

The Prospect of Global History

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CHAPTER

1 Global History and Historical Sociology

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Abstract

This chapter argues that global history is not a self-contained field but one in need of theoretical and terminological support from various parts of the systematic social sciences. A strong candidate for conceptual inputs is historical sociology—an old discourse that originated with the founding fathers of sociology and can in turn profit from a close attachment to global history. Different kinds of global history require their respective conceptual tools many of which can be provided by a historical sociology that keeps a balance between the richness of anthropological description and the formalism of network analysis. A particularly fruitful topic of mutual interest is that of time and temporalities.

Keywords: Global History, Historical Sociology, conceptual innovation, comparative history, time, space, civilization

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Global History's Need for Theory

The vision of global history shared by many contributors to the present volume is far from that of an insular sub-discipline settling down into complacent self-sufficiency. It is important to emphasize this point since the growth and internal professionalization of a new field, and especially a successful one, tend to strengthen its sense of autonomy. The very ability to draw upon one's own intellectual resources seems to be the hallmark of emancipation from a paternal master discipline. Yet, as this chapter will argue, such proud independence reflects only in part the achievement of maturity. In more than one sense it is an illusion. Global History[1] has to feed on conceptual inputs from outside its own purview. A major source of theoretical inspiration is historical sociology.

This diagnosis partly results from the situation of Global History in Germany, to some extent also in Austria and Switzerland, a situation that may be representative of a much greater number of countries.[2]

Reconstructing the development of Global History only in view of the Anglophone experience provides a somewhat distorted picture. In the German-speaking countries, Global History has evolved neither from imperial history, as in Britain, nor from Western Civilization courses, as in the United States. The old German tradition of world history, from the Göttingen Enlightenment—with August Ludwig Schlözer as its main representative—to the Weimar Republic,[3] was virtually defunct by the late 1980s, and Marxist approaches—the most important alternative route to a universal view of history—were thoroughly
p. 24 discredited after the collapse of communist East Germany where historical materialism remained the ↳ binding party line to the very end.[4] Given this lack of an unbroken tradition, Global History had to be imported, or rather *re*-imported, in the 1990s, to some extent via less ambitious historiographical programmes such as transnational history or *histoire croisée*.[5] Too weak in numerical terms to form a viable sub-discipline it is nowadays increasingly successful with a lay readership, but still finds limited support in school or college curricula, and continues to struggle for acceptance in research and academic teaching beyond a handful of universities.[6] This institutional fragility, however, offers at least one major advantage: it compels practising Global Historians to look for academic allies and to insert their activities as far as possible into cross-disciplinary research. A lack of discursive autarchy and a shallow rootedness in mainstream historiography turn an interdisciplinary orientation into a daily necessity. Global History is never alone.[7]

The situation in Germany, as well as other countries where a 'global turn' is far from being accomplished, highlights the general relationship between Global History and theory. It is important to state that by 'theory' I do not mean the all-encompassing 'grand' theories that claim to hold the answers to almost every problem under the sun, such as Marxism, Niklas Luhmann's theory of social systems, or a comprehensive Foucauldian view of the world.[8] Nor do I have post-modernist Theory (with a capital 'T') in mind—often a peculiar rhetoric rather than a coherent way of reasoning.[9] The extent to which Global History might commit itself to any of those grand theories and attempt, for example, to devise a comprehensive systems theory view of world history[10] is an intriguing matter, but not one to be considered at the moment.

Theory, as the term will be used in this chapter, is a coherent set of explicitly defined concepts—as well as ideas about the application of those concepts to the interpretation and explanation of observable phenomena. Historical observation involves the study of sources and relics, in the broadest possible sense, in the light—and by means—of established and newly emerging tools and methods of research.

p. 25 The main argument to be developed in the following pages will run as follows: Even more than other branches of history, Global History cannot be satisfied with mere description. Whether more explanatory or more interpretive in its general inclination, it always requires theoretical input—usually input it has not generated itself. This is not to resuscitate a sharp dichotomy between sociology as an explanatory, generalizing science and history as a descriptive, particularizing craft oblivious to larger intellectual vistas and destined to carry grist to the sociologists' mills. Still, interdisciplinarity presupposes a cognitive division of labour. Historians are very rarely ambitious and competent originators of big ideas. They look for theoretical inspiration beyond the boundaries of their own turf, and when they borrow theoretical concepts, as William H. Sewell, Jr—who has a foot in both camps—has put it, 'we often find that the concepts don't quite fit, that they need to be adjusted, nuanced, or combined with concepts from other, apparently incompatible, theoretical discourses in order to be useful in historical research'.[11] One major source of such inspiration is, or should be, a special branch of sociology known as Historical Sociology.[12] Before developing that argument, a few words are necessary about Global History and theory in general.

Concepts and Constructions in Global History

By its very nature, Global History is a theoretical enterprise. It involves reflection and requires decisions far beyond the needs of ordinary historical casework. None of its parameters can be treated as given or sanctioned by tacit conventions among the community of scholars. At least three such parameters demand constant attention and fine-tuning: time, space, and the mix of analytical approaches.

(1) Time frames and periodization are open to the constructivist intentions—though not the unbridled fancy—of the historian since the accustomed temporalities of national or continental (for example, European) history will no longer do. Global history challenges the temporal imagination.[13]

p. 26 (2) ↳ Likewise, the spaces of Global History are anything but self-evident. One of its great attractions to those fleeing the iron cage of conventional thinking and research about the past is the almost infinite variety of spatial units and levels at the global historian's disposal. Only a vulgar misunderstanding could accuse Global History of being inexorably drawn towards the largest possible picture. Global History is not to be confused with 'macro history', that is, the history of vast spaces, long periods of time, and colossal issues.[14] To quote the famous title of Donald R. Wright's study on the Kingdom of Niumi in The Gambia: the world *and* 'a very small place in Africa' (or anywhere else) can be accommodated within one and the same analytical framework.[15]

(3) A third dimension requiring decisions that do not spontaneously emerge from carefully contemplating the sources is the plurality of approaches in the repertoire of the global historian and the specific mix of those approaches. The vehement battles between social and cultural historians that marked the 1980s and 1990s look dated when held against the flexible combination of purportedly contradictory approaches in the better class of global history literature. In a similar vein, a history of discourses and a history of material culture do not seem to be as incompatible as many, until recently, were wont to believe. While Global History is not a sponge waiting to absorb anything that comes its way, it basically assumes a multi-faceted point of view and rejects crude alternatives: society vs. culture, structure vs. agency, and so on. Yet, combining different aspects—and sub-disciplines within historical scholarship—in a more than additive way entails careful considerations that one should not hesitate to call 'theoretical'.[16] If Global History is a special, cross-cutting or lateral way of devising questions, these questions can rarely be answered from within conventional self-contained discourses. To give just one example: a global economic history can even less afford to ignore 'culture', in the sense of knowledge, rules of conduct, or value orientations, than economic history in a national mould. In that sense, the questions themselves should have some theoretical content.

p. 27 But where does theory come from? Usually, historians are importers, consumers, and appliers of concepts generated within non-historical disciplinary contexts. They are rational and discriminating shoppers at the marketplace of theory. The terms and concepts they use are borrowed and derivative: obtained from sociology, anthropology, economics, philosophy, political science, religious studies, or whatever else might be pertinent to the study of a given problem. There is nothing objectionable about that. History can tolerate the pleasures of controlled eclecticism. It suffers whenever it is chained to theoretical orthodoxy. At the other extreme, it becomes dull when practised in the spirit of a craftsman-like empiricism, disdaining any kind of broader intellectual aspiration. Global History should steer clear of both dogma and of the kind of superficial *naiveté* that is content with a good 'global' story expertly told or, worse, with a jumble of facts and images.

