John Quincy Adams on Latin American Independence

"The republican spirit of our country not only sympathizes with people struggling in a cause, so nearly if not precisely the same which was once our own, but it is working into indignation against the relapse of Europe into the opposite principle of monkery and despotism. And now, as at the early stage of the French Revolution, we have ardent spirits who are for rushing into the conflict, without looking to the consequence."

Writings of John Quincy Adams, ed. Worthington Chauncey Ford (New York: Macmillan, 1913–1917), vol. 6, pp. 275–76.

serving as secretary of state in 1815, wrote candidly of his bias toward the patriots: "When it is considered that the alternative is between governments, which, in the event of their independence, would be free and friendly, and the relation which, reasoning from the past, must be expected from them, as colonies, there is no cause to doubt in which scale our interest lies."[2]

Diplomatic, commercial, and cultural relations between the United States and Latin America in this early period were exploratory and uneven in part because events moved so rapidly. Agents from both the United States and the newly emerging republics passed back and forth, some in a formal capacity, others in semi-official roles, as the two worlds sought to learn more about each other and to exploit their mutual self-interests. Patriots and royalists alike were, for example, intensely interested in buying American arms, gunpowder, and foodstuffs such as wheat to keep their armies in the field. Meanwhile, American merchants—from Baltimore, New York, and New England, principally—were eager to sell the products of U.S. farms and workshops in exchange for Latin American silver and gold, always in short supply in North America. U.S. merchants did not particularly discriminate between patriots or royalists when it came to finding good markets.

One of the earliest U.S. agents to Latin America was Joel Roberts Poinsett, whom President James Madison sent to Buenos Aires, Chile, and Peru in 1810. Typically, Poinsett defended U.S. commercial interests against the English in Buenos Aires, and he involved himself deeply in partisan politics in Chile. Others like Poinsett were dispatched to Cuba, to Mexico, and to Venezuela, while the revolutionaries in Latin America sent such individuals as Diego de Saavedra from Buenos Aires and Telésforo de Orea from Venezuela to the United States to buy arms, flints, and other supplies to further the patriot cause.

By 1816, however, a combination of circumstances—among them the low fortunes of the patriot cause and the wariness of the United States with respect

about of the powerful European allies of Spain—forced the United States to maintain a public stance of strict neutrality and watchful waiting.

BOLÍVAR FREES COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA

Before leaving his Jamaica exile to take up arms against the royalists in Venezuela, Bolívar wrote a letter of remarkable candor and penetrating insight into the nature of the Latin American people, their aspirations, and their limitations. Frustrated by factionalism among the patriots, he championed a strong central government capable of dealing with crises. Bolívar concluded that the people were not ready for the political freedoms and the democratic, representative style of government that existed in the United States. Instead, they needed strong leadership to overcome all of the handicaps inherited from a colonial system that had deprived the Latin Americans of experience with self-government and free institutions.

In the letter, written in 1815, Bolívar stated, "Events in Tierra Firme [Venezuela and Colombia] have proved that wholly representative institutions are not suited to our character, customs and present knowledge."[3] Bolívar, the young, ardent champion of liberal, representative government deriving its sole powers from the political participation of the people, was becoming Bolívar the older, more experienced military realist, concerned with wielding power efficiently and successfully. It was an important transition that foreshadowed the Latin American dictators who would later dominate nineteenth-century governments.

In late 1815 Bolívar and his ragtag revolutionaries sailed to Haiti, where they were hosted by President Alexandre Pétion. Concerned that the fall of Napoleon and consolidation of the Holy Alliance might lead to European reconquest of the Americas, Pétion supported the cause of hemispheric independence. In exchange for Bolívar's promise to emancipate the slaves on the mainland, Pétion outfitted the revolutionaries with small boats, supplies, and arms. After two unsuccessful attempts, Bolívar finally created a beachhead in the Venezuelan llanos.

After returning to the continent in 1816, Bolívar began a five-year campaign to liberate Venezuela and Colombia. The length of this campaign spoke as much for the durability and popularity of the royalist cause as it did for the political and military maneuvering of Bolívar and his allies, like José Antonio Páez, caudillo of the llaneros and a linchpin in the liberation of Venezuela.

Three factors aided Bolívar in this grueling half-decade of war. First, he based his campaign deep in the heart of Venezuela's plains, guarded by vast malarial rivers and wide spaces, far from the centers of royalist power in Caracas and the coastal provinces. The llanos nourished the patriots in both a

Bolívar's "Jamaica Letter"

In the Jamaica Letter, cited at the beginning of chapter 2, Bolívar expressed himself candidly on the nature and form that governments should take:

> Until our compatriots acquire the political skills and virtues that distinguish our brothers to the north, entirely popular systems, far from being favorable to us, will, I greatly fear, lead to our ruin. . . . This nation would be named Colombia in fair and grateful tribute to the creator of our hemisphere. Its government might be modelled on the English, though in place of a king there would be an executive power elected for life, never hereditary, assuming that a republic is the goal. The senate or upper legislative body would be hereditary, and during times of political turmoil it would mediate between the frustrations of the people and unpopular governmental decrees. Finally, there would be a legislative body, freely elected, as unencumbered by restrictions as the English House of Commons.

