

Beliefs about Gender[†]

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We conduct laboratory experiments that explore how gender stereotypes shape beliefs about ability of oneself and others in different categories of knowledge. The data reveal two patterns. First, men's and women's beliefs about both oneself and others exceed observed ability on average, particularly in difficult tasks. Second, overestimation of ability by both men and women varies across categories. To understand these patterns, we develop a model that separates gender stereotypes from misestimation of ability related to the difficulty of the task. We find that stereotypes contribute to gender gaps in self-confidence, assessments of others, and behavior in a cooperative game. (JEL C92, D83, D91, J16)

Beliefs about ourselves and others are at the heart of many economic and social decisions, with large consequences for welfare. One critical area where such beliefs are often found to be biased is abilities of men and women. Holding performance constant, women have been found to be less confident about their own ability in math and science than men, contributing to economically consequential differences in financial decision-making, academic performance, and career choices (Barber and Odean 2001; Buser, Niederle, and Oosterbeek 2014). Biased beliefs about others also shape discrimination against both women and minorities (Bohren, Imas, and Rosenberg 2017; Glover, Pallais, and Pariente 2017). Such biases are inconsistent with the standard model of statistical discrimination (Arrow 1973, Phelps 1972), in which equilibrium beliefs are accurate. Identifying the sources of bias in beliefs about oneself and others is a significant yet insufficiently understood problem.

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One hypothesis is that beliefs respond to social stereotypes. For example, women may be underconfident in math and science, and observers may be biased in judging women, because these fields are stereotypically male (Kiefer and Sekaquaptewa 2007; Nosek et al. 2009; Eccles, Jacobs, and Harold 1990; Guiso et al. 2008; Carrell, Page, and West 2010; Reuben, Sapienza, and Zingales 2014; Bohren, Imas, and Rosenberg 2017). However, because beliefs are influenced by other factors, such as overconfidence, misestimation of probabilities, and self-image concerns, it may be difficult to identify stereotypes. An empirical strategy must separate alternative belief mechanisms.

To address this challenge, we combine theory and experimental data in an analysis of beliefs about the ability of oneself and others. Following and extending the experimental setting of Coffman (2014), participants answer multiple-choice trivia questions in several categories, including the Kardashians, Disney movies, cooking, art and literature, emotion recognition, verbal skills, business, mathematics, cars, rock and roll, videogames, and sports and games. Participants then estimate both their total number of correct answers for each category, and the probability of answering each particular question correctly. They also provide beliefs about the performance of a randomly-selected partner. For some participants, the gender of their partner is revealed, although we take some pains not to focus attention on gender. In this way, for every participant, we have direct measures of their own performance in multiple domains, but also their estimates of both their own performance and that of their partner.

A comparison of different categories of knowledge enables us to assess stereotypes, which are by definition category-specific. A preliminary look at the data reveals that women, in fact, tend to *overestimate* their own performance in categories that are judged to be female-typed. Likewise, when evaluating others, participants tend to overestimate the performance of women in categories that are judged to be female-typed. The reverse is true for men.

These facts, while suggestive, do not allow us to identify the role of stereotypes. The problem is the presence of confounding belief distortions. Most notably, the data show that participants tend to overestimate performance for hard questions, where the share of correct answers is low. This is the case when assessing both self and others, as previously documented by Moore and Healy (2008). We call this phenomenon difficulty-induced misestimation (DIM). DIM can obscure the role of stereotypes, because different domains of knowledge exhibit different levels of difficulty for the two genders. To assess the role of stereotypes, we must separate them from DIM in the data.

To disentangle these two forces shaping beliefs, we start with a model. We incorporate gender stereotypes by following the formalization of Bordalo et al. (2016)—henceforth, BCGS—which builds on the “kernel of truth” property: beliefs exaggerate the ability of women in categories in which women are on average more competent than men, while underestimating it in categories where women are on average less competent than men. In a nutshell, the kernel of truth predicts that stereotypes exaggerate true gender performance gaps in different categories. We model DIM as an affine and increasing function relating question difficulty to beliefs. This formalization captures in reduced form several mechanisms that may give rise to DIM, ranging from imperfect knowledge of ability (Moore and Healy 2008), random errors or bounded estimates, over-precision, or overestimation of low probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).

For empirical identification, the model assumes that the effects of DIM on beliefs about performance are orthogonal to the effects of stereotypes. DIM depends on task difficulty, whereas stereotypes depend only on the gender gap at the category level. Comparing easy and difficult questions in math should reveal the role of DIM. Comparing difficult questions in math to difficult questions in verbal should reveal the role of stereotypes. While an approximation, the orthogonality assumption takes an important methodological step toward isolating stereotypes from other first-order factors shaping beliefs.

We show that, after controlling for DIM, gender stereotypes are an important source of belief distortions. Stereotypes are especially important for women and for domains in which the gender gap in performance is larger. We estimate that a 5 percentage point male advantage in a domain (roughly the size of the male advantage in math in our sample) reduces a woman's believed probability of answering a question correctly by between 2.2 to 2.5 percentage points, holding her own true ability fixed. Similarly, when we analyze beliefs about others, a 5 percentage point male advantage in a domain reduces a participant's belief of a woman's ability by between 0.7 to 2.4 percentage points, holding fixed average female ability. Effects for men are more mixed. We estimate that a 5 percentage point male advantage increases men's beliefs of own ability by between -0.2 to 1.1 percentage points, and other's beliefs of men's ability by 0.1 to 2.3 percentage points. We find support for the kernel of truth prediction in explaining beliefs about both own ability and that of others. Consistent with past work, we also find a substantial role for DIM in shaping beliefs. Participants on average overestimate the ability of themselves and others, particularly in more difficult questions and domains.

We estimate that, conditional on item difficulty, the effects of DIM are similar for men and women. However, because in the data average item difficulty varies by domain and gender, DIM influences the gender gap in self-confidence. Our estimates actually show that DIM is an important countervailing force to stereotypes: it causes individuals to be more overconfident in categories where own gender performance is weaker, which by the kernel of truth are precisely the categories where stereotypes lower confidence. Stereotypes and DIM are thus two important but distinct forces shaping beliefs.

We next consider how beliefs about self and others influence decision making, measured here as a participant's willingness to contribute ideas, as in Coffman (2014). Participants face a series of questions in each category and must decide how willing they are to answer the question for the group. Our experiment goes beyond Coffman (2014) by revealing gender of partner for some groups. We find two results. First, beliefs about self tend to become more stereotyped when the partner is known to be of a different gender. Second, stereotypes hurt the performance of groups in which gender is known. Under rational expectations, revealing the partner's gender should be beneficial, for it provides information about relative competence, fostering better decisions. The data, however, show that this is not the case: if anything, knowledge of the partner's gender reduces performance, consistent with a negative impact of more stereotyped beliefs about self and partner.

Our paper follows a large literature on beliefs about gender. Coffman (2014) shows that decisions about willingness to contribute ideas to a group are predicted by gender stereotypes in the form of subjective beliefs about a category's gender-type.

While closely following her paradigm, we make several new contributions. First, we offer a psychologically founded theory of stereotypes based on observable gender gaps in performance and distinguish it from the confounding effect of DIM. Second, we identify a role for stereotypes by exogenously varying whether partner's gender is revealed. In our data, both stereotypes and DIM shape beliefs, with substantial predictive power for incentivized beliefs and decisions.

Other past work points to a role for both stereotypes and DIM in shaping beliefs about both one's own and others' ability. Many studies find that gender stereotypes in math and science influence academic performance (see Kiefer and Sekaquaptewa 2007 and Nosek et al. 2009 on implicit bias and test performance and Spencer, Steele, and Quinn 1999 on stereotype threat). Both experimental and field evidence document a widespread belief that women have lower ability than men in math (Eccles, Jacobs, and Harold 1990; Guiso et al. 2008; Carrell, Page, and West 2010; Reuben, Sapienza, and Zingales 2014), even though the differences have been shrinking and now only exist at the upper tail (Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko 2006). Guiso et al. (2008) find that actual male advantage in math disappears in cultures where gender stereotypes are weaker.

Many researchers have studied gender differences in overconfidence. While it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions from this vast literature, a prevalent though far from universal finding is that men are more overconfident than women, but only, or primarily, in male-typed domains.¹ This finding has been found in research that, like ours, asks participants to estimate their performance on a task (e.g., estimate your score on a test). Here some studies find no gender differences (Acker and Duck 2008), while others find men overestimating more than women when the domain is male-typed (Lundeberg, Fox, and Punčcohař 1994; Deaux and Farris 1977; Pulford and Colman 1997; Beyer 1990, 1998; Beyer and Bowden 1997). By separating different beliefs distortions empirically, our analysis suggests that these prior results may be due to the category-specific impact of gender stereotypes.

I. Experimental Design

We report three laboratory experiments, one at Ohio State University, one at Harvard Business School (but with most subjects being Harvard College undergraduates), and one at the University of California Santa Barbara.² Our goal is to collect detailed data on beliefs about both own and others' ability in different domains and to link these beliefs to strategic decisions.

¹ Some of these studies focus on qualitative questions. Campbell and Hackett (1986) ask students to assess their confidence in their performance and find that men provide higher ratings, but only for a number-adding task and not an anagram task. Fennema and Sherman (1978) ask students about their confidence in their ability to learn mathematics, with men on average indicating greater confidence than women. Other studies ask participants to rank themselves relative to others. Here, results are mixed, ranging from no gender differences to more male overplacement in male-typed domains (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007; Große and Reiner 2010; Dreber, von Essen, and Ranehill 2011; Shurchkov 2012; Acker and Duck 2008).

² The first draft of this paper included only experiments 1 and 2 (Ohio State and Harvard). We ran experiment 3 (UCSB) in response to feedback from an editor and referees, encouraging us to explore more strongly female-typed categories. In what follows, we analyze all data together. Analysis done separately for each experiment is presented in online Appendix D.

A. Overview of Design

All three experiments follow a three-part structure as in Coffman (2014). In part 1, each participant answers questions and assesses own performance in each category. We then randomly assign participants into groups of two. In part 2, we use the procedure developed by Coffman (2014) to measure willingness to contribute answers to their group. In part 3, we collect incentivized data on beliefs about own and partner's ability in each category.

The key departure from Coffman's (2014) experiment is that when participants are assigned to groups, we randomly vary whether the gender of one's partner is revealed. This allows us to: (i) collect direct measures of beliefs about male and female performance, and (ii) assess how team performance is influenced by knowing the gender of one's partner. In revealing the gender of one's partner we seek to avoid experimenter demand effects. To this end, we try to reveal gender in a subtle way. At Ohio State, we use photos of the partner, which convey gender but may also introduce confounds. For instance, photos may reduce social distance between partners (Bohnet and Frey 1999) or render race or attractiveness top of mind. For that reason, in the Harvard and UCSB experiments, we use a subtler method. At the moment of assignment to groups, the experimenter announces each pairing by calling out the two participant numbers. In the treatment where gender is not revealed, the experimenter simply announces the pairings. In the treatment where gender is revealed, participants are asked to call out, "here," when their participant number is announced. Because of the station partitions in the laboratory, it is highly likely that in this treatment a participant can hear the voice of his or her assigned partner, but not see them. By restricting to the word, "here," we hope to limit the amount of conveyed information (through tone of voice, friendliness, etc.). We thus suppose that only gender is likely to be revealed.³ In analyzing the data, we group all participants who received a photo or heard a voice as our "knew gender" treatment, performing an intent-to-treat analysis.