When historians use other people's theories, they seldom simply apply them in a straightforward way. They mostly prefer what the American sociologist Dietrich Rueschemeyer has called 'usable theory' or 'empirical social theory'[17]—concepts that do not inhabit a space totally sealed off from the real world. They make

those theories even more useful by adapting them to specific analytical purposes. In a way, theory comes into its own by being used for goals that lie outside its own auto-referential circle. Historians defer to the theorists' superior powers of abstract construction. But their handling of language tends to be more subtle and flexible than is often the case in today's systematic social sciences—with the partial example of anthropology and certain kinds of sociology where literary ambition has not been entirely forsaken. Historians embed variables and generalities into narratives. Rather than the antithesis of theory, narration is a potent medium of theoretical integration.

Conceptual innovation ought to constitute a major aim of the humanities under *any* circumstances. Global History can proudly display an assortment of novelties of that kind ranging from the 'settler revolution' (James Belich) and the 'Eurasian revolution' (John Darwin) to the 'mosquito empire' (John R. McNeill). Still, concepts such as these rarely form part of systematic theory-building. Historians may generate and successfully promote concepts or models of medium-range validity—J. G. A. Pocock's 'language of politics', Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger's 'invention of tradition', Alfred Crosby's 'Columbian exchange' or Jan de Vries's 'industrious revolution' are celebrated examples—but they seldom propose entire terminologies or *systems* of terms and propositions, in other words, theories. In world history writing, one counts only three heroic attempts at creating a new language—if not necessarily a fully articulated 'theory'—to accompany a novel approach to history: by Arnold J. Toynbee in the earlier volumes of his *A Study in*
p. 28 *History*,[18] by the now forgotten German world historian Kurt ↳ Breysig (1866–1940),[19] and by the Australian economist and systems theorist Graeme Donald Snooks.[20] All three of them failed to win a conspicuous number of followers, at least among historians.[21] Historians seem to be ill equipped to enter the competition for comprehensive theorizing.

Global History and Historical Sociology: A Few Shared Interests

Historical Sociology is only a marginal sub-discipline within sociology, in any country located at some distance from the centre of the profession. It is as peripheral as Global History continues to be within historical studies in many national systems of research and education. So why is it attractive as an interlocutor for Global History—regardless of the fact that historical sociologists may have an interest in Global History for their own reasons? Five points are of special importance.

(1) An excellent Italian overview of the classics of Historical Sociology carries the title *La storia comparata.*[22] Indeed, Historical Sociology, counting scholars like Max Weber and the German historian Otto Hintze among its founding fathers, boasts a long experience with comparison and its methodology.[23] At a time when historians still frowned upon comparison, or were at most willing to consider *two* national paths within a common analytical framework, historical sociologists developed intricate procedures of macro-historical comparison. This kind of literature—represented by Barrington Moore, Charles Tilly, Theda Skocpol, Jack Goldstone, or Michael Mann—achieved prominence during what has been called a 'second wave' of Historical Sociology—after the 'first
p. 29 wave' of the classics of Weber's and Hintze's ↳ generation at the beginning of the twentieth century, lasting from the late 1960s to the early 1990s.[24]

(2) Historical Sociology has for a long time been far less Eurocentric than mainstream historiography. While some of the greatest protagonists of Historical Sociology, Norbert Elias foremost among them,[25] largely disregarded the non-European world, others followed in the footsteps of Max Weber whose comparative studies on, for example, the city, capitalism, music, or the world religions set standards for a sociology of universal scope.[26] Representatives of such a truly cosmopolitan vision include Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Jóhann Páll Árnason, or the sociologist of religion Robert N. Bellah—all three of them, interestingly, students of Japan. They provide models for transcending the West or,

more generally, for overcoming *any* kind of parochialism, including that of area studies or oriental philologies.

(3) One outcome of such a globalizing attitude has been the attempt to pluralize the sociological mainstream's pet concepts of modernization and modernity. The idea of *multiple* modernities is chiefly associated with Eisenstadt's later work,[27] but it had already been implicit in a few earlier contributions to Historical Sociology. A long-term consideration of different developmental paths and a respect for the empirical historical record cast doubt on unilinearity and homogeneity in the course of societal evolution. Global Historians have much to contribute to this discussion.[28]

(4) Historical Sociology has shared the general infatuation of social scientists with the idea of globalization ever since the pioneering days when that concept was elaborated by a startling
p. 30 generation of original thinkers.[29] However, ↳ at a time when only a handful of historians made themselves heard in the surging debate, historical sociologists were among the first to warn against exaggerated fantasies of the unprecedented novelty of 'global modernity' and the blessings of a futuristic 'global age', ungrounded in any previous human experience.

(5) Finally, one particular name has to be mentioned. Nobody has been more influential in building bridges between incipient global perspectives in history and sociology than Immanuel Wallerstein—a sociologist who developed a very serious involvement with historical research and who gained the respect of one of the greatest historians of the twentieth century, Fernand Braudel.[30] Whatever one may think of Wallerstein and his unwavering theoretical quest[31]—he served as an eye-opener and inspiration to many, especially among a generation that had become alerted to new or persisting inequalities on a global scale in the wake of decolonization. Wallerstein reinvigorated historical sociology in the early 1970s by taking, as one of his most perspicacious critics has put it, 'the long historic view, one that identifies enduring cycles, tendencies, structures, and the patterns of structural change',[32] he added historical depth to the emerging studies of global connections 'after empire'.

Today, Historical Sociology is not a homogenous field. It went through a 'third wave' during the 1990s when new authors, new sensibilities, and new subjects came to the fore, when comparison was attacked in the name of more relational approaches, when postmodernist aspersions were cast on the preference for vast master narratives, and when the battle between culturalists and adherents of rational choice unsettled the placid structuralism of an earlier generation of scholars. Three authoritative collections of articles, published in the first decade of the new century, projected quite different images of Historical Sociology—ranging between the allegedly polar opposites of explanation vs interpretation, structure vs agency, and
p. 31 macro vs micro levels.[33] For historians, this kind of plurality should be ↳ welcome rather than troubling. It testifies to the vitality of a field where no single theoretical orientation has gained the upper hand.

Six Types of Global History: Their Specific Needs for Theory

Global History is no unitary and monolithic discourse either.[34] Practising Global Historians are likely to find it difficult to agree on a definition that goes beyond the claim that Global History is an approach to the past that is non-Eurocentric and focussed on long-distance connectivity across national and cultural boundaries. Under such a spacious roof, several different historiographical styles live in peaceful coexistence. A cursory glance at the leading journals and at the shelves of any well-stocked academic bookshop will already reveal divergent types of Global History or world history.[35] They also differ in their need of and demand for theory, as the six types identified below demonstrate.

