Two kinds of *de re* blocking[1]

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MIT Ling Lunch
March 18, 2010

1   Overview and goals of the talk

- I'll be looking at (mostly English) pronouns in intensional contexts, in particular the distribution of so-called *de re* and *de se* forms across anaphors and non-anaphoric pronouns.

- We'll start with an introduction to some of the issues and some of the technology.

- I'll argue that *de se* forms can bind *de re* anaphors, but *de re* forms can't bind *de se* anaphors.

- Additionally, I'll argue that (a) *de se* readings are grammatically encoded and (b) that grammatical processes—e.g. Conditions A and B, Fox's (2000) Economy of variable binding—are *sensitive to* the *de re* vs. *de se* distinction, *pace* Anand (2006), but in sympathy with Heim (1993).

- An Economy-like condition on *de re* "introduction" is proposed and defended, with consequences for Zimmermann's (1991) argument that *de re* LFs are compatible with *de se* readings.

2   Preliminaries: attitudes *de se* and *de re*

2.1   A well-worn example

- Kaplan's (1989) pants are on fire, but (improbably) he doesn't realize it. Looking in a mirror, he either (a) recognizes himself and thinks, "My god, *I'm* on fire" or (b) doesn't and thinks, "Hey, *that guy's* on fire."

  (1)   Kaplan$_i$ thinks that his$_i$ pants are on fire.

- (1) has two true readings describing two very different cognitive states; (a)'s is *de se*, and (b)'s is *de re*.

2.2   Some semantics

- *De se* reading as self-ascription of a property (Lewis 1979). Implemented with *centered worlds* $\in D_e \times D_s$:

  (2)   Restricting attention to belief ascriptions, $\langle x', w' \rangle \in \mathrm{Att}_x^w \leftrightarrow x'$ is someone x thinks^w she might be, and w' is a way x thinks^w the world might be.

  (3) $\lambda P_{\langle e, st \rangle}, x, w \,.\, \forall \langle x', w' \rangle \in \mathrm{Att}_x^w \,.\, P(x')(w') = 1$

  (4)   We get a property by λ-abstracting over *his*$_i$... $\rightsquigarrow \lambda i_e, w_s \,.\, [\![x_i\text{'s pants are on fire}]\!]^{w,g}$

  (5) $[\![(1)^{de\,se}]\!]^{w,g} = 1 \leftrightarrow \forall \langle x', w' \rangle \in \mathrm{Dox}_{\mathbf{kap}}^w \,.\, \mathbf{pants\text{-}on\text{-}fire}(x')(w') = 1$
         i.e. just in case x self-ascribes the **pants-on-fire** property

- *De re* as *de dicto* (Kaplan 1968):

  (6) $[\![(1)^{de\,re}]\!]^{w,g} = 1 \leftrightarrow \exists R \,.\, \forall \langle x', w' \rangle \in \mathrm{Dox}_{\mathbf{kap}}^w \,.\, \mathbf{pants\text{-}on\text{-}fire}(w')(R(x')(w')) = 1$
         i.e. just in case x thinks "the person who bears R to me's pants are on fire."
         (1) maps to True since there exists such an R, namely $\lambda i, w \,.\, [\![\text{the person } x_i \text{ thinks in the window}]\!]^{w,g}$

 (7)   Constraining R: (a) it's a *vivid* description for x for $g(i)$ (x is acquainted with $g(i)$), (b) $R(x)(w) = g(i)$.

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  (8)   Crucially, $g(i)$ cannot be evaluated in the scope of a co-indexed λ_i—cf. (4); otherwise you end up relating the attitude holder to people he thinks he might be rather than to himself. We'll come back to this later.

  (9)   Has the effect of replacing x_i with a nonrigid definite description $\rightsquigarrow$ can vary across doxastic alternatives.

2.3   Implementing this compositionally

- Percus & Sauerland (2003a) (PS): *de re* DPs occur as sisters of *concept generators* G.

- G is a free variable of type $\langle e, se \rangle$. Maps an individual (the *res*) to a non-rigid individual concept.

- PS assume that G is co-indexed with an abstraction operator in the syntax. So the complements of attitude predicates will be of type $\langle \tau_G, \langle e, st \rangle \rangle$.

