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Reproducing Deportability: Migrant Agricultural Workers in South-western Ontario

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Deportability, or a threat of deportation, can be viewed as a technique of discipline employed to make migrant workers efficient and compliant. Under the threat of deportation, migrants accept dangerous, dirty, degrading and difficult jobs for low pay. Deportability also prevents them from challenging their working and living conditions either individually or collectively. Most of the literature on deportability applies to unauthorised migrants. Yet, as illustrated in this article, migrants employed legally on temporary contracts are also disciplined through a threat of deportation. While for unauthorised migrants, it is the receiving state that is the most important actor (re) creating the regime of deportability, for legally employed migrants, other actors—such as employers, the sending states, recruiters and international organisations—assume a more important role in employing the threat of deportation as a disciplinary technique. In this article, we explore how power is reproduced in this disciplinary regime of deportability. We examine migrants' responses to the techniques of discipline that subjugate them. We argue that when migrants adopt calculative and reflexive practices to avoid deportation and secure their own employment, they often end up reproducing the disciplinary power of the deportation regime.

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In the last few decades, there has been an increase in human mobility spurred by global economic restructuring and/or ethnic and political conflicts and these

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movements have been facilitated by improvements in communication and transportation technologies. Fearing 'invasion' by unwanted immigrants, migrant-receiving nations have erected barriers to prevent this unsolicited inflow of people. At the same time, many economic sectors in advanced economies have grown dependent on a constant supply of migrant labour. In their efforts to support economic growth while simultaneously maintaining control over the inflow of workers, many host states have advanced various temporary migration schemes that make it possible for employers in economic sectors experiencing labour shortages to recruit foreign workers for a specified job for a limited period stipulated in the contract. Yet, despite the intended objective of squeezing out unauthorised migration, these recruitment schemes have at times had no or even an opposite effect. Despite elaborate measures adopted by many states to prevent unwanted migration and the inflow of asylum seekers, it has been impossible to seal off the borders entirely. Furthermore, under certain circumstances, those who arrive on temporary work visas abandon their jobs and join the ranks of unauthorised migrants who lack legal permission to stay and work in a host country. Consequently, among migrant workers, we often find a mix of people in different conditions—albeit all precarious, that is, without access to secure jobs, legal status and social benefits available to Canadian citizens (Goldring, Berinstein, and Bernhard 2009; Goldring and Landolt 2013). Unauthorised migrants, as well as migrants recruited to work on temporary work visas for particular employers, and, to a certain degree, refugee claimants often find themselves in jobs that are dirty, dangerous, difficult and demeaning (the four 'D' jobs) in what we would call the 'fluid zones of precarity', emphasising the potential for migrants in one precarious status to move to another, similarly precarious status (see, Basok, Bélanger, and Rivas 2012a). Their compliance with the working conditions imposed on them by the employers is assured through a number of disciplinary practices. Deportability, or a threat of involuntary removal of the migrants from the host country, constitutes one of the main disciplinary techniques.

Various researchers have examined deportation (De Genova and Peutz 2010) as a disciplinary technique used to keep unauthorised migrants docile and cheap, as well as to cleanse a society of 'anti-citizens', portrayed as immoral and/or ideologically unacceptable (Coutin 2003a, 2003b; De Genova 2002, 2005; Hindess 2000; Harrison and Lloyd 2012). Both historically and today, deportation can be seen as an expression of sovereign or biopolitical power or as one of many technologies of governance adopted by the host *state* (see Walters 2010, for instance). Numerous authors have illustrated how the regime of deportability, or a threat of deportation, is (re)created by state authorities through workplace raids, home arrests, road surveillance and other measures (Coleman 2007; Heyman 1998; Ngai 2003; Harrison and Lloyd 2012; De Genova 2005; McNevin 2011; Romero 2006; Anderson, Gibney, and Paoletti 2011). While other actors (such as employers and ordinary citizens) contribute to this deportation regime, their role has not received adequate attention in the scholarly literature. Furthermore, most literature focusing on the disciplinary

power of deportation and deportability centres on unauthorised migrants. Yet as some researchers (e.g. Hahamovitch 2003, 2011; Binford 2013) have suggested the notion of deportability applies equally to legally employed temporary workers, and many scholars have illustrated how blacklisting and repatriation are employed as a technology of labour control (e.g. Griffith 2006, 167; Basok 1999, 205, 210–212; Basok 2002, 110–112; Becerril 2011b, 191; Preibisch 2004, 212; McLaughlin 2010, 85; Preibisch and Encalada 2010, 305–306; Valarezo and Hughes 2012, 101–102; Preibisch and Hennebry 2012, 55).

