

## Official Nationalism and Imperialism

In the course of the nineteenth century, and especially in its latter half, the philological-lexicographic revolution and the rise of intra-European nationalist movements, themselves the products, not only of capitalism, but of the elephantiasis of the dynastic states, created increasing cultural, and therefore political, difficulties for many dynasts. For, as we have seen, the fundamental legitimacy of most of these dynasties had nothing to do with nationalness. Romanovs ruled over Tatars and Letts, Germans and Armenians, Russians and Finns. Habsburgs were perched high over Magyars and Croats, Slovaks and Italians, Ukrainians and Austro-Germans. Hanoverians presided over Bengalis and Québécois, as well as Scots and Irish, English and Welsh.<sup>1</sup> On the continent, furthermore, members of the same dynastic families often ruled in different, sometimes rivalrous, states. What nationality should be assigned to Bourbons ruling in France and

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1. It is nice that what eventually became the late British Empire has not been ruled by an 'English' dynasty since the early eleventh century: since then a motley parade of Normans (Plantagenets), Welsh (Tudors), Scots (Stuarts), Dutch (House of Orange) and Germans (Hanoverians) have squatted on the imperial throne. No one much cared until the philological revolution and a paroxysm of English nationalism in World War I. House of Windsor rhymes with House of Schönbrunn or House of Versailles.

Spain, Hohenzollerns in Prussia and Rumania, Wittelsbachs in Bavaria and Greece?

We have also seen that for essentially administrative purposes these dynasties had, at different speeds, settled on certain print-vernaculars as languages-of-state – with the ‘choice’ of language essentially a matter of unselfconscious inheritance or convenience.

The lexicographic revolution in Europe, however, created, and gradually spread, the conviction that languages (in Europe at least) were, so to speak, the personal property of quite specific groups – their daily speakers and readers – and moreover that these groups, imagined as communities, were entitled to their autonomous place in a fraternity of equals. The philological incendiaries thus presented the dynasts with a disagreeable dilemma which did not fail to sharpen over time. Nowhere is this dilemma clearer than in the case of Austro-Hungary. When the enlightened absolutist Joseph II decided early in the 1780s to switch the language of state from Latin to German, ‘he did not fight, for instance, against the Magyar language, but he fought against the Latin. . . . He thought that, on the basis of the mediaeval Latin administration of the nobility, no effective work in the interest of the masses could have been carried on. The necessity of a unifying language connecting all parts of his empire seemed to him a peremptory claim. Under this necessity he could not choose any other language than German, the only one which had a vast culture and literature under its sway and which had a considerable minority in all his provinces.’<sup>2</sup> Indeed, ‘the Habsburgs were *not* a consciously and consequentially Germanizing power. . . . There were *Habsburgs who did not even speak German*. Even those Habsburg emperors who sometimes fostered a policy of Germanization were not led in their efforts by any nationalistic point of view, but their measures were dictated by the intent of unification and universalism of their empire.’<sup>3</sup> Their essential aim was *Haushmacht*. After the middle of the nineteenth century, however, German

2. Jászi, *The Dissolution*, p. 71. It is interesting that Joseph had refused to take the coronation oath as King of Hungary because this would have committed him to respecting the ‘constitutional’ privileges of the Magyar nobility. Ignotus, *Hungary*, p. 47.

3. Ibid., p. 137. Emphasis added.

increasingly acquired a double status: ‘universal-imperial’ and ‘particular-national’. The more the dynasty pressed German in its first capacity, the more it appeared to be siding with its German-speaking subjects, and the more it aroused antipathy among the rest. Yet if it did not so press, indeed made concessions to other languages, above all Hungarian, not only was unification set back, but its German-speaking subjects allowed themselves to feel affronted. Thus it threatened to be hated simultaneously as champion of the Germans and traitor to them. (In much the same way, the Ottomans came to be hated by Turkish-speakers as apostates and by non-Turkish-speakers as Turkifiers.)

Insofar as all dynasts by mid-century were using *some vernacular* as language-of-state,<sup>4</sup> and also because of the rapidly rising prestige all over Europe of the national idea, there was a discernible tendency among the Euro-Mediterranean monarchies to sidle towards a beckoning national identification. Romanovs discovered they were Great Russians, Hanoverians that they were English, Hohenzollerns that they were Germans – and with rather more difficulty their cousins turned Romanian, Greek, and so forth. On the one hand, these new identifications shored up legitimacies which, in an age of capitalism, scepticism, and science, could less and less safely rest on putative sacrality and sheer antiquity. On the other hand, they posed new dangers. If Kaiser Wilhelm II cast himself as ‘No. 1 German,’ he implicitly conceded that he was *one among many of the same kind as himself*, that he had a representative function, and therefore could, in principle, be a *traitor* to his fellow-Germans (something inconceivable in the dynasty’s heyday. Traitor to whom or to what?). In the wake of the disaster that overtook Germany in 1918, he was taken at his implied word. Acting in the name of the German nation, civilian politicians (publicly) and the General Staff (with its usual courage, secretly) sent him packing from the Fatherland to an obscure Dutch suburb. So too Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, having cast himself,

4. One could argue that a long era closed in 1844, when Magyar finally replaced Latin as language-of-state in the Kingdom of Hungary. But, as we have seen, dog-Latin was in fact the *vernacular* of the Magyar middle and lower nobility until well into the nineteenth century.

not as Shah, but as Shah of Iran, came to be branded traitor. That he himself accepted, not the verdict, but, as it were, the jurisdiction of the national court, is shown by a small comedy at the moment of his departure into exile. Before climbing the ramp of his jet, he kissed the earth for the photographers and announced that he was taking a small quantity of sacred Iranian soil with him. This take is lifted from a film about Garibaldi, not the Sun King.<sup>5</sup>

The ‘naturalizations’ of Europe’s dynasties – maneuvers that required in many cases some diverting acrobatics – eventually led to what Seton-Watson bitingly calls ‘official nationalisms,’<sup>6</sup> of which Czarist Russification is only the best-known example. These ‘official nationalisms’ can best be understood as a means for combining naturalization with retention of dynastic power, in particular over the huge polyglot domains accumulated since the Middle Ages, or, to put it another way, for stretching the short, tight, skin of the nation over the gigantic body of the empire. ‘Russification’ of the heterogeneous population of the Czar’s subjects thus represented a violent, conscious welding of two opposing political orders, one ancient, one quite new. (While there is a certain analogy with, say, the Hispanization of the Americas and the Philippines, one central difference remains. The cultural conquistadors of late-nineteenth-century Czardom were proceeding from a selfconscious Machiavellism, while their sixteenth-century Spanish ancestors acted out of an unselfconscious everyday pragmatism. Nor was it for them really ‘Hispanization’ – rather it was simply *conversion* of heathens and savages.)

The key to situating ‘official nationalism’ – willed merger of nation and dynastic empire – is to remember that it developed *after*, and *in reaction to*, the popular national movements proliferating in Europe since the 1820s. If these nationalisms were modelled on

5. From Professor Chehabi of Harvard University I have learned that the Shah was in the first instance imitating his father, Reza Pahlavi, who, on being exiled by London to Mauritius in 1941, included some Iranian soil in his luggage.

6. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, p. 148. Alas, the bite extends only to Eastern Europe. Seton-Watson is rightly sardonic at the expense of Romanov and Soviet regimes, but overlooks analogous policies being pursued in London, Paris, Berlin, Madrid and Washington.

American and French histories, so now they became modular in turn.<sup>7</sup> It was only that a certain inventive legerdemain was required to permit the empire to appear attractive in national drag.

To gain some perspective on this whole process of reactionary, secondary modelling, we may profitably consider some parallel, yet usefully contrasting cases.

How uneasy Romanov autocracy initially felt at ‘taking to the streets’ is excellently shown by Seton-Watson.<sup>8</sup> As noted earlier, the language of the court of St. Petersburg in the eighteenth century was French, while that of much of the provincial nobility was German. In the aftermath of Napoléon’s invasion, Count Sergei Uvarov, in an official report of 1832, proposed that the realm should be based on the three principles of Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationality (*natsionalnost*). If the first two were old, the third was quite novel – and somewhat premature in an age when half the ‘nation’ were still serfs, and more than half spoke a mother-tongue other than Russian. Uvarov’s report won him the post of Minister of Education, but little more. For another half-century Czarism resisted Uvarovian enticements. It was not until the reign of Alexander III (1881–94) that Russification became official dynastic policy: long after Ukrainian, Finnish, Lett and other nationalisms had appeared within the Empire. Ironically enough, the first Russifying measures were taken against precisely those ‘nationalities’ which had been most *Kaisertreu* – such as the Baltic Germans. In 1887, in the Baltic provinces, Russian was made compulsory as the language of instruction in all state schools above the lowest primary classes, a measure later extended to private schools as well. In 1893, the University of Dorpat, one of the most distinguished colleges in the imperial domains, was closed down because it used German in the lecture-rooms. (Recall that hitherto German had been a provincial language-of-state, *not* the voice of a popular nationalist movement).

7. There is an instructive parallel to all this in the politico-military reforms of Scharnhorst, Clausewitz and Gneisenau who in a selfconsciously conservative spirit adapted many of the spontaneous innovations of the French Revolution for the erection of the great modular professionally-officered, standing, conscript army of the nineteenth century.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 83–87.

And so on. Seton-Watson even goes so far as to venture that the Revolution of 1905 was ‘as much a revolution of non-Russians against Russification as it was a revolution of workers, peasants, and radical intellectuals against autocracy. The two revolts were of course connected: the social revolution was in fact most bitter in non-Russian regions, with Polish workers, Latvian peasants, and Georgian peasants as protagonists.’<sup>9</sup>

At the same time, it would be a big mistake to suppose that since Russification was a *dynastic* policy, it did not achieve one of its main purposes – marshalling a growing ‘Great Russian’ nationalism behind the throne. And not simply on the basis of sentiment. Enormous opportunities were after all available for Russian functionaries and entrepreneurs in the vast bureaucracy and expanding market that the empire provided.

No less interesting than Alexander III, Russifying Czar of All the Russias, is his contemporary Victoria von Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Queen of England *and*, late in life, Empress of India. Actually her title is more interesting than her person, for it represents emblematically the thickened metal of a weld between nation and empire.<sup>10</sup> Her reign too marks the onset of a London-style ‘official nationalism’ which has strong affinities with the Russification being pursued in St. Petersburg. A good way to appreciate this affinity is by longitudinal comparison.

In *The Break-up of Britain*, Tom Nairn raises the problem of why there was no Scottish nationalist movement in the late eighteenth century, in spite of a rising Scots bourgeoisie and a very distinguished Scots intelligentsia.<sup>11</sup> Hobsbawm has peremptorily dismissed Nairn’s thoughtful discussion with the remark: ‘It is pure anachronism to expect [the Scots] to have demanded an independent state at this time.’<sup>12</sup> Yet if we recall that Benjamin Franklin, who co-signed the American Declaration of Independence, was born five years before

9. *Ibid.*, p. 87.

10. This weld’s disintegration is clocked by the procession from British Empire to British Commonwealth, to Commonwealth, to . . . ?

11. *The Break-up of Britain*, pp. 106ff.

12. ‘Some Reflections’, p. 5.

## OFFICIAL NATIONALISM AND IMPERIALISM

David Hume, we may be inclined to think this judgement itself a shade anachronistic.<sup>13</sup> It seems to me that the difficulties – and their resolution – lie elsewhere.

On the other hand, there is Nairn's good nationalist tendency to treat his 'Scotland' as an unproblematic, primordial given. Bloch reminds us of the chequered ancestry of this 'entity', observing that the ravages of the Danes and William the Conqueror destroyed forever the cultural hegemony of Northern, Anglo-Saxon Northumbria, symbolized by such luminaries as Alcuin and Bede:<sup>14</sup>

A part of the northern zone was detached for ever from England proper. Cut off from other populations of Anglo-Saxon speech by the settlement of the Vikings in Yorkshire, the lowlands round about the Northumbrian citadel of Edinburgh fell under the domination of the Celtic chiefs of the hills. Thus the bilingual kingdom of Scotland was by a sort of backhanded stroke a creation of the Scandinavian invasions.

And Seton-Watson, for his part, writes that the Scottish language:<sup>15</sup>

developed from the flowing together of Saxon and French, though with less of the latter and with rather more from Celtic and Scandinavian sources than in the south. This language was spoken not only in the east of Scotland but also in northern England. Scots, or 'northern English,' was spoken at the Scottish court and by the social elite (who might or might not also speak Gaelic), as well as by the Lowland population as a whole. It was the language of the poets Robert Henryson and William Dunbar. It might have developed as a distinct literary language into modern times had not the union of the crowns in 1603 brought the predominance of southern English through its extension to the court, administration and upper class of Scotland.

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13. In a book significantly entitled *Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence*, Gary Wills argues in fact that the nationalist Jefferson's thinking was fundamentally shaped, not by Locke, but by Hume, Hutcheson, Adam Smith, and other eminences of the Scottish Enlightenment.

14. *Feudal Society*, I, p. 42.

15. *Nations and States*, pp. 30–31.

The key point here is that already in the early seventeenth century large parts of what would one day be imagined as Scotland were English-speaking and had immediate access to print-English, provided a minimal degree of literacy existed. Then in the early eighteenth century the English-speaking Lowlands collaborated with London in largely exterminating the Gaeltacht. In neither ‘northward thrust’ was a selfconscious Anglicizing policy pursued – in both cases Anglicization was essentially a byproduct. But combined, they had effectively eliminated, ‘before’ the age of nationalism, any possibility of a European-style vernacular-specific nationalist movement. Why not one in the American style? Part of the answer is given by Nairn in passing, when he speaks of a ‘massive intellectual migration’ southwards from the mid eighteenth century onwards.<sup>16</sup> But there was more than an intellectual migration. Scottish politicians came south to legislate, and Scottish businessmen had open access to London’s markets. In effect, in complete contrast to the Thirteen Colonies (and to a lesser extent Ireland), *there were no barricades* on all these pilgrims’ paths towards the centre. (Compare the clear highway before Latin- and German-reading Hungarians to Vienna in the eighteenth century.) English had yet to become an ‘English’ language.

