



13Cubed Memory CTF

DATE: **Saturday, 26 July, 2025**

▼ **Volatility** Memory CTF – Day 26 | 13Cubed

Memory Dump: `memdump.mem`

Volatility Version: `Volatility 3 Framework 2.26.2`

Profile: **Win10x64**

Analyst: Jinay Shah (*a.k.a. Jynx*)

▼ Question 1 - Identify **Malicious** Process

GOAL → Find the running rogue (malicious) process. The flag is the MD5 hash of its PID.

- Tool(s): `pslist`
- PID Identified: `360`
- Suspicious Trait:

1. **Typo squatting** Attack

Legitimate: `svchost.exe`

Malicious: `scvhost.exe` (s and v swapped!)

- **Classic technique:** Slight misspelling to avoid detection

- **Visual deception:** Looks legitimate at quick glance
 - **Process hiding:** Blends in with real svchost processes
2. **0 threads:** Impossible for 5+ day runtime.
 3. **Wow64: True:** 32-bit process (potentially evasive).
 4. **Same parent (4824):** Spawned by compromised process.
 5. **Perfect timing:** Terminated right before memory dump.
- **FLAG [MD5 HASH - PID]:** `e7b24b112a44fdd9ee93bdf998c6ca0e`

3016	4824	svchost.exe.exe	0xc20c6e0bf580	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:52:29.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 19:52:29.000000 UTC	Disabled
336	4824	svchost.exe.exe	0xc20c6d36c080	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:52:31.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 19:52:31.000000 UTC	Disabled
1404	4824	svchost.exe	0xc20c6d82e080	0	-	1	True	2018-08-01 19:54:55.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 19:56:35.000000 UTC	Disabled
560	4824	svchost.exe	0xc20c6cdf4580	0	-	1	True	2018-08-01 19:56:45.000000 UTC	2018-08-06 18:12:03.000000 UTC	Disabled
7968	4824	notepad.exe	0xc20c6daf9580	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:57:10.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 19:57:10.000000 UTC	Disabled
8852	4824	svchost.exe	0xc20c6ab70080	0	-	1	True	2018-08-01 19:59:49.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 20:00:08.000000 UTC	Disabled
400	924	OfficeHubTaskH	0xc20c6d482080	10	-	1	False	2018-08-01 20:03:42.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
2744	924	RuntimeBroker.	0xc20c6db7c200	9	-	1	False	2018-08-01 20:03:52.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled

Parent process of common suspicious and the actual malware in our findings as well as the multiple svchost.exe:

PPID - `4824`

Process Name - `explorer.exe`

```
(jynx@kali) (~/.Desktop/forensics/vol3/Day-26)
$ volatility3 -f memdump.mem windows.pslist | grep 4824
```

