

Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918–1965

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CHAPTER

5 Germany

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Abstract

This chapter discusses political Catholicism in Germany. Catholicism in German is not simply a religious phenomenon: it has also been a historically significant political force. In strictly numerical terms the importance of Catholicism in Germany since unification in 1870 is clearly illustrated by the following figures: 35% of the population of the Empire in 1871 were Catholics, as were 32.4% of the population of the Weimar Republic in 1925, and 44.6% of the population of West Germany in 1970. During the later 19th century a relatively cohesive political and indeed party-political Catholic movement developed — especially in areas with large Catholic populations in the Rhineland and Westphalia, in Bavaria, and in parts of Franconia and Upper Silesia. In 1870 the establishment of the overwhelmingly Catholic Centre Party (Zentrumspartei) gave this political Catholicism the form that it was to retain until 1933.

Keywords: political Catholicism, Germany, German Catholics, German Catholicism, political activity, Catholic Centre Party, Zentrumspartei

Subject: European History, History of Religion, Political History, Modern History (1700 to 1945), Social and Cultural History

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1. The Historical Background

In Germany Catholicism is not simply a religious phenomenon: it has also been a historically significant political force. In strictly numerical terms the importance of Catholicism in Germany since unification in 1870 is clearly illustrated by the following figures: 35 per cent of the population of the Empire (not including Alsace) in 1871 were Catholics, as were 32.4 per cent of the population of the Weimar Republic in 1925, and 44.6 per cent of the population of West Germany in 1970.[1] Numbers are, however, only part of the story. During the later nineteenth century a relatively cohesive political and indeed party-political Catholic movement developed—especially in areas with large Catholic populations in the Rhineland and Westphalia, in Bavaria, and in parts of Franconia and Upper Silesia. In 1870 the establishment of the overwhelmingly Catholic Centre Party (Zentrumspartei) gave this political Catholicism the form which it was to retain until 1933.[2]

German Catholics also formed a broad network of organizations and associations which formed very close links with the Church and the Centre Party and which kept alive an extensive Catholic subculture. Through these organizations German Catholics involved themselves with the wider society. For instance, they responded to endemic social problems through the Kolping-Vereine (Kolping Societies) established in 1851 and the Caritas-Verband (Charity Association) founded in 1897, and worked successfully for socio-political influence with the Catholic Workers' Associations (after 1894), the Christian trade unions, and especially with the People's Union for Catholic Germany (Volksverein für das Katholische Deutschland) founded in 1890. From 1848 annual Katholikentage ('Catholic Day' rallies) provided such organizations and associations with a forum which increasingly involved Centre Party politicians as well as Church leaders.

These institutions arose, in part, in response to a series of challenges to their religious and social status that
p. 157 German Catholics faced in the course of the nineteenth ↳ century. The secularization laws of 1803 resulted in the dissolution of the monasteries and the loss of many Catholic educational establishments, deepening a sense of disadvantage amongst Catholics within German society and forcing them to look increasingly to Rome for support and leadership. German unification in 1870, under the auspices of the predominantly Protestant state of Prussia, cut Catholics off from Catholic Austria and increased their alienation. Finally, in the 1870s Imperial Chancellor Bismarck launched his *Kulturkampf* (cultural struggle) against German Catholicism, identifying the Church as a potential focus of opposition to the new state. The *Kulturkampf* met with stiff resistance from the Catholic minority, and was abandoned in the late 1870s, not least because Bismarck began to need the Centre Party's support in the Reichstag.[3] However, the aspersions that he had cast on the national loyalty of German Catholics had a profound impact on their identity well into the twentieth century.

One unexpected result of the *Kulturkampf* was that the Centre Party, to a large extent, became politically representative of German Catholics. Already in the second Reichstag election in 1874 the party had gained 27.9 per cent of the votes and, with 91 deputies, a quarter of the total seats. In the 1870s the party could count on up to 83 per cent of the Catholic vote.[4] Electoral support for the Centre Party thus became an almost plebiscitary expression of the growing sense of solidarity which German Catholics felt with the Church in its battle against the effects of the *Kulturkampf*.

There were always two aspects to the Centre Party: the confessional and the political. As a political party it was open in principle to Protestants as well as Catholics. One result of the *Kulturkampf* was, however, to accentuate the specifically Catholic basis of the party; it was this that became the focal point of party unity and, as such, it created the popular image of the party.[5] This identification of party and religious confession speeded up the consolidation of the Centre Party's support and enabled the party to integrate voters from all points in the very broad Catholic socio-economic spectrum. In this manner it acted as a kind of political brace holding together widely divergent interest groups in its religious and ideological grip.

Yet, though Catholicism was a powerful unifying factor for the party, this also had problematic consequences. Excessive importance, for instance, was attributed to clerics and to the ecclesiastical and papal hierarchy in the formation of the party's demands and policies. In the longer term, the Centre Party became too identified with Catholicism's generally hostile reaction to secularizing trends in society. Ideological rivals such as the Liberals or the Socialists, with whom pragmatic political collaboration was
p. 158 perfectly possible, were increasingly objects of suspicion; and in the case of ↳ the Communists this developed into outright hatred. In contrast, Fascists and National Socialists often came to seem quite acceptable as allies.

With the end of the *Kulturkampf* Centre Party was increasingly integrated into the political system of the Empire. On many occasions it was involved in the formation of pro-government majorities in the Reichstag, without, however, ever reaching the point of being able to mount a serious challenge to the leadership claims of Conservatives or Liberals. Instead, the Centre Party was to be persistently drawn towards strengthening the dominance of the Conservatives both in the Empire and in the individual German states. Consequently, the party proved unable to take any decisive step towards overcoming the political exclusion of the Social Democrats (SPD), which became the largest single party in the Reichstag with 110 deputies elected in 1912.

At the outbreak of the First World War, German Catholics fell as much under the spell of the prevailing mood of nationalistic zeal as did their compatriots of other political persuasions and their fellow-Catholics in enemy countries.[6] A Peace Resolution put forward in the Reichstag by one of the Centre Party's leaders, Matthias Erzberger, advocated a negotiated peace and was broadly supported by his party, but its impact was quickly marginalized by political and military developments. The war had a particular appeal to German Catholics in that it offered them an opportunity to prove beyond doubt their loyalty to the nation. In the first waves of war fever, divisions among Catholics were forgotten. In particular, the long-running tension within the Centre Party between the minority of aristocrats and middle classes who had previously monopolized the leadership and those white-collar employees, peasants, and workers who were striving for recognition and influence was temporarily submerged.

This national solidarity soon began to crumble as the anticipated rapid victory failed to materialize and the sheer extent of the sacrifices the population were having to make began to dawn on them. As a result of the unfair distribution of the material burdens of war between the middle and working classes, German society began to polarize rapidly. This proved to be the case even within the Centre Party. The fact that the workers had interests in common diminished the distance between Social Democrats and Christian workers' organizations to such an extent that their involvement in common protests seemed to threaten the independence of the Christian organizations. It was not until the last War Cabinet meeting at the beginning of October 1918 that the political reform process reached a point where the Centre Party together with the Social Democrats and left Liberals could take up the role of a responsible party of government. It exercised this role just long enough for the military élite and politicians of the right to be able to blame it (with some appearance of plausibility) for Germany's final military capitulation in the war. The fact that their leader Erzberger had had the task of signing the Armistice on Germany's behalf at Compiegne in November 1918
p. 159 made it easier to portray the Centre Party as traitors. ↳ Ironically, therefore, the Centre Party reached the apogee of its importance as the unquestioned political voice of German Catholicism in the Hohenzollern Empire just at the moment when that Empire was on the verge of collapse. The party's new position of apparent strength was thus no more than a cruel illusion.

2. Catholics in the Weimar Republic

The fall of the Hohenzollern Empire was profoundly traumatic for the German nation, and for German Catholicism in particular. In the case of political Catholicism, an indication of the depth of this trauma may be found in the fact that its representatives initially made no contribution to the political debate concerning the nature of a post-Imperial German[7]. The first phase of the Revolution of 1918–19 was almost exclusively inspired by the Independent Social Democrats (USPD) and the Majority Social Democrats (MSPD). Initially Centre Party politicians holding high office in the regime simply carried on with the roles which they had filled under the monarchy. As interior minister, for instance, the Centre Party leader Erzberger fought on single-mindedly to end the war through a negotiated peace. Only in the states of Baden, Württemberg, and Hesse did the leaders of the Centre Party take an active part in the first revolutionary regimes.

Within the party this brief period of inactivity was followed by one of uncertainty. Proposals were put forward in Cologne and Berlin for it to be given a stronger democratic and social character. In Cologne the 'Free German People's Party' was added to the old party title, while in Berlin the party's name was changed to 'Christian Democrat People's Party'. On the other hand, individual conservative Centre Party politicians pressed for it to be transformed into a Christian-Conservative party. On both wings there were proposals to go beyond the former, almost exclusively Catholic, character of the party and to set up instead a supra-denominational Christian party. In the case of the Bavarian branch of the Centre Party an earlier trend in favour of regional independence was reinforced and led to its transformation into a separate Bavarian People's Party, dominated by conservative and monarchical elements.

It was crucial for the subsequent development of political Catholicism in Germany that the leadership of the Centre Party finally decided to preserve the party-unchanged. They thereby both affirmed their unconditional acceptance of the new constitutional arrangements created by the Revolution and, at the same time, prepared to be a part of the new state whose constitution was to be created by a national assembly chosen by universal suffrage. The Centre Party deliberately avoided making a clear-cut stand for or against the monarchy, as such a move would certainly have forced the party's internal divisions out into the open.

These decisions provided the Centre Party with a basis for pursuing its pragmatic policies, encompassing both Erzberger's collaboration with the new authorities as well as the instances of Centre Party participation in individual revolutionary regimes. The decision to remain loyal to the traditional approach of
p. 160 the Centre Party ↳ also meant the abandonment of more expansionist policies, such as the plans (whether under a social-democratic or a national-conservative banner) to widen the party's confessional base.

