### Word Games

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March 16, 2022

# Dialogue and information gathering

- Resolve ambiguity and coordinate through dialogue
- OneCommon: Interactive, symmetric reference game
  - Isolates info gathering (and coordination)
  - Environment (dots) are completely static
  - Dynamism comes from dialogue only
- 20 questions with symmetric information constraints

#### Previous SotA

- Purely supervised
  - Upper-bounded by performance of demonstrators
- Uncalibrated beliefs: overconfidence
  - Pushes for to select a dot that will not work
- Research goal: Improve supervised models via model-based planning

# Fixing strategy with planning

- Prior: Fully supervised neural encoder-decoder
  - ► Encode past interactions with a neural net
  - ► Generate what to say with a neural net
  - Brittle strategy, less brittle language
- Next: Model-based planning
  - Choose what to say by imagining how partner would respond
  - Say utterance with best expected outcome
  - Potentially stronger player than expert demonstrations

# Challenges in model-based planning


- Partner modeling is hard
  - Variable amount of information in utterances
  - High entropy demonstration strategies
- Multi-turn planning
  - Accuracy of planning depends greatly on the partner model
  - Errors from the partner model will compound over time<sup>1</sup>
- Single-turn planning
  - Removes compounding errors
  - Must optimize a dialogue progress heuristic: uncertainty reduction
  - Requires belief with uncertainty
  - Still requires accurate partner model<sup>2</sup>
- Research question: Can we improve partner modeling for planning by simplifying partner responses?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Errors in planning will be a result of compounding partner model errors on top of search error.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Belief is function of dialogue history and partner model.

#### **Planning**

- Partner response depends on utterance and conversation history
  - First history  $h_0 = \text{dots you can see}$
  - ► History  $h_t$ , utterance u, response r
  - Next history  $h_{t+1} = (h_t, u, r)$



Plan by imagining partner response r

$$\min_{u} \mathbb{E}_{p(r|h,u)} \left[ \mathsf{Cost}(h,u,r) \right]$$

- Produce utterances from prior model and rerank
- Cost should approximate dialogue progress
  - Goal of dialogue is information gathering and coordination
  - Focus on information gathering
- Cost should be a function of belief

## Planning with Belief

- ▶ Introduce belief  $p(s \mid h)$ 
  - State s is what dots partner can also see
  - ightharpoonup Response model  $p(r \mid h, u, s)$  now has more conditioning



► Incorporate belief in planning


$$\min_{u} \mathbb{E}_{p(r|h,u,s)p(s|h)} [\mathsf{Uncertainty}(p(s\mid h,u,r))]$$

► Obtain belief posterior via belief update

$$p(s \mid h, u, r) = \frac{p(r \mid h, u, s)p(s \mid h)}{\sum_{s} p(r \mid h, u, s)p(s \mid h)}$$

#### Partner response model

- Static latent state s: which dots do they also see
  - Alternative: actual field of view
  - Pick s that is observed during training so we can keep all models supervised
- ▶ Uniform prior p(s) over 7 choose 4 dots partner also sees
- ▶ Partner response model  $p(r_t \mid u_{1:t}, r_{1:t-1}, s)$ 
  - History  $h_t = (u_{1:t-1}, r_{1:t-1})$



#### Response model: Informativity

- Example exchange
  - Action: Do you see a red dot?
  - Observation: No, but I see a blue one.
- Utterances are multifaceted
  - Responses contain more information than asked
  - New information injected by partner, not constrained
  - Difficult to model new information
- Introduce informativity as another variable
- Make worst-case assumption about informativity during planning
  - Assume a limit on number of bits transmitted
  - Conservative lower bound on uncertainty reduction / dialogue progress

### Incorporating informativity

- Add partner-level informativity i to response model p(r | h, u, s, i)
  - ▶ Determines partner willingness to give more information
  - More information improves game-play
- ▶ Introduce uncertainty set over  $i \in [low, high]$

$$\min_{u} \min_{i \in [\mathsf{low}, \mathsf{high}]} \mathbb{E}_{p(r \mid h, u, s, i) p(s \mid h)} \left[ \mathsf{Uncertainty}(p(s \mid h, u, r)) \right]$$

- ightharpoonup Optimize worst-case informativity i = low
- Constrain informativity in response via discrete coding

# Limiting informativity with discrete coding

- ▶ Compress response into discrete code  $z \in [K]$
- ► Use variational information bottleneck (VIB)<sup>3</sup>
- ► Optimize mutual information objective<sup>4</sup>
  - ► Focus code *z* on response to new information introduced by utterance *u*
  - But limit the information shared with response r and history h max  $I(z, u; \theta) \beta I(z, r; \theta) \gamma I(z, h; \theta)$
- ▶ Lagrange multipliers  $\beta, \gamma$
- ▶ Plan with response model p(z | h, u, s) instead of r