This article explores the reproduction of the deportation regime used to discipline both unauthorised and legally employed temporary farm workers. It pays attention to a number of actors involved in the reproduction of this deportation regime, including the migrants themselves. As illustrated below, many migrants employ certain calculative and reflexive practices to secure their own employment. In particular, they discipline themselves and other migrants to comport themselves in a particular way. However, by adopting these practices, these migrants co-construct the disciplinary power of the deportation regime.

This article is based on fieldwork conducted among Spanish-speaking (mainly Mexican) workers in Leamington, a rural community located in South-western Ontario, Canada. We interviewed a total of 79 migrant workers in 2010 and 2011. Most were employed through the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Programme (SAWP) and some through the Stream for Lower-Skilled Occupations Programme (SLSOP), formerly known as the Low Skilled Workers Pilot Project Programme. Others were working (or have worked) without authorisation. All the interviews were semi-structured and included many open-ended questions. To gain trust among the workers, Eloy Rivas, one of co-authors, spent numerous hours socialising with the migrants. Some workers were recruited at the Agricultural Workers' Alliance Centre, a labour union-funded support centre that assists migrant workers. All the other study participants were recruited through snowball technique.

Deportability and the State: Disciplining Unauthorised Migrants

In a world of increasing mobility, deportation has been used as a technology that reaffirms the principles of national sovereignty and in particular the rights granted to nation-states to distinguish between citizens and non-citizens (Ngai 2003; Peutz and De Genova 2010; Walters 2010). While the former receive certain privileges and protections, at least at the formal level, the latter are often portrayed as 'anti-citizens' who steal jobs, bring diseases and drain the social safety system (Inda 2005). Furthermore, in the post 9–11 era of increasing securitisation, certain non-citizens are portrayed as radicals who pose a threat to the national safety (Maira 2010; Hing 2006). Without a right to have rights (to use Arendt's famous expression – see Arendt 1979 [1951]), non-citizens are therefore subject to removal by state immigration authorities. Deportation is thus used as a technology of biopolitical power to protect the nation's well-being. For Cornelisse (2010), deportation reflects

two elements of state power. At a structural level, deportation reaffirms the territorial principles of state sovereignty. At the same time, at the internal level, deportation is practiced in order to sustain the belief in the state's ability to control its borders and protect its population from outside threats (115). Although deportation practices are entrenched in laws (Ngai 2003; De Genova 2002), in practice, they are either leniently enforced (as in Switzerland, see Wicker 2010), or they simply fail to significantly reduce the population of unauthorised migrants. For De Genova (2002), even if it were possible, deporting all unauthorised migrants would be counter-productive since it would deprive local economies of an important source of docile and cheap labour. Therefore, the putative goal of deportation is never fully intended. Yet, to keep unauthorised migrants vulnerable and exploitable, their deportability, or the possibility of being deported, is constantly reproduced through intimidation and harassment (De Genova 2002). Peutz and De Genova observe:

> Deportation regimes are profoundly effective, and quite efficiently so, exactly insofar as the grim spectacle of the deportation of even just a few, coupled with the enduring everyday deportability of countless others millions … produces and maintains migrant illegality as not merely an anomalous juridical status but also a practical, materially consequential, and deeply interiorized mode of being – and of being put in place. (2010, 14)

As Wicker similarly argues, despite the actual leniency in deportation procedures, the constantly communicated threat of possible deportation, 'represents a first-class disciplinary instrument that serves perfectly to keep the lowest echelon of an increasingly split society both in line and at arm's length' (2010, 240). Viewing it as an economic strategy of the neoliberal state, Maira (2010) contends that deportation ensures that wages will stay low and immigrant workers will not engage in activism to defend or advance their rights (301).

The studies reviewed above focus on unauthorised migrants. In these studies, it is mostly the state, and particularly the immigration authorities, that seem responsible for their enforcement or reproduction (although some researchers also recognise the contributing role of employers, service providers and/or ordinary citizens). However, as made clear in the discussion presented below, deportability as a technology of discipline is applied not only to unauthorised migrants, but also to migrants employed legally on temporary contracts. We illustrate that, while for unauthorised migrants, it is the receiving state that is the *most* important actor (re)creating the regime of deportability, for legally employed migrants, it is other actors (e.g. the sending state officials, recruitment agencies, and employers) that assume a more important role in employing the threat of deportation as a technology of discipline. Furthermore, when migrant workers attempt to minimise the disciplinary power of the deportation regime, they engage in practices of discipline and self-discipline and thereby co-construct the deportation regime.

