

# Perceptions of Inequality and Meritocracy: Their Interplay in Shaping Preferences for Market Justice in Chile (2016-2023)

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## Abstract

Several countries have experienced a shift toward the privatization and commodification of public goods, welfare policies, and social services. In Latin America, Chile stands out as a paradigmatic case where this trend has led to the extensive marketization of essential services. From a moral economy perspective, the extent to which individuals consider it fair for access to such services to depend on market criteria has been conceptualized as market justice preferences. This study investigates the relationship between perceptions of economic inequality, meritocratic beliefs, and market justice preferences in Chile between 2016 and 2023. Using six waves of panel data from the Chilean Longitudinal Social Survey – ELSOC ( $N_{observations} = 8,643$ ;  $N_{individuals} = 1,687$ ), the analysis examines how subjective assessments of inequality shape attitudes toward the role of merit in access to key social services such as healthcare, education, and pensions. The findings show that greater perceived inequality is associated with lower market justice preferences. However, individuals who believe that effort is rewarded are more likely to legitimize existing disparities. In contrast, the perception that talent is rewarded shows a negative effect on market justice preferences; an effect that intensifies as perceived inequality increases over time. The study also considers the influence of major social movements during this period, which appear to have reshaped public discourse on justice and fairness. These findings contribute to a deeper understanding of how distributive beliefs evolve in contexts marked by persistent inequality and entrenched neoliberal frameworks

**Keywords:** Economic inequality, meritocracy, market justice, Chile, public preferences, inequality perception

## 1 Introduction

Since 1980, economic inequality and wealth concentration have dramatically increased worldwide, becoming one of the main challenges for the social sciences. Globally, in 2021, less than 50% of the world population owned only 2% of the wealth, while the richest 10% concentrated 76%. Furthermore, the wealthiest 1% captured nearly 38% of total assets ([Chancel et al., 2022](#)). This context of economic disparity has sparked renewed interest in studying not only the objective aspects of inequality, such as income and access to resources, but also its subjective dimensions, including perceptions, beliefs, and associated attitudes ([Janmaat, 2013](#)). Such dimensions are deemed as key to understand the political delegitimation that economic inequality can elicit ([Castillo et al., 2022](#)). Therefore, understanding how people perceive inequality is crucial, as these perceptions can influence how societies comprehend and justify (or not) inequality in the distribution of goods and services, as well as their capacity to funnel political discontent

and eventually opposition to the current economic distribution.

The justification of economic inequality has a long tradition in sociology, with seminal works such as the ones from Kluegel (1995; 1986) and Lane (1962, 1986). Lane's main aim was to "help explain the tenacious hold of market capitalism on the public mind" (1986, p. 384), proposing the distinction between market and political justice. Whereas political justice refer to government actions aligned with justice principles such equality or need, market justice involves the allocation linked to earned desserts, particularly through individual contributions based on as effort and ability. Sociological survey research in this area has considered questions related to the extent to which it is considered just to get better access to social services (such as pensions, health and education) based on payment capacity (Busemeyer, 2014; Castillo et al., 2024; Immergut & Schneider, 2020; Koos & Sachweh, 2019; Lindh, 2015; Lindh & McCall, 2023). Although these services could be considered basic rights of citizens, evidence to date suggests that a significant portion of the population justifies inequality in these areas (Koos & Sachweh, 2019) and that such preferences vary according to objective socioeconomic factors and the contextual characteristics of countries (Busemeyer, 2014; Lindh, 2015). In the present paper, we argue that there are two other relevant factors to take into account when analyzing differences between individuals and groups to this regard: the perception of economic inequality and the perception of meritocracy.

The perception of economic inequality can be understood as an individual's subjective assessment of how resources are allocated among members of a given society (Akyelken, 2020). Regardless of their measurement, various studies have shown that this perception often underestimates the gap between the rich and the poor, revealing inconsistencies between objective and subjective aspects of inequality (Trump, 2018). Moreover, there is consistent evidence that perceived inequality, even under control of objective inequality, could have implications for attitudes toward the distribution of goods and services (Castillo et al., 2022; Schröder, 2017), redistributive preferences, justification of inequality, and legitimacy of the economic system (Castillo et al., 2022; García-Sánchez et al., 2020, 2018). From this perspective, in this paper we argue that perceptions of economic inequality may play a relevant aspect for understanding market justice preferences, as a lower perceived inequality could reinforce the idea that the differences in access to social services could be justified — a link that becomes difficult to hold when high inequality is perceived.

Along with perception of inequality, a second focus of this paper is the perception of meritocracy. Meritocracy posits that inequality can be legitimized through distributive criteria such as effort and talent (Davis & Moore, 2001; Young, 1962). Previous studies have demonstrated that people with stronger meritocratic beliefs tend to perceive less inequality as they attribute economic differences to individual achievements (Mijs, 2021; Wilson, 2003) and also to justify more inequality as these beliefs are associated with attitudes that legitimize status differences (Batruch et al., 2023). In a context as Chile, where the distribution of goods and services is predominantly governed by market logics strongly introduced during the military dictatorship (1973-1989) (Boccardo, 2020; Madariaga, 2020), meritocratic perceptions have the potential to affect the acceptance of social inequalities. Therefore, incorporating the perception of meritocracy in this literature allows for an understanding of how attitudes toward inequality are shaped not only by the perception of economic gaps, but also by beliefs about how these gaps are justified. Furthermore, these

beliefs are often consolidated from an early age, reinforced by institutions promoting values such as effort and individual skills to climb socially (Castillo et al., 2024; Reynolds & Xian, 2014).

At this point we can propose the following research questions: To what extent the preferences for market justice are associated with perceptions of inequality and meritocracy? How stable are these associations (within subjects) along time? The primary objective of this study is to analyze the interplay between perceptions of inequality and meritocracy and their joint influence on preferences for market justice along time in Chile using the panel survey ELSOC (Social Chilean Longitudinal Study, 2016-2023). The Chilean case appears as a particular case for studying market justice preferences given their story of high inequality and strong free-market policies introduced in the dictatorship period (Flores et al., 2020; Madariaga, 2020). Additionally, this analysis seeks to explore how political and social contingencies—such as the 2019 and 2022 social movements—might have moderated these relationships by prompting more critical reflection on the commodification of social services (Somma et al., 2021). Recognizing the temporal dimension in shaping market justice preferences is essential, given that historical and contextual factors that could challenge or reaffirm the way in which individuals perceive inequality and meritocracy, and consequently — following our argument — the preferences for market justice.

