

# Topic: Security of In-vehicle Communication

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## Abstract—

While IoT devices get more and more widely used, embedded boards are already a central part of every car for several years now. Sensors and embedded boards for car control are connected via a multitude of networks. The most widely used of these networks, the Controller Area Network (CAN), was designed in the eighties with no security in mind because these networks were closed off. But nowadays vehicles have a multitude of interfaces to outside networks, so there is a dire need to modernise the in-vehicle networks with appropriate security measures....tbd

## I. INTRODUCTION

Gradually zooming in: IoT, IoT in vehicles, IoT Security, IoT security in vehicles [1], [3]

## II. IN-VEHICLE COMMUNICATION NETWORKS AND SECURITY

CAN Network, Time-Triggered Networks, Low-Cost Automotive Networks, Multimedia and Infotainment Networks, Automotive Ethernet [3]

Security Measures: Controller Authentication, Encrypted Communication, Gateway Firewalls [2]

## III. LEIA: LIGHTWEIGHT AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL FOR CAN

Overview of LeiA [6]

## IV. VATICAN: VETTED, AUTHENTICATED CAN BUS

Overview of vatiCAN [5]

## V. VULCAN: VEHICULAR COMPONENT AUTHENTICATION AND SOFTWARE ISOLATION

In depth description/analysis of VulCAN [7] based on Sancus 2.0 [4]. Van Bulck et. al. "vulcanized" the LeiA and VatiCAN protocols to improve the protocol-level security guarantees and add several system-level security guarantees.

## VI. DISCUSSION

Key trade-offs & considerations on the presented technologies for in-vehicle communication security: VulCAN vs VatiCAN vs LeiA

## VII. CONCLUSIONS

Wrapping up the presented technologies for in vehicle communication, especially VulCAN.

## REFERENCES

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## APPENDIX