

TO WHAT EXTENT DID PROPAGANDA ALLOW HITLER TO EARN THE SUPPORT OF THE GERMAN POPULACE BETWEEN 1933 AND 1939?

HL History Internal Assessment

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Section A: Plan of Investigation

In volume one of his 1926 book, *Mein Kampf*, Adolf Hitler speaks of propaganda as a “means” to achieve an end¹, a means which is able to appeal to the hearts and capture the attention of the masses. In the book he further goes on to prelude his intent to use propaganda as one of his desired methods of “spreading the ideals of National Socialism in Germany — among them racism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Bolshevism”.² The objective of this investigation will be to determine the extent that this propaganda allowed Hitler to earn and maintain the support of the German populace between 1933 and 1939. This will be done by studying several sources of both primary and secondary nature. Some such references are a public speech given by the Nazi Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, official election results from the period being examined, and analyses of Hitler’s rise to power through propaganda.

Section B: Summary of Evidence

Mein Kampf

- Hitler stresses the effectiveness of propaganda to gain the support of the public.
- He berates Germany for not using it in the First World War to the extent that the Allies did since it proved to be so powerful for them.³
- Hitler believed that propaganda would have helped immensely in the German struggle of WWI.⁴

¹ Adolf Hitler, “War Propaganda,” In *Mein Kampf: The New Ford Translation*, trans. Michael Ford (Michael Ford & Elite Minds, 2009).

² “Nazi Propaganda.” *United States Holocaust Memorial Museum*, last modified August 2015. Accessed January 12, 2016, <http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005202>.

³ Hitler, 2009.

⁴ *Ibid.*

Media Published by Nazi Ministry of Propaganda

- After Hitler became Chancellor of Germany he appointed Dr Joseph Goebbels to the position of Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda to lead the government-sanctioned Ministry of Propaganda.⁵
- The ministry's mandate was to disseminate National Socialist ideals to the German people through radio, print and film.
- According to Hitler, propaganda needed to be simple. It needed to "aim at the lowest levels of intelligence" and be "reduced to easily learned slogans which then had to be repeated many times".⁶
- The Nazi propaganda policy embodied the infamous slogan "*Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Führer,*" which was used in combination with a multitude of other methods of propaganda to create a personality cult surrounding Hitler.⁷
- The Ministry of Propaganda commissioned many posters to encourage support of the Nazi party and to encourage civilians to join the German military.⁸
- One of the most influential pieces of film propaganda was *Triumph des Willens* (1935). This film presented Hitler giving highly emotional and motivational speeches to the German people and gave him an appearance of power.⁹

⁵ "Joseph Goebbels." Jewish Virtual Library, accessed January 12, 2016, <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/goebbels.html>.

⁶ David Welch. *Nazi Propaganda: The Power and the Limitations* (711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017: Routledge, 2015).

⁷ David Welch, "Nazi Propaganda," *BBC History*. Last modified February 17, 2011. Accessed February 03, 2016,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/nazi_propaganda_gallery_03.shtml.

⁸ Karthik Narayanaswami. *Analysis of Nazi Propaganda*. Harvard University. Harvard Blogs. Accessed January 30, 2016, <http://blogs.harvard.edu/karthik/files/2011/04/HIST-1572-Analysis-of-Nazi-Propaganda-KNarayanaswami.pdf>.

⁹ Michael J. Stout. *"The Effectiveness of Nazi Propaganda During World War II."* (master's thesis, Eastern Michigan University, 2011). Accessed January 13, 2016, <http://commons.emich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1313&context=theses>.