Comprehensive histories. This first type needs very little theory since it does not aim at explanation and is often limited to a collection of data and materials fitted into a rough temporal framework of periods and stages. These are histories of 'something' on a worldwide canvas: a commodity, an institution, an idea, and so on (*Alcohol in World History,* or *A World History of the Family*).[36] This kind of literature can offer fascinating insights. If expertly done, it requires a certain technical 'field knowledge'. To take up the examples just mentioned, it would be impossible to write about alcohol or the family in world history without a good understanding of oenology or demography. But what one does *not* need for considering any given topic in a 'world historical'—in other words, a comprehensive—perspective, is a more general brand of theory that accounts for patterns and prime movers of change.

Universal histories. A second type of Global History is made up of reconstructions of the evolution of humankind as a whole and its cultural ecumene, including ideas of global unity and a common human
p. 32 destiny. As a continuation of the ↳ Enlightenment's 'history of man' and of nineteenth-century evolutionism, this kind of rejuvenated 'universal history' makes considerable demands on theory. It presupposes a material philosophy of history or even, in the case of 'big history', of cosmological development in the very long run.[37] Philosophies of such a 'neo-Hegelian' kind are rarely offered by philosophers today,[38] but they are sometimes advanced by sociologists.[39] They have to address the question of what constitutes the overall unity of history during the period of the unification of the globe, but preferably also in earlier ages when planetary awareness was still lacking. One possible answer is the idea of 'world society' as the largest possible horizon of human activity.[40] Professional historians seldom dare to step on such treacherous ground. But the public from time to time demands sweeping visions of where we come from and which way we are heading. The popularity of authors such as Jared Diamond or Ian Morris testifies to these expectations.

Movement histories. A third type is composed of histories of transnational and global movements: political movements of global reach such as socialism, communism, feminism, or anti-colonialism,[41] but also the rise of globally adopted (and adapted) practices such as organized sports.[42] This approach, which is mostly organizational history with a firm rooting in institutional sources, in spite of its descriptive proclivities, is likely to profit from concepts of transfer, of translation, and of agency in varying contexts.

Competition histories. A fourth type comprises histories of material progress and backwardness and of the translation of materiality into power.[43] Any writings dealing with the European Miracle, the Great Divergence, the rise of Asia, or hegemonic cycles come under that heading. This type is rigorously comparative and thus closely related to 'second wave' Historical Sociology. All authors share a concern with
p. 33 progress and backwardness, with power differentials and with actual or ↳ virtual rivalry between civilizations or economic regions. History is basically seen as jockeying for the top position in a global ranking competition. Several prominent combatants in the ongoing debate have a disciplinary background in sociology, though the majority are (economic) historians. Even the economic historians do not directly import concepts from the theory of economic growth. Most of them reject mono-causal reasoning and excessively general models and strive for their own personal version of 'a giant combination lock'[44] that might offer access to the secrets of Europe's ascendancy in modern times. The state of the art is presently an economic and ecological interpretation incorporating political/institutional and cultural aspects, 'culture' mostly meaning a religiously driven work ethic in the Weberian tradition.

Of the six types of Global History distinguished here, this has been the most successful in generating its own syncretistic theory, in many cases based on paradigms from classical 'political' economy (Adam Smith, Thomas R. Malthus, Joseph A. Schumpeter, et al.). Where it is manifestly dependent on sociology and anthropology is in determining the units of comparison. This makes the issue of 'civilizational arenas' almost unavoidable. Nowadays, the concept of 'civilization'—understood as a bounded macro-unit—has fallen out of favour, although the booming 'varieties of capitalism' literature is contributing to a modest revival, and books on 'Islamic capitalism' or 'Confucian capitalism' enjoy undiminished popularity.

Comparisons are preferably drawn between sub-national regions such as Southern England and the Lower Yangzi. Still, whenever 'the West' and its competitive record make an appearance,[45] the issue of 'civilization' is at stake and resists an answer in terms of mere common sense. Even in economic history, reflections on civilizational boundaries and identities cannot be dismissed as pedantic trifles.[46] Global Historians owe clarity to their readers.

Network histories. A fifth type are histories of expansion, or to put it in less old-fashioned terms, histories of large-scale systems-building: of huge, often transcontinental, empires, migration systems, technical networks of communication, city networks, the world economy or, as *sub*systems of the world economy, of global trade, or a global financial system. The key term here is the 'network'. What is needed, therefore, is a non-technical approach to network analysis that makes it possible to describe networks and tell stories about their members without foregoing the advantages of a limited amount of quantification and
p. 34 formalism: networks always presuppose a multiplicity of participants and a certain degree of order and ↳ regularity in the interaction among them.[47] If it chooses to ignore such an approach, history misses a bridge towards the systematic social sciences. Whether, and to what extent, general theories of 'globalization' are helpful to the historian is a related but distinct topic.[48]

Connection histories. Finally, a growing share of Global History literature is made up of histories of transfers and connections—perhaps in numerical terms this is the most significant class of studies today. Unlike the previous type, they do not necessarily involve two-dimensional systems and networks. Analysing a complex commodity chain is already a considerable challenge, even if it is not embedded in a truly systemic configuration.[49] The focus of connection histories is narrower than that of network histories. This enables them to identify and trace specific causal relationships. A good example is Lynn Hunt's attempt to be as precise as possible in inserting a global element into the usual internalist interpretations of the outbreak of the French Revolution of 1789.[50] Connection histories are frequently to be found in studies of migration and diasporas as they follow a group of migrants from their place of origin to their destination. They also play a considerable role in the global history of ideas where dissemination, especially in early stages, often occurs through individual contacts rather than by way of elaborate networks that demand 'a wider investigation than any single point of interface'.[51]

'Connectivity' has emerged as the signature concept of the sixth approach. If a plenary assembly of Global Historians were asked to choose the one central concept defining the field, the majority is likely to vote for 'connectivity'. In contrast to 'network histories' this category has received little theoretical attention and is mostly used in a casual way. Describing connections is not particularly demanding in terms of theory. But when the aim is explanation, things become more difficult. From an infinite number of connections in the universe, we are then interested in a much smaller number of *effective* connections with causative power. Therefore, connectivity is, or should be, a concept encompassing explanation.

In the cases of familiar mega-events such as the French Revolution or early industrialization, Global History has detected a wider context of impacting factors. The French Revolution, for a long time seen as a domestic
p. 35 conflict in Paris ↳ and the provinces, is now regarded as part of a wider Revolutionary Atlantic with repercussions from the distant 'periphery' on the metropole.[52] The Industrial Revolution is inserted into the vast scenarios of a global history of cotton textiles or of a transcontinental concatenation of coerced and (more or less) free labour.[53] In a different field, Global History undermines Western claims to matchless cultural originality by demonstrating the non-European origins of innovations such as perspective in painting, which the German art historian Hans Belting believes to be based on Arabic conceptions of light.[54]

Transfers such as the transmission of optical knowledge from the Near East to early Renaissance Italy—or the activities along any commodity chain—rarely just 'happen'. Their close description and, even more, their explanation raise all sorts of intricate issues. One way of linking up with current sociological theory would be to experiment with the concept of 'mechanism' that occupies a central role in so-called 'analytical

sociology'.[55] That concept, still lacking a unanimous definition, covers only a small range of human motivation and will always remain suspicious to humanistic historians. At the same time, it has the great advantage of identifying and isolating for analytical purposes the 'typical' combinations of causes that bring about certain outcomes with a high degree of likelihood and regularity.[56]

In a similar vein Reinhart Koselleck, the great German theorist of time and historical semantics, urged historians to pay attention to recurrences and 'structures of repetition' (*Wiederholungsstrukturen*).[57] Koselleck would have been the last person to deny historical individuality. What he meant to say was that between strict determinism ('laws of history') and the total freedom of individual choice lies a wide intermediate space where the repetitive logics of limited spheres—such as markets, bureaucracies, churches, ecosystems—are brought together in ever-changing combinations to produce 'history'. It would be worthwhile to look at transfers, transmissions, and other forms of connectivity in the light of such considerations.

