

Wealth, Officeholding, and Elite Demand for Slavery in Antebellum Georgia

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Abstract

This paper uses the first large-scale land lottery in US history to identify the effects of randomly-induced wealth on officeholding and the ideology of politicians. First, I link records from the 1805 Georgia land lottery to a roster of state politicians and estimate the effect of winning a lottery prize on ex-post officeholding. Lottery winners are 1.2% more likely to hold office compared to lottery losers ($N = 21,612$; $p < 0.001$). The treatment effect is larger for lottery winners who received higher-valued land lots. Second, I restrict the sample to members of the Georgia Assembly and measure support for slavery using roll call votes. Winning a lottery prize increases support for slavery by 7%, although this effect may be due to chance ($N = 174$; $p = 0.220$). The results demonstrate that wealth has a robust effect on officeholding, but does not significantly effect the ideology of politicians.

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What it lacks in numbers, the slaveholders' party makes up in the means of power that many years' possession of all state offices, hereditary engagement in political intrigue and concentration of great wealth in few hands have secured for it.

Karl Marx, "The Civil War in the United States,"
Die Presse No. 306, Nov. 7, 1861

The hypothesis that wealth influences political power has long been discussed as political theory, but rarely systematically studied. Ferguson [1767], for instance, theorizes that unequal divisions of property produce inequalities in political power, and thus contradicts popular government. Madison [1787] argues that representative bodies necessarily reflect and regulate the sentiments that arise from the unequal distributions of property.¹ Applications of the hypothesis to American history include Marx's [1861] account of the slaveholder oligarchy in the late antebellum South and Beard's [1913] study of the movement for the US Constitution, wherein he argues the document was designed to protect commercial property interests from the reach of popular majorities.² Recently, Winters and Page [2009] formulate a theory of oligarchy as the politics of wealth defense.

The antebellum South is an ideal setting to explore the relationship between wealth and political power. Technological advances in cotton production at the turn of the 19th century transformed slaveholding cotton planters into a dominant industrial and political force. Despite representing a narrow minority of the population, slaveholders dominated political offices at every level and advanced an agenda to propagate and protect the institution of slavery. Slaveholders secured their dominance amid universal white male suffrage through building alliances with sympathetic professionals, maintaining poll taxes to restrict poor whites from voting, and paying for voters' poll taxes in exchange for support.

This paper tests the hypothesis using a unique natural experiment in wealth redistribution. In 1805, the state of Georgia conducted the first large-scale land lottery in American history. The vast majority of adult white males participated in the lottery, and about one-in-ten participants

¹Madison does not fear the aristocracy; rather, he is more concerned about the possibility of an "overbearing majority" of propertyless men that would restrict property rights. For this reason, Madison argued in favor of property qualifications for voters during the Constitutional Convention, concluding, "the freeholders of the Country would be the safest depositories of Republican liberty." [Farrand, 1911].

²The specific property interests Beard refers to are "money, public securities, manufactures, and trade and shipping," which were disadvantaged by the Articles of Confederation and instead favored small farmers and debtors. Beard argues the Framers were "personally interested in, and derived economic advantages from" the Constitution.

won a land lot prize, representing over half of median income at the time. Linking lottery records to a historical roster of officeholders and roll call vote data, I employ a method of randomization inference to estimate treatment effects on officeholding and politicians' ideology. I find winning a lottery prize increases ex-post officeholding and has no effect on politicians' support for slavery legislation.

There are three possible mechanisms in which lottery wealth increases officeholding. First, lottery winners have more of an incentive to hold office in order to secure their property interests. Relatedly, the lottery wealth may help winners "buy" elections by financing campaigns or bribing voters. In support of these two interpretations, I find the treatment effects on officeholding are higher for participants who won more valuable land lots. Third, the lottery expanded the lower tail of the distribution of citizens eligible to hold office under freehold qualifications. However, I show the treatment effect is not mechanically driven by lottery winners who were previously below the property threshold for holding office.

Empirical research on the relationship between wealth and officeholding is limited because it is difficult to determine whether the association is causal, or due to unobserved measures of quality that are correlated with wealth.³ One exception is Rossi [2011], who uses the random allocation of land in 16th century Argentina to identify the effect of wealth on dynastic political power. Using distance as a continuous treatment variable that captures differences in families' wealth, the results show that families receiving land closer to the city of Buenos Aires have a higher probability of ex-post officeholding.

If wealth causes individuals to select into office, does it also effect their ideology? Carnes [2012] examines the relationship between the economic backgrounds and voting behavior of members of the US House of Representatives and finds members with white-collar backgrounds vote more conservatively on economic policy than members with blue-collar backgrounds. It remains an open question whether wealth causes politicians to vote more conservatively, or whether conservatism is simply correlated with unobserved qualities that are also related to the accumulation of personal wealth. Doherty et al. [2006] attempt to answer this question using a non-elite sample of Massachusetts lottery winners. The authors find lottery wealth increases opposition to estate taxes and

³Besley [2005] reviews the political economy literature concerned with how individuals of differing quality select into office.

government redistribution, but has no effect on broader attitudes concerning income inequality and government social welfare programs. The study, however, suffers from non-random assignment of experimental groups.

This paper is also related to Gilens and Page’s [2014] study on the impact of wealthy citizens’ preferences on policy change, and research on the returns to legislative careers [Eggers and Hainmueller, 2009, Querubin and Snyder Jr, 2013].

The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 describes the land lottery process and the historical context of the natural experiment; Section 2 describes the data sources and the data construction; Section 3 describes the method of randomization inference used to estimate the treatment effect; Section 4 tests for balance in treatment assignment; Sections 5 and 6 provide results, and Section 7 concludes.

1 Historical background

1.1 1805 Georgia Land Lottery

Land frauds and the Land Lottery Act of 1803 After purchasing millions of acres of ceded land from the Creek and Cherokee nations during the last two decades of the 18th Century, the Georgia General Assembly adopted a “headright” system to redistribute the land for private ownership to Georgia’s citizens. Under the headright system, heads of household were entitled to 200 acres of land and additionally 50 acres for each family member or slave, capped at 1,000 acres [Meyers and Williams, 2012]. Land titles were issued on a first-come-first-served basis to applicants who personally explored the sought-after lands. The headright system was inefficient, however, because land titles were often granted for identical or overlapping tracts of land [Chappell, 1874]. The system favored the wealthy and well-connected, who could receive more land by obtaining the approval of the Assembly and the Governor, who at the time was appointed by the legislature [Meyers and Williams, 2012]. In the Pine Barrens Speculation, three different governors signed off on grants of millions of acres of land —more than actually existed— to a few land speculators.

The Pine Barrens scandal was overshadowed by the Yazoo Act of 1795, in which the legislature allocated up to fifty million acres of ceded land to four speculation companies for a half-million dollars in return for bribes. Following a public anti-corruption campaign, voters installed a mostly

new government in the election of 1796, which quickly nullified the Yazoo Act and grants made under the Act [Meyers and Williams, 2012].

The Creek Nation signed the Compact of 1802 at Fort Wilkinson, ceding territory south of the Oconee and Altamaha rivers. In the shadow of the dual corruption scandals, Georgia's Assembly responded with a novel system of land redistribution: a public land lottery. The Act of 11 May 1803 outlined the rules and procedures of the first large-scale land lottery in US history, only to be replicated in the subsequent Georgia land lotteries and in Oklahoma in 1901.⁴ According to Chappell's [1874] history, the land lottery was a superior system of land redistribution because it was egalitarian, prevented the accumulation of land by speculators, assured unquestionable titles, and promoted rapid settlement. The lottery was also inherently less corruptible compared to the headright system:

... [E]very temptation and means for the practice of fraud and corruption was taken away. For who was going to bribe the members of the Legislature or other public functionaries, high or low, when it was rendered utterly impossible by the very system adopted, for the corruptor to make or secure anything by means of the bribery? Who would ever think of bribing surveyors to measure or mark lots falsely or make forged or fictitious returns of surveys, when nobody could possibly know or foresee to whom any particular lots would be drawn, in the coming lottery? And how could speculators, single or combined, practice frauds upon the State, in regard to the lands, where every lot of land had already passed out of the State into private ownership, before it could become an object of speculation?

The land lottery system did not completely strike out the potential for public corruption. In his study of the 1820s Georgia land lotteries, Weiman [1991] finds that district surveyors were often selected based on political connections rather than qualifications.

