

# Stress Testing and Reliability Validation of Process Monitoring Module

This section documents stress testing and reliability evaluation performed on the Windows process monitoring module to assess its stability, correctness, and operational resilience under realistic and adversarial conditions.

## ▼ Test 1: Single Process Creation

### **Description:**

Multiple applications and desktop apps were launched as a basic prerequisite to test the operational feasibility of the script.

#### Executing:

```
brave.exe  
notion.exe  
virtualbox.exe
```

### **Expected Behavior:**

The monitoring agent should capture all process creation events i.e. applications as and when launched without missing entries, crashing, or blocking execution.

### **Result:**

```
process_monitor.py { } process_events.jsonl
```

```
antiHOR > agent > { } process_events.jsonl
```

```
947 {  
955   "risk_hint": null,  
956   "event_type": "process_create"  
957 }  
958 {  
959   "timestamp": "2026-01-20T23:53:59.460900",  
960   "process_name": "Notion.exe",  
961   "pid": 11176,  
962   "parent_pid": 1996,  
963   "command_line": "\"C:\\Users\\DELL\\AppData\\Local\\Programs\\Notion\\Notion.exe\" ",  
964   "username": "JYNX-DESKTOP\\DELL",  
965   "executable_path": "C:\\Users\\DELL\\AppData\\Local\\Programs\\Notion\\Notion.exe",  
966   "risk_hint": null,  
967   "event_type": "process_create"  
968 }  
969 {  
970   "timestamp": "2026-01-20T23:54:00.670570",  
971   "process_name": "Notion.exe",  
972   "pid": 13272,  
973   "parent_pid": 11176,  
974   "command_line": "\"C:\\Users\\DELL\\AppData\\Local\\Programs\\Notion\\Notion.exe\" --type=gpu-process  
--user-data-dir=\"C:\\Users\\DELL\\AppData\\Roaming\\Notion\"  
--gpu-preferences=SAIAAAAAAAAAAAGAAAAAAAGAAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAIAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAAAAAAAAABAAAAAAA  
AACAAAAAAATAAAAAAAAA== --field-trial-handle=1784,i,7488736261092223666,9609949946278250203,262144  
--enable-features=DocumentPolicyIncludeJSCallStacksInCrashReports,EnableTransparentHwndEnlargement,  
PdfUseShowSaveFilePicker --disable-features=LocalNetworkAccessChecks,MacCatapLoopbackAudioForScreenShare,  
ScreenAIOCREnabled,SpareRendererForSitePerProcess,TraceSiteInstanceGetProcessCreation --variations-seed-version  
--trace-process-track-uuid=3190708988185955192 --mojo-platform-channel-handle=1768 /prefetch:2",  
975   "username": "JYNX-DESKTOP\\DELL",  
976   "executable_path": "C:\\Users\\DELL\\AppData\\Local\\Programs\\Notion\\Notion.exe",  
977   "risk_hint": null,  
978   "event_type": "process_create"
```

```

process_monitor.py  {} process_events.jsonl  X
antiH0R > agent > {} process_events.jsonl
991 {
992   "timestamp": "2026-01-20T23:54:04.151197",
993   "process_name": "VirtualBox.exe",
994   "pid": 22336,
995   "parent_pid": 1996,
996   "command_line": "\\\"C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Oracle\\\\VirtualBox\\\\VirtualBox.exe\\\" ",
997   "username": "JYNX-DESKTOP\\\\DELL",
998   "executable_path": "",
999   "risk_hint": null,
1000   "event_type": "process_create"
1001 }
1002 {
1003   "timestamp": "2026-01-20T23:54:06.512850",
1004   "process_name": "VBoxSVC.exe",
1005   "pid": 5836,
1006   "parent_pid": 1256,
1007   "command_line": "\\\"C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Oracle\\\\VirtualBox\\\\VBoxSVC.exe\\\" -Embedding",
1008   "username": "JYNX-DESKTOP\\\\DELL",
1009   "executable_path": "",
1010   "risk_hint": null,
1011   "event_type": "process_create"
1012 }
1013 {
1014   "timestamp": "2026-01-20T23:54:07.668695",
1015   "process_name": "VBoxSDS.exe",
1016   "pid": 17664,
1017   "parent_pid": 1080,
1018   "command_line": "\\\"C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Oracle\\\\VirtualBox\\\\VBoxSDS.exe\\\" ",
1019   "username": "NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM",
1020   "executable_path": "C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Oracle\\\\VirtualBox\\\\VBoxSDS.exe",
1021   "risk_hint": null,
1022   "event_type": "process_create"
1023 }