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Alemi et al. (2016)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Closely related to the approach of Li and Eisner (2019)

# Belief update

- Performing the belief update with z instead of r would lose information
- ▶ Use original model p(r | h, u, s) to update belief?
  - May run into original possible issue of poor calibration
- ► Learn another discrete representation of *r* that does not aim to disentangle
  - Need as baseline for model with z
  - Likely adequate when combined with mentions

### Summary

- Goal: Show (partner) model-based planning works for dialogue with purely supervised components
  - ► Single-turn planning for limiting compounding model errors
  - Belief-based heuristic for measuring dialogue progress
  - Response coding for conservative planning

#### Belief unit tests

Focus on belief calibration. Belief is a function of response model.

- Repeated information does not change belief
  - Ask the same question twice (rephrased)
- Updates are conservative
  - Require multiple positive answers to diff questions before being certain about a dot
- ► Follow-up questions improve belief
  - Want one case where first (uncertain) answer results in less information and vice versa
- Multiple partner dots satisfy question
  - Still a positive response, might be same as single satisfy
  - Next preferred utterance should be a follow-up in both multiple and single satisfy
- High probability after confirming all neighbouring dots

### Extrinsic evaluation: Selfplay

#### Compare to fully supervised prior work

- Success rate
  - Should be higher
- Efficiency (success / num turns)
  - Possibly higher because more success, but more turns
- Number of repeated mentions
  - Should be higher if policy more conservative

#### Questions

- 1. How do we measure belief calibration?
  - Unit tests examining conservativity of beliefs
- 2. How calibrated are the belief updates using various response representations?
- 3. How well can we produce a range of utterances to search over?

#### Response representations

- Words in response
  - ► Full response
  - First *k* words of response
- Dot mentions
  - All dot groups mentioned in response
  - First dot group mentioned in response
- Discrete encoding
  - K-means cluster of sentence rep
  - Specialized cluster (information bottleneck)
- Continuous encoding
  - Sentence rep
  - Specialized encoding (information bottleneck)

# Experiment 1:

# End

# Full planning details

Given history h, we need to chose an action a by optimizing heuristic utility

$$\min_{a} C(h, a)$$

- ightharpoonup Cost c = -information gain <math>+ utterance + pragmatic cost
  - ► IG: Reduce uncertainty
  - Utterance cost: Can't send a full paragraph
  - Pragmatic cost: Want utterance to be accurate
- ▶ Ideally would estimate and optimize future reward directly
  - Heuristic approximation of future reward U
  - Limited-horizon planning to minimize impact of model error

## Expected information gain

 Maximizing expected information gain equivalent to minimizing uncertainty


$$\min_{u} \sum_{r} \sum_{s} \underbrace{p(r \mid h, u, s)}_{\text{response model}} \underbrace{p(s \mid h)}_{\text{belief}} \text{Uncertainty}(\underbrace{p(s \mid h, u, r)}_{\text{new belief}})$$

#### **Experiments**

- Mutual Friends
  - ► Augment rule-based (prior work) to optimize info gain
  - After OneCommon: Add neural on top
- OneCommon
  - Use attributes = raw mention configurations
    - ▶ Need belief / info gain / LR weights
    - ▶ How to deal with redundancy? (i.e. correlation between features)
  - Learn latent refinement on top of mention configurations

#### Information gain issues

- Best info gain could be to ask the same question twice
- Usual fix: Limit to asking once only
- Would be nice to have a principled way to deal with correlated features though



Second turn after taking action with lowest entropy

#### Related work: 20 questions

- ► Padmakumar and Mooney (2020)
  - Attribute-based classification (string heuristic to map to description) + activate learning about attributes
  - ► Info gain (on top of binary unweighted logistic regression) as feature for RL policy
- Yu et al. (2019)
  - Question-based classification (attributes)
  - Learn weights of features
  - Do not consider feature correlations
- More interesting language, symmetric setting
- Learn weights, account for correlation
- Symmetry, deal with unexpected features

# End

#### Concerns

- ► Would a large LM solve all of this?
  - Fine tune on small onecommon dataset, are there still repeats?
  - Unlikely to solve strategy / over optimistism

# **Expected Information Gain**

$$IG(h,a) = H(i \mid h) - \mathbb{E}_{p(o|h,a)} [H(i \mid h,a,o)]$$

$$\mathbb{E}_{p(o|h,a)} [H(i \mid h,a)] = \sum_{o} \sum_{i'} p(o \mid h,a,i) p(i \mid h) H(i \mid h,a,o)$$

- Equivalent to minimizing expected uncertainty after receiving a response
- Cite Yu et al, White et al

#### Citations I

- Alemi, A. A., Fischer, I., Dillon, J. V., and Murphy, K. (2016). Deep variational information bottleneck. *CoRR*, abs/1612.00410.
- Li, X. L. and Eisner, J. (2019). Specializing word embeddings (for parsing) by information bottleneck. *CoRR*, abs/1910.00163.
- Padmakumar, A. and Mooney, R. J. (2020). Dialog policy learning for joint clarification and active learning queries. *CoRR*, abs/2006.05456.
- Yu, L., Chen, H., Wang, S. I., Artzi, Y., and Lei, T. (2019). Interactive classification by asking informative questions. *CoRR*, abs/1911.03598.

