A Computational Model of Linguistic Humor in Puns

**Abstract**

Humor plays an essential role in human interactions. However, its precise nature remains elusive. While research on natural language understanding has made significant advancements in recent years, there has been little direct integration of humor research with computational models of language understanding. In this paper, we propose two information-theoretic measures—ambiguity and distinctiveness—derived from a simple model of sentence processing that correspond to key components of humor proposed in the most influential theories. We then test these measures on a set of puns and regular sentences and show that they correlate significantly with human judgments of funniness. Our model is one of the first to integrate general linguistic knowledge and humor theory to model humor computationally. We present it as an example of a framework for applying models of language processing to understand higher-level linguistic and cognitive phenomena.

**Introduction**

Love may make the world go round, but humor is the glue that keeps it together. Our everyday experiences serve as evidence that humor plays a critical role in human interactions and composes a significant part of our linguistic, cognitive, and social lives. Previous research has shown that humor is ubiquitous across cultures (Martin, 2010; Kruger, 1996), increases interpersonal attraction (Lundy, Tan & Cunningham, 1998), helps resolve intergroup conflicts (Smith, Harrington & Neck, 2000), and improves psychological wellbeing (Martin, Kuiper, Olinger & Dance, 1993). However, the cognitive basis of humor remains largely a mystery. In this paper, we build upon theories of humor and language processing to computationally model the humor in pun sentences. By providing a formal model of linguistic humor, we aim to shed light on the precise properties of inputs that make us laugh.

Many theories of humor have been proposed since Plato and Aristotle (see Attardo, 1994) for review). Of these theories, incongruity and incongruity-resolution theories have had a strong influence on contemporary studies of humor (Suls, 1983; Attardo, Hempelmann & Di Maio, 2002; Samson, Hempelmann, Huber & Zysset, 2009; Bartolo, Benuzzi, Nocetti, Baraldi & Nichelli, 2006). Incongruity is often defined as the incompatible and often unexpected interpretations of a stimulus, while resolution involves discovering a “cognitive rule” that explains the incongruity in a logical manner and thereby reduces it (Ritchie, 1999; Suls, 1972). Some theorists posit that incongruity is sufficient for humor, which exemplifies incongruity theories; others argue that incongruity must be resolved in order to generate humor, which exemplifies incongruity-resolution theories (Suls, 1983; Ritchie, 1999). While the distinction is sometimes subtle, the following riddle may help illustrate the different types of analyses generated by the two families of theories:

(1)

Q: What is grey, has four legs, and a trunk?

A: A mouse on vacation.

An incongruity-based analysis may focus on the fact that the answer is incongruent with the most natural response to the question, which is “elephant.” Incongruity-resolution theorists, however, would argue that the riddle is funny only because the incongruity is resolved by the realization that “a mouse on vacation” is a legitimate answer given one meaning of “trunk.” While it is unclear which analysis is more “correct” for this particular joke, it is clear that the informal nature of these analyses leaves much room for disparate interpretations. The lack of precision and computational rigor makes it difficult to empirically evaluate the contribution of different factors to the perception of humor (Ritchie, 1999).

More recently, researchers in artificial intelligence have applied computational tools to examine features of humor. The interest in computational humor is motivated by the need for computers to recognize and generate humorous input in order to interact with humans in a more engaging manner (Mihalcea & Strapparava, 2006). However, most work on computational humor focuses either on joke-specific templates and schemata (Binsted, 1996) or surface features such as innuendo and slang (Mihalcea & Strapparava, 2006; Kiddon & Brun, 2011). While these approaches are able to identify and produce humorous stimuli within certain constraints, they fall short of testing and building upon a more general cognitive theory of humor.

In this paper, we utilize a simple computational model of sentence processing to derive theory-driven measures of humor. While one could compare multiple formalizations that correspond to different interpretations of the informal theories, as a first step, we propose and test one particular formalization. We derive two measures of humor—ambiguity and distinctiveness—that correspond to aspects of incongruity and resolution. The ambiguity measure quantifies the degree to which a stimulus has multiple plausible interpretations. For example, the word “trunk” gives rise to multiple incongruous answers precisely because it is ambiguous in context. The distinctiveness measure quantifies the degree to which different interpretations are supported by distinct parts of the input. The more distinct the support, the more likely it is that the stimulus can be partitioned into internally congruent sets, thus resolving the incongruity. For example, the *snout* meaning of “trunk” is supported by the question part of the riddle, while the *suitcase* meaning is supported by the answer. One can thus resolve the incongruity by focusing on distinct parts of the riddle. We propose that both ambiguity and distinctiveness capture important characteristics of linguistic humor as outlined by the incongruity-resolution model. By formalizing these measures, we can more precisely evaluate how different factors contribute to humor and provide empirical evidence to help refine humor theories.