Public Speeches and Radio Propaganda Policy

- In a speech, Dr Joseph Goebbels states that he believes the radio is to the twentieth century what the press was to the nineteenth. He says everything on the radio should “include the theme of our great reconstructive work” and that his goal is to double German radio listenership.¹⁰

Note: The speech that this information came from is included in Appendix 1 (p. 12)

- To ensure that everyone could hear Hitler speak, Goebbels created the sale of the *Volksempfänger* (English: “People’s Receiver”), a cheap radio which put the Führer in nearly all homes. Cafés and the like were ordered to play Hitler’s speeches in public and loudspeakers were placed in streets so that people could not avoid the message being sent by the Führer. Goebbels believed that if Hitler was to give speeches, the people should be able to hear him.¹¹

Note: The speech that this information came from is included in Appendix 1 (p. 12)

- In his speeches, Hitler drew attention to his many successes in Germany as well as the injustice thrust upon the German people by neighbouring states and the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. This was used to make the people of Germany believe Hitler was a caring individual whose first priority was fighting for Germany.¹²
- Hitler also used guilt to build his support. In his speech on the day of the 1936 Parliamentary election, Hitler told the German people “that he has given [them] strength for three years, and that now the German people must give him strength. He had often strengthened the nation’s faith; now the nation had to strengthen his faith.”¹³

¹⁰ Randall Bytwerk. “*Joseph Goebbels: The Radio as the Eighth Great Power (1933)*.” German Propaganda Archive at Calvin College, last modified 1999. Accessed January 01, 2016, <http://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/goeb56.htm>.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Ian Kershaw. “*The Führer Myth: How Hitler Won Over the German People*,” Spiegel Online, last modified January 30, 2008. Accessed September 20, 2015, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-fuhrer-myth-how-hitler-won-over-the-german-people-a-531909.html>.

¹³ Randall Bytwerk. “*Our Hitler (1936)*.” Our Hitler (1936), last modified 2004. Accessed January 01, 2016, <http://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/unser36.htm>.

- “Goebbels’ goal was to present Hitler as almost a Christ figure, divine (or at least superhuman), yet also human. He was not presented as an ordinary human, but rather as a historically unprecedented parson with near miraculous strengths. More than a dozen books of photographs of Hitler were published in huge editions. “Heil Hitler” became the expected greeting in Germany. Thousands of poems were written in his honour. Many were hymns of praise. Yet he was also presented as a warm, loving human being, deeply concerned about each German.”¹⁴

Political Polls in Pre-WWII Germany

- The Nazi party secured a vote of 43.9% (17,277,000 votes) in the March 1933 Reichstag Election.¹⁵
- 93.4% of German voters showed support of the Nazi party in the November 1933 Election¹⁶ (after the Enabling Act which gave the party nearly unlimited power to enact laws¹⁷, through which Hitler was able to create a one-party state that left voters with minimal choice).
- Official provisional figures issued on 31 March 1936 gave the result of 97.75% of the electorate voted for Hitler in the 29 March 1936 German Election & Referendum.¹⁸

¹⁴ Randall Bytwerk. *Landmark Speeches of National Socialism*, 79. College Station: Texas A & M University Press, last modified 2008.

¹⁵ "Election Results in Germany 1924-1933" *Marxists Internet Archive*. Accessed January 12, 2016, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/germany/elect.htm>.

¹⁶ "All Germans rounded up to vote." *The Guardian*. November, 13, 1933. Accessed February 02, 2016.

<http://www.theguardian.com/world/1933/nov/13/secondworldwar.germany2>.

¹⁷ “The Enabling Act of 23 March 1933: Historical Exhibition Presented by the German Bundestag.” *Deutscher Bundestag*. Last modified March 2006. Accessed February 03, 2016. https://www.bundestag.de/blob/189778/d0f948962723d454c536d24d43965f87/enabling_act-data.pdf.

¹⁸ "All For Hitler." *The West Australian*. Perth, Western Australia, Australia. March 31, 1936. From National Library of Australia. <http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article25137273>.

