

# Bugs Framework (BF)

Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD)

April 4, 2024

# Agenda

- Introduction
  - CWE, CVE, NVD
  - BF Approach
  - BF Security Concepts
- BF
  - Bugs Models
  - Weakness Taxonomies
  - Vulnerability Models
  - Formal Language
- BF Datasets
  - BFCWE
  - BCVE
- BF Vulnerability Classification Model
- Potential Impacts

# Introduction

# Current State of the Art

- Weaknesses

[CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/) – Common Weakness Enumeration

<https://cwe.mitre.org/>

- Vulnerabilities

[CVE](https://cve.mitre.org/) – Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures

<https://cve.mitre.org/>

- Assigning weaknesses to vulnerabilities – CWEs to CVEs

[NVD](https://nvd.nist.gov/) – National Vulnerabilities Database

<https://nvd.nist.gov/>

# Repository Challenges

1. Imprecise descriptions
2. Unclear causality
3. Gaps in coverage
4. Overlaps in coverage
5. Wrong NVD assignments
6. No tracking methodology
7. No tools




Focus is on descriptions

Repository Challenges	Imprecise Descriptions	Unclear Causality	Gaps in Coverage	Overlaps in Coverage	Wrong CVE to CWE mapping	No Tracking Methodology	No Tools
CWE	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
CVE	✓	✓				✓	✓
NVD	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓


BF is a classification of security bugs and related faults, featuring a formal language for unambiguous specification of weaknesses and underlined by them vulnerabilities.

- Bugs and faults – as weakness causes
- Errors and final errors – as weakness consequences
- BF formal language – based on:
  - Weakness taxonomies
  - Bugs models
  - Vulnerability models

# BF Weakness




# BF Weakness States





# BF Vulnerability

BF Vulnerability



BF, I. Bojanova, 2014-2024

Improper State: an  $(operation, operand, ..., operand_n)$  tuple with at least one improper element

↪ Chaining



Initial State – caused by a Bug



Propagation State – caused by a Fault




Final State – supplies an Exploit Vector



Failure – result of the exploit of the vector supplied by the Final Error

# BF Bugs Detection

## BF Bug Identification



BF, I. Bojanova, 2014-2024

Improper State: an  $(operation, operand_1, \dots, operand_n)$  tuple with at least one improper element

↪ Chaining

↩ Backtrack to previous State



Initial State – caused by a Bug



Propagation State – caused by a Fault



Final State – results in an Exploitable Error



Failure – caused by exploitation of the Final Error

# BF Security Concepts

Bug/Fault – relates to **Execution Phase**:

Operations

Input Operands

Output Results

- **Security Bug**

- Code or specification defect
- May result from a hardware defect
- May resurface by configuration/environment

- **Fault**

- Name, data, type, address, or size error
- Could be from a Bug or induced by a hardware defect

- **Error**

- From bug or fault
- Propagates to another fault

- **Security Final Error**

- From bug or fault
- Undefined system behavior

- **Security Weakness**

- (bug, operation, error)  
(fault, operation, error)  
(bug, operation, final error)  
(fault, operation, final error)


- **Security Vulnerability**

- Chain of weaknesses
- Bug → Error/Fault → ... → Final Error

- **Security Failure**

- Violation of system security requirement
  - Information Exposure (IEX)
  - Data Tempering (TPR)
  - Denial of Service (DoS)
  - Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE)

# BF Security Concepts Model



Operation<sub>1</sub> has a Bug and results in Error 1, which becomes Fault<sub>1</sub> for Operation<sub>2</sub>, leading to Error<sub>2</sub>.


The chain goes on, until the last operation results in a Final Error, leading to a Failure.