```

```
process_monitor.py process_events.jsonl X
antiH0R > agent > {} process_events.jsonl
3369 {
3370   "timestamp": "2026-01-21T00:31:49.451858",
3371   "process_name": "brave.exe",
3372   "pid": 17016,
3373   "parent_pid": 12676,
3374   "command_line": "\"C:\\Program Files\\BraveSoftware\\Brave-Browser\\Application\\brave.exe\" --type=renderer
--enable-distillability-service --origin-trial-public-key=BYUKPJoPnCxeNvu72j4EmPuK7tr1PAC7Shh8ld9Mw3E=,
fMS4mpO6buLQ/QMd+zJmxzty/VQ6B1EUZqoCU04zoRU= --no-pre-read-main-dll --video-capture-use-gpu-memory-buffer
--lang=en-US --device-scale-factor=1.5 --num-raster-threads=4 --enable-main-frame-before-activation
--renderer-client-id=21 --time-ticks-at-unix-epoch=-1768901939130767 --launch-time-ticks=33769249072
--metrics-shmem-handle=952,i,14719174790581775174,2801716546627221822,2097152 --field-trial-handle=2000,i,
5918705375266489752,10185387828210828410,262144
--variations-seed-version=main@0d09901ed302d0ad42cd48c4ada7f75894c045d1
--trace-process-track-uuid=3190709005989750323 --mojo-platform-channel-handle=5588 /prefetch:1",
3375   "username": "JYNX-DESKTOP\\DELL",
3376   "executable_path": "C:\\Program Files\\BraveSoftware\\Brave-Browser\\Application\\brave.exe",
3377   "parent_process_name": "brave.exe",
3378   "parent_command_line": "\"C:\\Program Files\\BraveSoftware\\Brave-Browser\\Application\\brave.exe\" ",
3379   "risk_hint": null,
3380   "event_type": "process_create"
3381 }
3382 {
3383   "timestamp": "2026-01-21T00:31:57.689641",
3384   "process_name": "brave.exe",
3385   "pid": 22008,
3386   "parent_pid": 12676,
3387   "command_line": "\"C:\\Program Files\\BraveSoftware\\Brave-Browser\\Application\\brave.exe\" --type=renderer
--enable-distillability-service --origin-trial-public-key=BYUKPJoPnCxeNvu72j4EmPuK7tr1PAC7Shh8ld9Mw3E=,
fMS4mpO6buLQ/QMd+zJmxzty/VQ6B1EUZqoCU04zoRU= --no-pre-read-main-dll --video-capture-use-gpu-memory-buffer
--lang=en-US --device-scale-factor=1.5 --num-raster-threads=4 --enable-main-frame-before-activation
--renderer-client-id=22 --time-ticks-at-unix-epoch=-1768901939130767 --launch-time-ticks=33777679535
Ln 3370, Col 44 Spaces: 2 UTF-8 CRLF {} JSON Lines Go Live Prettier
```

**Observed Behavior:**

All process creation events were logged correctly.  
No crashes, deadlocks, or delays were observed.

▼ **Test 2: PowerShell Variants**

**Description:**

PowerShell execution patterns were tested,

Executing:

```
powershell -Command "Get-Process | Select-Object -First 5"
```

**Expected Behavior:**

The monitoring agent should reliably capture PowerShell process creation events along with relevant metadata such as parent process, command-line arguments, and execution context.