We designed the experiment to minimize the extent to which participants are focused on gender. Participants see no questions that refer to gender until the final demographic questions at the end of the experiment. Our findings may underestimate the importance of stereotypes, but we can be more confident that the effects we observe are not due to experimenter demand.

Participants complete the experiment using a laboratory computer at an individual station and can work at their own pace. In each part, they can earn points. At the end of the experiment, one part is randomly chosen for payment; participants

³We validate this approach by asking a subset of participants at the conclusion of the experiment to guess the gender and ethnicity of their partner. Participants are significantly more likely to identify the gender of their partner in treatments where the voice is heard (correctly identified in 92 percent of cases where voice is revealed at Harvard and 95 percent of cases where voice is revealed at UCSB compared to 67 percent of cases where voice is not revealed at Harvard, pairwise p -values of $p < 0.0001$ and $p < 0.0001$, respectively); they are not significantly more likely to identify ethnicity (correctly identified in 45 percent of cases where voice is revealed at Harvard and 41 percent of cases where voice is revealed at UCSB compared to 38 percent of cases where voice is not revealed at Harvard, pairwise p -values of $p = 0.28$ and $p = 0.59$, respectively).

receive a fixed show-up fee and additional pay for every point earned in the selected part.⁴

We describe the experimental design in detail below. The full instructions and materials for each experiment are provided in online Appendix A.

B. Category Selection

In each experiment, participants answer questions in either four (OSU and Harvard) or six (UCSB) categories. At Ohio State, the categories are arts and literature (art), verbal skills (verbal), mathematics (math), and sports and games (sports); at Harvard, we use art, emotion recognition (emotion), business (business), and sports; at UCSB, we use Kardashians (Kard), Disney movies (Disney), cooking (cooking), cars (cars), rock and roll (rock), and video games (video games). All questions for each category can be found in online Appendix A.

We sought to select categories featuring substantial variation in gender gaps in performance. At OSU and Harvard, our prior was that art, emotion, and verbal would be categories with female advantages, while business, math, and sports would be categories with male advantages. For art and sports, this prior was informed by the study of Coffman (2014), which found observed performance differences and consistent perception gaps in her sample. Our priors for verbal and math are guided by observed gender differences on large-scale standardized tests such as the SAT.⁵ Neuroscientists and psychologists have identified a female advantage in the ability to recognize emotion (Hall and Matsumoto 2004).⁶

While the ordering of gender gaps in performance across categories corresponds closely to our priors in the first two experiments, none of the categories produced significant female performance advantages. Because performance gaps are key to estimating our stereotypes model, we ran a new experiment targeting categories for which the observed gender gap would be large enough to offer a reliable test of the model, particularly categories displaying a female advantage. This experiment, conducted at UCSB, included categories that were pretested as displaying larger, consistent gender gaps in performance, both in favor of women (Kardashians, Disney, cooking) and in favor of men (cars, rock, video games).

We also collect a direct measure of the perceived gender-type of the category. Following Coffman (2014), we ask participants to use a slider scale to indicate which gender, on average, knows more about each category in general.⁷ This

⁴ At Ohio State, participants earned a \$5 show-up fee plus an additional \$1 for every point earned in the selected part. At Harvard, they earned a \$10 show-up fee, \$15 for completing the experiment, and an additional \$0.25 for every point earned in the selected part. At UCSB, participants earned a \$10 show-up fee, \$5 for completing the experiment, and \$0.50 for every point earned in the chosen part. At UCSB, one participant per session was randomly-selected to receive \$50 per point earned on one randomly selected part 3 question. These differences reflect requirements on the minimum and average payments across the labs (the \$50 bonus at UCSB was geared toward increasing attention in later parts of a longer experiment).

⁵ For data, see <http://media.collegeboard.com/digitalServices/pdf/research/2013/TotalGroup-2013.pdf>.

⁶ The emotion recognition questions are adapted from a quiz created by The Greater Good Science Center at UC Berkeley (https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/quizzes/take_quiz/ei_quiz), where a model displays an emotion and the respondent is asked to identify it. We follow this quiz and code one answer as being objectively “correct,” though we note that this may be seen as a more subjective category than the others.

⁷ They use a sliding scale ranging from -1 to 1 , where -1 means “women know more” and 1 means “men know more.” Participants report Kardashians, Disney, art, cooking, emotion, and verbal as areas of female advantage

measure offers a direct measurement of stereotypes that can be compared to the kernel of truth hypothesis.

C. Detailed Design

Part 1: Measure of Individual Ability.—Participants answer a bank of 10 multiple-choice questions in each category, for a total of 40 at OSU and Harvard and 60 at UCSB. Each question has five possible answers. Participants earn 1 point for a correct answer and lose 1/4 point for an incorrect answer; they must provide an answer to each question. All questions from a category appear on the same page, in random order. Here we just collect a measure of individual ability in each category.

Treatment Intervention.—Following completion of part 1, participants are told that they have been randomly assigned to groups of two. In the control condition, no further information about partners is given. Treated participants at Ohio State are given a photo of the partner, and at Harvard and UCSB they hear the partner answer a roll call with the single word “here.”

Bank-Level Belief Elicitation.—Following the intervention, participants estimate their own and their partner’s total score in each category in part 1. For each category, they are asked to guess the total number of correct part 1 answers they had, and that their randomly-assigned partner had. That is, they estimate their own part 1 score out of 10 (and their partner’s part 1 score out of 10) in art, and then in verbal skills, etc. Participants receive an additional point for every correct guess, incentivizing them to give the guess they think is most likely to be correct. We refer to these guesses as *bank-level beliefs*, as they are elicited at the level of the ten-question bank for each category.

Part 2: Place in Line Game.—Participants make decisions about their willingness to contribute answers to new questions in each category to their group. They are given 10 new questions in each category, for a total of 40 at OSU and Harvard and 60 at UCSB. As in part 1, all questions appear on the same page, in a randomized order, labeled with their category. For each question, participants must indicate their answer to the question and how willing they are to have it count as the group answer.

We determine group answers as in Coffman (2014). For each question, participants are asked to choose a “place in line” between one and four. The participant who submits the lower place in line for that question has her answer submitted as the group answer. To break ties, the computer flips a coin. Both partners earn 1 point if the group answer is correct and lose 1/4 point if the group answer is incorrect. Choosing a lower place in line weakly increases the probability that one’s answer is submitted for the group. Thus, we interpret place in line as “willingness to contribute.”

To maximize bank-level belief data collected per participant, our experiment at UCSB then elicits another set of bank-level beliefs for each participant following

(means of -0.66 , -0.42 , -0.30 , -0.30 , -0.28 , and -0.18 , respectively) and business, math, rock, sports, videogames, and cars as areas of male advantage (means of 0.15 , 0.18 , 0.27 , 0.50 , 0.56 , and 0.60 , respectively).

part 2. For each category, participants are again asked to estimate their own and their partner's individual part 2 score out of 10 on each of the 10-question banks in part 2.^{8,9}

Part 3: Question-Level Belief Elicitation.—We collect data on *question-level beliefs* from participants. Participants revisit questions seen in earlier parts of the experiment. For each question, they estimate (i) the probability of their own answer being correct and/or (ii) the probability of their partner's answer being correct. Participants are not reminded of their previous answers, and are never aware of what answers their partner has chosen. Depending on the treatment, some participants know their partner's gender at this stage and others do not.¹⁰

Following the completion of part 3, participants answer demographic questions about themselves and the slider scale questions. Participants receive no feedback throughout the course of the experiment. Participation lasted approximately 90 minutes at OSU and Harvard and 120 minutes at UCSB. Average earnings were approximately \$30 per participant.

II. A Look at the Data

To motivate our model and analysis, we first show some raw data on ability and beliefs, exploring how these measures vary by gender, category, and question difficulty. Table 1 presents summary statistics on our participants. In our sample, men are significantly more likely to have attended a US high school, more likely to be white, and less likely to be East Asian. Online Appendix D shows that our results are similar in a more ethnically-balanced sample of men and women who attended high school in the United States.

In Figure 1, we report actual and believed performance differences between genders. We have ordered the categories by their average slider scale perception, from most

⁸For participants who were not treated prior to part 2 (i.e., did not hear their partner's voice), we take this opportunity to treat them following part 2 and before the elicitation of part 2 bank-specific beliefs. This gives us a set of bank-specific beliefs of a known gender partner for every participant in the UCSB experiment, while still allowing for some groups to *not* know each other's gender during the place in line game. We exploit this variation in Section V.

⁹At OSU and Harvard, we used a fixed 40-question block of questions for part 1 and a fixed 40-question block of questions for part 2. That is, all participants saw the same block of questions in part 1 and then they all saw the same new block of questions in part 2. At UCSB, we use randomization to further increase our statistical power. We created two 60-question blocks and randomly presented (at the session level) one block in part 1 and one block in part 2. Thus, while at OSU and Harvard our bank-specific part 1 beliefs all refer to the same bank of questions for each participant, at UCSB we have bank-specific beliefs for two 10-question banks in each category for each participant, one elicited after part 1 and one elicited after part 2, where the order of presentation is randomized at the session level.

¹⁰We apply the incentive-compatible belief elicitation procedure used by Möbius et al. (2014), implemented as in Coffman (2014). At Ohio State, participants see all 40 questions from part 2 again. For every question they are asked to provide *both* their believed probability they answered correctly, *and* their believed probability their partner answered correctly. At Harvard, for 20 of the 40 part 2 questions, (5 in each category faced by the participant), participants provide their believed probability of answering correctly. For the remaining 20 questions, they provide their believed probability of their partner answering correctly. This is done as a separate section of the experiment. At UCSB, we seek to maximize data collected per participant. We re-present all 120 questions from parts 1 and 2 (60 for each part). For one-half of the questions, participants provide their own believed probability of answering correctly. For the remaining half of the questions, in a separate block of the experiment, they provide their believed probability of their partner answering correctly. For each mode of belief elicitation, truth-telling is profit-maximizing regardless of the participant's risk preferences (details in online Appendix A).