## **2 Theoretical views on market justice, inequality perception, and meritocracy**

### **2.1 The justification of market inequality**

Conceptually, *market justice* has been discussed in the literature as a normative principle that legitimates the distribution of economic rewards based on individual merit. It is possible to trace the concept to the understanding of Lane (1986), who makes a contrast between market justice and political justice. The author defines market justice as a system of “earned deserts”, whereby individuals are seen as deserving of a determined distributive outcome due to their effort and skills. In contrast, political justice emphasizes principles of equality and need, which are often represented by the welfare state action through social policies. An important remark is that the principles of market justice rely on the assumption that markets are neutral and self-regulating arenas, where individuals are treated fairly because they face the same formal rules of engagement (Lane, 1986). Consequently, the legitimacy of market justice stems from the assumption that inequalities are not only inevitable but fair—so long as the rules are transparent and opportunities are open. In this way, market justice provides a moral justification for inequality by framing it as a necessary outcome of individual responsibility (Kluegel et al., 1999; Lindh, 2015).

Empirical studies have shown different strategies for the study of market justice preferences. A common approach in the literature is to gauge attitudes toward the legitimacy of inequality in specific domains, especially when linked to income differences. This can be traced to the seminal work of Kluegel and Smith (1981) who assessed the normative foundations that explain public support for economic inequality. Over time, this approach has been extended beyond income to include other market-mediated outcomes, such as education, healthcare, and/or pensions. For example, Von Dem Knesebeck et al. (2016) and Immergut

and Schneider (2020) examine whether citizens consider it fair that individuals with higher incomes can access better healthcare, while Lee and Stacey (2023) apply a similar method in the context of education in Australia. These studies usually rely on a survey item asking respondents to evaluate the fairness of income-based access to welfare services, allowing for comparing justice perceptions across different contexts. Similarly, comparative studies have also considered these indicators to study the support for market-based distribution in welfare systems (Lindh, 2015; Svallfors, 2007). More recently, Castillo et al. (2024) introduced a single-item composite measure of market justice to assess student attitudes toward income-based access to education, healthcare, and pensions in Chile. These empirical strategies all aim to capture the extent to which individuals accept inequality when framed as a reflection of market outcomes.

The study of market justice preferences has increasingly focused on how they are shaped by individuals' socioeconomic position, normative beliefs, and the institutional context in which they are embedded. Across the literature, there is empirical evidence suggesting that individuals in more advantaged socioeconomic positions—those with higher occupational class, income, and education—are more likely to support market justice principles (Koos & Sachweh, 2019; Lindh, 2015; Svallfors, 2007). This tendency reflects not only material self-interest but also a broader moral economy, in which winners of the market system internalize justifications for the status quo. At the same time, political ideology also plays a role—such as economically conservative values—where more right-wing individuals show higher support for meritocracy and more skepticism towards redistribution. This is particularly salient in countries with more restricted public provision of social services. For example, Castillo et al. (2024) in Chile and, Lee and Stacey (2023) in Australia show that right-wing individuals are more supportive of market-based distribution of welfare. Beyond individual characteristics, country-level institutions also play a central role. In liberal welfare regimes like those of the United States or the United Kingdom, market justice preferences are more widespread, while in coordinated or social-democratic regimes—such as Sweden or Germany—citizens are generally more critical of market-based inequalities (Immergut & Schneider, 2020; Lindh, 2015). These findings suggest that market justice is also shaped contextually, which is represented by the development of welfare institutions, in line with the policy-feedbacks literature (Campbell, 2012; Pierson, 1993).

## 2.2 Perception of inequality

Perceptions of inequality have been associated with a range of distributive attitudes (Castillo et al., 2022; García-Sánchez et al., 2019; McCall et al., 2017; Trump, 2018). Research indicates that perceptions of inequality influence redistributive preferences to a greater extent than objective or actual economic inequality (Gimpelson & Treisman, 2018). Others have shown that the perception of inequality, through the perceived wage gap, is related to the justification of greater inequality (Castillo, 2011). In that sense, lower perceived inequality can reinforce support for market-based distributive arrangements by suggesting that the system is fair and that outcomes reflect effort and ability (Kuhn, 2011). In contrast, when inequality is perceived as excessive or structurally determined, individuals could question the legitimacy of market justice and become more supportive of redistributive policies (García-Sánchez et al., 2019).

Perceptions of inequality refer to individuals' subjective evaluations of the extent, causes, and conse-

quences of income and wealth disparities (Akyelken, 2020). Unlike objective measures such as the Gini index, perceived inequality captures how individuals make sense of distributive hierarchies in their everyday lives, shaped by reference groups, social comparisons, and information environments (García-Castro et al., 2020; Gimpelson & Treisman, 2018; Mijs, 2016). Scholars have proposed multiple dimensions of perceived inequality, including its magnitude (how significant are the gaps), vertical structure (between which groups), the trend over time (increasing or decreasing), and legitimacy (whether it is just or not) (Engelhardt & Wagener, 2018; García-Sánchez et al., 2019). These dimensions encompass both cognitive and normative aspects of perceptions of inequality and can vary across societies and social groups, depending on exposure, ideology, and personal experience (Castillo et al., 2022; García-Sánchez et al., 2018).

Among the different approaches to measuring perceived inequality, one of the most widely used is the estimation of wage gaps between occupational extremes, such as between a CEO and a manual worker. This type of item provides a concrete frame that respondents can relate to more easily than abstract questions about national income distribution (Castillo et al., 2012; Easterbrook, 2021; Willis et al., 2015). While it enables the estimation of inequality using simple heuristics, this method is not without challenges. For instance, people often lack reliable knowledge about the earnings of those at the top of the income ladder, which leads to high variability in responses and the use of biased mental shortcuts (Knell & Stix, 2020). Despite this, perceived wage gaps are strong predictors of political attitudes (García-Sánchez et al., 2018; Pedersen & Mutz, 2019), making them a valuable tool for understanding public responses to economic disparities.

