



SCHOOLO APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY

Fermat Factorization Attack – Jun Sheng
EGLmaal with elliptic curves – Haozheng

ATTACK ON 2048-BIT RSA

```
1 def generate_two_close_primes():
2     # Define the minimum gap between the two primes
3     min_diff = 10**150
4
5     # Using cryptographically secure RNG
6     secure_rand = SystemRandom()
7
8     # Generate a random number with 2048 bit length
9     n = secure_rand.getrandbits(1023) | (1 << 1023) # force the first bit to 1
10
11    # Find the next prime greater than or equal to n
12    p = nextprime(n)
13
14    # Find the next prime after (p + diff)
15    q = nextprime(p + min_diff)
16
17    # Compute the actual difference
18    D = abs(p - q)
19
20    return p, q, D
21
22 # Generate the primes
23 p, q, D = generate_two_close_primes()
24
25 # Print results
26 print("Prime 1 (p):", p)
27 print("Prime 2 (q):", q)
28 print("Difference (D):", D)
29 print("Bit length of p:", p.bit_length())
30 print("Bit length of q:", q.bit_length())
31
```

```
1 # Checks if a number n is a perfect square. Return True if n is a perfect square, False otherwise.
2 def is_perfect_square(n):
3
4     if n < 0:
5         return False # Negative numbers cannot be perfect squares in real numbers
6
7     root = math.isqrt(n)
8     return root * root == n # Return True or False
9
10 ✓ 0.0s
11
12 # Fermat's factorization
13 def fermat_factor(N):
14     a = math.isqrt(N) + 1
15     iters = 0
16
17     while True:
18         b2 = a * a - N
19
20         if is_perfect_square(b2): # Check if b2 is perfect square
21             b = math.isqrt(b2)
22             q_found = a + b
23             p_found = a - b
24             return q_found, p_found, b, iters
25
26         print("b^2 is not a perfect square.")
27         a += 1
28         iters += 1
29
30     q_found, p_found, b, iters = fermat_factor(N)
31     print("b:",b)
32     print("\nFactors found:")
33     print("q found =", q_found)
34     print("p found =", p_found)
35     print("\nIterations:", iters)
36
37 ✓ 0.0s
```

ATTACK ON 2048-BIT RSA

Modulus: N (public)

Two large prime factors: p & q (private)

Public Exponent: e (public)


Private Exponent: d (private)

- Strength of RSA comes from the computational difficulty of factoring the product of 2 large prime numbers (p and q)
- However, if the 2 prime numbers are close, we can easily find them using Fermat's Factorisation
- Objective is to find p and q (d can be derived if p and q are known)

ATTACK ON 2048-BIT RSA

$$\begin{aligned}N &= p \times q \\&= (a + b)(a - b) \\&= a^2 - b^2\end{aligned}$$

$$b^2 = a^2 - N$$



ATTACK ON 2048-BIT RSA


How do we find a ?

$a = (p+q)/2 = \text{Arithmetic Mean (midpoint)}$

$\sqrt{N} = \sqrt{pq} = \text{Geometric Mean}$

*Geometric Mean always \leq Arithmetic Mean.

→ Can use Geometric Mean to find a



ATTACK ON 2048-BIT RSA


How do we find a ?

a is always an integer

*All prime numbers (except 2) are odd

\rightarrow odd + odd = even

\rightarrow even / 2 = integer




ATTACK ON 2048-BIT RSA

$$\begin{aligned} N &= p \times q \\ &= (a + b)(a - b) \\ &= a^2 - b^2 \\ b^2 &= a^2 - N \end{aligned}$$