⁴Figure 4 shows the ceded lands that were at stake in the 1805 Land Lottery. Between 1805 and 1832, the state of Georgia allocated most of its public land by lottery. This study uses the 1805 lottery because it is the only one of six land lotteries to have a complete record of participants. The five other lotteries in Georgia occurred in 1807, 1820, 1821, and 1832 (Cherokee Land Lottery and Gold Lottery). Approximately two million acres were redistributed in the Oklahoma lottery, compared to more than one million acres in the 1805 Georgia Land Lottery, and more than 27 acres in all six Georgia Land Lotteries [Graham, 2004].

Land lottery process The Act of 11 May 1803 created three new counties: the territory lying south of the Oconee river was split into two counties, the northern part called Baldwin and the southern part called Wilkinson, with each county divided into five districts; Wayne county, lying south of the Altamaha river, was divided into three districts. For each district, one surveyor was appointed by the legislature to map the area into square lots, with sizes and orientations specified in Figure 2, and to return the results to the Surveyor General. Surveyors received \$2.75 per mile surveyed as compensation, and were required to take an oath and submit bond and security. The surveyed lots were then appropriated for use in the lottery:

After the surveying is completed, and the returns made to the Surveyor General, his Excellency the Governor shall cause tickets to be made out whereby all the numbers of the surveys in the different districts shall be represented, which tickets shall be put into a box to constitute prizes,⁵ with others to be denominated blanks, of which blanks the number or amount shall be determined, by subtracting the number of prizes from the whole number of draws.

Registration for citizens entitled to draw took place in the eleven months following passage of the law. Eligibility was extended to unmarried white men twenty-one years and older and orphaned children, who received one draw; married white men with children and widows with children, who received two draws.⁶ Citizens were given at least ten days notice, by public advertisement, to attend their respective county courthouse in order to register. Additionally, Governor John Milledge was required to issue a proclamation “to be published in all gazettes of [the] state” outlining the rules of the Act. County justices were responsible for compiling a list of names and number of eligible draws for each registered participant. Participants were required to pay 12.5 cents per draw and take an oath when “doubt exist in the minds of the said justices” regarding the veracity of participants’ eligibility.

⁵The prize tickets were written in the form of ”county – district – lot number”. E.g., a prize ticket denoted “WaD3L9” specifies lot number 9 in District 3 of Wayne County.

⁶Figure 1 details the sequence of the land lottery process and Figure 3 details the qualifications.

The lottery was established under the direction of five managers appointed by the legislature.⁷ The managers provided one months' public notice in all of the state's newspapers of the draw schedule, which commenced on July 22, 1805, and ended on August 31 of the same year [Graham, 2004]. The managers apportioned the blank and prize tickets, which were placed in a wooden drum, or "lottery wheel," built by the carpenter John Jacob Schely for \$40 [Cadle, 1991].

The lottery room was arranged with the managers seated at a long table with a volume of four books containing the names of all participants. Unlike the popular portrayal of a subsequent lottery in Figure E, there was one lottery wheel in the room, and a orphan boy named Burke Chisholm was charged with drawing the tickets [Graham, 2004].⁸ The managers announced the names and number of registered draws for each participant in alphabetical order. Chisholm drew the tickets without replacement as each participant name was announced and the managers recorded "B" (for Blank) or "P" (for prize) next to the name of each participant for each registered draw. For over five weeks, approximately 1,250 tickets were drawn each day (except Sunday) in this manner [Graham, 2004].

Grant process Participants who won a prize, called fortunate drawers, had twelve months following the drawing to claim their prize. Fortunate drawers were required to pay four dollars per hundred acres in order to obtain the title, or "grant", on the land lot. In some cases, fortunate drawers sold their grants to land speculators, who in turn sold the land to out-of-state settlers [Davis, 1981].⁹

While the majority of grants were obtained by fortunate drawers, a second means of obtaining

⁷The five managers were Jared Irwin (President), William Barnett, George R. Clayton, Edwin Mounger, and George Watkins. Irwin was a political reformer who, during his first term as Governor of Georgia (1796–1798), signed the bill that nullified the Yazoo Act. Barnett was a state senator from Elbert county. Mounger served as State Treasurer at the time of the lottery (1799–1806). Clayton served as State Treasurer after Mounger (1806–1825). Watkins was a local politician who authored the first *Digest of the Laws of the State of Georgia* with his brother Robert in 1800.

⁸In all subsequent lotteries, there were two lottery wheels: one containing the names of participants, and the other containing lot numbers. The two corresponding tickets were combined to form a prize draw (participants whose names were not drawn were considered to have drawn blanks) [Cadle, 1991]. Chisholm drew one blank ticket in the 1805 lottery.

⁹The legislature extended the grant deadline on an annual basis for a decade. Land speculators often sought out fortunate drawers who drew particularly valuable lots [Cadle, 1991]. The grant records indicate 52 grants were obtained jointly by John Forsyth and Lewis Alexander Dugas. Forsyth was a Georgia lawyer who launched an illustrious political career in 1808 when he was elected attorney general of Georgia; Forsyth would later serve as the 33rd Governor of Georgia and the 13th US Secretary of State. Dugas was a Georgia businessman. Land speculator Robert Flournoy of Putnam County purchased 36 grants. Flournoy served two consecutive terms as a state senator from Montgomery county starting in 1814.

land lots was by public auction. If fortunate drawers did not claim their land, then the lots were reverted to the state of Georgia and sold to the highest bidder. Fractional lands (i.e., lots containing less than the acreage of a whole lot) were not part of the lottery and were instead sold at public auction in 1806 [Graham, 2004].

A third way of obtaining land through the grant process is through filing suit against a fraudulent fortunate drawer. The law specifies that a plaintiff in such a suit receives half of the land lot, while the other half is reverted to the state. According to Graham [2004], only six land lots were found by a jury to be fraudulently drawn or granted. It is likely, however, that some participants fraudulently registered but did not successfully draw.

1.2 Freehold qualifications for officeholding

The 1798 constitution —in effect for the entirety of the Antebellum period — tied political office eligibility to land and property value. Beyond age and residency requirements, eligibility for the office of state representative includes owning property worth \$250 or having paid property tax of at least \$500 within the county one year preceding the election. Requirements for holding the office of state senator include having property worth \$500 or paying property taxes of at least \$1,000. Other major political offices, such as the governor, constitutional officers, military officers, and judges, were appointed by the legislature.¹⁰

A substantial portion of the otherwise eligible population were constitutionally restricted from holding office. Approximately 13% of a sample of adult male heads of household who were born in Georgia and were living in Georgia at the time of the 1850 Census (the earliest available) have nominal property values below the threshold for eligibility for state representative and 28% are below the property threshold for state senate.

Winning a prize in the 1805 lottery enabled otherwise eligible fortunate drawers who did not meet the property threshold to hold office. Using county-level data from 1850 [Haines, 2010], I estimate that the mean value of a land lot prize is \$831.02. Most fortunate drawers, including those

¹⁰Candidates for state representative must be at least twenty-one years old, have been a US citizen for seven years, and a resident of the county one year prior to the election (unless absent on public business). Candidates for state senate must be at least twenty-five years old, have been a US citizen for nine years, a resident of Georgia for three years, and a resident of the county for one year. Felons, public debtors, and active members of the military are excluded from elective positions. Amendments to the 1798 constitution altered age and residency requirements and opened the following offices to popular election: inferior court judges (Amendment III; 1812), justices of the peace (Amendment VI; 1819); Governor (Amendment VII; 1824); state's attorney (Amendment XX; 1855).

above the property threshold, experienced a substantial wealth shock: the prize lot represented approximately 55% of median income in 1805.¹¹

1.3 Wealth and power

The invention of the cotton gin in 1794 made the cultivation of upland cotton immensely profitable, and according to Simons's [1912] critical history of the period, "created a new industrial, and therefor a new political power, — the slave-owning cotton planter." While slaveholders represented only 7% of the total white population in Georgia in 1850, slaveholder interests dominated state politics. In his antislavery polemic, *The Impending Crisis of the South*, Helper [1860] rails against the "slave-driving oligarchy" which dominated political offices in the antebellum South:

The magistrates in the villages, the constables in the districts, the commissioners of the towns, the mayors of the cities, the sheriffs of the counties, the judges of the various courts, the members of the legislatures, the governors of the States, the representatives and senators in Congress — are all slaveholders.