As far as the leadership were concerned, such radical departures appeared either superfluous or far too ambitious. In Prussia, in particular, the revolutionary socialist regime's hostility to the traditional position of the religious denominations in state and education was forcing political Catholicism to adopt a resolutely defensive posture. This threat encouraged the Centre Party to resort to the tried and trusted appeal to confessional interests. As before, the Centre Party saw its chief task as the best possible defence of the Church's interests in politics and culture. But, though the party remained loyal to its confessional origins, it also made clear its commitment to bringing about a wide-ranging social and political settlement. This would make it possible for the middle classes to collaborate equally with the revolutionary workers represented above all by the SPD and USPD. Such collaboration would also reduce the potential for conflict between proletariat and property-owners, while a policy promoting a strong Germany would be combined with efforts to come to terms with the reality of the defeat in war.

It is clear that the Centre Party's double strategy of preserving denominational interests while seeking to maintain a balance between opposing ideological and social positions also meant that the Centre Party was able to respond effectively to the need to reconcile the very broad range of social and political outlooks

represented within its own ranks. The party, therefore, unquestionably played a crucial role in the laborious process of bringing stability to the Weimar Republic. But this stability depended more on bridging over conflicts—or simply ignoring them—than it did on the elaboration of constructive plans that could have prompted the emergence of a new democratic mentality. No truly creative or dynamic power emerged in the party, yet this would have been an essential prerequisite for any powerful impulse to be given to the process of building the Republic.

While the Revolution was a shattering experience for Germany, the origins of the Centre Party's 'balancing act' may, in fact, already be glimpsed in the policies followed by the party during the last years of the war. As early as 1917 the Centre Party had collaborated with the majority SPD and the left-wing liberal Progress Party on an interparty committee. In the 1919 Weimar Assembly the party was quick to cooperate with the MSPD and the newly established left-wing liberal German Democratic Party (DDP) in the so-called Weimar Coalition, in which the Centre Party emerged as one of the leading participants in the discussions about the content of the new constitution.

Bourgeois liberal principles predominated in the Weimar Constitution but the ideas of the Social Democrats also found expression and the latter recognized in the Republic the basis for democratic development in the direction of socialist objectives. The Centre Party therefore performed the considerable service of managing to extract compromises from the opposing parties, as well as making concessions itself. With its help the
p. 161 Weimar state became a parliamentary republic. The Reichstag, ↳ chosen by proportional representation, had considerable power within it, and only the political parties were in a position to form majorities on the strength of which chancellors, chosen by the Reich President, were appointed to office.

The Centre Party achieved important confessional objectives in the constitutional discussions on the establishment of equal rights for the religious denominations and on issues of freedom of belief and conscience. It prevented a rigid separation of Church and State which was quite unacceptable to Catholics. Instead, the churches were recognized in public law as corporate institutions enjoying full control over their internal affairs. Church property and State payments to the Church—for example, as compensation for confiscations in the course of secularization—were placed under constitutional guarantee. The right of the churches to raise money and to receive financial support from the State was guaranteed, as were provision for the care of souls in public institutions like the army and hospitals. Religious orders were granted complete and unlimited freedom in respect of their establishment and operations. However, although the Constitution foresaw the provision of a law to give a legal role to parents and guardians in the organization of confessional schools, and this was strongly supported by the Centre Party, proposals for such a law in the Reichstag failed in 1925 and 1927. Nor, in spite of several initiatives, was any concordat established between the Weimar Republic and the Papacy, as the future Pope Pius XII, Eugenio Pacelli, Papal Nuncio in Bavaria and to the Reich government between 1917 and 1929, would have liked. The Papacy managed to conclude concordats only with Bavaria (1924), Prussia (1929), and Baden (1932).

Overall, despite these unfulfilled hopes, the founding of the Weimar Republic brought clear improvements for Catholics on confessional issues. None the less, Catholics did not develop any close bond with the Republic. What occurred instead was a weakening of the influence within the Catholic community of the Centre Party, which now had to content itself with a much-reduced proportion of the Catholic vote. Even the introduction of votes for women did not counter this trend, despite the fact that the party's female supporters outnumbered the men at the polls by 3 to 2. In 1920 the Centre Party still attracted only 13.6 per cent of the votes (19.7 per cent when combined with the votes of the Bavarian People's Party) and in 1932 (the last free Reichstag elections) it received 11.9 per cent.

This decline in Catholic support was not the only factor behind the decline of the Centre Party. Its claim to be the sole political mouthpiece for German Catholics was further brought into question, first by the secession of its Bavarian state association as the more right-wing Bavarian People's Party (BVP); secondly because of

the existence of a grouping of conservative Catholics within the German National People's Party (DNVP), which was attracting the support of 6–8 per cent of Catholic voters; and finally on account of the emergence of the Christian Social Party under Vitus Heller—though this was in fact minimally successful.[8]

It is, therefore, only with some reservations that we can equate the Centre Party with political Catholicism
p. 162 in the Weimar Republic. Even so, the Centre Party turned ↳ political Catholicism into a major force. Its considerable influence is illustrated by the fact that out of the twenty cabinets of the Weimar period up to the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor on 30 January 1933 ten were led by Centre Party politicians. These cabinets had a variety of different political configurations, ranging from the 'Weimar Coalition' of SPD, DDP, and Centre, through coalitions of the right, to presidential cabinets (backed by emergency decree of the Reich President). Furthermore, the Centre Party—or at least individual Centre Party politicians—were involved in every single cabinet with the exception of those led by von Papen (from June to December 1932), von Schleicher (from December 1932 to January 1933), and that of Hitler established in January 1933.[9]

Thus under the Weimar Republic the Centre Party represented an extremely important force for political integration. But the widely differing configurations of the cabinets in which it participated ensured that, while it could offer political stability, it was unable to provide clear political leadership. Instead, the strength of the Centre Party lay much more in its ability to hold opposites in equilibrium and to build bridges between them. This was particularly important in the area of economic policy. Under the influence of Christian trade-unionist and Centre Party politician Adam Stegerwald, the Central Labour Association for the organization of a new collaboration between employers and workers came into being. Moreover, the Centre Party deputy Heinrich Braun, one of the most important spokesmen for the sociopolitical policies of the People's Union for Catholic Germany,[10] held the position of minister of labour without a break through twelve cabinets between 1920 and 1928. During his period in office he was responsible for the most important socio-political achievement of the Weimar Republic—unemployment insurance—even though this played only a limited role in attenuating the ensuing economic crisis.

The open and pluralistic Weimar regime supported by the Centre Party was increasingly under threat from the right. After their success in the election of September 1930, the National Socialists (NSDAP) subjected the Centre Party first of all to verbal threats and then to actual violence. But the party lacked sufficient resolution to make common cause against this violence with any other political forces. Its vulnerability was cruelly exposed as it was forced to accept increasingly artificial restrictions on fundamental democratic freedoms within the presidential system. These concessions were an inevitable consequence of its reluctance to look for allies on the left to help to defend democracy, or to countenance the state-imposed dissolution of the Nazi Party.

As the right grew more powerful so the centre of gravity of political Catholicism shifted increasingly in that direction. Coalitions with the DNVP in 1925 and 1927 had already presaged a rightward shift. In addition,
p. 163 after the election of Prelate Kaas ↳ as party chairman in 1928, instead of either Stegerwald (as representative of the German Trades Union Congress) or Josef Joos (as spokesman for the Catholic Workers' Associations), important social interests remained without a voice. With the election of Kaas, who as a cleric stood above social conflicts, a much more successful attempt was made to strengthen the confessional coherence of the Centre Party and to gloss over complex social problems instead of addressing them. As it shifted to the right the Centre Party now fitted even more comfortably than before into the general system of the Weimar Republic. It had less reason than ever to take account of the point of view of its working-class electorate and the features of the Centre Party which might have blocked any further rightward shift in the Weimar Republic's political and ideological focus were all eliminated in advance.

The Centre Party's character as a confessional party necessarily led it to be more alienated by the pluralist atmosphere of the Weimar Republic than would have been the case if it had become a party focused on immediate social and economic concerns. The latter approach would have prompted the Centre Party to opt

for some form of collaboration with the Social Democrats. Instead, its justified anxieties about its own inner cohesiveness and future ability to manœuvre, as well as its growing alarm about social trends (most notably the spread of secularization) were all factors which acted as very unfortunate influences on the way the Centre Party operated in the final crisis phase of the Weimar Republic.

These difficulties prompted a number of demands for the adoption of alternative political strategies. As early as 1918 Adam Stegerwald argued very strongly for a broader-based Centre Party boosted by an appeal to Protestants, something which had in theory been envisaged since the party's foundation. As a representative of Christian trade unions and a member of the Centre Party, Stegerwald played a crucial role in the establishment of the German Trades Union Congress (Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund) and was its chairman for many years. This was a Christian and national bourgeois worker and white-collar organization which emerged as a competitor to the Social Democratic trade unions in the Weimar period.

In November 1920 Stegerwald used his trade-union position to press for the creation of a single moderate Christian party that would be German, Christian, democratic, and social.[11] He based his argument on the existence of a gulf between the Centre Party's task of acting as mediator in the party system and its actual sociopolitical composition which, he argued, made it quite inadequate to perform such a role. Stegerwald considered it essential that there be a moderate party with the power to hold opposites in equilibrium while at the same time providing a source of political and social creativity.

Stegerwald believed that the moderate party he was endorsing would appeal not only to all levels in the Centre Party but also to the liberal bourgeois and the conservative parties close to it, the DVP and the DNVP, as well as the diverse membership of the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund; the hope was that such a moderate
p. 164 party would attract them to the centre of the party political spectrum and hold them there. ↳ This was not to be simply an enlarged and strengthened Centre Party. Social and economic cooperation between all groups in society with the rejection of both socialist and capitalist claims to hegemony was to be presented as an alternative to social democracy. In order to achieve this co-operation, Stegerwald emphasized the responsibility of the national state to encourage social integration and to provide leadership.