Key Issues of Historical Sociology

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Historical Sociology is not a visibly demarcated discourse with an established grid of themes and a characteristic toolbox. During its 'second wave', from the 1960s to the 1980s, it defined itself as comparative sociology in the long run. Since then, the focus on comparison has been somewhat attenuated and the clear identity of the field thrown into doubt. Ironically, the ascendancy of globalization studies and Global History has contributed to a growing insecurity among historical sociologists. When everything in the world is seen to be moving and flowing, when boundaries are constantly undermined, shifted, and transgressed, it is difficult to 'freeze' units for analytical purposes: a logical prerequisite of comparison. Moreover, traditional notions of 'society' have been destabilized on two different fronts: on the one hand, a microsociology interested in rational action by individuals and small groups has little use for overall social structures; on the other hand, cultural sociologists have shifted the emphasis from the objective and observable markers of class, gender, and race to meaning, symbolism, emotion, and the social imaginary.

This multiple challenge to Historical Sociology may enhance its openness towards a dialogue with Global History. But what can Global History in turn expect from Historical Sociology? A good starting point for a discussion of the linkages between Global History and Historical Sociology is the venerable question of the concept of civilization. That issue has vexed world history almost from its beginnings. Since the nation state is obviously a very late phenomenon and an inappropriate spatial unit for comprehending pre-modern history, the larger framework of a cultural ecumene—'*la personnalité collective la plus grande qu'on connaisse*' (as Émile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss put it in a path-breaking passage)—offered itself.[58] It has the additional advantage of being a mode of *self*-description under a wide variety of historical circumstances: The Western term 'civilization' has semantic equivalents in many languages, and the opposition between 'Us the Civilized' and 'Them the Barbarians' is an almost universal grid of asymmetrical classification. Since Oswald Spengler's and Arnold J. Toynbee's time, the category of civilization has percolated from the summits of world history writing down to the level of a popular literature that uses it in a casual and offhand way.

Samuel Huntington's controversial resuscitation of the concept as a vision of antagonistic combat units in world politics has not enhanced its standing among historians. Global History's hallmark has been that of an approach that avoids the carving up of humankind into clearly demarcated macro-communities whose coherence or identity is mainly guaranteed by shared religious beliefs. In other words, Global History has positioned itself as world history liberated from the straightjacket of 'civilization'. One of its characteristic features has been a penchant ↳ for *multi*-civilizational spaces of interaction: the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, the Pacific, Eurasia, and so on.

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However, the problem cannot be simply wished away. While nobody wants to return to a history of five, six, or seven 'Great Civilizations', it is impossible to dispense, in a radical way, with ideas of civilizational arenas. Whenever, for example, the term 'the West' is used in a way not explicitly restricted to geopolitics, it resonates with meanings of a 'Western *civilization*', of norms, values, institutions, and social rules that are distinctive attributes of European and neo-European societies. The debate about manifestations of modernity in the region between Manchuria and Hong Kong is largely conducted in terms of 'Chinese' modernity. Though much more ambiguous, the framing term 'Islamic world' is routinely used by many social scientists and historians when referring to an enormous range of heterogeneous phenomena. In this situation, conceptual awareness could be raised by referring to the work of Jóhann Páll Árnason and of the late Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt. In the writings of both authors, who place themselves in a broadly conceived Weberian tradition, we find an elaborate concept of civilization.[59] Eisenstadt summed up a lifetime of thinking about civilization(s) in a definition that sees a specific civilization as a characteristic 'combination of ontological or cosmological visions, of visions of trans-mundane and mundane reality, with the definition, construction, and regulation of the major arenas of social life and interaction'. Such regulation comprises institutional formations (political rule, the economy, kinship, etc.) as well as collective identities.[60]

One of the great virtues of refined concepts of 'civilization' is that they transcend the fruitless dichotomy between essentialism and constructivism. Historians, as contemporaries of, and sometimes participants in, the 'cultural turn' and as readers of anthropological literature, have learned to be wary of any 'essentialist' branding of human collectives. We are all constructivists now. At the same time, projecting present-day perceptions of cultural hybridity and infinitely malleable identities back onto the past is a less than satisfactory general approach for global historical studies. The ideas that human groups form about themselves, their neighbours, and enemies are certainly products of creative 'social imaginaries'.[61] However, such image-creating activities are not entirely arbitrary and contingent. They are partly shaped by traditions and social and cultural 'path-dependencies'; they are closely tied to institutions; and they produce effects that can, under certain circumstances, transform imagination into reality. The complex
p. 38 notion of 'civilization' as developed ↳ by theorists like Eisenstadt on the basis of Durkheim, Mauss, and Weber goes far beyond the crude essentialism of authors of the Huntington school while not succumbing to the other extreme of denying any structural constraints of the collective imagination.

A second—and related—topic in need of careful and theory-guided consideration is the significance of the idea of 'fluidity' and 'flows' for Global History. Where earlier versions of world history tended to stress the different internal logics of macro-societies and civilizations, Global History prefers to see mobility or, in the fashionable plural form, 'mobilities'. This reflects a more general shift of sensibility. The social history of the 1960s and 1970s, at least on the European continent, neglected migration; it focussed on stratification, class conflict, and, following in E. P. Thompson's footsteps, on the connections between material life, class consciousness, and collective protest. The history of migration was mainly left to historical demography. At most, social history took an interest in *dramatic* instances of mass relocation; for instance, the transatlantic emigration from Europe during the second half of the nineteenth century or the forced translocations of populations after the two world wars.

Meanwhile, preferences have been turned upside down. When reading certain kinds of Global History literature these days, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that mobility is treated as the normal state of affairs. Social history dissolves into movement—movement of nomads and warriors, of slaves and convicts, of coolies, refugees, and frontiersmen, of gentleman travellers, and mass tourists.[62] Research of impressive quality has shown how travel, trade, gift exchange, or religious and literary communication constituted long-distance sociability and created spaces of interaction.[63] Yet, little is left of social history once mobility is subtracted, and the diaspora looks like a universally dominant form of social organization. Enamoured with what the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman calls social 'liquidity',[64] Global History appears to develop a

mobility bias. It tends to be indifferent to *non*-migrant forms of social life: the sedentary peasantries that formed the bulk of numerous societies for the past millennia, or the many millions of townspeople who were stuck in their little communities and never set their sights on a metropolis or the all-connecting ocean.[65]

This may not be a serious problem, and it probably only compensates for a long and inexcusable neglect of mobility in mainstream historical scholarship. But it raises a couple of theoretical issues. Global History may be in danger of losing a sense of proportion by underestimating social structure and hierarchy; these
p. 39 are, after all, the foundations and preconditions of many kinds of movement and also ↳ the crystallizations of past mobility.[66] The early and path-breaking theorists of globalization, scholars such as Arjun Appadurai, Manuel Castells, and Ulf Hannerz, coined and elaborated the term 'flow', and a great number of monographical studies testify to its usefulness.[67] Sociology and anthropology have provided an innovative language to account for social dynamics at various spatial levels and along finely graded temporal scales. The success of this new way of framing the social is stunning. Yet one should beware of lopsidedness. From recent American social science textbooks, for example those written and edited by the prolific George Ritzer,[68] one gathers the impression that sociology in general and globalization studies in particular have abandoned any notion of a minimally stable social order.

