

# Intimidation and Resistance: A Case-Study of Race, Crossburnings and Political Behavior in North Carolina

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## Abstract

Political threat can either stimulate or depress political participation among victim communities. While previous work has argued *either* that threat and violence (and associated fear) depress black participation in the South (namely turnout) (Salamon and Van Evera 1973) *or* is irrelevant (Matthews and Prothro 1966; Kernell 1973), we argue that hostility and violence may achieve the desired ends of the attackers only if the targets are weak in resources (political, organizational, or otherwise). Threat, measured here in the form of counts of county level crossburnings and as individual level perceptions of racial attacks in North Carolina, seems to matter for community participation and vote turnout depending on the presence of organizational resources in the form of black local elected officials. Where there are many black local elected officials and crossburnings a sample of African-American survey respondents report more political activity than in comparable counties without cross-burnings. Where there are few black local elected officials and also crossburnings, African-Americans reported less political activity than in comparable counties within cross-burnings. The methodological innovations of this paper include: multilevel matching, and design-based estimation of treatment effects.

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## 1 Introduction

Throughout the social sciences, scholars have invoked ideas about threat to explain a wide range of phenomena. In particular, the concept of threat has been used to explain white racial attitudes and prejudice (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Giles 1977; Glaser 1994; Key 1949; Kinder and Mendelberg 1995; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Quillian 1996), political intolerance (Feldman and Stenner 1994; Shamir and Sullivan 1983), group and partisan identity among whites (Giles and Evans 1985; Giles and Hertz 1994), the occurrence of lynchings and intergroup conflict between whites and blacks (Olzak 1992, 1996; Tolnay and Beck 1989; Tolnay and Beck 1995) and the David Duke vote (Giles and Buckner 1993, 1996; Voss 1996). Despite the analytic tractability of datasets in which white respondents predominate, this white-focused approach seems counterintuitive given the historical relations between blacks and whites in this country. Specifically, the use of physical threats to instill fear and quiescence was a staple of the pre-Voting Rights Act disfranchisement of blacks in the southern United States (Keech and Sistrom 1994; Matthews and Prothro 1966; McAdam 1982; Salamon and Van Evera 1973; Tolnay and Beck 1995). In their extensive analysis of black voting in the South, Matthews and Prothro (1966) investigate the possibility that low black political participation in the South could be a reaction to the existence of violence (measured by attacks and lynchings) and also by the perceptions of violence (measured in a survey). In neither case do they find evidence that threat, or perceptions of threat, matter much in depressing turnout across their sample. However, in a 1973 article in the *American Political Science Review*, Salamon and Kernell criticize Matthews and Prothro's methods and attempt to show that fear of violence and of economic coercion are important factors in depressing black turnout in selected counties of Mississippi during the late 1960s. However, a re-evaluation of their article by Kernell (1973) shows that their measures of vulnerability to threat are less powerful once their sample is expanded.

There is scattered evidence, however, that the existence of lynchings and other physical threats not only engendered quiescence, but also spawned resistance among black communities during the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Keech and Sistrom 1994; Olzak 1992; Tolnay and Beck 1995). More recently, racial threat against blacks has been used to explain black intolerance of racists (Green and Waxman 1987) and political mobilization by blacks during the Civil Rights Era (McAdam 1982).

Commonsense plus previous research suggests that threat leads to intimidation. Our intuition about threat, however, is that intimidation is not necessarily the only possible response. Research on African-American political behavior since the Reconstruction, as well as on authoritarian regimes in Latin America, suggests that *both* resistance and intimidation can and do result when individuals face harm.

This paper explores the conditions under which the occurrence of racially targeted threat mobilizes African-American citizens into political action or intimidates them into political quiescence. We expect that the impact of racial threat is conditioned by the existence of political resources among members of the target community. In this paper we use two indicators of threat aimed at blacks as a group: 1) crossburnings in counties in the state of North Carolina between 1987 and 1996 and 2) perceptions of the frequency of racial attacks and harassment by the respondents to a survey of North Carolinians conducted in the spring of 1997. The existence of black elected officials at the municipal and county

levels represents organizational resources and the potential for political mobilization among blacks. Community level participation and electoral turnout represent political participation. We suggest specifically that blacks in communities which have histories of crossburnings and in which blacks hold many political offices are apt to react to racial threat by mobilization; and that blacks in communities which have histories of crossburnings and in which blacks do not hold many political offices are apt to react to racial threat by quiescence. In this paper, we use survey data for individuals and contextual data for counties within North Carolina, to show that the existence of black local elected officials conditions the effects of crossburnings.<sup>1</sup> When crossburnings are frequent, but black local officials are plentiful, black turnout is enhanced. When crossburnings are frequent, but black local officials are rare, black turnout is depressed.

## 2 Threat and Politics: Background

Despite an extensive literature on the impact of black population density or clashing group interests as “threat”, political scientists still do not understand the political impacts of more direct and aggressive forms of threat such as hate crime. The political impact of fear and intimidation has been documented in some measure by researchers trying to understand the effects of authoritarian governments in Latin America (Corradi et al. 1992; Lira and Castillo 1991; O’Donnell 1984). In these works, findings of apathy and fear predominate. Since the source of threat in Latin America has often been the State, researchers have found that victims of threat or torture, and even members of civil society who lived through the dictatorships personally unscathed, express feelings of powerlessness when faced with the possibility of overwhelming and sudden physical punishment by the police arm of the military. Also, the fields of criminology and psychology have devoted some attention to the psychic damage that trauma can inflict upon a person (see Ehrlich 1990; Herek and Berrill 1992). For example, a recent study of the effects of hate crime found that lesbian and gay victims of bias attacks “showed more signs of psychological distress — including depression, stress, and anger — than did lesbian and gay survivors of comparable non-bias-motivated crimes in the same time period” (Herek 1997, pg. 1). Still, until now, to our knowledge, there has been no empirical investigation of the effects of racial aggression on the political behavior of victim communities.

The relationship between threat and participation at first glance seems quite clear. An individual who is threatened ought to be deterred from continuing the behavior that brought on the threat (if there is a clear connection between prior behavior and the occurrence of the threat). Support for the idea that fear from threat causes obedience and social peace can be found in Thomas Hobbes’s *Leviathan*. In general, Hobbes’s use of fear is most well known as the impetus which ”disposeth men to obey a Common power” (Hobbes, 161). Specifically, it is fear of death (Hobbes, 162) and fear of oppression (Hobbes, 163) which form an important basis for political unity.

In the U.S. South, whites employed threat and aggression against blacks to maintain white supremacy and to limit blacks from playing a significant role in the polity. In *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, V.O. Key (1949) notes that:

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<sup>1</sup>Appendix A describes the variables and data sources used in the project in detail. The survey data come from the Spring 1997 Carolina Poll via the good graces of Dr. Bev Wiggins at the Institute for Research in the Social Sciences at UNC, Chapel Hill.

In its grand outlines the politics of the South revolves around the position of the Negro ... The hard core of the political South—and the backbone of southern political unity—is made up of those counties and sections of the southern states in which Negroes constitute a substantial proportion of the population. In these areas a real problem of politics, broadly considered, is the maintenance of control by a white minority (Key, 5).

As a student of institutions, Key identified the “predominant consideration” among southern institution builders as the need “to assure locally a subordination of the Negro population, and externally, to block threatened interference from the outside with these local arrangements” (665). Formal, legal, methods of assuring black subordination included the poll tax, the literacy test, and the grandfather clause.

The use of lynchings and crossburnings to intimidate African-Americans and specifically to keep African-American citizens out of political power has been well documented for the period between 1870 and 1930 as well as the Civil Rights Era (Burton et al. 1994; McAdam 1982; Tolnay and Beck 1994). It is important to note here, however, that North Carolina has never experienced nearly as much blatant anti-black aggression as Deep Southern states such as Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, or Louisiana. For example, during the period 1882-1930, Tolnay and Beck (1993) recorded 82 anti-black lynchings in North Carolina. During that same period in Mississippi, 509 blacks were killed by white mobs.<sup>2</sup> Since this paper focuses on the recent history of anti-black threat in North Carolina, the hypothesis that threat has any impact at all faces a very strong test when compared with other places in the South. That is, if one wished to discover the political impact of historical threat in the South, and one did find it in North Carolina, despite its relatively low levels of threat, then one would have greater confidence in generalizing one’s results to other contexts which have historically experienced much higher levels of threat.

The history of threat against blacks in the U.S., however, does not end with lynchings in 1930 or even with the bombings and lynchings surrounding the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In North Carolina, voter registration rates were negatively related to the number of crossburnings recorded in North Carolina counties during the years between 1987 and 1993 (Green et al., 17-18). Other studies by Professor Don Green and his colleagues at Yale University point to patterns of hate crime in New York City 1987–1995 which coincide with shifts in racial demographics — and the shifts in political power that are often implied by such changes (Green et al. 1996a, 1996b).

Nor does the story of threat does end with intimidation. Despite the prevalence of successful uses of threat and actual aggression to produce quiescence and maintain social control, almost equally prevalent are those instances in which the victims of threat and aggression resisted the hostility. In the U.S., the Civil Rights Movement is a good example of resistance and mobilization by African-Americans in the South in the face of repeated physical violence including the burning and bombing of churches, assassinations, and beatings.<sup>3</sup> Chong explains that the Freedom Riders were willing to face such abuse because

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<sup>2</sup>We are grateful to Professors Tolnay and Beck for providing the data on lynchings which they used in their book. Between 1882 and 1930: 435 blacks were lynched in Georgia, 304 in Louisiana, 273 in Alabama, 224 in Florida, 184 in Arkansas, 175 in Tennessee, 148 in South Carolina, and 128 in Kentucky. Over all, according to Tolnay and Beck’s data, 2462 blacks died in lynchings during those 48 years in the South.

<sup>3</sup>“The term ‘civil rights movement’ describes a broad coalition of political, social, and religious organizations that engaged in a wide range of activities with the general aim of securing political, economic,

of strong feelings of righteousness and desire for glory, but also because the televised beatings and dramatic confrontations with white supremacists had strategic value in bringing the federal government into the fray (Chong 1991).

The Freedom Riders, however, were a few, dedicated activists. Mass participation in the face of threat, however, is usually mobilized and does not emerge spontaneously from isolated individuals. Black voter registration drives in the South are a good example of mass participation despite threat and often physical violence (Hansen and Rosenstone 1993, 192; McAdam , 1982, 172). It makes sense that participation by many ordinary people in the face of threat during the Civil Rights Movement occurred via mobilization rather than via some individual fortitude and righteousness. For example, Kernell (1973) shows that by 1968, “in Mississippi counties with federal examiners present, 71 per cent of the black eligible voters were registered as compared to only 50 percent registered in non-examiner counties (1313).” After an analysis of the impact of federal registrars and Civil Rights activity in Mississippi counties Kernell concludes that “one of the most important consequences of the civil rights movement appears to be the mobilization of black electoral majorities (1314).” Mobilization by leaders can occur because leaders have the skills to organize and move people into action. Mobilization can also be manifested by political rhetoric and calls to action (even without the creation of an activist organization) which frame a threatening event as an injustice that must be resisted, rather than as a tragedy that must be suffered in silence

The idea that “hate” crime differs from “normal” crime is a common one in our society. Usually arguments in favor of increasing the penalties for committing a hate crime state that hate crimes attack not only the individual victim, but also harm the community as a whole (Anderson 1993, 25 ;Levin and McDevitt 1993, x,13). Some proponents of increased hate crime penalties claim that hate crimes attack the Constitution (Lawrence 1992, 62). Certainly, some hate crimes, such as church burnings, are explicitly directed against communities as wholes. Crossburnings are less clearly attacks against entire communities. Of course, the burning cross was born as a symbol used to summon the Klan to save the white heroine from rape by a newly freed black man in D.W. Griffith’s popular movie *Birth of a Nation* (Rogin 1987, 221; Green et al. 1995, 1).<sup>4</sup> Given that the ideology of the Ku Klux Klan is expressly organized around the intimidation and subjugation of blacks to whites [cite], it is easy to see how a crossburning on the lawn of one black family might send a signal to an entire black community. Even the non-political threat of a burglary is often enough to influence security decisions by an entire neighborhood [cite].