David Bushnell, ed., *Simón Bolívar: El Libertador; Writings of Simón Bolívar,* trans. Frederick H. Fornoff (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 23, 26.

physical and spiritual sense, vast herds of cattle providing for the former and the sanctuary and safety of the llanos providing the latter. Second, professional English and Irish soldiers, casting about for employment after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, found their way into Bolívar's army, and these legionnaires added a constancy and experience that helped sustain the army. Third, Bolívar's genius and charisma held together and inspired a situation of incredible complexity that called for consummate tact in some instances and ruthless discipline in others.

By 1819, and still unable to expel the royalists from Venezuela, Bolívar fashioned a new strategy. He struck audaciously across the Andes into Colombia. The results were spectacular: by boldly switching the main theater of campaign, he surprised the Spaniards in Bogotá. This lightning campaign led to the liberation of Colombia. His army defeated the royalists at the Battle of Boyacá on August 7, 1819, and three days later Bolívar entered Bogotá. The viceroy fled and Colombia was free. With this newfound base of independent support, for the next two years Bolívar maneuvered to oust the royalists from Venezuela. He finally accomplished this during a successful campaign at the Battle of Carabobo on June 24, 1821. Spanish power was now broken across all of northern South America. Venezuela and Colombia were declared independent as one nation, Gran Colombia, by the Congress of Angostura in 1819. Two years later, a congress met at Cúcuta and wrote a constitution to govern the new nation. The new president of Gran Colombia was, naturally enough, Simón Bolívar.

The constitution was a mixture of liberal and conservative sentiment typical of national charters being written by newly independent nations throughout

Figure 3.1 Reprint of a painting by Venezuelan artist Martín Tovar y Tovar depicting the signing of the Venezuelan Act of Independence, with Francisco de Miranda making a speech. Courtesy Library of Congress.

Latin America. It abolished Indian tribute, guaranteed civil freedoms, and provided for the gradual abolition of slavery. But it also mandated a strong president and limited the vote to literate males who owned substantial property. Bolívar, however, did not linger to govern the new nation. He rode south to liberate Ecuador from royalist control and to incorporate it into the nation of New Granada.

In early 1821 Bolívar's brilliant lieutenant, General Antonio José de Sucre, preceded his commanding officer into Ecuador and Bolívar soon followed. Through a strategy of envelopment, they forced the royalists to yield. While Bolívar battled through the royalist strongholds of Pasto and Popayán in southern Colombia, Sucre struck at Quito. Their campaign culminated on the slopes of the extinct volcano of Pichincha, which overlooks Quito. There, on May 24, 1822, Sucre defeated the royalists and freed Ecuador. Bolívar proceeded to the coastal city of Guayaquil to meet San Martín, who had sailed up from his campaigns in Peru.

COMPLETION OF RIO DE LA PLATA'S INDEPENDENCE

As Bolívar had been fighting to defeat the royalists in northern South America, José de San Martín had been busy building patriot support and strategy in the

south. His strategy was simple. From the province of Mendoza in western Argentina, he built his forces and prepared for a secret crossing of the high Andes into Chile to take the royalists by surprise. He knew that Peru was the center of Spanish control in South America, with royalists able to sustain their power using the profits from the silver mines. For this reason, no frontal assault on Lima or the mining district in Bolivia would ever succeed. By the same token, Spanish power had to be destroyed in Peru, or else the other revolutions would never be safe.

San Martín's plan was to hit at the heart of Spanish support through a different path. He planned to capture Chile by surprise and then send an amphibious expedition to blockade Lima. In the meantime, led by Buenos Aires, elites formally and finally declared Argentina independent on July 9, 1816. Their first constitution, ratified in 1819, provided for a strong central government and favored Buenos Aires at the expense of the provinces. While Argentina's struggle to retain some of its distant provinces, such as Uruguay, continued, independence for the country was nevertheless settled.

SAN MARTÍN, O'HIGGINS, AND THE LIBERATION OF CHILE

San Martín knew that his invasion force was extremely vulnerable while crossing the Andes. All the passes were high in the Andes and completely snowbound except during the middle of the summer, which south of the equator is in January. Even a small defending force could annihilate his troops. His only hope was to keep the exact timing and location of his attack from the Spanish. San Martín managed to fashion an army of five thousand, mostly Argentines and Chileans, including black slaves who were offered their freedom in return for service in the cause of Latin American liberty, a promise that San Martín kept.

While building his "Army of the Andes," San Martín was joined by the Chilean independence fighter Bernardo O'Higgins, who had fled to Argentina after a crushing defeat by royalist forces at the Battle of Rancagua in 1814. In early 1817, San Martín and his forces crossed the high, freezing passes at several different points to confuse the royalists. The ensuing campaign proved the genius of San Martín as an organizer and soldier. Exact timing and attention to detail brought his army into Chile with surprise and coordination, while his strict discipline and the devotion of his soldiers kept order and enthusiasm high. With Chileans fighting alongside him, San Martín defeated the royalists at the Battle of Chacabuco and rode triumphantly into the capital city of Santiago in February 1817. The royalists rallied in southern Chile, and the campaign continued until April 1818, when another victory on the Plains of Maipo near Santiago finally freed Chile. Leaving O'Higgins to take the glory and be named supreme dictator of Chile, San Martín next turned to Peru.