**Result:**

```
PS C:\Users\DELL> powershell -Command "Get-Process | Select-Object -First 5"

Handles      NPM(K)      PM(K)      WS(K)      CPU(s)      Id      SI ProcessName
-----
242          14         4896      16240           8244      0 AggregatorHost
141          10         1796       4852           4884      0 armsvc
334          13        8104      21892         1.06     21632      0 audiodg
454          20       22088     50656         1.09     10496      5 backgroundTaskHost
336          28       37892     75936         9.27      1424      5 brave

PS C:\Users\DELL> |
```

```
process_monitor.py  process_events.jsonl
antiHOR > agent > {} process_events.jsonl
4916 {
4921   "command_line": "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiprvse.exe",
4922   "username": "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM",
4923   "executable_path": "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiprvse.exe",
4924   "parent_process_name": "svchost.exe",
4925   "parent_command_line": "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p",
4926   "risk_hint": null,
4927   "event_type": "process_create"
4928 }
4929
4930 {
4931   "timestamp": "2026-01-21T00:50:02.887742",
4932   "process_name": "powershell.exe",
4933   "pid": 11684,
4934   "parent_pid": 13812,
4935   "command_line": "\"C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe\" -Command \"Get-Process |",
4936   "Select-Object -First 5\"",
4937   "username": "JYNX-DESKTOP\\DELL",
4938   "executable_path": "C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe",
4939   "parent_process_name": "powershell.exe",
4940   "parent_command_line": "\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe\" ",
4941   "risk_hint": null,
4942   "event_type": "process_create"
4943 }
4944 {
4945   "timestamp": "2026-01-21T00:50:11.048494",
4946   "process_name": "docker.exe",
4947   "pid": 21368,
4948   "parent_pid": 18240,
4949   "command_line": "Unknown",
4950   "username": null,
4951   "executable_path": null,
4952   "parent_process_name": "Code.exe",
4953 }
Ln 4932, Col 16 Spaces: 2 UTF-8 CRLF {} JSON Lines Go Live Prettier
```

**Observed Behavior:**

PowerShell process creation events were logged successfully. Variations in command-line visibility were observed depending on invocation method, but the agent remained stable and continued logging without interruption.

**Rationale:**

*Human-operated ransomware heavily relies on PowerShell for reconnaissance, lateral movement, payload staging, and defense evasion,*

*making robust observation of PowerShell execution patterns essential for early detection.*

---

## ▼ Test 3: Burst Process Creation

### **Description:**

Multiple short-lived processes were spawned in rapid succession using batch scripts and command loops to simulate burst execution scenarios.

### **Expected Behavior:**

The monitoring agent should capture all process creation events without missing entries, crashing, or blocking execution.

### **Action: Creating a script**

```
@echo off
for /L %%i in (1,1,50) do (
    start cmd /c echo %%i
)
```

### **Expected behavior:**

- No crash
- No missed events
- JSON remains valid

### **Result:**

```
Windows PowerShell
PS C:\ANYTHING\DFIS\Semester2\MinorProject\SourceCode\antiHOR\agent> dir

Directory: C:\ANYTHING\DFIS\Semester2\MinorProject\SourceCode\antiHOR\agent

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
-a----             19-Jan-26  11:55 AM              0 event_schema.py
-a----             21-Jan-26  12:53 AM          329250 process_events.jsonl
-a----             21-Jan-26  12:42 AM          13024 process_monitor.py
-a----             20-Jan-26  11:42 PM              68 stress.cmd

PS C:\ANYTHING\DFIS\Semester2\MinorProject\SourceCode\antiHOR\agent> .\stress.cmd
PS C:\ANYTHING\DFIS\Semester2\MinorProject\SourceCode\antiHOR\agent> |
```

```
process_monitor.py  process_events.jsonl
antiHOR > agent > {} process_events.jsonl
7438 {
7439 }
7450 }
7451 {
7452   "timestamp": "2026-01-21T00:54:13.852480",
7453   "process_name": "OpenConsole.exe",
7454   "pid": 20664,
7455   "parent_pid": 1256,
7456   "command_line": "\"C:\\Program Files\\WindowsApps\\Microsoft.WindowsTerminal_1.23.13503.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe\\OpenConsole.exe\" -Embedding",
7457   "username": null,
7458   "executable_path": "C:\\Program Files\\WindowsApps\\Microsoft.WindowsTerminal_1.23.13503.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe\\OpenConsole.exe",
7459   "parent_process_name": "svchost.exe",
7460   "parent_command_line": "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p",
7461   "risk_hint": null,
7462   "event_type": "process_create"
7463 }
7464 {
7465   "timestamp": "2026-01-21T00:54:14.062467",
7466   "process_name": "OpenConsole.exe",
7467   "pid": 21180,
7468   "parent_pid": 1256,
7469   "command_line": "\"C:\\Program Files\\WindowsApps\\Microsoft.WindowsTerminal_1.23.13503.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe\\OpenConsole.exe\" -Embedding",
7470   "username": null,
7471   "executable_path": "C:\\Program Files\\WindowsApps\\Microsoft.WindowsTerminal_1.23.13503.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe\\OpenConsole.exe",
7472   "parent_process_name": "svchost.exe",
7473   "parent_command_line": "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p",
7474   "risk_hint": null,
7475   "event_type": "process_create"
7476 }
```

**Observed Behavior:**

All process creation events were logged correctly.  
No crashes, deadlocks, or delays were observed.