Since the humor of a sentence depends on its meaning, a formal model of humor requires a formal model of meaning. We focus on a subset of linguistic humor for which we can reasonably approximate complex sentence meanings—phonetic puns, defined as puns containing words that sound identical or similar to other words in English. Philosopher Henri Bergson described puns as sentences “in which two ideas are expressed, and we are confronted with only one series of words.” The following is an example of a phonetic pun:

(2) “The magician got so mad he pulled his hare out.”

The phonetic form of this sentence generates two “ideas,” or meanings:

(2a) *The magician got so mad he performed the trick of pulling a rabbit out of his hat.*

(2b) *The magician got so mad he pulled out the hair on his head.*

Meaning (2a) arises if the word “hare” is interpreted as *hare*; meaning (2b) arises if the word “hare” is interpreted as its homophone *hair*. As a result, we can approximate meaning (2a) with the meaning *hare* and (2b) with the meaning *hair.* The sentence-level meanings of a phonetic pun thus directly correspond to the meanings of a single phonetically ambiguous word. Although this is a coarse approximation that captures the “gist” of a sentence rather than its full meaning, it allows us to bypass the largely unsolved problem of formally representing complex sentence meanings.

We derive our measures of humor from a distribution over these approximate sentence meanings. Formally, a sentence is composed of a vector of words , where *h* is a phonetically ambiguous word. The meaning of the sentence is a latent variable that we infer. We assume has two possible values and , where corresponds to the meaning of *h*, and corresponds to the meaning of the homophone of *h*. Consistent with a noisy channel approach, we formally construe the task of understanding a sentence as inferring using probabilistic integration of noisy evidence given by (is this an accurate characterization of the noisy channel approach?). In order to infer the true meaning of a sentence, comprehenders rationally incorporate word-level interpretations to arrive at coherent interpretations at the sentence level. We construct a simple generative model (see Figure) that captures the relationship between the meaning of a sentence and the words that compose it. If a word is a correct observation (should we call this “correct”, “meaningful”, or “relevant”?), it is sampled based on semantic similarity to the sentence meaning; if the word is irrelevant, or “noise,” it reflects the sentence’s sequential structure and is sampled from an n-gram model. We propose that the humor in phonetic puns may arise from this assumption of a noisy channel. Because the comprehender maintains uncertainty about the input, it is possible for her to arrive at multiple interpretations of a sentence that are each coherent but incongruous with each other. While our model does not capture deep sentence comprehension, it is sufficiently powerful as a first step for modeling humor in phonetically ambiguous sentences.

Given the words in a sentence, we can infer the joint probability distribution over sentence meanings and the “meaningful” subset of words. This distribution can be factorized as the following:

We derive a formal measure of humor from each of the two terms on the right-hand side. Ambiguity is quantified by the entropy of the binomial distribution . If the entropy is high, then the sentence is ambiguous because both meanings are similarly likely. Distinctiveness captures the degree to which distributions over meaningful words differ given different sentence meanings. Formally, given one possible meaning and the words , we compute . Given another meaning and the words , we compute . Distinctiveness is then quantified by the Kullback-Leibler divergence score between these two distributions, ). If the KL score is high, it suggests that the two sentence meanings are supported by distinct subsets of the sentence. Together, ambiguity and distinctiveness constitute a two-dimensional formalization of humor inspired by incongruity-resolution theories. To determine their relationships with human judgments of humor, we empirically evaluate the measures on a set of phonetically ambiguous sentences.