Figure 3.2 An 1821 painting of General José de San Martín in full military dress, done by Afro-Peruvian portraitist José Gil de Castro, who himself enlisted for a time in San Martín's Army of the Andes. Courtesy Bastique/Flickr.

FORTRESS PERU: THE LAST ROYALIST BASTION

Peru's Creole elite, which held the keys to revolution and independence, were a fickle lot. Not wishing to give up power in any way, they flocked indecisively between royalists and patriots, searching for a guarantee to their future. San Martín turned to this politically charged situation in Peru in August 1820 at the head of a large expeditionary force of Chileans and Argentines. They traveled on ships of the Chilean fleet commanded by a former English naval officer, Thomas Cochrane.

Successful warfare along the west coast of South America demanded control of the sea. Cochrane and other English and American officers and sailors provided the backbone of the expeditionary force. It enabled San Martín to transport his army to the Peruvian coast in 1820 and begin his campaign to liberate Peru.

San Martín

Commander William Bowles described his friend San Martín as "tall, strongly formed, with a dark complexion and marked countenance. He is perfectly well bred . . . simple and abstemious." Bowles further noted that "he was liberal in his instincts, knowledgeable and widely read, with a fanatical devotion to work, yet without personal ambition or acquisitiveness."

Bowles to Croker, February 14, 1818, in Gerald S. Graham and R.A. Humphreys, eds., *The Navy and South America, 1807–1823: Correspondence of the Commanders-in-Chief on the South American Station* (London, 1962), p. 227, quoted in John Lynch, *The Spanish-American Revolutions: 1808–1826,* 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1986), p. 139.

Cochrane wanted to attack Callao and Lima and deal the royalist army a decisive blow. San Martín, by contrast, wanted to gradually attract Peruvian Creoles to the cause of independence. He was aided when in 1820, Ferdinand VII was forced to accept the liberal 1812 Constitution, leading conservative Creoles in Lima to turn to independence as a conservative cause. By 1821 San Martín appeared to be successful, winning the allegiance of many Peruvians. The Spanish, nonetheless, proved intransigent, unwilling to bargain even when San Martín offered to place a prince of Spain at the head of Peru, keeping it a monarchy. San Martín was a monarchist, having viewed the chaos caused by attempts at broadly representative government, but he was totally committed to independence. Faced with growing patriot support for San Martín and blockaded at sea by Cochrane's forces, the viceroy of Peru, José de la Serna, evacuated Lima.

San Martín entered Lima in early July and proclaimed Peru's independence on July 28. However, independence was not yet won. The royalist troops still numbered nearly seventeen thousand and controlled the silver-mining district. Although they were harassed in the highlands by bands of montoneros, they had not been defeated on the battlefield. With his support falling away and factionalism once again on the rise for various reasons, San Martín sailed up to Guayaquil in 1822 to meet with Bolívar. The two greatest Latin American liberators met in July. For Bolívar, it was a triumphant encounter, fresh as he was from victory. For San Martín, it was the bittersweet end of a long campaign that had begun in 1814 when he was named general of the Argentine armies. After their meeting, San Martín withdrew from the field and abdicated leadership to Bolívar. But between 1814 and 1822, the brilliant Argentine soldier had matched Bolívar's record with campaigns and victories in Argentina, Chile, and Peru that were no less grand and enduring in the minds and hearts of those people. Martín went into exile in Europe and he died in 1850 without ever returning to the continent that he had helped liberate.

Why did San Martín bow out? We will never know for certain, but historians generally agree that San Martín recognized the futility of competing with the charismatic Bolívar. There were other equally compelling reasons. Bolívar would not tolerate monarchy in Latin America, and San Martín could not reverse that deeply ingrained commitment in the Liberator. Bolívar was at the height of his powers, having just freed Ecuador; San Martín had just left a quarreling, faction-ridden Peru with little hope of enforcing order on the nation. San Martín suffered from an obscure illness and had become addicted to narcotics to relieve the pain. Without aid from Bolívar, his cause was probably lost. Nevertheless, San Martín, "the Protector of Peru," remains revered by millions of Latin Americans today who continue to recognize his bold actions and achievements in pursuit of Latin American independence.

MEXICO: MARCHING TO DIFFERENT DRUMMERS

While Bolívar, San Martín, and their lieutenants completed their pincer movement on royalist Peru, Mexico was marching on the road to independence at its own pace. As frequently happened during the Wars of Independence, foreign events triggered changes in the Americas that proved lasting. In this case, political changes in Spain set off a reaction in Mexico that finally culminated in its independence. Ironically, the leaders of Mexican independence were conservative Creoles—most unlikely revolutionaries. But the old adage that reminds us that politics makes for strange bedfellows was richly borne out in the Mexican independence movement.

In 1820, liberals in Spain forced Ferdinand VII to restore the Constitution of 1812 and to call the Cortes, the Spanish parliament, into session. The Cortes attacked religious institutions, striking directly at the vested interests of the conservative Creole elite in Mexico. In the same liberal vein, enlarging the franchise, or the right to vote, struck at Creole control of political power. Other acts undermined their economic privileges. The result was predictable. As in Lima, conservative Creoles in Mexico rejected the new liberal reforms and began to look more favorably on independence.

