

2. Martingales in Market Microstructure Analyses

Definition 2.1. The process $\{x_t\}$ is a *martingale* with respect to the process $\{z_t\}$ if $E[|x_t|] < \infty$ for all t and $E[x_{t+1}|z_t, z_{t-1}, \dots] = x_t$.

Suppose that the payoff of a security is a random variable v . Traders form beliefs based on a sequence of information sets $\Phi_1 \subset \Phi_2 \subset \Phi_3 \subset \dots$. Then, the conditional expectation $m_t = E[v|\Phi_t]$ is a martingale with respect to the sequence of information sets $\{\Phi_t\}$: i.e.,

$$E[m_{t+1}|\Phi_t, \Phi_{t-1}, \dots] = m_t.$$

- When the conditioning information Φ_t is all public information, m_t is called the *fundamental value* or the *efficient price* of the security.


3. The Roll Model

1984

Roll (1994) specifies that the transaction price at time t , denoted by p_t , consists of (a) the long-lasting fundamental value, denoted by m_t , arising from information about future cash flows and (b) the transient value, denoted by $q_t c$, attributable to the market organization and trading process: i.e.,

$$p_t = m_t + q_t c, \quad \begin{array}{ll} q_t = 1 & \text{buy} \\ q_t = -1 & \text{sell} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{ll} p_t = m_t + c \\ p_t = m_t - c \end{array} \quad \text{BID-ASK spread.} \quad (3.1)$$

where q_t is a trade direction indicator having one if the customer is buying and minus one if the customer is selling.



- Let m_t denote $E[v|\Phi_t]$, where v is the payoff from a security. Assume that m_t follows a random walk,

$$m_t = m_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t,$$

where $\varepsilon_t \sim WN(0, \sigma_\varepsilon^2)$.

even if $(\text{information shock})$

dealer mkt

- Assume (a) that all trades are conducted through dealers who quote bid price, b_t , and ask price, a_t ; i.e., a customer must buy (sell) at the dealer's ask (bid) price and (b) that dealers incur a cost of c per trade and compete to the point where the cost is just covered. This implies that $b_t = m_t - c$ and $a_t = m_t + c$, so the bid-ask spread is $a_t - b_t = 2c$ which is "constant" over time.

expected $\Rightarrow +$

From (3.1) and (3.2), the change in prices is written as

BID-ASK spread = $2c$
constant.

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta p_t &= (m_t + q_t c) - (m_{t-1} + q_{t-1} c) \\ &= (m_t - m_{t-1}) + c(q_t - q_{t-1}) \\ &= \varepsilon_t + c(q_t - q_{t-1}). \end{aligned}$$

Buy $P_t = m_t + c$
Sell $P_t = m_t - c$

Mkt pric
ASK BID mkt
Av2 Tg

BID-ASK
spread

Mkt
noise

trading II
value
BID-ASK
price
noise

negative auto \Rightarrow

trading II
value
BID-ASK
price
noise

even if $(\text{information shock})$

trading II
value
BID-ASK
price
noise

expected $\Rightarrow +$

expected \Rightarrow

Def) $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, (\mathcal{F}_t)_{t \in \mathbb{T}}, P)$: filtered prob. space. $\underline{\mathbb{T} = \{0, 1, \dots, T\}}$.

$M : \Omega \times \mathbb{T} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is a stochastic process

We say M is a **martingale**

If ① M is adapted. M_t is \mathcal{F}_t -measurable for $t \in \mathbb{T}$

② $E^P(M_{t+1} | \mathcal{F}_t) = M_t$ for $t = (0, 1, 2, \dots, T-1)$.

Assume (a) that buys and sells are equally likely: i.e., $E[q_t] = 0$ and $E[q_t^2] = 1$, (b) that buys and sells are serially independent: i.e., $E[q_t q_{t-k}] = 0$ for $k = 1, 2, \dots$, and (c) that the customers buy or sell independently of ε_t : i.e., $E[q_t \varepsilon_s] = 0$ for all $\tau \neq s$. $T > S$, $T < S$ ~~byt~~ ~~hol~~

- Then, it shows that

Symmetric information

$$\begin{aligned}
 Var[\Delta p_t] &= E[(\Delta p_t)^2] \\
 &= E[(\varepsilon_t + c(q_t - q_{t-1}))^2] \\
 &= E[\varepsilon_t^2 + 2\varepsilon_t c(\underbrace{q_t - q_{t-1}}_o) + c^2(q_t - q_{t-1})^2] \\
 &= \sigma_\varepsilon^2 + 2c^2, \quad \varepsilon_t \sim WN(0, \sigma_\varepsilon^2)
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 Cov[\Delta p_t, \Delta p_{t-1}] &= E[\Delta p_t \Delta p_{t-1}] \\
 E[(\Delta p_t - E[\Delta p_t]) \times (\Delta p_{t-1} - E[\Delta p_{t-1}])] &= E[(\varepsilon_t + c(q_t - q_{t-1}))(\varepsilon_{t-1} + c(q_{t-1} - q_{t-2}))] \\
 E[\varepsilon_t \varepsilon_{t-1}] + E[\varepsilon_t c(q_{t-1} - q_{t-2})] + E[c(q_t - q_{t-1}) \varepsilon_{t-1}] \\
 &\quad + E[c^2(q_t - q_{t-1})(q_{t-1} - q_{t-2})] \\
 = -c^2, \quad \text{Roll model - ex ante prediction} \\
 \text{Lat autocorrelat} &= \text{negative.}
 \end{aligned}$$


and $\text{Cov}[\Delta p_t, \Delta p_{t-k}] = 0$ for all $k > 1$.

- In particular, the Roll model implies that the first-order covariance is “negative”, which is consistent with the real data and the main contribution of the Roll model.

Remark 3.1. The Roll model can be used to estimate the bid-ask spread with $2\hat{c} = 2\sqrt{-\hat{\gamma}_1}$ in situations where the bid and ask data are not available.

-  Remark 3.2. Contrary to the Roll's assumptions, actual datasets show (a) that the bid-ask spread is time-varying, (b) that $\{q_t\}$ is serially correlated; i.e., buys tend to follow buys, and sells tend to follow sells, and (c) that a trade direction is positively associated with a shock.

Roll
 : Value is random walk \Rightarrow no autocorrelation
 mkt friction of \Rightarrow autocorrelation (roll off)
 \Rightarrow negative autocorrelation.



1201 data:

b/b Ast spread $\frac{1}{2} \text{ sec}$.
order flow persistent
information assymetric $\frac{1}{2} \text{ min}$.