Precarious Workers in Canadian Agriculture

Since 1966, SAWP has made it possible for Caribbean and Mexican workers to work in Canadian fields and greenhouses under bilateral agreements between Canada and the sending states. Under this programme, foreign workers are brought to work in Canada, mostly to Ontario, for up to eight months per year (HRSDC 2011). The programme allows migrants to reapply as long as their employers approve their work. At the end of the season, each employer submits workers' evaluations to the relevant authorities in the workers' countries of origin. Employers are also allowed to nominate (request) workers to return to their farms. The nominated workers often return to the same farm. Those who receive a positive evaluation but are not nominated may be sent to a different farm. Once granted permission to work for a specific employer, these workers are highly dependent on this employer not only for their current employment and daily necessities, but also for their future opportunity to work in Canada. In Mexico, the Ministry of Labour is in charge of selecting workers for this programme, receiving employers' evaluations, and assigning specific jobs to the applicants (see, for instance, Basok 2002; Preibisch 2010). The Ministry of Labour also provides pre-departure training to selected SAWP workers.

As many researchers have documented, the lack of mobility in the labour force and the dependence on employers, combined with desperate conditions in home countries, renders SAWP workers very vulnerable to overexploitation and exposure to occupational hazards (Basok 2002; Preibisch 2007; Sandoval, Manuel, and Vanegas 2001; Binford 2013; Lutz et al. 2010; Hennebry and McLaughlin 2012; Binford et al. 2004; Binford 2013). However, the increasing presence of other precarious groups in Canadian agriculture has the potential to make these workers even more vulnerable (Preibisch 2010, 2012; Becerril 2011a).

In 2002, the Canadian Government introduced SLSOP as another venue to import foreign workers from any country. In the case of Guatemala, International Organization for Migration (IOM) signed an agreement with provincial growers' associations to recruit workers for all Canadian provinces. However, in 2011, Quebec's growers' association, *Fondation des entreprises pour le recrutement de la main-d'oeuvre étrangère* (FERME), terminated its agreement with IOM and opened its own recruitment office (Hughes 2012, 141; Valarezo and Hughes 2012, 97).

In 2013, McLaughlin and Hennebry (2013, 179) estimated the number of agricultural workers employed in both programmes to be over 35,000. In addition to legally employed foreign farm workers, some unauthorised migrants are employed in Leamington. Until 2009, Mexican citizens did not require a visa to enter Canada. Arriving as tourists, some Mexicans solicited refugee status or worked without authorisation. This situation changed on 14 July 2009, in response to an increasing number of refugee claims from Mexico (CIC 2009). While the new visa requirement has made it harder for Mexican nationals to come to Canada in recent years, some are nevertheless successful in obtaining the required tourist visa. Upon arriving in Canada as tourists, some choose to overstay their visa and disappear into the labour

force or solicit refugee status. In addition, some Mexican and Central American migrants arriving on a SAWP or SLSOP visa drop out of the programme and seek employment without authorisation or solicit refugee status.

Among the 80 workers we interviewed in 2010 and 2011, 62 were originally recruited through SAWP or SLSOP. Four of them had dropped out of the programme and continued to work in Canada without authorisation. The remaining18 came to Canada as tourists and half of them solicited a refugee status. The vast majority of the interviewed workers (76) were from Mexico. We also interviewed three Guatemalan migrants and one Salvadoran (the latter was a refugee claimant).[1]

Experiences of Deportability as a Technology of Discipline

Whether employed on a contract or without authorisation, many migrants fear deportation. However, there are variations in how this deportability is experienced and how it is enforced. Deportation has been a distinct possibility for the migrants interviewed in our study who had at some point of their lives lived and worked in Canada without authorisation. Marianita, an unauthorised worker, discusses how she heard about deportations and the impact these stories have had on her:

> They weren't my friends or fellow workers, but I found out about their deportation. This is a small town, and people talk. So this is alarming for me because you get nervous when others are apprehended. And you think that you would be next.

For unauthorised workers, deportation usually involves immigration authorities, as in the literature on deportability presented above. Tonia remembers that one time her supervisor wanted to have sex with a new worker, a 15–16-year old unauthorised migrant. When she refused, he called immigration authorities. Tatiana who is now a refugee claimant tells us of her fear of deportation when she was an unauthorised migrant:

> I've heard lots of stories about so-and-so being taken away and that they just come to your house and without saying anything just take you away. I was very anxious, very worried. Each day that we were going to work I kept thinking what if there is an immigration raid and they capture us and send us back to Mexico?

Immigration raids are extremely rare in Leamington, and it is only when someone reports a fellow unauthorised worker that the immigration authorities show up to apprehend such a person. So it is not the frequency of deportation, but its possibility that keeps unauthorised migrants anxious, fearful and disciplined.