Another relevant critique of this approach lies in its conflation of different psychological constructs. Many surveys assess perceived inequality through Likert-type items that ask respondents to agree or disagree with statements, such as “income differences are too large,” which captures general concern or discomfort rather than a specific perception (Castillo, 2011; García-Sánchez et al., 2019). These items mix cognitive estimations with affective evaluations, complicating the interpretation of what respondents perceive versus what they morally reject. As a result, the conceptual clarity between perceived inequality and inequality aversion remains blurred in many empirical studies. To address this limitation, recent work has emphasized the need to distinguish between absolute and comparative measures, as well as between ideal and actual estimates of economic gaps (Auspurg et al., 2017; García-Sánchez & De Carvalho, 2022).

## 2.3 Perception of meritocracy

Meritocracy constitutes a central ideological framework for legitimizing different types of social inequality, for instance through market justice beliefs. Rooted in the belief that rewards and positions should be allocated based on individual effort and talent, meritocracy operates as a normative ideal and a descriptive belief about how society functions. As initially conceptualized by Michael Young (1962), the term was meant to critique a system in which merit-based stratification becomes a new form of inequality. However, over time, meritocracy has been widely supported in many societies as a fair and desirable principle of distribution, particularly within liberal democracies and market-oriented economies (Mijs, 2021; Sandel, 2020). From a sociological perspective, the belief in meritocracy is more than a cognitive assessment;



it reflects a moral lens through which individuals interpret inequality. People who believe that success results from hard work and talent are more likely to view social and economic disparities as legitimate (Batruch et al., 2023; Castillo et al., 2012). Conversely, if they see outcomes as driven by luck, social origin, or systemic barriers, inequality is more likely to be perceived as unjust. This distinction becomes crucial in societies with persistent structural inequality, where public narratives often emphasize personal responsibility and merit while overlooking entrenched disadvantages.

We adopt a multidimensional perspective on meritocracy, distinguishing between two key dimensions: effort-based and talent-based perceptions. This distinction is essential, as it captures different pathways through which individuals justify inequality. Effort-based meritocracy emphasizes hard work and perseverance as the basis for social rewards, aligning closely with cultural narratives of personal responsibility. A talent-based meritocracy, by contrast, emphasizes intelligence and innate abilities, which are often perceived as less malleable and more unequally distributed. Both dimensions have been shown to correlate with acceptance of inequality, but they may carry distinct implications for how inequality is justified in specific domains (Castillo et al., 2023). The relevance of this distinction is supported by recent studies, which show that individuals respond differently to these dimensions. For instance, perceptions that effort is rewarded in society are more strongly associated with positive evaluations of fairness and acceptance of unequal outcomes (Batruch et al., 2023). This may be because effort is seen as a controllable and morally virtuous trait, whereas talent is often perceived as a natural advantage. Consequently, effort-based meritocracy is likely more potent in legitimizing inequality, particularly in neoliberal contexts.

These dimensions of meritocracy reflect how respondents perceive society's distributive logic, regardless of whether they endorse meritocratic principles. This distinction aligns with recent findings indicating that individuals distinguish between how merit is perceived in society and how it should ideally operate, which in turn shapes their preferences for redistribution and justice (Tejero-Peregrina et al., 2025). Meritocratic beliefs serve as symbolic justifications for unequal outcomes, particularly when access is stratified by income or social opportunity. Prior studies have shown that individuals who perceive higher levels of meritocracy tend to express stronger support for unequal distributions that reflect market outcomes (Castillo et al., 2012; Castillo et al., 2024).

In addition to influencing individual attitudes toward inequality, meritocratic perceptions can contribute to social division and the stigmatization of disadvantaged groups. Recent research has demonstrated that exposure to meritocratic narratives can reinforce the belief that poverty results from individual failings rather than systemic conditions, reducing support for redistributive measures and increasing the stigmatization of the poor (Hoyt et al., 2023). This reinforces negative stereotypes and reduces empathy toward individuals from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. Moreover, Busemeyer et al. (2021) argues that meritocratic narratives can serve as feedback mechanisms that shape public opinion and well-being by framing individuals' understanding of welfare outcomes as deserved or undeserved within existing institutional structures. This psychological mechanism highlights the normative power of meritocracy in stabilizing unequal systems by shaping political attitudes and personal perceptions of success and failure.

## 2.4 The Chilean context

Chile offers an interesting case for examining how public attitudes toward the distribution of social services evolve amid declining poverty and persistently high income inequality within a residual welfare framework (Ferre, 2023). Following the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s, the Chilean welfare state has become increasingly reliant on private provision, with essential services often commodified and largely reserved for those with sufficient purchasing power (Boccardo, 2020; Madariaga, 2020). This model has favored the affluent, while lower-income groups are left dependent on limited and underfunded public alternatives. Research on social stratification characterizes Chile as a society where mobility into intermediate classes is feasible, but access to elite strata remains largely restricted (López-Roldán & Fachelli, 2021; Torche, 2014). While some indicators—such as education and occupation—suggest a relatively fluid class structure, income mobility remains constrained (Espinoza & Núñez, 2014).

Despite steady economic expansion, Chile continues to rank among the most unequal nations in the OECD, marked by a high Gini coefficient and substantial wealth concentration at the top (Flores et al., 2020). In this context, Chile experienced a wave of mass protests from October 2019 to March 2020. Initially led by high school students, the demonstrations quickly gained momentum as broader segments of society mobilized around demands for more equality of opportunities, particularly regarding precarious access to welfare services. The political system interpreted this unrest as a call to reform existing political institutions, with a special focus on equalizing opportunities and providing more egalitarian access to welfare by reducing reliance on out-of-pocket mechanisms (Somma et al., 2021).