- So, need a new denotation for attitude predicates: $\lambda P_{\langle \tau_G, \langle e, st \rangle \rangle}, x, w \,.\, \underbrace{\exists G}\, \forall \langle x', w' \rangle \in \mathrm{Att}_x^w \,.\, P(\underbrace{G})(x')(w') = 1$

- Attitude predicates restrict the sorts of Gs they feed to P. For any $y \in \mathrm{Dom}(G)$, attitude holder x, and attitude Att_x^w consisting of a set of centered worlds $\langle x', w' \rangle$, there must be a vivid R which uniquely relates x' to some y at w' and uniquely relates x to the *res*—G's first argument—at w.

- Here's how the syntax looks on this picture (given with typed nodes):

  (10)

2.4   Dedicated *de se* LFs?

- Imagine a G (supplied by an attitude predicate) that had no semantic effect: i.e. for every $\langle x', w' \rangle \in \mathrm{Att}_x^w$ and an arbitrary DP n, $[\![G\,n]\!]^{w',g} = [\![n]\!]^{w',g}$.

- If n was a pronoun x_i co-indexed with the abstractor λ_i, this would amount to just having x_i bound by λ_i; i.e. a *de re* LF (as in 10) would be compatible with a *de se* reading.

- Evidence that *de re* LFs *should* be compatible with *de se*, due to Zimmermann (1991):

  (11)   Bert, Dave, and Will are candidates in an election. On election night, all three sit down to watch the returns. It turns out that each wins his respective election. A clip plays of each winner, and the candidates all see it. Dave and Will are drunk, so neither realizes that the winner is he-himself. Bert's sober, so he does...
         ✓Each$_i$ of the candidates thinks that he$_i$ got elected.

- Are *de se* (G-less) LFs necessary at all?

- PS show certain operators are sensitive to the *de se-de re* distinction.

(12)　　Only Bert$_i$ realizes he$_i$ got elected

- (12) can be true in scenario (11), even if you add Bob to the scenario, who thinks, "Bert was elected" (i.e. to control for a "strict" construal of he$_i$ being what makes the sentence true).

- PS argue that this necessitates a dedicated *de se* LF, but that doesn't follow.

- Anand (2006: 25): Leave G *free*; context simply supplies a *de se*-yielding G; the truth of (12) follows. Then parametrization of G (à la Skolemized choice functions) to get covariation of Gs under ∀ in (11).

- PRO is obligatorily *de se* (cf. Morgan 1970; Chierchia 1989), but PRO might restrict which Gs it gets fed.

3　Some data from English

3.1　"Controlled" *de re* anaphors

- (Obligatorily) *de se* pronouns can (apparently?) antecede *de re* anaphors:

(13)　　Molly, the editor of a fiction journal, receives a short story from Will for review. Will's a plagiarist, and it turns out his submission was something Molly wrote in grad school. Molly, impressed with the piece, doesn't recognize that it's her own work. She decides she wants to publish it.
✓Molly wants to publish HERSELF!

- Analogous judgments reported in Heim (1994); Anand (2006, 2007); Sharvit (2009). Sharvit notes that unexpected Condition B effects also crop up.

- Heim (1994), presumably operating under the assumption that binding of some x by some y means x and y share acquaintance relations/*guises* (cf. Heim 1993), treats cases like (13) as the result of *long-distance anaphora* (LDA):

(14)　　Molly$_i$ wants λ$_j$ PRO$_j$ to publish HERSELF$_i$!

- What allows LDA in these cases is (according to Heim) something like invisibility of *de se* forms to BT.

- Somewhat surprising(?) since LDA tends to result in obligatorily *de se* interpretations—e.g. Mandarin Chinese *ziji* (see Anand 2006 for extensive discussion).

- Also, some problematic cases:

(15)　　Molly$_i$'s talking to Phil$_j$ about PRO$_{i/j/i+j/arb/*k}$ getting published. (after Jackendoff & Culicover 2003)

(16)　　Molly gets Phil's manuscript from Will the plagiarist.
*Molly$_i$'s talking to Phil$_j$ about PRO$_i$ publishing HIMSELF$_j$!

- Since (a) co-indexation between PRO and the matrix subject is licit in these sorts of control configurations, and (b) PRO$_i$ is *de se* and accordingly optionally invisible to BT, why should (16) be illicit?