- The 1938 German Referendum yielded a result of 99% of Germans and Austrians supporting a one-party Nazi state under Adolf Hitler as well as the recent Anschluss (annexation of Austria).¹⁹ “Herr Hitler said that the Austrian results, as in the rest of the Reich, surpassed his expectations.”²⁰

Section C: Evaluation of Sources

Source A: Randall Bytwerk. *"Joseph Goebbels: The Radio as the Eighth Great Power (1933)." German Propaganda Archive at Calvin College*, last modified 1999. Accessed January 01, 2016, <http://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/goeb56.htm>. (Also see Appendix 1 (p.13) for full transcript)

This source, a transcript of a speech given by German Minister of Propaganda, Dr Joseph Goebbels, in 18 August 1933 is a primary source. Coming directly from the Minister of Propaganda, the speech can provide very valuable insight to the intent of Nazi-commissioned propaganda. On the other hand, since the text has been translated from German to English, it may contain translation errors, subjectivity or omissions which historians would find to be a limitation of the source. As cited in *Welch, David. Nazi Propaganda: The Power and the Limitations*, Dr. Goebbels believed that propaganda and any type of public address should be simple and targeted at the lowest levels of intelligence. For this reason, it would be fair to assume that his own speeches follow this policy. This would mean that the source does not have any hidden meaning or ambiguity and would therefore be of a high value to historians since its meaning is quite clear-cut. Conversely, a limitation is that since this was designed to be a public speech, chances are it — in some capacity — contained propaganda. This makes it difficult for historians studying the source to gain an objective understanding of the topics discussed as any implementation of propaganda would stain it with pro-Nazism.

¹⁹ "Hitler's "Glorious Victory"," *The Courier-Mail*. Brisbane, Queensland, Australia. April 12, 1938. From National Library of Australia. <http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article39728535>.

²⁰ "99 Per Cent. Vote In Favor of Anschluss," *Advocate*. Burnie, Tasmania, Australia. April 12, 1938. From National Library of Australia. <http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article68418379>.

Source B: Ian Kershaw. *"The Führer Myth: How Hitler Won Over the German People,"* Spiegel Online, last modified January 30, 2008. Accessed September 20, 2015, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-fuhrer-myth-how-hitler-won-over-the-german-people-a-531909.html>. (Also see Appendix 2 (p. 19) for excerpt from article)

Being assessed is an article written by historian Ian Kershaw which focuses on the way in which propaganda was used to turn Hitler into an idol for the German people. Immediately, the origin of this source makes it very valuable as Kershaw is world renowned as one of the leading experts on Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany. A second way in which the source is valuable is how the article appears impartial as it considers the fact that there were times when Hitler's support from the people did in fact waver. Kershaw then dismisses the counterargument by proving that Hitler's support was gained through the events or factors that actually led to the gain of this public support – an example from the text is included in the section "Forgotten in Euphoria" (p. 19). Conversely, by choosing several events to use as evidence in his article, it is possible that Kershaw chose events that inadvertently make the argument one-sided despite the inherent impartialness of using counterarguments. Another limitation is that due to the article being a secondary source, it is possible that the author – despite being one of the top historians on this topic – has adopted a limited perspective on events due to not experiencing the events first-hand. On the other hand, being secondary source could also be viewed as a value due to the fact that any publications made at the time from insider sources would be subject to Nazi censorship.

Section D: Analysis

What began as a theoretical course of action — not even a real agenda or blueprint — in the sixth chapter of *Mein Kampf* was brought to life when Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany. Almost immediately he appointed his confidant Dr Joseph Goebbels as the Minister of Propaganda.²¹ Quickly, Goebbels formulated a comprehensive policy which

²¹ "Joseph Goebbels." Jewish Virtual Library, accessed January 12, 2016, <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsourc/Holocaust/goebbels.html>.

encompassed nearly all aspects of the media that existed at the time. This policy would quickly create a rise in pro-Nazi sentiments and have a permanent impact on Hitler's support from the people.

The resulting policy hinged on Goebbels' belief that propaganda should be targeted at the masses. Acting upon this, he created propaganda aimed at the lowest level of intelligence — often consisting of short, frequently repeated slogans²² like the infamous “*Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Führer*” — and propaganda that was near impossible to shield oneself from. The latter was done primarily through his *Volksempfänger* initiative.²³ The rest of the work was accomplished using loudspeakers in streets and through films. This method of surrounding the German populace with a virtually endless supply of Nazi-commissioned medias was used to brainwash the people into unconditionally supporting Hitler.