Deportation is also widely employed as a technology of discipline for workers currently employed in SAWP and SLSOP. In fact, among the 57 SAWP and SLSOP workers we interviewed in this study, as many as 32 (or 56%) mentioned fearing deportation and/or having received threats of deportation. This disciplinary practice is enforced by the employers and such inter-governmental organisations as the IOM in collaboration with representatives of the sending countries. Deportability in this

case refers not only to the immediate termination of the contract and the repatriation of migrants, but also to the fear of being denied the opportunity to return to work in Canada in the future. Workers may be repatriated or denied future employment within this programme for a number of reasons: low productivity, conflict with other workers, assertion of their rights, engaging in intimate relationships with other workers or Canadian residents, becoming pregnant, or health problems (see, for instance, Basok 1999, 205, 210–212; Basok 2002, 110–112; Becerril 2011b, 191; Binford 2013, 50; Preibisch 2004, 212; McLaughlin 2010, 85; Preibisch and Encalada 2010, 305–306; Valarezo and Hughes 2012, 101–102).[2] As Preibisch and Hennebry (2012, 55) point out, vaguely worded employment contracts make it possible for employers to dismiss workers arbitrarily and without the right of appeal. Migrants interviewed in this study cited examples of other workers who had been sent home or denied future employment. Ernestino remembers how some people are sent home:

> Have they fired anyone? Yes, the ones that don't work very fast. If they don't complete work fast enough, after one month they are returned to Mexico. And yes, each year 2 or 3 *paisanos* (countrymen) are sent back.

Migrant workers are expected to comply with the job requirements. If they complain, they can be deported. Paco told us how they had gone to complain about excessive work hours to the Agricultural Workers' Alliance Centre. The employer found out about it and punished the workers, first, by suspending them for 3 days, then, by giving them very few hours in the following days, and finally, by sending all of them back to Mexico. Sick or injured workers are also sent back to Mexico (McLaughling 2009a, 17, 59; 484–486; 2009b, 6; Preibisch and Hennebry 2012, 55). Raúl's testimony provides an illustration: 'I have a friend who will no longer be requested because every year he used to get bronchitis. And he was told that if he dies here, it would be too costly for them'. The actual cases of deportation tend to create anxiety among the other workers who fear it may happen to them as well. However, as illustrated above, the deportation regime is also (and to a large degree) reproduced by the repeated threats of deportation made by various actors, including employers, recruitment agencies and sending state representatives.

Beyond the Receiving State

While it is the federal state immigration authorities who have the jurisdiction to deport temporary migrants, many other actors are involved in the reproduction of the deportation regime. Among them are representatives of the sending state, such as the Mexican Consulate and the Ministry of Labour, employers, as well as such international organisations as IOM. They do it either by employing threats of deportation to encourage compliance and higher productivity among the workers or by actually contributing to deportations. Albertino, a SAWP worker, reflects on the role of the Mexican Consulate when he recalls a case of an injured worker returned home: 'One worker lost his hand because it was cut by a machine and what did the

Consul do? It just sent him back to Mexico'. Juan, another SAWP worker, also felt discouraged by the complicity between employers and the Mexican Consulate. Juan once spoke up for the workers who were to be deported. The workers were returned home and the Consulate admonished Juan for attempting to defend other workers' rights.[3]

The Ministry of Labour or *Secretaría*, as the workers frequently refer to it, has also contributed to this deportation regime. As mentioned above, the *Secretaría* uses the threat of deportation prior to the workers' departure to discipline them to work even harder. In addition, the *Secretaría* suspends the workers to stand up for their rights, as happened in Porfirio's story about a worker assaulted by his employer: 'We sent a report [about the incident] to the *Secretaría*. But what was their reaction? They suspended him [the assaulted worker] from the program'.

Migrant workers have told us again and again that many employers use the threat of deportation to make migrants work faster. Ernestino remembers how from his first day in Canada he heard his employer say, 'If you work hard, you will come back next year, and if not, there is no more work for you'. Arturo similarly reflects, 'It is used as pressure. Like they say, 'you have to work harder and, if not, I am not going to request you next year'.

Employers try to control their workers' sexuality and discipline those who are suspected of having intimate relationships or become pregnant (Preibisch and Encalada 2010, 305; Becerril 2007, 170). Rodolfo tells us how one morning he got up early and went into town by buy a few things. Upon his return, he was greeted by an angry employer. Assuming that Rodolfo had spent the night with a lover, his former employer told him he would never request him to work on that farm again.

In reality, deportations to Mexico are relatively few (Preibisch 2004, 212). According to the data obtained from the Mexican Ministry of Labour, between 2004 and 2011, the percentage of repatriated workers did not exceed 1.5% (see Table 1). In fact, a high percent of workers employed in the programme are nominated by their employer to return in the consequent year (see Table 2). Yet, the threat of

Table 1. Repatriation of Mexican SAWP workers 2003–2011, by year.