- LDA is typically subject-oriented. The instance of LDA in (16) isn't. But this won't explain:

(17)　　Will urges Molly to publish the story he sent her (i.e. hers).
✓Will$_i$'s telling Molly$_j$ PRO$_j$ to publish HERSELF$_j$!

(18)　　Two editors, this time: Molly and Phil. Will the plagiarist sends Molly Phil's manuscript and vice versa. Molly reads and loves both without recognizing who wrote either. She tells Phil she'll publish hers, and he should his.
✓Molly$_i$'s talking to Phil$_j$ about PRO$_{i+j}$ publishing EACH OTHER$_{i+j}$!

(19)　　Molly receives both manuscripts.
*Molly$_i$'s talking to Phil$_j$ about PRO$_{*\{i,j\}}$ publishing EACH OTHER$_{i+j}$!

- The LDA isn't subject-oriented in either (17) or (18).[2]

- If there's somehow some non-PRO antecedent for the reciprocal in (18), what happened to it in (19)?

- Conclusion: *de re* readings of reflexives with (obligatorily) *de se* antecedents don't result (exclusively, anyway) from long-distance binding. *De se* pronouns can antecede *de re* anaphors.

- So obligatory binding doesn't obligate identical Gs.

4　A "blocking" effect in English

- The above suggests a range of other configurations should be OK:

(20)　　she$^{de\ se}$ … herself$^{de\ se}$

(21)　　she$^{de\ re}$ … herself$^{de\ se}$

(22)　　she$^{de\ re_1}$ … herself$^{de\ re_1}$

(23)　　she$^{de\ re_1}$ … herself$^{de\ re_2}$

- Examples of (20) and (22) are relatively straightforward to adduce.

  - (20) is the vanilla reading of *Molly thinks she should publish something by herself*.

(24)　　Molly thinks, "That woman published something by herself," though "that woman" is in fact her.
✓Molly thinks SHE published something by herself!

  - So (22) is fine (both *she* and *herself* roughly correspond to *that woman* across Molly's doxastic alternatives).

- How about (23)? The example becomes a bit more complicated:

(25)　　Someone videotapes the sorry affair and shows it to Molly one night when she's drunk. Molly follows the plot but doesn't recognize that the author or the editor are in fact herself, nor that they're in fact identical to each other.
✓Molly thinks SHE published something by HERSELF!

- So (23) is a licit configuration, as well.[3]

(26)　　✓she$^{de\ se}$ … herself$^{de\ se}$

(27)　　_she$^{de\ re}$ … herself$^{de\ se}$

(28)　　✓she$^{de\ re_1}$ … herself$^{de\ re_1}$

(29)　　✓she$^{de\ re_1}$ … herself$^{de\ re_2}$

- Sharvit (2009) notes that (27) is actually not OK:[4]

(30)　　Molly thinks, "This author [i.e. Molly] should submit some revisions."
#Molly thinks SHE should get herself some revisions.

- In fact, a Condition B violation is *preferred*:[5]

(31)　　Molly thinks SHE should get her some revisions.

- Importantly, cases where a *de re* pronoun c-commands a non-reflexive *de se* pronoun are OK: e.g. *Molly thinks SHE should be published in her journal* (see Anand 2006; Sharvit 2009 for discussion). ⤳ Something about reflexives.

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2 In (17) PRO represents a *de te* form—see Schlenker (1999) for discussion.
3 Yael Sharvit (p.c.) notes that Hebrew speakers concur.
4 There's additional complications I can' go into here. Basically: there's certain less obvious intonational profiles which make (30) sound alright in its scenario. Is this felicity due to a *de re-de se* reading? PS-style tests show it *isn't* and that the reading in question arises from something like *event-de re*—cf. Heim (1993) for discussion of some similar cases. So you can't use a DE operator to "single out" the *de re-de se* reading the way we did in (12). *Only Molly thinks she should get published by herself* cannot be used in a situation characterized by (among other things) Molly thinking, "This author should be published by me."
5 This is of course highly reminiscent of the sorts of cases discussed in Heim (1993) and dating back to Lakoff (1972). To express the

5 Consequences for *de se* reductionism

- But we've arrived at a weird set of facts:

(32) ✓she$^{de\ se}$ ... herself$^{de\ se}$

(33) ✗she$^{de\ re}$ ... herself$^{de\ se}$

(34) ✓she$^{de\ re_1}$ ... herself$^{de\ re_1}$

(35) ✓she$^{de\ re_1}$ ... herself$^{de\ re_2}$

- Given Zimmermann's argument that *de re* must be compatible with *de se*, ✓(35) should imply ✓(33).