**Methods**

*Measure derivations*

Here we describe the derivations for ambiguity and distinctiveness in more detail. We use the entropy of to measure the ambiguity of a sentence. Using Bayes’ Rule, is derived as follows[[1]](#footnote-1):

We approximate as the unigram frequency of the words that represent . For example, is approximated as . We assume a uniform prior probability over all subsets of the words being semantically meaningful, which means is a constant. depends on the value of the indicator variable . If , is semantically meaningful and is sampled in proportion to its relatedness with the sentence meaning . If , then is generated from a noise process and sampled in proportion to its probability given the previous two words (including function words). Formally,

We estimate using measures described in Experiment 2 and compute using the Google Ngrams corpus. Once we derive , we compute its information-theoretic entropy as a measure of ambiguity:

We next turn to the distribution over indicator variables given a sentence meaning to compute the distinctiveness of words supporting each sentence meaning. Using Bayes’ Rule, we derive the following:

Since and are independent, , which is a constant. Let

Let and . We compute the Kullback-Leibler divergence score ) as a measure of distinctiveness:

We then implement and test these measures using the following two experiments.

*Experiment 1*

We collected 435 sentences consisting of phonetic puns and regular sentences that contain phonetically ambiguous words. We obtained the puns from a website called “Pun of the Day” (http://www.punoftheday.com), which at the time of collection contained over a thousand puns submitted by users. We obtained 40 puns where the ambiguous item is a single phonetically ambiguous word that has an identical homophone. Since only a limited number of puns satisfied this criterion, a research assistant generated an additional 25 pun sentences based on a separate list of homophone words, resulting in a total of 65 identical-homophone puns. We selected 130 corresponding non-pun sentences from an online version of Heinle's Newbury House Dictionary of American English (<http://nhd.heinle.com>). 65 of the non-pun sentences contain the ambiguous words observed in the pun sentences; the other 65 contain the alternative homophones. To test whether our measures generalize to sentences that do not contain words that are perfectly phonetically ambiguous, we collected 80 puns where the phonetically ambiguous word sounds similar (but not identical) to other words in English, as well as 160 corresponding non-pun sentences. Table shows an example sentence from each category.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Homophone | Type | Example |
| Identical | Pun | The magician was so mad he pulled his hare out. |
| Identical | Non-pun | The hare ran rapidly across the field. |
| Identical | Non-pun | Some people have lots of hair on their heads. |
| Near | Pun | A dentist has to tell a patient the whole tooth. |
| Near | Non-pun | A dentist examines one tooth at a time. |
| Near | Non-pun | She always speaks the truth. |

We obtained funniness ratings for each of the 435 sentences. 93 subjects on Amazon's Mechanical Turk rated the 195 sentences that contain identical homophones. Each subject read roughly 60 sentences in random order, counterbalanced for the sentence types, and rated each sentence on funniness and correctness. 158 subjects on Mechanical Turk rated the 240 near homophone sentences. Each subject read 40 sentences in random order, counterbalanced for the sentence types, and rated each sentence on funniness. We z-scored the ratings and used the average z-scored ratings across subjects as human judgments of funniness.

*Experiment 2*

As described in the measure derivations, computing ambiguity and distinctiveness requires the conditional probabilities of each word given a sentence meaning. However, this value is difficult to obtain reliably through traditional topic models trained on corpora due to data sparsity. As a result, we decided to measure it empirically.

We approximate using an empirical measure of the semantic relatedness between and , which we denote as . We use as a proxy for point wise mutual information between and , defined as follows:

We assume that human ratings of relatedness between two words approximate true relatedness up to an additive constant and assume . With the proper substitutions and transformations,

To obtain for each of the words in the stimuli sentences, we recruited 200 subjects on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to rate word pairs on their semantic relatedness. Function words were removed from each of the sentences in our dataset, and the remaining words were paired with each of the interpretations of the phonetically ambiguous word *h* (e.g., for the pun in Table, [“magician”, “hare”] is a legitimate word pair, as well as [“magician”, “hair”]). This resulted in 1460 distinct word pairs. Each subject saw 146 pairs of words in random order and were asked to rate how related each word pair is using a scale from 1 to 10. The average split-half correlation of the relatedness ratings was 0.916, suggesting that semantic relatedness is a reliable measure. Since it is difficult to obtain the relatedness rating of a word with itself, we used a free parameter and fit it to data (r=13). We used the average z-scored relatedness measure for each word pair to obtain and Google Web unigrams to obtain , thus computing for all word and meaning pairs.

**Results**


We computed an ambiguity and distinctiveness score for each of the 435 sentences. Ambiguity was significantly higher for pun sentences than non-pun sentences (F(1, 433) = 108.4, p < 0.0001), which suggests that our ambiguity measure successfully captures characteristics distinguishing puns from other phonetically ambiguous sentences. Distinctiveness differs marginally significantly across sentence types (F(1, 433) = 47.1, p < 0.1).