4824	4756	explorer.exe	0xc20c69cfe580	125	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:20:58.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
5716	4824	ie4uinit.exe	0xc20c6b588580	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:21:30.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 19:21:31.000000 UTC	Disabled
6268	4824	MSASCuil.exe	0xc20c6c095580	3	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:21:56.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
3372	4824	vmtoolsd.exe	0xc20c6cfc2580	9	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:21:56.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
2200	4824	OneDrive.exe	0xc20c6cfb1580	18	-	1	True	2018-08-01 19:22:10.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
3884	4824	cmd.exe	0xc20c6d86b080	1	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:37:47.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
8868	4824	cmd.exe	0xc20c6e495080	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:40:14.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 19:49:18.000000 UTC	Disabled
10012	4824	svchost.exe	0xc20c6d6fc580	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:49:19.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 19:49:19.000000 UTC	Disabled
7852	4824	svchost.exe	0xc20c6dbc5340	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:49:21.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 19:49:22.000000 UTC	Disabled
6948	4824	Bubbles.scr	0xc20c6d789580	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:50:30.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 19:50:31.000000 UTC	Disabled
10204	4824	Bubbles.scr	0xc20c6d002080	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:50:33.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 19:50:38.000000 UTC	Disabled
8532	4824	ByteCodeGenera	0xc20c6ab92580	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:50:42.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 19:50:42.000000 UTC	Disabled
6324	4824	xdiaq.exe	0xc20c6d4d2080	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:51:18.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 19:51:28.000000 UTC	Disabled
252	4824	xwizard.exe	0xc20c6e24f580	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:51:52.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 19:51:55.000000 UTC	Disabled
8140	4824	svchost.exe.exe	0xc20c6d99b580	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:52:16.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 19:52:16.000000 UTC	Disabled
6176	4824	svchost.exe.exe	0xc20c6ab2b580	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:52:19.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 19:52:19.000000 UTC	Disabled
5528	4824	svchost.exe	0xc20c6e05ac340	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:52:20.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 19:52:20.000000 UTC	Disabled
3016	4824	svchost.exe.exe	0xc20c6e0bf580	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:52:29.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 19:52:29.000000 UTC	Disabled
336	4824	svchost.exe.exe	0xc20c6d36c080	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:52:31.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 19:52:31.000000 UTC	Disabled
1404	4824	svchost.exe	0xc20c6d82e080	0	-	1	True	2018-08-01 19:54:55.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 19:56:35.000000 UTC	Disabled
360	4824	svchost.exe	0xc20c6cdf4580	0	-	1	True	2018-08-01 19:56:45.000000 UTC	2018-08-06 18:12:03.000000 UTC	Disabled
7968	4824	notepad.exe	0xc20c6daf9580	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:57:10.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 19:57:10.000000 UTC	Disabled
8852	4824	svchost.exe	0xc20c6ab70080	0	-	1	True	2018-08-01 19:59:49.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 20:00:08.000000 UTC	Disabled
9128	4824	notepad.exe	0xc20c6d732080	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 20:05:10.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 20:05:12.000000 UTC	Disabled
8800	4824	notepad.exe	0xc20c6e5ca200	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 20:10:19.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 20:10:21.000000 UTC	Disabled
6372	4824	notepad - Copy	0xc20c6d510080	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 20:10:32.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 20:10:32.000000 UTC	Disabled
3504	4824	notepad - Copy	0xc20c6d694080	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 20:10:37.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 20:10:37.000000 UTC	Disabled
8560	4824	svchost.exe	0xc20c6ddad580	10	-	1	False	2018-08-01 20:13:10.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
1412	4824	notepad.exe	0xc20c6abeb580	0	-	1	False	2018-08-06 18:12:15.000000 UTC	2018-08-06 18:12:17.000000 UTC	Disabled

▼ Question 2 - Dump and Analyze Memory of Rogue Process

GOAL → Find the running rogue (malicious) process and dump its memory to disk. You'll

find the 32-character flag within that process's memory.

- Tool(s): `memdump`, `strings`, `base64 -d`

- M2ExOTY5N2YyOTA5NWJjMjg5YTk2ZTQ1MDQ2Nzk2ODA=

- 3a19697f29095bc289a96e4504679680

```
{
    "auto_complete": {
        "selected_items": [
        ]
    },
    "buffers": [
        {
            "contents": "da391kdasdaadsssssss      t.h.e. fl.ag.is. M2Ex0TY5N2Yy0TA5NWJjMjg5YTk2ZTQ1MDQ2Nzk2ODAA=",
            "settings": {
                "buffer_size": 85,
                "line_ending": "Windows"
            }
        }
    ],
}
```

```
(jynx@kali) - [~/Desktop/forensics/vol3/Day-26]
$ echo M2Ex0TY5N2Yy0TA5NWJjMjg5YTk2ZTQ1MDQ2Nzk2ODA= | base64 -d
3a19697f29095bc289a96e4504679680
(jynx@kali) - [~/Desktop/forensics/vol3/Day-26]
$
```

▼ Question 3 - MAC Address of Default Gateway

GOAL → *What is the MAC address of this machine's default gateway?*

The flag is the MD5 hash of that MAC address in uppercase with dashes (-) as delimiters. Example:

01-00-A4-FB-AF-C2.