# BF Bugs Models

## NLST




# BF Input/Output Model (\_INP) Bugs Model



- Identify Secure Code Principles:
  - Input/Output Safety

# BF Data Type (\_DAT) Bugs Model

BF Data Type Bugs Model



- Identify Secure Code Principles:
  - Data Type Safety




# BF Weakness Taxonomies

# BF Memory Use (MUS) Class – Example from \_MEM Class Type

## Bugs Framework (BF)

Memory Corruption/Disclosure (\_MEM) Class Type  
Memory Use (MUS) Class



Bugs Framework (BF), I. Bojanova, 2014-2024

## BF Memory Use (MUS) Class


*An object is initialized, read, written, or cleared improperly.*

(Bug, Operation<sub>1</sub>, Error<sub>1</sub>) ← lookup\_weakness\_triple()  
(Fault<sub>1</sub>, Operation<sub>2</sub>, Error<sub>2</sub>) ← lookup\_weakness\_triple()  
(Fault<sub>n-1</sub>, Operation<sub>n</sub>, Final Error) ← lookup\_weakness\_triple()

Attributes					
Address Kind	Address State	Size Kind	Mechanism	Source Code	Execution Space
Huge	Stack	Actual	Direct	Codebase	Userland
Moderate	Heap	Used	Sequential	Third-Party	Kernel
Little	/other/			Standard Library	Bare-Metal
				Compiler/Interpreter	

Bug      Fault/Error      Final Error      Operation/Operand

# BF Data Validation (DVL) Class – Example from \_INP Class Type




## BF Data Validation (DVL) Class

*Data are validated (syntax check) or sanitized (escape, filter, repair) improperly.*

(Bug, Operation<sub>1</sub>, Error<sub>1</sub>) ← lookup\_weakness\_triple()  
(Fault<sub>1</sub>, Operation<sub>2</sub>, Error<sub>2</sub>) ← lookup\_weakness\_triple()  
(Fault<sub>n-1</sub>, Operation<sub>n</sub>, Final Error) ← lookup\_weakness\_triple()

# BF Type Computation (TCM) Class – Example from \_DAT Class Type



## Type Computation (TCM) Class

*An arithmetic expression (over numbers, strings, or pointers) is calculated improperly, or a boolean condition is evaluated improperly.*

- (Bug, Operation<sub>1</sub>, Error<sub>1</sub>) ← lookup\_weakness\_triple()
- (Fault<sub>1</sub>, Operation<sub>2</sub>, Error<sub>2</sub>) ← lookup\_weakness\_triple()
- (Fault<sub>n-1</sub>, Operation<sub>n</sub>, Final Error) ← lookup\_weakness\_triple()

<https://samate.nist.gov/BF/>Taxonomy>

# BF Weakness Taxonomies

- **Structured**  
(bug/fault, operation, error/final error)
- **Complete**  
no gaps in coverage
- **Orthogonal**  
no overlaps
- **Language and domain independent**  
context-free
- **Causation rules**  
cause-consequence transition by operation

# BF Taxonomy – BF.xml


```
BF.xml*  X
<!--@author Irena Bojanova(ivb)-->
<!--@date - 2/9/2022-->
<BF Name="Bugs Framework">
  <Cluster Name="_INP" Type="Weakness">...</Cluster>
  <Cluster Name="_DAT" Type="Weakness">
    <Class Name="DCL" Title="Declaration Bugs">
      <Operations>
        <Operation Name="Declare"/>
        <Operation Name="Define"/>
        <AttributeType Name="Mechanism">...</AttributeType>
        <AttributeType Name="Source Code">...</AttributeType>
        <AttributeType Name="Entity">...</AttributeType>
      </Operations>
      <Operands>
        <Operand Name="Type"><!--XXX-->
          <AttributeType Name="Type Kind">...</AttributeType>
        </Operand>
      </Operands>
      <Causes>
        <BugCauseType Name="The Bug">
          <Cause Name="Missing Code"/>
          <Cause Name="Wrong Code"/>
          <Cause Name="Erroneous Code"/>
          <Cause Name="Missing Modifier"/>
          <Cause Name="Wrong Modifier"/>
          <Cause Name="Anonymous Scope"/>
          <Cause Name="Wrong Scope"/>
        </BugCauseType>
      </Causes>
      <Consequences>
        <WeaknessConsequenceType Name="Improper Type (_DAT)">
          <Consequence Name="Wrong Type"/>
          <Consequence Name="Incomplete Type"/>
        </WeaknessConsequenceType>
      </Consequences>
    </Class>
  </Cluster>
</BF>
```

```
BF.xml*  X
<Definitions>
  <!-- Clusters-->
  <Definition Name="_INP" Type="Weakness">Input/Output Check Bugs
  <Definition Name="_DAT" Type="Weakness">Data Type Bugs - lead to
  <Definition Name="_MEM" Type="Weakness">Memory Bugs - lead to M
  <Definition Name="_CRY" Type="Weakness">Cryptographic Store or
  <Definition Name="_RND" Type="Weakness">Random Number Generation
  <Definition Name="_ACC" Type="Weakness">Access Control Bugs - l

  <!-- Classes - xxx update the definitions on BF web-site-->
  <!-- _INP-->
  <Definition Name="DVL">Data are validated (syntax check) or san
  <Definition Name="DVR">Data are verified (semantics check) or co
  <!-- _DAT-->
  <Definition Name="DCL">An object, a function, a type, or a name
  <Definition Name="NRS">The name of an object, a function, or a
  <Definition Name="TCV">Data are converted or coerced into other
  <Definition Name="TCM">A numeric, pointer, or string value is c
  <!-- _MEM-->
  <Definition Name="MAD">The pointer to an object is initialized,
  <Definition Name="MAL">An object is allocated, extended, or rea
  <Definition Name="MUS">An object is initialized, read, written,
  <Definition Name="MDL">An object is deallocated, reduced, or rea
  ...
  <!-- Values-->
  ...
```