The same point can be made from a different angle. It is true that in the seventeenth century London resumed an acquisition of overseas territories arrested since the disastrous ending to the Hundred Years War. But the ‘spirit’ of these conquests was still fundamentally that of a prenational age. Nothing more stunningly confirms this than the fact that ‘India’ only became ‘British’ twenty years after Victoria’s accession to the throne. In other words, until after the 1857 Mutiny, ‘India’ was ruled by a commercial enterprise – not by a state, and certainly not by a nation-state.

But change was on the way. When the East India Company’s charter came up for renewal in 1813, Parliament mandated the allocation of 100,000 rupees a year for the promotion of native education, *both* ‘oriental’ and ‘Western.’ In 1823, a Committee of Public Instruction was set up in Bengal; and in 1834, Thomas

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16. *The Break-up of Britain*, p. 123.

Babington Macaulay became president of this committee. Declaring that ‘a single shelf of a good European library is worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia,’<sup>17</sup> he produced the following year his notorious ‘Minute on Education.’ Luckier than Uvarov, his recommendations went into immediate effect. A thoroughly English educational system was to be introduced which, in Macaulay’s own ineffable words, would create ‘a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinion, in morals and in intellect.’<sup>18</sup> In 1836, he wrote that:<sup>19</sup>

No Hindu who has received an English education ever remains sincerely attached to his religion. It is my firm belief [so they always were] that if our plans of education are followed up, there will not be a single idolater among the respectable classes in Bengal thirty years hence.

There is here, to be sure, a certain naive optimism, which reminds us of Fermín in Bogotá half a century earlier. But the important thing is that we see a long-range (30 years!) policy, consciously formulated and pursued, to turn ‘idolaters,’ not so much into Christians, as into people culturally English, despite their irremediable colour and blood. A sort of mental miscegenation is intended, which, when compared with Fermín’s physical one, shows that, like so much else in the Victorian age, imperialism made enormous progress in daintiness. In any event, it can be safely said that from this point on, all over the expanding empire, if at different speeds, Macaulayism was pursued.<sup>20</sup>

Like Russification, Anglicization naturally also offered rosy

17. We can be confident that this bumptious young middle-class English Uvarov knew nothing about either ‘native literature’.

18. See Donald Eugene Smith, *India as a Secular State*, pp. 337–38; and Percival Spear, *India, Pakistan and the West*, p. 163.

19. Smith, *India*, p. 339.

20. See, for example, Roff’s poker-faced account of the founding in 1905 of the Kuala Kangsar Malay College, which quickly became known, wholly without irony, as ‘the Malay Eton.’ True to Macaulay’s prescriptions, its pupils were drawn from the ‘respectable classes’ – i.e. the compliant Malay aristocracy. Half the early boarders were direct descendants of various Malay sultans. William R. Roff, *The Origins of Malay Nationalism*, pp. 100–105.

opportunities to armies of middle-class metropolitans (not least Scotsmen!) – functionaries, schoolmasters, merchants, and planters – who quickly fanned out over the vast, permanently sunlit realm. Nonetheless there was a central difference between the empires ruled from St. Petersburg and London. Czardom remained a ‘continuous’ continental domain, confined to the temperate and arctic zones of Eurasia. One could, so to speak, walk from one end of it to the other. Linguistic kinship with the Slavic populations of Eastern Europe, and – to put it pleasantly – historical, political, religious and economic ties with many non-Slavic peoples, meant that *relatively* speaking, the barriers on the road to St. Petersburg were not impermeable.<sup>21</sup> The British Empire, on the other hand, was a grab-bag of primarily tropical possessions scattered over every continent. Only a minority of the subjected peoples had any long-standing religious, linguistic, cultural, or even political and economic, ties with the metropole. Juxtaposed to one another in the Jubilee Year, they resembled those random collections of Old Masters hastily assembled by English and American millionaires which eventually turn into solemnly imperial state museums.

The consequences are well illustrated by the bitter recollections of Bipin Chandra Pal, who, in 1932, a century after Macaulay’s ‘Minute’, still felt angry enough to write that Indian Magistrates:<sup>22</sup>

had not only passed a very rigid test on the same terms as British members of the service, but had spent the very best years of the formative period of their youth in England. Upon their return to their homeland, they practically lived in the same style as their brother Civilians, and *almost religiously* followed the social conventions and the ethical standards of the latter. In those days the India-born [sic – compare our Spanish-American creoles] Civilian practically cut himself off from his parent society, and lived and moved and had his being in the atmosphere so beloved of his British colleagues. *In mind and manners he was as much an Englishman as any Englishman.* It was no small sacrifice for him, because in this way he completely estranged himself from the society of his own people and became socially and morally a pariah

21. The trans-Ural populations were another story.

22. See his *Memories of My Life and Times*, pp. 331–32. Emphases added.

among them. . . . He was as much a *stranger in his own native land* as the European residents in the country.

So far, so Macaulay. Much more serious, however, was that such strangers in their native land were *still* condemned – no less fatally than the American creoles – to an ‘irrational’ permanent subordination to the English maturrangos. It was not simply that, no matter how Anglicized a Pal became, he was always barred from the uppermost peaks of the Raj. He was also barred from movement outside its perimeter – laterally, say, to the Gold Coast or Hong Kong, and vertically to the metropole. ‘Completely estranged from the society of his own people’ he might be, but he was under life sentence to serve among them. (To be sure, who ‘they’ included varied with the stretch of British conquests on the subcontinent.<sup>23</sup>)

We shall be looking later at the consequences of official nationalisms for the rise of twentieth-century Asian and African nationalisms. For our purposes here, what needs to be stressed is that Anglicization produced thousands of Pals all over the world. Nothing more sharply underscores the fundamental contradiction of English official nationalism, i.e. the inner incompatibility of empire and nation. I say ‘nation’ advisedly, because it is always tempting to account for these Pals in terms of racism. No one in their right mind would deny the profoundly racist character of nineteenth-century English imperialism. But the Pals also existed in the *white* colonies – Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa. English and Scottish school-masters also swarmed there, and Anglicization was also cultural policy. As to Pal, to them too the looping upward path still open to the Scots in the eighteenth century was closed. Anglicized Australians did not serve in Dublin or Manchester, and not even in Ottawa or Capetown. Nor, until quite late on, could they become Governors-

23. It is true that Indian officials were employed in Burma; but Burma was administratively part of British India until 1937. Indians also served in subordinate capacities – especially in the police – in British Malaya and Singapore, but they served as ‘locals’ and ‘immigrants’, i.e. were not transferable ‘back’ to India’s police forces. Note that the emphasis here is on officials: Indian labourers, merchants, and even professionals, moved in sizeable numbers to British colonies in Southeast Asia, South and East Africa, and even the Caribbean.

General in Canberra.<sup>24</sup> Only 'English English' did, i.e. members of a half-concealed English nation.

Three years before the East India Company lost its Indian hunting-ground, Commodore Perry with his black ships peremptorily battered down the walls that for so long had kept Japan in self-imposed isolation. After 1854, the self-confidence and inner legitimacy of the Bakufu (Tokugawa Shogunate regime) were rapidly undermined by a conspicuous impotence in the face of the penetrating West. Under the banner of Sonnō Jōi (Revere the Sovereign, Expel the Barbarians), a small band of middle-ranking samurai, primarily from the Satsuma and Chōshū *han*, finally overthrew it in 1868. Among the reasons for their success was an exceptionally creative absorption, especially after 1860, of the new Western military science systematized since 1815 by Prussian and French staff professionals. They were thus able to make effective use of 7,300 ultra-modern rifles (most of them American Civil War scrap), purchased from an English arms-merchant.<sup>25</sup> 'In the use of guns . . .

