Fuqua School of Business Phone: (346) 228-2292

**Duke University** Email: john.w.barry@duke.edu 100 Fuqua Drive Web: https://johnwbarry.info

Durham, NC 27708

**EDUCATION** Fugua School of Business, Duke University

Durham, NC PhD. Finance 2018-2023 (Expected)

**Barcelona School of Economics** Barcelona, Spain

MS, ITFD 2015-2016

Dublin, Ireland **Trinity College Dublin** 

BA, Philosophy, Politics, Economics & Sociology (PPES) 2009-2013

Corporate finance, capital budgeting, investment, production/trade credit networks, cap-RESEARCH

**INTERESTS** ital structure, CEO compensation, shareholder voting

**TEACHING** Corporate finance (MBA), Empirical methods in corporate finance (PhD)

**FIELDS** 

**PUBLICATIONS** Corporate Flexibility in a Time of Crisis

with Murillo Campello, John Graham and Yueran Ma

**Journal of Financial Economics** (June 2022)

We use the COVID shock to study the direct and interactive effects of several forms of corporate flexibility on short- and long-term real business plans. We find that i) workplace flexibility, namely the ability for employees to work remotely, plays a central role in determining firms' employment plans during the health crisis; ii) investment flexibility allows firms to increase or decrease capital spending based on their business prospects in the crisis, with effects shaped by workplace flexibility; and iii) financial flexibility contributes to stronger employment and investment, in particular when fixed costs are high. While the role of workplace flexibility is new to the COVID crisis, CFOs expect lasting effects for years to come: high workplace flexibility firms foresee continuation of remote work, stronger employment recovery, and shifting away from traditional capital investment, whereas low workplace flexibility firms rely more on automation to replace labor.

**WORKS IN PROGRESS**  CEO Compensation and Shareholder Voice: Evidence from a Learning Model

with James D. Pinnington

We estimate a model of executive compensation with non-binding shareholder approval votes ("Say-on-Pay"). Compensation decisions are delegated to a board, who is imperfectly informed of the executive's skill and biased towards offering a higher wage. In our model, Say-on-Pay serves two purposes. Failed votes punish the board for overpaying low-type executives, but also reveal shareholders' private information about the executive's skill. Our model rationalizes several stylized facts around non-binding compensation votes.

CONFERENCES & 2022 Duke University

SEMINARS 2021 American Financial Association Annual Meeting, ITAM Finance Conference

**2020** Duke University ( $\times$ 2)

RESEARCH Fuqua School of Business

Durham, NC

EXPERIENCE Research Assistant for John Graham, 2019-present

Head RA for the 2021 AFA presidential address

Research Assistant for Adriano Rampini & S. Vish Viswanathan, 2019-2020

Research Assistant for Alon Brav, 2018-2019

**Harvard Business School** 

Boston, MA

Research Associate

2017-2018

Research Assistant for Marco Di Maggio

**Princeton University** 

Princeton, NJ

Research Associate

2016-2017

Research Assistant for Maryam Farboodi

TEACHING Fuqua School of Business

Durham, NC

EXPERIENCE

Head Teaching Assistant

Introduction to Corporate Finance (MBA): 2020, 2021, 2022

John Graham

Weekly TA sessions throughout course

Empirical Methods in Corporate Finance (PhD): 2020, 2021, 2022

Manuel Adelino and Jillian Grennan

Guest lectures on coding best practices and using financial data resources

Other Teaching Experience

Advanced Corporate Finance (MBA), S. Vish Viswanathan: 2020, 2021, 2022

Globan Finance (MMS), Alon Brav: 2022

TECHNICAL

Python, Julia, R, SQL, Stata, SAS, HTML/CSS, Ruby

SKILLS Machine learning, neural networks, efficient algorithm design, structural estimation