In making his proposal Stegerwald took account of the fact that the Centre Party was simply overstretched by the role it needed to perform in the parliamentary Republic. But it seems very doubtful whether the non-socialist middle-class elements Stegerwald considered essential to the new party would have accepted the stabilizing and positive role he had planned for them in the new state. In 1920 the hardening of bourgeois parties against social democracy was a theme which still made a powerful impact in German bourgeois circles. It would, anyway, hardly have been able permanently to neutralize the hostility to the Republic endemic in the bourgeoisie, given the emotionally charged response of the whole nation—including Catholics—to the Versailles Treaty. From this point of view an appeal to a supra-confessional Christianity was not likely to make much headway, for the Protestants were more ready to console themselves for the fall of the monarchy by resorting to a new assertive nationalist consciousness. It has also rightly been pointed out that Stegerwald cherished visions of a hierarchical state which were not in the least likely to win the middle classes over to the democratic republic. On the contrary they were calculated to induce entirely contrary sentiments.[12] Although a failure in its own time, the emergence of the Christian Union parties (CDU and CSU) immediately after the Second World War demonstrates the prophetic quality of Stegerwald's vision of a pan-confessional Christian party.

Stegerwald was not the only figure looking for a more powerful and creative alternative to the Centre Party's policy of pragmatism and compromise. A broadly similar democratic and republican tone was set by Joseph Wirth, who was associated with South German Catholicism and liberal traditions. He wanted to go beyond the attitude of resigned acceptance of the Weimar Republic and hoped to attract new voters to the party by a marked democratic and republican reorientation in its policies. In 1922 when he was chancellor of the Reich Wirth saw all too clearly the damage being done to the Republic by its enemies on the nationalistic right. A

prime example was the murder of his Jewish Foreign Minister Walter Rathenau. In mounting his counter-attack, however, Wirth set his sights way beyond the circle of those directly responsible for the murder; he took as his target the nationalistic anti-republican and anti-democratic forces that had recently developed both in the DNVP and in the DVP. But his strategy also brought him into confrontation with certain elements within German Catholicism and the German episcopate. It was, after all, quite natural that Catholics, discredited in the *Kulturkampf* as enemies of the Reich, should wholeheartedly associate themselves with
p. 165 national protest movements of the time; ↳ and that in doing so they should quite often have adopted strongly nationalistic, revisionist, and anti-Republican postures.[13]

Nevertheless, Wirth repeatedly rejected all collaboration with the DNVP and called vociferously for a full-blooded alliance with all the forces of the moderate left. This approach met with little favour either in German Catholicism or in his own party, and frequently aroused bitter repudiation. for many years he enjoyed the support of the Catholic Workers' Associations but he did not succeed in developing a reliable power base in them for himself and his policies. Wirth was supported by the *Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung* a paper belonging to Friedrich Dessauer.[14] Dessauer combined a successful career as physicist and industrialist with an intense political commitment to the Centre Party group in the Reichstag. He gathered around him at his paper a dedicated team of young journalists and fully supported their aim of giving a definite social and republican character to the Centre Party. His regional paper developed into a national daily with a wide readership among young Catholic intellectuals, following Wirth's political line even after Wirth had discredited himself through numerous stubborn and clumsily fought battles with his party. This circle also argued that the Centre Party should weaken its confessional dimension. The party's emphasis on questions relating to ideology and ecclesiastical politics meant that general problems about socio-political and economic development were pushed into the background, and there was certainly no attempt by them to make such issues the driving-force of party-political activity, as the circle around Dessauer had wished.

In fact, the Republic and the parliamentary democratic system were widely taken for granted. The Centre Party took its stand on the new reality that had resulted from the revolution but generally made no effort at any serious debate about the actual historical legitimacy of the process. German Catholicism, therefore, missed a precious opportunity to identify with the ideals and practical political potential of the new democratic state and hence to make a complete emotional commitment to the creation of the Weimar Republic. A further obstacle was the Papacy's ambivalent attitude towards democracy.[15] Indeed, it was all too clear that, although the Weimar Republic could certainly expect help from the Papacy in its confrontation with the threat of communism and revolution, Rome's willingness to identify with it would be limited to a cool recognition of its *de facto* existence.[16]

German political Catholicism could not even derive much comfort or encouragement from the general state of contemporary Catholicism either at home or in the wider world. An important trend in German Catholicism in the 1920s was an emerging mood of spiritual renewal which diminished the importance of political and social issues and had a tendency to discriminate against democratic politics. A significant
p. 166 example of this is Quickborn and the newspaper he created, *Die Schildgenossen* ↳ (Companions of the Shield). Quickborn was one of the leaders of the Catholic youth movement who had come under the influence of Romano Guardini and who had stimulated a mood of religious and liturgical renewal in many local Catholic groups. This had exercised considerable influence over Catholic élites. In political terms Quickborn weakened the democratic tendency in Catholicism and instead the journal favoured an authoritarian and élitist view of the State.[17] This journal believed it possessed the means to lift itself above sordid and mundane party-political interests and to create a new form of state governed by the common good. Along with contempt for conflicts of social interests went veneration for a glorified state authority. An ecclesiastical community and a society impregnated with Christian values stood at the forefront of their concerns.

This new spiritual enthusiasm also affected the attitudes of many Catholics towards the numerous Catholic associations and organizations, which had hitherto been seen as instruments of their socio-political mobilization and influence. These now looked to many Catholics to be no more than a vehicle for the protection of their vested interests. The People's Union for Catholic Germany—hitherto an inspirational and educative influence on the leadership of the Workers' Associations, Christian trade unions, and societies—was not unaffected by this new climate of hostility to the associations and organizations and managed thereby to undermine its own influence.[18]

The young Republic received benevolent support from papal diplomacy in numerous moments of foreign-policy crisis in the post-war era. But in the long term this support had less influence on Catholics than decisions taken by the Papacy concerning matters of ecclesiastical organization, even though the effects of the latter on politics were only indirect. Thus, the general intention behind the creation of Catholic Action in the 1920s was a reinvigoration of religious energies and a concentration of all Catholic initiatives and organizations in parish communities. On the recommendation of the Pope, Catholic Action was transplanted to Germany after having developed on an entirely different basis in Italy. Although the ideals of Catholic Action were not widely or systematically established in Germany, it did help to distance Catholic associations from socio-political problems. By concentrating on the religious as the principal sphere of activity, Catholic Action strengthened tendencies already present that were antagonistic to a broad politicization of Catholics.

When the socio-political system of the Weimar Republic entered a new crisis in the late 1920s, the nature of the Centre Party as a constitutional party offered no obstacle to the actions of the Centre Party Chancellor Heinrich Brüning. He employed an excessive extension of the Reich President's emergency powers in order
p. 167 to bring in creeping changes to the constitution which resulted in a crucial strengthening of ↳ the State and the executive. Brüning's policy, and the support he received from the Centre Party, made it clear that a large proportion of Catholics (as was the case—even more strikingly—with the majority of their Protestant fellow-citizens) were not defending the Republic unreservedly, but saw it rather as open to change in fundamental areas of its constitution.

A further indication of the uncertain attitude of German Catholics towards the parliamentary democratic Republic was the attitude of German political Catholicism to the rise of Italian Fascism. The German Catholic press had, initially, warmly welcomed the foundation of the Italian People's Party (PPI) and criticized Fascist attacks on it in the early 1920s. However, the Fascist regime's willingness to make concessions to Church interests, and especially the Lateran Treaty, cast it in a favourable light in comparison with the Weimar regime. By the time that some Catholics began to realize that a similar fate awaited their party as had already befallen the PPI, it was already too late.

In conclusion, it can be stated that under the Weimar Republic, although the Centre Party continued to see itself as the voice of political Catholicism, it failed to create any clear political image for itself, and lost much of its former political dynamism. The party wasted significant opportunities to develop a definite new political orientation. It thereby retained its solid confessional foundation while remaining in thrall to the tradition of a party integrated on confessional lines, a tradition that was gradually losing its appeal.

3. Political Catholicism and National Socialism

At the elections of September 1930 the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) grew from being a splinter group with 2.6 per cent of the votes into the second largest body in the Reichstag with 18.3 per cent of the votes and 107 deputies. It had overtaken not only the Centre Party with its 68 deputies but even the Centre Party and BVP combined with their total of 87 seats in the Reichstag—although by this stage the BVP cannot really be considered alongside the Centre Party as it had moved markedly further to the right. Neither the Centre Party nor the BVP was directly affected by this political earthquake since both maintained their share of the vote more or less unchanged. But the preferred centre-right coalition partners of the Centre Party, the DDP and the DVP, as well as the SPD—the left-wing coalition partner of the early years of the Weimar Republic as well as between 1928 and 1930, and of the important Prussian coalition regime—had all suffered substantial losses. The erstwhile right bourgeois partner of the Centre Party, the DNVP, was reduced to less than half of its previous share of the vote.

The self-destructive indecision and disunity of their political rivals gave the Nazis evermore opportunity to mock and discredit the existing order. Intractable opponents like the Communists and Social Democrats were provoked and wherever possible were deliberately humiliated and intimidated. Enthusiastically provoking a situation close to civil war, while unemployment climbed above 6 million by 1932, ↳ the National Socialists presented themselves to the upper and lower middle classes as a new force for order that was ready and able to help Germany regain domestic peace, revive the economy, rid herself of the consequences of the war, and recover the respect of the international community. To many supporters of other parties—to the Communists for example with regard to the Social Democrats, the hope of seeing opponents defeated by the National Socialists was stronger than any fear of danger to themselves resulting from the latter's growing power.[19]

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There can be no doubt as to the atmosphere of mutual hostility which existed between the Centre Party–BVP and the NSDAR While the Nazis denounced the Centre Party as belonging amongst the 'November traitors', their own violence and demagogy appalled the Centre Party. The strategy adopted by them in response was to attempt to neutralize the threat until the disappearance of the Nazis, which was assumed to be only a matter of time, by taming them, where possible, through temporary collaboration. Centre Party politicians took comfort from their long experience of dealing with difficult coalition partners. This view received some confirmation from the fact that the combination of traditional party-political attachment and Church hostility to National Socialism enabled the Centre Party and the BVP to retain their traditional support in the teeth of the apparently irresistible rise of the National Socialists. But, like all the other political forces, the Catholics underestimated the threat from these new rivals. In spite of the temporary consolidation of its vote, political Catholicism would not be able to maintain a strong identity in the face of the rapidly growing Nazi threat without reliable allies. This consideration ought to have led the Centre Party to consider at least a tactical alliance with the SPD. There was a precedent for such an alliance in the existing cooperative arrangement with the SPD in Prussia, which also involved a remnant of the left-liberal bourgeoisie in the shape of the DDP[20] The *Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung* and especially its contributor Walter Dirks gave vigorous support and backing to the idea of a close collaboration between the Centre Party and the SPD with the tactical goal of blocking the National Socialists. Dirks advocated these ideas in numerous other newspapers without, however, winning over a majority of Catholic opinion. The distinctive feature of Dirks' opposition to Nazism was that he recognized more clearly than anybody else that Catholic middle-class opinion was also susceptible to Nazi ideology—even though Nazism was, as events would demonstrate, hostile to Catholic interests.

