



## Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918–1965

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### CHAPTER

## 8 Great Britain

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### Abstract

No account of the political and social impact of Catholicism in 20th-century Britain can ignore the fact that Catholics have formed a minority of the population. Catholics believed that the social and political principles derived from their faith were wholly relevant to a British society scarred by the effects of capitalism and liberalism, and now threatened by socialism. Accordingly, sections of the laity organized themselves, supported on occasion by a conservative hierarchy, to advance a distinctively Catholic critique of British society as they found it. Indeed, while the term ‘political Catholicism’ was alien to British Catholics, the term ‘social Catholicism’ was certainly not. This chapter contends that the many social Catholic movements of this period played an undeniably political role, both defensively (teaching the laity to resist socialism) and offensively (projecting a Catholic vision of a better society). It analyzes the attempts to articulate this Catholic social and political vision and to explain their ultimate failure.

**Keywords:** [British Catholics](#), [British Catholicism](#), [political activity](#), [political movements](#), [social Catholicism](#)

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No account of the political and social impact of Catholicism in twentieth-century Britain can ignore the fact that Catholics have formed a minority of the population. Catholics may, at times, have dreamed of reversing the pernicious effects of the Reformation but, in reality, their priority was defending their position within British society rather than trying to reconvert Britain to Catholicism. Moreover, this defence was undertaken in the absence of the socio-political institutions commonplace in continental European Catholic countries (even where Catholics were also in a minority)—most significantly, Catholic political parties, trade unions, or universities. Social and political divisions within the Catholic community, the long-standing British antipathy to confessional political parties, and a lack of funds and ambition have all conspired to make political Catholicism almost invisible in the twentieth century. However, it would be

wrong to conclude from this that there was no tradition of political Catholicism in Britain. Catholics believed that the social and political principles derived from their faith were wholly relevant to a British society scarred by the effects of capitalism and liberalism, and now threatened by socialism. Accordingly, during most of the period covered by this chapter sections of the laity organized themselves, supported on occasion by a conservative hierarchy, to advance a distinctively Catholic critique of (and an alternative to) British society as they found it. Indeed, while the term ‘political Catholicism’ was alien to British Catholics, the term ‘social Catholicism’ was certainly not. Although explicitly not party-political, it will be one of the main contentions of this chapter that the many social Catholic movements of this period played an undeniably political role, both defensively (teaching the laity to resist socialism) and offensively (projecting a Catholic vision of a better society).

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the attempts to articulate this Catholic social and political vision and to explain their ultimate failure. It will be argued that it is helpful to identify two distinct tiers of Catholic political activity in Britain. The first is the defence of communal interests, which was successfully pursued, and which was possible through any political party or none. The second tier is that of distinctive Catholic political thought and action—necessarily above party—which was mainly concerned with providing the ideas and resources to ensure that Catholics would not be simply absorbed into the political system once the immediate threats to communal interests were averted. A British version of political Catholicism did operate in this second tier for most of the years 1918–65, but for reasons which will be discussed below, proved unable to sustain itself even before the great changes effected through the Second Vatican Council.

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## 1. The Context

Compared with the nineteenth century, and especially the years since 1850, British twentieth-century Catholicism has been strangely neglected by historians, as the dramatic achievements and charismatic personalities associated with Catholicism in the later nineteenth century gave way to an administrative blandness and greater insularity after 1900.<sup>1</sup> The advances made by Catholicism since 1900 are generally seen as simply refining the work of the Church leaders of the nineteenth century, in particular Cardinal Manning, who rebuilt the ecclesiastical structures of Catholicism in the face of fierce opposition. The restoration of the Catholic hierarchy in England and Wales in 1850 (1878 in Scotland) was a highly controversial under-taking. Catholic Emancipation had, after all, only been achieved in 1829, and anti-Catholicism was still a potent force in British politics. Moreover, many petty restrictions, not to say prejudices, remained in place against Catholics, emphasizing that toleration should not be equated with full integration into British society.<sup>2</sup> The leaders of the ‘Second Spring’ of English Catholicism (many of them converts and, hence, particularly exposed to personal criticism) were forced to act in a very hostile environment, and inevitably took on a heroic stature in the process. By contrast, anti-Catholicism has been a diminishing force in the twentieth century (though not to be underestimated, especially in Scotland and the North-West of England) and Catholics have had to contend with a secular, rather than an explicitly anti-Catholic, society.

It would be wrong, however, to overlook the achievements of Catholics in the twentieth century. In fact, by any criteria, there was spectacular growth in the years covered by this chapter. Estimated numbers of Catholics in England and Wales, listed in the yearly *Catholic Directory*, rose from 1,890,018 in 1918, to 2,392,983 in 1945, and 3,956,500 in 1965.<sup>3</sup> Although there was a steady stream of converts—746,000 spread fairly evenly over the years between 1900 and 1960—the bulk of this increase came as a result of Irish immigration. Growth in numbers was matched by the building of churches and other facilities. The number of registered churches and public chapels rose from 1,380 in 1918 to 1,883 in 1945 and 3,319 in 1965; overall numbers of priests in the same period rose from 3,952 to 7,808. School provision also grew rapidly.

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In 1918 there were 1,623 Catholic secondary and elementary schools with some 390,000 pupils; by 1945 there were over 426,000 pupils attending 1,990 schools, and an even larger number attended the schools of the much more complex system of the 1960s. Thus, in the years covered by this chapter the Catholic Church in England and Wales sustained rapid growth. The same applies to the Catholic presence in Scotland. Almost negligible in the early nineteenth century, a survey in the mid-1950s showed that there were 774,000 Catholics in Scotland (15.1 per cent of the population, and over 25 per cent of the population of Glasgow).<sup>4</sup>

The very source of much of this growth—successive waves of Irish immigration—was, however, the key to many of the problems associated with achieving united Catholic political action. Catholicism could not have been so firmly re-established in the nineteenth century without the great influx of Irish labourers and their families during and after the Industrial Revolution. There was a further migration in the mid-twentieth century, following the closing of the United States to immigrants. Two hundred and fifty thousand Irish came to Britain during the Second World War, with 100,000 more in the years 1945–50, and, while their ancestors had settled in the North of England, this generation made for the new industrial belts of the Midlands and the South-East—especially London.<sup>5</sup> Thus, the patterns of Irish immigrant settlement (and, accordingly, of much of the Catholic community) in Britain were highly responsive to the changing demands of the national economy.

Irish immigrants brought strength in numbers, but also made the Catholic community in Britain peculiarly resistant to easy social categorization—more than in any European country it was a hybrid creation, the result of mass Irish immigration grafting a numerical base on to the descendants of the English recusant tradition (the ‘old Catholics’). Converts, the third pillar in the Catholic community, provided a leavening influence, disproportionately represented in culture and the arts. Nor were the Irish the only immigrants. After the Second World War, for instance, many thousands of Poles and other Eastern Europeans settled for what, for many, became a permanent exile in Britain. Hence, the Catholic Church offered an umbrella for otherwise disparate constituents, in which the unskilled labourer of Irish descent had little in common with the essentially Tory Catholic élite—represented by the *Tablet* newspaper and the Catholic peers of the realm—or the generally well-educated and middle-class converts.

p. 251 Many historians have taken the ethnic divide as the most important in the Catholic community, using it as a short-hand for other divisions such as those of class and politics. ‘Irish Catholics’, for instance, are often seen as synonymous with working-class Catholics. Steven Fielding, in an important recent contribution, has used detailed research on Salford to argue that Irish Catholics formed a ‘Viable and distinct culture that was a compound of class and ethnic influences’. Cultural traditions were strong enough to ensure that second- and third-generation Irish Catholics would still feel part of a group which enjoyed a distinctively ‘intermediate way of life’—neither Irish nor British—which was still a very real entity in the city as late as 1939.<sup>6</sup> This Irish Catholic culture was expressed most publicly in the religious processions—especially the annual Whit Walks which were a Manchester institution (both for Anglicans and Catholics) from the 1880s onwards.<sup>7</sup> Fielding stresses that Irish Catholics may ultimately have joined British political movements, but did not do so uncritically—the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921 (which temporarily resolved the ‘Irish Question’) and the collapse of Irish Nationalist politics in Britain ‘did not mean that the Irish had been politically assimilated into English politics and that ethnic influences had evaporated’.<sup>8</sup>

This approach, however, deserves qualification. ‘Irish Catholics’, for instance, is a very loose term because Irish immigration had been under way for so long, and there was a difference in identity between first-generation Irish immigrants and the descendants of those of the 1840s.<sup>9</sup> Despite the relative social and cultural cohesion of the immigrant Irish, there is no great evidence to show that, apart from during times of crisis such as 1916–22, Irish Catholics in Britain made Irish politics the centre of their political activities.<sup>10</sup> The Catholic press was likely to have a page on Irish news, but, after the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, Irish organizations served a mainly cultural and social purpose. These comments do not apply to Scotland where, as Tom Gallagher has argued, the ethnic and religious identity of Catholics of Irish descent became fused in

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the minds of their opponents in the inter-war years when, after many years of relatively peaceful coexistence, they began to be seen as an alien threat to Scottish nationality.<sup>11</sup> In England, however, it is important to note that in addition to the determinants of class and ethnicity, which contributed to an Irish Catholic identity, it is also important not to forget the role of religion itself. One of the main achievements of the Catholic Church was to stand above ethnic and class distinctions, and to attach the descendants of Irish immigrants to a Catholicism that went beyond such divisions. Almost all the lay Catholic social movements, for instance, contained converts and English recusants as well as members of the Irish working class.

The Irish legacy was, however, undoubtedly highly significant in forming the Catholic urban communities.<sup>12</sup> Catholic immigrants in the nineteenth century were made to feel alien within British society on both religious and ethnic grounds, and this acted as a check on their assimilation into it.<sup>13</sup> Many of the priests also came from Ireland, and imposed a strict and unimaginative Catholicism on their flocks. The hallmark of this era was the building of schools and churches by public subscription (raising funds from a very poor community), and the main lay organizations that emerged were those connected with charity and community leadership—groups such as the Knights of St Columba, the Ancient Order of Hibernians, and the St Vincent de Paul Society. Despite the beginnings of upward social mobility, these characteristics apply also to the period 1918–65, when it was still possible to identify a distinctive urban Catholic subculture that was primarily introspective, and extremely proud of (and defensive towards) its own local achievements.