- **Tool(s):** `printkey` , `dumpregistry` , `md5sum`
- **MAC Found:** `00-50-56-FE-D8-07`
- **Flag (MD5):** `6496d43b622a2ad241b4d08699320f4e`

```
# Print the NetworkList signatures to find the specific subkey
volatility3 -f memdump.mem windows.registry.printkey --key
"Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\NetworkList\Signatures\Unmanage
```

```

jym@kali:~/Desktop/forensics/vol3-Ray-26
└─$ print the networklist signatures to find the specific subkey
volatility3 -f memdump.new windows.registry.printkey --key "Microsoft/Windows NT/CurrentVersion/NetworkList/Signatures/Unmanaged"
Volatility3 Framework 2.26.2
Progress: 100.00%
Last Write Time Hive Offset
Type Key Name Data Volatile
-----
0438985432000 Key [NONAME]Microsoft/Windows NT/CurrentVersion/NetworkList/Signatures/Unmanaged - - - - -
043898543000 Key REGISTRY_MACHINE_SYSTEM\Microsfot/Windows NT/CurrentVersion/NetworkList/Signatures/Unmanaged - - - - -
0438985436000 Key REGISTRY_MACHINE_SYSTEM\Microsfot/Windows NT/CurrentVersion/NetworkList/Signatures/Unmanaged - - - - -
0438985438000 Key Value\Harddisk\Volume1\EFI\Microsoft\Boot\BCD\Microsfot/Windows NT/CurrentVersion/NetworkList/Signatures/Unmanaged - - - - -
2018-08-01 18:58:36.000 UTC 0438985438000 Key SystemRoot\System32\Config\SOFTWARE\Microsfot/Windows NT/CurrentVersion/NetworkList/Signatures/Unmanaged 01010300F000F00000000000F0000F00 3E3734ADCD831A7660296C7D805D0864
0438985436000 Key SystemRoot\System32\Config\DEFAULT\Microsfot/Windows NT/CurrentVersion/NetworkList/Signatures/Unmanaged - - - - -
0438986048000 Key SystemRoot\System32\Config\SECURITY\Microsfot/Windows NT/CurrentVersion/NetworkList/Signatures/Unmanaged - - - - -
0438986048000 Key SystemRoot\System32\Config\SAM\Microsfot/Windows NT/CurrentVersion/NetworkList/Signatures/Unmanaged - - - - -
0438986048000 Key SystemRoot\ServiceProfiles\NetworkService\NTUSER.DAT\Microsfot/Windows NT/CurrentVersion/NetworkList/Signatures/Unmanaged - - - - -
0438986048000 Key SystemRoot\System32\Config\Microsfot/Windows NT/CurrentVersion/NetworkList/Signatures/Unmanaged - - - - -
0438986048000 Key C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\NTUSER.DAT\Microsfot/Windows NT/CurrentVersion/NetworkList/Signatures/Unmanaged - - - - -
0438987556000 Key C:\Windows\AppCompat\Programs\Amcache_hive\Microsfot/Windows NT/CurrentVersion/NetworkList/Signatures/Unmanaged - - - - -

```



```
volatility3 -f memdump.mem windows.registry.printkey --key
"Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\NetworkList\Signatures\Unmanage
000F0000F0080000000F0000F0E3E937A4D0CD0A314266D2986CB7DE
43B828FEEDCEFFD6DE7141DC1D15D"
```

```
EEDCEFFD6DE7141DC1D15D FirstNetwork Network False
2018-08-01 18:50:26.000000 UTC 0xd38985eb3000 REG_BINARY \SystemRoot\System32\
B43B828FEEDCEFFD6DE7141DC1D15D DefaultGatewayMac
00 50 56 fe d8 07 .PV ... False
- 0xd38986a96000 Key \SystemRoot\System32\Config\DEFAULT\Microsoft\Windows
-
- 0xd38986bba000 Key \SystemRoot\System32\Config\SECURITY\Microsoft\Windows
```

```
(jynx@kali)-[~/Desktop/forensics/vol3/Day-26]
$ echo -n "00-50-56-FE-D8-07" | md5sum
6496d43b622a2ad241b4d08699320f4e -
(jynx@kali)-[~/Desktop/forensics/vol3/Day-26]
```

▼ Question 4 - Browser Cache File Path

GOAL → Find the full path of the browser cache created when an analyst visited

"www.13cubed.com." The path will begin with "Users\." Convert the path to uppercase. The flag is the MD5 hash of that string.

- Tool(s): -
- Path (Uppercase): -
- Flag (MD5): -

```
(jynx@kali)-[~/Desktop/forensics/vol3/Day-26]
$ volatility3 -f memdump.mem windows.mftscan --mft mft.txt
Progress: 100.00 PDB scanning finished
(jynx@kali)-[~/Desktop/forensics/vol3/Day-26]
$ grep -i "13cubed" mft.txt
+ 0x780d128 FILE 61988 2 File Archive FILE_NAME 2018-08-01 19:29:27.000000 UTC 2018-08-01 19:29:27.000000 UTC 2018-08-01 19:29:27.000000 UTC 2018-08-01 19:29:27.000000 UTC 13cubed[1].htm
+ 0x6826ad28 FILE 115915 2 File Archive FILE_NAME 2018-08-01 19:37:05.000000 UTC 2018-08-01 19:37:05.000000 UTC 2018-08-01 19:37:05.000000 UTC 2018-08-01 19:37:05.000000 UTC 13cubed[1].png
+ 0x780d128 FILE 61988 2 File Archive FILE_NAME 2018-08-01 19:29:27.000000 UTC 2018-08-01 19:29:27.000000 UTC 2018-08-01 19:29:27.000000 UTC 2018-08-01 19:29:27.000000 UTC 13cubed[1].htm
```

▼ Artifacts Collected

▼ 1. Registry Timestamp Discrepancy [10 Seconds]

Artifact	Description	Time Stamp
Registry 0xc20c69d52040	Registry should NOT start before System - this is actually an anomaly.	2018-08-01 19:20:10

Artifact	Description	Time Stamp
	How can a CHILD process initiate before the parent process.	