Figure shows the standard error ellipses for the two sentence types in the two-dimensional space of ambiguity and distinctiveness. Although there is a fair amount of noise in the predictors (likely due to simplifying assumptions, the need to use empirical measures of relatedness, and the inherent complexity of humor), we see that pun sentences (both identical and near homophone) tend to cluster at a space with higher ambiguity and distinctiveness, while non-pun sentences score lower on both measures. A linear regression model showed that both ambiguity and distinctiveness are significant predictors of funniness ratings across all 435 sentences. Together, the two predictors capture a modest but significant amount of the reliable variance in funniness ratings (F(2,432) = 76.79, r = 0.51, p < 0.0001; see Table).



|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Estimate | Std. Error | p-value |
| Intercept | -0.830 | 0.107 | < 0.0001 |
| Ambiguity | 1.899 | 0.212 | < 0.0001 |
| Distinctiveness | 0.568 | 0.082 | < 0.0001 |

We now examine the measures’ quantitative predictions of funniness within puns only. Ambiguity does not correlate with human ratings of funniness within the 145 pun sentences (r = 0.03, p > 0.05). However, distinctiveness ratings correlate significantly with human ratings of funniness within pun sentences (r = 0.28, p < 0.001). This suggests that while ambiguity distinguishes puns from non-puns, distinctiveness separates very funny puns from mediocre ones. (Which figure should we show?)



Besides predicting the funniness of a sentence, the model also reveals the critical features of each pun that make it amusing. For each sentence, we identified the set of words that is most likely to be meaningful given and each sentence meaning . Formally, we computed and . Table shows a group of identical-homophone sentences and a group of near-homophone sentences. Sentences in each group contain the same pair of candidate meanings for the homophone; however, they differ on ambiguity, distinctiveness, and funniness. Words that are most likely to be meaningful given sentence meaning are in red; words that are most likely given are in green; and words that are most likely given both meanings are in blue. Qualitatively, we observe that the two pun sentences (which are significantly funnier) have more distinct and balanced sets of meaningful words for each sentence meaning than other sentences in their groups. Non-pun sentences tend to have no words in support of the meaning that was not observed. Furthermore, the colorful words in each pun sentence—for example, the fact that magicians tend to perform magic tricks with hares, and people tend to be described as pulling out their hair when angry—are what one might intuitively use to explain why the sentence is funny. Besides producing quantitative predictions of funniness, the model also provides a natural way to explain which aspects of a pun make it funny.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Type | Sentence | Amb. | Dist. | Funni. |
| hare | hair | Pun | The magician got so mad he pulled his hare out. | 0.15 | 1.36 | 1.71 |
| Non | The hare ran rapidly through the fields. | 1.43E-5 | 1.07 | -0.40 |
| Non | Most people have lots of hair on their heads. | 9.47E-11 | 1.55 | -0.34 |
| tooth | truth | Pun | A dentist has to tell a patient the whole tooth. | 0.1 | 1.64 | 1.41 |
| Non | A dentist examines one tooth at a time. | 8.92E-5 | 1.23 | -0.45 |
| Non | She always speaks the truth. | 3.85E-10 | 0.72 | -0.46 |

**Discussion**

We presented a simple model of sentence processing and derived formal measures to predict human judgments of humor for a set of sentences. We showed that a noisy-channel model facilitates flexible context selection that enables a single series of words to express two ideas at once and give rise to humor. Future work may incorporate more sophisticated models of language understanding—ones that consider deeper semantic representations, the time course of sentence processing, and multi-sentence discourse—to derive corresponding measures for different types of jokes.

Our analysis contributes to humor theory by providing evidence that different factors may account for separate aspects of humor appreciation: ambiguity serves to distinguish humorous input from regular sentences, while distinctiveness predicts fine-grained degrees of funniness within humorous input. Assuming that our measures correspond to the incongruity-resolution model of humor, these results suggest that incongruity is necessary for humor, while the intensity of humor may depend on the degree to which the incongruity is resolved. Our work provides a theoretically motivated, computationally rigorous, and empirically validated account of humor, such that some day we can build machines that make us laugh and understand the appreciation for humor that makes us uniquely human.

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1. For simplification, our model disregards function words. Each in is a content word. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)