

Malware Analysis Report

WannaCry Malware



Basic Static Analysis

md5sum 24D004A104D4D54034DBCFFC2A4B19A11F39008A5 -md5sum.exe hash 75AA614EA04703480B1022C -md5sum.exe

Strings - Extracted using Floss

floss -n 6 Ransomware.wannacry.exe.malz > floss.txt

```
59 MSVCP60.dll
60 GetPerAdapterInfo
61 GetAdaptersInfo
62 iphlpapi.dll
63 InternetCloseHandle
64 InternetOpenUrlA
65 InternetOpenA
66 WININET.dll
```

Fig 1: Modules used to open a URL

```
USERID PLACEHOLDER
userid
treeid
  TREEPATH REPLACE
\\%s\IPC$
Microsoft Base Cryptographic Provider v1.0
%d.%d.%d.%d
mssecsvc2.0
Microsoft Security Center (2.0) Service
%s -m security
C:\%s\qeriuwjhrf
C:\%s\%s
WINDOWS
tasksche.exe
CloseHandle
WriteFile
CreateFileA
CreateProcessA
http://www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com
!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.
.rdata
```

Fig 2: Service names used, Kill Switch URL and random paths



Fig 3: Service names used, random paths icacls used for modifying access controls on files attrib +h . used to hide the file attribute



PEStudio

property	value
md5	DB349B97C37D22F5EA1D1841E3C89EB4
sha1	E889544AFF85FFAF8B0D0DA705105DEE7C97FE26
sha256	24D004A104D4D54034DBCFFC2A4B19A11F39008A575AA614EA04703480B1022C
first-bytes-hex	4D 5A 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 06 FF FF 00 00 B8 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00
first-bytes-text	MZ
file-size	3723264 bytes
entropy	7.964
imphash	n/a
signature	Microsoft Visual C++ v5.0/v6.0 (MFC)
tooling	wait
entry-point	55 8B EC 6A FF 68 A0 A1 40 00 68 A2 9B 40 00 64 A1 00 00 00 50 64 89 25 00 00 00 00 83 EC 68 53
file-version	6.1.7601.17514 (win7sp1_rtm.101119-1850)
description	Microsoft® Disk Defragmenter
file-type	<u>executable</u>
cpu	<u>32-bit</u>
subsystem	<u>GUI</u>
compiler-stamp	Sat Nov 20 09:03:08 2010 UTC
debugger-stamp	n/a
resources-stamp	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 UTC
import-stamp	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 UTC
exports-stamp	n/a

Fig 4: Basic Information about the executable



Basic Dynamic Analysis

Analysis with inetsim turned on

When the malware is executed with inetsim turned on, the malware does not execute. It tries to connect to "hxxp://www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com". On successful connection it does not infect the system.




Fig 5: Network traffic when malware is executed



Analysis with inetsim turned off




Fig 6: Network traffic when malware is executed. The requests are unreachable because inetsim is turned off

10:26:	4784 CreateFileMappC:\Windows\SysWOW64\cryptsp.dll	SUCCESS SyncType: SyncTy
10:26: 📧 Ransomware.w	4784 TreateFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rsaenh.dll	SUCCESS Desired Access: R
10:26: 📧 Ransomware.w	4784 CreateFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rsaenh.dll	SUCCESS Desired Access: R
10:26: 📧 Ransomware.w	4784 TreateFileMappC:\Windows\SysWOW64\rsaenh.dll	FILE LOCKED WI SyncType: SyncTy
10:26: 📧 Ransomware.w	4784 CreateFileMapp C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rsaenh.dll	SUCCESS SyncType: SyncTy
10:26: 📧 Ransomware.w	124 TreateFile C:\Windows\tasksche.exe	SUCCESS Desired Access: R
10:26: 📧 Ransomware.w	1248 🐂 CreateFile C:\Windows\tasksche.exe	SUCCESS Desired Access: R
10:26: 📧 Ransomware.w	1248 📷 CreateFile C:\Windows\tasksche.exe	SUCCESS Desired Access: R
10:26: 📧 Ransomware.w	1248 🐂 CreateFileMappC:\Windows\tasksche.exe	SUCCESS SyncType: SyncTy
10:26: • Ransomware.w	1248 📷 CreateFileMappC:\Windows\tasksche.exe	FILE LOCKED WI SyncType: SyncTy
10:26: 📧 Ransomware.w	1248 🐂 CreateFileMappC:\Windows\tasksche.exe	SUCCESS SyncType: SyncTy
10:26: 📧 Ransomware.w	1248 CreateHie C:\Windows\apppatch\sysmain.sdb	SUCCESS Desired Access: G
10:26: 📧 Ransomware.w	1248 CreateFile C:\Windows\apppatch\sysmain.sdb	SUCCESS Desired Access: G
10:26: Ransomware w	1248 CreateFileMappC:\Windows\apppatch\svsmain.sdb	FILE LOCKED WI SyncType: SyncTy