Nonslaveholding whites were politically marginalized under the slaveholder oligarchy:

They have never yet had any part or lot in framing the laws under which they live. There is no legislation except for the benefit of slavery and slaveholders... To all intents and purposes, they are disenfranchised, and outlawed, and the only privilege extended to them is a shallow and circumscribed participation in the political movements that usher slaveholders into office. [Helper, 1860]

The slaveholders' dilemma was to secure their political dominance amid universal white male suffrage. The 1798 state constitution extended rights to elect members of the legislature to white males aged at least twenty-one who "have paid all taxes which may be required of them...for the year preceding the election."¹² Propertyless whites were discouraged from voting on account

¹¹Table 2 provides the estimated lot value per county and a description of how the mean value of land lot prize calculations are made. The latter calculation is made by dividing the mean value of a land lot prize by the median income in 1850. The 1850 values are deflated to 1805 dollars using a historical consumer price index [Officer and Williamson, 2011]. The notes to Table 6 described the sample used to calculate median income.

¹²On the matter of suffrage, Georgia's constitution was a radical document compared to the constitutions of other southern states. The 1777 state constitution was more restrictive, extending suffrage to white males having in his own right property "of ten pounds valuable and liable to pay tax" or "being of any mechanic trade." William Houston, a delegate to the United States Constitutional Convention in 1787, lamented that the 1777 constitution "was a very bad one, and he hoped it would be revised and amended," to restrict suffrage [Beard, 1913].

of a poll tax that the legislature maintained during the antebellum period. Slaveholder candidates, however, often paid the poll taxes of poor whites in exchange for political support [Meyers and Williams, 2012]. Slaveholding cotton planters also found allies in members of the clergy and the professional class, whom often owned a few slaves for personal service, and this alliance “created a class of social retainers who defended the interest of the ruling class” [Simons, 1912]. Slaveholder dominance in the legislature was fortified by the 1798 constitution, which provides that each county is apportioned one state senator and up to four House representatives based on population, with slaves counted as three-fifths of a person.

The lack of party competition also strengthened the grip of the slaveholder oligarchy. The Democratic–Republican Party dominated the political scene in the early antebellum period. Even when the national party split into the Democratic and Whig parties after the 1824 presidential election, both parties catered to slaveholder interests. The singular push for slaveholder interests translated into an anemic party structure. “Far from encouraging citizen participation in the party system,” DeBats [1990] writes, “the leaders of both [Whig and Democratic] parties discouraged grassroots politics Beyond the simple casting of a ballot, the role of the citizen in the party system was passive by design.”

1.4 Slavery legislation

Georgia’s laws protected the institution of slavery by restricting the emancipation of individual slaves and limiting the number of free blacks in the state. The slave code of 1770, for instance, declares that all nonwhites “shall be presumed to be slaves, till the contrary be made appear.” The 1798 constitution makes certain “the legislature shall have no power to pass laws for the emancipation of slaves without the consent of each of the respective owners,” while the 1801 Act, “Prescribing the mode of manumitting Slaves in this State,” outlaws slaveholders from emancipating their slaves without a special law passed by the legislature. The 1810 Act, “For regulating and governing free persons of color coming into this State, or residing therein,” specifies that free blacks must annually register their name with the authorities.

The legislature frequently rejected applications to emancipate certain slaves, which often originated from the estates of deceased slaveholders. A public letter dated May 25, 1819 in the *Georgia Journal*, observes, “it is notorious that for years past, our Legislature has pursued a steady course of

hostility, to such indulgence and repeated applications in favor of particular favorite negroes, have been the precursors to as many disappointments.” Legislative opponents of emancipation argued that manumitted slaves have no place in Georgia — that they are effectively a tax on the public and should instead be sent to free states by their former owners. Legislative proponents argued on the principle that slaves are property and their owners have a right to manumit them.¹³

The legislature voted on several acts facilitating the introduction of slaves into the state and preventing slaves being carried out of the state. The legislature voted successfully to repeal an 1817 law that banned the importation of slaves from other states.¹⁴ In response to the 1837 Maine Controversy, in which a slave stowaway escaped through Maine to Canada on the schooner *Boston*, the House unsuccessfully voted for a bill that would require a mandatory search of all departing vessels originating from Maine.

The legislature voted are on acts to increase punishment for slaves, free blacks, and whites who illegally deal with slaves. The Senate voted successfully in 1821 to expand capital offenses for slaves and free blacks to include attempt to incite insurrection, assault on a white person, and attempt to poison. The Senate also voted successfully in 1831 to outlaw buying, selling, or trading with slaves without the consent of slaveholders.

The House resolved its disapproval for the doctrine of nullification following the South Carolina Nullification Crisis of 1832. While South Carolina’s protest was a direct response to the federal Tariff of 1832, nullification was essentially a posture to safeguard the interests of the slaveholder class against interference from the North.

2 Data and construction

2.1 Lottery participant records

The primary data source of this study is the complete list of participants of the 1805 Land Lottery published by Graham [2005], which is a more recent transcription of the Wood and Wood [1964] data. These data include the following information: record number; full name; county of residence

¹³These arguments are made in the House debate over the bill “to manumit a negro slave, Bob,” featured in the transcription from the *Georgia Journal* dated Nov. 10, 1828.

¹⁴The repeal was signed into law by Governor G.M. Troup on December 9, 1824. International slave trade was outlawed by the 1798 constitution, and on the federal level in 1807.

at the time of the lottery registration; draw record; and prize record for fortunate drawers. Generational titles, occupations, and the indicators for orphan and widow, are informed using identifying remarks next to the participants' names.¹⁵

There are 23,744 total participants in the data.¹⁶ The number of draws per participant and the number of prizes is inferred from the record of draw outcomes: 15,399 (65%) participants received two draws and 8,345 (35%) participants received a single draw.¹⁷ There are 3,658 prize tickets in the box (the remaining 35,485 are blank tickets). The probability of winning a prize per draw is approximately 9%.

2.2 Grant records

The study also relies on Graham [2004]'s list of fortunate drawers and grantees, which includes name, county at the time of registration, grant date, and information on the book and page of the recorded grant. The grant book information included the lot number of each grant and identifies whether each grant is taken by a fortunate drawer, or sold at public auction as a reverted grant or fractional lot. The records from the reverted lot grant books are used to identify "noncompliers" among the treated population; that is, fortunate drawers who did not obtain the grant for the land.

There are 326 reverted land records in total, less than 10% of the total number of land lot prizes. The majority of reverted lots are concentrated in Wayne county; likely due to the higher grant fee and relatively lower per-acre farm values.¹⁸

¹⁵These data are not complete, since the identifying remarks depended on the discretion of different county officials. For instance, not all participants are explicitly labeled "orphan" and this information cannot necessarily be inferred by the number of draws. However, I am able to identify widows on the basis of name and number of draws.

¹⁶There is one participant, Theodoric Munford of McIntosh, whose draw result is not recorded. Another participant record, for William Norris of Oglethorpe, was scratched out by the officials and does not have a draw result recorded. Norris's record is possibly a duplicate (there is another record of the same name and county). Neither Munford nor Norris's names appear in the grant records. I remove the two records from the data.

¹⁷The total number of tickets in the box is thus equivalent to #Draws = 23,744 + 15,399 = 39,143. The number of draws reflects the number of registered draws, not eligible draws. Some participants eligible for two draws only registered for one draw [Graham, 2004].

¹⁸Using the data in Table 3, the per acre farm value (1805\$) in Wayne county (\$1.72) is lower than the respective values in Baldwin (\$4.14) and Wilkinson (\$4.01) counties. However, the total land lot values (1805\$) in Wayne county (\$842.64) are higher than those in Baldwin (\$839.17) and Wilkinson (\$811.25) counties.

2.3 Officeholder records

Historical rosters of Georgia's officeholders are published by the Georgia Archives.¹⁹ The historical roster of the General Assembly (creation–1978) is included in the 1977–78 Georgia Official and Statistical Register [Archives, 1978]. Other elected and appointed offices (creation–1990) are included in the 1989–1990 Register [Archives, 1990]. The roster includes information on name, jurisdiction, and session or term date.