Concerning public opinion, the ELSOC survey shows that Chile has a low level of agreement with the idea that it is fair for those with higher incomes to buy better welfare in the areas of education, healthcare, and pensions, with average support of 8.5% between 2016 and 2023. At the same time, around 55% and 47% of the public between 2016 and 2023 *disagreed* that effort and talent are rewarded accordingly. This coincides with 90% of citizens *agreeing* that income differences in Chile are *too large* (Castillo et al., 2025).

In sum, Chile represents an illustrative case of a particular form of *moral economy* (Koos & Sachweh, 2019), in which national socioeconomic characteristics, institutional arrangements, and public attitudes coexist. This suggests that the country combines persistently high levels of economic and social inequality with a strong institutionalization of market-based mechanisms within the welfare system (Madariaga, 2020). At the same time, perceptions of inequality are high, and there is widespread public criticism of the commodification of social services (Somma et al., 2021). For the above reasons, we argue that the Chilean case represents a relevant context to study the role of perceived income inequality and meritocracy in shaping public preferences regarding the commodification of welfare services, particularly from the perspective of individual change.

## 2.5 This study

Building upon the previous literature, this study proposes that attitudes toward market justice are shaped by a dynamic interplay between individuals' perceptions of economic inequality and their perceptions of

meritocracy. Specifically, we argue that both perceptions independently and interactively influence the extent to which individuals endorse market-based distributions of social goods and services in Chile.

First, consistent with previous findings about redistributive preferences (Castillo et al., 2022), we expect that a higher perception of economic inequality will be associated with lower market justice preferences. When individuals perceive smaller income gaps, they are more likely to view market mechanisms as fair and legitimate, reinforcing the acceptance of outcomes based on competition and ability to pay. Conversely, a heightened perception of inequality may erode confidence in market fairness, weakening support for market-based distribution. This relationship is particularly relevant in the context of Chile, where the neoliberal economic model has been a dominant force in shaping public attitudes toward inequality and justice (Canales Cerón et al., 2021; Mac-Clure et al., 2024).

Second, higher perceived meritocracy is expected to be positively associated with market justice preferences. Individuals who believe that effort and talent primarily determine success are more likely to justify unequal outcomes and endorse the notion that markets allocate resources fairly according to individual merit (Castillo et al., 2024). This aligns with the idea that meritocratic perceptions serve as a moral framework that legitimizes market-based inequalities, as individuals perceive the system as just when they believe that rewards are based on individual merit. This is particularly relevant in contexts where neoliberal ideologies dominate, as they often emphasize individual responsibility and competition as the basis for social order.

Third, we propose that perceptions of meritocracy and perceptions of economic inequality interact in shaping market justice attitudes. Specifically, we argue that the legitimizing effect of perceived meritocracy on market justice preferences is moderated by perceived economic inequality: when perceived inequality is low, the positive association between meritocratic perceptions and market justice preferences will be stronger. However, when perceived inequality is high, this association will weaken, as greater awareness of large economic gaps may challenge the view that outcomes are purely merit-based.

Additionally, this study examines whether these relationships vary over time, particularly in light of broader social and political transformations. We are especially interested in whether changes in individuals' perceptions of inequality and meritocracy are associated with shifts in their market justice attitudes across different time points. The primary focus of this study is thus to scrutinize how individual-level changes in perceptions relate to changes in preferences over time. While we acknowledge the relevance of contextual events — such as the 2019 political outburst or the subsequent constitutional process — for public opinion and political orientation (Disi Pavlic et al., 2025), identifying causal effects of such events (e.g., mass protest exposure) on individual attitudes lies outside the scope of this research. Instead, we focus on how intra-individual trajectories in perceived inequality and merit shape evolving attitudes toward the commodification of social services.

Based on these arguments, we propose the following hypotheses:

$H1_a$  (Between-person) : Individuals who perceive higher levels of economic inequality will report lower support for market justice preferences, on average, compared to those who perceive lower levels of inequality.



$H1_b$  (Within-person) : Increases in an individual's perception of economic inequality over time will be associated with decreases in their support for market justice preferences.

$H2_a$  (Between-person) : Individuals who endorse stronger meritocratic perceptions will report higher support for market justice preferences, on average, compared to those with weaker meritocratic perceptions

$H2_b$  (Within-person) : Increases in an individual's meritocratic perceptions over time will be associated with increases in their support for market justice preferences.

$H3_a$  (Between-person) : The positive association between meritocratic perceptions and market justice preferences will be weaker among individuals who perceive higher levels of economic inequality, compared to those who perceive lower inequality.

$H3_b$  (Within-person) : The positive association between meritocratic perceptions and market justice preferences will be weaker at times when individuals perceive higher levels of inequality, relative to times when they perceive lower inequality.

$H4_a$  (Growth moderation – Inequality) : The longitudinal association between perceived economic inequality and market justice preferences will strengthen over time, both within and between individuals.

$H4_b$  (Growth moderation – Meritocracy) : The longitudinal association between meritocratic perceptions and market justice preferences will weaken over time, both within and between individuals.

### **3 Data, Variables and Methods**

#### **3.1 Data**

This study draws on data from the Chilean Longitudinal Social Survey (ELSOC), a nationally representative panel study of the urban adult population in Chile, conducted annually between 2016 and 2023. Designed to examine individuals' attitudes, emotions, and behaviors regarding social conflict and cohesion, ELSOC employs a probabilistic, stratified, clustered, and multistage sampling design covering both major urban centers and smaller cities. The sampling frame was proportionally stratified into six categories of urban population size (e.g., large and small cities), followed by the random selection of households within 1,067 city blocks. The target population includes men and women aged 18 to 75 who are habitual residents of private dwellings.

The survey has been conducted every year since 2016, except in 2020, when it was suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This study uses six waves: 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2022, and 2023. The 2021 wave was excluded because a reduced version of the questionnaire omitted key variables of interest. Between waves 1 and 6, panel attrition reached 40%, resulting in a final two-level sample comprising  $N = 8,643$  observations nested within  $N = 1,687$  individuals. Longitudinal weights are applied to adjust for both the sampling design and potential biases from systematic non-response. Further details on sampling, attrition, and weighting procedures are available at <https://coes.cl/encuesta-panel/>, and the dataset is publicly accessible at <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/elsoc>.