Within these communities the dominant force remained the parish<sup>14</sup> priest, who was particularly keen to maintain discipline in the areas of schooling and marriage—in both areas assisted by papal pronouncements. In the question of education, Pius XI's 1929 encyclical *Divini Illius Magistri* restated papal opposition to mixed schooling, while the 1907 decree *No Temere* consolidated the official position on 'valid' Catholic marriages.<sup>15</sup> The success was striking. Michael Hornsby-Smith has shown that in 1939 valid non-mixed weddings (i.e. those in which both parties were Catholics and which were solemnized by a priest) formed 68.5 per cent of Catholic marriages, compared with 5.6 per cent for the invalid non-mixed. These proportions remained remarkably constant until the 1960s, but by the 1970s the percentages stood at 30.2 and 33 respectively.<sup>16</sup> These figures are symptomatic of the immense social changes which overwhelmed the Catholic communities after 1945—including social mobility, greater university attendance, and the growing use of proscribed birth-control—and which overlapped the Second Vatican Council. By the late 1970s, Hornsby-Smith has concluded, the distinctive Catholic subculture was effectively dissolved.<sup>17</sup> The political consequences of this dramatic change will be explored below.

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The social and political heterogeneity of the Catholic population reinforced the hierarchy's desire to avoid any party-political commitment. Recent research has emphasized the lack of political cohesion amongst nineteenth-century Catholics, as upper-class Catholics tended to support the Conservatives, while the enfranchised working class either voted Liberal or took a lead from Irish leaders like Parnell.<sup>18</sup> In the twentieth century Catholic MPs have been found scattered amongst all the main parties, although the proportion of Catholics in Parliament was, of course, drastically reduced by the departure of the southern Irish MPs (formalized in the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921). Catholic politics have most effectively emerged around the common denominator of the defence of those institutions seen as central to Catholic life—especially the schools. Catholics were regularly mobilized, often very successfully, to defend denominational schooling or increase grants in aid to their schools. Indeed, until the 1960s there were few that doubted, despite the great expense, that this was the cornerstone of Catholic life. The most striking example was the Catholic Parents' and Electors' Associations (CPEAs) formed in order to campaign for a revision of the terms of the 1944 Education Act. Strictly controlled by the hierarchy, both in terms of their organizational basis and their political goals, the CPEAs acted in a classic pressure-group manner (for instance, by questioning MPs during the 1950 election) and significantly contributed to the more generous policy adopted by the government towards Catholic schools in the 1950s.<sup>19</sup> Earlier, Catholics had mobilized

against the Labour government's 1930 (Trevelyan) Education Bill, which was effectively killed by the rebellion of the Catholic Labour MP John Scurr.<sup>20</sup>

Education was particularly important because a perceived threat to Catholic schools could spark a broader mobilization. For instance, the 1906 Birrell Education Bill led to the formation of the diocesan Catholic Federations (originating in Salford), which soon extended their interests beyond the strictly educational sphere to the attempted marshalling of Catholic forces against the 'rising tides of Free-masonry, Socialism and an anti-Christian Democracy'.<sup>21</sup> Similarly, the 1942 Trades Union Congress (TUC) vote in favour of secular education led directly to the foundation of the Association of Catholic Trades Unionists (ACTU). In practice, however, it was precisely the success of the Church's own negotiations with the British state on issues such as schooling which made irrelevant the question of 'why was there no Catholic political party in Britain?'

p. 254 Inevitably, the Catholic hierarchy played a crucial role in the development of Catholic political engagement. Although the twentieth-century archbishops of Westminster have suffered by comparison with their predecessors Wiseman, Manning, and Vaughan, most carried out a difficult task with sensitivity and one, Hinsley (1935–43), attained a kind of greatness during the Second World War. According to the ecclesiastical structure created in 1850, Westminster was the sole metropolitan diocese, with, initially, twelve suffragan bishops. In 1911 two new metropolitan provinces were created, at Birmingham and Liverpool, each with its own archbishop. In 1916 Wales, too, was made a province with an archbishop in Cardiff. The Scottish hierarchy, as restored in 1878, contained the province of St Andrews and Edinburgh, including an archepiscopal and four suffragan sees, and the archepiscopal see of Glasgow. In the English hierarchy, Westminster became, from 1911, the permanent president of the bishops' conference, although the archbishop's power was restricted by the requirement to follow other bishops' majority opinion. The hierarchy was characterized by its close links with Rome. Hinsley, a former rector of the English College in Rome, was the best example of a strong and enduring Roman influence. Ironically, it was during Hinsley's archepiscopacy that relations with Rome experienced their greatest period of strain. The Vatican's decision to send an apostolic delegate to England in 1938 was initially resisted by the hierarchy on the grounds that he might revive religious bigotry at a time when the press saw the Pope as a 'tool of Fascism'.<sup>22</sup> A second important feature was the hierarchy's conservative recusant composition. Few converts were to be found amongst the bishops, and, until Cardinal Heenan (1963–76), archbishops of Westminster were not drawn from the Catholics of Irish descent.

The religious orders played a disproportionately large role in all areas of Catholic life. As elsewhere in Europe at this time the orders, which had languished after the Reformation, staged a remarkable recovery in the hundred years following the restoration of the hierarchy. Where in 1850 there had been a mere 10 male orders, with some 275 priests, by 1950 there were 70 orders and 2,360 priests. During the same period the 14 female orders in 53 convents grew into over 140 orders in 1,075 convents.<sup>23</sup> Not only was there a massive increase in the long-established orders such as the Jesuits (whose English province grew from 200 to 1,000 members between 1850 and 1950), there was also an infusion of new orders, many of which, such as the Passionists and Oratorians, brought a flamboyant form of Italian piety. The role of the orders was paramount in the development of Catholic education, conversion, and of course charity. Moreover, their publications (such as the Jesuits' the *Month*) contributed markedly to an already thriving Catholic intellectual culture at the level of reviews and journals. However, their work is also highly significant in the context of this chapter, for it was frequently the orders that were best placed to offer leadership to Catholic lay movements. Three Jesuits, for instance, underpinned the life of the Catholic Social Guild—Father Plater, who founded it; Father O'Hea, who for over thirty years ran the Guild and the Catholic Workers' College; and Father Crane, whose energy and political views had an ambiguous effect on the movement in its latter years. p. 255 Similarly, the Dominican Father Vincent McNabb, a 'trenchant critic of modern industrial life',<sup>24</sup> played a central role in the evolution of the Distributist movement in the inter-war years.

Thus, the orders, more than any other part of the Church, played a crucial role in shaping Catholic lay movements. But it was the hierarchy that retained the power to make or break such movements. Bishops often chose not to support new initiatives even when they were backed by the Archbishop of Westminster. For instance, Hinsley's enthusiastic backing for the wartime 'Sword of the Spirit' movement, and Cardinal Griffin's support for the ACTU, failed to engender significant support. For many bishops, any such movement was suspicious on political (and sometimes theological) grounds, and they preferred either to negotiate directly with government or to work through such conservative representatives of the Catholic establishment as the Catholic Union.<sup>25</sup> Acutely conscious of their minority status, and feeling an increasing sense of isolation within a secular society, the dominant concern of Catholic bishops was one of defence, encapsulated by the use of the term 'leakage' to describe the dreaded attenuation of the Catholic community. Hence, protection of Catholic schools, and the inoculation of working-class Catholics against a creeping loss of religion, easily took precedence over lay movements designed to attempt anything bolder — unless such movements could be clearly proven to serve the hierarchy's interests. The power of the bishops should not, however, be overestimated. The cerebral, strongly anti-socialist Bishop Casartelli of Salford found his attempts to promote the lay Catholic Federation movement before the First World War generally frustrated by the opposition or apathy of his own parish priests.

p. 256 A very different situation pertained to Catholics in the British province of Northern Ireland.<sup>26</sup> Here, in addition to forming a minority, Catholics also found themselves living in what many saw as a discriminatory and artificially created 'Protestant' mini-state. As a result of the partition of Ireland under the terms of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty Catholics formed a permanent minority in Northern Ireland (six of the nine counties of Ulster). The demographic balance changed little over time: Catholics formed 33.5 per cent of the Northern Irish population in the first official census of 1926 and 35 per cent in 1961.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, under the terms of the 1920 Government of Ireland Act, the province was accorded a highly devolved form of government (with its own Parliament and government) which the preponderantly Protestant Unionists dominated.<sup>28</sup> In the first elections to the new parliament at Stormont House in May 1921 the Unionists won forty seats, while Catholic votes were split between the constitutionalist Nationalists and the more radical Republicans of Sinn Féin, both of whom won six seats. The new state came into being against a background of intimidation directed at the Catholic minority. The Belfast 'Troubles' (1920–2) began with the violent expulsion of 5,000 Catholic workers from the shipyards, and continued with attacks on Catholic churches, church-goers, and their homes. The IRA (Irish Republican Army) responded in kind, but was defeated by the security forces controlled by the Northern Irish government.

The creation of Northern Ireland, and the tensions that continued to bedevil relations between Catholics and Protestants, inevitably gave an important political role to the Catholic Church as the main representative of the Nationalist Catholic population. However, as was also the case in the South of Ireland, the dominance of the national question over all other political issues militated against the development of an overt political Catholicism. This affected Catholic politics in two ways. First, the Catholic-Nationalist community was bitterly divided along lines that reflected those within the nationalist tradition in Ireland as a whole (especially over whether to reject the 1921 Treaty or to accept it as a pragmatic temporary settlement). Secondly, the peculiarity of the situation in Northern Ireland encouraged the Church to maintain a degree of direct control over Catholic-Nationalist politics in this period that was not encountered either in the Irish Free State or in mainland Britain. The role of the Church was complicated by the fact that the border created in 1921 did not take into account existing religious boundaries. Thus, the sees of Clogher, Derry, and the archdiocese of Armagh all straddled the border, while the sees of Dromore and of Connor and Down did not. Inevitably, such Northern bishops were unable to limit their attention merely to Northern Ireland.