Threat targeted specifically at African-Americans, in this case crossburnings, should elicit either increased or decreased participation from black citizens. Whether participation increases or decreases ought to depend on the resources which exist for political mobilization. We expect that crossburnings which occur where black communities do not have organizational resources will cause intimidation among the black citizens and, as a result, less political participation. Where black communities have strong social and political networks, we expect to find increased political participation in response to crossburnings.

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and social equality for black Americans” (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 189).

<sup>4</sup>This 1915 movie was an adaptation of Thomas Dixon’s book, *The clansman: an historical romance of the Ku Klux Klan* (New York : Grosset & Dunlap) 1905.

### 3 Threat, Mobilization, and Participation: Concepts and Indicators

This paper is structured around the interaction of three concepts: threat, resources, and mobilization. In this section, we will briefly define and describe the key concepts of the analysis. Then we will explain the relationships between the three concepts and their respective indicators (crossburnings, black local elected officials, and political participation). Because the concept of “threat” is the most complicated one in the analysis, we present it first and devote more space to its discussion.

#### 3.1 Threat

Threat is action. A threatening act conveys a promise of harm from a source to a target. The target of threat can both assess the threat — i.e. judge the potential for and magnitude of the threatener’s plan for harm — and feel threatened —i.e. react to the threat with fear, anxiety, or anger. A promise of harm that is not assessed as realistic, or harmful, is not very “threatening” in that it does not necessarily awaken anger, fear, or anxiety in the target. For example, a person may propose to give me a beating, but I may not “feel threatened” if I am twenty-six years old and the source of the threat is eleven. However, if I am eleven, and an adult proposes to give me a beating, I may become angry, or afraid, and I may also judge both the source of threat and the threatening action as bad, or at least, harmful to me. In this narrowest sense, threat involves a source, an intention to do harm, and a target. A central purpose of this paper is to explore the dynamics by which targets of threat react with intimidation (fear) versus resistance and action (anger).

An adequate conceptualization of threat, however, does not require explicit intention to do harm. Nor does an adequate conceptualization of reaction to threat require conscious reception of a focused proposal to harm. Blacks who wanted to vote in the Reconstruction South could have felt threatened without any explicit speech or behavior on the part of whites given the conditions of violence and domination that prevailed. Even if the feelings of threat may not have become conscious among the majority of blacks in a county, a few leaders who are stimulated into action by hate crimes would be enough to diffuse the mobilizing effects of such a threat through the county. On a more mundane level, a small child in the school yard can feel threatened (angry, fearful, ready to flee or fight) by the very existence of the big kids on the tarmac, whether or not the big kids explicitly convey any intention to beat up the little kid. In this case, any promise of harm from the big kids is likely to be carried out, and the harm will be significant to the small child. Thus we can see that threat involves a source, a target, and potential harm emanating from the source directed at the target. However, the expression of explicit intentions to do harm is not necessary in order for the targets (or likely targets) to assess the action as (seriously/not seriously) harmful and to feel threatened. Furthermore, we can see that threat can have an indirect effect on the behavior of individuals via the mobilization of leaders (or the lack of such mobilization).

Much of the initial literature on threat in American politics responded to V.O. Key’s influential study of southern politics in which he initially linked ideas about threat to racial density. In the introduction to *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, he observes that, “It is the whites of the black belts [areas in which blacks constitute above 40% of the

population] who have the deepest and most immediate concern about the maintenance of white supremacy” (Key 1949, 5). Subsequent researchers developed theories connecting the aggregate variable of black population to the political attitudes and behaviors of individual whites. In particular, Herbert Blalock formulated the “power-threat” hypothesis in 1967, which distinguished between two kinds of perceived threats (economic and political) that could influence discriminatory behavior in a majority group, and which could apply to the “propensity of whites to perceive threats and therefore to engage in lynching behavior” (Blalock 1989, PAGE).<sup>5</sup> Elaborations of this theory included the idea that threats to the cultural and social dominance of majority groups could also motivate prejudice and discriminatory behavior. Empirical tests of this theory have generated dozens of articles, including two multi-article controversies: one about lynching in *Social Forces* in March 1989, and one about the David Duke vote in *The Journal of Politics* in November 1996.

It makes sense that the existence of a large black population could be perceived as a threat to the political, social, and economic well-being of whites. Following our conceptualization of threat, one can see how whites in the black belt might assess the existence of many blacks as potentially very harmful if not controlled and worthy of anger or fear. When blacks are numerous, they possess the ability to harm whites in several serious ways (e.g. refusing to work for whites; physically rebelling from the continuing political, economic, and social control of whites; intermarrying with whites and therefore blurring the boundaries between the races). What is more, it is reasonable to suppose that 1) blacks possibly intend to harm whites in retribution for past treatment at the hands of whites and/or 2) that the goals of blacks include controlling the political and economic resources of the towns and cities where they live — which would involve taking at least some control away from whites. In this way, it is plausible to think that threat may operate between majority and minority groups at the aggregate level.

The Webster dictionary defines “threat” as “an expression of intention to inflict evil, injury, or damage” [page cite]. As we have already explained, while the clarity of intention behind a threat may give the threat power, threat can easily exist without intention. The actual execution of evil, injurious, or damaging intentions could be called “aggression” or “violence” if the execution of the threat involves physical harm.<sup>6</sup> Threat becomes political insofar as the expression of hostile intentions relate to government or governance. Threats or attacks against individuals on the basis of group characteristics can be considered political if such hostility is aimed at affecting the political behavior of the targets. For example, one explanation for the occurrence of lynchings against African-Americans in the post-Reconstruction South (roughly 1880 to 1930) is that the violence functioned to disfranchise the newly freed black populations of those ex-slave states (Keech and Sistrom 1994; Tolnay and Beck 1995).<sup>7</sup> Although the actual victims of lynching were killed — and

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<sup>5</sup>See in particular Green et al. (1995, 1996a, 1996b) for application of these ideas in the realm of contemporary hate crime.

<sup>6</sup>For the purposes of this paper, we will follow the Webster’s Dictionary definition of “threat” — “the expression of an intention to do harm”. Other studies of “threat” have defined the term much more loosely. For example, Giles operationalizes the threat that blacks pose toward whites as the density of black population (Giles and Hertz 1994; Giles and Buckner 1993; Giles and Evans 1985). This implies that threat is somehow the possibility of a shift in political power, and associated social and economic status, toward blacks and away from whites. In this case “threat” is not the “expression of an intention” but a “possibility” and makes common-sense as does the usage, “It is threatening to rain.”

<sup>7</sup>The discussion of the “function” of lynchings is fraught with logical and interpretive peril. For example, violence was often explicitly directed against blacks who tried to vote, or hold political office (Burton et al.

thus effectively excluded from the political process — the killing of black men (almost all the victims were men, not women) by mobs served as an expression of hostile intentions towards the African-American population of the counties, towns, and states in which lynchings occurred. In this manner, lynchings can be defined as a political threat to the African-American population at large, and as a political attack on those whose bodies suffered at the hand of lynch mobs directly.

Recent arguments about the nature of the “political”, however, have broadened the common connotation of the term. Many would consider that any hostile action directed against a person on the basis of their group identity or category is a political threat. For the purposes of this paper, the term “racial threat” refers to proposals to inflict harm upon an individual on the basis of his or her racial group. Any proposal to inflict damage against the person or property of a black person because they are black would be considered a racial threat. As such, crossburnings serve as a clear example of a racial threat. The burning cross is often associated with the activities of white supremacist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan. When someone plants a cross in the lawn of a black person and then sets this cross on fire, the owner of the lawn and the members of the community will understand that someone has proposed harm, or even has done harm, against that person on the basis of their race. Although crossburnings may also have to do with non-political motives (such as thrill-seeking by vandals), the legacy of white intimidation of black populations in the South via aggression and violence for political purposes is well known.

The status of a burning cross as a racial threat has become so obvious since the early part of this century that various statutes have been passed mentioning crossburning as a specifically damaging offense. For example, a St. Paul, MN City Ordinance which was later struck down as infringing on First Amendment rights reads as follows:

Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization, or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor (Cleary, 10).

Crossburnings in North Carolina represent racial threat toward blacks. The data that we use in this analysis consist of counts of the number of crossburnings occurring at the county level for each year between 1987 and 1996. The crossburning data for 1987 to 1993 was collected by Professor Donald Green and his colleagues from annual reports by North Carolinians Against Racial and Religious Violence (NCARRV) and Klanwatch.<sup>8</sup> We supplemented this data with our own coding of Klanwatch *Intelligence Reports* for 1987 through 1996.

We also employ an individual level measure of racial threat in this paper drawn from the Spring 1997 Carolina Poll.<sup>9</sup> Respondents were asked the following two questions:

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1994). Yet, the time-series of lynchings did not appreciably change after the institutionalization of Jim Crow laws in the South — laws which made political violence against blacks “unnecessary” (Tolnay and Beck 1994, 188–189). Other theories of lynchings include those proposing economic competition as the main cause (Tolnay and Beck 1994, 121–124).

<sup>8</sup>See Green et al. (1995) for details on the data collection procedure and the results of their ecological analysis of crossburnings.

<sup>9</sup>All of the survey questions presented here came from the Spring 1997, Carolina Poll which was a

**Perceptions of Racial Attacks and Harassment** Now I have a question about relations between Blacks and Whites where you live. As far as you can recall, during the past ten years, how often have Black people in your county been attacked or harassed because of their race? <sup>10</sup> Would you say this has happened often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

**Perceptions of Crossburnings** And, as far as you know, during the past ten years, have there been any crossburnings in your county?

Overall, only 8% of the sample (of 538 respondents) responded that they had any knowledge of a crossburning in their county over the last 10 years. Thirty-five percent of the 473 valid responses indicated that they thought that blacks were attacked or harassed because of their race “sometimes” or “often”. In the analysis that follows, we rely on the “racial attacks and harassment” question to replicate my analyses of the crossburning data in order add more confidence to my findings.

Figure 1 shows the distribution of crossburnings across counties in North Carolina as measured by a scale which combines information from two data sources: 1) North Carolinians Against Racial and Religious Violence (NCARRV) for the period 1987-1993 and 2) Klanwatch (of the Southern Poverty Law Center) for the period 1987-1996. Sixty-eight of the 100 counties in North Carolina had no crossburnings occur within their borders. Only two, Mecklenburg and Cleveland, had as many as four occur during this ten year period. Over all, about 40 crosses were burned in North Carolina between 1987 and 1996. This map shows that crossburnings were spread throughout the state. Crossburnings occurred in the mountainous western Piedmont region where the density of black population ranges below 6%. Likewise, crossburnings also occurred in the eastern coastal plains in which the percentage of blacks ranges above 30% (with 12 counties in which blacks make up above 43% of the population). This map also shows how sparse threat can be. Although it is possible that each of those 40 crossburning had a direct impact on individuals, it is also possible to conceive of these crossburnings as measurements that identify the tip of an iceberg of racial conflict. Obviously, crossburnings are much more valid measures of racial threat than, say, numbers of blacks physically attacked by whites. The dilemma of investigating hate crime lies in differentiating the hate from the crime. In this case, I have chosen to measure sparsely but validly in the hope that valid measurements will represent both the phenomenon of interest (crossburnings) but also a general climate and history of race relations in a given county.