## 3.2 Variables

**Market justice preferences:** the dependent variable in this study is preferences for market justice. This construct is operationalized through three items that capture how strongly individuals justify conditioning access to core services—healthcare, pensions, and education— basen on individual income. Specifically, the justification of inequality in healthcare is assessed by the question: “Is it fair in Chile that people with higher incomes can access better healthcare than people with lower incomes?” The same question is posed for pensions and education. In all cases, respondents indicate their level of agreement on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”). Additionally, we include a composite measure of “market justice preferences”, calculated as the average of these three items ( $\alpha = 0.84$ ). This index ranges from 1 to 5, with higher values indicating stronger preferences for market justice (see Table 1).

Table 1: Dependent variables for the first wave (2016)

Label	Stats / Values	Freqs (% of Valid)	Valid
Health distributive justice	1. Strongly disagree	558 (37.2%)	1501 (100.0%)
	2. Disagree	729 (48.6%)	
	3. Neither agree nor disagree	63 ( 4.2%)	
	4. Agree	133 ( 8.9%)	
	5. Strongly agree	18 ( 1.2%)	
Pension distributive justice	1. Strongly disagree	426 (28.4%)	1501 (100.0%)
	2. Disagree	718 (47.8%)	
	3. Neither agree nor disagree	108 ( 7.2%)	
	4. Agree	226 (15.1%)	
	5. Strongly agree	23 ( 1.5%)	
Education distributive justice	1. Strongly disagree	521 (34.7%)	1501 (100.0%)
	2. Disagree	783 (52.2%)	
	3. Neither agree nor disagree	73 ( 4.9%)	
	4. Agree	113 ( 7.5%)	
	5. Strongly agree	11 ( 0.7%)	
Market justice preferences	Mean (sd) : 2 (0.8)	12 distinct values	1501 (100.0%)
	min < med < max:		
	1 < 2 < 5		
	IQR (CV) : 0.7 (0.4)		

**Perception of economic inequality:** this variable is measured through the perceived wage gap (Castillo, 2009; Gijsberts, 1999; Hadler, 2005). This measure is derived from the salary gap between the perceived salaries of jobs at opposite ends of the occupational hierarchy. Specifically, it relies on the division between the perceived salary of a large-company president and that of an unskilled worker (Castillo, 2011). Higher values of this term indicate a greater perception of economic inequality between occupations lo-

cated at the extremes of the status continuum. This measure includes a logarithmic term in order to adjust income magnitudes (usually fewer cases with high income):

$$\text{perceived wage gap} = \log_{10} \left( \frac{\text{perceived salary of a large-company president}}{\text{perceived salary of an unskilled worker}} \right)$$

**Perception of Meritocracy:** this variable is operationalized through two components, namely effort and talent (Young, 1962). The item used to gauge effort is: “In Chile, people are rewarded for their efforts,” while the item for talent is: “In Chile, people are rewarded for their intelligence and skills”. In both cases, respondents indicate their level of agreement on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”).

Table 2 shows the independent variables used, their response categories and their frequencies.

Table 2: Independent variables ELSOC survey (descriptives for first wave 2016)

Label	Stats / Values	Freqs (% of Valid)	Valid
Inequality gap perception	Mean (sd) : 3.7 (1.1) min < med < max: 0.4 < 3.7 < 6.9 IQR (CV) : 1.6 (0.3)	296 distinct values	1501 (100.0%)
People are rewarded for their efforts	1. Strongly disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Agree 5. Strongly agree	169 (11.3%) 693 (46.2%) 263 (17.5%) 328 (21.9%) 48 ( 3.2%)	1501 (100.0%)
People are rewarded for their intelligence	1. Strongly disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Agree 5. Strongly agree	134 ( 8.9%) 617 (41.1%) 294 (19.6%) 401 (26.7%) 55 ( 3.7%)	1501 (100.0%)

### Controls

Sociodemographic and attitudinal variables are included to control for potential composition effects in the population. In terms of sociodemographic characteristics, we incorporate per capita household income quintile, educational level (1=Less than University, 2=University), age (in ranges), and sex (1=Male, 2=Female), which have been previously shown to influence market justice preferences significantly (Castillo et al., 2024; Lindh, 2015). Regarding attitudinal variables, we include political identification (1=Left, 2=Center, 3=Right, 4=No identification) and subjective social status (measured through a scale from 1 to 10) as they may affect the relationship between market justice preferences, perceptions of

inequality, and meritocracy ([Schneider & Castillo, 2015](#)). Descriptive statistics for the control variables can be found in the supplementary material.

### 3.3 Methods

Given the data’s hierarchical structure, in which observations are nested in survey waves, we employ longitudinal multilevel linear models ([Singer & Willett, 2009](#)). In a panel-data framework, within-person effects capture how shifts in individual-level variables across waves are associated with variations in market justice preferences. By contrast, between-person effects focus on differences among individuals, explaining how long-term (or average) values relate to overall levels of market justice preferences.

To estimate within-person effects, we use group-mean centering, where each respondent functions as the “group” (i.e., observations nested within persons). Meanwhile, the between-person effects are derived from each individual’s average on these variables, calculated across the waves of panel data.


All the analyses were conducted using R software and the *lme4* package ([Bates et al., 2015](#)).

## 4 Results

### 4.1 Descriptive statistics

Figure 1 shows the annual frequencies of market justice preferences for healthcare, pensions, and education from 2016 to 2023. Each year presents stacked percentage frequencies, and the flows between them reflect opinion changes among the same individuals from one year to the next, given that we are using panel data. For instance, of the 40.8% who strongly disagreed with justifying inequality in healthcare in 2019, around 24.3% maintained that position in 2022, while the remaining 16.5% shifted toward other response categories—primarily moving into disagreement rather than strong disagreement. Overall, more than half of the respondents exhibit a high level of disagreement (disagree + strongly disagree) with inequality in these three social service areas over time. Despite this general pattern, recent waves show a slight decrease in disagreement and a corresponding rise in support for market-justice inequality. Specifically, in healthcare and education, although disagreement remains substantial, agreement (agree + strongly agree) increased from 7.4% and 7.2% in 2019 to 13.1% and 14.2% in 2023, respectively. This shift is most evident in pensions, where the combined agree/strongly agree category grew by about 10 percentage points, from 16.9% in 2016 to 28% in 2023.