Coming from a background in anthropology, Stuart Alexander Rockefeller has raised a number of important objections to the unchallenged popularity of 'flow think'.[69] One does not have to approve of all of his arguments, but when Arjun Appadurai, responding to Rockefeller, endorses his colleague's critique of 'recent excesses of the anthropology of flow',[70] the historian feels reminded of similar tendencies in Global History. Rockefeller castigates 'flow' as 'an image of agentless movement with no starting point and no telos',[71] and he is also right in claiming that common usage puts the emphasis on the flow rather than on the substance that is flowing.'[72] Moreover, metaphors of fluidity are likely to evoke an unrealistic impression of smooth, continuous, and unimpeded movement. By contrast, the habitually myopic historian is trained to look for variations of speed, resistance, failure, changes of context and their impact, the coordination (or lack thereof) of the activities of numerous actors, and so on.[73] When he or she reads, as one does with increasing frequency, that something—a commodity, a germ, or an idea—'circulated around the globe', the first reaction is amazement at such an improbable feat.

One can immediately add two further observations, one concerning the concept of 'space', the other of the 'network'. Global History has contributed enormously to a sharpened sense of space and place in historiography in general. Hardly more than a decade ago, the call for a return of space into historiography
p. 40 caused a stir.[74] Meanwhile, Global Historians have thoroughly digested the ↳ 'spatial turn'[75] and, alerted by a neo-Braudelian *géohistoire*, they have refined their toolkit for spatial analysis. Where they evince some insecurity is in using spatial categories for purposes of *social* analysis. The more macro-sociology retreated from notions of social structure and social order, the more spatial metaphors were employed to describe social relationships—even if their distribution in space was not the prime focus of attention. 'Urban space' replaced 'urban society' even in those analytical contexts where forms of hierarchical subordination rather than mappable patterns of segregation were at stake. It would be preposterous to advocate a reversal of something that might be a wholesale paradigm change. Yet, Global History should enter into a dialogue with historical—and other—sociology about the spatialization of our analytical language, its gains and its limits. This should be done in view of a global social history that retains the full panoply of conceptual instruments accumulated ever since the beginnings of social history, sociology, and ethnology.

As far as the other master metaphor of global studies is concerned, the concept of the 'network', already mentioned above, begs all sorts of questions. It has rapidly become indispensable. All Global Historians use it: as economic historians, as historians of empires, as historians of the family. But how does one describe networks? How do we come to grips with their usually asymmetrical and irregular configurations? How do we avoid neglecting the holes between the nodes and connections? How do we add a third dimension to the

network: the vertical dimension of hierarchy and power? How do we measure quantities and intensities? How do we grasp the meta-networking among different networks, their entanglement at the edges? How do we tell stories about the rise and fall, the life and death of networks? And who are the insiders and outsiders, the activists and the victims, the winners and the losers, the friends and the foes of networks?

Presently, the theory of networks is a rather formal branch of sociology, sometimes verging on mathematics. An influential creator of versions accessible to ordinary historians is Harrison C. White, the author of the classic work *Identity and Control: How Social Formations Emerge* (1992): a book—though not commonly regarded as a contribution to Historical Sociology—that is historically well informed and squarely re-inserts the figure of the actor into models of networks from which individual and collective agency had almost entirely disappeared.[76] Even in Harrison White's hands, however, sociological network analysis remains too formal to invite immediate application to topics of Global History. But a glance at the sociological literature ought to dissuade us from an undisciplined and arbitrary use of a term that is everyone's favourite and yet, upon closer inspection, reveals a treacherous polymorphism of meaning.

A fifth and final point relates to the kind of dynamics relevant to history and sociology. Social history and
p. 41 Historical Sociology were particularly close when a ↳ 'building-block view of social structure' (William H. Sewell, Jr)[77] enjoyed general popularity and when both disciplines were focussed on the same robust macro-processes: rationalization, secularization, industrialization, state-building, bureaucratization, urbanization, revolution, and so on: processes that are now discussed with less assurance and naiveté.[78] From the very beginning, however, Historical Sociology with its ingrained interest in pre-industrial societies was reluctant to identify 'society' with the bounded nation state. At the same time, it extended its comparative scope beyond Europe and North America, including Asia and sometimes, via ethnological research, also Africa and the Pacific in its wide-ranging considerations. When History 'went global', it moved in a direction already familiar to Historical Sociology. Both share a concern for 'global variability'.[79]

The processes studied by Historical Sociology were not entirely domestic. In her influential book *States and Social Revolutions* Theda Skocpol made the point that a country's position in the international system was an independent variable that determined the development and outcome of revolutionary conflict.[80] Charles Tilly emphasized the importance of war-making for the development of European states.[81] At the same time, Historical Sociology lacked the analytical tools to come to grips with the multi-layered and multi-directional constellations that Global History would discuss so enthusiastically under headings such as 'entanglement' or 'hybridization'.[82] It is indicative that none of the leading representatives of Historical Sociology has made an original contribution to the study of colonialism.[83]

Where Historical Sociology and Global History could mutually benefit is in reflecting on the various concepts of change presently available—and conceivable in the future—to describe and explain processes at different temporal scales. The more numerous the connections and entanglements discovered by Global Historians, the greater the need to discriminate between them along parameters such as duration, intensity, rhythm, reversibility, causative power, and so on.[84] There is a danger that Global History degenerates into
p. 42 long, and somewhat trivial, ↳ lists of spaces, people, and events that are somehow linked to each other.[85] However, connections alone do not suffice to get to grips with the major institutions of the modern era, especially states and the structures of global capitalism. States and, by extension, empires are more than mere networks, as historical sociologists from Otto Hintze to Charles Tilly and Michael Mann have impressively shown.[86] And global capitalism cannot be reduced to market integration and commodity flows, disregarding the 'mercantilist' intervention of states, the effects of war and the agency of entrepreneurs, workers, and consumers.[87] Historical Sociology with its antennae for power and violence, and the processual dynamics of both, can remind Global History that the world has never been as 'flat', two-dimensional and peaceful as some theorists of globalization tend to suggest.

One might go on assessing the convergence and divergence between Global History and Historical Sociology in many different fields. There are topics of Global History that cannot be handled in a responsible manner without some familiarity with the relevant social science literature. It is hardly possible, for example, to work on the global history of the family in ignorance of the rich scholarly traditions in the sociology and anthropology of kinship and gender. In other instances, sociologists (and political scientists) will not be able to tell historians much they do not already know. Thus while a few political scientists are authorities on the theory of empire, the most important elements of that theory were elaborated by historians—since the time of Edward Gibbon.

