

# JOHN W. BARRY

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## EDUCATION

<b>Duke University, Fuqua School of Business</b>	Durham, NC
PhD, Finance	2018-2024
<b>Barcelona School of Economics</b>	Barcelona, Spain
MS, International Trade, Finance and Development (ITFD)	2015-2016
<b>Trinity College Dublin</b>	Dublin, Ireland
BA, Philosophy, Politics, Economics & Sociology (PPES)	2009-2013

## RESEARCH INTERESTS

Corporate finance, corporate investment, discount rates and capital budgeting, project horizon, executive compensation, shareholder voting, structural estimation

## WORKING PAPERS

### **Shareholder Voice and Executive Compensation** (Job market paper, December 2023)

[Latest version, SSRN](#)

Managerial influence on the Board of Directors induces an agency problem in the design of executive compensation. I evaluate the role of shareholder voice in disciplining compensation practices by estimating a model of CEO compensation with non-binding shareholder approval votes (Say-on-Pay). The Board sets CEO pay and is biased towards a high wage; shareholders can fail the Say-on-Pay (SOP) and punish the Board for overpayment. Failed votes are perceived as costly by both the Board and shareholders: a cost of 2.06% (0.76%) of value for the Board (shareholders) is sufficient to match the data. SOP thus resembles a costly punishment mechanism and the disciplining effect on compensation increases firm value by 4.6% on average. Empirical evidence suggests the Board cost is a career and reputation concern for directors, and shareholders internalize a cost to dissenting from the Board on a prominent policy. I construct a counterfactual SOP mechanism which emulates giving a focal shareholder an advisory seat on the Board; this lowers the SOP failure rate, decreases wages and further increases firm value.

### **Project Development with Delegated Bargaining: The Role of Elevated Hurdle Rates**

with Bruce Carlin, Alan Crane and John Graham (March 2024)

[SSRN](#)

During project development, costs are endogenously determined through delegated bargaining with counterparties. In surveys, nearly 80% of CFOs report using an elevated hurdle rate, the implications of which we explore in a delegated bargaining model. We show that elevated hurdle rates can convey a bargaining advantage that exceeds the opportunity cost of forgone projects, whether hurdle rate buffers arise for strategic or non-strategic reasons. Using CFO survey data, we find buffer use is negatively related to the cost of capital and ex ante bargaining power, consistent with the model, and that realized returns exhibit “beat the hurdle rate benchmark” behavior.

## WORKS IN PROGRESS

### **Human Capital and Mobility in the Executive Labor Market**

with Noah Lyman and Lin Zhao (March 2024)

## PUBLICATIONS

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### Corporate Flexibility in a Time of Crisis

with Murillo Campello, John Graham and Yueran Ma (June 2022)

[Journal of Financial Economics](#)

We use the COVID shock to study direct and interactive effects of several forms of corporate flexibility on short- and long-term real business plans. We find that i) *workplace flexibility*, namely the ability for employees to work remotely, plays a central role in determining firms' employment plans during the health crisis; ii) *investment flexibility* allows firms to increase or decrease capital spending based on their business prospects in the crisis, with effects shaped by workplace flexibility; and iii) *financial flexibility* contributes to stronger employment and investment, in particular when fixed costs are high. While the role of workplace flexibility is new to COVID, CFOs expect lasting effects for years to come: high workplace flexibility firms foresee continuation of remote work, stronger employment recovery, and shifting away from traditional capital investment, whereas low workplace flexibility firms rely more on automation to replace labor.

## CONFERENCES AND SEMINARS

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**2023-2024:** AFA, LBS TADC, Inter-Finance PhD Seminar, Duke IO lunch, Fuqua, Olin Finance Conference PhD Poster Session, Boca Finance Conference, MFA (2024)<sup>†</sup>, EFA (2024)<sup>†</sup>

**2020-2022:** AFA, ITAM Finance Conference, Fuqua (×3) <sup>†</sup>= scheduled

## RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

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### Fuqua School of Business

Durham, NC

Head RA for [John Graham's 2021 AFA Presidential Address](#)

2019-2023

RA for Adriano Rampini & S. "Vish" Viswanathan

2019-2020

RA for Alon Brav

2018-2019

### Harvard Business School

Boston, MA

Research Associate

2017-2018

### Princeton University

Princeton, NJ

Research Associate

2016-2017

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

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### Fuqua School of Business

Durham, NC

Head Teaching Assistant

**Corporate Finance** (MBA)

2019-2023

John Graham

**Empirical Methods in Corporate Finance** (PhD)

2019-2023

Manuel Adelino and Jillian Grennan

Other

**Advanced Corporate Finance** (MBA)

2019-2023

S. "Vish" Viswanathan

**Foundations of Capital Markets** (MMS)

2021

Alon Brav

## TECHNICAL SKILLS

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Python, Julia, R, SQL, Stata, SAS, Git

Machine learning, neural networks, efficient algorithm design, structural estimation

## PROFESSIONAL SERVICES

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**Referee:** American Economic Review: Insights

## REFERENCES

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**John R. Graham** (chair)

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