
Modiglian, Franco and Merton H. Miller, 1958, "The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance and the Theory of Investment," *American Economic Review*, vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 261–297



Proposition 1 In equilibrium,

$$V_j \equiv S_j + D_j = \frac{\overline{X}_j}{\rho_k}$$
 for any firm j in class k

Where V=the market value of the firm, S=the market value of its common shares, D=the market value of its debts, X=the expected return on its assets, ρ_k =the average cost of capital.

Proof Suppose Firm 1 and Firm 2 exist. Firm 1 is unlevered and Firm 2 is levered—thanks to Siyuan (09/26/17). Their expected returns are identical with \overline{X} . Then, by investing s_2 into Firm 2,

$$Y_2 = \frac{S_2}{S_2}(\bar{X} - rD_2) = \alpha(\bar{X} - rD_2)$$

Where Y=the return from the portfolio. Meanwhile, by borrowing αD_2 and investing $s_2+\alpha D_2$ into Firm 1,

$$Y_1 = \frac{s_2 + \alpha D_2}{S_1} \bar{X} - r\alpha D_2 = \frac{\alpha S_2 + \alpha D_2}{S_1} \bar{X} - r\alpha D_2$$
$$= \alpha \left(\frac{S_2 + D_2}{S_1} \bar{X} - rD_2 \right)$$
$$= \alpha \left(\frac{V_2}{V_1} \bar{X} - rD_2 \right)$$

If $V_2/V_1>1$, then $Y_1>Y_2$ and hence there exists an arbitrage opportunity. Therefore, in order to eliminate this opportunity, $V_2/V_1\ge 1$.

Similarly, by investing s_1 into Firm 1,

$$Y_1 = \frac{S_1}{S_1} \bar{X} = \alpha \bar{X}$$

Meanwhile, by lending $(D_2/V_2)s_1$ and investing $(S_2/V_2)s_1$ into Firm 2,

$$\begin{split} Y_2 &= \frac{(S_2/V_2)s_1}{S_2}(\bar{X} - rD_2) + r(D_2/V_2)s_1 \\ &= \frac{s_1}{V_2}(\bar{X} - rD_2) + r\frac{D_2}{V_2}s_1 \\ &= \frac{\alpha S_1}{V_2}\bar{X} \\ &= \alpha \frac{V_1}{V_2}\bar{X} \end{split}$$

If $V_1/V_2>1$, then $Y_2>Y_1$ and hence there exists an arbitrage opportunity. Therefore, in order to eliminate this opportunity, $V_1/V_2\ge 1$. Thus, since $V_2/V_1\ge 1$ and $V_1/V_2\ge 1$, $V_1=V_2$.

Proposition 2 For Firm j,

$$i_j = \rho_k + (\rho_k - r) \frac{D_j}{S_j}$$

Where i=the expected rate of return.

Proof The expected rate of return is given by,

$$i_j \equiv \frac{\bar{X}_j - rD_j}{S_j}$$

From Proposition 1,

$$\bar{X}_j = \rho_k \big(S_j + D_j \big)$$

Therefore,

$$i_j = \frac{\rho_k S_j + \rho_k D_j - r D_j}{S_j} = \rho_k + (\rho_k - r) \frac{D_j}{S_j} \blacksquare$$

Proposition 3 $S_1 \rightleftharpoons S_0$ (or $W_1 \rightleftharpoons W_0$, $P_1 \rightleftharpoons P_0$) $\Leftrightarrow \rho^* \rightleftharpoons \rho_k$ Where ρ^* =the rate of return on the investment, Proof

Firstly, for bonds,

$$V_0 = \bar{X}_0 / \rho_k$$

$$S_0 = V_0 - D_0$$

By borrowing *I* and investing at ρ^* ,

$$V_1 = \frac{\bar{X}_0 + \rho^* I}{\rho_k} = V_0 + \frac{\rho^*}{\rho_k} I$$

$$\therefore S_1 = V_1 - (D_0 + I) = V_0 + \frac{\rho^*}{\rho_k} I - D_0 - I = S_0 + \left(\frac{\rho^*}{\rho_k} - 1\right) I$$

If $\rho^*/\rho_k \ge 1$, then $S_1 \ge S_0$.

Secondly, for retained earnings, if the firm acquired I dollars of cash,

$$W_0 = S_0 + I = \frac{\bar{X}_0}{\rho_k} - D_0 + I$$

Where *W*=the stockholders' wealth. By investing *I* at ρ^* ,

$$W_1 = \frac{\bar{X}_0 + \rho^* I}{\rho_k} - D_0 = S_0 + \frac{\rho^*}{\rho_k} I$$

If $\rho^*/\rho_k \ge 1$, then $W_1 \ge W_0$.

Lastly, for common stock issues,

$$P_0 = S_0/N$$

Where P=the current market price per share of stock, N=the original number of shares. Then, for investing I,

$$M = \frac{I}{P_0}$$

Where M=the number of new shares. Then,

$$S_1 = \frac{\overline{X}_0 + \rho^* I}{\rho_k} - D_0 = S_0 + \frac{\rho^*}{\rho_k} I$$

If $\rho^*/\rho_k \ge 1$, then $S_1 \ge S_0$. Or, equivalently,

$$P_{1} = \frac{S_{1}}{N+M} = \frac{1}{N+M} \left(S_{0} + \frac{\rho^{*}}{\rho_{k}} I \right)$$

$$= \frac{1}{N+M} \left(NP_{0} + MP_{0} + \frac{\rho^{*} - \rho_{k}}{\rho_{k}} I \right)$$

$$= P_{0} + \frac{1}{N+M} \frac{\rho^{*} - \rho_{k}}{\rho_{k}} I$$

If $\rho^* \geqslant \rho_k$, then $P_1 \geqslant P_0$.

Note

The effect of the corporate income tax on investment decisions

$$\frac{(\bar{X} - rD)(1 - \tau) + rD}{V} = \underbrace{\rho_k^{\tau}}_{\text{constant}}$$


$$\therefore \frac{\bar{X}}{V} = \frac{1}{1 - \tau} \left(\rho_k^{\tau} - \frac{\tau rD}{V} \right) = \frac{\rho_k^{\tau}}{1 - \tau} \left(1 - \frac{\tau rD}{\rho_k^{\tau}V} \right) = \begin{cases} \rho_k^S = \frac{\rho_k^{\tau}}{1 - \tau}, & \text{if } D/V = 0 \\ \rho_k^D = \rho_k^S - \frac{\tau}{1 - \tau}r, & \text{if } D/V = 1 \end{cases}$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{d(\bar{X}/V)}{d(D/V)} = -\frac{\tau r}{1 - \tau} < 0$$

Where ρ_k^S =the required rate of return on a venture with D=0, ρ_k^D =the required rate of return with D=V. For investments financed out of retained earnings,

$$\rho_{k}^{R} = \frac{\rho_{k}^{\tau}}{1 - \tau} \frac{1 - \tau_{d}}{1 - \tau_{a}} = \frac{1 - \tau_{d}}{1 - \tau_{a}} \rho_{k}^{S}$$

Where ρ_k^R =the required return for retained earnings, τ_d =the assumed rate of personal income tax on dividends, τ_g =the assumed rate of tax on capital gains.



 ρ_k =WACC: not affected by D/V ratio

$$i_j = \rho_k + (\rho_k - r) \times D/S$$

Summary

- 1. If $\not\exists$ tax \Rightarrow firm value and WACC are both independent of capital structure.
- $2. \Rightarrow$ expected rate of return is dependent on capital structure.
- $3. \Rightarrow$ only the rate of return of investment does matter; the way to finance does not matter.