Starting with an analysis of contemporary society, Dirks outlined an ideal of a 'sozialen Volksstaates' (social people's state) in which the negative political and social consequences of capitalism, which he believed underlay the widespread trend towards fascism, could be overcome.

> The only socio-political ideal that can positively counterbalance the ideal of fascism is that of socialism—at least in its pure form, cleansed of the impurities accumulated in the course of party
p. 169 [i.e. the SPD's] development. What is needed if the spectre of fascism is to be banished ↳ is an alliance between the ideal of this pure form of socialism and the power of the faith of Christendom. Catholicism, as the only possible focus for the mobilization of the religious powers of Christendom in the great arena of politics, is particularly called to bring about such an alliance.[21]

The critical attitude of the Centre Party and the BVP was echoed and strengthened by the widespread rejection of National Socialism within the Church. The episcopal authorities in Mainz even went so far as to exclude enrolled members of the NSDAP from the sacrament. Its decision was grounded in the anti-Christian character of National Socialism, which the episcopal authorities noted, for example, in Nazi racial ideas as formulated in the NSDAP programme:

> The Christian moral law is founded on love for our neighbour. National Socialist writers do not accept this commandment in the sense taught by Christ; they preach too much respect for the Germanic race and too little respect for foreign races. For many what begins as mere lack of respect ends up as full-blown hatred of foreign races and it is unchristian and uncatholic. Moreover the Christian moral law is universal and valid for all times and races: so there is a gross error in requiring that the Christian faith be suited to the moral sentiments of the Germanic race.[22]

The same message was set out in a declaration by the Bavarian bishops. This also included criticism of National Socialism's hostility to the Concordat, its preference for non-denominational schooling, and its excessively nationalistic thinking; these were condemned as traits strongly reminiscent of the *Kulturkampf*. Any possibility of debate with the political ideals of National Socialism was expressly ruled out. In retrospect however it must said that even in this document the rejection of National Socialism was worded somewhat cautiously- and that room was left for the possibility of compromise, a possibility that Hitler was able to exploit after his seizure of power.[23]

In general in the early 1930s the Centre Party overlooked, or at least underestimated, the special characteristics of National Socialism and overestimated the strength of its own position in relation to it. The party believed that it could control National Socialism with the tried and tested methods of coalition politics. The Church's condemnation of National Socialism did not stand in the way of such a policy as it was fundamentally directed against the religious and moral errors of the National Socialists and went hand in hand with an awareness that the latter shared the Church's hostility to Marxism. The Church's points of dispute could be toned down in a pragmatic coalition policy such as had previously been allowed to the Centre Party by the Church in respect of other parties. In fact no such coalition ever developed, and Hitler succeeded instead in his quest for the post of Reich chancellor by forming a coalition with the conservative DNVP. Against its will and in spite of earlier negotiations the Centre Party was excluded from the new coalition regime, so it was never able to put its ideas about taming National Socialism to the test.

p. 170 When in March 1933 the Reich President allowed the Nazi-led minority cabinet to seek a majority at the polls, Hitler seized the opportunity to influence the result in favour of the National Socialists by trickery and violence. Even so, the proportion of the vote won by the Centre Party and the BVP was only very slightly reduced, and the Centre Party was even able to win additional votes. It was only by combining the 43.9 per cent of National Socialist votes with the 8 per cent of votes gained by the DNVP that Hitler's regime was able to obtain an absolute majority in the Reichstag.

It was only because the regime sought dictatorial plenary powers by means of an Enabling Law that the Centre Party re-emerged in a key position, as its votes were necessary for the two-thirds majority required for passing it. In negotiations the Centre Party put forward a catalogue of demands that Hitler promised to fulfil, publicly confirming his promise in his speech proposing the Enabling Law. These demands had both a

cultural content—a guarantee of continuing Christian influence in schools and education, respect for the state concordats with the Papacy and for the rights of the Christian confessions—and a constitutional and public law content—the preservation of the position of Reich President, retention of the Reichstag and the Reichsrat, a guarantee of continued existence for the states and of the independence of the judiciary. The Centre Party would have achieved an unquestionable success if Hitler's public statements had been trustworthy. This was precisely what a minority of Centre Party deputies doubted, passionately opposing acceptance of the measure and abandoning their opposition only for the sake of the unity of their political grouping.

It was no accident that in the published version of Hitler's speech on the occasion of the introduction of the Enabling Law, a sentence of great importance for Catholics was left out of the text: 'The national government will encourage and entrench the influence properly exercised by the Christian confessions in schooling and education.'[24] This omission was a sign that even as the concessions to the Centre Party were being made, discussions were under way on how to restrict their scope as far as possible.

In considering the arguments for the ultimate acceptance by the Centre Party and BVP of the Enabling Law, the atmosphere of tyranny and terror in which the National Socialist regime was operating must be taken into account. Centre Party deputies were subjected to intimidation. The temporary home of the Reichstag, the Kroll Opera House, was surrounded by armed SA and SS troops, and after the Communist deputies had been illegally arrested no one knew whether these forces would respect the immunity of the Assembly. Centre Party deputies were worried about rejecting the Enabling Law to the extent that such a rejection would be interpreted as a declaration of war against National Socialist domination, with the likely consequence that Hitler would simply pursue his goals by force without legal powers. Among the members of the Centre Party the sight of public officials being dismissed from their jobs and arrested had given rise to widespread anxiety and fear.

p. 171 Thus, in accepting the Enabling Law, the Centre Party was bowing to enormously strong political and psychological pressure. The result showed political Catholicism, represented by the deputies who had been chosen in a hard-fought electoral battle with National Socialism, co-operating in an apparently legal extension of the powers of the Hitler regime. While this regime thereby gained additional means of power and prestige there remained no real possibility of subjecting it to constitutional restraints. The consequent general feeling of despair within Centre Party ranks eventually drove some individuals and groups to move closer to the Nazi regime or even simply to go over to National Socialism.

The disintegration of the Centre Party was accelerated by a fresh episcopal statement on National Socialism which has subsequently provoked a wide range of reactions ranging from astonishment to emphatic condemnation. After the passing of the Enabling Law on 23 March, the Fulda Bishops' Conference issued a declaration on 28 March that redefined the Church's relationship to National Socialism. In contrast to the earlier rejection of National Socialism by the Church this declaration signalled an abrupt change of position, acknowledging the new facts of power relations in Germany and making the support and preservation of this regime a matter of duty for Catholics.[25] Acceptance of this new relationship was imposed on Catholics out of a blinkered preoccupation with the protection of the interests and cultural concerns of the Church, while the warning against 'illegal or subversive behaviour' offered no hope for opposing the destruction of the legal order of the Weimar Republic.

Although no direct connection between the Bishops' Declaration and the plans for a concordat made a little later has so far been proved, there cannot be any real doubt that the new attitude of the German bishops made the Concordat negotiations a great deal easier. These began in Rome at the beginning of April 1933 and continued with various interruptions until 8 July (three days after the dissolution of the Centre Party) when an agreement was signed by the Papacy and the Nazi regime, opening the way for a potential understanding between National Socialists and Catholicism.

With its general veto on any clergy participation in political activities the Concordat finally confirmed the already *de facto* marginalization of political Catholicism. The clergy had played an important role in the Centre Party and the BVP in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and the active collaboration which had developed between the party and the parish priests had been its greatest strength.

p. 172 The question of how to assess the value of the Concordat for the position of Catholicism under the Third Reich has been a matter of intense scholarly debate.[26] On the positive side it needs to be remembered that the Concordat accorded the Church the freedom to pursue its spiritual activities while at the same time providing it with a legal basis for the defence of Church associations and publications. However, the Concordat associated the Church with a regime which had already shown that it had not the least respect for right or law. The Nazis clearly intended to exploit the prestige of the Catholic Church for their own purposes,[27] and, at the same time, to limit the independence of Catholic citizens as much as possible.

This objection is still valid even if one accepts that for the National Socialists the Concordat agreement was primarily intended to undermine political Catholicism and that, strictly speaking, Hitler gained nothing from it since political Catholicism had already collapsed before the signing of the Treaty.[28] The mere knowledge that such negotiations were taking place was sufficient to undermine German political Catholicism. In this sense Hitler was rewarded in advance for the Concordat.

Nor were the freedoms which the Concordat granted to German Catholics for the propagation of their faith of any great significance. These legal guarantees only retained their value as long as the Nazis felt obliged by the pressures of the domestic and international situation to honour them. Moreover, the very doubtful value of these advantages has to be balanced against the fact that the conclusion of the treaty gave added legitimacy at home and abroad to the Nazi regime. As a contemporary witness later commented:

> German Catholics—and the whole Catholic world—were in the position that they had a kind of moral obligation to believe that a compromise would be possible with National Socialism at least in the future. They had to hope that the (still evolving) movement was ultimately on the way to improvement.[29]

The Concordat strengthened the illusions of right-wing Catholics such as the all-party 'the Cross and the Eagle' movement.[30] Although patronage of this movement was taken over by the then vice-chancellor Franz von Papen, its hope of influencing the Third Reich in the direction of conservative Christian and authoritarian hierarchical values remained unfulfilled. The dissolution of the movement in the autumn of 1934 set the seal on the failure of an initiative based on the false assumption that there existed a readiness for co-operation on the part of the National Socialists.

p. 173 With the benefit of hindsight, the Bishops' Declaration, the conclusion of the Concordat, and the quest for a working relationship with the regime must be seen as a product of the state of mind of German Catholicism which arose from its distinctive historical experience.[31] Three factors were of particular importance: first a sense of alienation from the modern state and society together with a tendency (strengthened by the experience of the *Kulturkampf*) for the Church to withdraw into its own religious sphere; secondly, a preoccupation with the defence of religion, church, and school as the crucial arbiters of political policy; and finally a deeply rooted antiliberalism, which sealed off Catholic thinking from the developing movement towards parliamentary-democratic models of government. This antiliberalism seemed to make the authoritarian defeat of modern individualism in state and society desirable and therefore gave Catholicism an affinity with authoritarian regimes.