Conclusion: Ambivalence

The strengths and weaknesses of the respective disciplines vary from topic to topic. In general, Historical Sociology is strong on the methodology of explanation—which is generally not Global History's forte, while Global Historians in their practice of writing frequently come up with reasonable solutions for problems that seem daunting and intractable in theory, for instance the relationship between processes and institutions.[88]

The relationship between Global History and Historical Sociology is an ambivalent one. Neither of those two minority fields enjoys comfortable acceptance by its home discipline, and neither is institutionally stable and self-contained. They are both in search of thematic relevance, intellectual attractiveness, and scholarly
p. 43 stature. Cooperation between the two could be genuinely beneficial, not just a ↳ grudging nod towards academic institutions that brandish the banner of interdisciplinarity. But it will only be promising if historical sociologists shed the theorist's disdain for empirical work and allow their generalizing flights of fancy to be corrected by what Reinhart Koselleck termed 'the veto power of the sources', *and* if Global Historians come to distrust the persuasive appeal of nicely told narratives and develop a desire, already impressively evident in the Great Divergence debate, for explicitly argued explanation.

Sociology always includes a historical dimension even when it is not explicitly flagged up as Historical Sociology. From its very beginning, the discipline's central concern has been the emergence of the 'modern' world and its specificity when contrasted with what came before. It has tried to capture these phenomena that unfolded over at least two centuries in terms of large processes, above all 'modernization' and 'globalization', today sometimes welded into one as the rise of 'global modernity'.[89]

Global Historians, for their part, use sociological categories more often than they are probably aware. They tend to do this naively, without taking account of all possible theoretical implications. And they may place an unwarranted trust in concepts such as 'modernity' or 'globalization', about which many sociologists have come to feel distinctly uneasy. Global Historians are likely to retain their deep longing for analyses at the 'micro', or local level and will regard the sociologists' distance from primary sources with a measure of unsurmountable suspicion. And sociologists will be happy about anyone who engages with their analyses while in their heart of hearts respecting historians only to the extent that they continue to write in a language other than the arid idiom of macro-sociological theory.

Notes

1 'Global History' written with capital letters denotes the academic discipline and its various discourses, 'global history' its object of study. In the case of 'Historical Sociology' such ambiguity is unlikely to occur; capitals are used only for reasons of symmetry.

2 Dominic Sachsenmaier, *Global Perspectives on Global History: Theories and Approaches in a Connected World* (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2011), ch. 3; Jürgen Osterhammel, 'Global History in a National Context: The Case of Germany', *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 20 (2009), pp. 40–58.

3 No individual author can be named for this period. Its main achievement was a cooperative work: Walter Goetz (ed.), *Propyläen-Weltgeschichte: Der Werdegang der Menschheit in Gesellschaft und Staat, Wirtschaft und Geistesleben*, 10 vols (Berlin: Propyläen, 1931–3).

4 Jürgen Osterhammel, 'World History', in Axel Schneider and Daniel R. Woolf (eds), *Oxford History of Historical Writing, vol. V: Historical Writing since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 93–112.

5 For a careful distinction between these (and other) approaches see Margrit Pernau, *Transnationale Geschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck && Ruprecht, 2011), pp. 36–66.

6 Hans-Heinrich Nolte, 'Zum Stand der Weltgeschichtsschreibung im deutschen Sprachraum', *Zeitschrift für Weltgeschichte* 8 (2008), pp. 89–113; Matthias Middell and Katja Naumann, 'Global History 2008–2010: Empirische Erträge, konzeptionelle Debatten, neue Synthesen', *Comparativ* 20 (2010), pp. 93–133.

7 But see the plausible observation that new fields in History seem to renege on their initial interest in theory once they have attained a certain degree of acceptance and routine: Gary Wilder, 'From Optic to Topic: The Foreclosure Effects of Historiographic Turns', *American Historical Review* 117, 3 (2012), pp. 723–45, esp. p. 731.

8 On the notion of 'grand theory' see Quentin Skinner (ed.), *The Return of Grand Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

9 In the critical sense of Daphne Patai and Will H. Corral (eds), *Theory's Empire: An Anthology of Dissent* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).

10 The best starting point for such a venture would be the theory of 'world society' elaborated by one of Luhmann's disciples, Rudolf Stichweh, *Die Weltgesellschaft: Soziologische Analysen* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2000).

11 William H. Sewell, Jr, *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 5.

12 The best introductions are Charles Tilly, 'Historical Sociology', in Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (eds), *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, vol. 10 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001), pp. 6753–7; Richard Lachmann, *What Is Historical Sociology?* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013); Theda Skocpol (ed.), *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Dennis Smith, *The Rise of Historical Sociology* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991); Craig Calhoun, 'The Rise and Domestication of Historical Sociology', in Terrence J. McDonald (ed.), *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), pp. 305–37; Gerard Delanty and Engin F. Isin (eds), *Handbook of Historical Sociology* (London: Sage, 2003); Rainer Schützeichel, *Historische Soziologie* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2004); Walter L. Bühl, *Historische Soziologie: Theoreme und Methoden* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2003).

13 See the chapter on time in Jürgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2014), pp. 45–76. Two important articles are William A. Green, 'Periodization in European and World History', *Journal of World History* 3, 1 (1992), pp. 13–53; Jerry H. Bentley, 'Cross-Cultural Interaction and Periodization in World History', *American Historical Review* 101, 3 (1996), pp. 749–70. On the undermining of schematic periodization by more flexible 'temporalities' see Helge Jordheim, 'Against Periodization: Koselleck's Theory of Multiple Temporalities', *History && Theory* 51, 2 (2012), pp. 151–71; from a different theoretical angle: Jon May and Nigel J. Thrift (eds), *Timespace: Geographies of Temporality* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001). A stimulating collection is Chris Lorenz and Berber Bevernage (eds), *Breaking up Time: Negotiating the Borders between Present, Past and Future* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck && Ruprecht, 2013), including the chapter 'Globalisation and Time' by Lynn Hunt (pp. 199–215).

14 Which again is different from Big History; a history of unlimited temporal depth linking the history of mankind with that of nature as such. On macro history see Charles Tilly, *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984), and a collection of chapters on various historical topics:Randall Collins, *Macrohistory: Essays in Sociology of the Long Run* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).

15 Donald R. Wright: *The World and a Very Small Place in Africa: A History of Globalization in Niumi, The Gambia* (Armonk, NY and London: Sharpe, 2010). There are now numerous examples linking (in concrete detail) what sociologists differentiate schematically as 'macro', 'meso', and 'micro' levels. An interesting discussion is Lara Putnam, 'To Study the Fragments/Whole: Microhistory and the Atlantic World', *Journal of Social History* 39, 3 (2006), pp. 615–30.

16 However, Sebastian Conrad in his superb mapping of the field argues that the very catholicity and inclusiveness of Global History has blunted efforts to provide it with a clear-cut theoretical profile: *Globalgschichte: Eine Einführung* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2013), p. 88.

17 Dietrich Rueschemeyer, *Usable Theory: Analytic Tools for Social and Political Research* (Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 1.

18 Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, 12 vols (London: Oxford University Press, 1934–61), esp. vols 1–2 (1934); see William H. McNeill, *Arnold J. Toynbee: A Life* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

19 Breysig's monumental works are difficult to read—even for Germans—and one is grateful for an overview: Bernhard vom Brocke, *Kurt Breysig: Geschichtswissenschaft zwischen Historismus und Soziologie* (Lübeck: Matthiesen, 1971).