TABLE 1—SUMMARY STATISTICS

	Men	Women	<i>p</i> -value
Proportion OSU participants	0.39	0.34	0.08
Proportion Harvard participants	0.23	0.25	0.64
Proportion UCSB participants	0.37	0.41	0.18
Current student	0.996	0.996	0.93
Attended US high school	0.90	0.85	0.02
<i>Ethnicity</i>			
Caucasian	0.54	0.36	0.00
East Asian	0.19	0.32	0.00
Latino	0.11	0.12	0.69
Black or African American	0.06	0.07	0.39
Observations	548	508	

Notes: *p*-value is given for the null hypothesis of no difference between genders using a two-tailed test of proportions. Two participants at Ohio State dropped out when photographs were taken. One participant at Ohio State was caught cheating (looking up answers on the internet); she was dismissed. One participant at Ohio State was unable to complete the experiment due to a computer failure. All observations from these participants and their randomly-assigned partners are excluded from the analysis. At UCSB, we preregistered a restriction to only participants who self-reported attending high school in the United States and thus we exclude non-US-HS UCSB participants.

female-typed to most male-typed. The solid orange line represents the observed male advantage in performance in each category.¹¹ Categories perceived to be male-typed according to the slider scale measure tend to also display a male advantage in performance. Female performance significantly exceeds male performance in Kardashians and Disney movies. Male performance significantly exceeds female performance in cars, videogames, sports, rock and roll, math, business, and verbal. In art, cooking, and emotion, performance gaps are small and statistically insignificant.

Are perceived gaps as measured by stated beliefs in line with actual performance gaps? The dashed teal line reports the gender gap in belief about own ability (the difference between men and women's average believed probability of answering correctly).¹² The believed gap is in fact directionally larger than the performance gap in most categories. As the perceived maleness of the category rises, the gender gap in self-beliefs generally increases relative to true performance, with the largest differences coming in the more male-typed domains of business, sports, videogames, and cars. This exaggeration of actual differences suggests that self-confidence may at least in part reflect stereotypes. At the same time, in Figure 1 believed performance gaps are often close to true gaps, which may suggest that stereotypes, while present, are weak.

The problem in making inferences from Figure 1 is that other belief distortions are also at work. To see this, consider average ability and average beliefs across genders

¹¹ We construct a measure of average ability in a category for each individual by calculating average probability of answering a question correctly across all 20 questions seen in the category. Then, we take the population average of this average ability measure by gender and difference the male and female averages.

¹² We construct a measure of average believed own ability in a category for each individual by first computing the average question-specific belief for that category for the individual (averaging over all questions in that category in part 3 answered by the individual) and then computing the average bank-level belief for that category for the individual. We then average these two measures for each individual, and take the average of this average self-belief measure by gender and take the difference between the male and female averages.




FIGURE 1. GENDER DIFFERENCES IN PERFORMANCE AND SELF-BELIEFS

Notes: Error bars reflect confidence intervals, where standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Average slider scale perceptions are in parentheses. We construct a measure of average ability in a category for each individual by calculating average probability of answering a question correctly across all 20 questions seen in the category. Then, we take the population average of this average ability measure by gender and difference the male and female averages. We construct a measure of average believed own ability in a category for each individual by first computing the average question-specific belief for that category for the individual (averaging over all questions in that category in part 3 answered by the individual) and then computing the average bank-level belief for that category for the individual. We then average these two measures for each individual, and take the average of this average self-belief measure by gender and take the difference between the male and female averages.

and categories.¹³ In Figure 2, we ask how stated beliefs compare with observed ability. In panel A, we plot men's average probability of answering correctly in each category, their average believed probability of themselves answering correctly, and the average of others' believed probability of men answering correctly. The others' belief measure averages across the "partner beliefs" of all individuals in the known gender treatment paired with a male partner. Panel B presents the corresponding data for women. Categories are again ordered by the average slider scale perception of the category.

Beliefs, both about oneself and others, are on average inaccurate. Weighting each category equally, the average probability of a correct answer for men in our sample is 0.53, while men's self-beliefs average 0.59, and others believe men get it right with probability 0.57. For women, beliefs also directionally exceed observed ability, the corresponding probabilities being 0.49, 0.53, and 0.57.¹⁴ Critically, overconfidence

¹³These are computed just as in Figure 1 for ability and self-beliefs. We measure average believed ability of men (women) in a category for each individual who evaluated a known male (female) partner by first computing the average question-specific belief for that category for the individual (averaging over all questions in that category in part 3 answered by the individual) and then computing the average bank-level belief for that category for the individual. We then average these two measures for each individual, and take the average of this average partner belief measure by partner gender.

¹⁴We estimate that men's average self-beliefs significantly exceed ability ($p < 0.01$), while beliefs about men are only marginally significantly greater than men's observed ability ($p = 0.08$). For women, the difference between mean self-beliefs and actual ability is smaller in magnitude but statistically significant ($p < 0.01$), and beliefs about women are significantly larger than women's observed ability ($p < 0.01$). These p -values are generated from regressions that cluster at the individual level and weight each observation equally.




FIGURE 2. AVERAGE ABILITY AND BELIEFS

Notes: Error bars reflect confidence intervals, where standard errors are clustered at the individual level. We construct a measure of average ability in a category for each individual by calculating average probability of answering a question correctly across all 20 questions seen in the category. We construct a measure of average believed own ability in a category for each individual by first computing the average question-specific belief for that category for the individual (averaging over all questions in that category in part 3 answered by the individual) and then computing the average bank-level belief for that category for the individual. We then average these two measures for each individual. We measure average believed ability of men (women) in a category for each individual who evaluated a known male (female) partner by first computing the average question-specific belief for that category for the individual (averaging over all questions in that category in part 3 answered by the individual) and then computing the average bank-level belief for that category for the individual. We then average these two measures for each individual, and take the average of this average partner belief measure by partner gender.

is not just about oneself, but also about others. This finding is unlikely to be explained just by motivated or self-serving beliefs. Rather, it suggests a general overestimation of performance for these tasks.¹⁵

¹⁵One might worry that, in our design, beliefs about self anchor reported beliefs about others, leading to our findings. We address this concern in our question-specific beliefs in our Harvard and UCSB experiments, where we




FIGURE 3. DIFFICULTY AND SELF-BELIEFS

Notes: Each point represents a question from the dataset, marking the averaged self-belief provided for that question against the share of correct answers provided to that question. We do this separately for men and women. The solid black line is the 45-degree line; points along this line would indicate accurate average beliefs.

Figure 2 also suggests that category level difficulty has predictive power for belief distortions. Given the questions we chose, some areas are more difficult than others, and beliefs about both self and others adjust to differential difficulty. To dig deeper into how beliefs depend on task difficulty, Figure 3 plots the average self-belief for each particular question, calculated separately by gender, against the average share of correct answers to that question, again calculated separately by gender. We split categories into three groups: the clearly female-typed ones (where the perception of the category and the gender gap in performance both point to a female advantage—Kardashians and Disney), the clearly male-typed ones (where the perception of the category and the gender gap in performance both point to a male advantage: math, rock, sports, video games, and cars), and the ambiguous ones (where the perception and gender gap in performance are either noisily estimated or do not consistently coincide across all parts of the experiment: cooking, art, emotion, verbal, business).

We can see that question-level difficulty predicts question-level self-beliefs, both for men and women. We also present the 45-degree line as a point of reference.

separately elicit beliefs about self (part 3) and beliefs about partners in another section, and for a *separate* subset of questions. Even with this design, we observe similar levels of overestimation across own and partner ability (16 pp for own ability, 14 pp for ability of others for question-specific beliefs at Harvard, 9 pp for own ability and 6 pp for ability of others at UCSB). We thus do not think that anchoring effects triggered by our design are sizable. Of course, people may naturally form beliefs about others by first thinking about oneself and then adjusting (independent of the methodology used). To the extent that this is true and we are capturing a general phenomenon, we see this not as a problem with our methodology but rather as a mechanism of belief formation.

Most points fall above the 45-degree line, pointing to overestimation on average. As questions become easier, the extent of overestimation falls, with our data pointing to underestimation on average for the easiest questions. We also see a few cases of extreme underestimation of own ability for women assessing themselves in male-typed domains. In general, for both men and women, fitting beliefs as an affine function of true ability appears to be an appropriate approximation.

The influence of question difficulty on beliefs raises an important challenge for assessing the role of stereotypes. The reason is that average category difficulty and the gender-type of the category are somewhat confounded, particularly for women. Categories that are typically harder for women are also on average categories that are more male-typed. This is problematic from an identification perspective, and may lead to a masking of stereotypes in a naïve analysis. Stereotypes would predict *underestimation* of performance for women in male-typed categories, but those same male-typed categories may be harder for women on average, leading to more *overestimation* driven by their difficulty alone. These countervailing forces may generate the reasonably close correspondence between performance and belief gaps in Figure 1. To disentangle the effects of item difficulty from stereotyping, we need a model that separates these factors.

III. The Model

There are two groups of participants, $G = M, F$ (for male and female) and 12 categories of questions, $J \in \{\text{Kardashians}, \text{Disney}, \text{art}, \text{cooking}, \text{emotion}, \text{verbal}, \text{business}, \text{math}, \text{rock}, \text{sports}, \text{cars}, \text{video games}\}$. Denote by $p_{i,j}$ the probability that individual $i \in G$ answers the question $j \in J$ correctly. We assume that $p_{i,j}$ is given by

$$(1) \quad p_{i,j} = p_{G,J} + a_{i,j},$$

where $p_{G,J}$ is average performance of gender G in the bank of ten questions from category J that question j is drawn from. Component $a_{i,j}$ captures individual-specific ability and question-specific difficulty. At the gender-category level, the definition $E_{ij}(p_{i,j}) = p_{G,J}$ imposes $E_{ij}(a_{i,j}) = 0$. Individual $i \in G$ is better than the average member of group G in category J if $E_j(a_{i,j}) > 0$. Question $j \in J$ is easier than the average in category J if $E_i(a_{i,j}) > 0$.

A. Misestimation of Ability and Question Difficulty

In our data, participants systematically overestimate their performance in harder questions. The cause of this phenomenon is an open question. In a study of overconfidence not focused on gender, Moore and Healy (2008)—henceforth, MH—attribute it to imperfect information about individual ability.¹⁶ Excess optimism for hard questions may also be due to a mechanical overweighting of low probability events,

¹⁶In MH (2008), agents know their average ability in a category, but get a noisy signal of the difficulty of a specific question. Bayesian agents should discount the noisy signal, generating overestimation (underestimation) for questions that are hard (easy) relative to the agents' expectations. The same mechanism generates similar patterns when assessing others.

possibly related to the probability weighting function of Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory (1979). Alternatively, these distortions could be due to over-precision, or excessive confidence in the accuracy of beliefs (MH 2008). Because our questions are multiple-choice, an excessive confidence that one's answer is correct will exactly overestimate her probability of answering correctly. A fourth possibility is that people overestimate their performance due to self-serving beliefs about own ability, or image concerns that motivate them to view themselves favorably. Finally, the larger amount of overestimation for more difficult questions could be driven by noise in beliefs: if beliefs are random and constrained to be between 0 and 1, we would also expect more overestimation for the more difficult questions.