# BF Vulnerability Models

# BF Vulnerability State Model




- The bug in at least one of the chains must be fixed to resolve the vulnerability
- Fixing a fault may only mitigate the vulnerability



# BF Vulnerability Specification Model

- Chain of (cause, operation, consequence) weakness triples
- Bug = improper operation
- Fault = improper operand
- Bug Types: Code, Specification
- Fault Types: Name, Data, Type, Address, Size
- Causation within a weakness
- Causation between weaknesses
- Causation between vulnerabilities
- Propagation between weaknesses
- Propagation between vulnerabilities



# BF Formal Language

# BF Context Free Grammar (CFG)

$$G = (V, \Sigma, R, S) \quad (1)$$

, where:

- $\Sigma$  defines the BF lexis (the alphabet of the CFG) as a finite set of tokens (terminals) comprised by the sets of BF taxons and BF symbols (see Listing 3)

$$\Sigma = \{ \alpha \mid \alpha \in \Sigma_{BFtaxons} \cup \Sigma_{BFsymbols} \}$$

- $V$  and  $R$  define the BF syntax as
  - a finite set of variables (nonterminals)

$$V = \{ S, V_1, \dots, V_n \}$$

- and a finite set of syntactic rules (productions) in the form

$$R = \{ A \mapsto \omega \mid A \in V \wedge \omega \in (V \cup \Sigma)^* \}$$

, where:

$(V \cup \Sigma)^*$  is a string of tokens and/or variables

$A \mapsto \omega$  means any variable  $A$  occurrence may be replaced by  $\omega$ .

- $S \in V$  is the predefined start variable from which all BF specifications derive.

# BF Formal Language

The formal language is defined as the set of all strings of tokens  $\omega$  derivable from the start variable  $S$ .

$$L(G) = \{\omega \in \Sigma^* : S \xRightarrow{*} \omega\} \quad (2)$$

, where:

- $\Sigma^*$  is the set of all possible strings that can be generated from  $\Sigma$  tokens
- $S$  is the start variable
- $\alpha \xRightarrow{*} \beta$  means string  $\alpha$  derives string  $\beta$

Note that  $\omega$  must be in  $\Sigma^*$ , the set of strings made from terminals. Strings involving non-terminals are not part of the language.

# BF CFG Lexis

$$\Sigma = \{\Sigma BFtaxons, \Sigma BFsymbols\}$$

, where

$$\begin{aligned} \Sigma BFtaxons = \{ & \Sigma Category, \Sigma ClassType, \Sigma Class, \Sigma BugType, \Sigma Bug, \\ & \Sigma Operation, \Sigma OperationAttributeType, \\ & \Sigma FaultType, \Sigma Fault, \Sigma OperandAttributeType, \Sigma OperandAttribute, \\ & \Sigma FinalErrorType, \Sigma FinalError \} \end{aligned}$$