**Rationale:**

*Human-operated ransomware frequently deploys tools in bursts during initial access, lateral movement, and staging phases, making burst process creation a realistic adversarial pattern.*

## ▼ Test 4: Sustained Activity

### Description:

The monitoring agent was allowed to run continuously for an extended period while normal user activity occurred in the background.

Leaving the agent running for 30–60 mins while:

- Browsing
- Using VS Code
- Open/close apps


### Expected Behavior:

The agent should remain stable, consume predictable resources, and continue logging events reliably.

### Result:

```
PS C:\ANYTHING\DFIS\Semester2\MinorProject\SourceCode\antiHOR\agent> python temp.py
=====
Windows Process Monitor v1.1
=====
✓ PRIVILEGE STATUS: Running with ADMINISTRATOR privileges
  → Full process telemetry available
=====
Log file: process_events.jsonl
Auto-reconnect: Enabled
Short-lived processes: CAPTURED (cmd /c echo, PowerShell, etc.)
Press Ctrl+C to stop monitoring
=====

2026-01-21 00:18:59,376 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Starting Windows process monitor...
2026-01-21 00:18:59,376 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logging events to: C:\ANYTHING\DFIS\Semester2\MinorProject\SourceCode\antiHOR\agent
\process_events.jsonl
2026-01-21 00:18:59,610 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Monitor active. Capturing ALL processes including short-lived commands.
2026-01-21 00:18:59,611 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Press Ctrl+C to stop.
2026-01-21 00:19:08,366 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: smartscreen.exe (PID: 11484, User: JYNX-DESKTOP\DELL)
2026-01-21 00:19:08,656 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: VBoxSDS.exe (PID: 12992, User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM)
2026-01-21 00:19:08,958 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: VBoxSVC.exe (PID: 20620, User: JYNX-DESKTOP\DELL)
2026-01-21 00:19:09,259 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: VirtualBox.exe (PID: 22468, User: JYNX-DESKTOP\DELL)
2026-01-21 00:19:09,577 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: svchost.exe (PID: 1520, User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM)
2026-01-21 00:19:17,845 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: docker.exe (PID: 11272, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:19:18,080 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: conhost.exe (PID: 13472, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:19:35,702 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: docker.exe (PID: 10544, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:19:35,893 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: conhost.exe (PID: 13648, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:19:38,100 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: conhost.exe (PID: 18288, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:19:38,384 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: docker.exe (PID: 20640, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:19:45,240 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: WhatsApp.Root.exe (PID: 1544, User: JYNX-DESKTOP\DELL)
2026-01-21 00:19:48,959 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: WmiPrvSE.exe (PID: 12276, User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM)
2026-01-21 00:19:49,336 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: svchost.exe (PID: 12580, User: NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE)
2026-01-21 00:19:51,276 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: WmiPrvSE.exe (PID: 19252, User: NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE)
2026-01-21 00:19:51,637 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: svchost.exe (PID: 9068, User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM)
2026-01-21 00:19:58,442 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: docker.exe (PID: 22072, User: None)
```



### Observed Behavior:

The agent remained stable with consistent logging behavior and no memory leaks or performance degradation.

### Rationale:

*Human-operated ransomware campaigns can persist for days or weeks; long-lived defensive agents must remain reliable throughout prolonged dwell times.*

## ▼ Test 5: WMI Failure Simulation

### Description:

Simulated failure scenarios were introduced where WMI queries intermittently failed or returned incomplete results.

Manually stopping WMI service (briefly):

```
net stop winmgmt
```

Then restart:



```
net start winmgmt
```

## Expected Behavior:

The agent should handle exceptions cleanly and continue monitoring without crashing.