Volatility 3 Framework 2.26.2										
PID	PPID	ImageFileName	Offset(V)	Threads	Handles	SessionId	Wow64	CreateTime	ExitTime	File output
4	0	System	0xc20c69c74280 103	-	N/A	False		2018-08-01 19:20:20.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
68	4	Registry	0xc20c69d52040 3	-	N/A	False		2018-08-01 19:20:20.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
500	4	smss.exe	0xc20c6a212040 2	-	N/A	False		2018-08-01 19:20:20.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
612	604	csrss.exe	0xc20c6adac580 10	-	0	False		2018-08-01 19:20:24.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
680	672	csrss.exe	0xc20c6b8ed580 14	-	1	False		2018-08-01 19:20:25.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
696	604	wininit.exe	0xc20c6b913080 1	-	0	False		2018-08-01 19:20:25.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled

Normally, the **System process (PID 4)** should **always** be the first process and have the earliest timestamp because:

1. **System process** is the kernel itself
2. **Registry process** is created BY the System process
3. **Parent-child relationship**: Registry (PID 68) has PPID 4 (System as parent)

This **10-second discrepancy is suspicious** and warrants further investigation. While it could be explained by technical issues, it's also a potential indicator of:

- **Rootkit activity**
- **Process manipulation**
- **Anti-forensics techniques**
- **System compromise**

▼ 2. **svchost.exe** suspicious

Artifact	Description	Path/Hash
svchost.exe	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ZERO Threads [Critical] - 5 days later the process terminated but then how was the current memory dump captured while other processes are still running - PID < PPID: Child PID lower than parent PID [Unusual] 	0xc20c6bae9580

```
(jynx@kali) ~/Desktop/forensics/vol3/Day-26
$ volatility3 -f memdump.mem windows.pslist
Volatility 3 Framework 2.26.2
Progress: 100.00
PDB scanning finished
Offset(V)
Threads
Handles
SessionId
Wow64
CreateTime
ExitTime
File output
```

PID	PPID	ImageFileName	PDB	Offset(V)	Threads	Handles	SessionId	Wow64	CreateTime	ExitTime	File output
4	0	System	0xc20c69c74280	103	-	N/A	False	2018-08-01 19:20:20.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
68	4	Registry	0xc20c69d52040	3	-	N/A	False	2018-08-01 19:20:10.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
500	4	smss.exe	0xc20c6a212040	2	-	N/A	False	2018-08-01 19:20:20.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
612	604	csrss.exe	0xc20c6adac580	10	-	0	False	2018-08-01 19:20:24.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
680	672	csrss.exe	0xc20c6b8ed580	14	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:20:25.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
696	604	wininit.exe	0xc20c6b913080	1	-	0	False	2018-08-01 19:20:25.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
732	672	winlogon.exe	0xc20c6b910080	6	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:20:25.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
804	696	services.exe	0xc20c6b93e080	16	-	0	False	2018-08-01 19:20:26.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
816	696	lsass.exe	0xc20c6b98e080	9	-	0	False	2018-08-01 19:20:26.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
904	804	svchost.exe	0xc20c6b8df580	2	-	0	False	2018-08-01 19:20:28.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
924	804	svchost.exe	0xc20c6b8dd580	41	-	0	False	2018-08-01 19:20:28.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
940	696	fontdrvhost.exe	0xc20c6b8db580	5	-	0	False	2018-08-01 19:20:28.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
948	732	fontdrvhost.exe	0xc20c6b8d9580	5	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:20:28.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
1020	804	svchost.exe	0xc20c6ba39580	19	-	0	False	2018-08-01 19:20:28.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
628	804	svchost.exe	0xc20c6ba17580	7	-	0	False	2018-08-01 19:20:28.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
800	804	svchost.exe	0xc20c6bae9580	0	-	0	False	2018-08-01 19:20:29.000000 UTC	2018-08-06 18:11:48.000000 UTC	Disabled	
476	804	svchost.exe	0xc20c6ba9f080	7	-	0	False	2018-08-01 19:20:29.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled	
1040	804	svchost.exe	0xc20c6bae5580	4	-	0	False	2018-08-01 19:20:29.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled	

Most Likely Scenarios:

1. Process Hallowing

- Malware created legitimate svchost.exe
- Replaced its memory with malicious code
- Left zombie process object

2. Rootkit Activity

- Rootkit manipulating process visibility
- Hiding active malicious processes
- Showing terminated processes as decoy

3. Memory Corruption

- Process object partially corrupted
- Memory dump captured during termination
- Data structure inconsistencies

▼ 3. Microsoft Edge.