Core Logic
 $\sqrt{N} = \sqrt{pq} \leq a$,
which is an integer

brute force \sqrt{N} to a and
check that b^2 is a perfect
square each time



ELGAMAL WITH ECC



ELGAMAL WITH ECC

```
class ELGamal_with_ECC:
    def __init__(self, curve, base_point, n):
        self.curve = curve
        self.base_point = base_point
        self.n = n
        if not curve.point_on_curve(base_point):
            raise ValueError("Based point is not on curve!")

    def generate_key(self):
        private_key = secrets.randrange(self.n - 1) + 1
        public_key = self.curve.scalar_point(private_key, self.base_point)
        return private_key, public_key

    def encrypt(self, message, public_key):
        k = secrets.randrange(self.n-1) + 1
        cipher1 = self.curve.scalar_point(k, self.base_point)

        kA = self.curve.scalar_point(k, public_key)
        cipher2 = self.curve.add_points(kA, message)

        return cipher1, cipher2

    def decrypt(self, cipher1, cipher2, private_key):
        shared_secret = self.curve.scalar_point(private_key, cipher1)
        if shared_secret:
            neg_x_value = shared_secret[0]
            neg_y_value = -shared_secret[1] % self.curve.p
            neg_S = (neg_x_value, neg_y_value)
        else:
            neg_S = None
        M = self.curve.add_points(cipher2, neg_S)
        return M
```

```
class ECC:
    def __init__(self, a, b, p):
        self.a = a
        self.b = b
        self.p = p

    def point_on_curve(self, point):
        if point is None:
            return True
        x = point[0]
        y = point[1]
        left = (y ** 2) % self.p
        right = (x ** 3 + (self.a * x) + self.b) % self.p
        return left == right

    def extended_gcd(self,a, b):
        if b == 0:
            return (a, 1, 0)
        gcd, x1, y1 = self.extended_gcd(b, a % b)

        x = y1
        y = x1 - (a // b) * y1

        return (gcd, x, y)

    def inverse(self, value_a, mod_value):
        gcd, x, y = self.extended_gcd(value_a, mod_value)
        if gcd != 1:
            raise ValueError("GCD != 1, there is no inverse value.")

        inverse_value = x % mod_value
        return inverse_value

    def add_points(self, point1, point2):
        if point1 is None:
            return point2
        if point2 is None:
            return point1

        point_1_x, point_1_y = point1
        point_2_x, point_2_y = point2

        if (point_1_x == point_2_x and point_1_y == point_2_y):
            # case where it is 2P
            m = (3 * (point_1_x ** 2) + self.a) * self.inverse(2* point_1_y ,self.p)
        else:
            m = (point_2_y - point_1_y) * self.inverse((point_2_x-point_1_x) ,self.p)

        m = m % self.p

        point_3_x = (m**2 - point_1_x - point_2_x) % self.p
        point_3_y = (m * (point_1_x - point_3_x) - point_1_y) % self.p

        new_point = (point_3_x, point_3_y)
        return new_point

    def scalar_point(self, n, point):
        R = None
        Q = point
        while n:
            if n & 1:
                R = self.add_points(Q, R)
                Q = self.add_points(Q, Q)
            n >>= 1
        return R
```

ELGAMAL WITH ECC - ALGORITHM

Suppose bob wants to send alice an encrypted message (M)

Step 1 - Alice will first generate her Public and Private key:

- 1) Alice will first generate a where $a \in [1, n-1]$
- 2) Alice's Private key will be a
- 3) Alice's Public key will be $A = a * p$ where p is a point on the *elliptic curve*

ELGAMAL WITH ECC - ALGORITHM

Suppose bob wants to send alice an encrypted message (M)

Step 2 - Bob will encrypt his message with Alice's Public key:

- 1) Bob will first generate a random k
- 2) Bob will then produce $C1 = k * p$ where p is a point on the elliptic curve
- 3) Bob will also produce $C2 = (k * A) + M$ where M is the message to be encrypted
- 4) Bob will send Alice point $(C1, C2)$

ELGAMAL WITH ECC - ALGORITHM

Suppose bob wants to send alice an encrypted message (M)

Step 3 – Alice will decrypt Bob's message:

- 1) Alice will generate $S = a * C1$
- 2) Alice can recover the message with $C2 - S$

Reason for why it works:

$$C1 = kP$$

$$C2 = (kA) + M = kaP + M$$

$$A = aP$$

$$S = akP$$

$$M = C2 - S = kaP + M - akP = kaP - kaP + M$$

ELGAMAL WITH ECC - EXAMPLE

We have a curve such that $y^2 = x^3 + 2x + 2 \text{ mod } 17$

Base point of $(5, 1)$, n value of 19 and message mapped to point $(16, 4)$

Alice's Private key $a = 7$

Alice's Public key will be $7(5, 1) = (0, 6)$

Bob generate $k = 11$

$C_1 = 11(5, 1) = (13, 10)$

$C_2 = M + 11(0, 6) = (16, 4) + 11(0, 6) = (9, 1)$

Bob sends $((13, 10), (9, 1))$ to Alice

Alice computes $S = 7(C_1) = 7(13, 10)$

Message $= (9, 1) - 7(13, 10) = (16, 4) = M$





**DEMO WITH
SECP256K1
CURVE**



**THANK
YOU**