Here we do not seek to distinguish these mechanisms, but call this broad phenomenon difficulty-induced misestimation (DIM). To measure the total role of DIM in the data, and to separate it from stereotypes, we specify the perceived probability $p_{i,j}^{DIM}$ of answering correctly to be an affine transformation of the true ability $p_{i,j}$:

$$(2) \quad p_{i,j}^{DIM} = c + \omega p_{i,j},$$

where c and ω are such that beliefs always lie in $[0, 1]$. This affine approximation appears to be consistent with the data presented in Figure 3. When $c > 0$ and $\omega \in (0, 1)$ participants overestimate ability in hard questions where $p_{i,j}$ is low, and may underestimate it when $p_{i,j}$ is high. Accurate estimation in easy questions occurs if $c = 1 - \omega > 0$.

Our belief measures for each participant come from estimation tasks, where participants are asked to evaluate their absolute ability (either their probability of answering correctly, or their score on a ten-question bank). We then classify beliefs that on average exceed observed ability as "overconfidence." In a critique of the overconfidence literature, Benoît and Dubra (2011) show that learning from own performance can rationally produce *overplacement* in tasks where participants are asked to evaluate themselves relative to others. That is, y percent of subjects can rationally believe that they are in the top x percent of the distribution, with $y > x$. Our setting is not of this form. Instead, our estimation setting is closer to what Benoît and Dubra refer to as a "scale experiment," where beliefs that are too high on average cannot be rationalized (see Theorem 3 in Benoît and Dubra 2011).

B. Stereotypes

We model stereotypes following BCGS (2016). Consider a decision-maker trying to assess the distribution of some set of types in a target group, G . These types could be categorical, such as occupations, hair colors, or political affiliations, or ordered, such as math abilities, heights, or incomes. In BCGS (2016), when forecasting the distribution of types in some target group G , the decision-maker compares the target group to a comparison group $-G$. The model posits that the decision-maker's beliefs about the target group are swayed by the representativeness heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky 1972), the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of types that are *relatively* more likely in the target group than in the comparison group.

Take a simple example connected to gender. Suppose a decision maker is trying to assess the distribution of math abilities among men. The model postulates that

the decision-maker compares, perhaps by sampling from memory, the distribution of math abilities among men to the distribution from a natural comparison group, such as women. The decision-maker's beliefs about the abilities of men are then shifted toward the more representative types, which are ability levels that are relatively more frequent among men than women. For instance, if abilities in the two genders are normally distributed with slightly different means, the representative types occur in the tails. As a result, men may be over-represented in the high-ability tail relative to women, even if the absolute frequency of these high-ability types is extremely low. In this case, the decision-maker swayed by representativeness would get the direction of the gender gap right but exaggerate its magnitude. A tiny male advantage in math on average will be translated into a larger believed advantage.

With this approach, stereotypes contain a “kernel of truth”: they exaggerate true group differences by focusing on the, often unlikely, features that distinguish one group from the other. BCGS (2016) show that beliefs about Conservatives and Liberals in the United States exhibit such a kernel of truth: when asked to estimate the average position of a political group on an issue, participants get the direction of the average difference right, but overestimate its magnitude.¹⁷ This overestimation is larger when a party's extreme types occur with low frequency in *absolute terms*, but *high relative frequency* compared to the other party.

In our setup, stereotypes distort the perceived ability $p_{G,J}$ of the average member of a given gender. In each question within a category J , we model each gender as distributed over two types: “answering correctly” and “answering incorrectly.” Aggregating to the category level, for gender G (resp. $-G$) the probability of these types is $p_{G,J}$ and $1 - p_{G,J}$ (resp. $p_{-G,J}$ and $1 - p_{-G,J}$). Following BCGS, we say that “answering correctly” is more representative for group G in category J than “answering incorrectly” when $\frac{p_{G,J}}{p_{-G,J}} > \frac{1 - p_{G,J}}{1 - p_{-G,J}}$, that is, when $p_{G,J} > p_{-G,J}$. The stereotypical ability of the average member of G in category J is given by

$$(3) \quad p_{G,J}^{st} = p_{G,J} \left(\frac{p_{G,J}}{p_{-G,J}} \right)^{\theta\sigma} \frac{1}{Z_{J,G}},$$

where $\theta \geq 0$ is a measure of representativeness-driven distortions and $Z_{J,G}$ is a normalizing factor so that $p_{G,J}^{st} + (1 - p_{G,J})^{st} = 1$. Parameter σ captures the mental prominence of cross gender comparisons: the higher is σ , the more are male-female gender comparisons top of mind. The case $\theta\sigma = 0$ describes the rational agent. When $\theta\sigma > 0$, representative types are overweighted. This is different from statistical discrimination, where individuals $i \in G$ are judged as the average member of gender G , overweighting $p_{G,J}$ relative to $a_{i,j}$, but there is no average distortion in G .

¹⁷ Other models, including work on naïve realism by Keltner and Robinson (1996), can generate similar exaggeration of differences in political and other contexts. The key distinguishing feature of our approach is its connection to the true distribution of underlying types, and the way representativeness serves to distort beliefs about these distributions.

When $p_{G,J}$ is close to $p_{-G,J}$, equation (3) can be linearly approximated as¹⁸

$$(4) \quad p_{G,J}^s = p_{G,J} + \theta\sigma(p_{G,J} - p_{-G,J}).$$

The stereotypical belief of gender G in category J entails an adjustment $\theta\sigma(p_{G,J} - p_{-G,J})$ in the direction of the *true* average gap ($p_{G,J} - p_{-G,J}$) between genders. In domains where men are on average better than women, $p_{M,J} > p_{F,J}$, the average ability of men is overestimated and that of women is underestimated.

The effect of the gender gap in beliefs is stronger when gender comparisons are more top of mind, namely when σ is higher. Although we try to reduce the prominence of gender comparisons in the experiment, different experimental treatments, in particular the assignment of a male or female partner, could be expected to influence σ .

C. Estimating Equations and Empirical Strategy

Denote by $p_{i,j}^b$ the probability that person i believes he or she has correctly answered question j . We assume that belief $p_{i,j}^b$ is distorted by two separate influences: difficulty-induced misestimation $p_{i,j}^{DIM}$ of true ability and the gender stereotype in category J . Formally, we write

$$(5) \quad p_{i,j}^b = c + \omega(p_{G,J} + a_{i,j}) + \theta\sigma(p_{G,J} - p_{-G,J}).$$

This equation nests rational expectation for $c = \theta\sigma = 0$ and $\omega = 1$, in which case beliefs only depend on the objective gender and individual-level abilities. If $\theta\sigma = 0$, but $c \neq 0$ or $\omega \neq 1$, then DIM is the only departure from rational expectations. If instead $\theta\sigma > 0$, but $c = 0$ and $\omega = 1$, distortions are driven only by stereotypes.¹⁹

We use equation (5) to organize our investigation of beliefs both at the question and bank levels. DIM, characterized by the constant c and slope ω , can be identified by comparing beliefs to objective ability either across questions within a given category J or across individuals with different abilities. This effect is orthogonal to gender stereotypes, which are identified by comparing beliefs across categories, controlling for question difficulty.

We next present our estimating equations along these dimensions and discuss econometric issues. We have two ways of estimating the roles of DIM and stereotypes. First, and most directly, we can estimate equation (5) using beliefs about own performance at the question level. This estimation uses the question-level beliefs data from part 3 of the experiment. This approach identifies DIM from variation in question-level difficulty within categories, holding the category-level stereotype constant.

The second approach is to use assessments at the category level, with the bank-level beliefs about own score on the ten-question bank provided following part 1

¹⁸To see this, start from $p_{G,J}^\theta = p_{G,J} \left(p_{G,J} + (1 - p_{G,J}) \cdot \left(\frac{1 - p_{G,J}}{1 - p_{-G,J}} \right)^\theta \cdot \left(\frac{p_{G,J}}{p_{-G,J}} \right)^{-\theta} \right)^{-1}$. Write $p_{G,J} = p_{-G,J} + \epsilon$, so that $\left(\frac{1 - p_{G,J}}{1 - p_{-G,J}} \right)^\theta \sim 1 - \frac{\theta}{1 - p_{-G,J}}\epsilon$ and $\left(\frac{p_{G,J}}{p_{-G,J}} \right)^{-\theta} \sim 1 - \frac{\theta}{p_{-G,J}}\epsilon$. Then expand $p_{G,J}^\theta$ to first order in ϵ to get the result.

¹⁹Equation (5) can be equivalently derived by assuming that DIM applies to stereotyped beliefs, in the sense that $p_{i,j}^b = c + \omega(p_{G,J}^s + a_{i,j})$. In this case, the coefficient in front of the gender gap is $\omega\theta\sigma$ and not $\theta\sigma$.

(and part 2 for UCSB participants). Using equation (5), the belief about own performance at the category level (part 1 or 2) is

$$(6) \quad E_{j \in J}(p_{i,j}^b) = c + \omega(p_{G,J} + E_{j \in J}(a_{i,j})) + \theta\sigma(p_{G,J} - p_{-G,J}),$$

where $E_{j \in J}(p_{i,j}^b)$ is the average probability of answering correctly a question in category J . In equation (6), the DIM parameters c and ω are estimated using variation across individuals with different abilities, not across specific questions within an individual as in the question-level estimation. Thus, equations (5) and (6) use different sources of variation to estimate DIM, allowing us to assess robustness of our results.

We next consider beliefs about others. We focus on participants who knew the gender of their partner. The belief $p_{i' \rightarrow i,j}^b$ held by individual i' about the performance of individual $i \in G$ on a given question j (part 3) is

$$(7) \quad p_{i' \rightarrow i,j}^b = c + \omega(p_{G,J} + E_i(a_{i,j})) + \theta\sigma(p_{G,J} - p_{-G,J}).$$

The term $E_i(a_{i,j})$ reflects the fact that i' has no specific information about the ability of i in question j , so beliefs should depend on the average hit rate of gender G for the same question. The average believed score out of 10 for a generic member of G in category J satisfies

$$(8) \quad E_{j \in J}(p_{i' \rightarrow i,j}^b) = c + \omega p_{G,J} + \theta\sigma(p_{G,J} - p_{-G,J}).$$

Equations (7) and (8) allow us to estimate beliefs about the performance of each gender using question-level and bank-level data, respectively.

We follow a common empirical strategy and estimate equations (5)–(8) separately for men and women and separately for beliefs about self and others. Allowing parameters c , ω , and $\theta\sigma$ to vary across genders and belief types can be informative. For instance, this approach can detect differences in DIM between men and women or in beliefs about self and others (e.g., self-serving overconfidence should only affect self-beliefs). The stereotypes coefficient $\theta\sigma$ may be higher if gender comparisons become top of mind when the partner is revealed to be of the opposite gender, or when beliefs are elicited about performance in a category as opposed to a specific question.

Two main econometric issues arise when bringing specifications (5) through (8) to the data. Estimation relies on finding proxies for (i) the gender gap ($p_{G,J} - p_{-G,J}$) in performance and (ii) individual as well as group level ability. We next discuss how we handle these explanatory variables, starting with the gender gap.