Proof of the efficacy of the regimented propaganda the Nazis employed can be shown by the results of the 1933, 1936 and 1938 German elections and referendums. In the March 1933 federal election, the Nazis won only about 45% of the vote.²⁴ After this, Hitler introduced the Enabling Act and the November 1933 election then yielded a 93.4% public support of the NSDAP party.²⁵ This dramatic increase may contribute to the counterargument that it was the creation of a one-party state through the Enabling Act that gained the majority of Hitler's support. That would mean that the values about 90% support are inflated. This is not the case though as proved by the way that Hitler's following was extremely loyal to him and provided

²² Welch, David. *Nazi Propaganda: The Power and the Limitations* (711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017: Routledge, 2015).

²³ Randall Bytwerk. “*Joseph Goebbels: The Radio as the Eighth Great Power (1933)*.” German Propaganda Archive at Calvin College, last modified 1999. Accessed January 01, 2016, <http://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/goeb56.htm>.

²⁴ “Election Results in Germany 1924-1933” *Marxists Internet Archive*. Accessed January 12, 2016, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/germany/elect.htm>.

²⁵ “All Germans rounded up to vote.” *The Guardian*. November, 13, 1933. Accessed February 02, 2016. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/1933/nov/13/secondworldwar.germany2>.

him with unparalleled popularity and prestige by 1936²⁶ – something that would not occur if people merely voted for him due to a lack of alternatives.

The 1936 election showed a 97.75% support rate of Hitler and the Nazis²⁷. This rose again in 1938 when a 99% German-Austrian combined vote supported a one-party Nazi state which included Austria.²⁸ Based on these statistics, it cannot be argued that public and political support of the Nazi party wasn't growing significantly between 1933 and 1938 due to propaganda.

Although these numbers speak for themselves in providing a clear picture of the support that propaganda earned the Nazi party, it *can* be argued that this rising political support was a result of other factors — namely, the Enabling Act of 1933 as touched on above. While this was a cause of the dramatic increase in support from March to November 1933, it cannot explain the further increases or the non-political support Hitler received in this timeframe. Some such examples are how “*Heil Hitler*” became the expected greeting in Germany and how the Nazi salute was adopted by civilians. Additionally, Adolf Hitler was seen by the people of Germany to be not only as a powerful leader but as a deeply caring individual who was thoroughly concerned for each German over whom he ruled.²⁹

In conjunction with the larger and more quantifiable effects of Nazi propaganda, it is these factors that — while not vast — allow historians to make the claim that propaganda allowed Hitler to win over the people of Germany.

²⁶ David Welch, “Nazi Propaganda,” *BBC History*. Last modified February 17, 2011. Accessed February 03, 2016,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/nazi_propaganda_gallery_03.shtml.

²⁷ “All For Hitler.” *The West Australian*. Perth, Western Australia, Australia. March 31, 1936. From National Library of Australia. <http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article25137273>.

²⁸ “Hitler’s “Glorious Victory”,” *The Courier-Mail*. Brisbane, Queensland, Australia. April 12, 1938. From National Library of Australia. <http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article39728535>.

²⁹ Randall Bytwerk. *Landmark Speeches of National Socialism*, 79. College Station: Texas A & M University Press, last modified 2008.

Section E: Conclusion

Ultimately, when considering the many stringent policies concerning Nazi propaganda, as well as the way in which the public viewed Hitler on the eve of the Second World War and the results of the elections that took place between 1933 and 1938 in Germany, it is abundantly clear that propaganda was the key element of Hitler's publicity campaign which allowed him to win the trust of the people of Germany. Without propaganda, he may have earned the political support simply by eliminating all other political options, but, he would not have been able to secure the image of a powerful yet kind man who was deeply concerned for each German and that is where the real public support came from.

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<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-fuhrer-myth-how-hitler-won-over-the-german-people-a-531909.html>.

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The Radio as the Eighth Great Power

by Joseph Goebbels

My fellow people's comrades!