$$\Sigma BFsymbols = \{ \rightarrow, \hookrightarrow, \oplus \}$$

$$\Sigma Category = \{ 'Weakness', 'Failure' \}$$

$$\Sigma ClassType = \{ '_INP', '_DAT', '_MEM', \dots \}$$

$$\Sigma Class = \{ 'DVL', 'DVR', 'DCL', 'NRS', 'TCV', 'TCM', 'MAD', 'MMN', 'MUS', \dots \}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Sigma Operation = \{ & 'Validate', 'Sanitize', 'Verify', 'Correct', 'Declare', 'Define', 'Refer', \\ & 'Call', 'Cast', 'Coerce', 'Calculate', 'Evaluate', 'InitializePointer', \\ & 'Reposition', 'Reassign', 'Allocate', 'Extend', 'Reallocate - Extend', \\ & 'Deallocate', 'Reduce', 'Reallocate - Reduce', 'InitializeObject', \\ & 'Dereference', 'Read', 'Write', 'Clear', 'Generate/Select', 'Store', \\ & 'Distribute', 'Use' \dots \} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} (3) \quad \Sigma Operation = \{ & 'Validate', 'Sanitize', 'Verify', 'Correct', 'Declare', 'Define', 'Refer', \\ & 'Call', 'Cast', 'Coerce', 'Calculate', 'Evaluate', 'InitializePointer', \\ & 'Reposition', 'Reassign', 'Allocate', 'Extend', 'Reallocate - Extend', \\ & 'Deallocate', 'Reduce', 'Reallocate - Reduce', 'InitializeObject', \\ & 'Dereference', 'Read', 'Write', 'Clear', 'Generate/Select', 'Store', \\ & 'Distribute', 'Use' \dots \} \end{aligned}$$

$$\Sigma BugType = \{ 'CodeDefect', 'SpecificationDefect' \}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Sigma Bug = \{ & 'MissingCode', 'ErroneousCode', 'Under - RestrictivePolicy', \\ & 'Over - RestrictivePolicy', 'WrongCode', 'MissingModifier', \\ & 'WrongModifier', 'AnonymousScope', 'WrongScope', \\ & 'MissingQualifier', 'WrongQualifier', 'MismatchedOperation', \dots \} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Sigma FinalErrorType = \{ & 'Injection', 'Access', 'TypeCompute', \\ & 'MemoryCorruption/Disclosure', \dots \} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Sigma FinalError = \{ & 'QueryInjection', 'CommandInjection', 'SourceCodeInjection', \\ & 'ParameterInjection', 'FileInjection', 'WrongAccessObject', \\ & 'WrongAccessType', 'WrongAccessFunction', 'Undefined', \\ & 'MemoryLeak', 'MemoryOverflow', 'DoubleDeallocate', \\ & 'ObjectCorruption', 'NotClearedObject', \\ & 'NULLPointerDereference', 'UntrustedPointerDereference', \\ & 'TypeConfusion', 'UseAfterDeallocate', 'BufferOverflow', \\ & 'BufferUnderflow', 'BufferOver - Read', 'BufferUnder - Read' \} \end{aligned}$$

# BF CFG Syntax

$$S ::= (Vulnerability (\oplus Vulnerability)? Failure+) + \epsilon \quad (4)$$

*Vulnerability* ::= + *Weakness*

*Weakness* ::= *Cause Operation Consequence*

*Cause* ::= *Bug* | *Fault*

*Consequence* ::= *Error* | *FinalError*

$$S ::= (Vulnerability (\oplus Vulnerability)? Failure+) + \epsilon \quad (5)$$

*Vulnerability* ::= *SingleWeakness*

| *FirstWeakness* (*Weakness*+) *LastWeakness*

*SingleWeakness* ::= *Bug Operation FinalError*

*FirstWeakness* ::= *Bug Operation* (*Error* | *FinalError*)

*Weakness* ::= *Fault Operation Error*

*LastWeakness* ::= *Error Operation FinalError*



# BF Syntax – LL(1) Grammar

$S ::= \text{Vulnerability Converge\_Failure}$  (6)

$\text{Vulnerability} ::= \text{Bug\_Fault Operation OperAttrs\_Error\_FinalError}$