20 Graeme Donald Snooks, *Longrun Dynamics: A General Economic and Political Theory* (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1998); Graeme Donald Snooks, *The Laws of History* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998); Graeme Donald Snooks, *Global Transition: A General Theory of Economic Development* (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1999). For an essay on how economic and global historians could learn from each other, see O'Rourke in this volume.

21 A global historian who is particularly sensitive towards questions of terminology and naming is Hans-Heinrich Nolte. See, for instance, his innovative *Weltgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Vienna, Cologne, and Weimar: Böhlau, 2009).

22 Pietro Rossi (ed.), *La storia comparata: Approci e prospettive* (Milan: Il Saggiatore, 1990).

23 On the history of comparative macro-sociology see Jürgen Osterhammel, 'Transkulturell vergleichende Geschichtswissenschaft', in Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka (eds), *Geschichte im Vergleich* (Frankfurt a.M. and New York: Campus, 1996), pp. 271–313, reprinted in my book *Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Nationalstaats: Studien zu Beziehungsgeschichte und Zivilisationsvergleich,* 2nd edn (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck && Ruprecht, 2002), pp. 11–45; Jürgen Osterhammel, 'Gesellschaftsgeschichte und Historische Soziologie', in Jürgen Osterhammel, Dieter Langewiesche, and Paul Nolte (eds), *Wege der Gesellschaftsgeschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck && Ruprecht, 2006), pp. 81–102.

24 On the second wave see Julia Adams, Elisabeth S. Clemens, and Ann Shola Orloff, 'Introduction: Social Theory, Modernity, and the Three Waves of Historical Sociology', in Julia Adams, Elisabeth S. Clemens, and Ann Shola Orloff (eds), *Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), pp. 1–72, at pp. 15–22.

25 Followers of Elias later extended the master's scope, especially Johan Goudsblom and his school.

26 Even those early 'cosmopolitan' authors, from Karl Marx to Fernand Braudel, are, of course, Eurocentrically biased if judged by very strict standards. See Jack Goody, *The Theft of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). For most of what global historians need to know about Weber see Stephen Kalberg, *Max Weber's Comparative-Historical Sociology* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994).

27 Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, 'Multiple Modernities', *Daedalus* 129, 1 (2000), pp. 1–30; Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, 'Some Observations on Multiple Modernities', in Dominic Sachsenmaier, Jens Riedel, and Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (eds), *Reflections on Multiple Modernities: European, Chinese and Other Interpretations* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 28–41; and the essays collected in Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities*, 2 vols (Leiden: Brill, 2003). A good discussion is Thomas Schwinn, 'Multiple Modernities: Konkurrierende Thesen und offene Fragen. Ein Literaturbericht in konstruktiver Absicht', *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 38, 6 (2009), pp. 454–76. Therborn made the interesting suggestion to distinguish between different modernities not by institutions and values but according to their concepts of time: Göran Therborn, 'Entangled Modernities', *European Journal of Social Theory* 6, 3 (2003), pp. 293–305.

28 See also Wolfgang Knöbl, *Die Kontingenz der Moderne: Wege in Europa, Asien und Amerika* (Frankfurt a.M. and New York: Campus, 2007), pp. 70–110.

29 For summaries of the path-breaking work of that first generation of globalization studies see David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, *Globalization: Key Concepts* (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 1999); David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999); Jan Aart Scholte, *Globalization: A Critical Introduction* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 2000); Roland Robertson and Kathleen E. White (eds), *Globalization: Critical Concepts in Sociology*, 6 vols (London and New York: Routledge, 2003).

30 Wallerstein's own reflections are to be found in Immanuel Wallerstein, 'From Sociology to Historical Social Science: Prospects and Obstacles', *British Journal of Sociology* 51, 1 (2000), pp. 25–35; Immanuel Wallerstein, 'Wegbeschreibung der Analyse von Weltsystemen, oder: Wie vermeidet man, eine Theorie zu werden?' trans. Hans-Heinrich Nolte, *Zeitschrift für Weltgeschichte* 2, 2 (2001), pp. 9–31 (from an unpublished English manuscript).

31 Volume IV of his tetralogy 'The Modern World System' seems to have (so far) gone almost unnoticed. It is not really the 'global' interpretation of the nineteenth century many of his adherents had hoped for: Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System, vol. IV: Centrist Liberalism Triumphant, 1789–1914* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2011).

32 William I. Robinson, 'Globalization and the Sociology of Immanuel Wallerstein: A Critical Appraisal', *International Sociology* 26, 6 (2011), pp. 723–45, at p. 742, see also Immanuel Wallerstein's response: 'Robinson's Critical Appraisal Appraised', *International Sociology* 27, 4 (2012), pp. 524–8.

33 James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds), *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Delanty and Isin, *Handbook of Historical Sociology*; Adams et al., *Remaking Modernity*. For a comparison and classification of current approaches, see Willfried Spohn, 'Historical and Comparative Sociology in a Globalizing World', *Historická Sociologie* 1 (2009), pp. 9–27, at pp. 10–13. For an entirely different typology of strands within Historical Sociology, see Tilly, 'Historical Sociology', p. 6753.

34 This becomes apparent in any survey of the field: Conrad, *Globalgeschichte*; Sachsenmaier, *Global Perspectives on Global History*; Andrea Komlosy, *Globalgeschichte: Methoden und Theorien* (Vienna, Cologne, and Weimar: Böhlau, 2011);

Sebastian Conrad, Andreas Eckert, and Ulrike Freitag (eds), *Globalgeschichte: Theorien, Ansätze, Themen* (Frankfurt a.M. and New York: Campus, 2007); Jürgen Osterhammel, 'Globalgeschichte', in Hans-Jürgen Goertz (ed.), *Geschichte: Ein Grundkurs*, 3rd edn (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 2007), pp. 592–610; Patrick Manning, *Navigating World History: Historians Create a Global Past* (New York: Palgrave, 2003).

35 German authors tend to distinguish between Global History as a history of connectedness and World History as a more general history of civilizations, whereas international usage seems to conflate the two terms preferring a broader concept of global history—or what the Enlightenment called 'general' history.

36 Two recent examples chosen at random: Gina Hames, *Alcohol in World History* (London and New York: Routledge, 2012); Mary Jo Maynes and Ann Waltner, *The Family: A World History* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). The multi-volume *New Oxford World History* (to which the Maynes and Waltner volume belongs) seems to take such a line.

37 On Big History see the brief sketch Fred Spier, 'Big History', in Douglas Northrop (ed.), *A Companion to World History* (Malden, MA, Oxford, and Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), pp. 171–84.

38 An exception was Ernest Gellner, *Plough, Sword and Book: The Structure of Human History* (London: Collins Harvill, 1988).

39 Stephen K. Sanderson, *Social Transformations: A General Theory of Historical Development* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995); Niklas Luhmann, *Theory of Society*, vol. 2, trans. Rhodes Barrett (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013 [first German edition 1997]), pp. 27–131.

40 A good survey of concepts of world society (especially John W. Meyer, Niklas Luhmann, and his school) is Theresa Wobbe, *Weltgesellschaft* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2000).

41 For example Robert Strayer, *The Communist Experiment: Revolution, Socialism, and Global Conflict in the Twentieth Century* (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 2007); Gerd Koenen, *Was war der Kommunismus?* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck && Ruprecht, 2010); with relatively little historical depth: Pierre Hamel, Henri Lustiger-Thaler, and Jan Nederveen Pieterse (eds), *Globalization and Social Movements* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).