Something of this kind of attitude was apparent in the conduct of the leading clerical representatives of German Catholicism in helping, objectively if not intentionally, to stabilize National Socialist hegemony in the decisive phase of its development after March 1933. This meant that as soon as the inevitable conflicts

and controversies arose between the Church and the regime, they were limited almost exclusively to the defence of the ecclesiastical and institutional positions of the Church rather than to any broader political and moral principles. Nor should it be forgotten that National Socialism had its supporters even among Catholics at home and abroad, including both the laity and priests.[32]

From the point of view of the Papacy the development of the Church and of Catholicism in society was to be secured independently of that society through the conclusion of a concordat between the Church and the State. As far as the Papacy was concerned, the National Socialist state was viewed as a legal sovereign rather than as an apparatus for the oppression of the socio-political forces opposed to it. The capacity of Church and Catholicism to be an active force in society was progressively paralysed by the increasing number of measures taken against the activities of Church associations, against the Catholic press, and against confessional schools. Moreover, by means of constant supervision they also attempted to prevent the clergy from uttering any word of criticism of the regime, as well as to seal them off as much as possible from the faithful in order to minimize their influence.

At the same time the fundamentals of Catholic teaching were attacked through the propagation of a racist substitute religion as expounded in Alfred Rosenberg's *Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Myth of the Twentieth Century). In addition, a propaganda campaign against the religious orders was mounted with a view to discrediting the clergy and thereby undermining the inner cohesion of the Church.[33] During the war new measures were introduced for the confiscation of monastic and Church property. Not even in the midst of
p. 174 war was there any let-up in the oppressive strategy ↳ and indeed the high tide of anti-Church measures had not yet been reached, as was indicated by the annihilation methods employed during the war against other unwanted groups such as Jews and the mentally handicapped.

Catholics were still able to carry on a war of ideas against Rosenberg's anti-Christian campaign in the pages of an assortment of Catholic publications.[34] But the Church never found any effective means of coping with the torrent of oppressive government measures. Together with the Vatican, the German episcopate, and especially the President of the Fulda Bishops' Conference, Cardinal Bertram, exploited the legal rights guaranteed by the Concordat to make numerous futile written protests against the encroachments on Church privileges. In 1937 the papal encyclical *Mit brennender Sorge*, brought to the attention of the faithful by public readings from church pulpits, was the occasion for a stirring protest against anti-Church policies and the whole totalitarian system of National Socialism; but it had no power to stem the tide of Nazi aggression.

This encyclical did, however, make an important contribution to the growing awareness of Catholics. It helped them to evade the totalitarian claims of National Socialism, at least in the essential sphere of their Christian faith, for, along with its complaints about the oppression of the Church, it contained a detailed defence of the content of the Catholic religion.[35] Catholicism's spirit of independence was always at least potentially subversive of National Socialist domination. This emerges clearly from reports by the state authorities on the situation of the Church in Bavaria.[36] But the bishops limited themselves to written complaints and their public silence amounted to an abandonment of any real attempt to mobilize the heightened awareness of Catholics against the regime or even against any of its individual measures. On the other hand, the sermons of the Bishop of Münster, Clemens August Graf von Galen, did make a considerable impact with their condemnation of the euthanasia policy launched by the Nazi regime in 1942. Copies of the text of the sermons were passed secretly from hand to hand and precipitated a partial cessation of the programme.

However, even within the episcopate, the desire for a more energetic opposition was thwarted and none of the proposed comprehensive condemnations of the regime ever saw the light of day. The episcopal sense of solidarity meant that no individual bishop was prepared to speak out on his own account against the numerous appalling crimes perpetrated by the regime. Indeed, with total inappropriateness, the President

of the Fulda Bishops' Conference, Cardinal Bertram, actually sent birthday greetings to Hitler. How could individual Catholics find the strength for refusal, for public dissent, or protest against the crimes of the
p. 175 National Socialists or indeed ↳ ultimately for martyrdom, if individual bishops and indeed the majority of the episcopate never once felt able to follow their consciences instead of sticking passively to a policy of solidarity with their colleagues?

In spite of this silence it is undeniable that the Church and Catholicism did achieve something of importance in asserting their independence in the face of the totalitarian claims of the National Socialist regime. To a large extent, they closed themselves off from the influence of the philosophy of National Socialism. This is a valid point even though it must be admitted that many individual Catholics contributed to the functioning of the National Socialist regime and that many did therefore incur real guilt, albeit with differing degrees of a bad conscience and on the basis of more or less worthy motives. For most Catholics this spirit of independence amounted to nothing more than the type of inner refusal which occasionally took the form of an outburst of intense religiosity. Moreover, it would be unrealistic or inappropriate to have expected a more heroic or outspoken attitude on the part of ordinary Catholics. In this perspective, the behaviour of the bishops may appear more explicable, especially in so far as they knew that the individual clerics or laymen appointed as their representatives were in effect potential hostages to the regime. But ultimately it must be stressed that their faith gave many lay Catholics and priests support in their resistance, even if such resistance only rarely went beyond a spirit of independence and even more rarely involved taking a stand against the National Socialist regime in all its facets.

The real influence of Catholicism during the Nazi years was not political but ethical and religious. Its independence of mind did have a considerable political effect, to the extent that it set limits to the potential for the infinite manipulation of the citizen which the regime coveted. No one could predict when this inner hostility might find expression. In general, the National Socialist state was faced with a typical kind of Catholic stoicism, a stoicism that discouraged Catholics from committing themselves to actions in the social sphere while encouraging them to restrict themselves for as long as possible to a defence of their own spiritual and religious existence, or at best to a defence of the existence of the Church and her institutions.[37]

A clear indication of the independence adopted by elements of the Catholic population towards the Nazi regime was the involvement of influential Catholics in the Kreisauer Circle.[38] This circle was Protestant in inspiration and remained so in substance. It did, however, involve Catholics and especially Jesuits in its decision making and had links with Catholic as well as with Lutheran bishops. The circle did not believe itself to be called upon to defeat National Socialism but rather to prepare the new order that would be established after the much-anticipated fall of the regime.

The papers that survive from the work of the circle clearly show a strong Christian component.[39] The greatest importance was attributed to the Christian heritage, whose various confessions and Church
p. 176 institutions were expected to be key factors ↳ in the establishment of a new order. Although Catholic Christianity was only one component within the Kreisauer Circle and its goals, its discussions always clearly showed what a major role commitment to the Christian confessions played in bolstering the opposition to the National Socialist regime. The notes made by the Jesuit Alfred Delp during his imprisonment and before his execution also serve as an impressive testimony to the religious inspirations which could support Catholic resistance in enormously distressing situations.[40]

In conclusion, therefore, though the preservation of a distinctive religious outlook in a substantial sector of the population during the Nazi period constituted a significant achievement on the part of Catholicism, the underlying weakness in the way in which Catholics responded to the Third Reich related to the wider framework of the tension between Catholicism and modern society. While it is true that Catholic resistance to the Nazis in the closing stages of the Weimar Republic and the initial period of the Third Reich was significant, with political parties, episcopate, and large portions of the electorate each making their own

contribution, it nevertheless remained limited to the defence of Catholic interests. The wider interests of the State and of a legitimate socio-political order were almost entirely neglected.

This exclusive focus on the Church and its interests grew more and more prevalent with the increasing dominance of the National Socialist regime and became endemic with the Concordat negotiations. By contrast Catholics failed to respond to the provocation of the regime's violent and arbitrary treatment of Communists and Jews and its brutal disregard for the law. The Catholic resistance also paid too little attention to the protection of those physically threatened or attacked by the Nazi regime. This is not intended to belittle the dedication of individuals and institutions such as Dean Lichtenberg of Berlin Cathedral or the Aid Committee for Catholic Non-Aryans, whose heroic actions only served to throw the general lack of such initiative into an even more cruel relief.[41]

German political Catholicism as represented by the Centre Party and the BVP collapsed with unexpected rapidity in 1933, but in spite of relentless persecution by National Socialism the Catholic Church and its structures remained in existence. On the other hand Catholic community life was more and more restricted, despite the provisions of the Concordat. Thus, as a force for religious integration, the Church grew stronger through its experience of defending itself against persistent aggression and of suffering both wartime deprivations and the even greater hardships of the immediate post-war years. This prepared the way for the resurgence of Catholicism as a political force in the years following the collapse of the Third Reich.

4. Political Catholicism in the Post-War New Order

As the war ended, the Catholic Church enjoyed an enhanced reputation, chiefly as a consequence of its
p. 177 independence of mind *vis-à-vis* National Socialism.[42] ↳ Expectations were high within the German episcopate of a renewed Christianization of society after the fall of a regime which was seen to symbolize the moral bankruptcy of a secularized society.[43] The bishops were encouraged in these views by the Churches increased power over the Catholic community and even more by the renewed devotion shown by some of the faithful in the first years after the war. For many, too, the Church provided vital moral support in the hardships of the post-war era, when hunger, homelessness, and displacement were everyday experiences.

Following the unconditional German surrender of May 1945 Germany was divided into American, British, French, and Soviet Occupation Zones. Limited by this factor, political life developed in different forms and at a different pace in the various zones. Political structures had to be rebuilt completely, and in the light of all that had taken place this could only take the form of an uncompromising rejection of National Socialism and its criminal regime. The traditional political forces of the Weimar Republic played roles of varying importance in this phase of political reconstruction. With their history of consistent hostility to the National Socialist regime, the KPD and the SPD were free to embark on their own task of reconstruction without delay. More problematic was the position of the supporters of the former Liberal and Conservative parties, which had shown considerable weakness towards National Socialism.