Napoleon spoke of the "press as the seventh great power." Its significance became politically visible with the beginning of the French Revolution, and maintained its position for the entirety of the 19th century. The century's politics were largely determined by the press. One can hardly imagine or explain the major historical events between 1800 and 1900 without considering the powerful influence of journalism.

The radio will be for the twentieth century what the press was for the nineteenth century. With the appropriate change, one can apply Napoleon's phrase to our age, speaking of the radio as the eighth great power. Its discovery and application are of truly revolutionary significance for contemporary community life. Future generations may conclude that the radio had as great an intellectual and spiritual impact on the masses as the printing press had before the beginning of the Reformation.

The November Regime [the Nazi term for the Weimar Republic] was not able to understand the full significance of the radio. Even those who claimed to have awakened the people and gotten them involved in practical politics were without exception almost blind to the possibilities of this modern method of influencing the masses.

At best, they saw it as an easy way to distract the masses from the difficulties of our national and social life through games and entertainment. Only reluctantly did they think of using radio for political purposes. As in all other things, they viewed radio through the mildew of an ostensible objectivity. They left the radio and its development to its technical and administrative experts, limiting their own use of it for partisan purposes to times of particular domestic crises.

Appendix 1: Dr Joseph Goebbels' Speech Evaluated in Section C – Source A

It goes without saying that the National Socialist revolution, which is modern and intent on action, as well as the popular upheaval we have led, must change abstract and lifeless methods in the radio. The old regime was content simply to fill empty offices or change the faces, without however changing the spirit and content of public life. We on the other hand intend a principled transformation in the worldview of our entire society, a revolution of the greatest possible extent that will leave nothing out, changing the life of our nation in every regard.

This process, which has been visible to the layman in the last six months, was naturally not random. It was systematically prepared and organized. We have used our power in the last six months to carry out this transformation. We spent the period before 30 January in winning power, having then the same goals that we have carried out in the six months since we took power.

It would not have been possible for us to take power or to use it in the ways we have without the radio and the airplane. It is no exaggeration to say that the German revolution, at least in the form it took, would have been impossible without the airplane and the radio.

It is in fact a modern revolution, and it has used the most modern methods to win and use power. It therefore does not need saying that the government resulting from this revolution cannot ignore the radio and its possibilities. To the contrary, it is resolved to use them to the fullest extent in the work of national construction that is before us, and in ensuring that this revolution can stand the test of history.

That means a series of important reforms in the organization and content of the radio. On the one hand, these reforms will assure the organic continuation of the radio and its further development both in the near and long term. They will also mean a transformation of its whole nature, bringing it in tune with the modern community of our people.

As in all other areas, the changes are primarily spiritual in nature. The radio must be brought out of the stubborn emptiness of its technical limitations into the lively spiritual developments of our age. It is not possible for the radio to ignore the times. More than any other form of public expression, it has the duty to meet the needs and demands of the day. A

Appendix 1: Dr Joseph Goebbels' Speech Evaluated in Section C – Source A

radio that does not seek to deal with the problems of the day does not deserve to influence the broad masses. It will soon become an empty playground for technicians and intellectual experimenters. We live in the age of the masses; the masses rightly demand that they participate in the great events of the day. The radio is the most influential and important intermediary between a spiritual movement and the nation, between the idea and the people.

That requires a clearly expressed direction. I have spoken of this often with regards to various areas of our spiritual life. There can be no lack of direction, either with people or with things. The moral value or lack thereof depends not on words, but on content. The direction and the goal always determine whether something is good, useless or even harmful for our people.

A government that has determined to bring a nation together so that it is once more a center of power in the scales of great world events has not only the right, but the duty, to subordinate all aspects of the nation to its goals, or at least ensure that they are supportive. That is also true for the radio. The more significant something is in influencing the will of the broad masses, the greater its responsibility to the future of the nation.