The Catholic Church bitterly opposed the partition of Ireland, both on nationalist grounds and also because it feared that a Protestant-dominated Northern Ireland would be inimical to Catholic religious interests. Initially the Church refused to recognize the new state, and many Catholic chaplains (in Poor Houses and

other institutions) lost their jobs through refusing to swear allegiance to it. The bishops' hopes were focused on the Boundary Commission which had been promised under the Treaty, in the confident expectation that it would allow Catholic-majority areas such as the city of Derry and the border-county of Fermanagh and South Tyrone to join the Irish Free State. The failure of the Commission in 1925 to recommend any changes created a new situation in which the Church had to address the question of how Catholic interests could be promoted, at least in the short term, within the borders of Northern Ireland.<sup>29</sup> Thus, the Church began to recommend that, on tactical grounds, the Nationalist Catholic MPs should end their policy of abstention from Stormont.

p. 257 Thereafter, the political role of the Church was preponderant as, for instance, in the mobilization of Catholics in the anti-partition National League, founded in May 1928. While committed to a united Ireland, the League was also concerned with justice for Catholics in Northern Ireland. It was, however, opposed by Republicans who argued that the creation of what they saw as a 'Catholic party' would never win the wider support needed to create a majority for Irish unity in the province.<sup>30</sup> Catholic Action was actively promoted in the late 1920s, with a wide range of lay organizations being established. In this case, the Catholic sense of isolation and the need for their own institutions served to reinforce support for a movement that was found throughout Catholic Europe. The hierarchy and clergy were again prominent in supporting and promoting the Anti-Partition League established in November 1945.

However, the political lead offered by the Catholic Church was somewhat equivocal. While never losing sight of the goal of national unity, the hierarchy was also quick to gain what institutional advantage it could for the Church within Northern Ireland. Lord Londonderry, the province's first education minister and an advocate of non-denominational schooling, was forced to give way to Protestant pressures for religious control over local authority schools, culminating in the 1930 Education Act. In return, however, Catholics were able to secure 50 per cent grants for building and equipment costs in their voluntary schools. In addition, their teachers' salaries were paid by the State, and the costs of training Catholic teachers would soon be state-subsidized. No further attempts were made to challenge the segregated schools system. Thus, despite the Catholic community's political weakness, the Catholic Church defended its institutional interests robustly, and successfully exploited the sectarian assumptions of its Unionist rivals. There was, however, a price to be paid. While Catholic interests were safeguarded when the Butler Education Act (1944) was applied to Northern Ireland in 1947, Catholic schools only received 65 per cent support for capital expenditure rather than the 100 per cent that had been demanded. Similarly, when the 1949 Public Health Act brought Northern Ireland into line with the rest of Britain in relation to the National Health Service, Catholics successfully lobbied for their Mater Hospital in Belfast not to be appropriated by the Local Health Authority. It was, however, deprived of public funds.

In the two decades after 1945 many Northern Catholics appeared less concerned with the national question, especially after the creation of the Irish Republic in 1948 and the consequent Ireland Act (1949) made a united Ireland appear an even more distant possibility. The new archbishop of Armagh, John D'Alton, appointed in 1945, adopted a more conciliatory posture towards the Northern Ireland authorities, and it has been argued that in the post-war era many Catholics may have come to accept their lot within the province.<sup>31</sup> The IRA guerrilla campaigns in 1956–62 attracted relatively little support in the province. However, the continuing discrimination against Catholics in housing and jobs, as well as the overt  
p. 258 gerrymandering of the province's political boundaries, prevented any real resolution of underlying Catholic grievances. In the mid-1960s a new generation of Catholic activists, many with university education, began to campaign for civil rights. The violence of the Protestant response escalated the descent into a new bout of 'Troubles' which finally boiled over in 1969. British troops were sent to restore order and in 1972 'direct rule' from Westminster was imposed. One significant result of the volatile situation after 1969 was the creation of new Catholic-Nationalist political leaderships which acted independently of the Catholic Church. These crystallized primarily around the Provisional IRA and Sinn Féin in the Republican camp,

while the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), created in August 1970 from a number of predominantly Catholic political parties, replaced the Nationalist Party as the main representative of constitutional nationalism. Thus, the new Troubles marked a significant erosion of the Church's traditional political domination of the Catholic minority, and the emergence for the first time—despite the close links between the Church and the SDLP—of more autonomous forms of Catholic political organization.

## 2. Catholic Political and Social Engagement, 1918–1965

The year 1918 represented a watershed for Catholic political engagement in Britain for three main reasons. First, the introduction of universal suffrage greatly increased the enfranchisement of Catholics, thus preparing the way for the mobilization of Catholic voters around domestic political issues. It is notable that the organization of Catholic women dates, in effect, from these years, as the hierarchy came to see them as a new bulwark against state-sponsored attacks on the family.<sup>32</sup> Secondly, wartime measures, and post-war reforms, had greatly extended the powers of the State. In some cases this was beneficial—for instance, the 1918 Scottish school settlement was often seen by Catholics as a potential model for the English system. However, centralizing reform of the welfare system and the creation, for the first time, of a ministry of health was greeted with immense suspicion by Catholics. Thirdly, the political changes following the war greatly affected Catholics. In particular, the decline of the Liberals and the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty left the way clear for working-class Catholics (many of whom had previously favoured the Liberals because of their stance on Irish Home Rule) to support the Labour party. Yet, by its 1918 Constitution Labour had specifically identified itself with socialism for the first time. Thus, the events of 1918 brought to a head the previously avoided question of Catholic involvement with the Labour party.

p. 259 Cardinal Bourne's 1918 Lenten Pastoral letter on 'The Nation's Crisis' showed awareness of these changes, couched in the distinctive voice of Catholic social thought. He called for a 'New Order' after the war, although not one that would minimize the family and magnify the State. He recognized the change in political consciousness amongst soldiers, and the 'undisguised revolt' of workers against the capitalist system, the excesses of which would have been unthinkable in a Catholic-inspired social order. And he endeavoured to see in the contemporary working-class unrest: 'the true lineament of the christian spirit. Its passion for fair treatment and for liberty; its resentment at bureaucratic interferences with family life; its desire for self-realisation and opportunities of education; above all, its conviction that persons are of more value than property'.<sup>33</sup> Whatever his real political views (perhaps better expressed by his forthright opposition to the 1926 General Strike),<sup>34</sup> Bourne's language is striking, and underlines the many dilemmas which the Church faced in confronting a volatile political situation as the war drew to a close. In particular, one should note the fundamental lack of sympathy for capitalism, and a tolerance of working-class radicalism—so long as it did not conflict with Catholic teaching.

Catholics in Britain had responded surprisingly slowly to the challenge of industrialization and the consequent rise of socialism. There was considerable interest in social problems such as drink in the later nineteenth century, and Cardinal Manning's intervention on behalf of the striking London dockers in 1889 created an enduring image of solidarity with the working class which later Catholic prelates were to perpetuate.<sup>35</sup> Conversely, there was little formal response to *Rerum Novarum* at the time of its publication in 1891. By 1918, however, there was broad agreement amongst interested Catholics that what were termed 'Catholic social principles' must revolve around a number of points: a more equally distributed private property, defence of the family, support for a 'Just Wage' and a code of industrial relations which did not rule out strikes but made them unlikely, and advocacy of 'subsidiary function'—in other words the belief that social tasks were best carried out by the lowest and smallest appropriate groups.<sup>36</sup> This package of ideas survived until the 1950s, when they had to be modified in the light of the introduction of the Welfare State.



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A particularly important element in British Catholic social thought was the influence of Hilaire Belloc, G. K. Chesterton (who converted in 1922), and 'Distributism', the political movement that they founded. Belloc's memorable attack on *The Servile State* (1912) did much to make opposition to state power, and to collectivism in general, the most distinctive feature of social Catholic thought. Belloc went on to foster the concept of Distributism, according to which the redistribution of property should be tied in with a general anti-modernism—for instance, a quasi-medieval glorification of crafts and guilds and a 'back to the land' enthusiasm. Although not a confessional movement, Distributism was still the closest approximation to a specifically political Catholic movement in twentieth-century Britain. The movement ↴ revolved around the journal *GK's Weekly*, which was launched in 1925, and the Distributist League, founded to support it in September 1926. Belloc and Chesterton's journalism, brilliant, assertive, and opinionated, played an important role in drawing out a younger generation of anti-liberal Catholic journalists such as Douglas Jerrold, according to whom 'the Chesterbelloc [in George Bernard Shaw's famous phrase] brought Catholicism out of private and into public life'.<sup>37</sup> The movement began to disintegrate following Chesterton's death in 1936, and Belloc's increasing support for both Fascism and Nazism. The Distributist League was disbanded in 1940, though it enjoyed sporadic revivals after the war, even after Belloc's death in 1947.

