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EDUCATION	<b>Fuqua School of Business, Duke University</b> <i>PhD, Finance</i>	Durham, NC 2018-2023 (Expected)
	<b>Barcelona School of Economics</b> <i>MS, ITFD</i>	Barcelona, Spain 2015-2016
	<b>Trinity College Dublin</b> <i>BA, Philosophy, Politics, Economics &amp; Sociology (PPES)</i>	Dublin, Ireland 2009-2013
RESEARCH INTERESTS	Corporate finance, capital budgeting, investment, production/trade credit networks, capital structure, CEO compensation, shareholder voting	
TEACHING FIELDS	Corporate finance (MBA), Empirical methods in corporate finance (PhD)	
PUBLICATIONS	<b>Corporate Flexibility in a Time of Crisis</b> with Murillo Campello, John Graham and Yueran Ma <b>Journal of Financial Economics</b> (June 2022) We use the COVID shock to study the direct and interactive effects of several forms of corporate flexibility on short- and long-term real business plans. We find that i) <i>workplace flexibility</i> , namely the ability for employees to work remotely, plays a central role in determining firms' employment plans during the health crisis; ii) <i>investment flexibility</i> allows firms to increase or decrease capital spending based on their business prospects in the crisis, with effects shaped by workplace flexibility; and iii) <i>financial flexibility</i> contributes to stronger employment and investment, in particular when fixed costs are high. While the role of workplace flexibility is new to the COVID crisis, CFOs expect lasting effects for years to come: high workplace flexibility firms foresee continuation of remote work, stronger employment recovery, and shifting away from traditional capital investment, whereas low workplace flexibility firms rely more on automation to replace labor.	
WORKS IN PROGRESS	<b>CEO Compensation and Shareholder Voice: Evidence from a Learning Model</b> with James D. Pinnington We estimate a model of executive compensation with non-binding shareholder approval votes ("Say-on-Pay"). Compensation decisions are delegated to a board, who is imperfectly informed of the executive's skill and biased towards offering a higher wage. In our model, Say-on-Pay serves two purposes. Failed votes punish the board for overpaying low-type executives, but also reveal shareholders' private information about the executive's skill. Our model rationalizes several stylized facts around non-binding compensation votes.	