Mexico had been generally quiet since Morelos's capture and execution in late 1815. A policy of amnesty by Spanish authorities and the tendency of Mexican Creoles to desire tranquility and order after the threat of social disorder brought by Father Hidalgo and his followers both helped keep the peace. This delicate balance was upset in 1820 with the liberal revolt in Spain. Mexican Creoles did not accept the unbridled attacks on their privileges, their power, and the church. Into the act stepped a well-born Creole, Agustín de Iturbide, an ardent Catholic and conservative who had fought against independence since 1810. Now he intended to lead the revolution against the liberals in control of Spain.

His Highness, Emperor Agustín I of Mexico

"With the throne thus occupied, the congress set to work, not on the conspicuous demands of the Mexican nation but on defining proper etiquette and protocol in an obvious attempt to emulate the greatest imperial regime the world had ever known. . . . the congress refined the organizational structure of the monarchy, declaring it to be hereditary and assigning titles of nobility to his immediate family. May 19, the day of Iturbide's proclamation, was declared a national holiday, as were his birthday and the birthdays of his children.

"The greatest preparations of all were made for the official coronation ceremonies in July . . . The efforts were all based on a French model, and the congress hired a French baroness who had designed the costumes for Napoleon Bonaparte some twenty-two years before. . . . jewelry was borrowed, thrones were erected, banners and flags were hung from church towers, and teams of peasants were engaged to scour the streets. The citizenry of the capital was being prepared for the most pretentious spectacle ever to occur in Mexico City . . .

"While the outer trappings of the empire were pretentious to an absurd degree, they were not entirely without purpose and meaning. Iturbide's understanding of Mexico's past, while by no means profound, was acute enough. He realized that the entire governmental system of the colonial period had been predicated upon loyalty to the king and the crown."

Michael C. Meyer, William L. Sherman, and Susan M. Deeds, *The Course of Mexican History,* 10th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 232–33.

In late 1820 Iturbide led a royalist army into the field to destroy the last vestiges of a revolutionary band led by Vicente Guerrero. This old fighter had kept the faith with Hidalgo's and Morelos's revolution. Instead of warring on Guerrero, however, Iturbide joined forces with him. He rallied other Creoles to the cause of independence for Mexico under his banner, which he called the Plan of Iguala. If Spain could not guarantee the sanctity of the church or the safety, property, privileges, and powers of the Creoles, then Mexicans would take matters into their own hands. Iturbide was the instrument of this movement that blossomed into independence.

Aimed at quelling any fears that conservatives or Creoles might have, the Plan of Iguala is often referred to as the Plan of the Three Guarantees, in this case of religion, independence, and unity. It called for the restoration of the church and all its rights and privileges, independence under a constitutional monarchy, and equal treatment of Creoles and Spaniards in the new nation. On September 28, 1821, Mexico's Creoles formally declared independence. But,

finding no suitable European prince to assume the throne of the newly independent Mexican empire, Iturbide had himself declared emperor less than a year later. The reign of Agustín I was not, however, destined to last very long. Iturbide was unable to cope with the problems of a newly independent nation. Republicans in the new Congress distrusted him. Furthermore, Iturbide's excessive spending as he acquired the trappings of monarchy was repugnant to many.

When Iturbide suspended Congress, his irritated opponents rose in revolt, rallied by the rising young commander of the Veracruz garrison, Antonio López de Santa Anna. Iturbide tumbled from power in 1823, and a republican constitution was enacted in 1824. An old revolutionary, Guadalupe Victoria, was elected the first president of Mexico. Mexico was now an independent constitutional republic.

CENTRAL AMERICA FOLLOWS THE LEADER

Independence came to Central America almost as an afterthought. There was virtually no independence movement until events in Mexico in 1821 forced the issue. Guatemala, the largest of the Central American colonies and the seat of government for the entire isthmus, declared independence on September 15, 1821. The next year, Central American leaders joined Iturbide's new Mexican empire as Spanish authority crumbled throughout the Americas. When the union with Mexico failed, Guatemala withdrew, and in July 1823 the United Provinces of Central America became independent of Mexico as well. The United Provinces included the future nations of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.

The principal issues in the new Central American nation, which was destined to last only to 1838, were largely regional and local. The Creoles "came to blows over Church-State relations, fiscal policies, office holding, economic planning, trade policy, and general philosophy of government"—everything, it seemed, except independence.[4] Though independence came easily, Central America was in no way spared from the instability and conflict of the 1820s and 1830s that afflicted most of its Latin American neighbors.

FINAL PATRIOT VICTORY IN PERU AND BOLIVIA

When San Martín left Peru in 1822, the road to final victory was opened to Bolívar. Yet even the imperious and commanding Liberator hesitated to take up the challenge of Peru, where quarreling Creole factions in the north and a strong and unbowed royalist army in the south made the road rocky and

Bolívar's Constitution

"The Bolivian Constitution pleased no one. Sucre, the only leader who ever attempted to act under its authority, damned it roundly. Humboldt dismissed it as an inexplicable madness. Scholars have concluded that it united all the defects of all political systems. Víctor Andrés Belaúnde has observed that it took life tenure from absolutism, the demagoguery of electoral assemblies from democracy, and absolute financial centralization from unitarianism. It combined the worst of centralism with the worst of federalism. British constitutionalism was scrapped in favor of Napoleonic despotism or democratic imperialism."