As far as political Catholicism was concerned, the impulse to a new order emanated predominantly from former supporters of the Centre Party. But a watershed was reached when the decision was taken that no straightforward revival of the old Centre Party should be attempted. Any such revival would in any case have been compromised from the start by ghosts from the past such as the (with hindsight highly problematic) vote for the Enabling Law, the rapid collapse and unopposed dissolution of the parties, and the absence of any significant resistance activity by Centre Party politicians either within Germany or abroad. In the main party centres, Berlin and Cologne, as well as in numerous other places, moves were none the less afoot to reactivate the Centre Party as a much more broadly based supraconfessional Christian party—recalling what Stegerwald in particular had tried to do in the Weimar era—and to give it a shape more suitable for the

new social conditions. In the resistance movement against National Socialism a new relationship between the Christian confessions had begun to develop, in which a new attitude of co-operation and collaboration had replaced the long-established tendencies to separation and confrontation. This new conception of political Catholicism implied the launch of an entirely new enterprise that would of necessity transform the political activity of Catholics very profoundly. One consequence of this important change in Catholic attitudes was to encourage lay Catholics to become more independent of their own Church and spiritual leaders, and this impulse was to be greatly reinforced from the early 1960s onwards as a result of the controversies over the attitude adopted by the Catholic bishops to National Socialism.

p. 178 The reasons for the abandonment of the old Centre Party lay in the changed political situation of Catholics compared with the era when the party had been founded. They were no longer faced by a strong Protestant State in alliance with a State Church as in the days of the Empire, and Catholics now represented almost 45 per cent of the West German population. Moreover, although the Centre Party had always claimed it could achieve a fundamental integration of Christian forces extending beyond just Catholics it had never managed to fulfil this promise. With its image as a confessional Catholic Party it could not realistically hope to do so even after the collapse of the National Socialist regime.

Among the advocates of a single all-embracing Christian party in Berlin were Andreas Hermes and Jacob Kaiser. In 1933 Kaiser had been involved in an attempt to bring together Christian and non-Christian trade unions into one single union.[44] In common with others who participated in this Berlin initiative, he had been in contact with the conspirators in the bomb plot against Hitler of 20 July 1944. Thus, in June 1945 they issued a call for a rallying of all Christian and Democratic forces, having a few days previously founded the German Christian-Democratic Union (CDUD), initially only within the Soviet Occupation Zone. Together with fierce criticism of the defeated National Socialist regime, the programmatic *Appeal to the German People* contained a demand for the nationalization of the coal and other key industries and for the appropriation of the large landed estates for the creation of new housing. It did not reject private property but wanted to see it limited to a modest size, and called for an end to the manipulation of the State by economic interest groups. In addition, social demands were voiced on behalf of deprived and disadvantaged groups such as the war-wounded and working women.

Although the Berlin initiative preceded all other attempts to found a more broadly based Christian party, it had little immediate impact. The main reason for this was that the Soviet occupying power exercised a very strong influence over the new party and forced it to collaborate with the Socialist Unity Party (SED). The Soviets prevented the party leaders from having contact with the organizers of similar initiatives in the western zones of Germany, although in doing so they actually assisted the West German groupings in remaining free from the influence of the Berlin party leadership.

With Kaiser at the helm the CDUD followed a domestic reform strategy that could be called Christian socialist. It stressed German unity and aimed at keeping Germany free from subservience to the great powers currently in control of the different Occupation Zones, attributing to Germany a bridging role between East and West. In 1948 the CDUD, however, fell completely under the political dominance of the SED while an exiled remnant merged with the western CDU The CDUD in the east could only continue to exist as a bloc party in enforced alliance with the SED. For the CDUD this meant a substantial loss of its
p. 179 identity. Thus, in ↳ the Soviet Occupation Zone and later in the German Democratic Republic (the DDR) political Catholicism was no longer able to find any significant way of expressing itself, while in the newly established West Germany (the FDR) the CDU-CSU offered it a much wider scope for action. With Catholics forming only 7 per cent of the population of East Germany the CDUD lacked the strong support of a Catholic population which was to be a crucial factor in the development of the CDU-CSU in West Germany. The Catholic Church in the east sought to withdraw into the spheres of religious and charitable action, but—especially after the division of Germany—it endured severe repression.

The most significant initiatives for a new political organization of Catholicism after 1945 were launched in the Rhineland and especially in Cologne.[45] As in Berlin the impulse came from former Centre Party politicians. The first point they agreed on was to found a new party open to Protestants rather than to reactivate the old Centre Party. In this way, former Conservatives and Liberals were to be drawn in, and Lutheran leaders could be brought into policy discussions from the start. These discussions led to the publication of the Cologne Principles in July 1945. The establishment of the party then ensued in Cologne, under the name 'Christian Democratic Party'. It was not until the end of the year that the name 'Christian Democratic Union' (CDU) was adopted at a conference of the Christian Democrats in Godesberg. In 1947 the Baden Christian Social People's Party (BCS V) joined the CDU and took its name, while in Bavaria the Christian Social Union (CSU) retained its independence while collaborating very closely with the CDU.

The Cologne Principles were the product of several round-table discussions held in the Dominican House at Walberberg. The foundations of the programme had already been laid during the National Socialist era in conversations between the Dominicans Laurentius Siemer and Eberhard Welty and various Catholic lay figures in Cologne. The heavy stress laid on Christian Socialism which came particularly from Siemer was not followed up in subsequent negotiations and in particular found no expression in the name of the new party. Even so, the Principles still contained a demand for a 'true Christian socialism', which was given a basis in Christian natural law. In addition to political demands for the rule of law and freedom of expression, the Principles also contained wide-ranging social demands, including calls for a 'social wage policy, a just equalization of wealth', and nationalization in the interest of the common good.

In later years, however, Christian solidarism as developed by the Jesuits, rather than Christian socialism, exercised a greater influence on the programme and actions of the CDU—CSU.[46] In the conception of solidarism, elaborated by Heinrich Pesch and further developed by Gustav Gundlach and Oswald von Nell-Breuning, the interests of the community did not play such a dominant role as in the Christian socialism of
p. 180 the Dominicans. Much more emphasis was placed on the individual and ↳ his or her development, even though the individual's bond with society and obligation to serve the common good was always stressed. Solidarism was flexible enough on the one hand to be able to exploit and develop capitalist economic methods, while on the other hand highlighting the requirements of the community and the solidarity of the whole of society. State action to resolve particular social problems was permitted, but regulatory socialist or statist tendencies were rejected as opening the way to an unhealthy collectivism. Equally, however, liberal economic management without reference to the common good found no acceptance. It was to the solidaristic school in Catholic social teaching that the strong social component in the policy of the CDU—CSU generally owed its ideological foundation and its consistent vitality.[47]

Unlike in the Weimar Republic, the collaboration of the former Centre Party with Conservative and Liberal forces in the CDU and CSU offered an opportunity for the development of new alliances. The new party was to unite Catholics and Protestants in practical cooperation, and as a result of the shared struggle of the Christian denominations against National Socialism there was considerable enthusiasm for this enterprise on all sides.

Against the background of this determination that the confessions should work together in the CDU and the CSU a tension developed between the social reformist elements among the Catholics and those Protestants who came to the CDU chiefly from the more right-wing parties of the Weimar Republic. This was soon evident in the formulation of the Cologne Principles, influenced by the involvement of a Protestant group in Wuppertal[48] and also in the success of Konrad Adenauer's efforts to restrict the social reformist movement within the CDU in favour of a system of limited capitalism. In these efforts he was able to rely on the support of the Protestant constituency.

Despite the existence of so many factors militating against any re-establishment of the Centre Party, a small group of former members remained faithful to their old party. But, although they did found the

German Centre Party (DZP) in October 1945, it was never powerful enough to be able to offer any serious competition to the rapidly evolving CDU. Its biggest problem was that the episcopate was quickly won over to the CDU and CSU and was very anxious to avoid any disastrous split in the Catholic vote. Until 1949 a substantial element of the Centre Party's vote continued to pass over to the CDU and by 1953 membership of the DZP had dwindled to the point where it was only by virtue of an electoral pact with the CDU that the party gained any seats in the Bundestag. Centre parties established in Hessen (1947/8) and Baden (1951) also failed to meet with any lasting success.

Relations between the Catholic Church and the CDU and CSU were not always easy. Education policy was one point of conflict. The plan put forward by Schwering, initiator of the Cologne discussions on the founding of
p. 181 the CDU, was criticized by ↳ the Church 'for aiming to reorganize the entire education system on the pattern of the Christian non-denominational school, with provision for obligatory religious instruction'.[49] Catholic authorities sought instead the re-establishment of the confessional Catholic school system. In a second version of the Cologne Principles issued in September-October 1945 a return to a confessional basis for education was called for—mainly with an eye to the tradition of the Centre Party and the wishes of the bishops—but this suggestion never had any prospect of success. Even Catholic politicians had finally to accept that confessional schools were an unattainable demand. In the course of the 1950s this issue, however, lost much of its former importance, especially since confessional religious instruction in non-Catholic schools was guaranteed in the constitution.

The abandonment by the CDU of Schwering's original concept of a deconfessional school system made it easier for the episcopate to take a positive attitude towards the new party. In general the Catholic Church came to enjoy a close relationship with the CDU–CSU and the newly established Federal Republic.[50] In addition, the CDU was also approved by the Lutheran Church, confirming the Christian foundations of the new united party.

Pressure from Adenauer meant that concerns for the common good and the ideas of Christian socialism put forward in the Cologne Principles were increasingly excluded. The efforts of the CDU's founders in Frankfurt and of the *Frankfurter Heft*, a monthly journal established in 1946 and edited by Walter Dirks and Eugen Kogon, proved insufficient to block this tendency. Dirks argued—as he had in the *Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung* under the Weimar Republic—for a socialism based on Christian responsibility and for a Christian political system embodying Marxist ideals. He uttered 'a dire warning to the Christian Democrats as a political party not to discredit Christianity by allowing its message to be mixed up with a bourgeois ideology'.[51] With this warning Dirks set himself in opposition to the intentions of a large majority of the founders of the CDU, who did in fact see a party based on Christian principles as a focus for bourgeois defenders of law and order. In fact, the CDU never fully became such a party, and some disgruntled elements moved away to establish the more right-wing but secular Free Democratic Party (FDP).