That does not mean we want to turn the radio into a spineless servant of our partisan political interests. The new German politics rejects any partisan limitations. It seeks the totality of the people and nation, and the reconstructive work it plans or has already begun includes all who are of good will. Within the framework of these great tasks, the radio, if it is to remain living, must hold to and advance its own artistic and spiritual laws. Just as its technical methods are modern and distinct, so too are its artistic capacities. It is only distantly related to the stage and film. It is rarely possible to bring a powerful stage or film presentation to the radio with no changes. There is a style of speaking on the radio, a style of drama, of opera, of radio show. The radio is in no way a branch of the stage or film, but rather an independent entity with its own rules.

It faces particular demands to be contemporary. It works with the tasks and needs of the day. Its duty is to give immediate events lasting meaning. Its actuality is both its greatest danger and its greatest strength. It gave impressive evidence on 21 March and 1 May of its ability to reach the people with great historical events. The first event acquainted the entire

Appendix 1: Dr Joseph Goebbels' Speech Evaluated in Section C – Source A

nation with a major political event, the second with an event of social-political significance. Both reached the entire nation, regardless of class, standing, or religion. That was primarily the result of the tight centralization, the strong reporting, and the up-to-date nature of the German radio.

Being up-to-date brings one close to the people. We call our revolution a popular one for good reason. It came from the depths of the people. It was carried out by the people, and done for them. It dethroned absolute individualism and put the people once again at the center. It broke with the weary skepticism of our intellectual leadership, which in the end turned out to be only a thin layer of morbid big-city intellectualism that left the masses alone in their hopeless misery.

The problems that we in the government face today are the same problems that face the man in the street. The problems we treat over the ether in plays, speeches, addresses and dramas are the problems that directly concern people. The better the radio recognizes them and treats them in fresh and varied ways, the better it will fulfill its tasks and the more the people will resolve to deal with these problems.

Before we reach this ideal situation in our radio policies, there are a series of preparations and problems to deal with. These are primarily organizational. Probably as a result of the period behind us, which ignored spiritual and political responsibilities, the art of organization developed to an intolerable degree. This disease of the age infected radio stations as well. Here too one organized not what had to be organized, but whatever could be organized. A hundred cooks spoil the soup, a hundred bureaucrats spoiled any spiritual accomplishments. The more committees, review committees, bureaucrats and higher offices there were in the German radio system, the less its political accomplishments. Here more than anywhere else, there were no personalities who took pleasure in responsibility. The spiritual energy, the flexibility necessary to reach the people in changing times, may not be the responsibility of boards, commissions or committees. They only get in the way. Here, too, faster than is generally believed, we will clearly and resolutely introduce the leadership principle.

Excessive organization can only get in the way of productivity. The more bureaucrats there are, the more obscure the internal structures, the easier it is for someone to hide his

Appendix 1: Dr Joseph Goebbels' Speech Evaluated in Section C – Source A

inability or incompetence behind some committee or board. And not only that. Excessive organization is always the beginning of corruption. It confuses responsibility and thus enables those of weak character to enrich themselves at public expense.

That is what formerly happened in the German radio system. There were huge salaries that lacked any justification given what was accomplished, outrageous expense accounts, generous insurance policies, usually inversely related to any positive achievements. There are some today who claim to have been the “fathers of radio.” One can only say to them that they were not the ones who developed radio, but rather that they made no productive use of it in hard times. They only knew how to exploit it for their own benefit. It would surely be good for those who really built the German radio if they did not have to stand beside these fortune hunters with their fat wallets and empty consciences. As the saying has it: “Tell me your friends and I’ll tell you who you are.”

I need not say that the government of the National Socialist revolution will not be moved in its resolve to bring order here. We will eliminate excessive organization as quickly as possible, replacing it with Spartan simplicity and economy. We will also systematically increase productivity in all areas. We will bring to the microphone the best spiritual elements of the nation, making the radio into the most multifaceted, flexible means of expressing the wishes, needs, longings, and hopes of our age.

We do not intend to use the radio only for our partisan purposes. We want room for entertainment, popular arts, games, jokes, and music. But everything should have a relationship to our day. Everything should include the theme of our great reconstructive work, or at least not stand in its way. Above all it is necessary to clearly centralize all radio activities, to place spiritual tasks ahead of technical ones, to introduce the leadership principle, to provide a clear worldview, and to present this worldview in flexible ways.