- So *de re* LFs should in fact *not* be compatible with *de se* readings, for reflexives anyway.

- Which is to say that Zimmermann's example shouldn't work with mixed readings of reflexives. Let's see:

(36) Molly, Irene, and Dani, all journal editors, each decide to publish an article. Molly's article is written by Molly, Irene's by Irene, and so on. But only Dani realizes she's self-publishing.
✓Each of those editors decided to publish herself.

- Summing up: *de re* reflexives don't seem like they can be interpreted *de se*, keeping (33) consistent with (35). But reflexives pass Zimmermann's mixed-readings test anyway, which they shouldn't (i.e. the proposition that for each editor there exists some *de re* construal such that so-and-so should be incompatible with any of the editors deciding to publish she-herself).

- This is puzzling. We'll come back to it at the end.

6 Anand's account of *de re* blocking

- This phenomenon quite reminiscent of *de re* blocking (DRB) effects for Yoruba logophors and *de se* pronouns in English dream reports—cf. Adesola (2005); Anand (2006, 2007).

(37) Olu$_i$ so pé o$_{*i,j}$ rí bàbá òun$_i$
Olu say that o see father oun-gen
Olu$_i$ said that he$_{*i,j}$ has seen his$_i$ father. (Adesola 2005, ex. 59a, p. 213)

(38) Olu$_i$ so pé bàbá rè$_{i,j}$ ti rí ìyá òun$_i$
Olu say that father o-gen PERF see mother oun-gen
Olu$_i$ said that his$_{i,j}$ father has seen his$_i$ mother. (Adesola 2005, ex. 60, p. 213)

(39) I dreamt I was Brigitte Bardot, and I kissed me.
✗ *de re* ... *de se*

(40) I dreamt I was Brigitte Bardot, and my mother kissed me.
✓ *de re* ... *de se*

- In (37)–(38), *o* is a weak form, ambiguous between *de re* and *de se* uses; *oun* is a strong (logophoric) form, unambiguously *de se*.

- (37) and (38) show that a c-commanding co-indexed weak form is sufficient to block appearance of a strong form.

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thought that *if I were you, I'd hate me too* expresses, a reflexive form won't suffice; *if I were you, I'd hate myself too* means something quite different. So a Condition B violation is preferred "in order to" yield a construction which means something the BT-obeying version cannot.

Interestingly this doesn't hold in (at least) Hungarian, where the reflexive constructions are ambiguous, and the Condition B violating cases are sharply ungrammatical. Possibly related: in Hungarian you cannot say the analog of *I put the book next to me*; a reflexive form is required. Thanks to Anna Szabolcsi (p.c.) for discussion of these facts.

- Dream reports—exs. (39)–(40)—reported to show the same sort of effect—see Percus & Sauerland (2003b); Anand (2006) for discussion.[6,7]

- We focus on Anand's account of logophoric DRB (the details for the dream report case are similar in the important respects).

- Anand's crucial assumptions:

  i. Pronouns ambiguous between bare (obligatorily *de se*), G-having (*de re*) forms.

  ii. Bare forms must get bound by a +log operator (i.e. the λ-abstract). G having forms needn't.

  iii. Fox's (2000) Economy of variable binding—roughly, if two binding configurations give the same truth conditions, the longer one is ungrammatical (we'll see how this works shortly)—is operative and (Anand assumes) *insensitive to the de re-de se distinction*.

- This suffices to derive DRB for Yoruba logophors:

- Given assumption (ii), oun_i^{+log} needs to be bound by λ_i^{+log}.

- Given assumption (iii), oun_i^{+log} needs to be bound by o_i^{-log}.

- Inconsistency isn't resolved ⤳ crash.

7 Why this falls short for our cases

- Recall (a simpler version of) our case of DRB with anaphors:

(46) Molly thinks that SHE wrote herself.
✗ *de re* ... *de se*

- Let's assume that *de re* anaphors can't take "do-nothing" (i.e. *de se*-yielding) Gs.

- In other words, *de re* anaphors are never *de se* (recall we argued for this above). The only way to get a *de se* anaphor is with a bare (i.e. +*log*) anaphor.