Year	Number of workers	Number of repatriated workers	% of repatriated workers
2004	10,708	166	1.5
2005	11,720	141	1.2
2006	12,868	96	0.7
2007	14,288	89	0.6
2008	15,849	156	0.9
2009	15,352	75	0.4
2010	15,809	137	0.8
2011	16,492	107	0.6

Source: Secretaría de Trabajo y Provisión Social, México (Ministry of Labour), 2012. Unpublished data provided to the authors.

Table 2. Mexican SAWP workers nominated by their employers, 2004–2012, by year.

Year	Number of nominated workers	Total number of workers	%
2004	5967	10,708	55.7
2005	8098	11,720	69.1
2006	9343	12,868	72.6
2007	10,858	14,288	76
2008	10,375	15,849	65.5
2009	11,686	15,352	76.1
2010	12,339	15,809	78.1
2011	13,062	16,492	79.2
2012	13,298	17,607	75.5

Source: Secretaría de Trabajo y Provisión Social, México (Ministry of Labour), 2012. Unpublished data provided to the authors.

deportation is frequently utilised by the employers, the Mexican Consulate and the Ministry of Labour as an effective disciplining mechanism to increase migrant workers' productively and keep them docile.

In addition to the Mexican state institutions and employers, IOM contributes to this regime of deportability. As various researchers (Ashutosh and Mountz 2011; Basok and Piper 2012; Basok, Piper, and Simmons 2013; Geiger 2010; Preibisch and Hennebry 2012; Valarezo and Hughes 2012) have pointed out, IOM has assumed an important role in 'managing' and disciplining migration flows throughout the globe. Norma, a Guatemalan worker who came to Canada under the SLSOP, has told us how the IOM disciplines workers. She told us that when an official from the Guatemalan Consulate visited their farm to inspect their working conditions, the Guatemalan workers did not complain to him out of fear of being fired even though their working conditions were deplorable. Norma explains the reason, 'We were told by the IOM in Guatemala that if we complained about our employers, we would not receive a good recommendation letter, and we would not be able to return to work on a contact'.

The IOM also warns workers not to share their concerns with any activists. Norma tells us how the IOM teaches workers to be obedient and docile if they wish to stay in the programme:

> The IOM has told us, 'Don't talk to anyone. You're not going to talk to Mexican workers. You're not to talk to absolutely no one. If you meet local people when you go shopping, even if they tell you they are Guatemalans, you are not going to talk to them because these people make it their business to tell you to drop out of the contract. These people just want to harm you.' So they [the IOM representatives] would put it in your head so that you would be fearful. Of course, this was to keep us isolated. And they particularly did not want us to talk to people from organizations because, of course, these organizations explain to us what our rights are and that's what they [the IOM representatives] don't want us to know.

Furthermore, the IOM threatens to remove relatives from the programme if a worker defects. In fact, Norma's story testifies to this disciplinary power assumed by this

international organisation. After Norma and about twenty of her co-workers were told they were to be sent home, she dropped out of the programme and continued living and working in Canada without authorisation. A former co-worker reported her and someone from the IOM office contacted her to tell her that, unless she returned, her three brothers— who also were working under the same programme— would be removed from the programme. Norma did in fact return to Guatemala, only to re-enter Canada as a tourist, without IOM's knowledge.

Thus, the threat of deportation is used effectively by employers, the sending states and recruitment organisations to discipline migrant workers. How can migrant workers minimise the disciplinary power of the deportation regime? The remainder of the article explores this question.

Migrants' Response: Reproducing the Deportation Regime

The Mexican and Central American migrants interviewed in this study adopted certain practices to avoid their own deportation, thus demonstrating their ability to consciously reflect on the disciplinary power that subjugates them and to attempt to minimise it. Yet, as we illustrate below, the practices many of them choose to adopt tend to reproduce the deportation regime as a whole.[4] We focus on two strategies that reaffirm the deportation regime: (i) self-discipline in compliance with the deportation regime; and (ii) causing the deportation of others.