- Agent does NOT crash
- Logs error
- Recovers automatically

## Result:

```
C:\Windows\System32>net stop winmgmt
The Windows Management Instrumentation service is stopping.
The Windows Management Instrumentation service was stopped successfully.

C:\Windows\System32>net start winmgmt
The requested service has already been started.

More help is available by typing NET HELPMSG 2182.

C:\Windows\System32>
```

```
2026-01-21 00:57:59,210 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: docker.exe (PID: 4484, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:58:28,182 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: conhost.exe (PID: 20672, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:58:28,429 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: docker.exe (PID: 3672, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:58:30,516 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: docker.exe (PID: 14800, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:58:30,721 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: conhost.exe (PID: 21764, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:58:32,889 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: conhost.exe (PID: 21360, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:58:35,209 - ProcessMonitor - ERROR - WMI error: <x_wmi: Unexpected COM Error (-2147352567, 'Exception occurred.', (0, '
SWbemEventSource', 'Call cancelled ', None, 0, -2147217358), None)>
2026-01-21 00:58:35,210 - ProcessMonitor - WARNING - WMI connection lost. Reconnecting in 5 seconds...
2026-01-21 00:58:40,211 - ProcessMonitor - WARNING - Attempting to reconnect to WMI...
2026-01-21 00:58:45,737 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Monitor active. Capturing ALL processes including short-lived commands.
2026-01-21 00:58:45,737 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Press Ctrl+C to stop.
2026-01-21 00:58:48,334 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: SnippingTool.exe (PID: 21940, User: JYNX-DESKTOP\DELL)
2026-01-21 00:58:50,691 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: docker.exe (PID: 20020, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:58:50,903 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: conhost.exe (PID: 21056, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:58:52,970 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: conhost.exe (PID: 18044, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:58:53,226 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: docker.exe (PID: 7784, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:59:01,129 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: SnippingTool.exe (PID: 20448, User: JYNX-DESKTOP\DELL)
2026-01-21 00:59:08,167 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: SnippingTool.exe (PID: 19480, User: JYNX-DESKTOP\DELL)
2026-01-21 00:59:19,876 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: docker.exe (PID: 6892, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:59:22,158 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: conhost.exe (PID: 20188, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:59:22,379 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: docker.exe (PID: 2568, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:59:24,515 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: conhost.exe (PID: 13080, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:59:24,767 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: docker.exe (PID: 8100, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:59:32,741 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: WhatsApp.Root.exe (PID: 18160, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:59:34,020 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: msedgewebview2.exe (PID: 19744, User: JYNX-DESKTOP\DELL)
2026-01-21 00:59:35,239 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: msedgewebview2.exe (PID: 12872, User: JYNX-DESKTOP\DELL)
2026-01-21 00:59:44,581 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: docker.exe (PID: 12128, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:59:46,838 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: docker.exe (PID: 10648, User: None)
```

**Observed Behavior:**

WMI failures were logged, and monitoring resumed automatically without manual intervention.

**Rationale:**

*WMI instability is common in compromised or heavily loaded systems, especially during attacker activity; resilience to telemetry degradation is critical.*

## ▼ Test 6: Permission Degradation

**Description:**

The process monitor was executed under non-administrative privileges to evaluate behavior under restricted access conditions.

Running the agent:

- Once as admin
- Once as standard user

**Expected Behavior:**

The agent should continue functioning gracefully, logging available data while handling permission errors without crashing.