John J. Johnson and Doris M. Ladd, eds., *Simón Bolívar and Spanish-American Independence: 1793–1830* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1968), pp. 96–97.

dangerous. Bolívar traveled to Lima in September 1823, preceded by a portion of his army commanded by the ever loyal and talented General José Antonio de Sucre.

Bolívar soon accepted the title of dictator offered by a Peruvian Congress desperately in need of leadership and unity above all else. Since San Martín had declared Peru independent in 1821, some members of Peru's Creole aristocracy, like the marquis of Torre Tagle, had changed sides three times, even turning Lima over to the royalists at one point. Bolívar called Peru a "chamber of horrors" where loyalty to independence was often determined by self-interest and where today's Creole patriot was apt to metamorphose into a royalist by morning.[5] Yet his strong hand stayed the centrifugal forces long enough to free Peru by 1824.

Bolívar and Sucre had fashioned a formidable army, especially a seasoned cavalry drawn from gauchos of Argentina, *huasos* (cowboys) of Chile, and llaneros of Venezuela and Colombia. The royalists themselves were divided between those who supported the liberal Cadiz Constitution and reforms of 1820 and those who supported the absolutism of Ferdinand VII, who had been restored to full power in late 1823. The patriot army under Sucre and Bolívar met the royalists under General José de Canterac on the high plains of Junín on August 6, 1824, and the patriot cavalry carried the day. Lances and swords thrust and slashed in the cold, treacherous Battle of Junín, where not one shot was fired. The victory at Junín paved the way for one last momentous battle between royalists and patriots on the continent of South America. On December 8, 1824, Sucre's army defeated Viceroy José de la Serna's royalists at the Battle of Ayacucho. Effective Spanish power on the continent of South America was over. Peru was free.

Fresh from his victory at Ayacucho, Sucre traveled to Upper Peru to liberate the highland province, which soon emerged as the independent nation of

Manuela Sáenz, The Liberator of the Liberator

Bolívar was accompanied in much of his work and travels in the 1820s by Manuela Sáenz, a woman deeply committed to the patriot cause. Though she was already in a marriage to a much older Englishman, she courted Bolívar instantly, and many said outrageously, when she met him. She left her husband behind and followed Bolívar to Lima and on to various military campaigns, playing a prominent social and political role along the way. Known as the Liberator of the Liberator, Sáenz was much more than Bolívar's mistress. In 1828, she saved Bolívar from an assassination plot in Bogotá, and vehemently attacked his enemies. She defended him and his faction even after his death—and paid a dear price for it. In 1833, Sáenz was exiled to the small fishing port of Paita in northern Peru, where she lived simply, selling sweets, until her death in 1856. She was criticized long after her death for her scandalous affair and for what many saw as political activities inappropriate for a woman at the time. However, in recent years, she has received a more positive reception for her actions. Countries such as Argentina and Colombia have erected monuments and museums in her honor, and in 2007, Ecuador awarded Sáenz the rank of general in its army for her military contributions to the independence movements. In 2010, her "symbolic remains" were reburied next to Bolívar's grave in Venezuela at a state ceremony attended by the presidents of both Venezuela and Ecuador.

Despite the recent revival of her memory, for more than a century after her death, stories of Sáenz were most often critical of her behavior: she was outspoken, wore men's clothing as she rode into military battle, and of course had an extramarital affair. In an essay by Peruvian writer Ricardo Palma, she is compared to Rosa Campusano, the lover of San Martín and dubbed "La Protectora." Palma used oral traditions, chronicles from the 1820s, and a good deal of imagination to write the essay. Read it for what it tells us about Sáenz and Campusano, but also about traditional views about women and femininity:

"Because I had the good fortune of knowing both Bolívar's favorite lady, and San Martín's, as well, I can establish cardinal differences between them. Physically and morally, they were opposites.

"I saw in Rosa Campusano a woman with the delicate sentiments and weaknesses proper in her sex. In Rosa's heart there was a trove of tears and tenderness, and God even allowed her to become a mother, something He denied Manuela Sáenz. Doña Manuela, in contrast, was a mistake of Nature, the spirit and ambition of a man in a woman's body. Like tough men, she couldn't cry, only get angry.

"La Protectora loved home life and the comforts of the city, while La Libertadora felt at home in the hurly-burly of a barracks or bivouac. The former never went out unless it was in a carriage, and the latter could be seen in the streets of Quito or Lima riding a stallion—astride, like a man—wearing a red military

uniform with gold trim and white pants, escorted by two lancers of Bolívar's Colombian army.

"Sáenz renounced her gender, while Campusano was proud to be a woman, fussing over the fashion of her garments. Sáenz put on whatever the seamstress gave her. Doña Manuela wore only two small gold and coral earrings, while Camusano dazzled the senses with her profusion of fine jewelry. Sáenz, educated by nuns in the austerity of their convent, was a freethinker. Campusano, raised amid agitation that challenged the church, was a devout believer.

