SOUTIONS PROBLEM SET 3

- (1) a) equivalent; h(f), or here, h(u) = 7u+2
 - b) equivalent; h(u) = Inu+1
 - c) not equivalent; it is not a monotonic transformation So, for example, consider bundles (X_1Y) : Bundle A = (2.3) and Bundle B = (3.2). If Utility is $U(X_1Y) = XY_1$, the consumer is indifferent between the bundles. However, if Utility is $U(X_1Y) = X^2Y_1$, the consumer strictly prefers B + A.
- (2) By the implicit function theorem, the MRSXY = $\frac{\partial u}{\partial v} \frac{\partial x}{\partial y} = \frac{\partial y}{\partial x} \frac{1}{u}$ i) u(x,y) = xy, $\frac{\partial u}{\partial y} = x$, so $u(x,y) = \frac{\partial u}{\partial y} \frac{\partial u}{\partial y} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial x} \frac{\partial u}{\partial y} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial y} \frac{\partial u}{\partial y} =$

 $AU_X = \frac{\partial U}{\partial X} = Y$, and at (2,1), $MU_X = 1$

(i) $U(X,Y) = 7 \times 7 + 2$ $\partial X = 7 + 2 + 3 = 7 \times 7 = 7$


(ii) $u(x,y) = \ln x + \ln y + 1$ $\frac{\partial u}{\partial x} = \frac{1}{x}$ $\frac{\partial u}{\partial y} = \frac{1}{y}$, so MRS_{xy} = $\frac{1}{xy} = \frac{1}{x}$ so MRS at (2,1) = $\frac{1}{2}$ Mu_x = $\frac{1}{x}$ and at (2,1), Mu_x = $\frac{1}{2}$

The MRS is invariant to order preserving transformations of the utility function, and therefore its value is based on ordinal, not cardinal properties. In contrast, the marginal utilities are not inverient to such transformations of utility, and they are therefore a cardinal property.

- (i.e. the MRS, the derivative of the indifference corns) is g(x/y), a known of the ratio y/x (or x/y), the function is nomothetic.
 - b) MRSXH when S=1 is d/β . $\sigma=\frac{1}{1-5}$ and at S=1, $\sigma \Rightarrow \infty$. This describes perfect substitutes.
 - C) This individual is indifferent between I unit at X and d/p units at Y; IX is a perfect substitute for d/p units at Y. They will therefore Spend their entire income on whichever is chapper: IX or d/p Y. IX costs lx and d/p Y costs 1/p Ry. We are given 1 X or d/p Y, IX costs lx and d/p Y costs 1/p Ry. We are given lx 4/p Py, so the consumer will spend look at income on good X may.

d) $U(\chi, \eta) = 3\chi^{3} + 3\eta^{3}$ $\sigma = \frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{3}} = \frac{3}{2}$ o measures $\frac{2\Delta(y/x)}{2\Delta Mes_{xy}}$ Since at the consumer of those, the consumer equates their MRS_{xy} = $^{9}/_{\text{Ry}}$, the 5% mercase in the price ratio => the MRS will have wereased 5% as well. So the percentage Δ m Y/x is approximately: $2\Delta(y/x) \approx 2\Delta(MRS_{xy})$ or $2\Delta(y/x) \approx 5(3/2) = 7.5$


e) $\mathcal{L} = 3x^{\frac{1}{3}} + 3x^{\frac{1}{3}} + x (60 - 4x - 14)$ $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x} = x^{\frac{1}{3}} - x + 0 \qquad \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x} = x^{\frac{1}{3}} - x = 0 \qquad \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x} = 60 - 4x - 1x = 0$ $\frac{x^{-\frac{1}{3}}}{x^{-\frac{1}{3}}} = \frac{x^{-\frac{1}{3}}}{x^{-\frac{1}{3}}} = \frac{x^{-\frac{1}{3}}}$



g) From above, we have $\lambda^{\frac{1}{2}} = \frac{\chi^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{1}{3}}}{4}$ $= \frac{5^{-\frac{1}{3}}}{4} = .0855 = \text{marginal obility}$ Historican at the optimism

(9) a) $\frac{1}{2}$ x = 3, or $\frac{1}{2}$ 3 x For every x, they consume 3 y.

b) Budget constraint: 10x+5y=200. But since they maintain Y=3x, we have $10x+5(3x)=200 \Rightarrow \boxed{x^x=8}$ and $\boxed{y^x=3(8)=2y}$



(3)
$$u(x,y) = 5x + 2y$$
 or any $u(x,y) = 2x + \beta y$ where $\frac{\alpha}{\beta} = 2.5$ will do.

than the perfect substitute of two units of X (which cost 2 x \$19 = \$18). Therefore the consumer will spend his entire income on the cheaper substitute (good Y). He can afford to buy a maximum amount of good Y of I/Ry, or 360/3 = 120 units. He buys 0 units of X.

optimel burdle indifference = 2.5

(wroner Han)

40

Automotive = Mes = 2.5

Anole: We want DX

ARSYX = DY

ANOTHER DY

(= 3)

(6,5) = 1/3 = MRS xy at (12,3)

We are also given that these bundles lie on the same IC

So, X and Y are perfect substitutes where 1/3 unit of Y

is a perfect substitute for I unit of X 1 u(x,y) = x+3y

for example. ICs are linear with slope = -1/3.

for example. It's are linear with slope = -1/3.

b) for Cobb. Douglas $u(x,y) = X^{2}y^{\beta}$, MRSxy = $u^{2}/u_{y} = \frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{16}\frac{1}{1$

(1) Given u(x,y), $MeS_{xy} = u_x/u_y$ (ratio of marginal utilities)

AMRS_{xy} = u_yu_{xx} - u_xu_y^2 Since we are given $u_{yx} = 0$,

we see that this expression is negative.

Strictly speaking as we man down along IC, Y is changing (decreasing) and by similar analysis to the above drasmy >0 so as we move along IC, X is increasing and Y is decreasing,

both of which cause MRS xy to decrease.

More formally when Uxy =0, Uxx <0 Uyy <0, the utility knowlon

cen be shown to be strictly quesi-conceve => convexity of I(s

(diminishing MRS) - see footnote 7 on pg. too of text.