

## 13Cubed Memory CTF

DATE: Saturday, 26 July, 2025

## ▼ Molatility Memory CTF - Day 26 | 13Cubed

Memory Dump: memdump.mem

Volatility Version: Volatility 3 Framework 2.26.2

Profile: Win10×64

Analyst: Jinay Shah (a.k.a. Jynx)

## ▼ Question 1 - Identify Malicious Process

 $GOAL \rightarrow Find$  the running rogue (malicious) process. The flag is the MD5 hash of its PID.

• Tool(s): pslist

• PID Identified: 360

• Suspicious Trait:


1. Typo squatting Attack

Legitimate: svchost.exe

Malicious: scvhost.exe (s and v swapped!)

• Classic technique: Slight misspelling to avoid detection


- Visual deception: Looks legitimate at quick glance
- Process hiding: Blends in with real sychost processes
- 2. **O threads**: Impossible for 5+ day runtime.
- 3. Wow64: True: 32-bit process (potentially evasive).
- 4. Same parent (4824): Spawned by compromised process.
- 5. Perfect timing: Terminated right before memory dump.
- FLAG [MD5 HASH PID]: e7b24b112a44fdd9ee93bdf998c6ca0e



Parent process of common suspicious and the actual malware in our findings as well as the multiple svchost.exe:

PPID - 4824

**Process Name - explorer.exe** 



# **▼** H Question 2 - Dump and Analyze Memory of Rogue Process

 $GOAL \rightarrow Find$  the running rogue (malicious) process and dump its memory to disk. You'll

find the 32-character flag within that process's memory.

• Tool(s): memdump , strings , base64 -d

Base64 Encoded String Found:

M2ExOTY5N2YyOTA5NWJjMjg5YTk2ZTQ1MDQ2Nzk2ODA=

• Decoded Flag: 3a19697f29095bc289a96e4504679680

```
(jynx⊗ kali)-[~/Desktop/forensics/vol3/Day-26]
$ echo M2ExOTY5N2YyOTA5NWJjMjg5YTk2ZTQ1MDQ2Nzk2ODA= | base64 -d
3a19697f29095bc289a96e4504679680

(jynx⊗ kali)-[~/Desktop/forensics/vol3/Day-26]
```

## ▼ @ Question 3 - MAC Address of Default Gateway

GOAL  $\rightarrow$  What is the MAC address of this machine's default gateway? The flag is the MD5 hash of that MAC address in uppercase with dashes (-) as delimiters. Example:

01-00-A4-FB-AF-C2.

• Tool(s): printkey , dumpregistry , md5sum

• MAC Found: 00-50-56-FE-D8-07

• Flag (MD5): 6496d43b622a2ad241b4d08699320f4e

# Print the NetworkList signatures to find the specific subkey volatility3 -f memdump.mem windows.registry.printkey --key "Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\NetworkList\Signatures\Unmanage

```
| S Print Net Networkits | Signatures to find the specific subkey | Volatility | F mendion, negative, printey - key MicrosoftWindows NT/CurrentVersion/Networkiist\Signatures\Unmanaged* | Volatility | F mendion, negative, printey - key MicrosoftWindows NT/CurrentVersion/Networkiist\Signatures\Unmanaged* | Volatility | Properties | 100 Properties
```

volatility3 -f memdump.mem windows.registry.printkey --key "Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\NetworkList\Signatures\Unmanage 000F0000F008000000F0000F0E3E937A4D0CD0A314266D2986CB7DE 43B828FEEDCEFFD6DE7141DC1D15D"

```
EEDCEFFD6DE7141DC1D15D FirstNetwork Network False
2018-08-01 18:50:26.000000 UTC 0×d38985eb3000 REG_BINARY \SystemRoot\System32\0
B43B828FEEDCEFFD6DE7141DC1D15D DefaultGatewayMac
00 50 56 fe d8 07 .PV ... False
- 0×d38986a96000 Key \SystemRoot\System32\Config\DEFAULT\Microsoft\Windows
- 0×d38986bba000 Key \SystemRoot\System32\Config\SECURITY\Microsoft\Windows
```

```
(jynx kali) - [~/Desktop/forensics/vol3/Day-26]
$ echo -n "00-50-56-FE-D8-07" | md5sum
6496d43b622a2ad241b4d08699320f4e -

(jynx kali) - [~/Desktop/forensics/vol3/Day-26]
$
```

## ▼ Cache File Path ■ Question 4 - Browser Cache File Path

**GOAL** → Find the full path of the browser cache created when an analyst visited

"www.13cubed.com." The path will begin with "Users\." Convert the path to uppercase. The flag is the MD5 hash of that string.


- Tool(s): -
- Path (Uppercase): -
- Flag (MD5): -

## ▼ W Artifacts Collected

## **▼ 1. Registry Timestamp Discrepancy [10 Seconds]**

Artifact	Description	Time Stamp		
Registry 0xc20c69d52040	Registry should NOT start before  System - this is actually an anomaly.	2018-08-01 19:20:10		

Artifact	Description	Time Stamp
	How can a CHILD process initiate before the parent process.	