The map also brings to light one problem with contextual analysis. That is, by shading in an entire county, I implicitly assume that any crossburnings within that county threatened any given African-American person in that county equally. Unfortunately, I have no way

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random digit dialed computer assisted telephone survey of the population of North Carolina conducted by the Institute for Research in the Social Sciences at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

<sup>10</sup>The hypothesis of this paper is dynamic (about events occurring which influence behavior). But, the data available to assess the hypothesis is only cross-sectional. For this reason, these questions about threat, and the other questions about participation, ask about “the past X years” in order to get a sense of the impact of history on behavior — rather than relying on a snapshot of only one sliver of time. This formulation, however, does limit the number of cases available for analysis. The 538 respondents who form the core sample for this paper are only those people who reported having lived in their county of residence for more than 6 years. I would not expect a history of crossburnings to have any impact on people who were not living in a county very long.

to remedy this ill at the moment, and just rely on controlling for education, reading of the newspaper, religious attendance, and other individual level characteristics that may alter the propensity of a person to hear about, and to do something about, a crossburning in their vicinity.




Figure 1: North Carolina Counties experienced between 0 and 4 crossburnings during 1987–1996. Colors toward red indicate more crossburnings. Colors toward white indicate fewer crossburnings

### 3.2 Participation

The literature on political participation is vast and ever growing. By now, certain key arguments about the determinants of political participation have become widely accepted as fact. Wolfinger and Rosenstone focus on “the capacity to bear the costs of voting” in *Who Votes?* (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). This “capacity to bear costs” has come to be known in the literature on political participation as “resources”, including education and experience (or age). Verba, Scholzman and Brady expand on the resource model of political participation to include “skills” as well, which include experience in leading or attending meetings in which decisions are made, experience in public speaking or making presentations, and experience in writing letters (Verba et al. 1995, 561). Although these “civic skills” are often acquired via education, Verba et al. found that respondents who were very active in churches or other community organizations could compensate for low education and gain civic skills in the course of their non-political volunteerism (519–521). [add argument about “civic-status” from Nie et al. (1996).]

While not discounting Wolfinger et al. and Verba et al., Rosenstone and Hansen “argue most emphatically...for the centrality of strategic mobilization” (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 5). Mobilization works when citizens care about the issues involved and are thus “ready to follow their leaders into politics” (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 34). Rosenstone and Hansen note that “big pocketbook issues” and “big moral issues” are the ones apt to grab public attention in such a way as to make mobilization an effective political strategy (34). Voter mobilization can occur via the leadership of a variety of actors. Rosenstone and Hansen point out that the Civil Rights Movement was also a mobilizing influence on the voting turnout of blacks through “voter registration drives, protests and marches” and

organization of black voting blocs (192). Segregationist leaders reacted to the surge in black political power with violence and counter-mobilization.

The white reaction to the movement was notably violent, marked by assaults, assassinations, and bombing. Together with intimidation of black voters, segregationists worked to foster white racial identity, to shape social expectations, and to register Southern white voters to counterbalance black gains (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 192).

Without the mobilization of black and white leaders, the Civil Rights Movement would not have grown into a mass phenomenon, or spurred a counter-movement.

People participate in politics, then, when they have resources (such as income and experience), when they have skills (such as education), when they are well positioned within politically-relevant social networks (such social network resources also produced via education and income) and, importantly, when political leaders spur them into action (mobilization). For the purposes of this paper, we will take into account resources, skills and status, by the race, age, education, gender, newspaper reading activity, religious attendance, employment status, and income of individuals as predictors of their propensity to participate. We will take the possibility of mobilization into account via the variable which measures the number of black officials.

Good indicators of participation as a mobilized response to crossburnings include attendance at anti-hate crime protests, informal community activism, and the like. Even better measures would track the changes in community participation for individuals both before and after a community had experienced a crossburning. Unfortunately, the large national surveys which probe for more rich descriptions of political activity have very few respondents in North Carolina, the only state for which extensive crossburning data are currently available. Furthermore, these few respondents are usually all concentrated in one or two counties of the state. For example, the National Election Studies in 1990 and 1992 had 55 and 29 respondents, respectively in North Carolina, all of whom were in Robeson County.

Data on political participation for about 600 North Carolinian respondents were available, however, via the Spring 1997 Carolina Poll. In this paper we measure political participation with three survey questions:<sup>11</sup>

**Community Participation** In the past two years, how often have you gotten together with or worked with others in your community or neighborhood to try to deal with some community issue or problem? Would you say that you've done this often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

**Community Mobilization** In the past two years, how often have you, personally, been asked to take part in efforts in your community or neighborhood to solve some local problem? Would you say that you've been asked often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

**Vote Turnout** Did you vote in the November 1996 election, or did something come up to keep you from voting?

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<sup>11</sup>See Appendix A for more information about the variables and data sources used in this paper.

The first two measures of participation make obvious sense. When a crossburning occurs in a community, the locus of reaction to this event ought to be local. We also do claim that vote turnout is a plausible dependent variable for this analysis. Although white males with property have had the right to vote in this country from the beginning of the polity, the franchise was extended to women and blacks only after contentious political struggles. And even though blacks were granted the legal right to vote with the 14th and 15th Amendments, the exclusion of blacks from the ballot box in the southern United States is a well-known fact. After a surge in black political power from 1868 until 1877, the general assembly in North Carolina

replaced the popular vote with legislative control of county government. Other bills redrew ward lines in cities with heavy black populations, either to limit black influence in one district or to disperse it through several. This maneuvering, along with violent terror, gave the white Democratic minority control over the eastern black belt (Keech and Sistrom 1994, 157).

In this way, political power via the vote became intimately related to violence in North Carolina.

In the neighboring state of South Carolina, Burton et al. report that open violence was used to prevent blacks from exercising political power. For example, seven state legislators were murdered between 1868 and 1876, at least two pitched battles were fought between African-Americans (and allied whites) and ex-Confederate soldiers in 1871 which culminated in a seizure of a county courthouse by 700 men to prevent African-Americans from voting (Burton et al. 1994, 192-193). The result of these hostile and violent events was the effective disenfranchisement of blacks. While only 11 percent of black adult males, and 45% of white adult males, voted in the 1896 election in South Carolina and in North Carolina, “by 1910 almost no blacks voted, and white turnout had dropped substantially” (Keech and Sistrom 1994, 158). The violence in South Carolina continued with police intimidation of voting registration drives in the 1920s and 1930s. Burton et al. note, however, that the threat was not always effective. “Despite Klan marches and crossburnings, 35,000 black voters went to the polls in the 1948 primary.” (Burton et al. 1994, 197).

Black leaders in North Carolina also successfully organized to fight these restrictions on the vote. However, the black population did not register to vote in any significant numbers until the 1970s. The percent of the eligible black electorate that was registered was 5% in 1940, rising to around 30% in 1964, and continuing to increase to 54% in 1976 after the Voting Rights Act of 1965 rendered the literacy tests and poll tax obsolete (Keech and Sistrom 1994, 160).

### 3.3 Mobilization

Individuals who are threatened, or who suffer aggression, can flee or fight. This “flight or fight” dynamic is as common on the playground as in politics. A fight reaction in the face of political threat would be political participation. A flight reaction would be quiescence, or even withdrawal from the public sphere. What increases the likelihood of a fight reaction versus a flight reaction? When will victims resist threat versus succumb to it? In the previous section I described the literature which states that political participation is generally expected to occur when resources exist for such behavior. At the individual

level, these resources include education, experience, and civic skills. At the level of a community one can imagine several different factors which could influence individuals toward participation. For example, reaction to an event is premised on knowledge of the event. In this case, crossburnings are such dramatic events, and the news media are so quick to pick up drama, that the transmission of knowledge ought not to show much variance within the black community. Another factor could be social capital. Robert Putnam defines social capital as “features of social life — networks, norms, and trust — which enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared goals” (Putnam 1996, 34). For this paper, that definition of social capital is a bit tautological: social capital mobilizes because it is defined as that which enables mobilization. However, the idea that strong communities are more “powerful” in standing up to threat is not new. In North Carolina, African-Americans who organized into groups managed to wield some local electoral power even during the era of Jim Crow laws.

[I]n Winston-Salem a militant black labor union local began building a black electorate in the mid-1940s, and by 1947 a black was voted onto that city’s board of aldermen, becoming the first black public official elected in North Carolina in this century. In Durham an upper-middle-class black community had begun a political organization in the 1930s. This group, which was associated with the city’s black insurance and banking industry, increased the local black electorate until it became an important force in local elections ... (Keech and Sistrom 1994, 159).

Thus, despite the threat of violence and the threat of legal sanctions, some blacks in North Carolina did mobilize, and thus reacted to threat with participation instead of intimidation.

The use of black elected officials to reflect “empowerment” by blacks is common in the recent political science literature. Bobo and Gilliam showed that the existence of black mayors has a significant and positive impact on the propensity of blacks to turn out to vote, as well as decreasing black alienation toward government and increasing black attentiveness toward politics (Bobo and Gilliam 1990, 377). Highton later modified their argument to show that the existence of black mayors does not have a long term impact on voting turnout for either whites or blacks. Instead, Highton argues, the increase in black turnout is a function of the novelty of black elected officials, and of the intense political mobilization among blacks necessary for the election of a black mayor (Highton 1992). [more recent literature, and condense discussion]

For the purposes of this paper, we use the existence of black elected officials at the municipal and county levels less as an indicator of “empowerment” than as an indicator of the existence of organizational resources available for the political mobilization of the black community. Although black local elected officials do not represent a complete operationalization of the concept of mobilization, one would expect that the existence of black officials elected at the local level would indicate the existence of relatively strong organizational resources and social networks within the black communities in which black officials occur.<sup>12</sup> In concrete terms, I expect that as the number of crossburnings increase

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<sup>12</sup>Of course, non-blacks can elect black officials. I realize that the existence of black local elected officials does not necessarily show the existence of black community power and vice versa. I would expect, however, that the existence of black local elected officials would have strong and positive relationships with strong, activist, black communities in the social and historical context of North Carolina.

in a given county, the presence of significant numbers of black local elected officials will determine whether the black community responds via political mobilization or political quiescence.

## 4 Where do cross-burnings occur?

Why do some counties experience cross-burnings and others not? Statistical inference requires a model describing this process (Achen, 1986)[add cite to Rubin if not also to Cox]. Although estimation of effects quite often involves a model of outcomes (i.e. a model explaining how political activity depends on cross-burnings, black local elected officials, among other factors), since Fisher (1935) and Neyman (1990), we have known that a model of outcomes is not strictly necessary. In a randomized controlled experiment we can justify a model of assignment to treatment with some confidence. The model can be as simple as  $\Pr(Z_i = 1) = 1/2$  if we assign some intervention for each person  $i$  by flipping a fair coin. And we can justify this model by claiming that we actually flipped the coin. In general, a model of treatment assignment (or cross-burning occurrence) consists of a list of factors contributing to (or inhibiting) cross-burnings, and a functional form relating these factors to each other and to cross-burnings.