Consider the gender gap in performance in category J . Because $E_{i \in G, j \in J}(a_{i,j}) = 0$, a proxy for the gap ($p_{G,J} - p_{-G,J}$) in the data is given by the average performance gap between genders in the bank of ten questions in category J . With sufficiently large N , this measure should be reliable. Table 2 reports these performance gaps measured as the difference in the probability of answering a question correctly, separated by gender and category, for the two ten-question banks in each category. Men outperform women significantly in math, cars, rock, sports, and videogames in both banks while women outperform men significantly in Kardashians and Disney. Gaps

TABLE 2—SUMMARY STATISTICS ON GENDER GAPS IN PERFORMANCE

	Male advantage in prob. of correct answer at question-level			
	Average gap on bank 1 (M – W)	Average gap on bank 2 (M – W)	Average gap on both banks (M – W)	<i>p</i> -value (Avg. gap on both banks = 0)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Kardashians	–0.105 (0.021)	–0.169 (0.024)	–0.137 (0.021)	<0.001
Disney movies	–0.142 (0.022)	–0.084 (0.021)	–0.113 (0.020)	<0.001
Art	0.002 (0.016)	–0.026 (0.014)	–0.012 (0.013)	0.33
Cooking	0.002 (0.020)	–0.023 (0.019)	–0.010 (0.017)	0.55
Emotion recognition	0.024 (0.016)	–0.013 (0.017)	0.006 (0.013)	0.69
Business	0.079 (0.022)	–0.007 (0.020)	0.036 (0.018)	0.05
Verbal skills	0.062 (0.020)	0.029 (0.020)	0.045 (0.018)	0.01
Math	0.075 (0.022)	0.045 (0.022)	0.060 (0.020)	0.003
Cars	0.099 (0.017)	0.103 (0.015)	0.101 (0.013)	<0.001
Rock and roll	0.087 (0.019)	0.127 (0.020)	0.107 (0.017)	<0.001
Sports and games	0.142 (0.012)	0.142 (0.014)	0.142 (0.011)	<0.001
Video games	0.234 (0.021)	0.161 (0.018)	0.197 (0.017)	<0.001

Notes: Pools data from Ohio State, Harvard, and UCSB. Columns 2–4 report the mean difference in probability of answering correctly across gender in the ten-question bank. The standard error on the difference is reported in parentheses. *p*-value is given for the null hypothesis of no average performance difference between genders using a Fisher-Pitman permutation test for two independent samples.

in the other categories are mixed. In business and verbal skills, men outperform women by a significant margin in bank 1, but not in bank 2. In the other stereotypically female categories (emotion, art, and cooking), performance gaps are small and statistically insignificant.²⁰

This evidence raises two issues. First, observed gender gaps in some categories are small and noisily estimated, which introduces noise in our estimation of θ . Second, and related, stereotypes may be formed on the basis of gender gaps observed outside of our lab experiment (e.g., the gender gap in the broader population) which would also affect estimates of θ . To address these concerns, we perform two robustness checks. First, we replace observed gaps with the slider scale perceptions provided

²⁰Our math questions are taken from a practice test for the GMAT Exam. In 2012–2013, the gender gap in mean GMAT scores in the United States was 549 versus 504 (out of 800): see <http://www.gmac.com/~media/Files/gmac/Research/GMAT%20Test%20Taker%20Data/2013-gmat-profile-exec-summary.pdf>. Our verbal questions are taken from practice tests for the Verbal Reasoning and Writing sections of the SAT I. The relative performances we observe are broadly in line with other evidence. In SAT exams, taken by a population in many ways similar to our lab sample, men perform better than women in math (527 versus 496 out of 800) and perform equally in verbal questions (critical reading plus writing, 488 versus 492 out of 800), though these differences are not significant.

by participants, which proxy for gender gaps in the broader population (Section IVD). Second, we restrict attention to categories in which the gender gaps are large and stable across different measurements (see online Appendix D). Both of these tests suggest, if anything, a marginally stronger average impact of stereotypes on beliefs. The fact that estimates of θ remain fairly stable for these various specifications suggests that imperfect measurement of the relevant gender gap does not pose a substantial threat to our analysis.

The other component of the model is individual ability, which is also measured with error. The most severe problem arises when dealing with ability in a specific question, as in equation (5). We do not observe the objective individual- and question-specific ability $p_{i,j}$. Rather, we observe whether subject i answered question j correctly, denoted by a dummy $I_{i,j}$. Because $I_{i,j}$ is an imperfect measure of $p_{i,j}$, estimating equation (5) using $I_{i,j}$ involves well-known econometric issues. First, $I_{i,j}$ is noisier than $p_{i,j}$, which causes an attenuation bias on the coefficient ω on own ability. Second, to the extent that the noise in $I_{i,j}$ is related to the gender gap in performance, it can also bias the gender gap coefficient $\theta\sigma$.

To address this issue, we adopt a two-stage approach, instrumenting for individual question-specific ability. We first estimate $I_{i,j}$ using a set of proxies for individual-level ability: the individual's average ability in the rest of the bank excluding question j , denoted $p_{i,J\setminus j}$, and the average frequency of a correct answer to the same question j by all other participants, $p_{G\cup-G\setminus j}$.²¹ These proxies do not use information about participant i 's performance on question j , but still capture her ability in the category J and the question's overall difficulty. We implement the first-stage regression:

$$(9) \quad I_{i,j} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 p_{i,J\setminus j} + \alpha_2 p_{G\cup-G\setminus j} + \alpha_3 (p_{G,J} - p_{-G,J}),$$

where the gender gap $p_{G,J} - p_{-G,J}$ is also included as a regressor. The fitted values $\hat{I}_{i,j}$ of the regressions above are then used as proxies for true individual- and question-specific ability $p_{i,j}$. Instrumenting helps us reduce biases due to noisy ability measurement while preserving the interpretation of coefficients as distortions due to stereotypes or DIM.²²

Finally, ability at the category level, necessary to estimate equations (6), (7), and (8), is proxied for with its sample counterpart. Thus, $(p_{G,J} + E_{j \in J}(a_{i,j}))$ in equation (6) is proxied by the share of correct answers obtained by individual i in category J . Similarly, the ability measures in equations (7) and (8) are proxied by the share of correct answers by gender G in question j and in category J , respectively.

²¹ Alternatively, one could use the share of correct answers to question j by only participants of the same gender, $p_{G\setminus j}$. The results of Table 3 are robust to this alternative specification.

²² In online Appendix C, we perform a robustness check of the two-stage approach described above. We separately add the proxies for individual ability, $p_{i,J\setminus j}$ and $p_{G\cup-G\setminus j}$ to equation (5). This provides a simpler method to pinning down the effect of stereotypes; however, we lose the interpretation of c and ω . Estimated coefficients $\theta\sigma$ on the gender gaps are very similar to the two-stage estimates.

TABLE 3—SELF-BELIEFS

<i>Question-level self-beliefs: equation (5)</i> Two-stage least squares predicting own believed probability of answering a question correctly				<i>Bank-level self-beliefs: equation (6)</i> OLS predicting own believed score in bank on scale of 0 to 1			
	Parameter	Men (1)	Women (2)		Parameter	Men (3)	Women (4)
Own gender advantage	$\theta\sigma$	−0.039 (0.026)	0.49 (0.028)	Own gender advantage	$\theta\sigma$	0.21 (0.033)	0.44 (0.046)
Own ability: fitted value of $\hat{\tau}_{i,j}$	ω	0.60 (0.011)	0.61 (0.011)	Own ability: own average probability of correct answer in bank	ω	0.71 (0.018)	0.71 (0.020)
Constant	c	0.33 (0.009)	0.30 (0.009)	Constant	c	0.12 (0.012)	0.10 (0.012)
Clusters		548	504	Clusters		548	504
Observations		23,438	21,840	Observations		3,824	3,680

Notes: Pools observations for Ohio State, Harvard, and UCSB. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. *Own gender advantage* in both specifications is measured as the average gender difference in the probability of a correct answer on the bank of questions that the question is drawn from, coded so that a positive sign reflects an own gender advantage. *Own ability* for question-level data is the fitted value of $\hat{\tau}_{i,j}$ from equation (9), and, in bank-level data, own ability is an individual's average probability of answering correctly in the bank. Bank-level beliefs and inputs are rescaled to a 0 to 1 scale: that is, while an individual predicts her score on a 0 to 10 scale, we divide that belief by 10 here, so that all coefficients can be interpreted in probability points.

IV. Determinants of Beliefs

A. Beliefs about Own Performance

Table 3 reports the results from specifications 5 and 6 on self-beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 use part 3 question-level data to estimate equation (5). We capture ability using the fitted values $\hat{\tau}_{i,j}$ described above; first-stage estimates appear in online Appendix C. Columns 3 and 4 present the estimates of equation (6) using bank-level beliefs. To interpret the coefficients in probability points, we rescale bank-level beliefs (and all inputs) to a probability scale by dividing by 10.

In three of the four specifications, we identify a significant role for stereotypes in shaping beliefs about self. For women, the effects are consistent. Specifications 2 and 4 both suggest that, holding own true ability fixed, a 5 percentage point increase in male advantage in a category (roughly the size of moving from a gender-neutral category to a moderately male-typed category like math), decreases beliefs of own ability by between 2.2 percentage points (bank-level estimate) to 2.5 percentage points (question-level estimate).

For men, the results are less consistent: in the question-level data, we identify no significant effect of stereotypes on men's self-beliefs. In the bank-level data, men's self-beliefs are shaped by stereotypes, though by a smaller amount than women's self-beliefs: we estimate that an increase of 5 percentage points in the male advantage in a category increases a man's belief of answering correctly by 1.1 percentage points. In an interacted model, we estimate a stronger impact of stereotypes on women's self-beliefs than on men's self-beliefs ($p < 0.01$ in both the question-level and bank-level data). This evidence indicates that self-beliefs of women, and to a weaker extent of men, are influenced by stereotypes in the specific sense of the kernel of truth: they reflect, but overestimate, true gender differences.

Notably, DIM is also an important determinant of self-beliefs held by both men and women. We estimate $\omega < 1$ ($p < 0.001$) and $c > 0$ in all specifications, strongly rejecting the null of rational expectations ($c = \theta = 0$, $\omega = 1$). Participants overestimate their own performance for difficult questions and underestimate it slightly for easy questions, as $c + \omega < 1$ ($p < 0.001$). In question-level data, absent a distortion from stereotyping, we estimate that men overestimate own performance for questions where own ability is less than or equal to 0.83, and women overestimate own performance for questions where own ability is less than 0.77. DIM distortions are smaller in bank-level than in question-level beliefs (c is lower and ω is higher in columns 3 and 4 than in columns 1 and 2).²³

When we compare genders, running an interacted model, we estimate a somewhat smaller c for women than for men ($p < 0.01$ in the question-level data, n.s. in the bank-level data), but no significant differences in ω . Thus, no clear gender differences in DIM emerge in our data on self-beliefs. While it is difficult to compare this result directly with the earlier work that has not separated DIM from other sources of belief distortions, such as stereotypes, the null finding is consistent with the evidence of limited gender differences in overconfidence in neutral-typed categories. In our data, significant gender differences occur in categories with sizable gender gaps due to stereotypes.

