# Revision memo:

"Estimating population average treatment effects from experiments with noncompliance" (DGJCI.2018.0011)

1	Editor's comments		
	1.1	Definition of SATE	
	1.2	DAG	
	1.3	No defier assumption	
	1.4	Assumption 7	
	1.5	Conceptualizing PATT-C	
	1.6	Theorem 1	
	1.7	Prediction threshold	
	1.8	Same $W$	
	1.9	Formal definition of PATT	
2	Reviewer 1 (R1)'s comments		
	2.1	Definition of SATE	
	2.2	Estimation of PATT	
	2.3	Small points	
3	Oth	er revisions	
	3.1	Simulation	

## 1 Editor's comments

#### 1.1 Definition of SATE

Following R1's guidance, and conforming to naming conventions in the recent literature on causal inference with noncompliance (Yau and Little 2001; Frumento et al. 2012), we now call this quantity the sample Complier Average Causal Effect (CACE).

- 1.2 DAG
- 1.3 No defier assumption
- 1.4 Assumption 7
- 1.5 Conceptualizing PATT-C
- 1.6 Theorem 1
- 1.7 Prediction threshold
- 1.8 Same W
- 1.9 Formal definition of PATT
- 2 Reviewer 1 (R1)'s comments

#### 2.1 Definition of SATE

R1 points out that what we have referred to as SATE is inconsistent with how we'd usually define SATE. The quantity we're interested in estimating is the sample local average treatment effect among the compliers. This quantity is commonly referred to as the LATE in the econometrics literature (e.g., Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996) (AIR). Freedman (2006) shows that the instrumental variables estimator for the LATE proposed by AIR is equivalent to scaling the ITT effect by the proportion of treated compliers in the RCT.

Following the guidance of R1, we refer to this quantity in the revised manuscript as the Complier Average Causal Effect (CACE) and define it in Eq. (4). Referring to this quantity as the CACE also conforms to recent naming conventions in the literature concerning program evaluation in the presence of noncompliance (Yau and Little 2001; Frumento et al. 2012).

### 2.2 Estimation of PATT

### 2.3 Small points

#### Alternative complier-adjusted population estimator

R1 is correct: a more appropriate thought experiment to our proposed PATT-C is an estimator that reweights the ITT effect to the whole population and then divides by the proportion of treated compliers in the population. We have revised the manuscript accordingly.

#### Exclusion criteria and strong ignorability

The strong ignorability assumptions would be violated if the known exclusion criteria are correlated with unobserved factors that also determine potential outcomes. High exclusion would therefore increase the likelihood that there are unobserved differences between the RCT and target population.

We have revised the manuscript to make this point more straightforward and to provide an example. We also note that bias resulting from violations of ignorability assumptions would be detected in the placebo tests. Our placebo test results show no bias in estimates of the complier-average population effects.

#### RCT policy motivation

We've added a line in the introduction to emphasize the policy motivation for the health insurance RCT, as suggested by R1.

#### HH-level treatment

#### **Typos**

We fixed the two typos helpfully pointed out by R1.

## 3 Other revisions

#### 3.1 Simulation

We found that the confounding variable  $W_i^4$  was missing in the response equation in both the code and the write-up of the simulation design in Section 4.

In the current manuscript, we have included  $W_i^4$  and constant  $c_3$  (set to 1) in the response equation in the code and write-up and re-ran the simulation. The new compliance heatmaps (Figures 2 and A1) share a common gradient scale to ensure comparability between the PATT-C, PATT, and CACE estimators. The heatmaps show the PATT-C yields lower estimation error than its unadjusted counterpart when the population compliance rate is relatively low (i.e., 80% or less). The new bar plot comparing the RMSE of estimators when varying the population compliance rate (Figure 3) shows, as expected, the estimation error of

the estimators is inversely related to the population compliance rate. PATT-C outperforms its unadjusted counterpart when the compliance rate is relatively low (i.e., 80% and lower).

## References

- Angrist, Joshua D., Guido W. Imbens, and Donald B. Rubin. 1996. "Identification of Causal Effects Using Instrumental Variables." *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 91, no. 434 (June): 444–455.
- Freedman, David A. 2006. "Statistical Models for Causation What Inferential Leverage Do They Provide?" *Evaluation Review* 30 (6): 691–713.
- Frumento, Paolo, Fabrizia Mealli, Barbara Pacini, and Donald B Rubin. 2012. "Evaluating the effect of training on wages in the presence of noncompliance, nonemployment, and missing outcome data." *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 107 (498): 450–466.
- Yau, Linda HY, and Roderick J Little. 2001. "Inference for the complier-average causal effect from longitudinal data subject to noncompliance and missing data, with application to a job training assessment for the unemployed." *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 96 (456): 1232–1244.