Artifact	Description	Path/Hash
MicrosoftEdge.	- ZERO Threads [highly suspicious for a browser] for 3:57 mins .	0xc20c6debd400

10024	804	svchost.exe	0xc20c6ddb1580	3	-	0	False	2018-08-01 19:30:26.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
9408	1768	taskhostw.exe	0xc20c6a97b580	6	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:36:00.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
6552	924	MicrosoftEdge.	0xc20c6debd400	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:36:12.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 19:40:09.000000 UTC	Disabled
3884	4824	cmd.exe	0xc20c6d86b080	1	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:37:47.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
9912	3884	cmd.exe	0xc20c6d4cc3080	4	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:37:47.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
8868	4824	cmd.exe	0xc20c6e495080	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:40:14.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 19:49:18.000000 UTC	Disabled
7136	804	svchost.exe	0xc20c6e0ea580	3	-	0	False	2018-08-01 19:43:01.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
6884	924	dllhost.exe	0xc20c6d561080	5	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:43:12.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
3224	804	svchost.exe	0xc20c6b585580	4	-	0	False	2018-08-01 19:43:30.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled

Possible Explanations for 0 Threads

1. Normal Termination Artifact (Possible)

- Edge crashed or was force-killed
 - Memory dump captured during cleanup
 - Thread structures already deallocated
 - Process object not yet removed

2. Process Injection (Suspicious)

- Malware injected into legitimate Edge process
 - Ran malicious code for 4 minutes
 - Cleaned up threads during exit
 - Left process shell behind

3. Browser Crash (Normal)

- Edge encountered error and crashed
 - Abnormal termination left 0 threads
 - Windows cleanup process ongoing
 - Memory dump timing caught transition

▼ 4. cmd.exe

Artifact	Description	Path/Hash
cmd.exe	- ZERO Threads [highly suspicious for a terminal] running for 9:04 mins .	0xc20c6e495080

10024	804	svchost.exe	0xc20c6ddb1580	3	-	0	False	2018-08-01 19:30:26.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
9408	1768	taskhostw.exe	0xc20c6a97b580	6	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:36:00.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
6552	924	MicrosoftEdge.	0xc20c6deb4400	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:36:12.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 19:40:09.000000 UTC	Disabled
3884	4824	cmd.exe	0xc20c6d86b080	1	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:37:47.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
9912	3884	conhost.exe	0xc20c6cec3080	4	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:37:47.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
8868	4824	cmd.exe	0xc20c6e495080	0	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:40:14.000000 UTC	2018-08-01 19:49:18.000000 UTC	Disabled
7136	804	svchost.exe	0xc20c6e0ea580	3	-	0	False	2018-08-01 19:43:01.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
6684	924	dlhhost.exe	0xc20c6d561080	5	-	1	False	2018-08-01 19:43:12.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled
3224	804	svchost.exe	0xc20c6b585580	4	-	0	False	2018-08-01 19:43:30.000000 UTC	N/A	Disabled

9-Minute Runtime Impossibility:

Active for 9 minutes: Someone was using it

Zero threads: Process can't function without threads

Still responsive: Had to be processing commands

Clean termination: Got proper exit time

Most Likely Scenarios:

1. Process Hollowing (High Probability)

Malware created legitimate cmd.exe process

- Suspended original cmd.exe threads
- Injected malicious code using different threading
- Ran malware for 9 minutes disguised as cmd.exe
- Cleaned up all original threads during exit

2. Command Injection Attack

Attacker gained cmd.exe access

- Used it to run malicious commands
- Advanced malware manipulated thread visibility
- Anti-forensics technique to hide activity

3. Rootkit Thread Hiding

cmd.exe was actively used by attacker

- Rootkit hid real thread count from system
- Process appeared "inactive" while running malicious commands
- Sophisticated evasion technique

▼ Timeline Correlation

19:49:18 - cmd.exe ends (9-minute session)

19:49:19 - svchost.exe starts (0 seconds runtime)

19:49:21 - svchost.exe starts (1 second runtime)

19:50:30 - Bubbles.scr #(screensaver?)

19:52:16-20 - Multiple svchost.exe.ex processes

19:52:29-31 - MORE scvhost.exe.ex processes

19:56:45 - Main `scvhost.exe` starts #(THE BIG ONE - 5 days!)