42 Allen Guttmann, *The Olympics: A History of the Modern Games*, 2nd edn (Urbana, IL and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002); David Goldblatt, *The Ball Is Round: A Global History of Football* (London: Viking, 2006); Maarten van Bottenburg, *Global Games,* trans. Beverley Jackson (Urbana IL and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001).

43 There is probably no need for detailed references here. A good overview is Peer H. H. Vries, 'Global Economic History: A Survey', in Axel Schneider and Daniel R. Woolf (eds), *Oxford History of Historical Writing,* vol. V (2011), pp. 113–35, and also Peer H. H. Vries, *Escaping Poverty: The Origins of Modern Economic Growth* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck && Ruprecht, 2013), which is partly a detailed critique of all the major authors in the field.

44 Eric L. Jones, *The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia*, 3rd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 238.

45 This occurs less frequently now than in the past, but see Jack A. Goldstone, *Why Europe? The Rise of the West in World History, 1500–1850* (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 2008); Niall Ferguson, *Civilization: The West and the Rest* (London: Allen Lane, 2011).

46 There is a lot of material but little analysis in Brett Bowden, *The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2009); a concise discussion is Bruce Mazlish, *Civilization and Its Contents* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004). On the concept of the West see Alastair Bonnett, *The Idea of the West: Culture, Politics and History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Jacinta O'Hagan, *Conceptualizing the West in International Relations: From Spengler to Said* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

47 See, for example, John Scott, *Social Network Analysis*, 3rd edn (Los Angeles: Sage, 2012); John Scott and Peter J. Carrington (eds), *The SAGE Handbook of Social Network Analysis* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2011); a more formal approach in David Easley and Jon Kleinberg, *Networks, Crowds and Markets: Reasoning about a Highly Connected World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

48 But see as a preliminary statement: Jürgen Osterhammel, 'Globalizations', in Jerry H. Bentley (ed.), *Oxford Handbook of World History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 89–104.

49 Steven C. Topik and Allen Wells, 'Commodity Chains in a Global Economy', in Emily Rosenberg (ed.), *A World Connecting, 1870–1945* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2012), pp. 593–812.

50 Lynn Hunt, 'The Global Financial Origins of 1789', in Suzanne Desan, Lynn Hunt, and William Max Nelson (eds), *The French Revolution in Global Perspective* (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2013), pp. 32–43.

51 Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori, 'Approaches to Global Intellectual History', in Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori (eds), *Global Intellectual History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 201), pp. 3–30, at p. 13.

52 David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (eds), *The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c.1760–1840* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Wim Klooster, *Revolutions in the Atlantic World: A Comparative History* (New York and London: New York University Press, 2009).

53 Joseph E. Inikori: *Africans and the Industrial Revolution in England: A Study in International Trade and Economic Development* (Cambridge*:* Cambridge University Press, 2002); Giorgio Riello and Prasannan Parthasarathi (eds), *The*

Spinning World: A Global History of Cotton Textiles, 1200–1850 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Giorgio Riello, *Cotton: The Fabric that Made the Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2013); Sven Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A New History of Global Capitalism* (London: Allen Lane, 2014).

54 Hans Belting, *Florence and Baghdad: Renaissance Art and Arab Science*, trans. Deborah Lucas Schneider (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).

55 Peter Hedström, *Dissecting the Social: On the Principles of Analytical Sociology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Peter Hedström and Richard Swedberg (eds), *Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Peter Hedström and Peter Bearman (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

56 I am paraphrasing Peter Hedström and Peter Bearman, 'What Is Analytical Sociology All About? An Introductory Essay', in Hedström and Bearman, *Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology,* pp. 3–24, at p. 5.

57 Reinhart Koselleck, 'Einleitung', in his *Zeitschichten: Studien zur Historik* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2000), pp. 9–16, at p. 12.

58 The greatest classical text for the theory of civilization was first published in 1913: Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, 'Note sur la notion de civilisation', in Marcel Mauss, *Œuvres, vol. II: Répresentations collectives et diversité des civilisations*, ed. Victor Karady (Paris: Minuit, 1969), pp. 451–5.

59 Jóhann Páll Árnason, *Civilizations in Dispute: Historical Questions and Theoretical Traditions* (Leiden: Brill, 2003); see also Wolfgang Knöbl, 'Contingency and Modernity in the Thought of J. P. Arnason', *European Journal of Social Theory* 14, 1 (2011), pp. 9–22.

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66 John Urry, 'Mobilities and Social Theory', in Bryan S. Turner (ed.), *The New Blackwell Companion to Social Theory* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 475–95. See also the Journal *Mobilities* published since 2006 and edited by John Urry et al.

67 See the chapters on these authors in Matthias Middell and Ulf Engel (eds), *Theoretiker der Globalisierung* (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2010); see also Andrew Jones, *Globalization: Key Thinkers* (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2010).

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78 Wolfgang Knöbl, 'Social History and Historical Sociology', *Historická Sociologie* 1 (2013), pp. 9–32, at pp. 24–5.

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80 Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); see also Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (eds), *Historical Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

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82 But see an attempt to integrate these aspects: Zine Magubane, 'Overlapping Territories and Intertwined Histories: Historical Sociology's Global Imagination', in Adams, Clemens, and Orloff, *Remaking Modernity*, pp. 92–108. An excellent survey of many forms of 'mixing' is Peter Burke, *Cultural Hybridity* (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2009).

83 The most important sociological analyses of colonialism came from a sociological tradition that was closer to ethnology than to history. A good example is the work of Georges Balandier.

84 A little-known effort in this direction was made long ago in Peter Laslett, 'Social Structural Time: An Attempt at Classifying Types of Social Change by Their Characteristic Paces', in Tom Schuller and Michael Young (eds), *The Rhythms of Society* (London and New York: Routledge, 1988), pp. 17–36. A highly relevant sociological contribution to the theory of time and change (especially good on 'turning points') is Andrew Abbott, *Time Matters: On Theory and Method* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2001).

85 The same concern was voiced from a sociologist's point of view by Wolfgang Knöbl in his opening remarks at the workshop 'Macrosociology and World History Writing', Freiburg Institute of Advanced Study, Freiburg i.Br. (Germany), 10 to 11 February 2012 (unpublished manuscript, p. 4).

86 See, above all, Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, 4 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986–2013); the most relevant volume for theoretical purposes continues to be vol. I. A highly original discussion of the history of the state from a global history angle is Charles S. Maier, *Leviathan 2.0: Inventing Modern Statehood* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2014).

87 See as a wide-ranging survey Larry Neal and Jeffrey G. Williamson (eds), *The Cambridge History of Capitalism,* 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

88 On that see Karen Barkey, 'Historical Sociology', in: Hedström and Bearman, *Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology*, pp. 712–33.

89 Excellent surveys of various ways of theorizing 'global modernity' are to be found in Spohn, 'Historical and Comparative Sociology in a Globalizing World' and Spohn, 'Globale, multiple und (post-) koloniale Modernen: Eine interzivilisatorische und historisch-soziologische Perspektive', in Manuela Boatcă and Willfried Spohn (eds), *Globale, multiple und postkoloniale Modernen* (Munich: Hampp, 2010), pp. 1–28.