

milgrom setting.
+ information uncertainty

Lecture 4. Order Flow and the Probability of Informed Trading

이노베이션가 informed & uninformed traders
인지 파악하기 어려움.

1. The Distribution of Buys and Sells

Assume that conditional on V , the probability of a current order direction q_t (i.e., a buy or a sell) does not depend on the direction of prior orders: i.e.,

$$\Pr(q_t|V, q_{t-1}, q_{t-2}, \dots) = \Pr(q_t|V).$$

Let p denote the conditional probability of incoming a buy order given V . Then one sees that the conditional distributions of b buys given n trades and V are binomial:

$$\Pr(b|n, V) = \binom{n}{b} p^b (1-p)^{n-b}. \quad (1.1)$$

- Extending the previous **Glosten and Milgrom** sequential trading model, we compute p as:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(\text{Buy}|\underline{V}) &= \frac{\Pr(\text{Buy}, \underline{V})}{\Pr(\underline{V})} \\ &= \frac{\Pr(\text{Buy}, \underline{V}, I) + \Pr(\text{Buy}, \underline{V}, U)}{\Pr(\underline{V})} \\ &= \frac{0 + \delta(1-\mu)/2}{\delta} \\ &= \frac{1-\mu}{2} \end{aligned}$$

V < V̄

$\frac{\delta(1-\mu)}{2}$

and

$$\Pr(\text{Buy}|\bar{V}) = \frac{1+\mu}{2}$$

both of which are “constant” over successive trades.

Remark 1.1. Advancing (1.1), one sees that the number of buys conditional only on n trades is a mixture of binomials:


$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(b|n) &= \Pr(V = \underline{V}) \times \Pr(b|n, \underline{V}) + \Pr(V = \bar{V}) \times \Pr(b|n, \bar{V}). \\ &= \delta \binom{n}{b} \left(\frac{1-\mu}{2}\right)^b \left(1 - \frac{1-\mu}{2}\right)^{n-b} \\ &\quad + (1-\delta) \binom{n}{b} \left(\frac{1+\mu}{2}\right)^b \left(1 - \frac{1+\mu}{2}\right)^{n-b}. \end{aligned} \quad (1.2)$$

$p \rightarrow \Pr(b|V) = \frac{1-\mu}{2}$

mixture distribution over binomial.

For $n = 50$ and $\delta = 0.5$, the following plot shows (1.2) for different μ . With no informed trading (i.e., $\mu = 0$), the distribution is close to normal. With $\mu = 0.5$, the distribution is bimodal; that is to say, “one-sided” order flow (i.e., a preponderance of buys or sells) emerges if a proportion

of informed traders is high. Put differently, the data exhibiting distinct one-sided order flow may indicate a high proportion of informed traders.




2. Easley and O'Hara (1992)

Easley and O'Hara (1992) extend the basic sequential trade model by introducing **information event uncertainty**. Assume that the number of arriving traders in any finite interval follows a Poisson arrival process; specifically, the Poisson arrival intensities for informed and uninformed traders are μ and ε , respectively.

- Informed buyers arrive with intensity μ only if \bar{V} occurs, and informed sellers arrive with intensity μ only if \underline{V} occurs. In all states, uninformed buyers and sellers arrive with intensity ε .

Proposition 2.1. Let $N_1(t)$ and $N_2(t)$ denote the number of type I and type II events, respectively, occurring in $[0, t]$. Assume that $N_1(t)$ and $N_2(t)$ follow **Poisson arrival processes** with λ_1 and λ_2 , respectively. Suppose that $N_1(t)$ and $N_2(t)$ are independent. Define $N(t) = N_1(t) + N_2(t)$. Then, $N(t)$ follows a Poisson arrival process with $\lambda_1 + \lambda_2$.

- If \underline{V} occurs, the total arrival intensity of buyers is ε and that of sellers is $\mu + \varepsilon$. If \bar{V} occurs, the total arrival intensity of buyers is $\mu + \varepsilon$ and that of sellers is ε .



statistics
reason: toy

I: buy
II: sell

indep. assumption.

2

$p(\mu|\alpha)$

동일하게
분포를 갖는다

Given that an information event occurs with the probability of α , the unconditional number of buys and sells on any day are jointly distributed as a Poisson mixture:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \Pr(b, s) &= \Pr(b, s | \text{No information event}) + \Pr(b, s | \text{Information event, } \underline{V}) \\
 &\quad + \Pr(b, s | \text{Information event, } \bar{V}) \\
 &= (1 - \alpha) \Pr(b; \varepsilon) \Pr(s; \varepsilon) + \alpha \delta \Pr(b; \varepsilon) \Pr(s; \mu + \varepsilon) \\
 &\quad + \alpha(1 - \delta) \Pr(b; \mu + \varepsilon) \Pr(s; \varepsilon),
 \end{aligned} \tag{2.1}$$

intensity.

where $\Pr(n; \lambda)$ denotes the probability of n arrivals when λ is the intensity parameter.

- The joint probability $\Pr(b, s)$ can be used to construct a sample likelihood function, and one can estimate all parameters of $\alpha, \delta, \mu, \varepsilon$ by maximum likelihood estimation. Specifically, one writes (2.1) as

$$\begin{aligned}
 L(b, s | \theta) &= (1 - \alpha) e^{-\varepsilon t} \frac{(\varepsilon t)^b}{b!} e^{-\varepsilon t} \frac{(\varepsilon t)^s}{s!} + \alpha \delta e^{-\varepsilon t} \frac{(\varepsilon t)^b}{b!} e^{-(\varepsilon + \mu)t} \frac{((\varepsilon + \mu)t)^s}{s!} \\
 &\quad + \alpha(1 - \delta) e^{-(\varepsilon + \mu)t} \frac{((\varepsilon + \mu)t)^b}{b!} e^{-\varepsilon t} \frac{(\varepsilon t)^s}{s!}.
 \end{aligned}$$

Over h independent days, the likelihood of observing the data $M = (b_i, s_i)_{i=1}^h$ is the product of the daily likelihoods

$$L(M | \theta) = \prod_{i=1}^h L(b_i, s_i | \theta). \quad \Leftarrow \because \text{independent.}$$

Remark 2.2. The *probability of informed trading* (PIN) is defined as the unconditional probability that a randomly chosen trader is informed on a randomly chosen day: i.e.,

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{PIN} &= \frac{E[\text{Informed order arrival intensity}]}{E[\text{Total order arrival intensity}]} \\
 &= \frac{\alpha(\delta\mu + (1 - \delta)\mu)}{(1 - \alpha)(\varepsilon + \varepsilon) + \alpha[\delta(\varepsilon + \mu + \varepsilon) + (1 - \delta)(\mu + \varepsilon + \varepsilon)]} \\
 &= \frac{\alpha\mu}{\alpha\mu + 2\varepsilon}.
 \end{aligned}$$

analytic (x).
numeric (o).

$\frac{\partial \text{PIN}}{\partial \mu} > 0$.

As μ increases, PIN increases. Recall that high μ corresponds to a strong tendency of one-sided order flow. Therefore, the observation suggests that order flow tends to be one-sided on a trading day with high PIN.

PIN. : field order 시장 개입
 \Rightarrow trading strategy 수립.