"Sáenz could control her nerves, remaining calm and energetic amid flying bullets and charging lancers, or facing bloody swords and assassins' daggers. Campusano fainted as the skirt-wearing tribe will do when frightened by the ominous hoot of an owl or the squealing escape of a little mouse.

"The one perfumed her handkerchief with the most exquisite English extracts. The other used masculine verbena water."

Ricardo Palma, *Bolívar en las tradiciones peruanas* (Madrid: Compañía Ibero-Americana de Publicaciones, 1930), pp. 115–20, taken from Sarah C. Chambers and John Charles Chasteen, eds., *Latin American Independence: An Anthology of Sources* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2010), pp. 226–27.

Bolivia. The royalists had very little choice but to yield to the conquering patriots. A battle at Tumusla on April 1, 1825, confirmed the hopelessness of their cause. The royalists capitulated and Bolivia too was free. In July 1825 a congress convened in Chuquisaca to decide on the country's future. It formally declared independence on August 6 and named the country after the Liberator himself. Bolívar traveled to the new nation late in the year and made a triumphal procession. He then retired to Lima and drew up one of the most extraordinary documents to emerge from the revolutionary period: the Bolivian Constitution of 1826.

In that constitution Bolívar sought to reconcile his old liberal values with his instincts for order and authority, so severely tested in Peru. At the heart of the constitution was a president named for life, who controlled the army. Other features included the guarantees of civil rights; a strong, independent judiciary; and ministers responsible to the national legislature. While Bolívar had great faith in the constitution, it has been criticized over the years as an awkward, unworkable instrument, a noble effort that strove and ultimately failed to provide Bolivia with the foundations for its life as a new nation. It combined contradictory and unfamiliar elements, and faced great opposition as the various forces in the region soon began to pull apart amid factionalism and political chaos.

BRAZIL TAKES ITS OWN PATH TO INDEPENDENCE

Brazil was a colony of Portugal rather than of Spain, a difference that charted a course to independence quite distinct from that followed by the Spanish colonies. In 1807 Napoleon's armies, already in Spain, surged across the Iberian Peninsula to Portugal, reaching the capital of Lisbon only four days after crossing the frontier with Spain. The Portuguese could not resist militarily. The French issued an ultimatum to Prince Regent Dom João to surrender, but instead the royal family and the entire Portuguese court fled by sea on ships of the English and Portuguese fleets.

The fleets ferried João and more than ten thousand courtiers, bureaucrats, officials and family members to Brazil. Rio de Janeiro became the de facto capital of the Portuguese empire in 1808. Six years later, when the queen died, the prince became King João VI in his own right. He declared Brazil to be a kingdom equal to Portugal, rather than a colony. Brazil was thus spared the brutal warfare that was under way in Spanish America.

Along with the court had come not only equality with Portugal but also the privilege of freer trade and the rapid elevation of Rio from a provincial backwater to an imperial capital. Its new status warranted new institutions, like a botanical garden, a naval academy, a medical school, a royal museum, the nation's first newspaper, and other accouterments of civilization. João was happy in Brazil. In 1821, however, seven years after Napoleon had been forced by British, Portuguese, and Spanish troops to abandon his invasion of the Iberian peninsula, João was forced to return to Portugal to preserve his crown. He left his son Pedro as prince regent in Brazil. Soon, rising nationalism pushed Brazil toward independence.

The presence of the Portuguese court in Brazil between 1808 and 1821 had not been an entirely happy experience for the Brazilians, and even less so for the Portuguese who remained behind in Europe. Many Brazilian landowners and urban elites welcomed the monarchy, particularly the stability it brought as the rest of the Americas waged wars of independence. But with the court also came thousands of Portuguese officials who replaced many Brazilian administrators and officials. In most matters, João favored Portuguese advisors at the expense of Brazilians. And new taxes to fund the growing bureaucracy and the emerging power of Rio de Janeiro left even more Brazilians dissatisfied with the Portuguese monarch. Many Brazilians soon began to clamor for a constitutional monarchy or even a republic. Discontent welled up in scattered revolts that were put down by King João's forces. The final break with Portugal was triggered by a crisis brought on by the Portuguese Cortes.

In 1821 the Portuguese Cortes, to reestablish Portugal's primacy over Brazil, effectively returned Brazil to colonial status and ordered Prince Pedro to return to Lisbon. Brazilian Creoles, led by José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva and by Pedro's wife, Princess Leopoldina, rejected these humiliating measures and urged Pedro to lead the independence movement in Brazil.

Pedro was already thinking along the same lines. Before João left Brazil, he counseled his son to do that very thing if Brazil decided on independence. On September 7, 1822, Pedro issued his famous "Grito de Ipiranga." Traveling by the banks of the Ipiranga River, he received news from the Portuguese Cortes once again challenging his rule. He then apparently ripped the Portuguese colors off his uniform, drew his sword, and shouted, "The hour is now! Independence or death!" before sheathing his sword and continuing his journey. Portuguese garrisons scattered throughout Brazil resisted the independence movements for a while. Lord Cochrane, the English officer who had served the Chilean and Peruvian causes of independence, led the Brazilian Navy as it fended off Portuguese counterattacks. By early 1824, after forcing the Portuguese to surrender, Brazil was in effect free.