24. To be sure, by late Edwardian times, a few 'white colonials' did migrate to London and become members of Parliament or prominent press-lords.

25. Here the key figure was Ōmura Masujirō (1824–1869), the so-called 'Father of the Japanese Army'. A low-ranking Chōshū samurai, he started his career by studying Western medicine through Dutch-language manuals. (It will be recalled that until 1854 the Dutch were the only Westerners permitted access to Japan, and this access was limited essentially to the island of Deshima off the Bakufu-controlled port of Nagasaki.) On graduating from the Tekijyuku in Osaka, then the best Dutch-language training centre in the country, he returned home to practise medicine – but without much success. In 1853, he took a position in Uwajima as instructor in Western learning, with a foray to Nagasaki to study naval science. (He designed and supervised the building of Japan's first steamship on the basis of written manuals.) His chance came after Perry's arrival; he moved to Edo in 1856 to work as an instructor at what would become the National Military Academy and at the Bakufu's top research office for the study of Western texts. His translations of European military works especially on Napoléon's innovations in strategy and tactics, won him fame and recall to Chōshū in 1860 to serve as military adviser. In 1864–65, he proved the relevance of his writing as a successful commander in the Chōshū civil war. Subsequently he became the first Meiji Minister of War, and drew up the regime's revolutionary plans for mass conscription and elimination of the samurai as a legal caste. For his pains he was assassinated by an outraged samurai. See Albert M. Craig, *Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration*, especially pp. 202–204, 267–280.

the men of Chōshū had such mastery that the old blood and thunder slash and cut methods were quite useless against them.<sup>26</sup>

Once in power, however, the rebels, whom we remember today as the Meiji oligarchs, found that their military prowess did not automatically guarantee political legitimacy. If the Tennō ('Emperor') could quickly be restored with the abolition of the Bakufu, the barbarians could not so easily be expelled.<sup>27</sup> Japan's geopolitical security remained just as fragile as before 1868. One of the basic means adopted for consolidating the oligarchy's domestic position was thus a variant of mid-century 'official nationalism,' rather consciously modelled on Hohenzollern Prussia-Germany. Between 1868 and 1871, all residual local 'feudal' military units were dissolved, giving Tokyo a centralized monopoly of the means of violence. In 1872, an Imperial Rescript ordered the promotion of universal literacy among adult males. In 1873, well before the United Kingdom, Japan introduced conscription. At the same time, the regime liquidated the samurai as a legally-defined and privileged class, an essential step not only for (slowly) opening the officer corps to all talents, but also to fit the now 'available' nation-of-citizens model. The Japanese peasantry was freed from subjection to the feudal *han*-system and henceforth exploited directly by the state and commercial-agricultural landowners.<sup>28</sup> In 1889, there followed a Prussian-style constitution and eventually universal male suffrage.

In this orderly campaign the men of Meiji were aided by three half-fortuitous factors. First was the relatively high degree of Japanese ethnocultural homogeneity resulting from two and a half centuries of isolation and internal pacification by the Bakufu. While the Japanese spoken in Kyūshū was largely incomprehensible in Honshū, and

26. A contemporary Japanese observer, quoted in E. Herbert Norman, *Soldier and Peasant in Japan*, p. 31.

27. They knew this from bitter personal experience. In 1862, an English squadron had levelled half the Satsuma port of Kagoshima; in 1864, a joint American, Dutch, and English naval unit destroyed the Chōshū coastal fortifications at Shimonoseki. John M. Maki, *Japanese Militarism*, pp. 146–47.

28. All this reminds one of those reforms accomplished in Prussia after 1810 in response to Blücher's impassioned plea to Berlin: 'Get us a national army!' Vagts, *A History of Militarism*, p. 130; Cf. Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army*, ch. 2.

even Edo-Tokyo and Kyoto-Ōsaka found verbal communication problematic, the half-Sinified ideographic reading-system was long in place throughout the islands, and thus the development of mass literacy through schools and print was easy and uncontroversial. Second, the unique antiquity of the imperial house (Japan is the only country whose monarchy has been monopolized by a single dynasty throughout recorded history), and its emblematic Japanese-ness (contrast Bourbons and Habsburgs), made the exploitation of the Emperor for official-nationalist purposes rather simple.<sup>29</sup> Third, the penetration of the barbarians was abrupt, massive, and menacing enough for most elements of the politically-aware population to rally behind a programme of self-defence conceived in the new national terms. It is worth emphasizing that this possibility had everything to do with the timing of Western penetration, i.e. the 1860s as opposed to the 1760s. For by then, in dominant Europe, the ‘national community’ had been coming into its own for half a century, in both popular and official versions. In effect, self-defence could be fashioned along lines and in accordance with what were coming to be ‘international norms.’

That the gamble paid off, in spite of the terrible sufferings imposed on the peasantry by the ruthless fiscal exactions required to pay for a munitions-based programme of industrialization, was certainly due in part to the single-minded determination of the oligarchs themselves. Fortunate to come to power in an era in which numbered accounts in Zürich lay in an undreamed-of future, they were not tempted to move the exacted surplus outside Japan. Fortunate to rule in an age when military technology was still advancing at a relative amble, they were able, with their catch-up armaments programme, to turn Japan into an independent military power by the end of the century. Spectacular successes by Japan’s conscript army against China in 1894–5, and by her navy against Czardom in 1905, plus the annexation of Taiwan (1895) and Korea (1910), all consciously

29. But I have been informed by scholars of Japan that recent excavations of the earliest royal tombs suggest strongly that the family may originally have been – horrors! – Korean. The Japanese government has strongly discouraged further research on these sites.

propagandized through schools and print, were extremely valuable in creating the general impression that the conservative oligarchy was an authentic representative of the nation of which Japanese were coming to imagine themselves members.

That this nationalism took on an aggressive imperialist character, even outside ruling circles, can best be accounted for by two factors: the legacy of Japan's long isolation and the power of the official-national model. Maruyama shrewdly points out that all nationalisms in Europe arose in the context of a traditional pluralism of interacting dynastic states – as I put it earlier, Latin's European universalism never had a political correlate.<sup>30</sup>

National consciousness in Europe therefore bore from its inception the imprint of a consciousness of international society. It was a self-evident premise that disputes among sovereign states were conflicts among independent members of this international society. Precisely for this reason war, since Grotius, has come to occupy an important and systematic place in international law.

Centuries of Japanese isolation, however, meant that:<sup>31</sup>

an awareness of equality in international affairs was totally absent. The advocates of expulsion [of the barbarians] viewed international relations from positions within the national hierarchy based on the supremacy of superiors over inferiors. Consequently, when the premises of the national hierarchy were transferred horizontally into the international sphere, international problems were reduced to a single alternative: conquer or be conquered. In the absence of any higher normative standards with which to gauge international relations, power politics is bound to be the rule and yesterday's timid defensiveness will become today's unrestrained expansionism.

Secondly, the oligarchy's prime models were the self-naturalizing dynasties of Europe. Insofar as these dynasties were more and more defining themselves in national terms, while at the same time

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30. Maruyama Masao, *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics*, p. 138.