- Reduced fields when non-admin
- No crashes
- Clear logs

**Result:**

```

PS C:\ANYTHING\DFIS\Semester2\MinorProject\SourceCode\antiHOR\agent> python temp.py
=====
Windows Process Monitor v1.1
=====
✓ PRIVILEGE STATUS: Running with ADMINISTRATOR privileges
  → Full process telemetry available
=====
Log file: process_events.jsonl
Auto-reconnect: Enabled
Short-lived processes: CAPTURED (cmd /c echo, PowerShell, etc.)
Press Ctrl+C to stop monitoring
=====

2026-01-21 00:18:59,376 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Starting Windows process monitor...
2026-01-21 00:18:59,376 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logging events to: C:\ANYTHING\DFIS\Semester2\MinorProject\SourceCode\antiHOR\agent\process_events.jsonl
2026-01-21 00:18:59,610 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Monitor active. Capturing ALL processes including short-lived commands.
2026-01-21 00:18:59,611 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Press Ctrl+C to stop.
2026-01-21 00:19:08,366 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: smartscreen.exe (PID: 11484, User: JYNX-DESKTOP\DELL)
2026-01-21 00:19:08,656 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: VBoxSDS.exe (PID: 12992, User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM)
2026-01-21 00:19:08,958 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: VBoxSVC.exe (PID: 20620, User: JYNX-DESKTOP\DELL)
2026-01-21 00:19:09,259 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: VirtualBox.exe (PID: 22468, User: JYNX-DESKTOP\DELL)
2026-01-21 00:19:09,577 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: svchost.exe (PID: 1520, User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM)
2026-01-21 00:19:17,845 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: docker.exe (PID: 11272, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:19:18,080 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: conhost.exe (PID: 13472, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:19:35,702 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: docker.exe (PID: 10544, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:19:35,893 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: conhost.exe (PID: 13648, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:19:38,100 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: conhost.exe (PID: 18288, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:19:38,384 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: docker.exe (PID: 20640, User: None)
2026-01-21 00:19:45,240 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: WhatsApp.Root.exe (PID: 1544, User: JYNX-DESKTOP\DELL)
2026-01-21 00:19:48,959 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: WmiPrvSE.exe (PID: 12276, User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM)
2026-01-21 00:19:49,336 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: svchost.exe (PID: 12580, User: NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE)
2026-01-21 00:19:51,276 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: WmiPrvSE.exe (PID: 19252, User: NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE)
2026-01-21 00:19:51,637 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: svchost.exe (PID: 9068, User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM)
2026-01-21 00:19:58,442 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: docker.exe (PID: 22072, User: None)


```

```

Command Prompt - python { }  +  -
C:\ANYTHING\DFIS\Semester2\MinorProject\SourceCode\antiHOR\agent>python process_monitor.py
=====
Windows Process Monitor v1.1
=====
X PRIVILEGE STATUS: Running WITHOUT administrator privileges
  → Limited telemetry (some processes may be inaccessible)
  → Recommendation: Run as Administrator for complete monitoring
=====
Log file: process_events.jsonl
Auto-reconnect: Enabled
Short-lived processes: CAPTURED (cmd /c echo, PowerShell, etc.)
Press Ctrl+C to stop monitoring
=====

2026-01-21 01:02:24,188 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Starting Windows process monitor...
2026-01-21 01:02:24,189 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logging events to: C:\ANYTHING\DFIS\Semester2\MinorProject\SourceCode\antiHOR\agent\process_events.jsonl
2026-01-21 01:02:24,362 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Monitor active. Capturing ALL processes including short-lived commands.
2026-01-21 01:02:24,363 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Press Ctrl+C to stop.
2026-01-21 01:02:33,778 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: WhatsApp.Root.exe (PID: 10564, User: JYNX-DESKTOP\DELL)
2026-01-21 01:02:36,104 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: msedgewebview2.exe (PID: 19004, User: JYNX-DESKTOP\DELL)
2026-01-21 01:02:40,791 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: WMIADAP.exe (PID: 14092, User: None)
2026-01-21 01:02:49,975 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: autopsy64.exe (PID: 13788, User: JYNX-DESKTOP\DELL)
2026-01-21 01:02:50,129 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: backgroundTaskHost.exe (PID: 13860, User: None)
2026-01-21 01:02:56,838 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: cmd.exe (PID: 20360, User: JYNX-DESKTOP\DELL)
2026-01-21 01:02:57,173 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: RuntimeBroker.exe (PID: 7612, User: JYNX-DESKTOP\DELL)
2026-01-21 01:02:58,036 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: conhost.exe (PID: 1036, User: None)
2026-01-21 01:02:58,421 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: docker.exe (PID: 15448, User: None)
2026-01-21 01:02:58,659 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: java.exe (PID: 22244, User: None)
2026-01-21 01:02:59,039 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: conhost.exe (PID: 7064, User: JYNX-DESKTOP\DELL)
2026-01-21 01:02:59,553 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: java.exe (PID: 22088, User: JYNX-DESKTOP\DELL)
2026-01-21 01:02:59,919 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: java.exe (PID: 22164, User: JYNX-DESKTOP\DELL)
2026-01-21 01:03:00,546 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: conhost.exe (PID: 17168, User: JYNX-DESKTOP\DELL)
2026-01-21 01:03:00,988 - ProcessMonitor - INFO - Logged process: docker.exe (PID: 21020, User: None)