2.4 Roll call vote records

The study relies on roll call vote data to form a measure of support for slavery. The primary source for these data are the Journals of the House and Senate of the State of Georgia.²⁰ The journals contain information on the name and county of members present at each annual session of the General Assembly, roll call votes, and the vote total. I select roll call votes on motions to pass final bills related to slavery and the treatment of free blacks.²¹ A secondary source for roll call data are historic newspapers from the antebellum capital of Milledgeville.²² The Milledgeville newspapers reproduce similar content found in the Assembly journals.

The thirteen roll call votes used to construct an index measuring support for slavery, summarized in Table 12, generally fall into three categories: acts to emancipate certain slaves; acts facilitating the introduction of slaves into the state and preventing slaves being carried out of the state; and acts to punish slaves, free blacks, and whites who illegally trade with slaves.

2.5 Record linkage

Lottery participants are matched with officeholders on the Soundex codes of both surname and first name. The Soundex is a phonetic algorithm that accounts for minor misspellings of participant

¹⁹The rosters are available digitally on the website of the Digital Library of Georgia: <http://dlg.galileo.usg.edu/>.

²⁰The collections are available digitally through Emory University's Internet Archive and Newsbank's Archive of Americana at <https://archive.org/details/emory> and <http://www.newsbank.com/>, respectively.

²¹The time period from which the journals are selected is based on the availability of digital copies of the journals. The House journals searched are from the years 1805, 1808, 1811–1815, and 1818. The Senate journals searched are from 1805, 1808–1814, 1816–1819, 1821, 1823, 1824, 1826, 1827, and 1831.

²²The Milledgeville Historic Newspapers Archive database spans eleven titles over the years 1808–1920, and is available through the Digital Library of Georgia at <http://milledgeville.galileo.usg.edu/>.

names in the lottery records that may have occurred during registration.²³ Matched records are verified to ensure consistency between the grant date and the term date. Specifically, I remove matches in which the term year of the first office of the matched participant is in the year 1846 or later.²⁴

I employ a refinement algorithm that relies primarily on participants' county of registration to break multiple matches. Multiple matches that are unable to be resolved using the algorithm are discarded.²⁵ The presence of multiple matches would introduce error into the estimate of the effect of wealth on officeholding if participants with common names (i.e., those who are most likely to be multiply matched) are more or less likely to receive treatment. Table 5 demonstrates treatment and control groups are balanced on the length and frequency of surnames.

Table H summarizes the distribution of offices held in the matched data. In total, there are 881 officeholders, holding over 1,100 offices. Over 90% of offices held are in the Georgia General Assembly, which along with the United States House (3.6%), are elected offices. Several appointed offices are also represented: Governor (opened to popular vote in 1824); United States Senate; State Treasurer; Commissioner of Insurance; Secretary of State; and Adjutant General of Georgia.

3 Estimation

Under the Neyman [1923] framework, each $i = \{1, \dots, N\}$ participants have two potential outcomes: r_{Ti} and r_{Ci} , which represent i 's response to treatment and control regimes, respectively.

Only one outcome per participant can be observed, depending on treatment assignment Z_i . I calculate the following test statistic for the weighted difference-in-means between treated and control responses:

$$\delta = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N (r_{Ti}|Z_i = 1)}{nP(Z_i = 1)} - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N (r_{Ci}|Z_i = 0)}{m(1 - P(Z_i = 1))}, \quad (1)$$

²³The published land lottery and officeholders data are converted digitally using an Optical Character Recognition (OCR) program. Based on the number of fortunate drawers with corrected names in the list of fortunate drawers and grantees, Graham [2004] estimates that up to 2% of the entire participant list may have misspellings or names entered incorrectly.

²⁴Considering that the white male life expectancy at age twenty in 1805 was approximately forty years [Hacker, 2010], the youngest participants who were both eligible for the lottery and public office were twenty-one years old and were expected to live forty additional years.

²⁵Additional information on the process of refining multiple matches is provided in Section G.

where $Z_i = 1$ if i receives the treatment, n represents the number of treated participants, and $m = N - n$ is the number of control participants. For the main analyses, I define treatment as drawing at least one prize.²⁶ The probability of treatment assignment is given by

$$P(Z_i = 1) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{\# \text{Draws}} & \text{if } i \text{ has one draw} \\ \frac{2}{\# \text{Draws}} & \text{if } i \text{ has two draws.} \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

Inferences about the treatment effect are made by calculating the probability of receiving a δ as or more extreme than the observed test statistic, δ^* , under the hypothesis of no treatment effect [Fisher, 1935]. I estimate the one-sided p value using the expression

$$\hat{p} = \frac{\sum_{\mathcal{L}=1}^{\mathcal{L}} \mathbf{Z} (\delta_{\mathcal{L}} \geq \delta^*)}{\mathcal{L}}, \quad (3)$$

where $\delta_{\mathcal{L}}$ is the value of the test statistic for the \mathcal{L}^{th} random sample (without replacement) from the randomization distribution [Ernst, 2004].

3.1 Response variables and sample selection

Treatment effect on officeholding For estimation of treatment effect on officeholding, the response is a binary variable indicating whether the participant held office between 1806 and 1846, inclusive. Orphans and widows are excluded from this analysis. In addition, I remove individuals who held office on or prior to 1805.²⁷

Treatment effect on support for slavery The outcome variable for estimating the treatment effect on support for slavery is the mean of votes in favor of slavery for roll calls in which the member is present. The sample for this analysis is restricted to lottery participants who held office in the Georgia Assembly and who voted on at least one of the thirteen bills used to form the outcome variable.²⁸

²⁶140 (under 1%) participants won two prizes in the lottery. The number of treated participants is then $n = 3,849 - 140 = 3,709$ (15.6%) and the number of controls is $m = 20,046$ (84.3%).

²⁷Male orphans (by definition, under twenty-one years of age) and women are constitutionally restricted from officeholding for the entirety of the Antebellum period. All registered participants are considered when calculating treatment assignment probabilities.

²⁸Cronbach's alphas for the five House votes and eight Senate votes are 0.65 and 0.57, respectively.

3.2 Additional assumptions

SUTVA The estimation of treatment effects relies on the “stable unit treatment value assumption” (SUTVA), which specifies that the response of participant i is unaffected by the treatment assignment of other participants. More formally, r_{iZ} varies with Z_i , but does not vary with other elements of \mathbf{Z} [Rosenbaum, 2002]. SUTVA is potentially violated in the estimation of the treatment effect on officeholding if prizes give treated participants a competitive advantage over control participants in head-to-head contests for political office.

Ignorable attrition The analysis of the treatment effect on support for slavery relies on the assumption that attrition is not biasing the estimate. Attrition bias occurs when participants drop out of the sample in a non-random fashion, or if there is non-random missing outcomes. The sample used for this sub-analysis is restricted to lottery participants who were legislators and voted on slavery bills between 1813 and 1841. The sample includes legislators who held office prior to the 1805 lottery. Attrition bias might arise if participants non-randomly exited the legislature prior to or during the measurement period. Missing outcomes is not a problem because the roll call records are complete.

Contemporaneous accounts of the antebellum South depict the legislatures as dominated by wealthy slaveholders. Lottery participants who were legislators during the measurement period were likely well above median income prior to the lottery. It is arguable, then, that treatment assignment did not impact participants’ decisions to exit the sample.

4 Balance on pretreatment variables

Figure 10 shows balance in treatment assignment across the majority of pretreatment variables.²⁹ Generational titles, surname characteristics, and occupations are balanced at the 5% significance level. Three of 27 counties, however, are unbalanced. Participants registered in Bryan, Burke, and Jefferson counties are significantly more likely to be assigned to the control group.³⁰

²⁹Tables 4 and 5 describe the distribution of participants between experimental groups for each pretreatment variable.

³⁰Table 3 provides summary statistics of county-level 1850 Census data for counties that existed in 1805.

4.1 Surname length and frequency

Recent literature on intergenerational mobility finds the frequency of surnames is negatively correlated with wealth and the length of surnames is positively correlated with wealth [Guell et al., 2007, Clark and Cummins, 2012]. Figures 7 and 6 plot the relationship between property value and surname length and frequency, respectively, using a sample of adult male heads of household who were born in Georgia and were living in Georgia at the time of the 1850 Census. Bivariate regressions of log property value on surname length and surname frequency show each association in the expected direction, but neither statistically significant.³¹ The Q–Q plots in Figure 11 show balance across the probability distributions of surname length and frequency, respectively.