31. Ibid., pp. 139–40.

expanding their power outside Europe, it is not surprising that the model should have been understood imperially.<sup>32</sup> As the parcellization of Africa at the Congress of Berlin (1885) showed, great nations were global conquerors. How plausible then to argue that, for Japan to be accepted as ‘great,’ she too should turn Tennō into Emperor and launch overseas adventures, even if she was late to the game and had a lot of catching up to do. Few things give one a sharper sense of the way these residues impinged on the consciousness of the reading population than the following formulation by the radical-nationalist ideologue and revolutionary Kita Ikki (1884–1937), in his very influential *Nihon Kaizō Hōan Taikō* [Outline for the Reconstruction of Japan], published in 1924:<sup>33</sup>

As the class struggle within a nation is waged for the readjustment of unequal distinctions, so war between nations for an honorable cause will reform the present unjust distinctions. The British Empire is a millionaire possessing wealth all over the world; and Russia is a great landowner in occupation of the northern half of the globe. Japan with her scattered fringe [sic] of islands is one of the proletariat, and she has the right to declare war on the big monopoly powers. The socialists of the West contradict themselves when they admit the right of class struggle to the proletariat at home and at the same time condemn war, waged by a proletariat among nations, as militarism and aggression . . . If it is permissible for the working class to unite to overthrow unjust authority by bloodshed, then unconditional approval should be given to Japan to perfect her army and navy and make war for the rectification of unjust international frontiers. In the name of rational social democracy Japan claims possession of Australia and Eastern Siberia.

It remains only to add that, as the empire expanded after 1900, Japanification à la Macaulay was selfconsciously pursued as state policy. In the interwar years Koreans, Taiwanese and Manchurians,

32. Unluckily, the only alternative to the officially-nationalizing *dynastic* states of the time – Austro-Hungary – was not among the powers with a significant presence in the Far East.

33. As translated and cited in Richard Storry, *The Double Patriots*, p. 38.

and, after the outbreak of the Pacific War, Burmese, Indonesians and Filipinos, were subjected to policies for which the European model was an established working practice. And just as in the British Empire, Japanified Koreans, Taiwanese or Burmese had their passages to the metropole absolutely barred. They might speak and read Japanese perfectly, but they would never preside over prefectures in Honshū, or even be posted outside their zones of origin.

Having considered these three varied cases of 'official nationalism', it is important to stress that the model could be selfconsciously followed by states with no serious great power pretensions, so long as they were states in which the ruling classes or leading elements in them felt threatened by the world-wide spread of the nationally-imagined community. A comparison between two such states, Siam and Hungary-within-Austro-Hungary, may prove instructive.

Meiji's contemporary, the long-reigning Chulalongkorn (r. 1868–1910), defended his realm from Western expansionism in a style that differed markedly from that of his Japanese opposite number.<sup>34</sup> Squeezed between British Burma and Malaya, and French Indochina, he devoted himself to a shrewd manipulative diplomacy rather than attempting to build up a serious war machine. (A Ministry of War was not established until 1894.) In a way that reminds one of eighteenth-century Europe, his armed forces were primarily a motley array of Vietnamese, Khmer, Lao, Malay, and Chinese mercenaries and tributaries. Nor was anything much done to push an official nationalism through a modernized educational system. Indeed, primary education was not made compulsory till more than a decade after his death, and the country's first university was not set up until 1917, four decades after the founding of the Imperial University in Tokyo. Nonetheless, Chulalongkorn regarded himself as a modernizer. But his prime models were not the United Kingdom or Germany, but rather the colonial *beamtenstaaten* of the Dutch East

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34. The following section is a condensed version of part of my 'Studies of the Thai State: the State of Thai Studies', in Eliezer B. Ayal (ed.), *The State of Thai Studies*.

Indies, British Malaya, and the Raj.<sup>35</sup> Following these models meant rationalizing and centralizing royal government, eliminating traditional semi-autonomous tributary statelets, and promoting economic development somewhat along colonial lines. The most striking example of this – an example which in its odd way looks forward to contemporary Saudi Arabia – was his encouragement of a massive immigration of young, single, male foreigners to form the disoriented, politically powerless workforce needed to construct port facilities, build railway lines, dig canals, and expand commercial agriculture. This importing of *gastarbeiter* paralleled, indeed was modelled on, the policies of the authorities in Batavia and Singapore. And as in the case of the Netherlands Indies and British Malaya, the great bulk of the labourers imported during the nineteenth century were from southeastern China. It is instructive that this policy caused him neither personal qualms nor political difficulties – no more than it did the colonial rulers on whom he modelled himself. Indeed the policy made good short term sense for a *dynastic* state, since it created an impotent working class ‘outside’ Thai society and left that society largely ‘undisturbed.’

Wachirawut, his son and successor (r. 1910–1925), had to pick up the pieces, modelling himself this time on the self-naturalizing dynasts of Europe. Although – and because – he was educated in late Victorian England, he dramatized himself as his country’s ‘first nationalist.’<sup>36</sup> The target of this nationalism, however, was neither the United Kingdom, which controlled 90 per cent of Siam’s trade, nor France, which had recently made off with easterly segments of the old realm: it was the Chinese whom his father had so recently and blithely imported. The style of his anti-Chinese stance is suggested by the titles of two of his most famous pamphlets: *The Jews of the Orient* (1914), and *Clogs on Our Wheels* (1915).

35. Battye nicely shows that the purpose of the young monarch’s visits to Batavia and Singapore in 1870 and to India in 1872 was, in Chulalongkorn’s own sweet words, ‘selecting what may be safe models.’ See ‘The Military, Government and Society in Siam, 1868–1910,’ p. 118.

36. ‘The inspiration of Vajiravudh’s [Wachirawut’s] nationalist program was, first and foremost, Great Britain, the Western nation Vajiravudh knew best, at this time a nation caught up in imperialist enthusiasm.’ Walter F. Vella, *Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the Development of Thai Nationalism*, p. xiv. See also pp. 6 and 67–68.

Why the change? Doubtless dramatic events immediately preceding and following his coronation in November 1910 had their effect. The previous June the police had had to be called out to suppress a general strike by Bangkok's Chinese merchants (upwardly mobile children of early immigrants) and workers, marking their initiation into Siamese politics.<sup>37</sup> The following year, the Celestial Monarchy in Peking was swept away by a heterogeneous assortment of groups from which merchants were by no means absent. 'The Chinese' thus appeared as harbingers of a popular *republicanism* profoundly threatening to the dynastic principle. Second, as the words 'Jews' and 'Orient' suggest, the Anglicized monarch had imbibed the particular racisms of the English ruling class. But, in addition, there was the fact that Wachirawut was a sort of Asian Bourbon. In a pre-national era his ancestors had readily taken attractive Chinese girls as wives and concubines, with the result that, Mendelianly-speaking, he himself had more Chinese 'blood' than Thai.<sup>38</sup>

Here is a fine example of the character of official nationalism – an anticipatory strategy adopted by dominant groups which are threatened with marginalization or exclusion from an emerging nationally-imagined community. (It goes without saying that Wachirawut also began moving all the policy levers of official nationalism: compulsory state-controlled primary education, state-organized propaganda, official rewriting of history, militarism – here more visible show than the real thing – and endless affirmations of the identity of dynasty and nation.<sup>39</sup>)

The development of Hungarian nationalism in the nineteenth century shows in a different way the imprint of the 'official' model. We noted

37. The strike was occasioned by the government's decision to exact the same head-tax on the Chinese as on the native Thai. Hitherto it had been lower, as an inducement to immigration. See Bevans D. Mabry, *The Development of Labor Institutions in Thailand*, p. 38. (Exploitation of the Chinese came mainly via the opium-farm.)