```



```
process_monitor.py | process_events.jsonl X
antiH0R > agent > {} process_events.jsonl
8800 {
8801   "event_type": "process_create",
8802 }
8803 {
8804   "timestamp": "2026-01-21T01:02:40.790975",
8805   "process_name": "WMIADAP.exe",
8806   "pid": 14092,
8807   "parent_pid": 11436,
8808   "command_line": "Unknown",
8809   "username": null,
8810   "executable_path": null,
8811   "parent_process_name": "svchost.exe",
8812   "parent_command_line": null,
8813   "risk_hint": null,
8814   "event_type": "process_create"
8815 }
8816 {
8817   "timestamp": "2026-01-21T01:02:49.974200",
8818   "process_name": "autopsy64.exe",
8819   "pid": 13788,
8820   "parent_pid": 1996,
8821   "command_line": "\"C:\\Program Files\\Autopsy-4.22.1\\bin\\autopsy64.exe\" ",
8822   "username": "JYNX-DESKTOP\\DELL",
8823   "executable_path": "C:\\Program Files\\Autopsy-4.22.1\\bin\\autopsy64.exe",
8824   "parent_process_name": "explorer.exe",
8825   "parent_command_line": "C:\\WINDOWS\\Explorer.EXE",
8826   "risk_hint": null,
8827   "event_type": "process_create"
8828 }
8829 {
8830   "timestamp": "2026-01-21T01:02:50.128777",
8831   "process_name": "backgroundTaskHost.exe",
8832   "pid": 13800,
8833   "parent_pid": 1996,
8834   "command_line": "C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\backgroundTaskHost.exe",
8835   "username": "JYNX-DESKTOP\\DELL",
8836   "executable_path": "C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\backgroundTaskHost.exe",
8837   "parent_process_name": "explorer.exe",
8838   "parent_command_line": "C:\\WINDOWS\\Explorer.EXE",
8839   "risk_hint": null,
8840   "event_type": "process_create"
8841 }
8842 }
```

### Observed Behavior:

Some metadata fields (e.g., system-level processes, executable paths) were unavailable, but monitoring continued without failure.

### Rationale:

*Attackers may intentionally degrade system visibility or operate in restricted environments; defensive tooling must fail gracefully rather than terminate.*

## ▼ Test 7: Log Corruption Test

### Description:

The event log file was manually modified, truncated, and temporarily locked during runtime to test logging robustness.

While the agent is running:

- Open `process_events.jsonl`
- Force-write junk
- Save


### Expected Behavior:

The agent should either continue appending safely or recover without data corruption.

Agent continues logging

- Does not crash
- Appends clean JSON

## Result:



```
process_monitor.py process_events.jsonl X
antiHOR > agent > {} process_events.jsonl
9557 {
9558   --mojo-platform-channel-handle=3832 /prefetch:14",
9559   "risk_hint": null,
9560   "event_type": "process_create"
9570 }
Adipiscing quam eros amet sem nec praesent magna adipiscing consectetur faucibus quis ante. Libero condimentum
eget quam gravida faucibus vitae tortor sit tincidunt orci amet. Scelerisque a lorem semper sagittis ac odio
sapien. Sed maecenas nam sit luctus libero maecenas magna ut pellentesque quam laoreet quam sit. Quis bibendum
sodales sem nunc libero ut amet sodales sit nunc libero auctor sodales luctus. Feugiat rutrum etiam ut ipsum
laoreet tincidunt dolor vel. Augue quis justo ut etiam pulvinar etiam scelerisque ligula.
9571
9572 Diam nunc ut luctus hendrerit amet sapien amet dictum ante magna vulputate amet. Sapien sapien blandit vitae
donec sem in sed quam tortor etiam tempus. Rhoncus vestibulum vel et vitae neque tellus condimentum scelerisque
a luctus nunc vestibulum. Ut libero mi nullam bibendum leo donec ante nibh amet faucibus. Neque sed adipiscing
consectetur id nullam pulvinar semper fusce cursus etiam velit lorem vel. Sit adipiscing semper blandit dictum
nec ipsum et vitae quis eleifend tempus dictum.
9573
9574 Sit rhoncus nunc vulputate libero libero diam ante. Vestibulum vestibulum etiam amet sem sapien adipiscing quam
praesent rhoncus consequat et sem. Dictum nibh ut mi justo justo adipiscing elit nunc quam. Duis libero
praesent semper nunc fusce maecenas quam gravida pulvinar. Elit tellus quis ante eget sed sem sem etiam integer
venenatis donec. Vitae vitae lorem rhoncus duis amet donec nunc rutrum sed. Purus ac tincidunt pellentesque
sapien eget et quam rhoncus purus neque orci quam.
9575   "timestamp": "2026-01-21T01:18:15.998335",
9576   "process_name": "docker.exe",
9577   "pid": 12692,
9578   "parent_pid": 18240,
9579   "command_line": "",
9580   "username": null,
9581   "executable_path": null,
9582   "parent_process_name": "Code.exe",
9583   "parent_command_line": "\"C:\\Users\\DELL\\AppData\\Local\\Programs\\Microsoft VS Code\\Code.exe\"
--utility --utility-sub-typename=mojo.NodaService --language=JS --service-cmdhoy-typename=
```