5 Treatment effect on officeholding

Table 6 compares officeholding between treatment and control groups ($N = 21,612$). I estimate Eq. 1 and interpret the result as a 1.2% increase in officeholding attributable to winning a lottery prize, $p < 0.001$, 95% CI: [0.007288, 0.019670]. The randomization p value, estimated using Eq. 3, is highly significant and provides strong evidence against the hypothesis of no treatment effect. Assuming constant additive treatment effects, the two-sided randomization confidence interval implies 95% confidence that the treatment increases officeholding between 0.7% and 1.9%.³²

5.1 Sensitivity analyses

Participants likely to meet freehold qualifications The treatment effect on officeholding is robust to several sensitivity analyses, reported in Appendix Section L. In order to address the concern that the treatment effect is driven by otherwise-eligible lottery winners who did not meet the freehold qualifications for officeholding prior to the lottery, I restrict the data to participants likely to be qualified. In the absence of data on participant property values and incomplete occupational data, I rely on participants' surname lengths, which are demonstrated in Appendix Section J to be positively —albeit not significantly — related to property values. Restricting the data to

³¹Log property value is positively related to surname length ($\beta = 0.009, t(25518) = 1.823, p = 0.068$) and negatively related to surname frequency ($\beta = -0.0001, t(25518) = -1.268, p = 0.205$).

³²The p value is estimated using $\mathcal{L} = 10,000$. Figure 13 represents the randomization distribution of test statistics compared to δ^* . The confidence intervals are derived using $\ell = 1,000$ constant treatment effects and randomization tests with $\mathcal{L} = 100$ iterations. Appendix Section F describes the procedure for obtaining confidence intervals.

participants with surnames of length at or above the median of six characters ($N = 14,503$), the treatment effect remains significant, $\delta^* = 0.007$, $p = 0.033$, 95% CI: [0.003272, 0.015046]. The result of the subsetting analysis, reported in Table 7, evidences that the treatment effect is not driven by lottery winners likely to be below the property threshold.

Analysis of treatment-on-the-treated Seven percent of the treatment group failed to obtain a grant for the land. Table 8 reports that the officeholding rate of noncompliers is slightly lower than the rate for treated participants who received a grant for the land (“compliers”). The intention-to-treat (ITT) analysis used to estimate the treatment effect may therefore be diluted by noncompliance. In order to address the compliance problem, I implement the Angrist et al. [1996] instrumental variables (IV) procedure, where the treatment assignment indicator Z_i instruments for a dummy indicating whether treatment was actually received. I estimate the average effect on the treated of 1.5%, $p < 0.001$, 95% CI: [0.007901, 0.02127], which is slightly higher than the ITT effect. This result demonstrates that the ITT analysis likely understates the true treatment effect.

Three treatments Wayne county exhibits the highest concentration of noncompliers in the sample (80 %), likely due to relatively lower per acre farm values and higher grant fees.³³ However, as reported in Table 2, the value of a lot in Wayne is slightly higher than lots in Baldwin and Wilkinson counties. Are there differential treatment effects depending on the county where the land lot is drawn? The IV estimates reported in Table 11 demonstrate significant treatment effects for obtaining a land grant in Baldwin county, $\delta^* = 0.016$, $p < 0.001$, 95% CI: [0.007408, 0.02553]; and Wayne county, $\delta^* = 0.020$, $p = 0.013$, 95% CI: [0.004291, 0.03677]; but no treatment effect for obtaining land in Wilkinson county, $\delta^* = 0.006$, $p = 0.214$, 95% CI: [-0.003508, 0.01572]. These results, which also control for noncompliers, show that the relative size of per-county treatment effects corresponds to relative value of lots in each county.

³³Table 10 shows the distribution of treatment assignment, by county in which the land is drawn and compliance status.

6 Treatment effect on support for slavery

To estimate the treatment effect on support for slavery, I restrict the data to lottery participants who are members of the Georgia General Assembly ($N = 174$). Table 13 shows the mean support for slavery for the entire sample is high at 67%. Estimating Eqs. 1 and 3 on the sample, I find a 7% increase in support for slavery attributable to treatment, $p = 0.220$, 95% CI: [-0.1148, 0.2672]. This result is not statistically significant and thus we cannot rule out the hypothesis of no treatment effect.

Are there differential treatment effects depending on the county where the land lot is drawn? The IV estimates reported in Table 14 demonstrate a higher, albeit nonsignificant treatment effect for obtaining a land grant in Baldwin county, $\delta^* = 0.177$, $p = 0.155$, 95% CI: [-0.06622, 0.4206], compared to obtaining land in Wilkinson county, $\delta^* = 0.011$, $p = 0.932$, 95% CI: [-0.2615, 0.2853], and Wayne county, $\delta^* = -0.001$, $p = 0.994$, 95% CI: [-0.3821, 0.3792]. While these results are nonsignificant, it is worth pointing out that Baldwin county had a relatively higher slave population in 1850, perhaps because the land was more amenable to cotton production.

7 Conclusion

This paper uses the 1805 Georgia land lottery to estimate the effect of randomly-induced wealth on officeholding and politicians' ideology. First, I test the hypothesis of no treatment effect on officeholding using a large sample of adult white males, and find that winning a lottery prize shifted the post-treatment officeholding status for 1.2% of participants. The treatment effect is relatively large: approximately 33% of treated officeholders and 7% of all officeholders in the sample selected into office due to winning a prize in the lottery. IV estimates show the average effect on participants who actually received the treatment is 1.5%. The treatment effect is highest for lottery winners who obtained relatively higher-valued land lots. A sensitivity analysis demonstrates the treatment effect is unlikely to be driven by lottery winners who did not previously meet the freehold qualifications for officeholding.

The results point to the conclusion that the relationship between wealth and officeholding is causal. The two plausible causal mechanisms include lottery winners' motivation to run for secure their property interests and lottery winners' ability to "buy" elections. These mechanisms are not

mutually exclusive, and both are compatible with theories of elite dominance over representative bodies.

Second, I estimate the treatment effect on support for slavery among participants who were members of the Georgia General Assembly. Winning a prize in the lottery increases support for slavery by 7%, although the null cannot be ruled out in this case. The null finding is likely due to the small sample size. In addition, the legislature may be the most unlikely place to find a significant treatment effect — it was essentially a club for already-wealthy slaveholders during the antebellum period.

The antebellum South is substantively an ideal setting to investigate the relationship between wealth and politics, given that the contemporaneous accounts of this period point to government by slaveholder oligarchy. The results of the paper demonstrate that wealth has a robust and relatively large effect on officeholding, but does not necessarily effect the ideology of politicians. The positive effect on officeholding replicates the main finding of Rossi's [2011] natural experiment in 16th century Argentina. Whether or not these results are generalizable to contemporary politics depend upon the findings of future experiments.

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Appendix

A Chronology




Figure 1: Timeline of 1805 Land Lottery events. [Graham, 2010].

B Counties

Original counties	No. Districts	Lot sizes (acres)	Lot length (chains square)	Lot orientation (degrees)	Grant fee (1805\$)	Est. value of lot (1805\$)
Baldwin	5	202.5	45	45 / 60	8.10	839.17
Wayne	3	490	70	13 / 77	19.60	842.64
Wilkinson	5	202.5	45	45 / 60	8.10	811.25

Figure 2: Counties and land lots specified by Act of 11 May 1803. Lot orientation is degrees from the meridian [Cadle, 1991, Graham, 2010]. Lot values are estimated by averaging the cash value of farms minus the value of farming implements and machinery by the number of (improved and unimproved) acres of land in farms [Haines, 2010, Bleakley and Ferrie, 2013]. The 1850 values are deflated to 1805 dollars using a historical consumer price index [Officer and Williamson, 2011].

C Qualifications

Requirements

“Every free male white person, twenty-one years of age and upwards, being a citizen of the United States, and an inhabitant of this State, twelve months immediately preceding the passage of this act, or paid a tax towards the support of government (including such as may be absent on lawful business)”

“Every free white male person of like description, having a wife, legitimate child or children, under twenty-one years of age”

“All widows having a legitimate child or children, under the age of twenty-one years, who have resided twelve months in this State, immediately preceding the passage of this act”

“All families of orphans, under twenty-one years of age, having no parents living” [Note: A supplementary act entitles children whose father is dead and mother remarried]

Figure 3: Lottery qualifications specified by Act of 11 May 1803 [Assembly, 1964].