38. For genealogical details, see my 'Studies of the Thai State,' p. 214.

39. He also coined the slogan, *Chat, Sasana, Kasat* (Nation, Religion, Monarch) which has been the shibboleth of rightwing regimes in Siam for the last quarter of a century. Here Uvarov's Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationality appear in reversed Thai order.

earlier the Latin-speaking Magyar nobility's enraged opposition to Joseph II's attempt in the 1780s to make German the sole imperial language-of-state. The more advantaged segments of this class feared losing their sinecures under a centralized, streamlined administration dominated by imperial-German bureaucrats. The lower echelons were panicked by the possibility of losing their exemptions from taxes and compulsory military service, as well as their control over the serfs and rural counties. Yet alongside the defence of Latin, Magyar was, quite opportunistically, spoken for, 'since in the long run a Magyar administration seemed the only workable alternative to a German one.'<sup>40</sup> Béla Grünwald sardonically noted that 'the same counties which (arguing against the decree of the Emperor) emphasized the possibility of an administration in the Magyar tongue, declared it in 1811 – that is, twenty-seven years later – an impossibility.' Two decades later still, in a very 'nationalistic' Hungarian county it was said that 'the introduction of the Magyar language would endanger our constitution and all our interests.'<sup>41</sup> It was really only in the 1840s that the Magyar nobility – a class consisting of about 136,000 souls monopolizing land and political rights in a country of eleven million people<sup>42</sup> – became seriously committed to Magyarization, and then only to prevent its own historic marginalization.

At the same time, slowly increasing literacy (by 1869 one third of the adult population), the spread of print-Magyar, and the growth of a small, but energetic, liberal intelligentsia all stimulated

40. Ignatius, *Hungary*, pp. 47–48. Thus in 1820 the *Tiger in Schlafröck* (Tiger in a Nightgown), Emperor Franz II, made a fine impression with his Latin address to the Hungarian magnates assembled in Pest. In 1825, however, the romantic-radical grand seigneur Count István Széchenyi 'staggered his fellow-magnates' in the Diet by addressing them in Magyar! Jászi, *The Dissolution*, p. 80; and Ignatius, *Hungary*, p. 51.

41. Translated citation from his *The Old Hungary* (1910) in Jászi, *The Dissolution*, pp. 70–71. Grünwald (1839–1891) was an interesting and tragic figure. Born to a Magyarized noble family of Saxon descent, he became both a superb administrator and one of Hungary's earliest social scientists. The publication of his research demonstrating that the famous Magyar gentry-controlled 'counties' were parasites on the nation evoked a savage campaign of public obloquy. He fled to Paris and there drowned himself in the Seine. Ignatius, *Hungary*, pp. 108–109.

42. Jászi, *The Dissolution*, p. 299.

a *popular* Hungarian nationalism conceived very differently from that of the nobility. This popular nationalism, symbolized for later generations by the figure of Lajos Kossuth (1802–1894), had its hour of glory in the Revolution of 1848. The revolutionary regime not only got rid of the imperial governors appointed by Vienna, but abolished the supposedly Ur-Magyar feudal Diet of Noble Counties, and proclaimed reforms to put an end to serfdom and noblemen's tax-exempt status, as well as to curb drastically the entailment of estates. In addition, it was decided that all Hungarian-speakers should be Hungarian (as only the privileged had been before) and every Hungarian should speak Magyar (as only some Magyars had hitherto been accustomed to do). As Ignatius drily comments, 'The "nation" was, by the standard of that time (which viewed the rise of the twin stars of Liberalism and Nationalism with boundless optimism), justified in feeling itself extremely generous when it "admitted" the Magyar peasant with no discrimination save for that relating to property;<sup>43</sup> and the non-Magyar Christians on condition they became Magyar; and eventually, with some reluctance and a delay of twenty years, the Jews.'<sup>44</sup> Kossuth's own position, in his fruitless negotiations with leaders of the various non-Magyar minorities, was that these peoples should have exactly the same civil rights as the Magyars, but that since they lacked 'historical personalities' they could not form nations on their own. Today, this position may seem a trifle arrogant. It will appear in a better light if we recall that the brilliant, young, radical-nationalist poet Sándor Petöfi (1823–1849), a leading spirit of 1848, on one occasion referred to the minorities as 'ulcers on the body of the motherland'.<sup>45</sup>

After the suppression of the revolutionary regime by Czarist armies in August 1849, Kossuth went into life-long exile. The stage was now set for a revival of 'official' Magyar nationalism, epitomized by the reactionary regimes of Count Kálmán Tisza

43. The Kossuth regime instituted adult male suffrage, but with such high property qualifications that relatively few persons were in a position to vote.

44. Ignatius, *Hungary*, p. 56.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

(1875–1890) and his son István (1903–1906). The reasons for this revival are very instructive. During the 1850s, the authoritarian-bureaucratic Bach administration in Vienna combined severe political repression with a firm implementation of certain social and economic policies proclaimed by the revolutionaries of 1848 (most notably the abolition of serfdom and noblemen's tax-exempt status) and the promotion of modernized communications and large-scale capitalist enterprise.<sup>46</sup> Largely deprived of its feudal privileges and security, and incapable of competing economically with the great latifundists and energetic German and Jewish entrepreneurs, the old middle and lower Magyar nobility declined into an angry, frightened rural gentry.

Luck, however, was on their side. Humiliatingly defeated by Prussian armies on the field of Königgrätz in 1866, Vienna was forced to accede to the institution of the Dual Monarchy in the Ausgleich (Compromise) of 1867. From them on, the Kingdom of Hungary enjoyed a very considerable autonomy in the running of its internal affairs. The initial beneficiaries of the Ausgleich were a group of liberal-minded high Magyar aristocrats and educated professionals. In 1868, the administration of the cultivated magnate Count Gyula Andrássy enacted a Nationalities Law which gave the non-Magyar minorities 'every right they had ever claimed or could have claimed – short of turning Hungary into a federation.'<sup>47</sup> But Tisza's accession to the premiership in 1875 opened an era in which the reactionary gentry successfully reconstituted their position, relatively free from Viennese interference.

In the economic field, the Tisza regime gave the great agrarian magnates a free hand,<sup>48</sup> but political power was essentially monopolized by the gentry. For,

46. Ignotus observes that Bach did provide the noblemen with some financial compensation for the loss of their privileges, 'probably neither more nor less than they would have got under Kossuth' (pp. 64–65).

47. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

48. As a result, the number of entailed estates trebled between 1867 and 1918. If one includes Church property, fully one third of all land in Hungary was entailed by the end of the Dual Monarchy. German and Jewish capitalists also did well under Tisza.

there remained only one refuge for the dispossessed: the administrative network of national and local government and the army. For these, Hungary needed a tremendous staff; and if she did not she could at least pretend to. Half the country consisted of 'nationalities' to be kept in check. To pay a host of reliable, Magyar, gentlemanly country magistrates to control them, so the argument ran, was a modest price for the national interest. The problem of multi-nationalities was also a godsend; it excused the proliferation of sinecures.

Thus 'the magnates held their entailed estates; the gentry held their entailed jobs.'<sup>49</sup> Such was the social basis for a pitiless policy of enforced Magyarization which after 1875 made the Nationalities Law a dead letter. Legal narrowing of the suffrage, proliferation of rotten boroughs, rigged elections, and organized political thuggery in the rural areas<sup>50</sup> simultaneously consolidated the power of Tisza and his constituency and underscored the 'official' character of their nationalism.

Jászi rightly compares this late-nineteenth-century Magyarization to 'the policy of Russian Tsardom against the Poles, the Finns, and the Ruthenians; the policy of Prussia against the Poles and Danes; and the policy of feudal England against the Irish.'<sup>51</sup> The nexus of reaction and official nationalism is nicely illustrated by these facts: while linguistic Magyarization was a central element of regime policy, by the end of the 1880s only 2 per cent of the officials in the more important branches of central and local governments were Romanian, although Romanians constituted 20 per cent of the population, and 'even these 2 per cent are employed in the lowest grades.'<sup>52</sup> On the other hand, in

49. Ibid., pp. 81 and 82.

50. The thuggery was mainly the work of the notorious 'pandoors,' part of the army put at the disposal of the county administrators and deployed as a violent rural police.

51. *The Dissolution*, p. 328.

52. According to the calculations of Lajos Mocsáry (*Some Words on the Nationality Problem*, Budapest, 1886), cited in ibid., pp. 331–332. Mocsáry (1826–1916) had in 1874 established a small Independence Party in the Hungarian parliament to fight for Kossuth's ideas, particularly on the minorities question. His speeches denouncing Tisza's blatant violations of the 1868 Nationalities Law led first to his physical extrusion from parliament and then expulsion from his own party. In 1888, he

the Hungarian parliament prior to World War I, there was ‘not a single representative of the working classes and of the landless peasantry (the great majority of the country) . . . and there were only 8 Romanians and Slovaks out of a total membership of 413 in a country in which only 54 per cent of the inhabitants spoke Magyar as their mother-tongue.’<sup>53</sup> Small wonder, then, that when Vienna sent in troops to dissolve this parliament in 1906, ‘not even a single mass-meeting, a single placard, or a single popular proclamation protested against the new era of “Viennese absolutism.”’ On the contrary the working masses and nationalities regarded with malicious joy the impotent struggle of the national oligarchy.<sup>54</sup>

The triumph of the reactionary Magyar gentry’s ‘official nationalism’ after 1875 cannot, however, be explained solely by that group’s own political strength, nor by the freedom of manoeuvre it inherited from the Ausgleich. The fact is that until 1906 the Habsburg court did not feel in a position to assert itself decisively against a regime which in many respects remained a pillar of the empire. Above all, the dynasty was incapable of superimposing a strenuous official nationalism of its own. Not merely because the regime was, in the words of the eminent socialist Viktor Adler, ‘*Absolutismus gemildert durch Schlamperei* [absolutism tempered by slovenliness].’<sup>55</sup> Later

was returned to parliament from a wholly Romanian constituency and became largely a political outcast. Ignotus, *Hungary*, p. 109.

53. Jászi, *The Dissolution*, p. 334.

54. Ibid., p. 362. Right into the twentieth century there was a spurious quality to this ‘national oligarchy.’ Jászi reports the diverting story of one correspondent of a famous Hungarian daily who during World War I interviewed the wounded officer who would become the reactionary dictator of Hungary in the inter-war years. Horthy was enraged by the article’s description of his thoughts ‘winging back to the Hungarian father land, home of the ancestors.’ ‘Remember,’ he said ‘that, if my chief warlord is in Baden, then my fatherland is also there!’ *The Dissolution*, p. 142.

55. Ibid., p. 165. ‘And in the good old days when there was still such a place as Imperial Austria, one could leave the train of events, get into an ordinary train on an ordinary railway-line, and travel back home. . . . Of course cars also drove along those roads – but not too many cars! The conquest of the air had begun here too; but not too intensively. Now and then a ship was sent off to South America or the Far East; but not too often. There was no ambition to have world markets and world power. Here one was in the centre of Europe, at the focal point of the world’s old axes; the words ‘colony’ and ‘overseas’ had the ring of something as yet utterly untried and remote. There was

than almost anywhere else, the dynasty clung to vanished conceptions. 'In his *religious* mysticism, each Habsburg felt himself connected by a special tie with divinity, as an executor of the divine will. This explains their almost unscrupulous attitude in the midst of historical catastrophes, and their proverbial ungratefulness. *Der Dank vom Hause Habsburg* became a widely spread slogan.'<sup>56</sup> In addition, bitter jealousy of Hohenzollern Prussia, which increasingly made off with the plate of the Holy Roman Empire and turned itself into Germany, kept the dynasty insisting on Franz II's splendid 'patriotism for me.'

At the same time, it is interesting that in its last days the dynasty discovered, perhaps to its own surprise, affinities with its Social Democrats, to the point that some of their common enemies spoke sneeringly of 'Burgsozialismus [Court Socialism]'. In this tentative coalition there was doubtless a mixture of Machiavellism and idealism on each side. One can see this mixture in the vehement campaign led by the Austrian Social Democrats against the economic and military 'separatism' pressed by the regime of Count István Tisza in 1905. Karl Renner, for example, 'chastized the cowardice of the Austrian bourgeoisie who began to acquiesce in the separatistic plans of the Magyars, though "the Hungarian market is incomparably more significant for Austrian capital than [the] Moroccan is for the German," which German foreign policy defends so energetically. In the claim for an independent Hungarian customs territory he saw nothing else than the clamouring of city sharks, swindlers, and political demagogues, against the *very interests of Austrian industry*, of the Austrian working-classes, and of the Hungarian agricultural population.'<sup>57</sup> Similarly, Otto Bauer wrote that:<sup>58</sup>

some display of luxury, but it was not, of course as oversophisticated as the French. One went in for sport; but not in madly Anglo-Saxon fashion. One spent tremendous sums on the army; but only just enough to assure one of remaining the second weakest among the great powers.' Robert Musil, *The Man Without Qualities*, I, pp. 31–32. This book is the great comic novel of our century.

56. Jászi, *The Dissolution*, p. 135. Author's emphasis. When Metternich was dismissed after the 1848 insurrections and had to flee, 'nobody in the whole court asked him where he would go and how he could live.' Sic transit.