In an observational study like ours, we have no direct control over how cross-burnings occurred in different counties in North Carolina. Yet, merely comparing political activity across counties with and without cross-burnings is apt to confuse differences resulting from cross-burnings with differences of which cross-burnings are the result. For example, imagine that cross-burnings tended to happen more in counties with large black populations. A comparison of counties with and without cross-burnings would also be a comparison of counties with large black populations to counties with small black populations. Differences in the political activity of blacks and whites could as easily be explained by differences in sizes of relative populations as by differences in race-based violence. This example suggests that if we could posit a model for how cross-burnings occurred across counties we might be able to de-confound our comparisons: after all the unconfounded comparisons of a randomized experiment are unconfounded precisely because the units compared had equal probability of receiving the treatment. By creating groups of counties which themselves have roughly equal probabilities of receiving the “treatment” of cross-burnings, we aim to uncover the experiment hidden within our observational study.

If such an experiment exists, we will only find it if we use subject matter knowledge and theory about how cross-burnings occur. We also require some means of assessing whether a collection of posited sets of counties comes close to what we would observe were we to first stratify counties into groups and then to assign crossburnings within such groups at random. To address the first challenge we surveyed the formal theory and social movements and ethnic violence literatures to uncover a theoretical basis to guide the construction of an empirical model. To address the second challenge we rely on advances in the assessment of matched sets developed in Hansen and Bowers (2008); Hansen (2008); Bowers et al. (2009).

### 4.1 Theories of Hate Crime and Violence

Group-based violence occurs where members of one group have some reason to attack members of another group and where perpetrators believe that they can get away with such attacks.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>Lyons (2007) divides formal models of hate crimes into three categories based on general social theoretical background: social disorganization theory, resource competition theory, and defended communities theory. The differences between these perspectives helps us only insofar as they highlight factors and

Consider the effect of lack of sanctions on prevalence of cross-burnings: If places where attackers are not sanctioned ought to have more attacks, and then places where social networks are not dense and in-person contact is rare (and thus places where scholars such as (Hanifan, 1916; Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 2000) would predict trust and aid between neighbors is rare), ought also to be places where even outraged individuals cannot organize to prevent or effectively punish hate crimes (Gale et al., 2002). Thus, places where the population changes, and places with urban centers, ought to be places with more cross-burnings, *ceteris paribus*. Attacks might also be allowed (or at least not formally sanctioned) because they have tacit support from extant formal and informal institutions, thus, places which have allowed violence in the past might also be places which continue to allow it [cite to the sociology article on lynchings predicting death penalties in the Literature folder]. Sanctions might also be rare when the targeted group is small and/or subordinated (i.e. has little political or economic power).

What do attackers hope to gain from such violence? As we noted earlier in § 1, in the southern United States, white violence toward blacks has historically served the purposes of maintaining white political and economic power. Caselli and Coleman II (2006) define a model predicting ethnic conflict in general which captures such intuitions. They predict conflict based on: (1) cost of switching ethnic identity or ethnic distance, (2) inefficiencies of conflict, (3) the size of the dominant group, (4 and 5) the proportion of wealth the dominant and lesser groups can maintain during conflict.

In sum, if group *A* is the strong group, we are more likely to observe exploitation of group *B* by group *A* if: (i) The ethnic distance between *A* and *B* is large; (ii) the country's endowment of expropriable resources is neither too small or too large; (iii) group *A* is small; (iv) group *A* has low per-capita income; (v) group *B* has high per-capita income; and (vi) the efficiency of costs of exploitation are modest. (Caselli and Coleman II, 2006, p. 14)

It is important to note that exploitation in this scenario occurs as an alternative to open conflict such as civil war. The formal models of (Esteban and Ray, 2008), studies in which social and political status quo is defended(Glaeser, 2005) and the historical studies of lynchings support the idea that exploitation via violence (or otherwise) can be utility maximizing for a dominant group (See, e.g. Tolnay and Beck, 1995). And dominant groups have more reason to intimidate where costs of attacks are low and benefits are high. Thus, we ought to see more cross-burnings where the black population is small relative to the white population (but not so small as to make it costly for potential attackers to find a target), and perhaps where either economic or political resources are at stake.

## 4.2 A Past Study of Crossburnings in North Carolina

One previous study of crossburnings in North Carolina was written as part of an ongoing project to predict the occurrence of this type of hate crime. This study uses nearly the same data as we use in this paper and so deserves special consideration as a source of a county-level model of crossburnings in North Carolina during this period. Donald Green, Robert Abelson and their colleagues at Yale University predicted crossburnings in North Carolina via four groups of variables: the supply of victims, the supply of potential

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mechanisms for our models of prevalence of cross-burnings. (We use “prevalence” here because we are using cross-burnings as indicators of conditions that are relatively constant over time in a county.)

attackers, county crime rates, and sources of political and economic frustration for whites (Green et al., 1995, 17–18). They measured the supply of victims by the number of nonwhites within a county. Indicators for the supply of potential attackers included the number of white juvenile offenders in a county, the number of unemployed persons, and the number of votes for right-wing extremist candidates in 1984 and 1988, and countywide rates of high school completion (known hate crime perpetrators tend to be among those least well educated in a community [cite]). Political and racial conservatism were measured by the proportion of vote cast for Senator Jesse Helms in the racially and ideologically charged 1990 Senate race against the black democratic candidate, Harvey Gantt. Voter registration rates reflected “low levels of civic-mindedness and participation” (Green et al., 1995, 17). Sources of political and economic frustration were measured by the proportion of county commissioners who are black, the annual unemployment rate for the county and hate group activity (number of marches and rallies by white supremacist groups).

In their final analysis, Green et al. (1995) found that crossburnings were more likely to occur in counties with more potential targets (non-white populations) and more potential perpetrators (white juvenile criminals). Crossburnings also related to hate group rallies in the same year. Low levels of education and low levels of traditional political participation seemed to predict crossburnings as well, but not as strongly once previous hate group activity had entered into their linear model. Green et al. (1995) did not find that levels or rates of unemployment related very strongly to the occurrence of crossburnings at the county level. Nor did support for Jesse Helms, or voting for extremist candidates have much influence in their data models. Furthermore, the number of black county commissioners was not a significant predictor of crossburnings in their final equation (Green et al., 1995, Table 8).

In summary, counties which have suffered from crossburnings during the five years between 1987 and 1993, were those with higher population, higher black population, more serious crimes (of both violent and non-violent types), lower levels of income, more high school dropouts, and higher unemployment. At the level of the county, crossburnings appear much more related to general social and economic malaise than to any specific political conditions.

## 5 Seeking the Latent Experiment

Green et al. (1995), the formal models, and others (Green et al., 1998, 1996a,b) suggest ingredients for the model of assignment. We will only use such ingredients that exist before the period of cross-burning observation begins because we aim to find the latent experiment hiding in this observational study and, the model of assignment must generate crossburnings not be a result of them.<sup>14</sup> To the general social and economic variables we add historical lynching data to capture longer term aspects of the relationships between blacks and whites in these counties.

The theoretical story assessed in this paper has to do specifically with differences in effects of intimidation by virtue of the political resources (or perhaps opportunities) available to different people in the face of such events/circumstances/conditions. Our rough measure of these resources (to go with our rough measure of conditions of racial animosity) is the

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<sup>14</sup>For a nice exposition of the dangers of conditioning on “post-treatment” variables see (Gelman and Hill, 2007, Chapter 9–10).

number of black local elected officials (by local we mean county level or less — at least for now). Of course, it is reasonable to suppose that black local elected officials might cause cross-burnings by whites by exactly the same kinds of mechanisms that we posit here for blacks — only, here we only observe conventional political participation by blacks as the reaction to what they understand as a threat, and cross-burnings might indicate that race relations are more tinged with violence compared to the kind of threat posed by black elected officials to whites. For this reason, we coded black elected officials for the period before 1987 as another ingredient in our model of assignment.<sup>15</sup>

### 5.1 Estimating a model of assignment

We estimate models distinguishing counties with cross-burnings from counties without cross-burnings using a Bayesian logistic regression with the addition of “weakly informative priors” (Gelman et al., 2008). We do so to avoid problems of separation in logistic regressions (in which rare outcomes and/or sparse data lead to coefficients with infinite values).<sup>16</sup>

As suggested above, although past work shows rough agreement about what attributes of counties might relate to cross-burnings, there is less agreement about how these attributes ought to enter into a model. For example, as the population of targets increases as a proportion of the population, one might imagine that cross-burnings would increase (up to a certain point), and then perhaps decrease. At the same time, change in the population of targets might stimulate hate crime either within well-organized places (with high social capital used to defend the status quo) or within ill-organized places (where trust is low and ability to sanction is low and known to be low by strategically acting attackers). Related to this idea that change might threaten white potential attackers, is the idea that as the population of whites becomes small (and/or changes) relative to any other number of ethnic groups (not just blacks), that we might see more hate crime. For this reason we use regression splines to allow for these kinds of non-linear relationships to manifest themselves without having to commit to one or another story.

Operationally, we cannot enter “percent black” and “percent white” into the same equation four times in different combinations. Thus, we estimate four different models of cross-burnings here. First, we fit a model of cross-burnings as a (possibly non-linear) function of percent black in the county measured in 1940 and 1980. The second model uses percent white in the county (also measured as of the four census years as for percent black).<sup>17</sup> The third and fourth models use change in percent black (or white) respectively. All of the models include total population of the county as of 1980, 1970, 1960 and 1940 along with measures of the change in total population between census years, number of lynchings recorded in the county between 1882 and 1932, percent urban in the county as of 1980,

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<sup>15</sup>In what follows we replicated the analyses using black elected officials from only 1973 and 1968 and the results do not change.

<sup>16</sup>Eventually we anticipate that we can use some of the information gleaned from past studies of hate crimes to further inform the priors of this Bayesian model.

<sup>17</sup>“Percent white” approximates the Herfindahl or Herfindahl-Hirschman Index often used to measure the probability that a given person of one ethnicity will encounter another person of the same ethnicity [cites to Hopkins and Alessina and canonical cite]. In our case, only whites burn crosses, so we are interested most especially in how change in white (potential attacker) and black (potential target) populations rather than ethnic heterogeneity in general.

median income as of 1980 and number of black local elected officials in 1973 and 1987.<sup>18</sup>

### 5.1.1 Functional Form

The design of our study involves first, forecasting cross-burnings — that is, producing and fitting a model which predicts which counties ought to experience cross-burnings based on what we think we know about which variables distinguish places suffering from such violence from places with no events. The astute reader will by now wonder about how we will choose a functional form relating the covariates  $x_{1i}, \dots, x_{Ki}$  for each county  $j$  to the presence or absence of cross-burnings. Our search of the formal theory literature did not lead to any novel insights on this account — the debate appears to center on what attributes of places matter most, not exactly how they matter or relate to one another. In any case, since we are interested in a data-fitting model, we can err on the side of flexibility of functional form when fitting. We will see that we can produce a few very well-fit models following this strategy.

### 5.1.2 Missing Data

Our census information omitted one county (Yancey) in 1970. For this county, values were imputed as the average of the 1980 census information and the 1960 census. Only two survey respondents hail from Yancey, so we believe the impact of these imputation on the final results to be minimal. We are already tracking down this information for this county but for this paper, we will include it and eschew imputation when we have it.

We have no counties for which we have missing cross-burnings information. Of course, this does not mean that we have observed every cross-burning. It just means that the agencies collecting the cross-burnings data did not report an inability to observe cross-burnings in any county. Some counties experienced no cross-burnings. Future work will try to use church-burnings and FBI reported hate crimes (which only began reporting after the agencies reporting cross-burnings stopped tracking them) to counter any biases associated with the peculiarities associated with the collection of this particular cross-burnings dataset.