B. Beliefs about Others' Performance

Table 4 reports estimates of equations (7) and (8) for beliefs about others' performance on individual questions (columns 1 and 2) and at the bank-level (columns 3 and 4). We use data from participants who knew their partner's gender, and we pool all evaluators without keeping track of their gender. In online Appendix C we show effects separately by gender of the evaluator, finding no consistent differences in how men and women evaluate others.

There are many similarities between Table 4 estimates and the self-beliefs estimates of Table 3. Just as in the self-beliefs data, we estimate a significant role for stereotypes in three out of the four specifications. When evaluating women, stereotypes play a consistent and nontrivial role in shaping beliefs. Just as increases in male advantage decrease women's beliefs of own ability, increases in male advantage also decrease others' beliefs of women's ability. This effect is of roughly the same magnitude in the question-level data: a 5 percentage point increase in male advantage decreases beliefs of female ability by 2.4 percentage points. In the bank-level beliefs, the effects are smaller than the effects for self-beliefs, but still significant: an increase in male advantage of 5 percentage points is estimated to decrease beliefs of female ability by 0.7 percentage points. The evidence on the role of stereotypes for beliefs about men is mixed, just as it was for self-beliefs. In the bank-level data, stereotypes are quite strong, shaping beliefs about men as predicted by the model, just as they did for self-beliefs. In question-level data, we estimate no significant effect.

²³This is consistent with the Moore and Healy mechanism (subjects perceive a more precise signal of average difficulty after observing ten questions than after observing a single question) and with overestimation of small probabilities (which exerts a smaller distortion on the average score from several questions).

TABLE 4—BELIEFS ABOUT OTHERS

<i>Question-level beliefs: equation (7)</i> OLS predicting belief of partner's probability of answering a question correctly				<i>Bank-level beliefs: equation (8)</i> OLS predicting belief of partner's score on scale of 0 to 1			
Parameter	Beliefs about men (1)	Beliefs about women (2)		Parameter	Beliefs about men (3)	Beliefs about women (4)	
Partner's gender advantage	$\theta\sigma$	0.02 (0.027)	0.48 (0.037)	Partner's gender advantage	$\theta\sigma$	0.45 (0.052)	0.14 (0.055)
Partner ability: share of partner's gender answering question correctly	ω	0.34 (0.013)	0.33 (0.016)	Partner ability: partner's gender average probability of correct answer in bank	ω	0.64 (0.043)	0.62 (0.037)
Constant	c	0.40 (0.010)	0.43 (0.012)	Constant	c	0.16 (0.024)	0.21 (0.021)
Clusters		395	398	Clusters		395	398
Observations		18,020	18,179	Observations		2,590	2,630

Notes: Includes data only from participants who knew the gender of their partner at the time of providing the belief. Pools observations for Ohio State, Harvard, and UCSB. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. *Partner's gender advantage* in both specifications is measured as the average gender difference in the probability of a correct answer on the bank of questions that the question is drawn from, coded so that a positive sign reflects an advantage for the partner's gender. *Partner ability* for question-level data is share of individuals of partner's gender that answered that question correctly and, in bank-level data, partner ability is the average probability of answering correctly in the 10-question bank by members of the partner's gender. Note that bank-level beliefs and inputs are rescaled to a 0 to 1 scale: that is, while an individual predicts her partner's score on a 0 to 10 scale, we divide that belief by 10 here, so that all coefficients can be interpreted in probability points.

DIM also plays a role in beliefs about others, as participants overestimate ability on hard questions and slightly underestimate it on easy ones. These belief distortions are directionally more severe here than in the case of self-beliefs (particularly on hard questions). This finding could be explained by the Moore and Healy mechanism, because signals of difficulty for others are presumably noisier than those for self. This finding shows clearly that the overestimation of own performance we observe in our data is not only due to conventional self-serving biases.

When evaluating others, DIM plays a larger role in the assessment of women than of men. In both question-level and bank-level beliefs, we estimate a larger c when evaluating women than when evaluating men ($p < 0.05$ in question-level data, $p < 0.10$ in bank-level data), suggesting in general more overestimation of female ability than of male ability. While ω is directionally smaller when assessing women than men, these differences are not significant.

Most past studies of overconfidence, with the notable exception of Moore and Healy (2008), explore beliefs about others in the context of placement questions, asking participants to rank themselves relative to others. While this is an important and interesting line of inquiry, placement questions do not allow the researcher to infer whether beliefs about others are also inflated relative to the truth. Our data suggest that “overconfident” beliefs are not unique to self-assessments. Note that this is not necessarily inconsistent with past evidence on over-placement, as beliefs about self could still exceed beliefs about others, even if both are inflated relative to the truth. We explore the connection between beliefs about absolute and relative ability in Section V.

C. Taking Stock of Stereotypes and DIM

What do our model and data have to say about gender gaps in confidence? We can use our estimates to shed light on this question. As a metric for this assessment, we propose the male overconfidence gap (MOG), defined as the difference between male and female overconfidence: $\text{MOG} = [(\text{Average Male Self-belief} - \text{Average Male Ability}) - (\text{Average Female Self-belief} - \text{Average Female Ability})]$. This measure increases as men become more overconfident (or less underconfident) about themselves relative to women. In line with our initial motivation, this measure captures the extent to which self-assessments of confidence tend to favor men over women relative to real ability.

Our estimates allow us to assess the value of MOG under two counterfactuals, shedding light on the sources of gender differences in overconfidence. We focus on question-level data, as in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3. In the first counterfactual, we estimate MOG by assuming that only DIM is at work by computing a set of individual self-beliefs under the assumption that $\theta\sigma = 0$. That is, we compute a *DIM-only* self-belief by first using the first-stage regression in equation (9) to construct the fitted value of individual question-specific ability, $\hat{I}_{i,j}$, and then feeding that value into the model of Table 3:

$$c + \omega(\hat{I}_{i,j}) + \theta\sigma(p_{G,J} - p_{-G,J}),$$

where we set $c = 0.33$, $\omega = 0.60$, and $\theta\sigma = 0$ for men, and $c = 0.30$, $\omega = 0.61$, and $\theta\sigma = 0$ for women. This produces a set of DIM-only counterfactual self-beliefs, which we can then use to construct the DIM-only MOG in each category, subtracting observed average ability from average DIM-only self-beliefs for each gender, and taking the difference of these differences.

In the second counterfactual, we compute a set of individual self-beliefs under the assumption that only stereotypes are at work, using the same first-stage regression to produce $\hat{I}_{i,j}$ but then feeding it into the Table 3 model with $c = 0$, $\omega = 1$, and $\theta\sigma = -0.039$ (for men) or $\theta\sigma = 0.49$ (for women). We use this set of counterfactual self-beliefs to construct the *stereotypes-only* MOG for each category. In Table 5, we present these counterfactual MOGs, juxtaposed with the observed MOG in our data in the final column.

If only DIM distorted beliefs (column 1), men's overconfidence would exceed women's in all six of the female-typed domains. This is because, on average, questions in these female-typed domains are harder for men than for women (in the sense that men's scores are lower than women's), leading to more male overconfidence. Conversely, in the male-typed domains of video games, sports, rock, and cars, where questions are on average harder for women than for men, the DIM-only counterfactual predicts greater female than male overconfidence. Thus, the trend in the DIM-only counterfactual predicts greater gender gaps in overconfidence in favor of *women* exactly as the maleness of the domain increases. This of course is directly at odds with the observed trend in our data (column 3). A DIM-only perspective clearly misses an important component of beliefs.

When only stereotypes distort beliefs (column 2), the predictions are almost exactly the opposite of the DIM-only model: the largest gap in overconfidence in

TABLE 5—PREDICTED GENDER GAPS IN OVERCONFIDENCE

	DIM-only prediction of gender gap in overconfidence (M – F) (1)	Stereotypes-only prediction of gender gap in overconfidence (M – F) (2)	Observed gender gap in overconfidence (M – F) (3)
Kardashians	0.078	–0.063	0.028
Disney	0.070	–0.046	0.024
Art	0.033	–0.018	0.021
Cooking	0.028	–0.006	0.042
Emotion	0.034	0.002	0.040
Verbal	0.016	0.019	–0.004
Business	0.028	–0.005	0.063
Math	0.008	0.022	0.022
Rock	–0.018	0.043	0.025
Sports	–0.032	0.062	0.038
Video games	–0.051	0.093	0.061
Cars	–0.015	0.045	0.033

Notes: We generate the DIM-only predictions by constructing a DIM-only question-level self-belief for each individual in the dataset. This uses the estimates presented in Table 3, but sets $\theta\sigma = 0$. Once we have generated this set of DIM-only beliefs for each individual, we use them to construct the counterfactual male overconfidence gap (MOG) by taking the average DIM-only self-belief for men (women), differencing out observed average male (female) ability, and then subtracting female overconfidence from male overconfidence. We follow the same approach for the stereotypes-only counterfactual, again using the estimates from Table 3, but this time setting $c = 0$, $\omega = 1$. The final column presents the observed MOG in our data, using observed self-beliefs for men and women and observed ability for the question-level data.

favor of women obtains for Kardashians (6 percentage points), the largest gap in favor of men obtains for videogames (9 percentage points). While the trend toward predicting a larger gender gap in favor of men as category maleness increases is in line with the observed data, the stereotypes-only model is too extreme.

The pattern in the data is a small but rather consistent gender gap in overconfidence in favor of men. While these gender gaps are positively correlated with observed gaps in performance as predicted by stereotypes (correlation of 0.28), this correlation is muted by the countervailing force of DIM, which generates greater overconfidence in the more difficult (and on average less gender congruent) domains for each gender. A correct model of the sources of gender gaps in overconfidence must include these two distinct but key components. Relying only on the evidence of Figure 1, without separating DIM and stereotypes, leads to erroneous conclusions on the consequences of gender stereotypes.

At a broad level, our analysis indicates that lack of female self-confidence in certain tasks such as math does not arise because of their difficulty. If anything, difficulty would lead women, just like everybody else, to be overconfident. Rather, women seem relatively underconfident in difficult topics when these are stereotypically male, in the sense that they display a male advantage in performance. Here stereotypes play a key role.

Two questions remain open. First, does the kernel of truth capture a large chunk of variation in category-level stereotypes, or are there other mechanisms creating category-level gender stereotypes that are not considered here? Second, since DIM is important in the data, what are the forces behind it? While our experiment was not designed to examine the sources of DIM, our estimation results are somewhat informative.

We can assess the explanatory power of the kernel of truth by examining the correlation between the slider scale measure of stereotypes, which in principle incorporates several of their determinants, with the true gender gap in performance. The slider scale perceptions are very highly correlated with the observed gender gap in performance ($\text{corr} = 0.92$), with the average gender gap in self-beliefs ($\text{corr} = 0.93$), and with the gender gap in beliefs about others (0.94). This tight connection between the perception of male advantage, true performance gaps, and beliefs about ability shows that the kernel of truth hypothesis has strong explanatory power for category-level gender stereotypes. This evidence lends support to the BCGS (2016) theory of stereotypes.