$\text{Bug\_Fault} ::= \text{Bug}$

$\quad \mid \text{Fault}$

$\text{OperAttrs\_Error\_FinalError} ::= \text{OperationAttribute OperAttrs\_Error\_FinalError}$

$\quad \mid \text{Error Fault OprndAttrs\_Operation}$

$\quad \mid \text{FinalError}$

$\text{OprndAttrs\_Operation} ::= \text{OperandAttribute OprndAttrs\_Operation}$

$\quad \mid \text{Operation OperAttrs\_Error\_FinalError}$

$\text{Converge\_Failure} ::= \oplus \text{Vulnerability Converge\_Failure}$

$\quad \mid \text{Vector Exploit NextVulner\_Failure}$

$\text{NextVulner\_Failure} ::= \text{Fault OprndAttrs\_Operation}$

$\quad \mid \text{Failure } \epsilon$

# BF Semantics – Attribute CGF

*SyntaxRules :*

(7)

$S ::= \text{Vulnerability Converge\_Failure}$

$\text{Vulnerability} ::= \text{Bug\_Fault Operation OperAttrs\_Error\_FinalError}$

$\text{Bug\_Fault} ::= \text{Bug}$

$\quad | \text{Fault}$

$\text{OperAttrs\_Error\_FinalError} ::= \text{OperationAttribute OperAttrs\_Error\_FinalError}$

$\quad | \text{Error Fault}_1 \text{ OprndAttrs\_Operation}$

$\quad | \text{FinalError}$

$\text{OprndAttrs\_Operation} ::= \text{OperandAttribute OprndAttrs\_Operation}$

$\quad | \text{Operation}_k \text{ OperAttrs\_Error\_FinalError}$

$\text{Converge\_Failure} ::= \oplus \text{Vulnerability Converge\_Failure}$

$\quad | \text{Vector Exploit NextVulner\_Failure}$

$\text{NextVulner\_Failure} ::= \text{Fault}_2 \text{ OprndAttrs\_Operation}$

$\quad | \text{Failure } \varepsilon$

*SemanticRules :*

$(\text{Bug}, \text{Operation}_1, \text{Error}) \leftarrow \text{lookup\_weakness\_triple}()$

$(\text{Bug}, \text{Operation}_1, \text{FinalError}) \leftarrow \text{lookup\_weakness\_triple}()$

$(\text{Fault}_1, \text{Operation}_k, \text{Error}), k > 1 \leftarrow \text{lookup\_weakness\_triple}()$

$(\text{Fault}_1, \text{Operation}_k, \text{FinalError}), k > 1 \leftarrow \text{lookup\_weakness\_triple}()$

$(\text{Operation}_1, \dots, \text{Operation}_k), k > 1 \leftarrow \text{lookup\_operation\_flow}()$

$\text{Fault}_1 \leftarrow \text{if } (\text{Fault}_1.\text{ClassType} == \text{Error}.\text{ClassType}) \text{ then Error}$

*Predicates :*

$\text{Fault}_1.\text{Type} == \text{Error.Type}$

$\text{Vector.Type} == \text{FinalError.Type}$

$\text{Fault}_2.\text{Type} == \text{ExploitResult.Type}$



# BF Specifications of CWEs


# BFCWE Dataset

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!--Bugs Framework (BF), BFCWE Tool, I. Bojanova, NIST, 2020-2024-->
<BFCWE-Dataset>
  <CWE ID="20">
    <BFCWE Cause="Missing Code" Operation="Verify" Consequence="Wrong Value" />
    <BFCWE Cause="Missing Code" Operation="Verify" Consequence="Inconsistent Value" />
    <BFCWE Cause="Missing Code" Operation="Verify" Consequence="Wrong Type" />
    <BFCWE Cause="Erroneous Code" Operation="Verify" Consequence="Wrong Value" />
    <BFCWE Cause="Erroneous Code" Operation="Verify" Consequence="Inconsistent Value" />
    <BFCWE Cause="Erroneous Code" Operation="Verify" Consequence="Wrong Type" />
    <BFCWE Cause="Missing Code" Operation="Validate" Consequence="Invalid Data" />
    <BFCWE Cause="Erroneous Code" Operation="Validate" Consequence="Invalid Data" />
  </CWE>
  <CWE ID="22">
    <BFCWE Cause="Under-Restrictive Policy" Operation="Sanitize" Consequence="File Injection" />
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  <CWE ID="23">
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  <CWE ID="30">
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  </CWE>
  <CWE ID="31">
```