Distributism enjoyed an influence far beyond the membership of the Distributist League. It is clear that some of its themes (such as the 'diffusion of property') were widely accepted within the Catholic social movement. However, despite Belloc and Chesterton's influence, it would be wrong to exaggerate their importance, and, indeed, their more extreme views, and those of their followers, were often criticized by both social Catholics and the Church hierarchy. In the mid-1920s a leading figure in the Catholic Social Guild, Henry Somerville, led an attack against the anti-industrialism of the Distributists, arguing that 'Catholic social reformers should be striving for industrial peace and industrial efficiency instead of announcing every new industrial development as the work of the devil'.<sup>38</sup> He was supported by Michael de la Bedoyere SJ who warned against Distributism coming to be seen as 'official' Catholic economics.<sup>39</sup> Moreover, overtly Distributist movements had limited practical impact. One such was the Catholic Land Federation which was set up in 1934 to establish training farms for the unemployed and ran a journal *The Cross and the Plough*, proclaiming subsistence farming for Britain and opposing all use of machinery. The movement effectively collapsed when it fell foul of both the government's own Land Settlement Agency and the hierarchy, which felt that all available funds should be channelled into building schools and churches in new housing areas.<sup>40</sup>

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Thus, despite the flamboyance of their leaders, the Distributists should not be seen as part of the mainstream of social Catholicism. Here the central figure was undoubtedly the dynamic Jesuit Father Charles Plater (1875–1921) (latterly Master of Campion Hall in Oxford)<sup>41</sup> who devoted most of his short life to propagating knowledge of continental social Catholic thinking, and to raising the awareness of English Catholics about social problems. Plater's particular interest lay in workers' spiritual retreats, which he described with typical enthusiasm on a continental tour as a young man: 'I am quite mad on the subject of the Belgian retreats for working men. It is ↴ really unspeakable—the cure for all our troubles I am sure; the results are really miraculous.'<sup>42</sup> In the context of this chapter, however, Plater's major contribution was the formation of the Catholic Social Guild (CSG) in 1909. Plater's role was to galvanize the many strands within Catholicism which were now taking an interest in social issues. These included the Catholic Truth Society, which was promoting literature and lectures on this theme and acted as the parent body for the CSG; Mgr. Henry Parkinson, Rector of Oscott College in Birmingham, who had instructed his seminarians in social studies for a number of years and was the Guild's first president; and a number of individual members of the laity and religious orders. The CSG was very much a child of its times, given the vogue for social investigation—nor were comparisons with the Fabian society irrelevant, given the personal connections between some Fabians and members of the CSG. Surprisingly, however, the Guild soon developed away from

its intellectual and middle-class origins to lay the basis, with the support of some parish priests, of a committed working-class following in the years before the First World War.

Unlike other Catholic lay organizations, the CSG managed to continue operating during the First World War. After the war branches existed in many parts of England, and an annual summer school was established in Oxford from 1920. Membership was never particularly large, climbing slowly to some 3,910 in 1939, but it was exceptionally committed. Local study circles, which became the crux of the Guild's activities, were widely established, and it was possible for members to take examinations in a range of political and social studies. In 1924 the examiner noted a tendency amongst candidates for rash generalizations—for instance, 'to denounce land-owners and capitalists as a body, to attribute to socialists as a body very extreme views, and to imply that Catholics alone are anxious for social reform'.<sup>43</sup> The reality of the CSG was somewhat less radical. Its hallmark was analysis and enquiry rather than political intervention (which was deliberately eschewed) and the Guild's first *Year Book* in 1910 called for a 'careful and systematic enquiry into modern social conditions'.<sup>44</sup> At points in the Guild's life this emphasis was challenged by those who felt that it would be more effective as a specifically Fabian-style organization, actually within one of the main political currents. In the late 1920s Henry Somerville argued that the CSG should campaign for concrete social reforms—advocating industrial arbitration, family allowances, and industrial councils as possible goals.<sup>45</sup> In the 1950s, however, it was precisely the Guild's leaders' espousal of a clearly political stance (in this case right-wing anti-socialism) which caused a severe split in its ranks.<sup>46</sup>

p. 262 Plater died prematurely in 1921, but, despite his death, two very important steps were soon taken. First, a monthly paper—the *Christian Democrat*—was established, and, secondly, a Catholic Workers' College (CWC) was set up in Oxford. The mission of both the CSG and the CWC was to educate Catholics in Catholic social principles and to create a cadre of leadership. The college was not meant to help elevate Catholic workers socially, but rather to return them to their work places with improved powers of leadership. However, funding was always precarious, and relied on regular benefactions (many scholarships were provided by branches of the CSG). The college expanded from its small beginnings in 1921, but numbers were always disappointing. Writing in the report for 1963–4 Principal Joe Kirwan was to lament that over forty-two years only 280 British students had studied at the college: 'so small a band spread over so long a time is not going to revolutionise the land'.<sup>47</sup>

As noted above, the early twentieth century also saw the development of Catholic women's organizations. The first of these was the Catholic Women's League (CWL) founded by Margaret Fletcher in 1906. Fletcher was acutely aware of the suspicion with which the CWL would be treated at a time of militant female suffragism and socialism, and of the need to be 'non-political and officially neutral on the question of the suffrage'.<sup>48</sup> The CWL concerned itself mainly with social conditions affecting women, and spawned what would become independent bodies such as the Union of Catholic Mothers and the Junior League. The position of the women's organizations was transformed in 1918. Overnight Margaret Fletcher was inundated with requests from priests for study circles for women to be established. Despite this new-found respectability, however, the ambit of women's organizations remained limited. In 1918 Isabel Willis of the Catholic Women's Suffrage Society urged women to use their newly won votes on the grounds that parliament would be legislating on questions such as sexual morality, the rights of children to religious education, the sanctity of marriage, and the rights of motherhood.<sup>49</sup> In 1920 Archbishop MacIntyre of Birmingham called for the parish organization of women voters to defend their interests, defined as 'the welfare of their homes and the Catholic education of their children'.<sup>50</sup> Catholic women continued to encounter a mixture of expectation and condescension from their male leaders throughout this period. In 1950, for instance, Cardinal Griffin told a rally of 5,000 CWL members that their natural sphere was in local rather than national politics, as 'it is difficult for women to be travelling backwards and forwards to Westminster'.<sup>51</sup>

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A Catholic Women's Suffrage Society (CWSS) was set up in 1911 by Catholic women already active within the non-militant campaign for female suffrage. Unlike the CWL, the CWSS was not particularly concerned with winning hierarchical approval, and much more overtly feminist in its goals. In 1918, after the vote had been achieved, the CWSS committed itself to campaigning 'to establish the political, social and economic equality between men and women; and to further the work and usefulness of Catholic women as citizens'. The Society's approval of the new Ministry of Health, as beneficial to women, went counter to mainstream Catholic opinion, and increasing tension with the Catholic hierarchy over a number of issues led to its renaming as St Joan's Social and Political Alliance in 1923.<sup>52</sup> Thus, the Society was able to slip the noose of religious authority that was intended for it.

The early decades of the century were also marked by a prolonged debate over how the Catholic Church should respond to the emergence of the Labour party. There was no problem over Catholicism's opposition to socialism dating from *Rerum Novarum*; similarly little real opposition was placed in the way of Catholics joining their respective trade unions. The question for the hierarchy was always one of whether the Labour party was socialist or not? This question was not starkly posed before 1918. In 1912, for instance, the National Confederation of Catholic Trade Unionists (NCCTU), organized by Thomas F. Burns, was able to persuade Labour to abandon a commitment to secular education. The NCCTU continued to meet after this, but faded away at the end of the First World War in the face of hierarchical ambivalence.

In 1918, however, Labour's explicitly socialist constitution revived the controversy, revealing genuine splits within the hierarchy and the laity over how to respond. The leading lay opponent was T. F. Burns, now running the Manchester Branch of the so-called 'Centre Labour Party', who campaigned tirelessly for Catholic trade-unionists to vote against the political levy for the Labour party. In October 1919 the Bishop of Salford said that Catholics should not belong to the party, though remaining free to vote for it so long as no Catholic issues were at stake.<sup>53</sup> Others, however, urged caution. Archbishop Whiteside of Liverpool proclaimed that: 'When Rome speaks the question will be decided. We must wait till Rome speaks.'<sup>54</sup> With these comments he revealed that at the request of Cardinal Gasparri, Secretary of State at the Vatican, an inquiry was being conducted into the Labour party's political stance by Bishop Amigo of Southwark (no friend of socialism). Amigo's conclusion, in a letter to Gasparri of 25 November 1919, was that the Labour party would soon be in power, and that it would be a 'profound mistake' if it were condemned. Most Catholics, he wrote, 'look upon it simply as a political party willing and ready to help them with their difficulties'.<sup>55</sup>

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Two years later Burns and his followers revived the controversy when they passed a resolution at the conference of the Catholic Confederation (heavily weighted with members of his own Salford Federation) which affirmed that, as Catholics could not be socialists, Catholic trade-unionists should not pay the political levy.<sup>56</sup> The *Christian Democrat* sought a way through this issue by arguing that the Labour party had not gone as far to call for the *total* nationalization of *all* means of production, distribution, and exchange concluding that 'whatever is correctly described as socialism is condemned by the church, and whatever is not condemned is not really socialism'.<sup>57</sup>

This debate was finally resolved by Cardinal Bourne's statements in 1924–5, which declared that the Labour party was not strictly socialist, and that Catholics could therefore join it on the same terms as any other party apart from the Communist party. In 1924 Cardinal Bourne offered the following observations to the Dutch paper *De Tijd*:

I assure you positively that our Labour Party's programme contains nothing which threatens religion. No doubt there are extremists among them, but the Party as such has nothing in common with the Socialists of the Continent...Mr [James Ramsay] MacDonald is neither a materialist nor a Marxist, and one can say the same of the principal 'Labour men'.