Pedro convened a constitutional assembly in 1823 to write a charter for the new empire. Radicals used the body as a forum to denounce monarchy and to limit the emperor to the role of a figurehead. Pedro disbanded the assembly and formed a smaller one to write a constitution more to his liking, which it did in 1824. The new constitution was very conservative and provoked consternation among freedom-minded Brazilian Creoles. A republican-inspired revolt broke out again, in the northeastern state of Recife, but was crushed.

By comparison with Spanish America, Brazil had a relatively peaceful transition to independence. Pedro's presence helped set the stage for a unified and politically stable Brazil for much of the rest of the nineteenth century. Given the dismal record of chaos, caudillos, and militarism in Spanish America, it was no small or insignificant legacy to have a ready-made and generally acceptable member of a royal house on the throne of Brazil in 1822.

U.S. RECOGNITION AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE

The halting but inexorable progress of the Wars of Independence between 1817 and 1824 naturally attracted the attention of the United States. This was the formative period in U.S.-Latin American relations, and much of the future of those relations was foreshadowed by the early intercourse between these two parts of the Americas. Although the United States and Latin America shared the bonds of geography (the Western Hemisphere) and colonial origin (descended partly from European settlers), they were strikingly dissimilar in other ways, such as ethnic makeup, political and economic institutions, and religious patterns. Much of the history of U.S.-Latin American relations reflected these dissimilarities, which were accentuated as the nineteenth century advanced.

Of the many issues between the United States and Latin America in the early period, none was more significant than that of recognition. The United States wished to encourage the twin virtues of independence and republican-

ism in Latin America but had to proceed deliberately and cautiously so as not to antagonize Spain.

In 1819 Spain ceded Florida to the United States according to the Adams-Onís (or Transcontinental) Treaty. The United States gave up its claims to Texas, acquired Spain's claim to the Oregon Territory north of the Forty-Second Parallel, and paid Spain $5 million as well. The treaty was not ratified until 1821. Meanwhile Spain's colonies were breaking out in rebellion. While the United States negotiated with Spain, it would have been awkward to recognize the independence of Spain's former colonies. Besides, until 1821 to 1822, independence had not been clearly won throughout Latin America.

The Wars of Independence were an ongoing process rather than an accomplished fact, and President James Monroe (1817–1825) and his secretary of state, John Quincy Adams, waited until 1822 to recognize the independence of Mexico, Gran Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Argentina. In doing so, they set a precedent of unity and solidarity with their fellow American nations.

Recognition by the United States came none too soon. Early in 1823, France, backed by a reactionary bloc of European monarchies (the Holy Alliance), marched troops into Spain to overthrow the liberals and to restore Ferdinand VII's conservative, monarchical regime. Many feared that this was the first step toward the restoration of Spain's empire in the Americas. The specter of French armies crossing the Atlantic to help Spanish royalists crush the newly independent Latin American nations was abhorrent to most Americans and unacceptable to a great many English people as well.

Late in 1823 President Monroe read a remarkable address before Congress. Although not much noticed and largely unenforceable at the time, it set the tone for U.S.-Latin American relations for the next two centuries. The British foreign secretary, George Canning, paved the way for Monroe's address by actively opposing the French effort to restore royalist power in Latin America. Canning and the British cabinet wished to preserve the independence of the new nations, whose open ports and markets welcomed English merchants and English goods. It was certainly not in the English interests to allow a restoration of Spain's monopolistic empire in the Americas, and Canning made his views known to the Americans candidly.

Russian czar Alexander I also played a role in the formation of the Monroe Doctrine. From their colony of Alaska, the Russians claimed a wide sphere of influence south into the Oregon country—a sphere that challenged U.S. claims in the same region. The establishment of Russian trading posts as far south as California especially provoked the ire of the Americans. They were dead set against a Russian czar who championed despotic monarchy instead of those principles so dear to Americans—the ideals of revolution and republicanism—and a Russian regime that threatened the more practical issues of profits and territorial security.

Monroe Doctrine

"The American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Powers" (the noncolonization principle), and "the political system of the allied powers [the Holy Alliance] is essentially different . . . from that of America. . . . We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintain it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European Power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States."

Transcript of Monroe Doctrine, President Monroe's Seventh Annual Message to Congress, December 2, 1823, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc = 23&page = transcript.

Buttressed by the knowledge that the British would use their navy, the greatest in the world, to oppose the French, and feeling the urgency to respond to the Russian threat, Monroe elaborated two basic principles in his address to Congress. He declared that henceforth the American continents were closed to future colonization by European powers (the noncolonization principle) and that the American continents and political systems were unique and different from the European systems. Consequently, the United States would resist any attempt by the old European monarchies (Spain, France, and Russia, for example) to enforce or expand their systems of government in the New World.

Although the doctrine was specifically written to warn off the Russians and the French, its principles became cornerstones of future U.S.-Latin American relations. The Western Hemisphere was asserted as unique, and the United States vowed to protect the hemisphere's independence and to fend off European interference. Some Latin American nations, such as Colombia and Brazil, officially endorsed the doctrine. Others were negative or coolly indifferent. The Creole elites of Buenos Aires, much under the influence of the English, and many Mexicans, who feared the territorial ambitions of their neighbor to the north, had little taste for Monroe's doctrine.