D Land lottery area




Figure 4: 1850 US Census counties map. The outlined counties are those that existed in 1805. The shaded counties are those created by the Land Lottery Act of 1803. The northernmost shaded counties are Baldwin and Wilkinson, respectively, and Wayne is the southernmost shaded county.

E Portrayal of lottery drawing




Figure 5: Portrayal of land lottery drawing by George I. Parrish, Jr. [Davis and Lucas, 1979].

F Randomization test

F.1 Procedure

The following procedure derives a one-sided randomization p value:

1. Rerun the randomization using Eq. 2. Note that orphans and widows are included in the data when calculating the probability of assignment;
2. Calculate the test statistic $\delta_{\mathcal{L}}$ using the observed outcomes and the randomization of \mathbf{Z} ;
3. Repeat steps 1–2 \mathcal{L} times
4. Calculate the p value using Eq. 3.

F.2 Confidence intervals

The following procedure derives a two-sided $(1 - \alpha)100\%$ randomization confidence interval.

1. Choose an α ;
2. Choose a constant treatment effect, δ_C to test;
3. Subtract δ_C from treated outcomes;
4. Run randomization test and calculate the two-sided p :

$$\hat{p} = \frac{\sum_{L=1}^{\mathcal{L}} \mathbf{Z}(|\delta_L| \geq |\delta^*|)}{\mathcal{L}}; \quad (4)$$

5. If p value resulting from the randomization test is not significant at the level of α , δ_C is in the confidence interval;
6. Repeat steps 2–5 ℓ times;
7. The confidence interval is the range of δ_C that yields insignificant results in the randomization test.

G Record linkage

I remove matches in which the term year of the first office of the matched participant is greater than or equal to the year 1846.

For duplicate matches (e.g., a unique officeholder matched to several participants of the same name or vice versa), I use the following refinement algorithm to achieve unique matches:

1. Select match where county of residence in lottery registration records is identical to county of first office;
2. If counties don't match, select match with shortest distance between borders of county of residence and constituency;
3. If a tie still exists due to identically named participants residing in the same county, and these participants are father and son, select Senior if the term year of the first office is less than or equal to 1826 and select Junior if the first office is greater than 1826 (and less than 1846);
4. Remove matches if tie is unresolved after steps 1–3.

H Descriptive statistics: Offices held

Office	Frequency	%Total
Georgia House	642	57.8
Georgia Senate	374	33.7
United States House	41	3.6
Governor	17	1.5
United States Senate	13	1.1
State Treasurer	9	0.8
Commissioner of Insurance	6	0.5
Secretary of State	5	0.4
Adjutant General of Georgia	2	0.1
	1109	100

I Descriptive statistics: 1850 Census

The following descriptive statistics uses the preliminary full-count 1850 Census [NAPP, Ruggles et al.], restricted to male heads of households aged 21 and over who living in Georgia at the time the Census was taken, were born in the state, and have non-missing surnames and property value. The resulting sample is $N = 25,520$ individuals.

I.1 Property value and surname frequency




Figure 6: Correlation between the frequency in which surname appears in the sample and real estate value. Sample is drawn from the 1850 100% Census [NAPP, Ruggles et al.]. Sample is restricted to male heads of households aged 21 and over who living in Georgia at the time of the census, were born in Georgia, and have non-missing surnames and property value. The dashed line represents the value of the property requirement for eligibility for the office of state senator (\$500). The solid line is the local fourth-order polynomial regression fit. Graph excludes property values greater than \$150,000.

I.2 Property value and surname length




Figure 7: Correlation between surname length and real estate value. Sample is drawn from the 1850 complete-count census [NAPP, Ruggles et al.]. See notes in Table 6.

I.3 Individual-level summary statistics

Variable	N	Min.	Mean	Max.	S.d.
Surname length	25520	3	6.224	14	1.560
Surname frequency	25520	1	36.965	449	74.114
Age	25506	21	38.042	101	11.195
Log real estate value (1850\$)	25520	-6.908	6.865	12.429	1.294
Literate	25520	0	0.891	1	0.311
In school	25520	0	0.001	1	0.038
<i>Occupations</i>					
Blacksmith	25520	0	0.006	1	0.080
Carpenter	25520	0	0.009	1	0.092
Farmer	25520	0	0.852	1	0.355
Laborer	25520	0	0.004	1	0.065
Lawyer	25520	0	0.009	1	0.093
Mechanic	25520	0	0.008	1	0.087
Merchant	25520	0	0.021	1	0.143
Overseer	25520	0	0.006	1	0.075
Physician	25520	0	0.014	1	0.117
Reverend	25520	0	0.009	1	0.093
Teacher	25520	0	0.005	1	0.067

Table 2: Individual-level summary statistics using sample drawn from the 1850 full-count Census [NAPP, Ruggles et al.]. ‘Surname length’ is the character length of surnames. ‘Surname frequency’ is the number of times surnames appear in the sample. ‘Literate’ is a binary variable indicating literacy (can read and write). ‘In school’ is an indicator variable for individuals currently in school. The occupations dummies indicate contemporary occupational categories. Sample is restricted to male heads of households aged 21 and over who living in Georgia at the time of the census, were born in Georgia, and have non-missing surnames and property value.

I.4 County-level characteristics

County	Log value of farms	Log value of farm equip.	Log total # of farms	#	Log mean farm value	Log total farm acres	Per acre farm value	Free black pop. (%)	Slave pop. (%)	Slave births (%)	Slave deaths (%)
Baldwin	13.407	10.341	5.481	7.879	12.343	2.761	0.003	0.565	0.588	0.429	
Bryan	12.636	9.857	5.342	7.230	12.046	1.692	0.004	0.656	0.519	0.603	
Bulloch	12.761	9.724	6.021	6.691	13.122	0.663	0.000	0.340	0.301	0.250	
Burke	14.642	11.794	6.568	8.014	13.171	4.100	0.009	0.673	0.624	0.718	
Camden	13.715	10.242	5.460	8.223	12.240	4.234	0.001	0.672	0.534	0.836	
Chatham	14.513	12.251	4.883	9.520	11.866	12.643	0.031	0.587	0.541	0.499	
Clarke	13.876	11.028	5.991	7.825	12.197	5.051	0.002	0.503	0.496	0.570	
Columbia	14.213	11.682	6.192	7.938	12.613	4.559	0.006	0.692	0.657	0.791	
Effingham	12.646	9.721	5.730	6.861	12.358	1.263	0.002	0.478	0.385	0.529	
Elbert	14.262	11.443	6.690	7.511	12.655	4.691	0.001	0.484	0.524	0.636	
Franklin	13.882	11.335	7.174	6.626	12.900	2.461	0.005	0.207	0.211	0.417	
Glynn	13.544	10.353	4.522	8.980	11.574	6.877	0.001	0.858	0.761	0.858	
Greene	14.385	11.266	6.238	8.101	12.444	6.659	0.004	0.633	0.673	0.773	
Hancock	14.096	11.314	6.096	7.936	12.572	4.307	0.005	0.631	0.650	0.750	
Jackson	13.505	10.856	6.304	7.127	12.203	3.418	0.002	0.301	0.324	0.341	
Jefferson	14.118	11.483	6.288	7.756	12.603	4.227	0.005	0.588	0.578	0.679	
Liberty	13.563	10.400	5.497	8.022	12.743	2.174	0.002	0.745	0.571	0.767	
Lincoln	13.363	10.604	5.609	7.688	11.918	3.970	0.005	0.630	0.633	0.691	
Montgomery	11.678	9.094	5.124	6.475	12.140	0.582	0.000	0.285	0.326	0.273	
Oglethorpe	14.437	11.561	6.319	8.060	12.606	5.888	0.000	0.642	0.662	0.806	
Richmond	13.969	10.838	5.606	8.318	11.913	7.468	0.017	0.481	0.305	0.423	
Screven	13.320	10.672	6.211	7.036	13.144	1.109	0.000	0.536	0.447	0.344	
Tattnall	12.345	9.503	5.790	6.495	12.883	0.550	0.006	0.258	0.226	0.100	
Warren	14.335	11.434	6.405	7.873	12.825	4.277	0.013	0.492	0.494	0.522	
Washington	14.102	11.444	6.449	7.580	12.962	2.908	0.003	0.488	0.478	0.428	
Wayne	11.419	8.525	5.147	6.215	11.226	1.146	0.003	0.271	0.271	0.400	
Wilkes	14.112	11.332	6.148	7.899	12.571	4.378	0.002	0.684	0.742	0.756	
Wilkinson	13.723	11.147	6.469	7.175	12.662	2.670	0.000	0.331	0.324	0.276	

Table 3: Summary statistics on selected county-level characteristics for counties existing in 1805 from the 1850 Census. ‘Log total farm acres’ is the log of the sum of improved and unimproved acres of land in farms. ‘Log average farm value’ is the log of the difference between farm value and equipment value, over the total number of farms. ‘Per acre farm value’ is the difference between farm value and equipment value, over the sum of improved and unimproved acres of farm land. All dollar values are current (1850\$). The denominators for ‘Free black pop.’, ‘Slave pop.’, ‘Slave births’, and ‘Slave deaths’ are total population, total births, and total deaths, respectively.




