**PAPERS** 

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**EDUCATION** Fuqua School of Business, Duke University

Durham, NC PhD. Finance 2018-

**Barcelona School of Economics** Barcelona, Spain

MS, ITFD 2015-2016

**Trinity College Dublin** Dublin, Ireland

2009-2013 BA, Philosophy, Politics, Economics & Sociology (PPES)

RESEARCH Corporate finance, capital budgeting and investment, corporate governance, executive compensa-**INTERESTS** tion, shareholder voting, structural estimation

WORKING **CEO Compensation and Shareholder Voice** 

> Can non-binding shareholder votes impact real corporate policies? Answering this requires understanding how much the threat of failing a vote impacts corporate decision-makers. I estimate a model of CEO compensation with non-binding shareholder approval votes ("Say-on-Pay"). Compensation decisions are made by the Board of Directors, that is imperfectly informed of CEO skill and biased towards offering a high wage. Shareholder, whose beliefs about CEO ability may differ from the Board's, choose whether to pass or fail the Say-on-Pay (SOP) vote. Failed SOP votes punish the Board for overpaying, but also lead to a (perceived) cost of failure to shareholders for dissenting from the Board. To match observed outcomes in compensation and SOP votes, the model needs shareholders to behave as if failed votes punish themselves nearly as much as the Board. The cost of failure to the Board reveals that the (off-equilibrium) threat of SOP failure disciplines wages, even with high SOP support; yet shareholder impact on wages is limited by their own (perceived) cost of SOP failure. The model predicts CEO wages would on average fall by 1.7% and net operating income would rise by 1.2% if this perceived shareholder-SOP failure cost were eliminated, all else equal.

# Project Development with Delegated Bargaining: The Role of Elevated Hurdle Rates with Bruce Carlin, Alan Crane and John Graham SSRN (April 2023)

During project development, investment costs are endogenously determined through delegated bargaining with counterparties. In surveys, nearly 80% of CFOs report using an elevated hurdle rate, the implications of which we build a model to explore. We show that elevated hurdle rates can convey a bargaining advantage that exceeds the opportunity cost of forgone projects, whether these hurdle rate buffers arise for strategic or non-strategic reasons. Using CFO survey data, we find buffer use is negatively related to the cost of capital and to bargaining power, consistent with our model's predictions, and that realized returns are associated with "beat the hurdle rate benchmark" behavior.

#### **PUBLICATIONS**

#### Corporate Flexibility in a Time of Crisis

with Murillo Campello, John Graham and Yueran Ma

Journal of Financial Economics (June 2022)

We use the COVID shock to study the direct and interactive effects of several forms of corporate flexibility on short- and long-term real business plans. We find that i) workplace flexibility, namely the ability for employees to work remotely, plays a central role in determining firms' employment plans during the health crisis; ii) investment flexibility allows firms to increase or decrease capital spending based on their business prospects in the crisis, with effects shaped by workplace flexibility; and iii) financial flexibility contributes to stronger employment and investment, in particular when fixed costs are high. While the role of workplace flexibility is new to the COVID crisis, CFOs expect lasting effects for years to come: high workplace flexibility firms foresee continuation of remote work, stronger employment recovery, and shifting away from traditional capital investment, whereas low workplace flexibility firms rely more on automation to replace labor.

Conferences  $\dot{\sigma}$ 

**2023** AFA

SEMINARS

2022 Duke University

2021 AFA, ITAM Finance Conference

**2020** Duke University (×2)

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### **Fuqua School of Business**

Durham, NC

Research Assistant for John Graham

2019-

Head RA for the 2021 AFA Presidential Address

Research Assistant for Adriano Rampini & S. Vish Viswanathan

2019-2020

Research Assistant for Alon Brav

2018-2019

**Harvard Business School** 

Boston, MA 2017-2018

**Princeton University** 

Research Associate

Princeton, NJ

Research Associate

2016-2017

# TEACHING

#### **Fugua School of Business**

Durham, NC

EXPERIENCE Head Teaching Assistant

**Introduction to Corporate Finance (MBA)** 

2019-

John Graham

Weekly TA sessions throughout course

**Empirical Methods in Corporate Finance** (PhD)

2019-

Manuel Adelino and Jillian Grennan

Guest lectures on coding best practices and financial data resources

## Technical

Python, Julia, R, SQL, Stata, SAS, Git

Skills

Machine learning, neural networks, efficient algorithm design, structural estimation