We want a radio that reaches the people, a radio that works for the people, a radio that is an intermediary between the government and the nation, a radio that also reaches across our borders to give the world a picture of our character, our life, and our work. The money produced by radio should in general go back to it. [German radio listeners had to pay a radio license fee.] If there are surpluses, they should be used to serve the spiritual and cultural needs

Appendix 1: Dr Joseph Goebbels' Speech Evaluated in Section C – Source A

of the whole nation. If the stage and publishing suffer from the rapid growth of radio, we will use the revenues not necessary for the radio to maintain and strengthen our intellectual and artistic life. The purpose of radio is to teach, entertain, and support people, not to gradually harm the intellectual and cultural life of the nation. One of my main tasks in the near and more distant future will be to keep a reasonable balance in this regard. I am convinced that the radio as well as the stage, publishing, and film will benefit.

With the opening of this exhibition, a systematic campaign to advertise for new radio receivers begins. We will use the knowledge of propaganda we gained in the past years. Our goal is to double German radio listenership. That will result in a financial foundation that will not only enable radio to carry on its mission, but also will support the entire intellectual and cultural life of the nation. We will strengthen the stage, film, music, and publishing, providing a firm financial foundation.

This year's radio exhibition opens in this spirit. Its keynote is the People's Receiver [a cheap radio receiver]. Its low price will enable the broad masses to become radio listeners. Science and industry have done what they could, earning the thanks of the government and of the whole nation. May the radio leadership now do its part. Then we will together accomplish our goal. If science, industry and intellectual leaders work hand in hand, and if their common efforts are supported by a steadfast sense of the highest political responsibility, then we will leave behind the many mistakes and errors of the past and open a new era of German radio. It will open new paths not only for Germany's political life, but for the work of radio throughout the world.

This exhibition stands in the shadow of this great task. It is a start, a beginning, an expression of German courage and German confidence.

It is our dearest wish that science, industry and the intellectual leadership of German radio from now on will follow a new path, at the end of which stands our common, great goal:

One People, one Reich, one will, and a glorious German future!

In this sense I declare the 10th German Radio Exhibition open.

Adapted from Kershaw, Ian. "The Führer Myth: How Hitler Won Over the German People." Spiegel Online. Last modified January 30, 2008. Accessed September 20, 2015.
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-fuhrer-myth-how-hitler-won-over-the-german-people-a-531909.html>.

Note: The excerpt below is not the entire article, rather it includes the information referenced in Section B and Section C.

How Hitler Won Over the German People

by Ian Kershaw

There were still many Germans who were skeptical of Hitler when he became chancellor in 1933. But Führer propaganda and military success soon turned him into an idol. The adulation helped make the Third Reich catastrophe possible.

"Today Hitler Is All of Germany." The newspaper headline on Aug. 4, 1934 reflected the vital shift in power that had just taken place. Two days earlier, on the death of Reich President Paul von Hindenburg, Hitler had lost no time in abolishing the Reich Presidency and having the army swear a personal oath of unconditional obedience to him as "the Führer of the German Reich and People." He was now head of state and supreme commander of the armed forces, as well as head of government and of the monopoly party, the NSDAP. Hitler had total power in Germany, unrestricted by any constitutional constraints. The headline implied even more, however, than the major change in the constellation of power. It suggested an identity of Hitler and the country he ruled, signifying a complete bond between the German people and Hitler.

The referendum that followed on 19 August 1934, to legitimize the power-political change that had occurred, aimed at demonstrating this identity. "Hitler for Germany -- all of Germany of Hitler" ran the slogan. As the result showed, however, reality lagged behind propaganda. According to the official figures, over a sixth of voters defied the intense pressure to conform and did not vote "yes." In some big working-class areas of Germany, up to a third

Appendix 2: Article Evaluated in Section C – Source B


had not given Hitler their vote. Even so, there were one or two tantalizing hints that Hitler's personal appeal outstripped that of the Nazi regime itself, and even more so of the Party. "For Adolf Hitler yes, but a thousand times no to the brown big-wigs" was scribbled on one ballot-paper in Potsdam. The same sentiment could be heard elsewhere.