57. Ibid., p. 181. Emphases added.

58. Otto Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemocratie* (1907), as found in

In the era of the Russian revolution [of 1905], no one will dare to use naked military force to subjugate the country [Hungary], rent as it is by class and national antagonisms. But the inner conflicts of the country will provide the Crown with another instrument of power which it will have to exploit if it does not wish to suffer the fate of the House of Bernadotte. It can not be the organ of two wills and yet still intend to rule over Hungary and Austria. Hence it must take steps to ensure that Hungary and Austria have a common will, and that it constructs a *single* realm [*Reich*]. Hungary's inward fragmentation offers her the possibility to achieve this goal. She will dispatch her army to Hungary to recapture it for the realm, but she will inscribe on her banners: Uncorrupted, universal and equal suffrage! Right of coalition for the agricultural laborer! National autonomy! She will counterpose to the idea of an independent Hungarian nation-state [*Nationalstaat*] the idea of the *United States of Great Austria* [sic], the idea of a federative state [*Bundesstaat*], in which each nation will administer independently its own national affairs, and all the nations will unite in one state for the preservation of their common interests. Inevitably and unavoidably, the idea of a federative state of nationalities [*Nationalitätenbundesstaat*] will become an instrument of the Crown [sic! – *Werkzeug der Krone*], whose realm is being destroyed by the decay of Dualism.

It seems reasonable to detect in this United States of Great Austria (USGA) residues of the USA and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (one day to be ruled by a Labour Party), as well as a foreshadowing of a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics whose stretch is strangely reminiscent of Czardom's. The fact is that this USGA seemed, in its imaginer's mind, the necessary heir of a *particular* dynastic dominion (Great Austria) – with its enfranchised components exactly those produced by centuries of Habsburg 'hucksterings'.

Such 'imperial' imaginings were partly the misfortune of a socialism born in the capital of one of Europe's great dynastic

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his *Werkausgabe*, I, p. 482. Italics in the original. Comparison of this translation with that of Jászi, given in the original version of this book, offers food for thought.

empires.<sup>59</sup> As we have noted earlier, the new imagined communities (including the still-born, but still imagined USGA) conjured up by lexicography and print-capitalism always regarded themselves as somehow ancient. In an age in which ‘history’ itself was still widely conceived in terms of ‘great events’ and ‘great leaders’, pearls strung along a thread of narrative, it was obviously tempting to decipher the community’s past in antique dynasties. Hence a USGA in which the membrane separating empire from nation, crown from proletariat, is almost transparent. Nor was Bauer unusual in all this. A William the Conqueror and a George I, neither of whom could speak English, continue to appear unproblematically as beads in the necklace ‘Kings of England’. ‘Saint’ Stephen (r. 1001–1038) might admonish his successor that:<sup>60</sup>

The utility of foreigners and guests is so great that they can be given a place of sixth importance among the royal ornaments. . . . For, as the guests come from various regions and provinces, they bring with them various languages and customs, various knowledges and arms. All these adorn the royal court, heighten its splendour, and terrify the haughtiness of foreign powers. For a country unified in language and customs is fragile and weak. . . .

But such words would not in the least prevent his subsequent apotheosis as the First King of Hungary.

In conclusion, then it has been argued that from about the middle of the nineteenth century there developed what Seton-Watson terms ‘official nationalisms’ inside Europe. These nationalisms were historically ‘impossible’ until after the appearance of popular linguistic-nationalisms, for, at bottom, they were *responses* by power-groups – primarily, but not exclusively, dynastic and

59. Surely they also reflect the characteristic mindset of a well-known type of leftwing European intellectual, proud of his command of the civilized languages, his Enlightenment heritage, and his penetrating understanding of everyone else’s problems. In this pride, internationalist and aristocratic ingredients are rather evenly mixed.

60. Jászi, *The Dissolution*, p. 39.

aristocratic – threatened with exclusion from, or marginalization in, popular imagined communities. A sort of tectonic upheaval was beginning, which, after 1918 and 1945, tipped these groups towards drainages in Estoril and Monte Carlo. Such official nationalisms were conservative, not to say reactionary, *policies*, adapted from the model of the largely spontaneous popular nationalisms that preceded them.<sup>61</sup> Nor were they ultimately confined to Europe and the Levant. In the name of imperialism, very similar policies were pursued by the same sorts of groups in the vast Asian and African territories subjected in the course of the nineteenth century.<sup>62</sup> Finally, refracted into non-European cultures and histories, they were picked up and imitated by indigenous ruling groups in those few zones (among them Japan and Siam) which escaped direct subjection.

In almost every case, official nationalism concealed a discrepancy between nation and dynastic realm. Hence a world-wide contradiction: Slovaks were to be Magyarized, Indians Anglicized, and Koreans Japanified, but they would not be permitted to join pilgrimages which would allow them to administer Magyars, Englishmen, or Japanese. The banquet to which they were invited always

61. Half a century ago Jászi had already suspected as much: ‘One may ask whether the late imperialist developments of nationalism do really emanate from the genuine sources of the national idea and not from the monopolistic interests of certain groups which were *alien* to the original conception of national aims.’ *Ibid.*, p. 286. Emphasis added.

62. The point is nicely underlined by inversion in the case of the Netherlands Indies, which in its last days was still to a large extent ruled through a language which we know today as ‘Indonesian.’ This is, I think, the only case of a large colonial possession in which to the end a non-European language remained a language-of-state. The anomaly is primarily to be explained by the sheer antiquity of the colony, which was founded early in the seventeenth century by a corporation (the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie) – long before the age of official nationalism. Doubtless there was also a certain lack of confidence on the part of the Dutch in modern times that their language and culture had a European cachet comparable to that of English, French, German, Spanish, or Italian. (Belgians in the Congo would use French rather than Flemish.) Finally, colonial educational policy was exceptionally conservative: in 1940, when the indigenous population numbered well over 70 millions, there were only 637 ‘natives’ in college, and only 37 graduated with BAs. See George McT. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, p. 32. For more on the Indonesian case, see below, Chapter VII.

## OFFICIAL NATIONALISM AND IMPERIALISM

turned out to be a Barmecide feast. The reason for all this was not simply racism; it was also the fact that at the core of the empires nations too were emerging – Hungarian, English, and Japanese. And these nations were also instinctively resistant to ‘foreign’ rule. Imperialist ideology in the post-1850 era thus typically had the character of a conjuring-trick. How much it was a conjuring-trick is suggested by the equanimity with which metropolitan popular classes eventually shrugged off the ‘losses’ of the colonies, even in cases like Algeria where the colony had been legally incorporated into the metropole. In the end, it is always the ruling classes, bourgeois certainly, but above all aristocratic, that long mourn the empires, and their grief always has a stagey quality to it.

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## The Last Wave

The First World War brought the age of high dynasticism to an end. By 1922, Habsburgs, Hohenzollerns, Romanovs and Ottomans were gone. In place of the Congress of Berlin came the League of *Nations*, from which non-Europeans were not excluded. From this time on, the legitimate international norm was the nation-state, so that in the League even the surviving imperial powers came dressed in national costume rather than imperial uniform. After the cataclysm of World War II the nation-state tide reached full flood. By the mid-1970s even the Portuguese Empire had become a thing of the past.

The new states of the post-World War II period have their own character, which nonetheless is incomprehensible except in terms of the succession of models we have been considering. One way of underlining this ancestry is to remind ourselves that a very large number of these (mainly non-European) nations came to have European languages-of-state. If they resembled the 'American' model in this respect, they took from linguistic European nationalism its ardent populism, and from official nationalism its Russifying policy-orientation. They did so because Americans and Europeans had lived through complex historical experiences which were now everywhere modularly imagined, and because the European languages-of-state they employed were the legacy of imperialist official nationalism. This is why so often in the 'nation-building' policies of the new