### 5.1.3 The Models

Appendix B shows the coefficients from these models. Figure 2 shows the predicted influence of percent black and percent white on the occurrence of cross-burnings. The left panel shows a nonlinear relationship: counties with few blacks experienced comparatively more cross-burnings than counties with 20–40% black. Counties with more than 40% black experienced the most cross-burnings.<sup>19</sup> Although percent white was also fit with a spline function, it was not necessary as the relationship was relatively flat and linear — there was no evidence that counties with relatively few whites experienced that many more (or less) cross-burnings than mostly white counties. Black elected officials likewise showed no particular relationship distinguishing places with cross-burnings from places without cross-burnings. In each case the pointwise confidence intervals are quite wide.

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<sup>18</sup>We will be adding information on unemployment and education to more directly capture aspects of social organization/disorganization theorized to create the conditions for hate crimes.

<sup>19</sup>All this “controlling for” in a linear model of other demographic characteristics of the county as listed above and displayed in Models 1 and 2 of Appendix B, Table B2).




Figure 2: Predicted probability of cross-burnings in North Carolina counties from two propensity models (Models 1 and 2 of Appendix B, Table B2). Dashed lines indicate pointwise 95% CIs. Observed data on crossburning occurrence (0=no, 1=xburns), jittered to show variation.

Although the models only weakly supported the different theoretical models that we brought to these data, as forecasting models they do a fine job. Figure 3 shows that predicted probabilities of crossburnings map well onto actual occurrence — the predicted probabilities of crossburnings among counties without crossburnings are, in general, lower than the predicted probabilities of crossburnings among counties in which crossburnings were recorded.




Figure 3: Boxplots showing predicted prevalence of cross-burnings by four propensity models by actual prevalence of crossburnings.

## 5.2 County Matching

The four models estimated in § 5.1 summarize the relationships between a set of attributes of counties and cross-burnings. Each model produces a probability of exposure to cross-burnings for each county — Figure 3 summarizes these scores as a function of actual, observed cross-burnings. In order to closely approximate the situation in which cross-burnings would be assigned at random within subsets of counties chosen for their homogeneity in attributes like total population, change in percent black, historic lynchings,

etc.. we think of these scores as “propensity scores” now work to create matched sets of counties which differ in terms of observed crossburnings but which are similar in terms of forecasts from our model of cross-burnings. The idea that one may use linear projects of sets of variables to stand in for the variables themselves in the context of matching was developed in a series of articles by Rosenbaum and Rubin (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985, 1984, 1983). Of course, we do not know the true propensity score here, and theory relating to estimated propensity scores is only now appearing [cite to Hansen 2009 and Abadie and Imbens 2009]. That said, we are not claiming in this paper to be estimating a causal effect in a strict sense. Rather, since any inference (statistical, causal, descriptive, scientific, ..) about cross-burnings as they relate to political participation requires comparisons across counties, we are using these techniques to enhance our confidence that we are comparing counties which are truly comparable.

What do we mean by comparable? The primary goal of matching is to create balance (similar distributions) on observable covariates, just as true randomization creates balanced groups in expectation (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Figure 4 shows the balance on observable covariates before versus after matching for counties in North Carolina using the methods of Hansen and Klopfer (2006); Hansen (2004); Ming and Rosenbaum (2001); Rosenbaum (1991). Both treated (counties experiencing one or more cross burning incidents from 1987 to 1993) and control (counties not experiencing a cross burnig during this period) show similar means after matching whereas before matching the counties differed quite a bit. An test of balance which takes into account any linear combination of the variables casts very little doubt on the null hypothesis that, within matched set, the counties are as similar on these chosen covariates (and chosen nonlinear relationships) as could be expected from a randomized experiment ( $\chi^2 = 15_{df=24} p = .9$ ) (Hansen and Bowers, 2008).

Our theory is about subgroup differences: with subgroups of counties by black elected officials and subgroups of people by black/white. To assist in analyzing outcomes later, we add the a constraint to our matching process: counties must be similar in propensity score as well as not be vastly different on number of black elected officials. To enforce this constraint, we impose a caliper on the matching procedure based on the sum of black elected officials in the county from the years 1968, 1973, and 1987, all of which predate the crossburnings used in this this study.<sup>20</sup> In fact we used three calipers: (1) counties with no black elected officials must only be matched to other counties with no officials (31/100 counties), (2) counties with more than one black elected official 1968–1987 would be matched to other such counties within a range of 5 officials (thus, a county with 1 official could be matched to counties with 1,2,3,4,5 or 6 officials, but not to counties with more than 6; (3) the difference in combined propensity scores (a mean taken over all four scores) between counties in a matched set must be less than 3 standard deviations [cites about calipers from Cochran, Rubin, Rosenbaum].

Defining treatment for a county as having experienced a crossburning between 1987 and 1993, each set may have one treated county and more than one control counties or one control and more than one treated. No sets have both many treated and many controls. This algorithm results in 17Figure 5 shows the final matches, with matched counties

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<sup>20</sup>In future revisions we plan to replace 1987 black elected officials with 1980 — given the nature of our data, we worry that cross-burnings occurring just before our data collection period might both change the electoral outcomes for black elected officials in 1987 as well as cross-burnings that we observe.




Figure 4: After matching, standardized mean differences on covariates and propensity scores become small. 'mean.predicted'=mean(ps1,ps2,ps3,ps4). 'beos'='black elected officials'.

sharing the same color. We see that the first set ("m.1") has 6 control counties (i.e. counties with no crossburnings reported 1987–1996) and 1 treated county (i.e. one county with one or more crossburnings reported during that period). Matched set 23 ("m.23") has 35 controls and 1 treated county, where as we have seven sets with one control matched to one treated county. Two control counties were excluded from the matching after imposing the calipers.<sup>21</sup>

The balance test and other diagnostics make plausible the idea that our matched sets of counties, overall, could have emerged from a randomized experiment. Of course such balance only begs the question about covariates that we do not observe, or about functions of these covariates that we did not test. To address such questions we present a sensitivity analysis of our results after estimating effects.

### 5.3 Individual Matching

Until now, we have only discussed matching counties, as counties were the level of treatment assignment in our idealized experiment. Now we repeat the matching procedure at the level of outcome analysis: individuals. In essence, the latent experiment was conducted

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<sup>21</sup>There must be a better way to display geographic matches. The colors are not distinctive enough.




Figure 5: Graphical Representation of Full Matching

with clustered assignment, where all individuals within a given county were either exposed or not exposed to a cross burning. Of course, individuals are not randomly assigned to live in a given county, and hidden selection effects could bias our results. Just as we did for counties, we produced a model of an individual's propensity to live in a treated or control county. Individuals are then matched within the established sets of treated and control counties to produce a multi-level matching.

Table 1 shows the survey respondents within the matched sets of counties, with counts for the number of respondents in treated and control counties. Some sets of counties have many respondents, and others very few.

	Controls	Treated
m.1	5	4
m.10	8	11
m.12	5	19
m.16	6	4
m.17	26	5
m.18	4	9
m.2	11	1
m.22	0	5
m.23	109	1
m.26	12	5
m.27	7	4
m.28	10	5
m.3	18	139
m.4	9	35
m.5	5	8
m.6	8	27
m.9	5	4

Table 1: Numbers of individuals by matched county sets

While subjects were selected by random telephone dialing, their choice to live in a treated or control county is certainly a non-random event. Again, in order to increase the precision of our analysis and also to address issues of bias arising from self-selection into counties by individuals we turn to a model of where people choose to live. We model an individual's selection of a county that does or does not receive a cross burning conditional on living in a particular matched set as the product of a set of standard demographic covariates gathered during the survey. [We are re-thinking this step as we write. Perhaps we should model propensity to chose to live in a county in a particular set rather than model propensity to be exposed to cross-burnings conditional on set.]

With an estimated propensity score for all survey respondents, we produced a set of matches between treated and control subjects. While the model for living in a treated or control county was produced from all the survey respondents, matches are constrained to be only within the matched sets of counties and are also required to be exact on race (black/white). Table B3 presents the detailed results from this model. Given the nature of geographic segregation by class, and the deep differences between rural and urban ways of life, it is not surprising that the matched sets themselves tend to differentiate people's exposure to cross-burnings much more so than their own education or propensity to watch television (or their marital status, etc..)

Figure 6 assesses the balance across individual survey respondents. Across all assessed covariates, we find good balance within and among the different matched sets of counties. Our double matching, and the constraints that we placed on the matching procedure (only match individuals within matched sets of counties, only match individuals of the same race, only match individuals within 2/3sd of a propensity score.) caused us to discard 115 out of the 534 observations (51 blacks and 64 whites). This left us with 35 blacks and 384 whites with which to estimate treatment effects.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>Our eventual sensitivity analysis should return to this step and profile more indepth those excluded from the analysis.




Figure 6: After matching, standardized mean differences between individuals on covariates and propensity score become small. 'indiv.ps'='propensity score'.

## 6 Outcome Analysis

With matching completed for both counties and individuals, we now proceed to address the primary substantive question: what is the effect of hate crimes on political participation? Our expectations require an analysis by subgroups: effects of county-level cross-burnings ought to vary across subgroups of counties defined by number of black local elected officials measured at 1968, 1973, and 1987 and across subgroups of individuals defined by race (black vs. white). Having created sets of comparable counties and individuals via matching, we now use two complementary approaches to estimate effects. The first approach relies on a model of outcomes but is estimated conditional on the matching. The second approach relies only on the design of the study (and a second matching of individuals within counties) and on a simple model of effects. The second approach is more methodologically innovative than the first, but the first involves a style of analyses more common in political science and thus we start with the linear multilevel modeling approach.

### 6.1 Parametric Modeling of Effect Conditional on Matching and Covariates

We have two variables representing conditions of threat toward African-Americans. At the county-level we have counts of cross-burnings. At the individual level we have reported perceptions of attacks and/or harassment of blacks by whites. We have one variable representing the political resources available to blacks: number of black local elected officials.<sup>23</sup> Since we have chosen to use a linear model to estimate effects, we must specify the implication of our theory in terms of a linear equation. Here we use the Wilkinson and Rogers (1973) system for representing linear models succinctly (with the addition of some notation from Bates[cite] for representing varying parameters and nesting in a multilevel model):

In this case it is simple. For person  $i$  in County  $j$ , in County Matched Set  $k$ , and Individual Matched Set  $l$ , we model political participation as a function of the three-way interaction of race, crossburnings (or perceptions of racial antagonism), and numbers of black local elected officials:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Participation}_{ijkl} \sim & 1 + \text{County Matched Set}_k + (1|\text{County Matched Set}_k/\text{Individual Matched Set}_{jkl}) \\ & + (1|\text{County}_{jk}) + (\text{Black}_{ijkl} * \text{Black Officials}_{jkl} * \text{Crossburnings}_{jkl} + \mathbf{X}_{ijkl}) \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

Equation 1 also includes a fixed-effect for County matched set because it is this set which defines the latent experiment sought by the initial matching. This model also includes random-effects (random intercepts) for individual matched sets within county-matched sets, and also for county itself — thereby accounting for (1) the fact that crossburnings occur at the level of the county and (2) the complex clustering that we created using matching in order to eliminate bias. Finally, this equation includes a  $\mathbf{X}_{ijkl}$  term indicating

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<sup>23</sup>It should be noted that such officials represent a historically significant change in these counties. In 1968 there were only 18 such officials recorded in all of North Carolina. In 1973 there were 109. In 1987 and 1997 there were 333 and 501 respectively.

some collection of individual level covariates (such as education, martial status, etc..) Although these variables were used to create the individual matched sets, past literature suggests strongly that they ought to matter for political participation itself, and thus their inclusion here ought to increase the precision of estimation.

