accordance with the **power of judgment** in relation to the **feeling of pleasure and displeasure**; finally **morals<sup>e</sup>** (as prod-

<sup>a</sup> The headings on this line are doubly underlined.

<sup>b</sup> *Sitten*

<sup>c</sup> This word is doubly underlined.

<sup>d</sup> Doubly underlined.

<sup>e</sup> *Sitten*, doubly underlined.

uct of freedom) stand under the idea of a form of **purposiveness** that is qualified for universal law, as a determining ground of **reason** with regard to the **faculty of desire**. The judgments that arise in this way from *a priori* principles peculiar to each of the fundamental faculties of the mind are **theoretical**, **aesthetic** and **practical** judgments.

There is thus revealed a system of the powers of mind, in their relation to nature and freedom, both of which have their own special, **determining** principles *a priori* and therefore constitute the two parts of philosophy (the theoretical and the practical) as a doctrinal system, and at the same time a transition by means of the power of judgment, which connects the two parts through its own special principle, namely from the **sensible** substratum of the first part of philosophy to the **intelligible** substratum of the second, through the critique of a faculty (the power of judgment) which serves only for connecting and which hence cannot provide any cognition of its own nor make any contribution to doctrine, whose judgments, however, under the name of **aesthetic** (whose principles are merely subjective), insofar as they differ from all those, under the name of **logical**, whose fundamental principles<sup>a</sup> must be objective (whether they are theoretical or practical), are of such a special sort that they relate sensible intuitions to the idea of nature, whose lawfulness cannot be understood without their relation to a supersensible substratum – the proof of which will be provided in the treatise itself.

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We shall call the critique of this faculty with regard to the first sort of judgments, not **aesthetics** (as if it were a doctrine of sense), but a **critique of the aesthetic power of judgment**, because the former expression has too broad a meaning, since it could also signify the sensibility of **intuition**, which belongs to theoretical cognition and furnishes the material for logical (objective) judgments; that is why we have already restricted<sup>b</sup> the expression “aesthetic” exclusively to the predicate that belongs to intuition in cognitive judgments.<sup>28</sup> However, to call a power of judgment aesthetic because it does not relate the representation of an object to concepts, and thus does not relate the judgment to cognition (because it is not determining at all, but only reflecting) occasions no concern about misinterpretation; since for the logical power of judgment intuitions, even if they are merely sensible (aesthetic), must first be raised to concepts in order to serve for cognition of the object, which is not the case with the aesthetic power of judgment.

<sup>a</sup> *Grundsätze*

<sup>b</sup> *bestimmt*