```
<CWE ID="125">
  <BFCWE Cause="Over Bounds Pointer" Operation="Read" Consequence="Buffer Over-Read" />
  <BFCWE Cause="Under Bounds Pointer" Operation="Read" Consequence="Buffer Under-Read" />
</CWE>
<CWE ID="126">
  <BFCWE Cause="Over Bounds Pointer" Operation="Read" Consequence="Buffer Over-Read" />
</CWE>
<CWE ID="127">
  <BFCWE Cause="Under Bounds Pointer" Operation="Read" Consequence="Buffer Under-Read" />
</CWE>
<CWE ID="128">
  <BFCWE Operation="Calculate" Consequence="Wrap Around" />
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  <BFCWE Cause="Erroneous Code" Operation="Verify" Consequence="Wrong Value" />
</CWE>
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  <BFCWE Cause="Erroneous Code" Operation="Verify" Consequence="Inconsistent Value" />
</CWE>
<CWE ID="131">
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<CWE ID="134">
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<CWE ID="135">
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<CWE ID="138">
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</CWE>
<CWE ID="140">
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  <BFCWE Cause="Erroneous Code" Operation="Sanitize" Consequence="Parameter Injection" />
</CWE>
```

# CWE-125 – Two BF Specifications

BF Specifications of CWE-125




BF, I. Bojanova, 2014-2024

Class Type	Definition
Memory Corruption/Disclosure (_MEM)	Bugs/weaknesses allowing a memory corruption/disclosure exploit.
Class	Definition
Memory Use (MUS)	An object is initialized, read, written, or cleared improperly.
Operation	Definition
Read	Use the value of an object's data.
Cause	Definition
Address Fault	The object address in use is wrong.
Over Bounds Pointer	Holds an address above the upper boundary of its object.
Under Bounds Pointer	Holds an address above the lower boundary of its object.
Consequence	Definition
Memory Corruption/Disclosure Final Error	An exploitable or undefined system behavior caused by memory addressing, allocation, use, and deallocation bugs.
Buffer Over-Read	Reading above the upper bound of an object.
Buffer Under-Read	Reading below the lower bound of an object.

# Data Type CWEs by BF Operation


- Data Type CWEs  
(incl. Integer Overflow, Juggling, and Pointer Arithmetics) –  
mapped by BF DCL, RNS, TCV, TCM operation




CWEs by DCL, NRS, TCV, and TCM operation:



CWEs by Abstraction:



# Analyzing HW CWEs



# BF Specifications of CVEs

# Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160)

## [CVE-2014-0160](#)

The (1) TLS and (2) DTLS implementations in OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1g do not properly handle Heartbeat Extension packets, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory via crafted packets that trigger a **buffer over-read**, as demonstrated by **reading private keys**, related to d1\_both.c and t1\_lib.c, aka the Heartbleed bug.



→ ↻ 🔒 <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-0160>

## Weakness Enumeration

CWE-ID	CWE Name
CWE-119	Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer




# Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160)

[CVE-2014-0160](#) The (1) TLS and (2) DTLS implementations in OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1g do not properly handle Heartbeat Extension packets, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory via crafted packets that trigger a **buffer over-read**, as demonstrated by **reading private keys**, related to d1\_both.c and t1\_lib.c, aka the Heartbleed bug.


```
1448 dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
1449 {unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
1451 unsigned short hbtype;
1452 unsigned
1453 int payload;
1454 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
1455
1456 /* Read type and payload length first */
1457 hbtype = *p++;
1458 n2s(p, payload);
1459 pl = p;
1460
1461 ...
1462 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
1463 {
1464     unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
1465
1466     ...
1467     /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte
1468      * message type, plus 2 bytes payload, plus
1469      * payload, plus padding
1470      */
1471     buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
1472     bp = buffer;
1473
1474     /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
1475     *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
1476     s2n(payload, bp);
1477     memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
1478
1479 ...
1480 }
```