Avoiding Deportation Through Self-Discipline

Under the threat of deportation, SAWP and SLSOP workers discipline themselves to accept employers' pressures to work fast, get along with other workers, and be on their best behaviour (McLaughlin 2009a, 2010, 84, 89; Preibisch 2004, 204). The vast majority of the SAWP and SLSOP workers we interviewed (53 out of 57) talked about the need to comply with the employers' expectations by working fast and/or getting along with others. Arturo tells us that to be invited to return one needs to work to the best of his/her ability, behave oneself and be a 'responsible citizen'. For David, it is important to 'obey whatever is asked of you'. He tells us that at times, he is asked to clean bathrooms (something outside of his contract duties), but he complies with the demands. As he puts it, 'we come to obey and if I don't want to obey, I won't come here'. In addition to working hard and obeying employers' orders, many workers feel that they need to behave themselves. Toniah explains why his employer has been soliciting his and his co-workers' return, 'We are not problematic and this is a key. Not only does the employer like our work, he also likes how we behave ourselves'. Chepito explains why it is important to avoid going out at night:

> Why would you go out at night to look for a girlfriend? What if riding your bicycle on a road you get killed by a car? It would be your employer's problem. So the employer is right when he says, 'you know what? You are not allowed to go out. I take you to the town once a week and this is enough'. The employer is right. It's for our own protection.

Arturo tells us that even when he is tired, if he is asked to work an extra hour, he complies. And he adds that he never demonstrates his anger: 'No one ever sees me looking angry. I walk around with a smile on my face the whole time … And this is what my employer likes'. Ronaldo has learned discipline the hard way. He was once fired by his employer for refusing to work on a Sunday. He returned to Canada as a tourist and has worked without authorisation. Reflecting on this experience, Ronaldo now disapproves of his own behaviour. He says, 'This is true what the employer was saying. One comes to work here. It's true. I only thought of my own rights. But the owner also has rights. Today I know that the employer has rights to demand our labour because, logically, this is why he brings us over'. Working without authorisation currently, Ronaldo now needs to employ other techniques of self-discipline, as discussed below.

Similar to migrants cited in other studies (see, for instance, Rouse 1992; Núñez and Heyman 2007; Apostolidis 2010), most of the unauthorised migrants (or those who had been unauthorised as some point of time) interviewed in our study developed practices of self-regulation, self-confinement and self-discipline to protect their jobs and avoid deportation when faced with the stringent constraints and threats of deportation discussed above. Forms of discipline practiced by migrants during time spent undocumented began with the need to self-confine the body from unsafe spaces. Marianita compares herself to a delinquent who needs to hide from authorities: 'Once it (the visa) ends, you have to hide from authorities, hide as a delinquent because this is the message they send you, that you are like a delinquent when they walk behind you'.

The 'art of hiding' required the ability to identify and avoid places notorious for being at risk of state control. Because police raids change the places they target over time, migrants must constantly be aware of places to avoid. Marianita tells us that she avoids going to some stores and bars frequented by other Mexicans, because she believes migration raids happen there. Self-confinement is not only physical but also social. Learning to identify individuals they can trust is also part of the self-discipline that workers practice. When going to a social event, Ernestina talks about how self-restraint and avoidance of 'problems' are essential to hiding:

> It all depends on how you behave yourself because others realize that you are undocumented when you put yourself in a bad situation. If you go to a party and someone provokes you, for example, you have to avoid problems. Do you see what I mean? If you put yourself in any bad situation, the police will come and ask for your I. D. And then they will know … they will take you to the station, the immigration authority will come.

Self-regulation was expressed by Torino as controlling one's consumption of alcohol, and, when inebriated, avoiding the street:

> You have to drink as little as possible … certainly not walk on the street and drink alcohol. You have to drink where you live. If you drink at the bar, you take a taxi home

as soon as you leave. Certainly you do not walk on the street drunk. You have to avoid the attention of the police as much as possible. You have to pass completely unnoticed.

Self-regulation also meant avoiding fights with others. Serafino explains:

> What we need to do is to avoid problems. No undocumented migrant would have a fist fight in the street. Any undocumented migrant can be humiliated because he refuses to fight. Do you understand? These are difficult situations because anyone can insult you. And if they insult you, you can't do anything but run away from this situation, avoid it, escape. If you insult me, I will just let you talk. And nothing else. So that no police is called. And that's how you act every day. You need to understand the special situation you're in.

Self-regulation also involved accepting bodily assaults and abuses from various sources. For women, these physical assaults included sexual aggressions. In case of injury or illness, self-discipline manifested itself in putting up with the injury as part of one's fate. Enduring pain and fear was the only option for undocumented workers who had no access to health care.[5]

Unauthorised workers feel that by comparison to SAWP and SLSOP workers, they have freedom to refuse abusive working conditions and unreasonable demands. There is sufficient demand for labour in the agricultural labour market in this rural community and unauthorised workers feel that, if they lose a job, their contractor can find another one for them. Renaldo told us that he feels free to say, 'OK. If you don't like my work, I also don't like the way you treat me. I am leaving'. Luis observes:

> [when the employer tells me to work faster] I just say 'yes' and work the same way. If I want to work faster, I do but if I don't feel like it, I don't. And it makes me feel better. And if they want to fire me, let them. I am not worried. I feel free.