He added that the Labour party approximated to Catholic social thought 'without knowing it'. Thus, English Catholics were in the happy position of seeing good in all three major parties: the Conservative's respect for authority, the Liberals' individualism, and Labour's derivation of inspiration from 'some of the ideals of Pope Leo XIII'.<sup>58</sup> A few months later, at a New Year rally in the East End he qualified these remarks, adding that Catholics should never allow themselves to put party before religion, and had a duty to leave their party should its principles diverge from those of Catholicism.<sup>59</sup> Amusingly, by this stage the *Tablet* was challenging Catholic Labour politicians such as John Wheatley for daring to suggest that the Labour party was socialist!<sup>60</sup>

Whatever the attitude of the hierarchy, however, the reality was that this accommodation had been forced on it by the mass of Catholic workers voluntarily aligning themselves with the Labour party. It is possible to see this movement as a sign of increasing Catholic working-class radicalism in the latter stages of the First World War. Thus, considerable attention has been paid by historians to the role of John Wheatley's Catholic Socialist Society which operated in the Glasgow area from its inception in November 1906. Once converted to socialism Wheatley, a former Irish Nationalist and Liberal supporter, fought ardently against the Catholic hierarchy for the right for Catholics to be Catholics and socialists (of the British rather than continental type) at the same time. Indeed, Wheatley enjoyed considerable support from local priests in his debates with the Belgian Father Puissant who called for a priest-led Catholic Christian democratic party to resist socialism. However, recent research suggests that the movement of Catholics into the Labour party after the First World War in Glasgow was much more due to the Labour party's (and especially the puritanical Independent Labour party's) compromise in abandoning its anti-drink stance and its former opposition to denominational schooling—a case not of Catholics becoming more socialist, but of socialists becoming less rigid in their beliefs.<sup>61</sup>

Thus, while Catholics were now freely joining and voting for the Labour party, this support was contingent on Labour respecting the beliefs and values of working-class Catholics. There were many points of friction between Catholics and Labour in the inter-war years, for instance over the Spanish Civil War, birth control, and Communist 'front' activities, and on the local level there were cases of groups of Catholics breaking away from the Labour party.<sup>62</sup> However, given the predominant Anglicanism of the Conservatives and the decline of the Liberals there was no real political alternative, and the issue of Catholic Labour party membership was not seriously revived on a national level. Anti-socialism reappeared, instead, as a generalized anti-collectivism after 1945, especially within the CSG in the 1950s.

In the 1930s, as elsewhere in Europe, there was a considerable expansion of lay activity with the impulse for Catholic Action from the encyclical *Quadregesimo Anno* of 1931. This was very much targeted at specific groups. For instance, the *Catholic Worker* newspaper founded in 1935, inspired by the American movement of the same name, saw itself as challenging the Communist *Daily Worker* amongst the working class. Although founded by the middle-class intellectual Bernard Wall, editor of the *Colosseum* review, the editorship soon passed to Bob Walsh, the quintessential social Catholic working-class activist.<sup>63</sup> The paper ceased publication in 1959. The *Catholic Worker* was closely involved with the Young Christian Workers movement (YCW), which began properly in Wigan in the late-1930s and was inspired by the continental 'Jocist' movement. After the war the YCW went on to become one of the most successful of the lay movements of this period, and Bob Walsh estimated that by the mid-1950s some 60,000 young Catholics had passed through it. One of the earliest recruits, Patrick Keegan, went on to be president of the World Movement of Christian Workers, attending (and addressing) the Second Vatican Council as a lay auditor.<sup>64</sup>

There was also in the 1930s an attempt to set up Catholic Vocational Guilds within the trade unions. Catholic Guilds were set up in a range of industries and workforces, although they were only really successful in public transport—and even that had lapsed into largely social activity by the Second World War.<sup>65</sup> Catholic activists were quick to deny that these were in any sense political 'Minority Movements' (on the Communist model) within the unions or potential future Catholic trade unions. Rather, they were intended

to provide Catholic workers with the spiritual guidance which the unions were unable to deliver, and to monitor the activities of Communists within the unions. However, the Guilds were treated with deep suspicion by the left, and it has to be said that their protestations were somewhat disingenuous. For instance, by seeing the Spanish Civil War as a spiritual question they inevitably came into conflict with the union leaderships on issues such as fund-raising for the Republican side. Similarly, Bob Walsh quite openly claimed that the Catholic Guilds played a leading role in preventing the London tramwaymen joining the 1937 London bus strike and thus helped Ernest Bevin (leader of the Transport and General Workers' Union) to defeat his left-wing opponents.<sup>66</sup>

Another project inspired by *Quadregesimo Anno* was the establishment of a forum for Catholic employers, resulting in the first meeting in March 1938 of the Conference of Catholic Industrialists under the direction of the Jesuit Father Lewis Watt. Like other lay movements, the Conference owed much to the support of the CSG, as well as to the Catenian Association (for Catholic businessmen). Links were immediately forged with the strong associations of Catholic employers in Holland, Belgium, and France. The Conference continued to meet in Oxford on a regular basis during the war. The theme of the 1940 Conference was, appropriately, 'Experience of State Control'. After the war the group extended its interests to include meetings with selected Catholic trades unionists, but does not appear to have exerted any real influence on industrial relations.<sup>67</sup>

Thus, in the 1930s a vocal Catholic minority were putting across a coherent political message, largely derived from papal encyclicals. The late 1930s was arguably the period in which the most distinctive political Catholic movement emerged in Britain, advancing a positive case that was clearly marked off from the positions of right and left. Although neglected in standard works on the 'Red Decade', the *Catholic Worker*, with its woodcuttings and fashionable European devotions, was as characteristic in its own way as many of the better known icons of the era. The 1930s was the last period in which Catholicism genuinely could appear alien within British society, and some of the young Catholic intellectuals deliberately encouraged this with their sympathy for foreign Fascist movements, authoritarian regimes, and continental Catholic movements. This feeling of Catholic uniqueness is evident even in the writings of the convert novelist Graham Greene who came away from his visit to Mexico in 1938 with a heightened sense of the martyrdom of the Catholic church, and of the possibility of Catholic Action. Before entering Mexico from Texas Greene had witnessed a strike by Mexican pecan workers led by a Catholic priest: 'the first example I had come across of genuine Catholic Action on a social issue, a real attempt, led by the old, fiery, half-blind Archbishop, to put into force the papal encyclicals which have condemned capitalism quite as strongly as Communism'.<sup>68</sup> Such a scenario was unlikely to be repeated in Britain. However, at a time of political stagnation and mass unemployment, combined with a sense of Catholic alienation and even persecution by the forces of socialism and secularism, there was some reason to suppose that the intellectuals would finally in the late 1930s strike a chord with the Catholic masses.

Catholicism in these years was evidently troubling to the political establishments of both left and right (although they made little attempt to understand it). In practice, however, the position of many working-class Catholic activists was a misleading one. Activists such as Bob Walsh were, in fact, naturally men of the left, but the peculiarities of 1930s politics, which did not allow for shades of grey, placed them on the right on issues such as the Spanish Civil War. This put them at odds with the Labourist tradition in the labour movement (which resented any independent action within its ranks) at a time when their objective (anti-fascist and anti-communist) interests were the same. In the post-war years this ambiguity was removed as, during the Cold War, Catholics and the labour movement leadership found it much easier to unite in anti-communism. With Fascism discredited there were fewer potential irritants to the relationship than had been the case in the 1930s. Instead, the social Catholic movement itself split over the question of how to respond to the Welfare State.

In the inter-war years Catholicism in Britain, as in Europe, enjoyed a controversial relationship with fascism. Indeed, by the later 1930s many on the left saw the Catholics as a potential fifth column for fascism. As Adrian Hastings has noted, Catholic claims to the contrary were not helped by the fact that reputable Catholic publishing houses were willing to publish books like J. K. Heydon's *Fascism and Providence*, which envisaged a fascist-monarchist-corporatist regime as the best chance to undo the damage caused by the Reformation (though even Heydon accepted that once in power fascism may well turn on Catholicism and persecute it).<sup>69</sup> During the 1920s the Catholic Church had allowed itself to be manipulated by the Fascists in the Italian immigrant communities—for instance, a Te Deum for Mussolini's survival of an assassination attempt was held in St Peter's, Liverpool.<sup>70</sup> However, it should also be noted that bitter debates raged in the Catholic press at the time of the rise of Mussolini, with Miss Barbara Barclay Carter a particularly strong supporter of the Catholic PPI against the Fascists (she would later look after the exiled PPI leader Don Sturzo in London), while certain English priests resident in Italy were enthusiastic apologists for Mussolini.<sup>71</sup> Sturzo played a central role in setting up the Christian democratic 'People and Freedom' group which maintained a critique of authoritarian governments of the right in the later 1930s.<sup>72</sup> Sympathy for Mussolini was, however, lingering. As late as 1944, in his panegyric for Hinsley, the future Cardinal ↵ Heenan felt free to describe Italian Fascism as 'incomparably the best system of government ever to rule a United Italy'.<sup>73</sup>

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Historians have laid different emphases on what fascism meant for British Catholics. Adrian Hastings has argued that the Catholic cultural 'renaissance' of the 1930s incorporated a blindness to the evils of fascism, and a sympathy for authoritarianism which owed much to the ideas of Belloc and Chesterton. However, this was mainly a phenomenon of the English Catholic upper class, and made little impression on the working class.<sup>74</sup> Similarly, E. R. Norman claims that fascism had little appeal, especially for working-class Catholics in England—'English Catholicism was too English in its social and political outlook'.<sup>75</sup> Thomas Moloney, however, has stressed the attractions of fascism for a new generation of socially mobile young Catholics, being educated in boys' grammar schools but still subject to discrimination and prejudice. He also points out that Oswald Mosley's British Union of Fascists was very willing to reach out to Catholics as potential allies, noting in its journal, for instance, that 'the philosophy of both is opposed to democracy'.<sup>76</sup> Indeed, Mosley was, apparently, known in Leeds as 'the Pope' due to the large number of Catholic BUF supporters.<sup>77</sup>

What is certainly true is that even those sections of the Catholic hierarchy which ultimately came out very strongly against Nazism in the Second World War persisted in refusing to share the left's blanket condemnation of authoritarian political regimes and movements of the right. The best example of this was the widespread support for Franco in the Catholic community which often went beyond mere revulsion at the anti-Catholic outrages of the early stages of the Civil War to support for the 'New Spain' that Franco was hoping to build. A few well-known Catholics (such as Eric Gill, the maverick convert sculptor) were willing to come out in support of the Republic. However, recent research has overturned the traditional assumption that the Catholic working class was likely to be pro-Republican, emphasizing instead the very real problems that Catholic discontent caused in local Labour party branches, trade unions, and the Co-operative movement. The Labour party agent in St Helens, for example, complained that: 'The issues of Spain have deeply disturbed large groups of our Roman Catholic supporters...It must be remembered that the Catholics of this and other towns are hearing from certain sources an incessant propaganda against the heroic defenders of Spanish democracy.'<sup>78</sup> However, this research also emphasizes the limitations of Catholic dissent. In the absence of another political home, and given the hierarchy's hostility to breakaway movements, Catholics ultimately had little choice but to remain and fight their corner within their own organizations.<sup>79</sup>

Even so, the lasting effects of the Civil War must be noted. Cardinal Hinsley was to keep a signed photograph of Franco on his desk during the Second World War at the same time as he was being placed on a Nazi death list—possibly because his Sword of the Spirit movement was mistaken for a kind of Home Guard!<sup>80</sup> In the early 1950s Catholics led the campaign for full diplomatic relations to be restored with Franco's Spain.