```
/* Naive implementation of memcpy
void *memcpy (void *dst, const void *src, size_t n)
{
    size_t i;
    for (i=0; i<n; i++)
        *(char *) dst++ = *(char *) src++;
    return dst;
}
```









# BF States of CVE-2014-0160 (Heartbleed)



# BF Specification of CVE-2014-0160 (Heartbleed)



# BF Tool – BF Specification of Heartbleed



# CVE-2014-0160 - Heartbleed.bfcve

CVE-2014-0160...rtbleed.bfcve

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<CVE Name="1 CVE-2014-0160">
  <BugWeakness Type="_INP" Class="DVR">
    <Cause Type="The Bug">Missing Code</Cause>
    <Operation>Verify</Operation>
    <Consequence Comment="for payload size" Type="Improper Data">Inconsistent Value</Consequence>
    <Attributes>...</Attributes>
  </BugWeakness>
  <Weakness Type="_MEM" Class="MAD">
    <Cause Comment="(for s=s3->rrec.data[0])" Type="Improper Data">Wrong Size Used</Cause>
    <Operation>Reposition</Operation>
    <Consequence Type="Improper Address">Over Bounds Pointer</Consequence>
    <Attributes>
      <Operation>
        <Attribute Type="Mechanism">Sequential</Attribute>
        <Attribute Comment="dl_both.c and tl_lib.c" Type="Source Code">Codebase</Attribute>
        <Attribute Type="Execution Space">Userland</Attribute>
      </Operation>
      <Operand Name="Object Address">
        <Attribute Type="Location">Heap</Attribute>
      </Operand>
    </Attributes>
  </Weakness>
  <Weakness Type="_MEM" Class="MUS">
    <Cause Comment="(for s=s3->rrec.data[0])" Type="Improper Address">Over Bounds Pointer</Cause>
    <Operation>Read</Operation>
    <Consequence Type="Memory Error">Buffer Overflow</Consequence>
    <Attributes>...</Attributes>
  </Weakness>
  <Failure Type="_FLR" Class="IEX">
    <Cause Type="Memory Error">Buffer Overflow</Cause>
```

## > TAXONOMY

### ▼ BF CVE

#### Overview

CVE-2004-1287

CVE-2006-2362

CVE-2007-1320

CVE-2007-6429

CVE-2008-4539

CVE-2013-4930

CVE-2013-4934

**CVE-2014-0160**

CVE-2015-0235

CVE-2015-5221

CVE-2017-17833

CVE-2018-14557

CVE-2019-14814

CVE-2021-21834

CVE-2022-34835

CVE-2023-1283


CVE-2023-2356

CVE-2023-2564

CVE-2023-3765

...

## BF Specification of CVE-2014-0160 Heartbleed Heap Buffer Over-Read in OpenSSL v1.0.1 before v1.0.1g




Missing verification of 'payload' towards a upper limit leads to use of an inconsistent size for an object, allowing a pointer reposition over its bounds, which, when used in 'memcpy()' leads to a heap buffer over-read. If exploited, this can lead to exposure of sensitive information – confidentiality loss.

//generated// Missing Code (in 'dtls1\_process\_heartbeat(SSL \*s)') to Range Verify length (1 + 2 + 16 <= s->s3->rrec.length 1 + 2 + payload + 16 <= s->s3->rrec.length) Transferred (via network) in Third-Party (ssl /d1\_both.c#L1462 ssl /t1\_lib.c#L2591) Local leads to Inconsistent Value ('payload')

, which propagates to Wrong Size (in 'memcpy(bp, pl, payload)') Sequential Reposition (pointer) Heap Used (for s->s3->rrec.data[0]) Third-Party (ssl /d1\_both.c#L1487 ssl /t1\_lib.c#L2620) in Userland resulting in Over Bounds Pointer ('pl')

, which propagates to Over Bounds Pointer (in 'memcpy(bp, pl, payload)') Sequential Read (object) Huge (up to 64kb per exploit) Heap Used Third-Party (ssl /d1\_both.c#L1487 ssl /t1\_lib.c#L2620) in Userland resulting in Buffer Over-Read ('pl')

. If exploited this can lead to IEX (confidentiality loss).