Nevertheless, even unauthorised workers do not take their work ethic lightly. As Zorro says:

> I have to work faster than the workers on a contract. Or at least as fast as they so that I am the one they would want to have all year round … So you have to be the best. Punctuality, discipline at work, personal appearance … If they tell you not to smoke, don't smoke. Do you understand? … I shouldn't give them reason to think badly of me. I come to work five minutes earlier to be punctual, and I stop working when the buzzer rings. Do you understand? And that's how they see me. They take me seriously. I am a good worker.

As argued by Apostolodis, the deployment of micropractices of self-discipline and the pride attached to their effective performance (in the sense that one had successfully avoided deportation or had managed to return following deportation) indicates that our study's participants 'were in some degree feeding biopolitics by making it seem tolerable and justifiable in their own eyes' (Apostolidis 2010, 106). In his analysis of the narratives of migrants' personal power Apostolidis drew attention to skills being employed to stay concealed when smuggled over borders, resist demands from

abusive smugglers, pass as legal residents, and escape from immigration authorities (Apostolidis 2010, 104–105). He noted, 'channelling struggle toward either the smuggler or the self *displaced* oppositional energies that otherwise could have been levelled at the larger institutions that had created these terrains of power and resistance in the first place: the state and capital' (Apostolidis 2010, 106). Reflecting on how Mexican migrants employed in restaurants in Chicago use collective agency to shape their working environment and to manage and reduce their vulnerabilities, Gomberg-Muñoz (2010) similarly observes that by reproducing racialised stereotypes of 'Mexican work ethic', they end up reproducing various exploitative aspects of their work, such as work intensification at the same pay rate. Similar to these migrants, the Mexican and Central American migrants interviewed in our study co-produced the disciplinary power of the deportation regime.

Making Others Deportable

Fierce competition among Mexican workers was a recurrent theme in our research. In order to secure their own return, most workers try to meet their employers' expectations by working hard. However, some among them attempt to outperform other workers in order to ensure that they would be the ones selected for future contracts by the employer (also see McLaughlin 2009a, 276–278). As Julio (like many others interviewed in this study) puts it, 'among us there are some people who always want to finish their grove faster than others, to look good in the eyes of the employer so that he would ask them to return the following year'. Some workers see this work rhythm to be 'inhuman'. Zorro has compared the work environment to a jungle in which tigers, coyotes and cats (the fastest, average, and the slowest workers) engage in a fierce struggle to be the best and avoid being the worst. Because of the unreasonably fast work pace set by the employer's favourite workers or the 'tigers', the 'cats' are rendered deportable. In addition, to secure their own place in the programme, some workers, those who have been at the farm the longest, complain about newly arrived workers to supervisors or employers, telling them that the new workers are slow, incapable of performing certain tasks or that they do not get along with other workers with whom they share accommodation. Furthermore, some (very few) workers deliberately mislead less-experienced workers, making them work slower; consequently, they fall out of grace with the employer.[6] The story that Luis narrated about his Mexican supervisor presents an excellent illustration of this. His supervisor had been working at the same farm for 14 years. Fearing that new, and particularly young, workers would outpace him, he found a way to 'slow them down':

> There are two things he cares about. First, he wants to be in charge. And the other is he wants to be responsible for teaching new workers how to work. … So one day he told me to do the job in a certain way. And it took me twice as long to do it. And I asked 'why?' It can't be. I'm young, and my body is agile. So one day I stopped working and went to see how he does it. And it was the opposite of what he told me.

As we were told by more than one person, some workers even complain about other workers to their employers in order to receive more hours of work. Angel presents the calculations:

> Let's say, we are 10 workers here and we get no more than 10 hours per day. Being smart, they say, 'if we get rid of 2 workers, we will get their hours'. So what do they do? They make these two look bad, and the employer fires them. And there are 8 workers left. Among the 10 of them there were 100 hours of work. Now they can be split between 8 workers … Yes, me too, I've done it, that is, to get rid of some other workers. Me too, ha, ha, ha. I am not making it up because I too have participated in it.

Among the undocumented workers, in some cases, the regime of deportability is reproduced by other migrants who report them to the authorities. Marianita reflects with dismay:

> We Mexicans are like this. If the authorities are looking for a person because that person has received a deportation order to return to Mexico, and if some people know where he lives, they call the police and tell them 'You know, such and such person, lives here. Come and get him'.