### 6.1.1 Expectations

Blacks who live in counties which have experienced a history of high racial threat should be more apt to participate if the counties also contain many black local elected officials. The organizational structures that should exist as pre-conditions for black voters to have elected black officials in the first place should act to spur blacks to resist threat where it occurs. Compensating for the possibility of mobilization, however, we expect that blacks who live in areas without the resource of black officials would be expected to react to threat with intimidation (i.e. depressed participation). The expected direction of the effect of black officials in the absence of threat is less clear due to conflicts in the literature. Bobo and Gilliam would expect that black local elected officials (or only mayors in their case) would “empower” the black citizenry to participate (Bobo and Gilliam 1990). Highton, however, would claim that this empowerment effect would only occur in the time immediately surrounding the election of a black mayor. After the black mayor gains office, Highton predicts a decrease in black vote turnout (Highton 1992). Other scholars might even claim that a positive sign on the coefficient representing differences in political participation in the absence of threat but the presence of officials would signal *not* so much mobilization among blacks by black officials, but decreased participation (lack of interest, lack of mobilization) among whites who are represented by black officials. Recent studies of political participation lead me to expect that the base level of political participation for African-Americans, controlling for individual and county level characteristics via the matching and directly, is probably higher than the base level of political participation for whites (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 90; Verba et al. 1995, 230). The relationships between individual level control variables and participation ought generally to be positive given our discussion of political participation earlier in this paper.

We don’t have strong expectations how whites ought to react to threat. For whites not exposed to threat, we can easily imagine that high numbers black local elected officials could lead to increased participation among whites — perhaps counter-mobilized by local white officials. We can also imagine that white political participation could decrease where more local political power is controlled by blacks. That is, one could imagine that whites could interpret the presence of black local politicians as symbols that the local political system is not responsive to white needs and therefore lapse into apathy. The effect of threat on white political participation in areas with no black local officials is also less clear. Obviously, some sympathetic whites might be apt to be mobilized along with blacks in response to a climate of threat. However, other whites might not care, and thus show no effect of threat on their political participation.

This discussion of white political participation in response to anti-black threat and black local officials emphasizes another flaw in this analysis. It is plausible that as blacks gain political power whites become more active in public life — including both more active in legal political activism and more active in illegal, coercive activism. The white response to black political participation during the Reconstruction was violent as we described earlier in this paper. Doug McAdam(1982) has documented this dynamic clearly for Civil

Rights Movement events and white supremacist events between 1955 and 1960 (143). Furthermore, there is also reason to believe that blacks mobilize and try to maintain or gain political power in response to white mobilization. In this way, a more realistic model would account for dynamic cycles of mobilization and competition between the races. Unfortunately, the individual data on political participation available for this paper are limited to a single slice of time. For this reason, we cannot disentangle the inter-group dynamics which almost certainly lie behind the results that we find.

Despite the caveats and qualifications presented above, however, there is reason to believe that the model as specified above reasonably depicts the theory that we desire to assess. We expect to find that blacks exposed to a history of crossburnings, but who cannot rely upon the organizational resources signaled by the presence of local black officials, are projected to decrease their political participation (in two of these models, their involvement in their communities). If these results hold, then our hypothesis will have received some support. Note, finally, that “exposed to a history of crossburnings” does not require that these individuals know about the crossburnings. Our theory does not rest on the assumption that individual people increase or decrease their participation directly in response to a particular event. Rather, a history of threatening events (or the perception of such) may very well create a “climate” of black participation in general due to the efforts of a relatively few dedicated activists.

### 6.1.2 Results

Figure 7 summarizes the theoretically relevant features of the models as fit to the combined county-level and individual-level data (Table C4 shows the coefficients and standard errors for all 6 models). Each (overly busy at this point) plot contains our threat measure on the x-axis (either crossburnings or perceptions of racial antagonism) and predicted participation on the y-axis. Observed data are jittered to show variation — black respondents are plotted with larger dots than white respondents. The shaded areas represent 66% confidence intervals and the thick lines mean predictions — both from mcmc samples drawn from the theoretically implied posterior distribution for each model. The thick solid lines represent behavior among respondents living in places with the maximum number of black local elected officials (23) and the thick, dashed lines represent the situation that this model would extrapolate to places where black local elected officials are absent (0 officials). The reddish colors represent black respondents and the blueish colors represent white respondents.

Recall that the theory with which we began this paper states that violence leads to intimidation (and thus decrease political activity) where political resources are scarce but ought to enhance political activity where resources are plentiful. The mean predictions from these models in general support this idea. The most striking example of this pattern is the plot predicting Community Mobilization using Perceptions of Racial Attacks/Harassment (second column, second row). At the lowest level of perceived racial antagonism, the mean participation score (out of 1) was .4 where the mean score among respondents perceiving the maximum antagonism was close to .8: threat in that case is associated with increasing involvement in politics. Meanwhile, the pattern reverses among blacks living in places with no black elected officials (and thus, we assume, low political resources of many kinds): threat in that case is associated with sharply decreasing involvement.

Other analyses shown here suggest less that the existence of black elected officials catalyzes action, but rather prevents such threats from interrupting action (or perhaps merely helps blacks in those places maintain their aggregate level of participation). Yet, threat (as represented by cross-burnings or personal reports of perceptions of racial antagonism) tends to be associated with either flat or negative relationships — supporting the idea that threat does intimidate, but it does so under circumstances where the targets of the threat have few resources.

In contrast to the two local participation questions, voting shows a negative relationship with crossburnings for blacks living in places with few black local officials but a positive relationship for those same people with perceptions of racial attacks and harassment. Voting (self-report as of 1996) as an activity is qualitatively different from the local level activities in the top two rows of the figure. Since 1996 was a presidential election year, it is possible that threat at the local level interacted with the national level issues animating the campaigns in ways that mask (for perceptions of racial attacks) or enhance (for crossburnings) the relationships we see in the other panels. [more on this]

Another possible explanation for the Voting results highlights another general pattern in these results: the data are scarce and the confidence intervals are wide. Recall that we are showing here quite narrow intervals (essentially  $\pm 1$  standard error). Yet, even with these intervals the overlap between the regions is substantial. Since we only had 35 blacks in this analysis, it is quite possible that the Voting results (and also the results which more directly support our expectations) could vanish with the removal (or addition) of a single person. Much rides on our assumptions about linear functional forms (and the confidence intervals themselves arise from an assumption of Normal outcomes and Normal priors for the random intercepts).

Crossburnings directed against blacks have a very small impact on the political participation of whites, but a negative impact on the political participation of blacks who do not have black local elected officials around, *ceteris paribus*. Blacks who live in counties without black local elected officials and who perceive a high frequency of attacks and harassment against African-Americans because of their race are predicted to decrease their participation in their communities, and (strangely) to increase their propensity to vote. This reduced black political participation based on perceptions of racial attacks, however, is not predicted to be as great as the reduction projected to occur when African-Americans in North Carolina are exposed to a history of crossburnings in a county. It is interesting to note that perceptions of frequent attacks against blacks have a positive effect on white political participation, and for community mobilization and participation a much larger effect than that of crossburnings. Furthermore, for whites, the existence of black local officials in counties without racial threat seems to increase the predicted levels of community involvement (participation and mobilization) but not propensity to vote, holding all other factors constant. In all of the models, blacks who are represented by black local officials and who are not exposed to threat are predicted to participate in their communities at a higher rate than whites. Statistical significance in all of these models is hard to assess given the high levels of multicollinearity present among the interaction terms and because of the relatively small sample size given the task of relating variables at both the individual and county levels of analysis.

The basic finding of this analysis is clear. The existence of black local elected officials conditions the reactions of blacks to the racial threat of crossburnings. Where threat




Figure 7: Effects of crossburnings or perception of racial attacks/harassment on political activity for blacks (reddish colors) and whites (blueish colors) by number of black local elected officials. The think lines show posterior means (from 1000 mcmc draws). Solid lines reflect predictions for counties with the maximum number of black local elected officials (23) and dashed lines reflect predictions for counties with the minimum number (0). Shaded areas show pointwise 66% CIs (i.e. roughly 1 SE).

occurs, blacks who are represented by many black elected officials respond with increased participation. Blacks who are exposed to threat with almost no black local elected officials respond with depression of political participation, and thus intimidation. Perceptions of

racial threat also seem to matter for community participation (getting involved in local public life), community mobilization (being asked to get involved in local public life), and even vote turnout. However, this analysis also shows that perceptions of racial threat seem to be less powerful than the existence of a history of crossburnings in spurring or depressing political participation.

## 6.2 Design Based Estimation of Effects

[TODO: The Hansen and Bowers (2008)  $d()$  statistic allows us to construct confidence intervals using a Normal approximation. Rosenbaum (2002a) and Hansen and Bowers (2009) suggest ways to take advantage of covariates. Replicate the mixed model analyses without a model for outcomes using these design based estimation techniques]

## 6.3 Sensitivity Analysis

Following Rosenbaum (2002b, Chapter 4) we will mount a sensitivity analysis of the results of both modes of estimating effects.

## 7 Discussion

In this paper we have attempted to take the context of political behavior seriously. Political behavior certainly does occur based on the characteristics of an individual, however, we should not ignore the history of the place where they live, and the significant political events which have happened there, in our explanations of why people become involved in public life. However, in this attempt to deal squarely with context, we have walked right into data and measurement problems that seem endemic to this type of work. If political scientists are to take context — where people live, with whom they associate, the events in their vicinity — seriously in the future, we will have to face demands on our capabilities as data collectors similar to those faced by the U.S. Census Bureau. A national sample of 2,000 people, or even a sample of 600 people in a single state, is barely large enough to link meaningfully to geographies which are themselves often too big and too internally diverse to be treated as single units. Furthermore, merely modeling contextual effects with interaction terms ignores possible sources of error. However, the debate among statisticians on multilevel models began in the early 1980s and is continuing — which leaves these methods relatively untested, and certainly controversial in some cases (Jones and Steenbergen 1997; De Leeuw and Kreft 1994). We hope that our design-based estimation of the effects in this case can overcome some of the problems mentioned above.

Research into black disfranchisement, and the methods used to secure white political power, in North Carolina show that racial threat against blacks has played a significant historical role in North Carolina's political history — a role mainly of excluding blacks from effective political participation. Given this history and the literature on the “atomization/fragmentation of civil society” during authoritarian and totalitarian regimes (let alone extended civil wars) [cites], one might expect that only intimidation would result from crossburnings in North Carolina. What this paper shows, however, is that people in communities which suffer racial aggression and threat can also resist. Hobbes, then, was wrong. That is to say, fear of violence or threat does not only have power in one direction — that of intimidating individuals and preventing them from acquiring political power. Civil peace in Hobbes' polity was based on mutual fear among the citizens, and fear of the sovereign. Only an intimidated populace could be counted upon to keep promises, and not to wage civil war upon one another. In North Carolina, efforts at intimidation of the black populace do not necessarily work and can possibly backfire if the black community targeted for a crossburning has the organizational resources to mobilize into resistance.