In this new era, Latin Americans, especially Simón Bolívar, took just as much initiative as President Monroe to define the international relations of the new countries. Latin Americans sought some unity even as they fought for their independence as separate nations from Spain. This unity has been labeled "pan-Americanism." Its origins lay in the Wars of Independence period and, very specifically, are associated with the vision of Simón Bolívar. In 1824 Bolívar called for a meeting of all Latin American nations to consider matters of security and possible confederation. Bolívar acted on the old proverb that "in unity there is strength," and pan-Americanism was the expression of that ideal. After two years of preparation, the delegates gathered in Panama, although Bolívar himself did not attend.

The Congress of Panama was notable for two reasons. One, it was the first of many efforts by Latin American nations to act in concert to defend their rights and to develop international mechanisms to solve common problems. Two, it failed to accomplish anything because, with the exception of Gran Colombia, no other nation ratified the treaty that emerged from the congress. One must recall that international treaties and agreements reached at such congresses and conferences ultimately must be ratified at home. In fact, not all Latin American nations had been represented at the congress, with delegations coming only from Mexico, Central America, Gran Colombia, and Peru. Although the United States was invited as well, the Americans were tardy in naming a delegation, instead arguing over the nature of the Congress of Panama and how much or how little the United States should commit to international agreements. One American delegate died en route, and the other discovered that the congress had ended before he even reached it! The Congress of Panama was also frustrated by the factionalism and jealousies that were painfully apparent to those who shared a vision of pan-Americanism with Bolívar. For over a century, it remained an ideal difficult to translate into action.

In the next chapter we will analyze the meaning of independence. Latin America strode into a new world filled with both promise and uncertainty. The promise was the chance to create new and improved ways of life as independent nations. Yet, the legacies of the colonial past were not so easily discarded, and these same nations soon struggled with the uncertainty of how to incorporate these legacies into their visions for the future.

CONCLUSIONS AND ISSUES

The second half of the Wars of Independence occurred between 1816 and 1826. In many ways, the stage was set by the first half of the wars, from 1810 to 1816. The declarations were made then, the issues clarified, the battles joined, and the differences frozen into hatreds by the passions of war. Even though Spain temporarily prevailed again by 1815—of course with a few exceptions, Argentina the most significant—the embers of the revolutions were never doused.

From Argentina in the south and Venezuela in the north, San Martín and Bolívar led patriot armies to victory, meeting in the Ecuadorian port city of Guayaquil in 1822 to determine how to liberate the last great Spanish royalist stronghold of Peru. And in Mexico, conservative Creoles such as Iturbide persuaded old radical leaders like Guerrero to join them in the final overthrow of Spanish authority.

The United States responded to the Latin American independence movements with enthusiastic support. Recognition was one of the most effective means of support, while the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 expressed both short- and long-term goals of U.S. policy toward Latin America. The Congress of Panama of 1826 attempted to formulate a vision of pan-Americanism based on Latin American solidarity and cultural affinity.

At the end of the Wars of Independence, the patriots looked back on their recent achievements with immense pride. They had thrown off a three-hundred-year-old colonial rule and moved the countries of Mexico, Central America, and South America to independence. As they would soon learn, however, the legacy of the long colonial rule, and of the violent fifteen-year wars, was mixed.

Discussion Questions

How did the United States view the independence movements in their early years, and what factors shaped how the U.S. interacted with the independence movements? How and why did this change by the 1820s, and what was the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine?

What type of government did Bolívar envision for post-independence Latin America and why?

What factors changed the tide of the independence movements in favor of the patriots after Bolívar returned from exile in Jamaica?

What factors made winning the struggle for independence in Peru so difficult for the patriots?

How did events in Spain and Portugal affect the independence movements?

How did the Plan of Iguala help the independence fighters build a broad coalition in favor of independence in Mexico?

How and why was Brazil's independence struggle so different from that of Spanish America?

What was pan-Americanism and why did it fail?

Timeline

1815	Bolívar in exile in Jamaica
July 9, 1816	Argentina becomes independent
February 1817	Battle of Chacabuco
August 7, 1819	Battle of Boyacá
1819	Creation of Gran Colombia
1820	Ferdinand VII forced to accept liberal Constitution of 1812
June 24, 1821	Battle of Carabobo

[illegible]	Peru declares independence
[illegible], 1821	Mexico becomes independent
[illegible]	Meeting of Bolívar and San Martín
[illegible] 1822	Grito de Ipiranga
[illegible]	Reign of Emperor Agustín I in Mexico
[illegible]	Ferdinand VII restored to full power
[illegible]	Monroe Doctrine
[illegible], 1824	Battle of Ayacucho
[illegible] 1825	Bolivia becomes independent
[illegible]	Congress of Panama

Keywords

[illegible]-Onís Treaty
[illegible] of the Andes
[illegible] of Ayacucho
[illegible] Constitution of 1826
[illegible]
[illegible] of Angostura
Congress of Panama
Grito de Ipiranga
Jamaica Letter
Monroe Doctrine
Plan of Iguala