The social reformists had their opportunity to express their views at the CDU's national assembly held at Bad Godesberg in late 1945. The result was a resolution affirming that: 'socialism based on Christian responsibility' was officially recognized as a key element in CDU thinking. It seemed that the influence of the social reformist wing of the party was getting stronger, especially as the eastern zone CDUD made Christian socialism central to its programme, and such ideas were propagated in the west through Jacob Kaiser. But an opposite direction was adopted in a draft programme for the CDU in the British occupation
p. 182 zone as presented by Adenauer at ↳ Neheim-Hüsten. This indefinitely postponed the implementation of plans for the nationalization of the primary industries and the state regulation of banks and insurance companies. It derived all social demands from the idea of personalism, which, it was claimed, involved a recognition of employers 'and employees' rights and responsibilities. What distinguished personalism was that it could be used to justify actions by employers which only indirectly could be regarded as concerned with the common good, whereas, for the social reformers, a concern for the common good had always remained the central consideration.

The social reformist tendency in the CDU finally found expression in the Ahlen Programme of the British zone CDU.[52] This programme was prefaced by a preamble in which the inadequacy of the capitalist economic system was affirmed and a fundamentally new order called for, but it showed signs of inner contradiction; for, while it argued that an economic order based on the common good would ensure peace at home and abroad, it also gave a generally strong endorsement to the freedom of the individual in the political and economic spheres. The impulse to a new order was not sought in an economy run for the benefit of the community but in the development of the individual, even though the concentration of economic power was expressly condemned.

Beginning with a detailed critique of the industrial economy of the past the Programme formulated principles for the creation of an economic structure that would be defined neither by the 'unlimited domination of private capitalism' nor by some alternative 'state capitalism'. It expressed hostility to capitalism and socialism alike and sought a third way between them. Excessive economic concentrations of power were to be combated through restrictions on corporations, cartels, and shareholdings. The coal and steel industries were to be nationalized. Co-operatives and small and medium-sized businesses were to be encouraged. The position of the employee was to be strengthened by guaranteed consultation and the creation of factory councils.

While the Ahlen Programme contained proposals for substantial intervention in the process of reconstruction of the economic system, subsequent developments pushed fundamental reform measures into the background. In the social market economy of the first two decades of the Federal Republic—mainly the work of Ludwig Erhard—the capitalist market economy had a major part in the programme and policies of the CDU, although it was admittedly subject to regulation in accordance with state economic and social policies aimed at securing the common good and favouring socially disadvantaged groups and individuals. The economic policy guidelines of the CDU, the so-called Düsseldorf Principles, included the following definition: 'The "social market economy" means that the market is regulated by the needs of society—i.e. the activity of free and competent agents is directed to the highest possible degree towards the economic benefit and social justice of all.'[53]

p. 183 Within the party the Düsseldorf Principles were taken to be a market-economy extension of the Ahlen Programme, but in reality they represented a marked and final shift in CDU thinking away from a policy of socio-economic reform and towards a capitalistic market policy where society's needs were secondary and had to compete for resources with vested interests of economic groups and forces.

In the Hamburg Programme of 1953 the CDU put forward a comprehensive list of their aims and policies. This programme cited a range of demands for political rights including a guarantee of full freedom and independence for the churches in their official public functions, while opposition was expressed to any revival of confessional hostilities. The programme also contained a substantial treatment of social and economic problems. A key factor in the success of the CDU at the polls in 1957, when they won an absolute majority, was their introduction of index-linked old-age pensions.[54] The party's general self-confidence and the breadth of its agenda as embodied in the Hamburg Programme undoubtedly created the basis for the party's remarkable electoral success.

When the social market economy was further developed into a 'planned society' under the leadership of Ludwig Erhard during the 1960s, this led to a shift of emphasis from a recognition of the importance of a multiplicity of social forces to the State's role as the regulator of society. At the same time, there was a strong desire on the part of the people for a greater role in political and economic decision-making. The SPD and the FDP proved able to channel this sentiment and the result was that the reign of the CDU which had lasted almost twenty years finally came to an end and the party was driven into opposition in 1969.

Though, at least in West Germany the development of the CDU-CSU has more or less reflected the development of political Catholicism, there has been a gradual decline—especially since the late 1950s—in Catholic alienation from social democracy. Even the most dedicated of Catholics increasingly claim and practise freedom of choice in their socio-political ideas and their voting behaviour; some have even opted for movements such as Christians for Socialism.[55] Since the late 1960s the Bensberg Group, an informal association of Catholics, has sought to discuss important current issues from the perspective of Christian responsibility, in detachment from the influence of one-sided party-political considerations, with the aim of promoting such debate in the public arena.[56] The most notable action taken by this group was shortly before the treaty agreements between West Germany and the Soviet Union and Poland, when it called for steps to be taken on moral grounds towards reconciliation and peace with Poland.

A more serious element of tension within German political Catholicism since the immediate post-war period has been the Bavarian CSU. The party was created at the same time as the CDU and arose out of a similar political impulse. But it had to operate in a distinct regional political culture forged by long historical traditions. As a result the main characteristic of the CSU has been an intense and frequently ↳ excessive
p. 184 spirit of independence. Indeed, in contrast to other regional parties which have all eventually been integrated into the CDU, the CSU has maintained its independence. It has been able to exercise a dual role as a Bavarian party and a party of the Federal Republic, at once a leading political force in Bavaria and an independent factor in the politics of the FDR.[57]

The decision of political Catholicism to opt for the founding of the CDU-CSU in 1945 has thus proved crucially important for its development. Not only were former Centre Party politicians leading participants in the groups that sprang up spontaneously in many places to found the new united Christian party, but the support of Catholic votes was a key element in its growing success. It began to obtain increasing support from the electorate in Protestant communities too, though a resurgent confessionalism in Protestant ranks in the 1950s counterbalanced its influence, as did the feeling that the CDU and CSU were too closely tied to influence of the Catholic Church. The continued disproportionality of the commitment of Catholics to the CDU can be observed over a long period during which the party experienced marked fluctuations in its fortunes. The Catholic element in its support was 25.2 per cent (+CSU 31 per cent) in 1949, 36.4 per cent (+CSU 45.2 per cent) in 1953, 39.0 per cent (+CSU 50.2 per cent) in 1957, and 35.8 per cent (+CSU 45.4 per cent) in 1961, while at the point of its departure from government in 1969 the proportion was 36.6 per cent (+CSU 46.1 per cent). Up to 1969 between 60 and 62 per cent of Catholics voted for the CDU–CSU.[58] Thus there is much to suggest that at least until the 1960s the CDU and CSU were to be regarded as a clear expression of political Catholicism, though of a political Catholicism that made significant concessions to its Protestant partners—especially as regards its leading personnel. At the same time, its secular and liberal concessions to its bourgeois coalition partners (notably the Free Democrats) left much room for conflict with its Protestant allies. Catholic influence within the CDU was mitigated both by the influence of Protestant circles, which were able to draw on a considerable potential electorate, as well as by those conservative and liberal forces which were absorbed into the Christian unity party. These influences were increased through the actions of the CDU's liberal bourgeois coalition partners with whom the CDU was obliged to work in order to ensure a majority in parliament. These included the FDP (with whom the CDU worked almost continuously up until 1966), as well as more intermittently the more right-wing German Party (DP), and the Association for Exiles and the Dispossessed (BHE), the rapid growth of which was followed by an equally rapid decline. The leaders of the CDU and CSU have also been at pains to distance themselves from an exclusively Catholic image of their parties. Despite the large-scale involvement of the Catholic population with the CDU–CSU, the leaders have asserted ever more strongly their inter-confessional nature.

p. 185 From the start the commitment of Catholics to the CDU and CSU was assisted by the satisfactory position accorded to the Church in the West German Constitution. The framework for the relationship between

Church and State was incorporated from the Weimar Constitution as the fundamental laws of the Federal Republic. The right to freedom of religion was guaranteed in the fundamental articles. Moreover, the validity of existing concordats was recognized, including eventually the one made in 1933. Rights of participation and consultation in the operation of public institutions were accorded both to the Lutheran and Catholic Churches. Institutions such as kindergartens, youth organizations, and hospitals were entrusted to the administration of the Church while being largely financed by the State, and they proved to be one of the key elements of the Catholic Church's presence in society. Thus, although the Church's advantageous position did not depend entirely on the influence of the CDU and CSU, they played a central role in establishing it. Moreover, in return they enjoyed the support of the Catholic hierarchy, as was clearly expressed in the Church's electoral exhortations to the Catholic faithful.

Since the late 1960s the relationship between the Catholic Church and the CDU and CSU has become increasingly more difficult. There are a number of reasons for this: their growth into genuine 'People's Parties' as a result of greater participation by Protestants, the gradual *rapprochement* of some Catholics with social democracy, and the general modernization brought about by the Second Vatican Council, which opened up new political perspectives.[59] Secularization has of course also increasingly affected the Christian parties. With Catholic voters this has found expression in a tendency (though somewhat limited in scope) towards political pluralism, expressed notably in an attraction to the SPD, though the wider gulf between Catholics and the FDP has persisted.

While in power (until 1963) Adenauer pursued an economic policy that favoured a social market economy, combining this with a foreign policy which looked especially towards the Western nations, the USA, Great Britain, and France. While Kaiser and the CDUD in the Soviet occupation zone tried to prevent the establishment of close ties between the individual German occupation zones and their occupying powers in hopes of maintaining German unity, Adenauer opted for a close dependence on the Western powers.

It remains to be seen how far religious affiliation to Catholicism and its inspiration for political activity will continue to be of significance. If political Catholicism is to survive there must at the very least be no abandonment of religious values and Christian virtues as controls on the actions of the Christian parties. Catholic teachings must also serve to a certain degree as the doctrine of the CDU and CSU, but not to the extent that political Catholicism's every aim and policy has to be judged according to the very highest standards. On the contrary, it has to be in perpetual debate with these religious values. Political Catholicism
p. 186 cannot claim for itself a heightened insight and a special capacity to resolve problems on the basis of its ↳ connection with a religious world-view, but must rather display an increased readiness to think in terms of the needs and the future of the whole of humankind. How it goes about doing this will be more important for its future opportunities than any insistence on guaranteed rights for the Church and the Catholic faith, if their presence and their influence in society continue to diminish at the rate they are currently doing in the early 1990s.[60]

Notes

* Translated by Cyprian Blamires.

1 On the relevant figures see e.g. H. Maier, *Katholizismus unci Demokratie* (Freiburg, 1983), 271–86; on East Germany see below.

2 For further bibliographical material see K.-E. Lönne, *Politischer Katholizismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien* (Frankfurt am Main, 1986), 327–33.

