## Problem Set I, Macroeconomics III University of Copenhagen, 2025

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## Exercise 1 – General equilibrium

Assume an agent lives for two periods, maximizing the utility function

$$U = \ln(c_0) + \beta \ln(c_1)$$

Each period, she receives an endowment  $y_t$ . She can save some of her period 1 endowment until period 2, or borrow against her period 2 endowment (she must always be able to pay it back). Hence, her dynamic budget constraints are

$$c_0 + a_0 = y_0$$
$$c_1 = y_1 + (1+r)a_0$$

Assume  $\beta$  and r are exogenously given initially.

- 1. Combine the two budget constaints and set up the Lagrangian for the maximization problem. Solve for the first order conditions by maximizing the Lagrangian with respect to  $c_0$ ,  $c_1$  and  $\lambda$ .
- 2. Obtain an Euler equation and give an intuition for it.
- 3. Solve for the values of  $c_0$ ,  $c_1$  and  $a_0$  as a function of the primitives of the model (i.e. r,  $\beta$ ,  $y_0$ ,  $y_1$ ).
- 4. What is the marginal propensity to consume out of income changes at time 0, i.e., if  $y_0$  changes, how much does the agent consume immediately, how much is saved?
- 5. Assume that  $y_1 = (1+g)y_0$ , implying that (1+g) represents the growth rate of the endowment. How does the demand for assets  $a_0$  depend on this growth rate? Give an intuitive explanation.

- 6. Now, solve for the **general equilibrium** interest rate of this problem. The government collects no taxes, implying it cannot provide bonds for the agent to save in. Thus,  $a_0 = 0$ . Solve for the interest rate that must prevail in order for markets to clear, i.e., for the agent to be **indifferent** between holding bonds or not. (*Hint: at this interest rate, the Euler equation holds, but the agent optimally chooses*  $a_0 = 0$ .)
- 7. Compare the results of the previous exercise for two cases: a) The economy is in a boom today and will return to it's steady state tomorrow, i.e., g < 0; and (b) the agent is very optimistic about the future, i.e., g > 0. What are the interest rates in each of the two cases. Give an intuitive explanation.

## Exercise 2 – CCRA and Log utility

1. Consider the following Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function

$$u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1 - \sigma}, \sigma > 0; \sigma \neq 1.$$

Calculate the coefficient of relative risk aversion

$$\varepsilon \equiv -\frac{du'(c)}{dc}\frac{c}{u'(c)} = -u''(c)\frac{c}{u'(c)}$$

2. Calculate the coefficient of relative risk aversion for the following utility function

$$u(c) = \ln(c)$$

3. According to L'Hopital's rule, we have that when  $f(x_0) = g(x_0) = 0$  and  $g'(x_0) \neq 0$ , then

$$\lim_{x \to x_0} \frac{f(x)}{g(x)} = \frac{f'(x_0)}{g'(x_0)}.$$

Use this to calculate

$$\lim_{\sigma \to 1} \frac{c^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1 - \sigma}$$

*Hint: Remember that*  $\frac{d}{dx}a^u = a^u \ln(a) \frac{du}{dx}$