Figure 8: Per acre farm value, drawn from the 1850 Census [Haines, 2010]. The outlined counties are those that existed in 1805. See Table 3 for variable description.




Figure 9: Slave population as a percentage of total population, drawn from the 1850 Census [Haines, 2010]. The outlined counties are those that existed in 1805.

J Balance of pretreatment characteristics

J.1 Balance plot

J.2 Binary variables: Balance table

Variable	Response	Control	%m	Treated	%n	All	%N
<i>Generational titles</i>							
Junior	0	17607	96.2	3205	97.0	20812	96.3
	1	700	3.8	100	3.0	800	3.7
$p = 0.361$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Senior	0	17649	96.4	3161	95.6	20810	96.3
	1	658	3.6	144	4.4	802	3.7
$p = 0.381$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
<i>Occupations</i>							
Blacksmith	0	18299	100.0	3302	99.9	21601	100.0
	1	8	0.0	3	0.1	11	0.1
$p = 0.248$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Bricklayer	0	18305	100.0	3305	100.0	21610	100.0
	1	2	0.0	0	0.0	2	0.0
$p = 0.403$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Hatter	0	18304	100.0	3304	100.0	21608	100.0
	1	3	0.0	1	0.0	4	0.0
$p = 0.665$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Lawyer	0	18213	99.5	3285	99.4	21498	99.5
	1	94	0.5	20	0.6	114	0.5
$p = 0.920$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Merchant	0	18303	100.0	3305	100.0	21608	100.0
	1	4	0.0	0	0.0	4	0.0
$p = 0.671$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Military	0	18283	99.9	3297	99.8	21580	99.8
	1	24	0.1	8	0.2	32	0.1
$p = 0.292$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Physician	0	18291	99.9	3305	100.0	21596	99.9
	1	16	0.1	0	0.0	16	0.1
$p = 0.079$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Reverend	0	18289	99.9	3304	100.0	21593	99.9
	1	18	0.1	1	0.0	19	0.1
$p = 0.234$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Teacher	0	18305	100.0	3304	100.0	21609	100.0
	1	2	0.0	1	0.0	3	0.0
$p = 0.850$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
<i>County of registration</i>							
Bryan	0	18232	99.6	3285	99.4	21517	99.6

	1	75	0.4	20	0.6	95	0.4
$p = 0.016$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Bulloch	0	18054	98.6	3262	98.7	21316	98.6
	1	253	1.4	43	1.3	296	1.4
$p = 0.493$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Burke	0	17234	94.1	3085	93.3	20319	94.0
	1	1073	5.9	220	6.7	1293	6.0
$p = 0.019$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Camden	0	18167	99.2	3284	99.4	21451	99.3
	1	140	0.8	21	0.6	161	0.7
$p = 0.547$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Chatham	0	17919	97.9	3249	98.3	21168	98.0
	1	388	2.1	56	1.7	444	2.0
$p = 0.504$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Clarke	0	17378	94.9	3140	95.0	20518	94.9
	1	929	5.1	165	5.0	1094	5.1
$p = 0.737$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Columbia	0	17336	94.7	3137	94.9	20473	94.7
	1	971	5.3	168	5.1	1139	5.3
$p = 0.453$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Effingham	0	18145	99.1	3273	99.0	21418	99.1
	1	162	0.9	32	1.0	194	0.9
$p = 0.510$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Elbert	0	17159	93.7	3089	93.5	20248	93.7
	1	1148	6.3	216	6.5	1364	6.3
$p = 0.954$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Franklin	0	17372	94.9	3143	95.1	20515	94.9
	1	935	5.1	162	4.9	1097	5.1
$p = 0.417$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Glynn	0	18143	99.1	3275	99.1	21418	99.1
	1	164	0.9	30	0.9	194	0.9
$p = 0.366$	all	18289	100.0	3314	100.0	21603	100.0
Greene	0	16743	91.5	3062	92.4	19805	91.7
	1	1546	8.4	252	7.6	1798	8.3
$p = 0.279$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Hancock	0	16535	90.3	2982	90.2	19517	90.3
	1	1772	9.7	323	9.8	2095	9.7
$p = 0.717$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Jackson	0	17321	94.6	3105	94.0	20426	94.5
	1	986	5.4	200	6.0	1186	5.5
$p = 0.458$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Jefferson	0	17633	96.3	3159	95.6	20792	96.2
	1	674	3.7	146	4.4	820	3.8
$p = 0.020$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Liberty	0	18093	98.8	3262	98.7	21355	98.8
	1	214	1.2	43	1.3	257	1.2

$p = 0.368$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Lincoln	0	17726	96.8	3207	97.0	20933	96.9
	1	581	3.2	98	3.0	679	3.1
$p = 0.800$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
McIntosh	0	18305	100.0	3305	100.0	21610	100.0
	1	2	0.0	0	0.0	2	0.0
$p = 0.333$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Montgomery	0	17804	97.2	3223	97.5	21027	97.3
	1	503	2.8	82	2.5	585	2.7
$p = 0.331$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Oglethorpe	0	17136	93.6	3096	93.7	20232	93.6
	1	1171	6.4	209	6.3	1380	6.4
$p = 0.380$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Richmond	0	17864	97.6	3237	97.9	21101	97.6
	1	443	2.4	68	2.1	511	2.4
$p = 0.228$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Screven	0	17963	98.1	3248	98.3	21211	98.1
	1	344	1.9	57	1.7	401	1.9
$p = 0.762$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Tattnall	0	18095	98.8	3264	98.8	21359	98.8
	1	212	1.2	41	1.2	253	1.2
$p = 0.280$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Warren	0	17293	94.5	3124	94.5	20417	94.5
	1	1014	5.5	181	5.5	1195	5.5
$p = 0.780$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Washington	0	17057	93.2	3098	93.7	20155	93.3
	1	1250	6.8	207	6.3	1457	6.7
$p = 0.646$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0
Wilkes	0	16952	92.6	3041	92.0	19993	92.5
	1	1355	7.4	264	8.0	1619	7.5
$p = 0.421$	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0

Table 4: Balance table for binary variables, by treatment assignment, for entire sample. ‘Military’ indicates participants listed with a military rank (i.e., Captain, Colonel, General, or Major).




Figure 10: Balance in treatment assignment for entire sample. p values are calculated using a two-sided randomization test ($\mathcal{L} = 10,000$ iterations) for weighted difference of means between treatment and control groups. Refer to footnotes in Tables 4 and 5 for variable descriptions.

J.3 Surname characteristics: Balance table

Variable	Treatment	N	Min.	Mean	Max.	S.d.
Surname frequency	0	18307	1	31.702	348	56.343
	1	3305	1	31.479	348	55.224
	all	21612	1	31.668	348	56.172
Surname length	0	18307	3	6.259	14	1.589
	1	3305	3	6.303	13	1.598
	all	21612	3	6.266	14	1.590

Table 5: Balance table for participant surname characteristics, by treatment assignment, for entire sample. ‘Surname frequency’ is the number of times surnames appear in the sample. ‘Surname length’ is the character length of surnames.

J.4 Surname characteristics: QQ plots




Figure 11: Q–Q plot for surname length.




Figure 12: Q–Q plot for surname frequency.

K Treatment effect on officeholding

K.1 Officeholding by treatment assignment

Variable	Response	Control	% _m	Treated	% _n	All	% _N
Officeholder	0	17832	97.4	3176	96.1	21008	97.2
	1	475	2.6	129	3.9	604	2.8
<i>p</i> < 0.001	all	18307	100.0	3305	100.0	21612	100.0

Table 6: Distribution of the outcome variable, by treatment assignment, for sample excluding widows, orphans, and pre-treatment officeholders. ‘Officeholder’ indicates whether participant held office between 1806 and 1846, inclusive.