Normally, the **System process (PID 4)** should **always** be the first process and have the earliest timestamp because:

- 1. System process is the kernel itself
- 2. Registry process is created BY the System process
- 3. Parent-child relationship: Registry (PID 68) has PPID 4 (System as parent)

This **10-second discrepancy is suspicious** and warrants further investigation. While it could be explained by technical issues, it's also a potential indicator of:

- Rootkit activity
- Process manipulation
- Anti-forensics techniques
- System compromise
- **▼ 2. svchost.exe** suspicious

Artifact	Description	Path/Hash
svchost.exe	<ul> <li>ZERO Threads [Critical]</li> <li>5 days later the process terminated but then how was the current memory dump captured while other processes are still running</li> <li>PID &lt; PPID: Child PID lower than parent PID [Unusual]</li> </ul>	0xc20c6bae9580



#### **Most Likely Scenarios:**

#### 1. Process Hollowing

- Malware created legitimate svchost.exe
- Replaced its memory with malicious code
- Left zombie process object

#### 2. Rootkit Activity


- · Rootkit manipulating process visibility
- Hiding active malicious processes
- Showing terminated processes as decoy

#### 3. Memory Corruption

- · Process object partially corrupted
- Memory dump captured during termination
- Data structure inconsistencies

## **▼ 3. Microsoft Edge.**

Artifact	Description	Path/Hash		
MicrosoftEdge.	- <b>ZERO Threads</b> [highly suspicious for a browser] for <b>3:57 mins</b> .	0xc20c6debd400		



#### Possible Explanations for 0 Threads

#### 1. Normal Termination Artifact (Possible)

- Edge crashed or was force-killed
  - Memory dump captured during cleanup
  - Thread structures already deallocated
  - Process object not yet removed

#### 2. Process Injection (Suspicious)

- Malware injected into legitimate Edge process
  - Ran malicious code for 4 minutes
  - Cleaned up threads during exit
  - Left process shell behind

#### 3. Browser Crash (Normal)

- Edge encountered error and crashed
  - Abnormal termination left 0 threads
  - Windows cleanup process ongoing
  - Memory dump timing caught transition

#### ▼ 4. cmd.exe

Artifact	Description	Path/Hash		
cmd.exe	- <b>ZERO Threads</b> [highly suspicious for a terminal] running for <b>9:04 mins</b> .	0xc20c6e495080		

10024	804	svchost.exe	0×c20c6ddb1580			False 2018-08-01 19:30:26.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
9408	1768	taskhostw.exe	0×c20c6a97b580			False 2018-08-01 19:36:00.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
6552	924	MicrosoftEdge.	0×c20c6debd400			False 2018-08-01 19:36:12.000000 UTC 2018-08-01 19:40:09.000000 UTC Disabled
3884	4824	cmd.exe 0×c20c6	6d86b080 1		False	2018-08-01 19:37:47.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
9912	3884	conhost.exe	0×c20c6cec3080			False 2018-08-01 19:37:47.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
8868	4824	cmd.exe 0×c20c6	5e495080 0			2018-08-01 19:40:14.000000 UTC 2018-08-01 19:49:18.000000 UTC Disabled
7136	804	svchost.exe	0×c20c6e0ea580	-	0	False 2018-08-01 19:43:01.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
6884	924	dllhost.exe	0×c20c6d561080			False 2018-08-01 19:43:12.000000 UTC N/A Disabled
3224	804	svchost.exe	0×c20c6b585580		0	False 2018-08-01 19:43:30.000000 UTC N/A Disabled

#### 9-Minute Runtime Impossibility:

Active for 9 minutes: Someone was using it

Zero threads: Process can't function without threads

Still responsive: Had to be processing commands

Clean termination: Got proper exit time

#### **Most Likely Scenarios:**

## 1. Process Hollowing (High Probability)

Malware created legitimate cmd.exe process

- Suspended original cmd.exe threads
- Injected malicious code using different threading
- Ran malware for 9 minutes disguised as cmd.exe
- Cleaned up all original threads during exit

#### 2. Command Injection Attack

Attacker gained cmd.exe access

- Used it to run malicious commands
- Advanced malware manipulated thread visibility
- Anti-forensics technique to hide activity

#### 3. Rootkit Thread Hiding

cmd.exe was actively used by attacker

- Rootkit hid real thread count from system
- Process appeared "inactive" while running malicious commands
- Sophisticated evasion technique

## **▼** Timeline Correlation

19:49:18 - cmd.exe ends (9-minute session)

19:49:19 - svchost.exe starts (0 seconds runtime)

19:49:21 - svchost.exe starts (1 second runtime)

19:50:30 - Bubbles.scr #(screensaver?)

19:52:16-20 - Multiple svchost.exe.ex processes

19:52:29-31 - MORE scvhost.exe.ex processes

19:56:45 - Main 'scvhost.exe' starts #(THE BIG ONE - 5 days!)