3 On the *Kulturkampf see* L. Gall, *Bismarck* (Boston, 1986), ii, 12–39.

4 R. Morsey, 'Der Kulturkampf', in A. Rauscher (ed.), *Der soziale und politische Katholizismus*, i(Munich, 1981), 126.

5 On the pre-1914 Centre Party see M. L. Anderson, *Windthorst: A Political Biography* (Oxford, 1981);D. Blackbourn, *Class, Religion and Local Politics in Wilhelmine Germany: The Centre Party in Württemberg before 1914* (New Haven, 1980); R. J.

Ross, *Beleaguered Tower: The Dilemma of Political Catholicism in Wilhelmine Germany* (Notre Dame, 1976); E. L. Evans, *The Center Party 1870–1933: A Study in Political Catholicism* (Carbondale, 111., 1981).

6 H.-J. Scheidgen, *Deutsche Bischöfe im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Cologne, 1991).

7 R. Morscy, *Die deutsche Zentrumspartei 1917–1923* (Dusseldorf, 1966).

8 W. Fritsch, 'Christlich-soziale Reichspartei', in D. Fricke *et al, Lexikon*, i (Leipzig, 1983), 440 ff.

9 K. Ruppert, *Im Dienst am Staat von Weimar* (Düsseldorf, 1992); U von Hehl, *Wilhelm Marx 1863–1946* (Mainz, 1987). On Weimar political developments see e.g. E. Kolb, *The Weimar Republic* (Boston, 1988), 1–126.

10 The People's Union was a mass organization with more than 100,000 members which provided organization and training for local Catholic officials and trade-unionists.

11 A. Stegerwald, *Deutsche Lebensfragen* (Berlin, 1921).

12 H. Lutz, *Demokratie im Zwielicht: Der Weg der deutschen Katholiken aus dem Kaiserreich in die Republik J914–25* (Munich, 1963), 100.

13 For convincing examples see ibid.

14 H. Blankenberg, *Politischer Katholizismus in Frankfurt a. M. 1918–1933* (Mainz, 1981).

15 H. Lutz, *Katholizismus und Faschismus* (Dusseldorf, 1970); K.-E. Lönne, 'Heinrich Lutz und Franz Schnabel: Zwei Historiker unter den Eindruck der deutschen Katastrophe' in *Die Einheit der Neuzeit:Zum historischen Werk von Heinrich Lutz* (Vienna, 1988), 18–47.

16 E. Fattorini, *Germania e santa sede* (Bologna, 1992).

17 H. Lutz, *Politischer Katholizismus*, 110–17. Confirmation may be found in A.-B. Gerl, *Romano Guardini 1885–1968* (Mainz, 1985), 199–204; from the wider perspective of Guardini's later development L. Wetzal *(Das Politische bei Romano Guardini* (Percha, 1987), 158) comes to the conclusion that in hishandling of democracy Guardini simply ignored the reality of it.

18 H. Hürten, *Deutsche Katholiken 1918–1945* (Paderborn, 1992).

19 K.-E. Lönne, *Faschismus ah Herausforderung: Die Auseinandersetzung von 'Roter Fahne' und 'Vorwärts' mit dem italienischen Faschismus* (Cologne, 1981).

20 H. Hömig, *Das Preussische Zentrum in der Weimarer Republik* (Mainz, 1979).

21 W. Dirks, *Gegen die faschistische Koalition: Politische Publizistik 1930–1933* (Zürich, 1990).

22 H. Müller (ed.), *Katholische Kirche und Nationalsozialismus (Munich*, 1965), 170.

23 K. Scholder, *Die Kirchen und das Dritte Reich*, i (Frankfurt, 1977).

24 H. Muller (ed.), *Katholische Kirche*, 84.

25 Ibid. 88 ff.: 'It must now be recognized that solemn public declarations have been made by the highest representative of the Reich government, who is at the same time the authoritative leader of this movement, guaranteeing the Church's right to teach the Catholic faith as well as her right to carry out her other tasks. In addition, the full validity of treaties made by individual German states with the Church has been expressly affirmed by the Reich government. Without going back on the condemnation of specific moral and religious errors contained in our earlier declarations the episcopate is therefore satisfied that the aforesaid general prohibitions and warnings do not need to be repeated. There is no need at the present juncture to make any special exhortation to Catholic Christians, for whom the voice of the Church is holy, to be loyal to their legally established sovereign and to carry out their civil duties conscientiously, eschewing absolutely any illegal or subversive behaviour See also E. C. Helmreich, *The German Churches under Hitler: Background, Struggle, Epilogue* (Detroit, 1979), 237–240.

26 Scholder, *Die Kirche und das Dritte Reich;* see also id., *Die Kirchen zwischen Republik und Gewaltherr-schaft* (Berlin, 1988); K. Repgen, *Von der Reformation zur Gegenwart* (Paderborn, 1988). E. C. Helmreich, *German Churches*, 240–273.

27 For Hitler's attitude towards the Lateran Treaties see Scholder, *Die Kirche und das Dritte Reich*,488 ff.

28 On the internal and external collapse of the Centre see R. Morsey, *Der Untergang des politischen Katholizismus: Die Zentrumspartei zwischen christlichem Selbstverständnis und nationaler Erhebung 1932/3* (Stuttgart, 1977), 207.

29 F. Muckermann, *Im Kampf zwischen zwei Epochen* (Mainz, 1973), 584.

30 K. Breuning, *Die Vision des Reiches* (Munich, 1969).

31 E.-W. Böckenforde, *Der Deutsche Katholizismus im fahre J 933: Mit einem historiographischen Rückblick von K.-E. Lönne* (Freiburg, 1988).

32 See the numerous examples in Muckermann, *Im Kampf*.

33 H.-G. Hockerts, *Die Sittlichkeitsprozesse gegen katholische Ordensangehörige und Priester 1936/7* (Mainz, 1971).

34 R. Baumgärtner, *Weltanschaunngskamp im Dritten Reich* (Mainz, 1977).

35 For the text see D. Albrecht (ed.), *Der Notenwechsel zwischen dem Heiligen Stuhl und der Deutschen Reichsregierung*, i (Mainz, 1965), 404–43.

36 'Die kirchliche Lage in Bayern nach den Regierungspräsidentenberichten 1933–1943', *Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Zeitgeschichte bei der katholischen Akademie in Bayern*, Reihe A: Quellen: Bde 3, 8, 14, 16, 24, 31, 32. On popular

Catholic attitudes to Nazism in Bavaria see also I. Kershaw, *Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich: Bavaria 1933–1945* (Oxford, 1983).

37 On the obstacles to Catholic resistance created by the Concordat see Muckermann, *Im Kampf*, 584 ff.

38 On this problem see K.-E. Lönne in Böckenforde, *Der Deutsche Katholizismus*, 127 ff.

39 G. van Roon, *Neuordnung im Widerstand* (Munich, 1967).

40 A. Delp, *Gesammelte Schriften IV: Aus dem Geföngnis* (Frankfurt, 1984).

41 L.-E. Reutter, *Katholische Kirche als Fluchthelfer im Dritten Reich* (Recklinghausen, 1971).

42 T. M. Gauly, *Katholiken, Machtanspruch und Machtverlust* (Bonn, 1991).

43 K. Gotto, 'Zum Selbstverständnis der katholischen Kirche im Jahr 1945', in *Politik und Konfession: Festschrift für K. Repgen* (Berlin, 1983), 465–81.

44 U. Schmidt, 'Christlich-Democratische Union Deutschlands', in V. R. Stoss (ed.), *Parteienhand-buch* (Opladen, 1983), 490–661. On the CDUD see M. McCauley, *The German Democratic Republic since* 945 (London, 1983), 6–41.

45 H. G. Wieck, *Die Entstehung der CDU die Wiedergründung des Zentrttms im fahre 1945* (Düssei-dorf, 1953); U. Schmidt, *Zentrum oder* CDC (Opladen, 1987).

46 R. Uertz, *Christentum und Sozialismus in der frühen CD U* (Stuttgart, 1981) 10.1524/9783486703375 .

47 O. von Nell-Breuning, 'Der Beitrag des Katholizismus zur Sozialpolitik der Nachkriegszeit', in A. Rauscher (ed.), *Kirche und Staat in der Bundesrepublik 1949–1963* (Paderborn, 1979), 109–21.

48 Wieck, *Die Entstehung*.

49 H. Schwering, *Vorgeschichte und Entstehung der CDU* (Cologne, 1952).

50 R. Morsey, 'Katholizismus und Unionsparteien in der Ara Adenauer', in A. Langner (ed.), *Katholizismus impolitischen System der Bundesrepublik 1949–1963* (Paderborn, 1978), 33–59.

51 F. Focke, *Sozialismns aus christlicher Verantwortung* (Wuppertal, 1981), 204.

52 For the text see O. K. Flechtheim (ed.), *Dokutnente zur parteipolitischen Entwicklung in Deutschland seit 1945*, ii (Berlin, 1963), 53–8. On the social market economy see A. J. Nicholls, *Freedom with Responsibility: The Social Market Economy in Germany, 1918–1963* (Oxford, 1994).

53 Flechtheim (ed.), *Dokutnente*, ii. 53–8.

54 H. G. Hockerts, *Sozialpolitische Entscheidungen im Nachkriegsdeutschland* (Stuttgart, 1980).

55 Gauly, *Katholiken*.

56 H. Misalh, *Der Bensberger Kreis* (Düsseldorf, 1973).

57 A. Mintzel, 'Die Christlich-soziale Union in Bayern' in Stoss (ed.), *Parteienhandbuch*, 661–718.

58 For a fuller analysis of the voting behaviour of Catholics see K. Gotto, 'Die deutschen Katholiken und die Wahlen in der Adenauer-Ära', in Langner (ed.), *Katholizismus im Politischen System*, 7–32. For a general account of the CDU and CSU in post-war Germany, see G. Pridham, *Christian Democracy in Western Germany: The CDU and CSU in Government and Opposition, 1945–1976* (London, 1977).

59 G. Lindgens, *Katholische Kirche und moderner Pluralismus* (Stuttgart, 1980).

60 See Gauly, *Katholiken* and M. Klöcker, *Katholisch-von der Wiege bis zur Bahre* (Munich, 1991).