With respect to the drivers of DIM, one possibility is that beliefs are unbiased but noisily reported on a constrained interval. This would lead to overestimation of performance for hard questions and underestimation for easy ones, and the effects would be concentrated in the extremes. One problem of this hypothesis is that random beliefs would not be correlated with actual ability, contrary to the evidence. In addition, self-beliefs on question level performance suggests a preponderance of overestimation, even for average questions, and little if any underestimation for easier questions (see Table 3, in which approximately $c = 0.3$ and $\omega = 0.6$ for either gender). In fact, in 21 percent of the observations, subjects state they are 100 percent sure their answer is correct. This last argument also goes against an explanation based on a mechanical overweighting of small probabilities, possibly related to the probability weighting function of Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).

A second possibility is that the data reflect motivated beliefs, but we already argued that the data do not support this possibility. In contrast, the estimates show robust overestimation of others' performance (similar in magnitude to that for self-beliefs), suggesting that motivated beliefs are unlikely to be a first-order factor in our data.

A third possibility is that beliefs about performance are regressive to expectations of performance, as proposed by Moore and Healy (2008). This can account for significant overestimation for harder than expected questions, and underestimation for easier than expected ones. We do not have data on expectations of difficulty, but this pattern is consistent with broad overestimation if most questions are harder than expected, which is plausible in a trivia task. The model similarly predicts that beliefs about others are more regressive (because information on others' ability is noisier), which is directionally true in our estimates.

A related source of belief distortions is over-precision, defined as an excessive confidence in the accuracy of beliefs (MH 2008): to the extent that a participant strictly prefers one answer to another, overconfidence about the precision of their knowledge is exactly the overestimation of the likelihood of a correct answer. In our experiment, we do not elicit confidence in beliefs, so we cannot test this channel directly. Unlike overestimation, however, over-precision need not automatically lead to inflated beliefs about aggregate performance on a set of questions.

D. Exploring the Stability of θ

As we discussed after presenting Table 2, one challenge in estimating the role of stereotypes in our data is the fact that our estimates rely on observed performance

gaps in our sample. Noise in estimating these gaps may introduce imprecision in our estimates.

One way to explore the extent to which this concern impacts our findings is to estimate the model using the slider scale perceptions provided by participants at the end of the experiment. Recall that the slider scale asks participants to indicate on a scale from -1 to 1 the extent to which either women or men generally know more about the category, which we interpret as a proxy for the gender gaps people have in mind. While these perceptions are likely tainted by stereotypes, they also contain information about the true gender performance gaps that generate beliefs.

In online Appendix Tables A.15 and A.16, we replicate Table 3 on self-beliefs and Table 4 on beliefs about others, but replace the observed gender gap with the participant's slider scale perception of the gap. While one cannot directly compare magnitudes across the tables (the slider scale perception is measured on a different scale than the observed true gaps), we find qualitatively similar patterns. Again, for women's beliefs about self and other's beliefs about women, we estimate a consistent role for stereotyping. To give a rough sense of magnitudes, consider women's question-level self-beliefs. Using observed gaps in Table 3, we estimate that an increase of male advantage of 5 percentage points, roughly the size of the male advantage in math, decreases self-beliefs by approximately 2.5 percentage points. In the slider scale specifications, moving from 0 to a slider scale perception of 0.20 in favor of men on the -1 to 1 scale, roughly the perception of advantage in math, is estimated to decrease self-beliefs by 1.8 percentage points. In the estimates using observed gaps, the only cases in which we failed to find a role for stereotyping was in question-level beliefs for men (both men's self-beliefs and beliefs about men). Replacing true gaps with the slider scale perceptions leads to estimates of a directionally positive, but insignificant, impact of stereotyping in question-level self-beliefs for men, and a significant positive impact of stereotyping in question-level beliefs about men.

In sum, noisily estimated gaps are unlikely to exert a substantial impact on our findings on stereotypes. The results are robust, and if anything slightly stronger, when replacing these gaps with the slider scale measures. This is likely due to the fact that our stereotype estimates are largely shaped by the more "extreme" domains at both ends of the gender-type spectrum, where true gaps are significant, sizable, and consistently estimated. In online Appendix D, we present an alternative approach by showing that our results are very similar when we restrict attention only to domains in which actual performance gaps are sizable. We show that this holds if we restrict to domains where gaps are at least 5 percentage points, or at least 10 percentage points. Our main results (consistent effects of stereotypes for women's beliefs, less consistent effects for men's beliefs) are also similar when restricting the analysis to the data from the UCSB experiment, which included the strongest female and male-typed domains. Estimates of stereotyping seem to be effectively pinned down whenever large performance gaps in favor of each gender are considered simultaneously. Estimates of θ from other populations and contexts, particularly those that increase (or decrease) the salience of gender comparisons, could vary in magnitude. Our main message is that "kernel of truth" stereotypes play an important role in shaping self-assessments and beliefs about

others, and we offer one tractable model and methodology for isolating and documenting these effects.

E. Self-Beliefs and Context

The previous sections show that stereotypes shape beliefs about own and others' ability in our data. Are these belief distortions constant or do they predictably depend on certain features of the environment? The answer to this question is both interesting and important. If there are ways to frame the environment so that gender stereotypes do not come to mind, then perhaps it is possible to render beliefs more accurate. Our model implies that context matters. In particular, the strength of stereotype distortions should depend on the extent to which gender is top of mind when assessing performance, as captured by parameter σ in equation (4). When gender is more top of mind, σ is higher, beliefs should become more stereotypical.

This context dependence of beliefs is a broader feature of the “kernel of truth” theory of stereotypes. Because beliefs exaggerate differences relative to a comparison group, beliefs can be changed by changing the comparison group one has in mind. According to cognitive psychology, stereotypes are focused on “group features that are the most distinctive ... that provide the greatest differentiation between groups” (Hilton and Von Hippel 1996, p. 241). BCGS (2016) provide experimental evidence that exogenously changing the comparison set changes beliefs about a given set of mundane objects, in the precise sense implied by the kernel of truth.

To test this prediction of BCGS (2016), we next examine the effect of revealing the gender of one's partner. We do so in two steps. In this section, we assess how having a known partner of the opposite gender impacts self-beliefs about own absolute performance in part 1.²⁴ In the next section, we assess how knowing a partner's gender shapes team performance in the place in line game. In a rational model the predictions are clear: for self-beliefs, knowledge of a partner's gender should exert no effect. This prediction is shared by any model of stable, context independent, beliefs. For the place in line game, knowledge of a partner's gender should actually improve performance by revealing information about expected relative ability in different categories. We show that the evidence does not support these predictions.

We note up front that our treatment effects may be reduced by the nature of our implementation. While the subtlety of our gender revelation limits concerns about experimenter demand effects, it may also lead to an underestimation of the effects that could be obtained through more prominent framing. Furthermore, to the extent that subjects already have gender comparisons in mind absent the revelation of partner gender, we may also see more limited treatment effects.²⁵

We start with self-beliefs. In Table 6, we repeat the specifications of Table 3 in Section IVA but restrict the sample to individuals who know partner's gender at the time of reporting the question-level or bank-level belief. We include a dummy for a known female partner and interact it with own gender advantage. If having

²⁴ A related literature on “stereotype threat” (Steele and Aronson 1995; Spencer, Steele, and Quinn 1999) posits that highlighting gender comparisons reduces actual performance. However, in our experiment beliefs are elicited after performance, so gender comparisons primed by the treatment work only through beliefs.

²⁵ This could be due to a number of reasons, including that subjects see (and hear) a mix of men and women in the lab, and that subjects are prompted to assess performance in topics that are strongly gendered.

TABLE 6—SELF-BELIEFS WITH CONTEXT DEPENDENCE

<i>Question-level beliefs</i>				<i>Bank-level beliefs</i>			
Two-stage least squares predicting own believed probability of answering a question correctly				OLS predicting own believed score on 0 to 1 scale			
	Parameter	Men (1)	Women (2)		Parameter	Men (3)	Women (4)
Own gender advantage	$\theta\sigma$	-0.10 (0.036)	0.61 (0.038)	Own gender advantage	$\theta\sigma$	0.11 (0.054)	0.51 (0.067)
Own ability— fitted value of $\hat{I}_{i,j}$	ω	0.60 (0.013)	0.59 (0.012)	Own ability— own average probability of correct answer in bank	ω	0.71 (0.021)	0.69 (0.022)
Partner female		-0.021 (0.012)	0.021 (0.012)	Partner Female		-0.014 (0.013)	0.000 (0.013)
Partner female \times own gender advantage		0.045 (0.054)	-0.15 (0.056)	Partner female \times own gender advantage		0.12 (0.076)	-0.068 (0.082)
Constant	c	0.34 (0.013)	0.30 (0.010)	Constant	c	0.12 (0.016)	0.11 (0.015)
Clusters		401	392	Clusters		401	392
Observations		18,359	17,840	Observations		2,612	2,608

Notes: Pools observations for Ohio State, Harvard, and UCSB. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. Uses only observations for individuals who knew their partner's gender at the time of the belief elicitation. *Own gender advantage* in both specifications is measured as the average gender difference in the probability of a correct answer on the bank of questions that the question is drawn from, coded so that a positive sign reflects an own gender advantage. *Own ability* for question-level data is the fitted value of $\hat{I}_{i,j}$ from equation (9), and, in bank-level data, *own ability* is an individual's average probability of answering correctly in the bank. Note that bank-level beliefs are rescaled to a 0 to 1 scale: that is, while an individual predicts her score on a 0 to 10 scale, we divide that belief by 10 here, so that all coefficients can be interpreted in probability points.

a partner of the opposite gender causes gender comparisons to become more top of mind (i.e., if σ increases), beliefs about self should be more strongly shaped by gender gaps. Thus subjects paired with women, relative to subjects paired with men, should become relatively more optimistic about own performance as male advantage increases. This would translate into a positive interaction of female partner and own gender advantage for men and the reverse for women.

The evidence is directionally consistent with the predictions. The effects are in general not statistically significant, which may be because the treatment only weakly increases the salience of gender comparisons but may also be due to the lower sample size (and lower statistical power) relative to Table 3.²⁶ To increase statistical power, in online Appendix C4, we pool the data for both male and female participants who knew the gender of their partner, regressing self-beliefs on male advantage in the category, a dummy for female partner, and the interaction of these two terms. The estimated interaction is of similar magnitude to Table 6, and is now significant in question-level data and marginally significant in bank-level data.²⁷

To give a sense of magnitudes, we estimate that a woman moving from a gender-neutral category to a moderately male-typed category such as math (male advantage of 0.05) reduces her believed probability of answering correctly by approx-

²⁶Reading across columns 1–4, the p -values on the interaction of interest are 0.40, 0.007, 0.11, and 0.41.