Show/Hide Definitions

vendor:product: openssl:openssl

Bug Report

Code with Bug

Code with Fix

NVD Entry

### Class


### Definition

DVR

Data Verification (DVR) class – Data are verified (semantics check) or corrected (assign, remove) improperly.

...

# BF Vulnerability Classification



```
with cweClass as (
  select distinct c.Type, class = c.Name, wo.cwe
  from bf.class c
  inner join bf.operation o on c.Name = o.Class
  inner join cwebf.operation wo on o.Name = wo.operation
)
select m.cve [CVE], m.cwe [CWE], n.score [CVSS], ci.url [CodeWithFix], c.Type [BFClassType],
       c.class [BFClass], v.cause [Cause], v.operation [Operation], v.consequence [Consequence]
from cweClass c
inner join nvd.mapCveCwe m on m.cwe = c.cwe
inner join nvd.cve n on m.cve = n.cve
inner join githubVul.cve u on u.cve = n.cve
inner join githubVul.commitId ci on ci.id = u.commitId
inner join cwe.cwe w on w.id = m.cwe
inner join cwebf.specification s on s.cwe = m.cwe
inner join cwebf.mainWeakness mw on mw.mainWeakness = s.mainWeakness
inner join bf.validWeakness v on v.id = mw.weakness
left outer join cwebf.otherWeakness cw on cw.cwe = m.cwe and cw.mainWeakness = s.mainWeakness
left outer join bf.validWeakness vv on vv.id = cw.weakness
left outer join bf.operation oo on oo.Name = vv.operation
left outer join bf.class cc on oo.Class = cc.Name
where (c.Type = '_MEM')
order by n.score desc, m.cve, s.cwe, cw.chainId
```

# BF Data in NVD

## NVD's One-to-Five Year Plan

Once the NVD is up and running, Brewer said the program will consider new approaches to improving its processes within the next one to five years, especially around software identification.

Some of the ideas include:

- ▶ **Involving more partners:** Being able to have outside parties submit CPE data for the CPE Dictionary in ways that scale to fit the ever-growing number of IT products
- ▶ **Software identification improvements:** Dealing with software identification in the NVD in a way that scales with growing complexities (the adoption of PURLS is considered)
- ▶ **New types of data:** Developing capabilities to publish additional kinds of data to the NVD (e.g. from EPSS, NIST Bugs Framework)
- ▶ **New use cases:** Developing a way to make NVD data more consumable and more customizable to targeted use cases (e.g. getting email alerts from NVD when CVEs are published)
- ▶ **CVE JSON 5.0:** Expanding the NVD's capabilities to utilize new data points available in CVE JSON 5.0
- ▶ **Automation:** Developing a way to automate at least some CVE analysis activities

<https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/nist-unveils-new-nvd-consortium/>



# BF in Security Research

Machine readable formats of:

- BF taxonomy
- BFCWE specifications
- BFCVE specifications
- Vulnerability classifications

✓ Projects related to:

- Vulnerability specification generation
- Bug detection
- Vulnerability analysis and remediation
- Security failures and risks

## Improving the Software Security **Triaging** and **Remediation** Processes using Hybrid Techniques along with Human-Readable Diagnoses

A dissertation by: Kedrian James  
Committee: Fabian Monrose (advisor), Prasun Dewan, Cynthia Sturton, Sridhar Duggirala and Michalis Polychronakis




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### Approach

#### Report Generation Process

- Uses NIST's Framework<sup>1</sup>
  - Taxonomic model for describing bugs.
  - Each class is comprised of a set of:
    - Causes, Operations, Consequences, Operands, Attributes, Sites.



Challenge: Model is theoretical and lacks detail on how to collect information for crash diagnosis.

<sup>1</sup> I. Bojanova, NIST, The Bugs Framework (BF), Accessed: 12/16/2023. [Online]. Available: <https://usnistgov.github.io/BF/>.




32



# BF – Potential Impact

# BF – Potential Impacts

- Allow precise communication about security bugs, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities
- ML/AI bug finding, vulnerability analysis, and resolution
- Help identify exploit mitigation techniques.



# Questions

# BF Contact



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<https://samate.nist.gov/BF/>  
<https://usnistgov.github.io/BF/>