#### Games

#### Friends of agent A:

Name	School	Major	Company
Jessica Josh	Columbia Columbia	Computer Science Linguistics	Google Google

A: Hi! Most of my friends work for Google

B: do you have anyone who went to columbia?

A. Hello?


A: I have Jessica a friend of mine

A: and Josh, both went to columbia

B: or anyone working at apple?

B: SELECT (Jessica, Columbia, Computer Science, Google)

A: SELECT (Jessica, Columbia, Computer Science, Google)



#### Human A's view Human B's view

Human B: three light grey dots in a diagonal line

Human A: i dont have that but i have a black dot neer the top to the right, the only

black dot in the circle

Human B: i have two black dots. find something else Human A: ok i have a light grey dot by itself

at the bottom to the left. right on the line Human B: how big is it

Human A: its one of the bigger ones Human B: okay just pick it then

Human A: ok

Human B: SELECT blue Human A: SELECT red

Mutual Friends and OneCommon

#### Issue: Poor neural reasoning

#### From Mutual Friends: Neural + Human

- ► A: Know anyone who likes chess?
- B: None of my friends like chess.
- (conversation continues)
- A: Crocheting?
- B: None like crocheting.
- ► A: Chess?
- B: None like chess either, haha.

# Sample of prior work in model-based planning

- ➤ 20 questions (Yu et al., 2019; Padmakumar and Mooney, 2020)
  - Sym: Assymmetric questioner + answerer
  - ► Turns: Multi-turn game
  - Lang: Closed class answers (observations)
  - Heur: Expected info gain heuristic
- ► EVPI (??)
  - Sym: Assymmetric questioner + answerer
  - ► Turns: No interaction, single turn game
  - Lang: Open
  - Heur: Expected utility heuristic
- RSA reference game (?)
  - Sym: Symmetric
  - ► Turns: Multi-turn game
  - Lang: Symbolic language
  - Heur: Bounded depth search

# Conditioning in partner modeling


- Assuming conditional independence  $p(o \mid h, a, y) = p(o \mid a, y)$  is harmful
- ▶ If you ask the same question twice, your belief changes both times!
  - ▶  $p(\text{yes} \mid h = \emptyset, a = \text{red dot}?, y)$  can vary depending on the latent y
  - $p(\text{yes} \mid h = (\text{red dot}?, \text{yes}), a = \text{red dot}?, y) = 1$ , since we just asked!
- 'Questions with correlated answers' and deficient observation model lead to uncalibrated beliefs, and therefore poor strategy
- Contribution: relax independence assumption
  - Let past obs vote on current one (weighted by action similarity)
  - Probably solved by Transformers<sup>5</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Copy attention, depends on amount of data

### Example dialogue 1: Overconfidence


i have a large black dot, it 's not the same size, but it is not the darkest Mine is the darkest i see it . i think it is the one . I have multiple dark dots so I am not sure i have a large black dot, it is in the center I have a large dot in the lower part with a dark smaller dot at seven o'clock is the black dot the darkest? if so click it I have three the same darkness pick the lightest one Ok but our odds are not good. pick the light one

# Example dialogue 2: Overconfidence




- 0 i have two dark dots, one on top and slightly smaller than the other
- 1 i see it. pick the top one?
- 0 ok

# Example dialogue 3: Good humans



- 1 I have a large black dot by itself
- I see a large, very dark dot on the edge of my screen (so I won't be able to see anything to its right). Can you see anything on the left of your large black dot?
- 1 Yes, my large dark dot is on the edge of the right side
- Ok, to the left of the dark dot, and slightly above it, do you see a slightly-smaller, slightly lighter dot?
- 1 yes

# Example dialogue 3: Good humans



- and then far above (and a bit to the right of) that lighter one, do you see a slightly smaller, identically colored dot?
- 1 No, the first lighter dot is the closest dot to the top of mine
- 0 Okay. what do you see to the left of that lighter dot?
- 1 A slightly darker dot that is below it just a bit
- 0 ok, I think we're in the same place. Let's click that original, blackest dot
- 1 Okay sounds good