Figure 1: Change in the justification of inequality in healthcare, pensions and education over time (2016-2023)




Source: own elaboration with pooled data from ELSOC 2016–2023 (N obs = 8,643; N groups = 1,687)

Regarding the main dependent and independent variables of this study, Figure 2 depicts their standard-



ized average values across survey waves. The results show a notable upward trend in market justice preferences, particularly in the most recent waves. Perceived economic inequality exhibited the highest standardized mean in 2016; however, this variable shows a general downward trajectory over time, with a temporary increase in 2019, possibly reflecting the effects of the social uprising that year. Interestingly, while perceptions of inequality declined in the latest waves (2022–2023), market justice preferences continued to rise. Meritocratic perceptions, in contrast, remain relatively stable overall. Nevertheless, perceptions that individuals are rewarded based on talent tend to be slightly higher than those based on effort. Both meritocracy-related measures follow a similar temporal pattern: an increase from 2016 to 2018, a decline between 2019 and 2022—potentially associated with the social unrest and the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic—and a subsequent rise in 2023, returning to levels comparable to those observed in 2016.

Figure 2: Change in the standardized mean of market justice preferences, economic inequality perception, and meritocracy (2016-2023)



## 4.2 Multilevel models

Table 3 presents the results of the multilevel models estimated for market justice preferences, examining both individuals (within) and group-level (between) effects. The intraclass correlation (Hox et al., 2017) from the empty model (see Supplementary Material), which decomposes the variance of market justice preferences, is 0.31, indicating that approximately 31% of the variation is attributable to differences between individuals. Complementary, 69% of the variation corresponds to within-individual differences over time.

According to Model 1, which includes the survey waves to capture intertemporal variations in the dependent variable, there is a decrease in 2017 ( $\beta = -0.183, p < .001$ ) relative to 2016, and similarly in 2018 ( $\beta = -0.009, p > .05$ ) and 2019 ( $\beta = -0.009, p > .05$ ), although the latter effects are not statistically significant. In contrast, in the more recent waves of 2022 and 2023, there is a statistically significant increase in market justice preferences ( $\beta = 0.300, p < .001$ ;  $\beta = 0.320, p < .001$ ), suggesting a non-linear effect. To model this trajectory over time, Model 2 incorporates time (survey waves) as a continuous variable, along with its quadratic term, representing the non-linear association initially observed in Model 1. While the linear term (survey wave) shows a negative association, reflecting an overall decline in market preferences over time, the positive quadratic term indicates a reversal of this pattern in the final measurement points.

Models 3 and 4 incorporate the within-group effects (WE) of the primary independent variables, capturing how individual changes in these variables over time shape the dependent variable. The results in Model 3 suggest that the within effect of perceived economic inequality is negative and statistically significant ( $p < .001$ ). Specifically, each one-point increase in an individual's perception of economic inequality between waves is associated with a 0.027 point decrease in market justice preferences. Model 4 shows that meritocratic perceptions operate in distinct directions. An upward shift in the perception that effort is rewarded exerts a positive within effect ( $\beta = 0.070, p < .001$ ), while a parallel increase in the perception that intelligence and ability are rewarded is likewise associated with lower market-justice preferences ( $\beta = -0.027, p < .05$ ). Taken together, these results suggest that people who increasingly perceive meritocracy based on effort tend to have stronger preferences for market justice, and that the opposite is true for those who increasingly perceive meritocracy based on talent.

When examining the between-group effects (BE) in Model 5 and 6, which capture differences between individuals in the average of the main variables, a similar pattern emerges. Individuals who perceive higher levels of economic inequality tend to prefer less market justice ( $\beta = -0.002, p > .05$ ). However, this effect is no longer statistically significant. In Model 6, the meritocratic perception that effort is rewarded is positively associated with market justice preferences ( $\beta = 0.206, p < .001$ ), whereas the perception that talent is rewarded shows a positive but non-significant coefficient ( $\beta = 0.036, p > .05$ ).

Model 7 adds the control variables. The within- and between-effects of the principal predictors retain both their direction and statistical significance, confirming the robustness of the associations (see Supplementary Material for effects of control variables).

Table 3: Longitudinal multilevel models for market justice preferences

Table 4

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Intercept	1.938*** (0.023)	1.948*** (0.037)	1.965*** (0.037)	1.967*** (0.037)	1.974*** (0.087)	1.186*** (0.124)	1.250*** (0.144)
Wave (Ref.= 2016)							
Wave 2017	−0.183*** (0.025)						
Wave 2018	−0.009 (0.025)						
Wave 2019	−0.009 (0.025)						
Wave 2022	0.300*** (0.025)						
Wave 2023	0.320*** (0.025)						
Wave		−0.088*** (0.020)	−0.095*** (0.020)	−0.096*** (0.020)	−0.096*** (0.020)	−0.096*** (0.020)	−0.096*** (0.020)
Wave <sup>2</sup>		0.024*** (0.003)	0.024*** (0.003)	0.025*** (0.003)	0.025*** (0.003)	0.025*** (0.003)	0.025*** (0.003)
Perception inequality (WE)			−0.027** (0.009)	−0.025** (0.009)	−0.025** (0.009)	−0.025** (0.009)	−0.025** (0.009)
Merit: Effort (WE)				0.070*** (0.011)	0.070*** (0.011)	0.070*** (0.011)	0.070*** (0.011)
Merit: Talent (WE)				−0.027* (0.011)	−0.027* (0.011)	−0.027* (0.011)	−0.027* (0.011)
Perception inequality (BE)					−0.002 (0.023)	0.043 (0.023)	0.008 (0.024)
Merit: Effort (BE)						0.206*** (0.041)	0.191*** (0.040)
Merit: Talent (BE)						0.036 (0.040)	0.021 (0.040)
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
BIC	32146.711	31406.958	31414.699	31404.308	31419.062	31366.239	31473.850
Numb. obs.	8643	8643	8643	8643	8643	8643	8643
Num. groups: individuals	1687	1687	1687	1687	1687	1687	1687
Var: individuals (Intercept)	0.205	0.370	0.366	0.363	0.364	0.336	0.326
Var: Residual	0.416	0.345	0.345	0.343	0.343	0.343	0.343
Var: individuals, wave		0.022	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021
Cov: individuals (Intercept), wave		−0.061	−0.060	−0.059	−0.059	−0.058	−0.059

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ .


Table 5: Interactions for meritocracy, perceived economic inequality and market justice preferences

Table 6

	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11
Intercept	1.328*** (0.143)	1.346*** (0.143)	1.956*** (0.350)	2.281*** (0.369)
Perception inequality (WE)	−0.037* (0.015)	−0.036* (0.015)	−0.040*** (0.009)	−0.040*** (0.009)
Merit: Effort (WE)	0.075*** (0.018)	0.085*** (0.012)	0.081*** (0.011)	0.081*** (0.011)
Merit: Talent (WE)	−0.021 (0.011)	−0.017 (0.016)	−0.026* (0.011)	−0.026* (0.011)
Perception inequality (BE)	−0.003 (0.023)	−0.003 (0.023)	−0.176 (0.096)	−0.268** (0.101)
Merit: Effort (BE)	0.180*** (0.040)	0.183*** (0.040)	−0.045 (0.127)	0.191*** (0.041)
Merit: Talent (BE)	0.022 (0.039)	0.018 (0.039)	0.017 (0.041)	−0.320* (0.129)
Merit: Effort (WE) x Perception inequality (WE)	−0.014 (0.013)			
Merit: Talent (WE) x Perception inequality (WE)		−0.032* (0.013)		
Merit: Effort (BE) x Perception inequality (BE)			0.070 (0.036)	
Merit: Talent (BE) x Perception inequality (BE)				0.099** (0.036)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BIC	31201.714	31254.484	32281.698	32277.809
Numb. obs.	8643	8643	8643	8643
Num. groups: individuals	1687	1687	1687	1687
Var: individuals (Intercept)	0.178	0.178	0.170	0.169
Var: individuals, merit effort cwc	0.127			
Var: individuals, perception inequality cwc	0.090	0.088		
Cov: individuals (Intercept), merit effort cwc	−0.009			
Cov: individuals (Intercept), perception inequality cwc	−0.015	−0.013		
Cov: individuals, merit effort cwc, perception inequality cwc	0.003			
Var: Residuals	0.296	0.303	0.417	0.417
Var: individuals, merit talent cwc		0.097		
Cov: individuals (Intercept), merit talent cwc		−0.011		
Cov: individuals, merit talent cwc, perception inequality cwc		−0.004		

Note: Cells contain regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ . CWC = centered within group.

Figure 3: Predicted values of market justice preferences by perceptions of meritocracy and economic inequality



Source: own elaboration with data from ELSOC 2016–2023 (n = 8460). Based in Model 10 and Model 11 in Table 4

Table 5 examines whether perceived economic inequality moderates the effect of meritocratic perceptions on market justice preferences. Contrary to our expectations, the interaction terms in the within-person specification of Model 9 indicate that the negative effect of talent-based meritocratic perceptions becomes stronger as perceived inequality increases ( $\beta = -0.032, p < .05$ ). In contrast, in the between-person specification (Model 11), the interaction term is positive ( $\beta = 0.099, p < .01$ ), suggesting that perceptions of economic inequality significantly shape the influence of meritocratic perceptions on support for market-based allocation of social services. Specifically, these positive effects indicate that, as perceptions of



inequality increase, the association between talent-based meritocratic perceptions and market justice preferences shifts in a positive direction.

The effects of effort-based meritocratic perceptions are not statistically significant in either the within- or between-person specifications (Models 8 and 10). However, the direction of the coefficients is negative in the former and positive in the latter. As shown in Figure 3, Panel A, the between-person effect of effort-based meritocratic perceptions on market justice preferences strengthens as perceived inequality increases across individuals, whereas this effect weakens among those who perceive lower levels of inequality. Panel B reveals a similar pattern for the between-person effect of talent-based meritocratic perceptions, although the effect is substantially weaker at low levels of perceived inequality.

Substantively, these findings suggest that the legitimizing function of meritocratic perceptions is amplified in contexts perceived as highly unequal. In such contexts, meritocratic narratives may reinforce individualistic understandings of distributive justice and intensify support for market-based access to essential social services.

Regarding the temporal dynamics of the key predictors, the analysis shows that time has no statistically significant effects on the intrapersonal or interpersonal effects of perceived inequality and meritocratic perceptions. Further details about this analysis can be found in supplementary material.

## 5 Discussion

This study tests several key hypotheses concerning the relationships between perceptions of economic inequality, meritocratic perceptions, and preferences toward market justice in Chile. It posits that higher perceived inequality and stronger meritocratic perceptions both independently contribute to greater support for market-based distributions of social goods. Furthermore, the study examines how perceived economic inequality moderates the influence of meritocratic perceptions on market justice preferences. Additionally, it considers how major social and political mobilizations, such as those occurring around 2019 and subsequent years, may have weakened these relationships, reflecting increased critical perspectives on systemic inequalities and market mechanisms. The subsequent discussion interprets the empirical findings in light of these hypotheses, considering their implications for understanding attitudes toward inequality and social justice in a context marked by profound social change.

The first hypothesis suggested that perceptions of economic inequality were strongly linked to preferences for market justice. The findings demonstrated that individuals perceiving higher income disparities showed less support for the idea that the access to core social services depends on individual income, aligning with theories emphasizing that awareness of inequality could fuel a critical view of such policies (Castillo, 2012; Mijs, 2021). This relationship reflected a moral economy where perceptions of systemic unfairness threatened the legitimacy of existing distributions, prompting calls for greater equity. Similarly, the negative within-effects observed over time ( $H1_b$ ) implied that as perceptions of inequality became more salient, some individuals experienced a decline in support for market justice, possibly due to increasing distrust in market mechanisms or disillusionment with the fairness of the system.