Note here the language “targeted for a crossburning”. Not all crossburnings are intentionally directed at intimidating blacks communities and preventing them from political participation. The most common cases to hit the newspapers usually involve black families or interracial couples moving into white neighborhoods, or the semi-random actions of thrill-seeking teenagers (Green et al. 1995). What is interesting about crossburnings, and what makes crossburning such an attractive analytic variable, is that the intention of the crossburners hardly matters. The historical symbolism and significance of a crossburning is such that it is always interpreted by the community as a racial threat.

Note also that we say “interpreted by the community”. This paper does not claim to provide evidence that blacks in North Carolina respond immediately and directly to racial threat. In fact, when asked “And, as far as you know, during the past ten years, have there been any crossburnings in your county?” only 8% said yes. Blacks and whites did

not differ significantly on how they answered this question: about 8% of whites said yes and about 10% of blacks said yes. Of the 239 people living in counties for which NCAARV and Klanwatch had *not* recorded any crossburnings about 5% (12 people) answered “yes” to the question about crossburnings in their county. Meanwhile, of the 71 people living in counties that had either 3 or 4 crossburnings (depending on NCAARV versus Klanwatch figures) only 8 (11%) reported recalling any crossburnings in their counties over the past 10 years. However, the results that we have presented are also consistent with the interpretation that a climate of conflict and threat may directly mobilize a few leaders and activists who then stimulate participation among blacks — whether or not this participation is directly and intentionally targeted as resistance against racial threat. That is, our analysis has shown that crossburnings (and perceptions of racial threat) seem to matter in predicting levels of black political participation *holding constant* the impacts of other variables that the political science literature has shown to influence political participation. This does not mean that we have shown that individual blacks are directly mobilized by crossburnings, but that somehow, controlling for many other relevant factors, crossburning still seem to have a sizeable impact on black political participation. The main point, again, is that controlling for a host of factors, threat seems to matter in explaining the community level participation, and even the vote turnout, of blacks in North Carolina.

We suspect that null findings in previous research have occurred precisely from ignoring the complexities of threat. For example, if we did not include black local elected officials as a conditioning variable in our equations, we could very well find that across all blacks, on average, threat has no impact. In this case, finding that threat has no impact would largely occur because the positive impact of organizational resources on some African-American respondents would be canceled out by the negative impact of a lack of organizational resources on other African-American respondents. In this way, we hope that this paper both urges a re-examination of threat in multiple contexts (in the USA and abroad) and also reminds scholars that regression coefficients can easily obscure dynamics that are obvious to a commonsense understanding of a given situation.

We write at a time in which violence toward blacks and other groups in USA has reemerged as a focus of national attention due to a rash of church burnings targeted at black churches during the late 1990s and increased hate crimes toward Muslim minorities since 9/11 and yet more hate crimes against non-whites have been documented since the economic problems of the mid-2000s [cite to recent Klanwatch report on this] . Burnings of African-American churches was a form of attack against African-American communities for many years before the civil war — even during times in which white lynch mobs killed more whites than blacks. Between 1825 and 1850, Philadelphia alone experienced 6 burnings of African-American churches.

In 1829, white mobs rampaged through Cincinnati’s African American ward, torching churches, schools, businesses, and other signs of black autonomy and prosperity. Black Philadelphians endured six similar attacks in the 25 years between 1825 and 1850. In an 1834 riot, two black churches, one Methodist, and one Presbyterian, were razed. Mother Bethel A.M.E. Church did not escape unscathed. In 1825, a gang of young ruffians poured red pepper into the stove during a service. A stampede ensued, as worshippers struggled to escape the choking smoke. Four people died....Church burning remained a

largely northern phenomenon in the antebellum years, primarily because white Southerners rarely allowed blacks to build their own churches (Campbell, *LA Times* 6/16/96, M1, M6).

Beginning in the early days of the 19th Century, attacks on African American communities have continued in various waves. Campbell writes that the first wave of northern anti-black violence in the 1830s and 1840s subsided with “black codes” which disenfranchised blacks via laws rather than by physical intimidation. Campbell also shows that church burning in the South subsided after the Jim Crow laws took hold after 1877. Tolnay and Beck’s data analysis shows that lynchings did not subside during this period and in fact increased up through the national economic downturn of the 1890s, rising again after 1910, and declining finally in the 1930s (Tolnay and Beck 1994). Campbell marks three waves of church burning that occurred in this century. The first wave occurred right after WWI and coincided with a resurgence of the KKK (see also Green et al. 1995). The second wave rose during the Civil Rights era.

In the 1963 Birmingham, Ala. campaign alone, half a dozen black churches were bombed and burned, some more than once. And in neighboring Mississippi, dozens of black churches were bombed and burned in the final spasm of white resistance preceding passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Campbell 1996, M6).

The third wave occurred in the last 18 months of 1995 and 1996 (Campbell 1996, M6). The burning of a church does undoubtedly disrupt a community. [add a couple of examples post 9/11] However, we hope that this paper has provided the beginnings of some evidence that disruption and threat do not necessarily doom a community to intimidation, but can spur community participation if the conditions are right for mobilization.

## **Appendix A: Question Wording and Variable Coding**

*Note:*All of the survey questions presented here came from the Spring 1997 Carolina Poll, which was a random digit dialed computer assisted telephone survey of the population of North Carolina conducted by the Institute for Research in the Social Sciences at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

### **A.1 Threat**

#### **A.1.1 Crossburnings**

The measure of crossburning activity in a county used throughout this paper is a composite created as the average of two different data sources. I chose to average rather than to add in order to protect against adding two counts of the same crossburning together (since my measure from Klanwatch partially overlaps with the measure provided me by Professor Green). The scale runs from 0 (no crossburnings) to 1 (the most possible crossburnings).

1. A research group on Bias Crime at Yale University led by Professors Donald P. Green and Robert Abelson collected information from the North Carolinians Against Racial and Religious Violence (NCARRV) and from Klanwatch, an organization affiliated with the Southern Poverty Law Center, for counties in North Carolina between 1987 and 1993. After discarding incidents that may not really have stemmed from a bias motivation, they combined the information from NCARRV and Klanwatch to produce one variable measuring crossburning activity between 1987 and 1993 (see Green et al. 1995, 13-16).
2. In order to update the information provided by Professor Green, I gathered additional information on crossburnings in North Carolina from Klanwatch for the period 1987-1996.

#### **A.1.2 Perceptions of Racial Attacks and Harassment**

Now I have a question about relations between Blacks and Whites where you live. As far as you can recall, during the past ten years, how often have Black people in your county been attacked or harassed because of their race? Would you say this has happened often, sometimes, rarely, or never?<sup>x</sup>

Coding	Label	Freq
1.0	OFTEN	50 (11%)
0.67	SOMETIMES	114 (24%)
0.33	RARELY	205 (43%)
0.0	NEVER	104 (22%)
Missing	DK/NO ANS	65

#### **A.1.3 Perceptions of Crossburnings**

And, as far as you know, during the past ten years, have there been any crossburnings in your county?

Coding	Label	Freq	
1	YES	42	(8%)
0	NO	460	(92%)
Missing	DK/NO ANS	36	

## A.2 Mobilization (Black Local Elected Officials)

I combined information on black local elected officials from two main sources to create the measure used throughout this paper. For all of the analyses in this paper, this variable is coded 0 (no local black elected officials) to 1 (most local black elected officials).

1. The Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies publishes a book called *Black Elected Officials* on an irregular, but semi-yearly basis. I used the 1993 version of this book to provide information about blacks at the municipal and county level (mayors, councilmembers, commissioners, school board members) that were holding office in 1993. According to this data, there were about 380 black local elected officials across the 100 counties in North Carolina in 1993. The number of black local elected officials in a county ranged from 0 (in 22 counties) to 26 (in one county). The average number of black local elected officials in a county was 4.3 ( $\sigma = 5.2$ ).
2. The North Carolina League of Municipalities provided me complete information about the current (1997) numbers of black municipal officials in all of North Carolina's 527 incorporated municipalities. This meant that I had no data for two of North Carolina's 100 counties because two counties contain no incorporated municipalities. According to this data, there are about 412 municipal black elected officials across the 98 counties of North Carolina. Twenty-four counties have no black local elected officials. One county has 21 black local elected officials. The average number of black local elected officials in a county is 4.2 ( $\sigma = 4.7$ ).

The measure of the strength of black local elected officials that I used in the analysis in this paper is an average of the information I received from the *Black Elected Officials, 1993* and the information from the North Carolina League of Municipalities for 1997. I checked the two main data sources against two other, less complete, data bases.

1. The National League of Black Elected Officials (which is part of the National League of Municipalities), provided me the North Carolina subset of their mailing list of municipal level black elected officials that is updated each year for cities of over 10,000 people. The membership on this list is voluntary and comprises about 120 of North Carolina's 527 incorporated municipalities. I only found one municipality that diverged from the list provided me by the North Carolina League of Municipalities (of the municipalities containing over 10,000 people).
2. The National Council of Black Mayors (which is part of the National Council of Mayors) provided me a list of black mayors that they know of in North Carolina. (This information was perfectly redundant with that provided me by the North Carolina League of Municipalities).

## A.3 Participation

### A.3.1 Community Participation

In the past two years, how often have you gotten together with or worked with others in your community or neighborhood to try to deal with some community issue or problem? Would you say that you've done this often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

Coding	Label	Freq
1.0	OFTEN	110 (21\%)
0.67	SOMETIMES	161 (30\%)
0.33	RARELY	124 (23\%)
0.0	NEVER	139 (26\%)
Missing	DK/NO ANS	4

### A.3.2 Community Mobilization

In the past two years, how often have you, personally, been asked to take part in efforts in your community or neighborhood to solve some local problem? Would you say that you've been asked often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

Coding	Label	Freq
1.0	OFTEN	88 (17\%)
0.67	SOMETIMES	132 (25\%)
0.33	RARELY	140 (27\%)
0.0	NEVER	171 (33\%)
Missing	DK/NO ANS	7

### A.3.3 Vote Turnout

Did you vote in the November 1996 election, or did something come up to keep you from voting?

Coding	Label	Freq
1	YES	379 (71\%)
0	NO	158 (29\%)
Missing	DK/NO ANS	1

## A.4 Race

The sample includes 86 African Americans 86 (16%) and 452 Whites (84%) for a total of 538/600 respondents willing to report their race.