## Observed Behavior:

The agent continued operation without crashing, and subsequent events were logged correctly.

## Rationale:

*Human-operated ransomware frequently targets logs to erase traces; defensive telemetry systems must tolerate partial log tampering.*

## ▼ Test 8: Disk Stress

### Description:

High-volume disk write activity was generated concurrently with process monitoring to simulate heavy I/O conditions, including large file creation, modification, and deletion operations.

Let logs grow:


- 8k+ Events

### Expected Behavior:

The monitoring agent should continue capturing process events accurately without performance degradation, crashes, or log corruption despite increased disk I/O pressure.

- No slowdown
- No blocking
- No memory growth

### Result:



```
process_monitor.py  process_events.jsonl
antiH0R > agent > {} process_events.jsonl
9557 {
9558   "pid": 4468,
9559   "parent_pid": 18240,
9560   "command_line": "Unknown",
9561   "username": null,
9562   "executable_path": null,
9563   "parent_process_name": "Code.exe",
9564   "parent_command_line": "\"C:\\Users\\DELL\\AppData\\Local\\Programs\\Microsoft VS Code\\Code.exe\"
--type=utility --utility-sub-type=node.mojom.NodeService --lang=en-US --service-sandbox-type=none
--dns-result-order=ipv4first --experimental-network-inspection --inspect-port=0
--video-capture-use-gpu-memory-buffer --user-data-dir=\"C:\\Users\\DELL\\AppData\\Roaming\\Code\\\"
--standard-schemes=vscode-webview,vscode-file --enable-sandbox --secure-schemes=vscode-webview,vscode-file
--cors-schemes=vscode-webview,vscode-file --fetch-schemes=vscode-webview,vscode-file
--service-worker-schemes=vscode-webview --code-cache-schemes=vscode-webview,vscode-file
--field-trial-handle=1800,i,358184913532271926,18389977591774368564,262144
--enable-features=DocumentPolicyIncludeJSCallStacksInCrashReports,EarlyEstablishGpuChannel,
EnableTransparentHwndEnlargement,EstablishGpuChannelAsync --disable-features=CalculateNativeWinOcclusion,
LocalNetworkAccessChecks,ScreenAIOCREnabled,SpareRendererForSitePerProcess,TraceSiteInstanceGetProcessCreation
--variations-seed-version --trace-process-track-uuid=3190708894745248135 --mojo-platform-channel-handle=3832 /
prefetch:14",
9565   "risk_hint": null,
9566   "event_type": "process_create"
9567 }
9570
```

### Observed Behavior:

The agent maintained stable operation, continued logging process creation events correctly, and exhibited no observable impact from concurrent disk stress.

### **Rationale:**

*Ransomware encryption phases generate intense disk write activity; defensive agents must remain operational during such conditions to capture late-stage attacker behaviors and preserve forensic evidence.*

### **Quantitative Observation:**

During burst testing, the agent reliably handled **dozens of process creation events per second** without observable delays or missed entries, indicating suitability for real-world operational workloads.

### **Out of Scope for This Phase:**

The following aspects are intentionally excluded from this phase of testing and development:

- Kernel-level process injection and rootkit activity
- Command-level tracing within interactive shells (e.g., `cmd.exe`, PowerShell)
- Memory-only or fileless execution techniques
- Correlation with ETW, Sysmon, or EDR telemetry

These areas are identified as **future expansion points** rather than limitations.

### **Summary**

The stress testing demonstrates that the process monitoring module is operationally stable, resilient under adverse conditions, and suitable as a foundational telemetry layer for higher-level behavioral detection of human-operated ransomware.

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