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6 I don't find this effect so robust across syntactic configurations. For instance: *I dreamt I was an baby carrot sitting immobile on the kitchen counter. I could only watch in horror as it appeared to dawn on me that I might make a tasty snack.* Here the *de re* form *me* is a potential binder of the *de se* form *I* (cf. *it dawed on no one$_i$ that he$_i$...*). So blocking should be in effect. But this construction seems fine.

7 Malamud (2010) points to *de re* blocking of impersonals in English. English *you* ambiguous between *deictic* (D) and *impersonal* (I) forms:

(41) In those days, you were allowed to rob you. ✓ID, ✗DI

(42) Learn to make your favorite food! ✗DI

(43) PRO$_{arb}$ reading your mind is fun. ✓ID

(44) In those days, your mother was allowed to rob you. ✓ID, ✓DI

(45) In those days, if you were in a good mood, you'd be allowed an extension on your final. ✓ID, ✓DI

- Then an Anandian account looks like this:

Molly
thinks
that
λ_i^{+log}
she$_i^{-log}$
wrote   herself$_i^{+log}$

- Actually, Economy of variable binding might not be playing any crucial role here. Condition A might guarantee that *herself*$_i^{+log}$ can't be bound by λ_i^{+log}.

- But Economy of variable binding still assumed to be active. And this leads to a major issue. Apologies for the lame scenario:

(47)   Molly thinks, "I want to show myself to that woman on TV." "That woman" is, as you may have guessed, Molly, though she doesn't realize it.
Molly wants to show HERSELF herself!
✓ *de re ... de se*

(48)   Molly thinks, "I'm showing that woman [Molly] myself."
✓ Molly believes she's showing HERSELF herself.

(49)   Molly thinks, "I want that woman [Molly] to hug me."
✗ Molly wants HERSELF to hug herself.
✓ Molly wants HERSELF to hug her.

- A standard assumption is that the indirect object c-commands the direct object in double-object constructions—cf. Barss & Lasnik (1986).

- So we should have blocking in (47)–(48), *but we don't.*

- We only have blocking in (49), where the ECM "subject" of the complement clause isn't de se. Suggests that a *de se* subject is what really licenses a *de se* anaphor, rather than a *de se* closest antecedent.

- Importantly, the analogous double-object constructions are reported *ungrammatical* in Yoruba:

(50)
| John$_i$ | gbàgbó | pé | bàbá | òun$_i$ | fún | un$_{*i,j}$ | ìwé | oun$_i$ |
| John | believe | that | father | oun-gen | give | o-acc | book | oun-gen |

John$_i$ believed that his$_i$ father gave him$_{*i,j}$ his$_i$ book.

- Conclusion: DRB of anaphors is fundamentally distinct from DRB of logophors.

- Moreover, the assumptions powering Anand's treatment of DRB of logophors and dream-report pronouns yield the wrong results for English reflexives in double-object constructions.

- Seems to suggest that if Economy of variable binding exists, it's *sensitive to* the *de re-de se* distinction:

(51)   John said he likes his mother, and Bill did too.
✗ STRICT$_j$ SLOPPY$_b$

(52)   John said his mother likes him, and Bill did too.
✓ STRICT$_j$ SLOPPY$_b$

(53)   Olympia and Susan are roommates. One day they return home from the Senate chamber to find that they've been burgled. Horrors: both of their computers are gone. They walk around the apartment looking for clues and discover that a plant has been knocked over in the living room. They surmise that whoever the thief was, (s)he must have been the one who knocked over that plant. In reality, Olympia knocked the plant over the previous evening in a drunken stupor, an incident she has completely forgotten.
Well this is funny. Olympia thinks SHE stole her computer, and Susan does too.
✓ STRICT$_o$ SLOPPY$_s$

- Perhaps (53) has a status similar to *is that Zelda? It must be; she praises her to the skies*—i.e. *guises matter.*

8   Towards an account

8.1   Preliminaries

- The restriction placed on G previously was *ad hoc*—only applied to reflexives and only served to (sorta) derive our problematic data.

- Mixed readings of reflexives in quantificational contexts (*each of those editors wants to publish herself*), coupled with the conclusion that *de re* reflexives can't be *de se*, means we actually have no reason to believe *de re* is *ever* compatible with *de se*, including for non-anaphoric pronouns.