Beneath the veneer of Führer adulation constantly trumpeted by the uniform propaganda of the mass media, there are numerous indicators that Hitler's appeal remained far less than total, even in what later memory often recalled as the "good years" of the mid-1930s. One example of strong criticism leveled at Hitler can be seen in a report from the Gestapo in Berlin in March 1936. Hitler's toleration of the corruption and luxury life-style of the Party big-wigs at a time when poor living standards still afflicted most ordinary Germans was, the report noted, heavily criticized. "Why does the Führer put up with that?" was a question on many people's lips, noted the report, and it was evident "the trust of the people in the personality of the Führer is currently undergoing a crisis."

Forgotten in Euphoria

One day after this report was submitted, however, German troops marched into the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. In a spectacular move that fully exposed the weakness of the western democracies, Hitler could celebrate his greatest triumph in foreign policy to date. The domestic problems of previous months -- shortage of foodstuffs, high prices, low wages

and, in Catholic areas, much antagonism towards the regime over the struggle between the church and state were temporarily forgotten in the euphoria.



Despite the absurdity of the "election" result at the end of the month, when -- amid ballot-rigging, electoral manipulation and intense propaganda to conform -- according to the official figures 98.9 per cent voted "for the list and thus for the Führer," the re-militarization of the Rhineland was

Appendix 2: Article Evaluated in Section C – Source B

unquestionably a hugely popular move, and one widely attributed to Hitler's bold and skillful leadership. Much suggests, in fact, that between the death of Hindenburg in August 1934 and the expansion into Austria and the Sudetenland four years later Hitler was indeed successful in gaining the backing of the vast majority of the German people, something of immeasurable importance for the disastrous course of German policy ahead. Apart perhaps from the immediate aftermath of the astonishing victory in France in summer 1940, Hitler's popularity was never higher than at the height of his foreign-policy successes in 1938.

Sebastian Haffner plausibly reckoned that Hitler had succeeded by 1938 in winning the support of "the great majority of that majority who had voted against him in 1933." Indeed Haffner thought that by then Hitler had united almost the entire German people behind him, that more than 90 percent of Germans were by that time "believers in the Führer." In the absence of any genuine test of opinion, and in conditions of intimidation and repression for those who might dare to challenge official propaganda, when the only public opinion which existed was that of the regime's agencies, such a figure can only be guesswork, and is probably too high. At the same time, it seems hard to deny that the regime had won much support since 1933, and that this owed much to the perceived personal "achievements" of Hitler. The personalized focus of the regime's "successes" reflected the ceaseless efforts of propaganda, which had been consciously directed to creating and building up the "heroic" image of Hitler as a towering genius, to the extent that Joseph Goebbels could in 1941 with some justification claim the creation of the Führer Myth to have been his greatest propaganda achievement.

The propaganda image was never better summarized than by Hitler himself in his Reichstag speech of 28 April 1939 (which Haffner also cited):

'By My Own Efforts'

"I overcame chaos in Germany, restored order, enormously raised production in all fields of our national economy...I succeeded in completely resettling in useful production those 7 million unemployed who so touched our hearts...I have not only politically united the

Appendix 2: Article Evaluated in Section C – Source B

German nation but also rearmed it militarily, and I have further tried to liquidate that Treaty sheet by sheet whose 448 Articles contain the vilest rape that nations and human beings have ever been expected to submit to. I have restored to the Reich the provinces grabbed from us in 1919; I have led millions of deeply unhappy Germans, who have been snatched away from us, back into the Fatherland; I have restored the thousand-year-old historical unity of German living space; and I have attempted to accomplish all that without shedding blood and without inflicting the sufferings of war on my people or any other. I have accomplished all this, as one who 21 years ago was still an unknown worker and soldier of my people, by my own efforts..."