Fig 7: Procmon analysis. Creation of tasksche.exe file

TU.Zo IIII taskscrie.exe	420 III Closerile	C. \FrogramData \Xubrugcizub \taskscrie	3000533	
10:26: ■ tasksche.exe	3428 🖒 Load Image	C:\ProgramData\xdbrugci209\tasksche	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x400
10:26: ■ tasksche.exe	3428 🧱 CreateFile	C:\ProgramData\xdbrugci209	SUCCESS	Desired Access: E
10:26: ■ tasksche.exe	3428 🥁 CreateFile	C:\ProgramData\xdbrugci209	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R
10:26: ■ tasksche.exe	3428 🙀 Query Basic Infor.	C:\ProgramData\xdbrugci209	SUCCESS	Creation Time: 9/25
10:26: ■ tasksche.exe	3428 🥁 CloseFile	C:\ProgramData\xdbrugci209	SUCCESS	
10:26: ■ tasksche.exe	3428 🥁 CreateFile	C:\ProgramData\xdbrugci209\b.wnry	SUCCESS	Desired Access: G
10.00	2420 - Wa El	CAB DAA H :200/I	CHCCECC	011 1 1 1

Fig 8: Wannacry creates tasksche.exe and executes it. Tasksche.exe creates a file with a random name in C:\ProgramData\{random name}. This folder is a staging area for wannacry ransomware






Fig 9: Procmon process tree

C:\Pr	ogramData\xdbrugci209			
ata ^	Name	Date modified	Туре	Size
on	msg	9/25/2022 9:47 PM	File folder	
	@Please_Read_Me@.txt	9/25/2022 9:47 PM	Text Document	1 KB
y	₩ @WanaDecryptor@.exe	5/12/2017 2:22 AM	Application	240 KB
	🌠 @WanaDecryptor@.exe	9/25/2022 9:48 PM	Shortcut	1 KB
ts	00000000.eky	9/25/2022 9:47 PM	EKY File	0 KB
	🗋 00000000.pky	9/25/2022 9:47 PM	PKY File	1 KB
	00000000.res	9/25/2022 10:00 PM	RES File	1 KB
	b.wnry	5/11/2017 8:13 PM	WNRY File	1,407 KB
V	c.wnry	9/25/2022 9:47 PM	WNRY File	1 KB
	f.wnry	9/25/2022 10:01 PM	WNRY File	1 KB
Ca	r.wnry	5/11/2017 3:59 PM	WNRY File	1 KB
	s.wnry	5/9/2017 4:58 PM	WNRY File	2,968 KB
-(t.wnry	5/12/2017 2:22 AM	WNRY File	65 KB
	■ taskdl.exe	5/12/2017 2:22 AM	Application	20 KB
	tasksche.exe	9/25/2022 9:47 PM	Application	3,432 KB
)is	■ taskse.exe	5/12/2017 2:22 AM	Application	20 KB
	u.wnry	5/12/2017 2:22 AM	WNRY File	240 KB

Fig 10: C:\ProgramData\{random name} folder which is staging area for wannacry





Fig 11: Task Manager. Service name is same as the random file name created by tasksche.exe




Fig 12: Service. Service name is same as the random file name created by tasksche.exe. This service just invokes the tasksche.exe command on startup.