Reflecting in 1974 on his visit to Barcelona in 1952 for the Eucharistic conference Cardinal Heenan remarkably concluded that ‘Franco’s Spain is a dictatorship with a difference’ due to the open criticism of the regime that he believed was permitted.<sup>81</sup> Hence, within the Catholic Church sympathy for Franco was widespread, and, especially during the Civil War, those progressive Catholics who were critical of Franco’s crusade were made to feel like a beleaguered minority in the face of the ‘corporate’ outlook (in David Mathew’s term) of the hierarchy and priesthood.<sup>82</sup>

For all these reasons historians have identified the early stages of the Second World War—especially the months following the fall of France—as a crucial phase in British Catholic history when the loyalties of Catholics could have been seriously eroded by the example of the ‘Latin Bloc’ of authoritarian pro-Catholic regimes in Spain, Italy, and Vichy France. Indeed, many of the Catholic newspapers were accused of defeatism in the days after Dunkirk.<sup>83</sup> Michael de la Bedoyere, editor of the *Catholic Herald*, was a leading advocate of the Latin Bloc, describing it as the ‘specifically Catholic Christian work of Catholic statesmen like Salazar, de Valera or Pétain’. In February 1941 the same paper saw Pétain as standing for ‘the spiritual, moral and cultural values of Christian Europe’.<sup>84</sup> Despite these and other examples of Catholic sympathy for the ideals of Vichy, Franco, and Mussolini, it is clear, however, that fears of Catholic disloyalty were grossly overexaggerated in the crisis months of mid-1940. Even so, there were clearly strong motives for Cardinal Hinsley’s initiative in launching the Sword of the Spirit movement soon afterwards. It would educate Catholics in what the war was about and finally disperse the spectre of disloyalty to the war effort. More broadly, it filled a gap left by the Church of England in leading a campaign to establish the war as a spiritual crusade for a reconstructed Europe (the Anglican church being chastened by allegations of jingoism after the 1914–18 war and reluctant to give a lead again).

p. 270 Sword of the Spirit (SoS), founded in August 1940, was a major success in this respect, uniting British people with the remnants of the French and Polish forces. Working under the presidency of Cardinal Hinsley, SoS united some of the leading progressive Catholic intellectuals of the day, such as Christopher Dawson, Barbara Ward, and A. C. F. Beales. In this way the ‘Christian Democrats’ of the 1930s were at last given a platform, and the pro-authoritarian intellectuals were marginalized—much to their own discomfort. SoS activities included public meetings and a series of publications, and its finest hour was probably the Stoll Theatre rally in May 1941, when Catholics, Free Churchmen, and Anglicans met under the chairmanship of the Archbishop of Canterbury (Cosmo Lang) to discuss ‘A Christian Order for Britain’.<sup>85</sup> Tellingly, however, no Catholic bishops were present at the start of the meeting. Indeed, SoS was far from uniformly supported amongst the Catholic hierarchy, and fell foul of conservative theologians who protested against any moves to ‘ecumenicalism’.<sup>86</sup> Thus, although a united front was created with the Church of England and the Free Churches, it ultimately proved impossible to draw up a joint statement on the question of religious liberty, because canon lawyers cavilled at the concept that there was ‘a natural and civil right to religious freedom’.<sup>87</sup>

Moreover, the attempt to draw up a post-war social agenda through the SoS was far from successful, and the latent divisions were easily opened over questions such as birth-control once the immediate danger of German invasion had passed. In 1943 the Bishop of Salford cancelled a meeting of SoS branch secretaries after a non-Catholic speaker at an SoS public meeting had appeared to endorse divorce and birth-control.<sup>88</sup> Even so, by the time of his death in 1943 Hinsley, despite the divisions within his Church, had, through his radio broadcasts and campaigns, achieved a positive projection of British Catholicism unparalleled since the days of Cardinal Manning.

The same campaigning spirit that underpinned SoS was carried through into the post-war world, revolving around the issue of communism. Catholic opposition to communism was unflinching, especially given the strong pre-war links built up with Catholics in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, and was tempered only by the knowledge that the path from Communism to Catholicism (and vice versa) was a well-enough travelled one to preclude the complete demonization of the enemy.<sup>89</sup> Defecting

Communists like Douglas Hyde and Hamish Fraser gave a particular lead to this work, although it was not always clear how their talents could best be used.<sup>90</sup>

p. 271 In the 1940s all the new Catholic lay movements adopted a strongly anti-communist orientation. In Scotland, the Catholic Workers' Guild, an alternative to the CSG, criticized the alleged middle-class dominance of the CSG and the fact that ↵ many workers who went to the Catholic Workers' College returned less able to communicate with their workmates.<sup>91</sup> Founded in 1941 by Anthony Hepburn and James Darragh, it has been argued that the Guild should take some of the credit for the Communist party's relative failure on Clydeside in the war.<sup>92</sup> Importantly, the new guild was not diocesan but workplace based. In England, the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists (ACTU) was set up on a diocesan basis, initially to overturn the TUC's 1942 vote against denominational education, but increasingly to act as a weapon against communist infiltration of the unions, working closely with right-wing trade-union leaders and other anti-communist organizations such as IRIS and Common Cause.<sup>93</sup> However, despite strong backing from Cardinal Griffin, ACTU received only patchy support from the hierarchy, and the consistently inflated membership figures concealed a rapidly declining organization. Joan Keating's detailed research suggests that the mass movement of anti-communist Catholics (on the Australian model), which some leaders had envisaged, was always illusory.<sup>94</sup>

The main problem was that ACTU's pervasive anti-communism aroused (justified) fears that such a negative attitude would ultimately lead to failure. Bob Walsh, for instance, was keen for Catholic activists to spell out the positive, radical side to their own programme. The Communist was 'not an evil man to be exterminated...He shares my vision in which I see the end of a system that is worked for the benefit of a few...I tell employers that I am out to end capitalism. The Communist and I [only] part company in the method of attack on these evils and in the system that must replace capitalism.'<sup>95</sup> The truth of these warnings was borne out in the 1950s when the Communist peril faded after the death of Stalin, and when the Hungarian uprising weakened the Communist party in Britain. By the 1960s and 1970s Catholics were as likely to be interested in development issues in the Third World as in the defence of the 'free world' or rolling back communism. The evolution of the Sword of the Spirit into the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), which in 1974 led the criticism of Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique, was highly symbolic of this shift.<sup>96</sup>

p. 272 By the late 1940s, however, the real issue for many Catholics was not the threat of communist subversion, but what they saw as the crypto-communist 'big government' of the post-war consensus. The Welfare State appeared abhorrent to traditional Catholic social thought with its emphasis on the powerful state (as against subsidiary function), and its centralizing of schools and medical services. The 1942 Beveridge report and 1944 Butler Education Act caused considerable Catholic apprehension at the end of the Second World War, softened only by the knowledge that working-class Catholics would stand to gain financially from many of the reforms such as Family ↵ Allowances. The Bishop of Leeds accused RAB Butler of sleeping 'with a copy of *Mein Kampf* under his pillow'.<sup>97</sup> True to form, the *Tablet* recommended a Conservative vote in 1945 as closest to Catholic social principles, and later saw hope in a Tory 'property-owning democracy', though the Tories disappointed such hopes when they returned to power in 1951 by continuing with the Welfare State.

The problem was that the post-war changes in nationalization and social policy were becoming a fact of political life, at the same time as reconstruction was literally bulldozing the traditional social basis of the Catholic community. Thus, social Catholics had to decide between accommodation and opposition, leading to a major split in their ranks in the 1950s. By 1952 Bob Walsh was defending an alliance with the Labour party in *Blackfriars* and would soon run as a Labour candidate in Bury. Walsh argued that Labour party policy was not at odds with Catholic thought, and even chimed with *Quadragesimo Anno* which had accepted that certain forms of property must be reserved for the state. Improbably, he even argued that the opportunity was present for Catholics to occupy the role of 'moral advisor' to the Labour movement formerly provided



by the Nonconformists.<sup>98</sup> Battle-lines in the CSG were clearly drawn in 1951 when the economist Michael Fogarty published an article entitled 'I like the Welfare State' in the *Christian Democrat*, appealing for an end to attacks on the Welfare State in the name of Catholic principle.<sup>99</sup> Such views were set against those of the editor, Father Paul Crane, who saw the Welfare State as 'embryonic Communism' and warned that contemporary social policies could lead to totalitarianism and 'a Dachau of our own devising'.<sup>100</sup> By the late 1950s, when Crane was eased out of the editorship, the movement was severely divided and, despite Crane's success in sustaining membership, effectively moribund long before the Guild's ultimate demise in 1967.<sup>101</sup> Crane went on to promote his views in his own paper, *Christian Order*. Significantly, the last years of the Guild were run under a very different regime, as the Church authorities stepped in in 1959 after three years of 'uncertainty and dispute' to impose a diocesan framework, with priests appointed by the bishops as 'Diocesan Directors'. Archbishop Grimshaw of Birmingham noted that the Lay Committee 'cannot of course be an autonomous body, answerable to nobody...Democracy, I am afraid, is not the Church's constitution.'<sup>102</sup>

p. 273 This last comment identifies a recurring feature of Catholic political engagement both in Britain and Europe: the strength and weakness that came with the tradition of complete obedience to episcopal authority. By the 1960s the Catholic community in Britain was going through a process of change. In considerable numbers Catholics were now enjoying access to higher education, resulting in a better educated, more questioning and assertive laity. The quintessential lay movement of the 1960s, the Newman Society which drew inspiration from Cardinal Newman as a symbol of a more open Catholicism opposed to the spirit of the First Vatican Council, owed little to the social and political movements which have been discussed in this chapter. The English hierarchy may have been unprepared for the coming of the Second Vatican Council, but the evidence of the pressure for change was already evident in the Catholic community.