Jorge similarly observes:

> It's important to try not to have bad friends. Many people are envious … If one person steals someone's girlfriend or if there are some other personal problems, they seek an opportunity to get this person deported … The danger is constant … When immigration authorities come to a farm, it is because someone has informed them … Let's say, someone doesn't like me, they call the authorities and tell them that I work here…

The community where this research was conducted is not much different from other places where the deportation regime relies on civilian informers (Wicker 2010; Castañeda 2010, 246). What seems to be somewhat different in the case of the Mexican workers in this rural community, however, is that some of the migrants themselves are involved in the snitching. By engaging in these practices, these migrants contribute to the reproduction of this deportation regime. As mentioned earlier, the actual number of deportations is actually rather small and therefore it is the fear of other migrants' snitching, rather than its actual occurrence, that forces unauthorised migrants to adopt certain practices of self-discipline.

Conclusion

The regime of deportability disciplines migrants to work efficiently and cheaply expose themselves to health hazards, and accept their conditions in silence. Furthermore, the fear of deportation spreads beyond the economic realm and disciplines migrants to become 'invisible' – avoid public spaces, and restrain their wants and desires. Deportability as a technique of discipline has been analysed by a

number of researchers discussed in this article. Most research on deportability focuses on unauthorised migration and thus views the state as the main actors responsible for maintaining the deportation regime. In this article, we expand the notion of deportability by: (i) illustrating that it also applies to authorised workers employed on a temporary basis, and (ii) identifying various actors responsible for the deployment of threats of deportation as a technology of discipline, such as employers, recruitment agencies and representatives of the sending countries. Furthermore, we illustrate how in their effort to minimise their own deportability, migrants often co-construct the deportation regime.

How can this deportation regime be disrupted? For unauthorised migrants, opening opportunities to legalise their status would obviously remove the threat of deportation. For legally employed temporary workers, it is important to reduce the unilateral power granted to the employers to use the threat of deportation to exert pressure on their workers and deny them the right to claim rights, including the right to refuse excessive or dangerous work and the right to a harassment-free working environment. One step in that direction would be to set up a labour board that would review employer's decisions to terminate their workers' contracts and/or blacklist workers, and receive workers' appeals and transfer requests. Another way to undermine the unilateral power of the Canadian employers would be to grant migrant workers the right to circulate freely, at least within particular sectors of labour market. For some researchers and activists (e.g. Binford 2013; Sharma 2012), these solutions do not go far enough since the temporary status would still render these migrants vulnerable. Cindy Hahamovitch reflects on the US immigration reform:

> A better idea – and the only one that doesn't seem to have been considered in recent immigration reform debates – is the idea of bumping unskilled or low-wage labor way up the list of priorities that has ordered legal, permanent migration to the United States since 1965. If immigrant workers are essential to the nation's economy, as they clearly are, why should farmworkers (and nannies and roofers and crab pickers) be at the very bottom of the immigration preference list? (2011, 242)

The same considerations apply to the Canadian immigration policy. In Canada, many activists have campaigned for the right of temporary workers to settle in Canada permanently (or arrive with a permanent status, to begin with) under the slogan 'Good enough to work, good enough to stay' (Hanley et al. 2012). While many Mexican migrant farm workers prefer to return home at the end of the season (Basok, Bélanger, and Rivas 2012b), for others, settling in Canada may be a more humane alternative to submitting themselves to the deportation regime.

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Notes

[1]   All the names used in this article are pseudonyms.
[2]   McLaughlin (2010, 214–220) discusses other forms of punishment used by employers to discipline their workers, including: limiting hours of work, confiscating cell phones, locking workers in or out of the houses, turning off electricity and threats of physical violence.
[3]   On the structural weakness of consular officials, see Preibisch and Binford (2007, 23–29) and Binford (2013, 52–57), and Hahamovitch (2011, 104).
[4]   This is not to say that temporary migrants do not resist the abusive working conditions. In fact, despite the threat of deportation, some workers individually stand up to their employers and some workers have even engaged in organised job actions (see Becerril 2007; McLaughlin 2009a, 17; Basok 2002, 149). Hahamovitch (2011, 153–156) also provides a detailed account of Jamaican guest workers' militancy even in the face of deportability.
[5]   In Ontario, access to free health care is provided through the Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP) to categories of people such as: citizens, permanent residents, applicants for permanent residency, approved temporary workers or residents, refugee claimants (see http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/public/publications/ohip/ohip_eligibility.aspx). Unauthorised migrants are excluded from this coverage.
[6]   McLaughlin's (2009, 277) discussion of 'self-policing' provides another illustration of how some migrants are responsible for the deportation of others. She mentions that some migrant workers make complaints against each other at the Mexican Ministry of Labour in hope that their rivals will be removed from the programme.

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