L Sensitivity Analyses: Treatment effect on officeholding

L.1 Participants likely to meet freehold qualifications

Variable	Response	Control	% _m	Treated	% _n	All	% _N
Officeholder	0	11923	97.3	2167	96.5	14090	97.2
	1	334	2.7	79	3.5	413	2.9
<i>p</i> = 0.028	all	12257	100.0	2246	100.0	14503	100.0

Table 7: Distribution of the outcome variable, by treatment assignment, for sample of participants having a surname length of 6 characters or greater. See notes for Table 6.

L.2 Analysis of treatment-on-the-treated

Variable	Response	Control	% _m	Complier	%	Noncomplier	%	All	% _N
Officeholder	0	17832	97.4	2933	96.0	243	96.8	21008	97.2
	1	475	2.6	121	4.0	8	3.2	604	2.8
	all	18307	100.0	3054	100.0	251	100.0	21612	100.0

Table 8: Distribution of the outcome variable, by treatment assignment and compliance status. See notes for Table 6.

	IV/2SLS	IV/2SLS	IV/2SLS
Constant	0.026*** (0.001)	0.027*** (0.002)	0.030 (0.017)
Two draws		-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Treatment received	0.014*** (0.003)	0.015*** (0.003)	0.015*** (0.003)
County of registration	No	No	Yes
<i>R</i> ²	0.001	0.001	0.002
N	21612	21612	21612

Table 9: IV/2SLS estimates of the treatment effect on the treated. ‘Treatment received’ is a dummy variable indicating whether the participant received a land grant. ‘Two draws’ is a dummy variable indicating whether the participant registered for two draws. The omitted instrument is the treatment assignment indicator Z_i . ‘County of registration’ is a set of county dummies.

L.3 Analysis of treatment-on-the-treated: Three treatments

Variable	Treatment	Complier	%	Noncomplier	%	All	%N
Baldwin	0	1690	55.3	226	90.0	20191	93.4
	1	1364	44.7	25	10.0	1421	6.6
	all	3054	100.0	251	100.0	21612	100.0
Wayne	0	2523	82.6	52	20.7	20853	96.5
	1	531	17.4	199	79.3	759	3.5
	all	3054	100.0	251	100.0	21612	100.0
Wilkinson	0	1833	60.0	213	84.9	20326	94.0
	1	1221	40.0	38	15.1	1286	6.0
	all	3054	100.0	251	100.0	21612	100.0

Table 10: Distribution of treatment assignment, by county in which the land is drawn and compliance status. Excludes widows, orphans, and pretreatment officeholders.

	IV/2SLS	IV/2SLS	IV/2SLS
Constant	0.032 (0.017)	0.032 (0.017)	0.031 (0.017)
Two draws	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Treatment received (Baldwin)	0.016*** (0.005)		
Treatment received (Wayne)		0.020* (0.008)	
Treatment received (Wilkinson)			0.006 (0.005)
County of registration	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>R</i> ²	0.002	0.002	0.002
N	21612	21612	21612

Table 11: IV/2SLS estimates of the treatment effect on officeholding, by county in which the grant was actually received. ‘Treatment received’ is a dummy variable indicating whether the participant received a land grant in each of the respective counties. ‘Two draws’ is a dummy variable indicating whether the participant registered for two draws. The omitted instrument is the treatment assignment indicator Z_i . ‘County of registration’ is a set of county dummies.

M Summary of roll call votes on bills related to slavery

Year	Title or Text	Chamber	Direction	Vote total	Source
1813	"To emancipate and set free Abraham Mauzo, a person of color"	Senate	(-)	Yea 12 – nays 25	Journal
1816	"To emancipate a negro slave, named Caesar, commonly called Caesar Kennedy, and to carry into effect the last will and testament of Wm. Kennedy, late of Richmond county, dec'd"	Senate	(-)	Yea 12 – nays 19	Journal
1818	"To pardon a negro boy named Peter, the property of the late Mather Jones of Tattnall county, deceased"	Senate	(-)	Yea 16 – nays 21	Journal
1818	"To manumit and make free a certain negro slave, named therein, (the property of Henry Parks)"	House	(-)	Yea 39 – nays 51	Journal
1818	"To manumit and make free a certain person of color, named therein"	House	(-)	Yea 43 nays 44	Journal
1818	"To repeal that part of an act, passed the 20th of December, 1817, relative to the introduction of slaves into this state"	House	(+)	Yea 48 – nays 41	Journal
1821	"To alter and amend the several laws for the trial of Slaves and Free Persons of Color in this State"	Senate	(+)	Yea 34 – nays 7	Journal
1824	"To emancipate a certain colored man by the name of Henry, commonly called Henry Adams"	Senate	(-)	Yea 28 – nays 26	Journal
1824	"To repeal a law passed in the year 1817, prohibiting the introduction of slaves only on certain conditions"	Senate	(+)	Yea 33 – nays 13	Journal
1827	"To manumit a male slave and a female slave by the names of Davy and Hannah"	Senate	(-)	Yea 35 – nays 20	Journal
1831	"To alter and amend an act to impose an additional tax on Pedlers and other Itinerant Traders, passed the 9th December 1824;	Senate	(+)	Yea 39 – nays 27	Journal

and to punish such traders for illegal trading with slaves ”

1832	“Resolved, that we abhor the doctrine of nullification, as neither a peaceful or constitutional remedy, but, on the contrary, as tending to civil commotion and disunion: and while we deplore” the rash and revolutionary measures, recently adopted by the people” of South Carolina, we deem it a paramount duty, to warn our fellow citizens against the danger of adopting her mischievous policy.”	House	(-)	Yea ^s 102 – nay ^s 51	<i>Federal Union</i> (Dec. 6, 1832)
1841	“To protect the slave population of the people of the State of Georgia, by compelling vessels owned or commanded by citizens of, or coming from the ports of the State of Maine, and the officers, seamen and passengers thereof, to perform quarantine; and provide for a search thereof on their departure”	House	(+)	Yea ^s 78 – nay ^s 92	<i>Federal Union</i> (June 29, 1841)

Table 12: Summary of roll call votes on motions to pass final bills related to slavery. ‘Year’ is the year the bill was voted on. ‘Title’ is the full title of the bill. ‘Chamber’ indicates whether the vote occurred in the House or Senate. ‘Direction’ indicates whether an affirmative vote is coded as being in support of slavery (+) or not in support of slavery (-). ‘Vote total’ is the result of the roll call. ‘Source’ indicates the source of the roll call vote.

N Treatment effect on support for slavery

Variable	Treatment	N	Min.	Mean	Max.	S.d.
Support for slavery	0	138	0	0.661	1	0.422
	1	36	0	0.721	1	0.375
$p = 0.220$	all	174	0	0.674	1	0.412

Table 13: Distribution of the outcome variable, by treatment assignment, for lottery participants who held the office in the Georgia General Assembly, and who voted on at least one of the thirteen bills used to form the outcome variable. ‘Support for slavery’ is the mean of votes in favor of slavery for roll calls in which the member is present. p values are calculated using a randomization test for weighted difference of means between treatment and control groups.


N.1 Analysis of treatment-on-the-treated: Three treatments

	IV/2SLS	IV/2SLS	IV/2SLS
Constant	0.525 (0.304)	0.513 (0.306)	0.508 (0.311)
Two draws	-0.025 (0.070)	-0.013 (0.071)	-0.014 (0.072)
Treatment received (Baldwin)	0.177 (0.124)		
Treatment received (Wayne)		-0.001 (0.194)	
Treatment received (Wilkinson)			0.012 (0.139)
County of registration	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.119	0.107	0.107
N	174	174	174


Table 14: IV/2SLS estimates of the treatment effect on support for slavery, by county in which the grant was actually received. ‘Treatment received’ is a dummy variable indicating whether the participant received a land grant in each of the respective counties. ‘Two draws’ is a dummy variable indicating whether the participant registered for two draws. The omitted instrument is the treatment assignment indicator Z_i . ‘County of registration’ is a set of county dummies.

N.2 Randomization distributions

Treatment effect on officeholding



Treatment effect on officeholding: Above property threshold



Treatment effect on demand for slavery