## A.5 Subgroups/Covariates/Controls

### A.5.1 Individual Level

**Education** 1=Less than Grade 9, 2=9th to 11th Grade, 3= HS Grad, 4=Some College,  
5=Coll Grad or More

**Income** 1=Less than \$9,999, 2=\$10,000 to \$19,999, . . . , 7=\$60,000 or more

**Frequency of Religious Attendance** 1=Never, 2=Once a Year or less, 3= Several Times a Year, 4=About Once a Month, 5=2-3 Times a Month, 6=Every Week, 7=More than Every Week

**Frequency of Newspaper Reading Per Week** 0=Never, 1=1 Day ... 7=7 Days

**Employed** 0=Not Employed at all; 1=Employed Full/Part-Time

**Gender** 1=Male, 2=Female

**Age** Min=19 years old, Max=91 years old, Mean=49 years old

#### A.5.2 County Level

We used census data, data on historic black elected officials, and counts of lynchings (1882-1932) to match counties into sets. [LIST VARS HERE]

## Appendix B: Propensity Score Models

### B.1 County Models

The following table lists the coefficients that emerged from fitting four different models of cross-burnings at the county-level to the North Carolina data.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Intercept)	-2.27(1.46)	-2.87(2.24)	-2.10(1.04)	-2.02(1.03)
scale(c8medianincome)	0.29(0.37)	0.20(0.37)	0.23(0.38)	0.24(0.39)
scale(c8urbanper)	-0.47(0.39)	-0.46(0.39)	-0.43(0.40)	-0.42(0.39)
ns(c8totalpop, df = 2)1	8.96(5.46)	8.40(5.33)	7.99(5.35)	7.86(5.33)
ns(c8totalpop, df = 2)2	2.90(3.83)	3.11(3.81)	2.71(3.82)	2.63(3.85)
scale(c8totalpop/c7totalpop)	0.16(0.38)	0.07(0.38)	0.24(0.38)	0.12(0.38)
scale(c7totalpop/c6totalpop)	-0.10(0.46)	-0.16(0.47)	0.10(0.43)	0.14(0.43)
scale(c6totalpop/c5totalpop)	-0.77(0.56)	-0.70(0.55)	-0.86(0.57)	-0.80(0.55)
scale(c5totalpop/c4totalpop)	0.68(0.52)	0.59(0.50)	0.83(0.56)	0.64(0.54)
scale(c4totalpop)	0.90(0.73)	0.83(0.71)	0.87(0.71)	0.88(0.70)
scale(lynchings)	-0.17(0.28)	-0.19(0.28)	-0.20(0.27)	-0.19(0.27)
beos87	-0.03(0.10)	-0.00(0.10)	-0.08(0.09)	-0.08(0.09)
beos73	-0.56(0.35)	-0.58(0.35)	-0.62(0.35)	-0.67(0.35)
scale(c4blackper)	-0.57(0.66)			
ns(c8blackper, df = 2)1	-0.33(2.95)			
ns(c8blackper, df = 2)2	2.05(2.39)			
beos87:beos73	0.03(0.02)	0.03(0.02)	0.03(0.02)	0.04(0.02)
scale(c4whiteper)		0.42(0.64)		
ns(c8whiteper, df = 2)1		0.83(4.02)		
ns(c8whiteper, df = 2)2		0.68(1.78)		
scale(c6blackper - c4blackper)			0.57(0.37)	
scale(c8blackper - c7blackper)			0.30(0.41)	
scale(c6whiteper - c4whiteper)				-0.27(0.34)
scale(c8whiteper - c7whiteper)				-0.14(0.39)
N	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table B2: These models predicting cross-burnings in counties of North Carolina, 1987-1996 were fit using the Bayesian logistic regression `bayesglm` command described by Gelman et al. (2008). The rows labeled 'ns' are the natural cubic spline bases for the variable in question. The labels 'scale' signify standarization of the variable in order to enhance stability of the fitting algorithm. 'beo'='number of black elected officials','whiteper/blackper'=% white or % black'.

### B.2 Individual Model

## Appendix C: Outcome Analysis

	Model 1
(Intercept)	-0.16(0.48)
c.BLACK01	-0.44(0.39)
z.AGE	-0.13(0.38)
z.EDUC	-0.28(0.28)
z.INCOME	0.35(0.31)
z.RELIG	0.15(0.27)
z.TVVIEW	0.58(0.26)
c.CLUBJOIN	-0.12(0.53)
EMPLOYED2	-0.41(0.46)
EMPLOYED3	0.41(0.88)
EMPLOYED4	0.07(0.53)
EMPLOYED5	-0.46(0.47)
EMPLOYED6	1.32(0.79)
EMPLOYED7	0.19(0.81)
MARITAL2	-0.34(0.41)
MARITAL3	-0.60(0.64)
MARITAL4	-0.02(0.47)
MARITAL5	-0.74(0.43)
MARITAL6	0.05(0.98)
PARTYID2	0.51(0.32)
PARTYID3	-0.23(0.36)
PARTYID4	-0.65(0.60)
PARTYID5	0.90(0.58)
c.SCH01	-0.04(0.27)
linkm.10	0.55(0.63)
linkm.12	1.55(0.66)
linkm.16	-0.51(0.76)
linkm.17	-1.51(0.65)
linkm.18	0.82(0.72)
linkm.2	-1.99(0.95)
linkm.22	2.45(1.54)
linkm.23	-4.44(0.94)
linkm.26	-0.84(0.68)
linkm.27	-0.24(0.74)
linkm.28	-0.40(0.67)
linkm.3	2.44(0.52)
linkm.4	1.66(0.58)
linkm.5	0.71(0.71)
linkm.6	1.59(0.61)
linkm.9	-0.42(0.77)
N	534.00

Table B3: This model predicting exposure to cross-burnings by individuals interviewed by the Carolina Poll in 1997 were fit using the Bayesian logistic regression `bayesglm` command described by Gelman et al. (2008). The rows labeled 'c' or 'z' signify standarization of the variable in order to enhance stability of the fitting algorithm. 'linkm'='matched set'.

	Com.	Mob 1	Com.	Mob 2	Com.	Part 1	Com.	Part 2	Vote 1
(Intercept)	0.01(0.22)	-0.16(0.22)	0.12(0.22)	-0.00(0.22)	0.18(0.28)				
linkm.10	0.02(0.21)	-0.04(0.22)	0.08(0.21)	0.06(0.22)	-0.22(0.28)				
linkm.12	-0.16(0.24)	-0.07(0.25)	-0.19(0.24)	-0.12(0.25)	-0.24(0.33)				
linkm.16	0.09(0.23)	0.18(0.23)	0.11(0.22)	0.12(0.23)	0.04(0.29)				
linkm.17	-0.07(0.21)	-0.06(0.21)	-0.15(0.21)	-0.16(0.21)	-0.30(0.27)				
linkm.18	0.05(0.22)	0.11(0.22)	0.08(0.22)	0.17(0.22)	-0.37(0.28)				
linkm.2	-0.09(0.24)	-0.12(0.24)	0.13(0.23)	0.10(0.24)	-0.36(0.30)				
linkm.23	-0.00(0.20)	0.08(0.20)	0.05(0.20)	0.09(0.20)	-0.11(0.26)				
linkm.26	-0.03(0.22)	-0.08(0.22)	-0.10(0.22)	-0.12(0.22)	-0.28(0.28)				
linkm.27	-0.04(0.24)	-0.12(0.24)	0.01(0.23)	-0.04(0.25)	-0.10(0.31)				
linkm.28	0.04(0.21)	0.07(0.21)	0.03(0.21)	0.03(0.22)	-0.11(0.28)				
linkm.3	0.02(0.20)	0.04(0.21)	0.03(0.20)	0.01(0.21)	-0.17(0.26)				
linkm.4	0.06(0.20)	0.01(0.20)	0.01(0.20)	0.01(0.21)	-0.15(0.26)				
linkm.5	-0.05(0.24)	-0.00(0.25)	0.08(0.23)	0.13(0.24)	-0.21(0.31)				
linkm.6	0.06(0.21)	0.03(0.21)	0.12(0.20)	0.09(0.21)	-0.14(0.27)				
linkm.9	0.09(0.24)	0.13(0.24)	0.11(0.24)	0.15(0.24)	-0.31(0.32)				
anyxbsFXburn	-0.08(0.06)		0.01(0.06)		-0.00(0.08)				
totalbeos	0.00(0.01)	-0.00(0.01)	0.01(0.01)	0.00(0.01)	-0.00(0.01)				
blackFBlack	0.08(0.38)	0.33(0.26)	-0.07(0.38)	0.24(0.26)	0.19(0.49)				
AGE	-0.00(0.00)	-0.00(0.00)	-0.00(0.00)	-0.00(0.00)	0.01(0.00)				
EDUC	0.02(0.01)	0.03(0.01)	0.02(0.01)	0.02(0.01)	0.04(0.01)				
INCOME	-0.00(0.01)	-0.01(0.01)	0.01(0.01)	0.00(0.01)	0.00(0.01)				
RELIG	0.03(0.01)	0.03(0.01)	0.03(0.01)	0.03(0.01)	0.00(0.01)				
TVVIEW	0.01(0.01)	0.01(0.01)	0.01(0.01)	0.01(0.01)	-0.00(0.01)				
CLUBJOIN2	-0.18(0.08)	-0.15(0.08)	-0.17(0.08)	-0.13(0.08)	-0.01(0.10)				
EMPLOYED2	0.07(0.07)	0.03(0.08)	0.04(0.07)	0.08(0.08)	0.15(0.08)				
EMPLOYED3	0.05(0.12)	0.03(0.11)	0.08(0.11)	0.07(0.12)	0.04(0.15)				
EMPLOYED4	0.12(0.07)	0.16(0.08)	0.05(0.07)	0.10(0.08)	-0.11(0.09)				
EMPLOYED5	0.07(0.06)	0.10(0.07)	0.03(0.06)	0.08(0.07)	-0.00(0.08)				
EMPLOYED6	0.00(0.13)	-0.05(0.14)	0.36(0.13)	0.40(0.14)	0.08(0.17)				
EMPLOYED7	0.13(0.12)	0.10(0.12)	0.01(0.12)	0.02(0.12)	-0.38(0.15)				
GENDER2	0.01(0.04)	0.02(0.04)	0.02(0.04)	0.02(0.04)	-0.05(0.05)				
MARITAL2	-0.00(0.06)	-0.02(0.06)	0.01(0.06)	0.04(0.06)	-0.19(0.07)				
MARITAL3	-0.11(0.10)	-0.16(0.10)	-0.03(0.10)	-0.06(0.10)	-0.15(0.12)				
MARITAL4	-0.03(0.07)	-0.09(0.07)	0.08(0.07)	0.05(0.07)	-0.01(0.08)				
MARITAL5	-0.05(0.06)	-0.05(0.06)	-0.07(0.06)	-0.04(0.06)	0.01(0.08)				
MARITAL6	0.18(0.21)	0.18(0.20)	-0.20(0.20)	-0.22(0.21)	-0.23(0.26)				
PARTYID2	0.02(0.04)	0.00(0.04)	0.02(0.04)	0.01(0.04)	-0.01(0.05)				
PARTYID3	0.03(0.05)	0.03(0.05)	-0.01(0.05)	-0.01(0.05)	-0.27(0.06)				
PARTYID4	-0.22(0.09)	-0.20(0.09)	-0.11(0.09)	-0.15(0.09)	-0.29(0.12)				
PARTYID5	0.03(0.08)	0.03(0.09)	-0.06(0.08)	0.01(0.09)	-0.36(0.10)				
SCH011.00	0.20(0.04)	0.21(0.04)	0.19(0.04)	0.20(0.04)	0.05(0.05)				
anyxbsFXburn:totalbeos	0.00(0.01)		-0.01(0.01)		-0.00(0.01)				
anyxbsFXburn:blackFBlack	-0.02(0.39)			0.09(0.39)					
totalbeos:blackFBlack	0.01(0.02)		-0.01(0.01)	0.01(0.02)	-0.00(0.01)				
anyxbsFXburn:totalbeos:blackFBlack	-0.01(0.02)			0.00(0.02)					
RAT01			0.24(0.10)		0.13(0.10)				
RAT01:totalbeos			0.00(0.01)		-0.00(0.01)				
RAT01:blackFBlack			-0.68(0.39)		-0.46(0.39)				
RAT01:totalbeos:blackFBlack			0.03(0.02)		0.02(0.02)				
N	413.00	363.00	415.00	363.00	419.00	3			

Table C4: Multilevel linear models of political participation as a function of race, threat (anyxbs=crossburnings, RAT01=perceived racial attacks/harassment), and black local elected officials (beo) as well as county-level matched set (link), and individual level covariates. There were 77 counties/individual matched sets and 17 county-matched sets. Each model included intercepts varying by individual-level matched set within county-matched set, and also by county. All estimated using defaults of the `lmer` command from

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