### 3. Conclusion

This chapter has traced the rise and fall of a distinctive Catholic political tradition which, although never able to make much impact on national politics, played a major role within the Catholic community and, occasionally, beyond it. Although it drew inspiration from European, American, and even Australian developments it was never just a pale reflection of them. It possessed an indigenous strength which largely derived from the small but committed group of Catholic activists who cropped up in many guises in the overlapping initiatives of these years. The movement may be judged a failure in the sense that by the 1960s Catholic social principles were no longer seen as a model for the remaking of British society, even though, of course, the Catholic faith itself had an enduring religious significance. Similarly, the patterns of organization adopted by lay Catholics in the decades after 1918 were no longer deemed appropriate to the changed society of the 1960s. However, it would be wrong to judge a small movement (representing a minority within a minority) too harshly. The Catholic movements discussed in this chapter played a significant role in educating and empowering ordinary working-class Catholics. Bob Walsh, for instance, noted that ACTU began to decline when a whole generation of its leading figures moved into responsible trade-union posts.

The overall failure of this movement is perhaps not surprising, even if the reasons for it are open to debate. Activists were wont to lament the 'apathy' of the Catholic masses, although the problem was, perhaps, that they were apathetic about political Catholicism in particular rather than about politics or trade unionism in general. Moreover, the attitude of the Catholic hierarchy was never straightforwardly supportive towards these movements, and the tensions between the hierarchy and a more assertive laity certainly intensified in the 1950s. Ultimately, the dream of a distinctive Catholic social and political movement was engulfed in the fundamental changes that overtook British politics and society after 1945. In the 1960s Catholics' political engagement continued to fragment—into Third World development work, into left-wing political

radicalism,<sup>103</sup> or into intransigent campaigning on questions such as abortion. In recent years, however, there have been signs of an attempt to relaunch a national political force in the inter-denominational 'Movement for Christian Democracy'.

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There are welcome signs that the relative neglect of twentieth-century Catholicism and its associated political and social movements by historians is already being remedied. Indeed, many of the factors that fostered this neglect carry relatively little weight today. The marked Catholic diffidence in analysing the events of the twentieth century (especially Catholicism's relations with Fascism) should decline as the events of the potentially embarrassing 1930s recede. Moreover, while the lack of explicitly Catholic political institutions (such as parties and trade unions) made Catholicism fit uneasily within the mainstream study of British party politics, it is increasingly recognized that religion did not cease to play an important role in British politics with the ending of the nineteenth century. Catholicism, as a religion which maintained its position during the twentieth century and, indeed, grew in numbers, may be discordant with a typical view of British politics which sees religion as a declining force in a secular society. However, the remarkable resilience of Catholicism in the final decade of the century, especially in comparison with the travails of the Church of England, may well force a reappraisal of the reasons for its success.<sup>104</sup>

## Notes

- \* The main emphasis of this chapter will be on England and Wales, with reference to Scottish developments where appropriate. Northern Ireland is considered below, in Sect. 1.
- 1 One of the best sources for information on 20th-cent. Catholicism in England and Wales remains the official history ed. Bishop Beck, *The English Catholics, 1850–1950* (London, 1950), commissioned to celebrate the centenary of the restored hierarchy. Edward Norman's general history of English Catholicism also offers an excellent, if brief, introduction to the subject (E. R. Norman, *Roman Catholicism in England from the Elizabethan Settlement to the Second Vatican Council* (Oxford, 1985)). However, the title of the relevant ch.—'Twentieth Century Developments'—reinforces the view that the years after 1900 offered little inherently new. A. Hastings's *A History of English Christianity 1920–1990* (3rd edn., London 1991) devotes considerable space to Catholicism.
- 2 See e.g. G. I. T. Machin, 'The Liberal Government and the Eucharistic Procession, 1908', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 34/4 (Oct. 1983), 559–83 [10.1017/S0022046900037441](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022046900037441).
- 3 It should be noted that the figures for Catholic population were supplied by parish clergy who supplied an estimate of the number of Catholics 'known to live in their parish' (*Catholic Directory*, 1965, 769), and cannot be treated as anything more than a general indication of Catholic numbers.
- 4 *Tablet*, 4 June 1955.
- 5 J. Fitzsimons, 'The Irish', in D. Mathew (ed.), *Catholicisme anglais* (Paris, 1958), 61–2.
- 6 S. Fielding, *Class and Ethnicity: Irish Catholics in England, 1880–1939* (Buckingham, 1993), 1 and 17. Despite its title, this book is based almost entirely on a study of Salford, Manchester. M. McDermott's excellent 'Irish Catholics and the British Labour Movement: A Study with Particular Reference to London, 1918 to 1970', M. A. thesis, University of Kent, 1978, is also based on the concept of Irish Catholics.
- 7 S. Fielding, *Class and Ethnicity*, 72–8.
- 8 *Ibid.* 104.
- 9 As Fielding accepts, 'the term "Irish Catholic" "also embraces those who might have considered themselves more Catholic than Irish"' (*ibid.* p. xiii).
- 10 The main exception to this was the short-lived 'Friends of Ireland', set up after the Second World War in alliance with the Anti-Partition League in Ireland. This is described in B. Purdie, 'The Friends of Ireland: British Labour and Irish Nationalism, 1945–1949', in T. Gallagher and J. O'Connell (eds.), *Contemporary Irish Studies* (Manchester, 1983).
- 11 T. Gallagher, *Glasgow, The Uneasy Peace: Religious Tension in Modern Scotland* (Manchester, 1987), 134–6.
- 12 There is an immense literature on the Irish in Britain. The classic account is J. Denvir's *The Irish in Britain: From Earliest Times to the Fall of Parnell* (London, 1892). For a comprehensive recent bibliography on the subject see Fielding, *Class and Ethnicity*, 163–75.
- 13 J. Hickey, *Urban Catholics: Urban Catholicism in England and Wales from 1829 to the Present Day* (London, 1967), develops a model for the development of Catholic communities based on a case study of Cardiff.

- 14 The Catholic parishes were not formally restored until 1918. Until then their status had been as 'missions'.
- 15 P. Coman, *Catholics and the Welfare State* (London, 1977), 18–20.
- 16 M. Hornsbv-Smith, *Roman Catholics in England: Studies in Social Structure Since the Second World War* (Oxford, 1987), p. 94.
- 17 Ibid. 115.
- 18 See esp. the work of D. A. Quinn, 'English Roman Catholics and Politics in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century', D.Phil. thesis, Univ. of Oxford, 1985; and J. Supple, 'The Political Attitudes and Activities of Yorkshire Catholics, 1850–1900', *Northern History*, 22 (1986), 230–49.
- 19 See Coman, *Catholics and the Welfare State*, 53–4.
- 20 There is evidence of the damage that the Education Bill caused to the Labour party at by-elections during the period 1930–1 in A. Thorpe, *The British General Election of 1931* (Oxford, 1991), 23–4 [10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198202189.001.0001](https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198202189.001.0001).
- 21 *Federationist* (Nov. 1910), quoted in P. Doyle, 'The Catholic Federation, 1906–1929', in W. J. Sheils and D. Wood (eds.), *Studies in Church History*, xxiii. *Voluntary Religion* (London, 1986), 462.
- 22 T. Moloney, *Westminster, Whitehall and the Vatican: The Role of Cardinal Hinsley, 1935–1943* (London, 1985), 90–7. Hinsley also caused offence by his clumsy attempts to defend the Pope against critics who said that he should have condemned Mussolini's aggression against Abyssinia in 1935: 'Well, what can the Pope do to prevent this or any other war? He is a helpless old man with a small police force to guard himself' (J. C. Heenan, *Cardinal Hinsley* (London, 1944), 58).
- 23 E. Cruise, 'Development of the Religious Orders', in Beck, *English Catholics*, 442.
- 24 Ibid. 465.
- 25 The Catholic Union of Great Britain is a cross-party lay body established in 1872. Its main interests concern legislation affecting Catholics, and there is a Parliamentary Subcommittee composed of Catholic members of both Houses.
- 26 A great deal has been published on the problems of Northern Ireland, esp. on the period since 1969. For a general history see J. J. Lee, *Ireland, 1912–1985: Politics and Society* (Cambridge, 1989). For a review of religious aspects of the conflict see J. H. Whyte, *Interpreting Northern Ireland* (Oxford, 1990), 26–51. M. Farrell's *Northern Ireland: The Orange State* (London, 1976) is generally critical of the role of the Catholic Church. S. Wichert, *Northern Ireland since 1945* (Harlow, 1991), is a compact recent survey. F. O'Connor, *In Search of a State: Catholics in Northern Ireland* (Belfast, 1993) is based on interviews with Catholics and sheds light on the Catholic politics of Northern Ireland before 1969. See also G. McElroy, *The Catholic Church and the Northern Ireland Crisis, 1968–1986* (Dublin, 1991).
- 27 F. S. L. Lyons, *Ireland Since the Famine* (London, 1973), 717 and 749.
- 28 On the governing arrangements in Northern Ireland see Lyons, 695–705.
- 29 M. Harris, *The Catholic Church and the Foundation of the Northern Irish State* (Cork, 1993), 173.
- 30 Ibid. 174–85.
- 31 O. P. Rafferty, *Catholicism in Ulster, 1603–1983: An Interpretative History* (London, 1994), 246.
- 32 See M. Fletcher, *O, Call Back Yesterday* (Oxford, 1939), 169.
- 33 E. Oldmeadow, *Francis Cardinal Bourne, ii* (London, 1944), 137–41. J. M. Cleary notes the role of Fr Plater and other members of the Catholic Social Guild in the preparation of this pastoral (*Catholic Social Action in Britain, 1909–1959* (Hinckley, 1961), 52).
- 34 S. Mews, 'The Churches', in M. Morris (ed.), *The General Strike* (Harmondsworth, 1976), 330–3. In his High Mass on 9 May 1926, Cardinal Bourne declared that there was 'no moral justification' for the General Strike, and that '[A]ll are bound to uphold and assist the Government, which is the lawfully constituted authority of the country and represents therefore in its own appointed sphere the authority of God Himself [sic]'.  
35 In 1936 Cardinal Hinsley told Sir Walter Citrine, General Secretary of the TUC, at the height of the row with the labour movement over the Spanish Civil War, that he 'should favour Labour being the son of a working man', T. Buchanan, *The Spanish Civil War and the British Labour Movement* (Cambridge, 1991), 183.
- 36 P. Coman, *Catholics and the Welfare State*, 27.
- 37 Quoted in J. P. Corrin, *G. K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc: The Battle Against Modernity* (Athens, Ohio, 1981), 208. Corrin's book is the best survey of the political impact of Distributism, and offers a valuable listing of the voluminous literature which it produced.
- 38 *Catholic Times*, 22 Apr. 1927.
- 39 Ibid., 30 September 1927.
- 40 R. H. Butterworth, 'The Structure and Organization of Some Catholic Lay Organizations in Australia and Great Britain: A Comparative Study with Special Reference to the Function of Organizations as Pressure Groups', D.Phil thesis, Oxford, 1959, pp. 258–60; chapter 5.
- 41 *Tablet*, 29 Jan. 1921, obituary of Plater.
- 42 Cruise, 'Development of the Religious Orders', 467. There is a useful summary of Plater's ideas (emphasizing his role as a