Fig 13: After Infection. Ransom message



Advanced Static Analysis

Cutter

```
[0x00408140]
139: int main (int argc, char **argv, char **envp);
; var int32_t var_14h @ esp+0x28
    ; var int32_t var_8h @ esp+0x3c
    ; var int32_t var_45h @ esp+0x79
    ; var int32_t var_49h @ esp+0x7d
    ; var int32_t var_4dh @ esp+0x81
    ; var int32_t var_51h @ esp+0x85
    ; var int32_t var_55h @ esp+0x89
    ; var int32_t var_6bh @ esp+0x8b
            esp, 0x50
    sub
    push
            esi
            edi
    push
    mov
            ecx.
             esi, str.http:__www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com ; 0x4313d0
    mov
    lea
            edi, [var_sn]
             movsd dword es:[edi], dword ptr [esi]
    movsb
            byte es:[edi], byte ptr [esi]
                                                                  Kill Switch URL
             dword [var_41h], eax
            dword [var_45h], eax
dword [var_49h], eax
dword [var_4dh], eax
            dword [var_51h], eax
word [var_55h], ax
    push
            eax
            eax
    push
    push
    push
            eax
            byte [var_6bh], al
    mov
            dword [InternetOpenA]
                                         : 0x40a134
    push
            0x84000000
    push
    lea
           dword [InternetOpenUrlA] ; 0x40a138
   test edi, edi
            0x4081bc
                                                                                If url
If url
                      [0x004081a7]
                                                   [0x004081bc]
                                                                                exists
doesnot
                                                                                malware is
exists this
                                                            edi
                                                                                not
block gets
                       call
                                                                                executed
                              fcn.00408090
                      call
                                                             edi
executed
                                                             eax, eax
                                                                                and it
                       pop
                               eaı
which has a
                               eax, eax
                                                             esi
                                                                                exits out
function
                                                             esp, 0x50
                               esi
                                                    add
                                                                                of the
call
                       add
                                                             0x10
                                                                                program
```

Fig 14: Main function viewed inside cutter graph mode



Advanced Dynamic Analysis

X32dbg




Fig 15: Set a breakpoint on kill switch URL




Fig 16: The kill switch URL was not found therefore the EDI has value 0






Fig 17: The zero flag is evaluated to 1 but we change it to 0




Fig 18: Changing the zero flag to 0. This makes the program to take the jump call and the malware is not executed.

Recommendations for organizations to become more resilient against wannacry malware:



- 1.Keep Systems Updated: Regularly apply security patches and updates for operating systems, software, and applications. Vulnerabilities often arise from outdated software versions, so timely updates can help mitigate the risk.
- 2.Use Reliable Security Software: Deploy reputable antivirus and anti-malware solutions across your organization's network. Ensure that the software is regularly updated and configured to perform real-time scanning.
- 3. Network Segmentation: Implement network segmentation to isolate critical systems and data from the broader network. By segmenting your network, you limit the lateral movement of malware in case of an infection, containing the impact.
- 4.Least Privilege Principle: Enforce the principle of least privilege, granting users only the necessary permissions required to perform their duties. Restrict administrative privileges to reduce the potential impact of malware and limit unauthorized access.
- 5.User Awareness Training: Conduct regular security awareness training for all employees. Teach them about the risks associated with opening suspicious emails, clicking on unknown links, or downloading files from untrusted sources. Emphasize the importance of vigilance and reporting any suspicious activities.
- 6.Regular Data Backups: Implement a robust backup strategy that includes regular backups of critical data. Ensure backups are stored securely and tested periodically to ensure data can be restored effectively in case of an incident.



- 7.Disable Unnecessary Services: Disable or uninstall unnecessary services and protocols to reduce the attack surface. Unused or outdated services can often serve as entry points for malware attacks.
- 8.Regular Vulnerability Assessments and Penetration Testing: Conduct regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing to identify weaknesses in your network and systems. Address any discovered vulnerabilities promptly to minimize the risk of exploitation.