- A thought: G-"introduction" (*de re*-ification) has to have some semantic effect across the attitude ascribee's attitude-(centered)-worlds.

- An Economy-like story might be spun:

- The quantificational cases are OK because allowing a *de re* pronoun to be read *de se* for one (but not all!) of the individuals quantified over gets us a reading we couldn't have otherwise (the mixed one!).[8]

- So *de se* LFs are the only way to *de se* in most cases.

8.2   *De re* blocking of reflexives

- Recall the English reflexives data (and putting aside the double objects for the moment):

(54) ✓ she$^{de\,se}$ ... herself$^{de\,se}$
(55) ✗ she$^{de\,re}$ ... herself$^{de\,se}$
(56) ✓ she$^{de\,re_1}$ ... herself$^{de\,re_1}$
(57) ✓ she$^{de\,re_1}$ ... herself$^{de\,re_2}$

- Adding an insight from Sharvit (2009) (Condition B effects persist with a *de re* pronoun):

(58)   Molly: "I should publish that woman [Molly]."
Molly thinks she should publish *HER/✓HERSELF!

- A proposal: BT's covaluation (good in Condition A; bad in Condition B) only looks at *extensional* covaluation—i.e. covaluation at the matrix indices of evaluation.

- Recall that G is constrained to guarantee that it returns the *res* at the matrix indices of evaluation.

- So we predict:

(59) ✓ she$^{de\,se}$ ... herself$^{de\,se}$

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8 Thanks to Philippe Schlenker (p.c.) for pointing this out.

(60) ✓she$^{de\ re}$ ... herself$^{de\ se}$

(61) ✓she$^{de\ re_1}$ ... herself$^{de\ re_1}$

(62) ✓she$^{de\ re_1}$ ... herself$^{de\ re_2}$

(63) ✗she$^{de\ se}$ ... her$^{de\ re}$

(64) ✗she$^{de\ re}$ ... her$^{de\ re}$

- Problem lines: (60), (64). Here's what I think is happening:

- *De se* pronouns must bear the same index as the λ-abstract; in Anand's terms, they must be bound by something that's +*log*. This is what turns *de se*-containing clauses into properties.

- But a reflexive has conditions on how far away it can get bound—cf. Condition A.

- A reflexive in object position is simply too far from the λ-abstract to get bound by it directly. Has to pass through a subject, which entails that the subject must be +*log*.

Molly — thinks — λ_i^{+log} — IP — she$_i^{+log}$ — wrote — herself$_i^{+log}$

Molly — thinks — λ_i^{+log} — IP — $-log$ — G she$_i$ — wrote — herself$_i^{*+log}$

- Put another way: covaluation isn't what buys us DRB with reflexives. It's the locality requirement that reflexives have which does the work.

- Double-object constructions don't have DRB of a DO anaphor by a *de re* IO (*John wants to show HIMSELF himself*) since in these cases the DO anaphor is close enough to a *de se* subject to get bound by it—cf. *John showed Mary himself*:

Molly — wants — λ_i^{+log} — PRO$_i^{+log}$ — to show — $-log$ G herself$_i$ — herself$_i^{+log}$

- (64) *is* a Condition B violation in a strict sense, but it's rescued since (a) it's the only way to get at the *de re-de se* interpretation, (b) *guises can help obviate Condition B*—Heim (1993).

9 Conclusion

- In English *de se* pronouns can bind *de re* anaphors, but *de re* pronouns cannot bind *de se* anaphors.

- I've tried to argue that DRB of English anaphors is an important datum which presents substantial difficulties for Anand's (2006) account of DRB of Yoruba logophors and English dream report pronouns.

- In particular, I argued that Economy of variable binding must either not exist or, if it does, it must be sensitive to the *de re-de se* distinction to account for the double-object constructions.

- I gave an account on which BT checked matrix covaluation only. DRB of reflexives was ruled out by the locality restrictions on an anaphor's antecedent inherent to Condition A.

- But where does this leave us with respect to the logophor and dream-report DRB cases (as well as DRB of impersonals—cf. fn. 7)—neither of which can result from Condition A-like locality? Not clear.

- The contrast between Yoruba and English double-object constructions with respect to DRB (Yoruba has DRB; English doesn't) suggests that they should be analyzed as (at least somewhat) separate phenomena.

- Thanks!

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