- synthesizer and communicator of European social Catholic thought) in P. Doyle, 'Charles Plater SJ and the Origins of the Catholic Social Guild', *Recusant History*, 21/3 (May 1993).
- 43 *Tablet*, 10 May 1924.
- 44 Catholic Social Guild, *1910 Yearbook*, 18.
- 45 H. Somerville, 'Programme for the Catholic Social Guild', *Month* (Jan. 1928), quoted in P. Fitz-patrick, 'Education and Social Engagement: The Lessons of the Catholic Social Guild', *Month* (Apr. 1988), 651.
- 46 The best history of the CSG is J. M. Cleary's *Catholic Social Action in Britain* (Hinckley, 1961), which, although an official history, is a mine of useful information and interesting comment.
- 47 G. Scott, *The RCs: A Report on Roman Catholics in Britain Today* (London, 1967), 85–6. On the history of the College see J. Keating, 'The Making of the Catholic Labour Activist; The Catholic Social Guild and The Catholic Workers' College, 1909–1939', *Labour History Review*, 59/3 (Winter 1994), 9–51.
- 48 Fletcher, *Call Back Yesterday*, 141. For the history of the CWL see *Yesterday Recalled: A Jubilee istory of the Catholic Women's League, 1906–1981*, comp. M. Ryan (London, 1981).
- 49 *Tablet*, 23 Nov. 1918.
- 50 *Ibid.*, 7 Aug. 1920.
- 51 *Ibid.*, 10 June 1950.
- 52 See F. Mason, 'The Newer Eve; The Catholic Women's Suffrage Society in England, 1911–1923', *Catholic Historical Review*, 72/4 (Oct. 1986).
- 53 *Tablet*, 18 Oct. 1919.
- 54 Cleary, *Catholic Social Action in Britain*, 73.
- 55 M. Clifton, *Amigo: Friend of the Poor* (Southampton, 1987), 108–10. Clifton's book is an account of the life of one of the most important bishops of the period, and quotes extensively from Amigo's letters and papers.
- 56 *Tablet*, 8 Oct. 1921.
- 57 *Ibid.*, 5 Nov. 1921.
- 58 *Ibid.*, 15 Nov. 1924.
- 59 *Ibid.*, 17 Jan. 1925.
- 60 *Ibid.*, 28 Mar. 1925.
- 61 P. Morris, 'The Irish in the Glasgow Region and the Labour Movement, 1891–1922', M.Litt. thesis, Oxford, 1989, p. 170. For an introduction to the controversies surrounding Wheatley see S. Gilley, 'Catholics and Socialists in Scotland, 1900–30', in R. Swift and S. Gilley (eds.), *The Irish in Britain, 1815–1939* (London, 1989), 212–38.
- 62 Buchanan, *The Spanish Civil War*, 175. Tensions within the Camberwell Labour party over the Spanish Civil War lead to a breakaway Catholic 'Constitutional Labour Party' winning some 4,000 votes in the local elections of Nov. 1937.
- 63 B. Wall, 'The English Catholic Worker: Early Days', *Chesterton Review*, 10 (3 Aug. 1984), 275–93. I am grateful to Frank Loughlin for drawing this article to my attention.
- 64 *Guardian*, 9 Mar. 1990 carried a brief obituary for Keegan. See also R. P. (Bob) Walsh, *The Rise of the Social Conscience* (London, 1955), 8–12.
- 65 *Ibid.* 5.
- 66 Walsh, 5.
- 67 Cleary, *Catholic Social Action in Britain*, 148–50.
- 68 Characteristically, Greene went on to note that: 'There was something a little pathetic about Catholic Action in San Antonio'; G. Greene, *The Lawless Roads* (Harmondsworth, 1947 edn.), 24. This account of Greene's visit formed the basis for his famous novel *The Power and the Glory* (1940). For more on Greene's religious and political views see N. Sherry, *The Life of Graham Greene, i. 1904–1939* (London, 1989).
- 69 A. Hastings, 'Some Reflections on the English Catholicism of the late 1930s', in id. (ed.), *Bishops and Writers: Aspects of the Evolution of Modern Catholicism* (Wheatampstead, 1977), 115. J. K. Heydon, *Fascism and Providence* (London, 1937).
- 70 *Catholic Times*, 19 Nov. 1926.
- 71 *Ibid.*, 7 Jan. 1927 and ff.
- 72 J. Keating, 'Christian Democrat Thought in 1930s Britain', unpub. conference paper, 1991, *passim*.
- 73 J. C. Heenan, *Cardinal Hinsley* (London, 1944), 102.
- 74 Hastings, 'English Catholicism of the late 1930s', 107–25.
- 75 Norman, *Roman Catholicism in England*, 119.
- 76 Moloney, *Westminster, Whitehall and the Vatican*, 55–60. Catholics continued to be associated with Mosley's movements—e.g. E. J. Hamm, Gen. Sec. of the Union Movement of the 1960s, as well as Mosley's private secretary, were both Catholics. Hamm claimed that 'in the Union Movement the social teachings of the church find their political expression' (letter to *Christian Democrat*, Nov. 1963).
- 77 Fielding, *Class and Ethnicity*, 125.

- 78 Buchanan, *Spanish Civil War*, 185.
- 79 See *ibid.*, ch. 5, and T. Gallagher, 'Scottish Catholics and the British Left, 1918–1939', *Innes Review*, 34/1 (Spring, 1983).
- 80 Molony, *Westminster, Whitehall and the Vatican*, 71.
- 81 J. C. Heenan, *A Crown of Thorns* (London, 1974), 47.
- 82 D. Mathew, *Catholicism in England; The Portrait of a Minority; Its Culture and Tradition* (1936; 3<sup>rd</sup> edn., London, 1955), 271.
- 83 S. Mews, 'The Sword of the Spirit: A Catholic Cultural Crusade of 1940', *Studies in Church History*, 20 (1983), 409–20.
- 84 T. Greene, 'Vichy France and the Catholic Press in England: Contrasting Attitudes to a Moral Problem', *Recusant History*, 21/1 (May 1992), 118. Despite the *Catholic Herald's* admiration for the 'Latin' dictators, an editorial of 11 July 1941 held up the more explicitly collaborationist Catholics such as the German Von Papen, the Slovak Tiso, and the Belgian Degrelle as men 'from whom we have nothing to learn except as a warning'.
- 85 M. Walsh, *From Sword to Ploughshare: Sword of the Spirit to Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1940–1980* (London, 1980).
- 86 *Id.*, 'Ecumenism in War-time Britain: The Sword of the Spirit and Religion and Life, 1940–1945', pts. 1 and 2, *Heythrop Journal*, 23/3 (July and Oct. 1982); Mews, 'The Sword of the Spirit'.
- 87 Walsh, *From Sword to Ploughshare*.
- 88 *Ibid.* 11.
- 89 Author's interview with Bob Walsh, Jan. 1985.
- 90 Hyde was former news editor for the *Daily Worker*, Fraser had been a member of the International Brigades in Spain. See D. Hyde, *Believed* (London, 1950) and *From Communism Towards Catholicism* (London, 1949); H. Fraser, *Fatal Star* (London, 1952).
- 91 R. H. Butterworth, D.Phil, thesis, 254–6.
- 92 Gallagher, 'Scottish Catholics and the British Left', 220.
- 93 Scott, *The RCs*, 97.
- 94 J. Keating, 'Catholic Influence in Trade Unions', unpub. paper given at the Plater College Summer School, Aug. 1991. See also *ead.*, 'Roman Catholics, Christian Democracy and the British Labour Movement, 1910–1960', Ph.D. thesis, Manchester, 1992.
- 95 *Communism: A Catholic Worker Special* (Manchester, 1950), 8–9.
- 96 Walsh, *From Sword to Ploughshare*, 23–32.
- 97 Coman, *Catholics and the Welfare State*, 45.
- 98 MacDermott, 'Irish Catholics and the British Labour Movement', 252–3.
- 99 *Christian Democrat*, Nov. 1951, pp. 256–9. The riposte was R. Lyle's 'I Dislike the Welfare State' in the Dec. edn., pp. 283–5.
- 100 *Christian Democrat Mar.* 1950, p. 49, and Jan. 1951, p. 2.
- 101 Coman, *Catholics and the Welfare State*, 80–4.
- 102 *Tablet*, 14 Nov. 1959.
- 103 See B. Sharratt, 'English Roman Catholicism in the 1960s', in A. Hastings (ed.), *Bishops and Writers*.
- 104 See e.g. H. Young, 'Suddenly, Catholics are Major Players in National Life', *Guardian*, 27 Apr. 1993.