²⁷In question-level data, the estimated interaction is 0.096 (standard error of 0.039, p -value < 0.05). In bank-level data, the estimated interaction is 0.095 (standard error of 0.056, p -value = 0.10). See online Appendix C4, Table A5 for details.

imately 2.4 percentage points when paired with a woman and by 2.9 percentage points when paired with a man. Online Appendix C4, Table A6 shows that this effect is not limited to gender: among the sample of participants who received photographs of their partner, partner ethnicity has an impact on self-beliefs.

The evidence thus points to context dependence in our data. More detailed tests of the kernel of truth hypothesis and the context dependence of gender stereotypes would involve finding stronger ways of varying the salience of gender, in particular of reducing gender comparisons for subjects paired within their own gender. For example, evidence suggests that women educated at single-sex schools display little if any underconfidence in math (Fryer and Levitt 2010, Booth and Nolen 2012), perhaps because the gender comparison is less salient given their experience.

V. Beliefs of Relative Ability and the Consequences for Decision-Making


Our model and our data deal with beliefs of absolute ability: one's own and partner's believed probability of answering correctly. In many decision-making contexts, however, the beliefs of relative ability may be most predictive. Decisions whether to compete in a tournament are a function of whether an individual believes she can beat others; decisions whether to apply for a job or promotion are likely to be a function of believed rank within the pool of potential candidates. It is then important to check how the patterns in believed absolute ability we identify translate into beliefs of relative ability. In this section, we first document how the determinants of beliefs explored in Section IV (DIM, stereotypes, and context dependence) combine to produce gender differences in beliefs of *relative* ability. We then take this analysis from beliefs to strategic decisions within a group and examine how our participants make decisions about when to contribute ideas.

In Figure 4, we present data on beliefs about relative ability, focusing on both partner gender and category. For each participant who knows the gender of their partner at the time of belief elicitation, we construct the gap in average beliefs about own ability and average beliefs about partner's ability at the category level, weighting the bank-level and question-level data equally. We ask how this believed ability gap between self and partner varies with partner gender and category. Panel A presents believed relative ability for men with male partners in blue and with female partners in red. Panel B presents the same measures for women. In both graphs, we have also added the true gender difference in performance as the dotted green line for reference. Accurate beliefs for an individual paired with a same gender partner would average 0 in each category; accurate beliefs for an individual paired with an opposite gender partner would average the true gender difference in performance: the dotted green line.

Figure 4 shows that the patterns of beliefs documented in Section IV have important implications for beliefs about relative ability. For men paired with male partners, believed relative ability is relatively flat across the categories. If anything, men paired with male partners are relatively more confident in clearly female-typed categories (by an average of 4 percentage points) than in clearly male-typed categories (by an average of -1 percentage point).²⁸ For men paired with female partners, the pattern

²⁸ If we regress believed relative ability for men paired with male partners on the gender-type of the category, we can reject that believed relative ability is the same across gender-type with $p < 0.01$. The point estimates and

Panel A. Men's believed relative ability



Panel B. Women's believed relative ability




FIGURE 4. BELIEVED RELATIVE ABILITY

Note: Error bars reflect confidence intervals, where standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

is reversed. Men believe they are less knowledgeable than their female partners in the clearly female-typed categories (by 9 percentage points on average), and more knowledgeable than their female partners in male-typed categories (by 9 percentage points on average).²⁹ Relative to the accurate beliefs benchmark, men are not

p -value are unchanged if we include all categories (using slider scale to classify male versus female) or only those that are clearly male or female-typed as defined in Section II.

²⁹ If we regress believed relative ability for men paired with female partners on the gender-type of the category, restricting to clearly male or female-typed, we can reject that believed relative ability is the same across gender-type with $p < 0.01$. If we instead include all categories, the point estimates are 5 and 8 percentage points, respectively, $p < 0.01$.

exaggerating the gender gap in performance: if anything, they underestimate the extent of their advantage over women in many of the male-typed domains.

When paired with male partners, women believe that they outperform their partner in the female-typed categories, by 19 percentage points on average, but believe that they are outperformed by their partner in the male-typed categories: by 20 percentage points.³⁰ For the extreme categories, there is exaggeration relative to the true gap (green dotted line). When women are paired with women, relative beliefs vary less with the category, hovering closer to zero.

These patterns suggest that decisions are likely to be a function of gender stereotypes, reflected in responsiveness to both the domain, the gender of one's partner, and the interaction of the two. We find evidence for this in our data from the place in line game, where measured beliefs are strongly predictive of willingness to contribute.³¹ Here, we focus on the implications of stereotyped beliefs for group performance that follows from place in line decisions.

We say that a participant "contributes" her answer if she submits a place in line at least as close to the front as her partner. Women contribute 59 percent of their answers when paired with male partners and 68 percent of their answers when paired with female partners ($p < 0.001$).³² These differences are largely driven by the clearly male-typed categories, across which women contribute 66 percent of their answers when paired with women but only 44 percent when paired with men ($p < 0.001$). We see a smaller but directionally similar discrepancy for men: men contribute 73 percent of their answers when paired with female partners but 68 percent of their answers when paired with male partners ($p < 0.05$). Again, most of the difference stems from clearly male-typed categories, where the difference is 83 percent with female partners versus 67 percent with male partners ($p < 0.001$).

These contribution decisions have implications for group performance. We measure group performance as the fraction of questions for which a group submits the correct answer. We focus on those cases where exactly one group member has the right answer, as it is only in these cases that contribution decisions have the potential to impact performance.³³ Our design allows us to ask how performance varies across groups where one or both members do *not* know each other's gender and groups in which both partners know each other's gender. Given the significant gender gaps in performance across many domains, a reasonable null would predict that knowing gender should improve group performance. An interesting question is whether stereotyped beliefs are so exaggerated as to actually swamp any informational advantage of knowing gender. In this case, group performance could look more similar across the two treatments.

³⁰These estimates are both significantly different from 0, $p < 0.001$, and from each other, $p < 0.001$. Point estimates using all categories are 11 and 19 percentage points, p -value statements unchanged.

³¹This is a replication of the findings of Coffman (2014), who finds that beliefs about self and beliefs about partner strongly predict willingness to contribute answers in a very similar paradigm. Online Appendix Tables A.7 and A.8 explore this relationship in our data, regressing place in line from ability, male advantage in the category, partner gender, and beliefs.

³²In online Appendix C5, we present regressions that further explore these contribution results, showing that the patterns are robust to including controls for individual ability.

³³If both group members have the correct answer, the group will answer correctly. If both group members have the incorrect answer, the group will never answer correctly. Thus, stereotypes can impact group performance through contribution decisions only for questions in which one group member has the correct answer.




FIGURE 5. GROUP PERFORMANCE

Note: Error bars reflect confidence intervals, where standard errors are clustered at the group level.

Figure 5 shows the results, both overall and by gender-type of the domain. Overall, both members knowing each other's gender has a modest but significant *negative* impact on group performance: groups submit the correct answer approximately 2 percentage points less often when they both know each other's gender than when they don't (69 percent versus 71 percent, $p < 0.05$). The results for each subgroup of domains suggest an insignificant, but directionally negative, impact of knowing gender on group performance. Any advantage of knowing gender is completely crowded out by the overreaction to information entailed by stereotypes. For instance, just as Figure 4 shows, a woman learning that her partner is male would be too underconfident in her own relative ability in male-typed categories, translating into fewer contributed answers and a directionally negative impact on group performance.

VI. Conclusion

Despite substantial evidence that, in some domains, men are more overconfident than women about their ability, the sources of such overconfidence are not completely understood. Nor do we have a clear understanding of the sources of beliefs about the ability of others, and why such beliefs are often inaccurate. In this paper, we presented evidence that beliefs about both oneself and others to a significant extent come from the same two sources. The first source is stereotyping, and in particular the kernel of truth hypothesis whereby beliefs exaggerate true aspects of reality. The second source is overestimation of the ability of both oneself and others, which increases with the difficulty of the question, what we called difficulty-induced misestimation (DIM). Because we collect data not only on beliefs about oneself but also on beliefs about others, and do so for a variety of difficulties and domains, we can disentangle these two sources to shed light on beliefs about gender.

Stereotypes cause the participants in our experiments to exaggerate the actual gender performance gaps, leading women to be much less confident about themselves in domains where the male advantage is larger. Stereotypes also play a

role in explaining men's confidence, although not as much as they do for women. Crucially, stereotypes also matter for beliefs about others. Holding fixed category difficulty, both men and women underestimate the ability of women relative to men in male-typed domains, and overestimate it in female-typed domains. We also found that stereotypes are reflected in beliefs about relative and not just absolute ability, and actually influence behavior. DIM and stereotypes combine to encourage more self-confident behavior of men, and less self-confident behavior of women, but really only in male-typed fields.

Disentangling the causes of the gender gap in beliefs may help interpret the existing evidence, but also inform interventions aimed at narrowing these gaps. To the extent that stereotypes shape this gap, the reality that actual performance differences between genders are narrowing, especially at the upper tail, suggests that stereotypes will become less extreme over time. Role models and other manifestations of similar performance of men and women in the right tail may have big effects on reducing the gap. Porter and Serra (2017) find a large effect of female role models on the choice of economics concentration, which is consistent with this view. In areas where actual differences remain, factors that make gender (or ethnicity, or race) less top of mind would diminish the effects of stereotypes on beliefs. Although we do not understand the causes of misestimation as well, the Moore and Healy model suggests that objective feedback about ability will diminish the influence of DIM on self-confidence. But if DIM is driven by factors other than information, such feedback might not help.

Our analysis also suggests that the same factors that shape confidence might also shape discrimination. Unlike in the standard models of statistical discrimination, our experimental evidence suggests that beliefs are inaccurate in equilibrium. Recent research on gender (Bohren, Imas, and Rosenberg 2017), ethnicity (Glover, Pallais, and Paviente 2017), and race (Arnold, Dobbie, and Yang 2018) shows that inaccurate beliefs that look very much like stereotypes are at the heart of discriminatory practices. Because our evidence shows that beliefs about oneself and others are shaped by very similar psychological forces, the mechanisms that reduce the gap in self-confidence are also likely to reduce discrimination.

Perhaps the central message of our analysis, then, is the importance of psychological distortions in beliefs about gender. Research on self-confidence has appreciated the central role of such distortions for a long time. Stereotypes might be a useful concept for organizing and developing this analysis, in part because they point to the close relationship between beliefs and reality that varies across domains. Research on discrimination and the centrality of inaccurate beliefs about others has been more recent, and here as well stereotypes offer a new conceptualization. Our principal conclusion is that stereotyping and distortions related to task difficulty provide a unified framework for the study of distorted beliefs. By showing the role of these two factors, our analysis suggests a strategy for unification of disparate findings, but also of moving forward with both empirical research and policy.

Disclosure: We have reported all treatments conducted, all measures and materials are available in online Appendix A, and data exclusions are described in Table 1. At OSU, we ran 20 sessions, targeting approximately 400 total participants. At Harvard we ran until we had collected data from 250 participants. At UCSB, we ran

until we had collected data from at least 200 women and 200 men who had attended high school in the United States.

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