Regarding the second hypothesis, the results reinforced that meritocratic perceptions —particularly those emphasizing individual effort— were associated with stronger support for market-based distribution systems. Individuals who viewed success as primarily earned through effort were more inclined to justify existing inequalities, seeing them as outcomes of individual merit rather than systemic injustice. This aligned with research indicating that meritocratic narratives served as moral justifications that reinforced societal stratification (Castillo, 2012; Hoyt et al., 2023). These perceptions functioned symbolically to legitimize structural disparities, reducing support for redistributive measures by framing inequality as fair and deserved. The findings suggested that these perceptions bolstered the social hierarchy by fostering acceptance of inequality as a reflection of individual virtue rather than structural failure, which was especially pertinent in neoliberal contexts like Chile’s, where market logic heavily influenced social attitudes (Canales Cerón et al., 2021). Interestingly, intraindividual changes in meritocratic perceptions over time ( $H_{2b}$ ) reveal mixed effects. While an increase in the perception that rewards are based on individual effort is associated with stronger preferences for market fairness, an increase in the belief that rewards come from talent is linked to lower support for such principles. One possible explanation is that effort is generally perceived as a controllable and malleable trait, which aligns with the normative foundations of market fairness. Conversely, talent may be viewed as an innate and less alterable attribute, making talent-based reward allocation seem less fair or legitimate. Moreover, greater exposure to real-life situations where outcomes are strongly determined by inherent characteristics, rather than effort or hard work, may lead people to question the fairness of market-based reward systems.

The third hypothesis concerned the moderating role of perceptions of inequality on the relationship between meritocracy and market justice attitudes. The analysis indicated that the positive association between meritocratic perceptions and support for market-based distribution tended to strengthen when perceptions of economic inequality were particularly high. While this moderation is not significant for effort-related effects, it is significant for talent in the within- and between-individual effects. This appears as contrary to our initial hypothesis, as it would mean that effect of meritocratic perceptions becomes stronger as perception of inequality increases. Nevertheless, we need to be cautious about this interpretation, as the main effect of inequality perception on market justice is negative. Therefore, as perceived inequality become less negative (i.e. more positive), or closer to zero, then the meritocratic perception has an stronger positive relationship on market justice preferences. This could mean that meritocratic perceptions play an stronger role in justification of market justice inequalities for those who are less capable or less prone to perceive inequality.

Finally, the fourth hypothesis addressed the impact of recent social movements—particularly those that emerged in 2019—on the relationship between meritocratic beliefs, perceptions of inequality, and attitudes toward market justice. The main effect of time suggests that, on average, support for market justice increased after 2019. However, the results do not reveal any significant interactions between distributive mechanisms and market justice attitudes, indicating that the 2019 social mobilizations did not substantially alter the underlying associations between these variables. This may suggest a certain stability or resilience in the normative frameworks that shape individuals’ evaluations of justice, even in the context of major collective political events. Alternatively, it is possible that while the protests challenged institutional legitimacy, they did not fundamentally shift individuals’ views regarding how rewards should be

allocated in society.

## 6 Conclusions

This study examined the complex interplay between perceptions of economic inequality, meritocratic perceptions, and preferences toward market justice in Chile from 2016 to 2023, drawing on longitudinal data from the ELSOC survey. By exploring how subjective assessments and social contexts influence support for redistribution and market-based resource allocation, the research offers different elements that contribute to the understanding of the normative foundations underpinning social justice attitudes in a highly unequal and commoditized environment.

The findings confirm that higher perceptions of economic inequality are associated with less support for market justice preferences, this is, the belief that it is fair that those with higher income have better social services such as education, pensions and health. At the same time, meritocratic perceptions—particularly those emphasizing individual effort—are strongly associated with support for market-based distributions, suggesting that meritocracy serve as a moral justification for structural inequalities. However, changes in meritocratic perceptions over time reveal a more nuanced picture: while increased emphasis on effort reinforces support for market justice, increased emphasis on talent tends to reduce it. This distinction likely reflects broader beliefs about the controllability and fairness of different meritocratic traits. Moreover, the interaction between inequality perceptions and meritocratic perceptions indicates that the legitimizing power of meritocracy becomes stronger as perceptions of inequality become less negative—that is, when individuals are less aware or concerned about economic disparities. This finding highlights a potential feedback mechanism by which lower sensitivity to inequality may enable stronger endorsement of merit-based explanations for unequal outcomes.

This research advances the extant literature by integrating subjective perceptions with social and political contexts to explain attitudes toward economic inequality and distributional justice. While previous studies primarily focused on objective measures or individual characteristics ([Busemeyer, 2014](#); [Immergut & Schneider, 2020](#); [Lindh, 2015](#)), this work emphasizes the dynamic and interactional nature of perceptions and beliefs over time. It highlights the importance of socio-political upheavals in reshaping normative attitudes, underscoring the role of collective action in challenging entrenched narratives of meritocracy and fairness. The longitudinal approach provides a deeper temporal perspective on how societal events could influence individual perceptions and preferences.

Despite its contributions, the study has several limitations. First, the reliance on self-reported perceptions and attitudes may be subject to social desirability bias. Second, the focus on Chile, while offering valuable insights into a specific context, limits the generalizability of results to other countries with different institutional and cultural backgrounds. Third, the observational nature of the data prevents causal inferences, and unobserved confounding factors may influence the observed relationships. Finally, the potential influence of media, political discourse, and peer effects on perceptions was not directly assessed.

Future research could explore the causal mechanisms linking perceptions and attitudes, possibly through experimental or mixed-method designs. Comparative studies across different national contexts would

help determine the universality or specificity of these dynamics. Additionally, investigating the role of media, political communication, and education in shaping perceptions of inequality and meritocracy would deepen understanding of the normative foundations of social justice attitudes. Finally, examining how these perceptions influence behavioral outcomes, such as political participation or support for social movements, would provide valuable insights into the pathways from beliefs to collective action and policy change.

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