

Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918–1965

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CHAPTER

Introduction

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Abstract

This introductory chapter first sets out the purpose of the book, which is to explore an unduly neglected dimension of the history of 20th-century Europe — the phenomenon of political Catholicism. It presents a definition of the term 'political Catholicism', and explains chronological and geographical scope of this volume. This is followed by discussions on the factors that shaped 20th-century Catholic political movements in Europe, the influence of the Papacy, and the evolution of political Catholicism from 1918–1965.

Keywords: Catholics, Catholicism, Europe, political movements, political Catholicism, papacy

Subject: European History, History of Religion, Political History, Modern History (1700 to 1945), Social and Cultural History

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This book explores an unduly neglected dimension of the history of twentieth-century Europe. Catholic political parties and movements have been among the most successful in Europe during the twentieth century, flourishing in a wide variety of national and political contexts. And yet, compared with the considerable—indeed, some might argue, excessive—attention which historians have lavished on Fascist, Liberal, Socialist, or Communist parties, few historians have chosen to pay attention to the phenomenon of political Catholicism. While there has been a steady interest in particular aspects of the subject such as Church-State relations or the development of individual Christian Democrat parties, there remains a marked lack of scholarly work on the political articulation of Catholicism in Europe.

Even the briefest résumé, however, reveals the important role played by movements and parties either wholly or partially Catholic in inspiration in twentieth-century Europe. Catholic parties first emerged during the last decades of the nineteenth century but it was in the years after the First World War that they became a prominent feature of European life. The Partito Popolare Italiano was of central importance in the Italian political crisis after the First World War while the Centre Party played much the same role in Germany during the latter years of the Weimar Republic. In the 1930s the dictatorships of Salazar in

Portugal, Dollfuss in Austria, and Franco in Spain had an undoubted Catholic inspiration. Movements of Catholic resistance (and collaboration) flourished in Axis-occupied Europe during the Second World War, and Christian Democrat political parties enjoyed both electoral success and almost uninterrupted political power in Germany, Italy, and the Low Countries from the 1940s onwards. Indeed, all European countries with significant Catholic populations experienced in one form or another the influence of Catholic political ideas. In states such as Germany or Italy this took the form of important and durable Catholic political parties, but, as a number of the chapters in this volume seek to demonstrate, the absence of equivalent parties in states such as Ireland, Portugal, and Great Britain did not prevent the existence of a tradition of political Catholicism which in more indirect ways also influenced the histories of these countries. Political Catholicism has, thus, without doubt formed a major element of the historical landscape of twentieth-century Europe.

1. Parameters and Definitions

The term ‘political Catholicism’ demands some definition. As used in this volume, it is intended to describe political movements (broadly defined to encompass both political parties and a wide range of socio-economic organizations, as well as groups of intellectuals and others) which claimed a significant, though not necessarily exclusively, Catholic inspiration for their actions. As such, the scope of this volume is both wider and more restrictive than other possible definitions. On the one hand, it does not merely comprise those Catholic movements which were created by, or could claim some sort of authorization from, the Papacy or from national hierarchies. Political Catholicism was never merely a product of the Church authorities and many Catholic political movements were at pains to stress their autonomy from the Church. On the other hand, it does not seek to include all Catholics who engaged in political action. The simple fact that individuals were Catholic in their religious faith does not of course in itself imply that their faith influenced their political beliefs and actions. The Catholic character of the movements discussed in this book arises therefore less from the fact that they were composed of individuals who could be categorized as Catholic believers, than from the Catholic goals and values of the movements. Political Catholicism does not mean Catholics who were active in politics but political action which was Catholic in inspiration.

The chronological and geographical scope of this volume also requires explanation. All terminal dates in history are arbitrary and the decision to concentrate on the period from the First World War to the 1960s in no sense implies that this era of political Catholicism can be considered in isolation from those which preceded and followed it. Nevertheless, these dates have been chosen because they encompass, however imperfectly, an era when a particular form of organization and mentality characterized Catholic politics. Much of political Catholicism during the inter-war years was derived from Catholic political and intellectual developments of the later nineteenth century and this is reflected in the attention which a number of the contributors to this volume pay to the pre-1914 era. Nevertheless, it was only after the First World War that political Catholicism reached its full fruition in most countries of Europe, as the vestiges of nineteenth-century Catholic hostility towards the political process gave way to efforts to articulate a distinctly Catholic form of politics. The justification of the 1960s as the conclusion to this volume is perhaps more self-evident. Though the impact of the Second World War should not be minimized, Catholic political action in the 1940s and 1950s remained to a surprising degree rooted in the mentalities and forms of organization of the pre-war years. The 1960s, however, marked a decisive caesura in Catholic politics. The specific impact within Catholicism of the profound changes introduced by the Second Vatican Council was reinforced by the wider social and political transformations which took place in Europe during that decade. Catholic religious practice fell markedly in much of Europe and new forms of Catholic-inspired political action emerged which rejected the hitherto dominant assumption that the Catholic faithful were a community united by particular beliefs and interests.

p. 3 The geographical scope of the volume is intended to include all the major Catholic states of Western Europe. As the chapter devoted to Great Britain demonstrates, Catholic political action was also of significance in a number of European states in which Catholics formed only a relatively small minority. The book does not, however, consider all those countries in which Catholic political movements developed.[1] In particular, those countries of Central and Eastern Europe which passed under Communist control after the Second World War are absent from the volume. The emergence of Catholic political movements in these states during the inter-war years mirrored in many respects developments elsewhere in Europe but their post-1945 history clearly diverged substantially from both the democracies of Western Europe and the dictatorships of the Iberian peninsula.

The parameters of the volume are also defined by historiographical considerations. Monographs on particular instances of Catholic political action published in recent years have done much to demonstrate the importance of the phenomenon as well as to highlight the scope for further research.[2] Nevertheless, the overall impression remains one of relative neglect. In particular, it is striking that the emergence—especially in France—of the so-called 'new religious history' which has done so much to revivify the study of religion in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe[3] has not yet led to a renewal of interest in the political manifestations of the Catholic faith. At present, the only general accounts of political Catholicism in modern Europe are those of J. M. Mayeur in French and K.-E. Lönne in German respectively.[4] The most recent analysis in English is that provided by J. H. Whyte. His *Catholics in Western Democracies: A Study in Political Behaviour* analyses Catholic political development in Western Europe and compares it with the
p. 4 history of ↳ Catholic political action in North America and Australasia.[5] His central conclusion—namely that political Catholicism in Europe has been characterized by a concern with the defence of the Church and the faithful against alien non-Catholic influences (a so-called 'closed Catholicism')—has considerable validity though the book focuses only on a select number of West European democracies.

Probably the most influential analysis of political Catholicism in English remains Michael Fogarty's *Christian Democracy in Europe 1820–1953*, Written at the high tide of Christian Democrat electoral success in the 1950s, the book provides a valuable analysis of the post-war emergence of Christian democracy, even if from the perspective of the present day it appears much influenced by the character of its times. Fogarty's concern is to trace the emergence of a distinctive Christian democrat political tradition from its origins in the nineteenth century to its political maturity in post-1945 Europe. This preoccupation with the undisturbed and self-contained trajectory of Christian democracy requires Fogarty to be highly selective in his consideration of European Catholic movements. The book is essentially concerned with a central band of Catholic territories stretching from the Low Countries through western Germany and Switzerland to northern Italy, and it pays less attention to the rather different history of Catholic political movements in the Iberian peninsula and central Europe. Similarly, Fogarty chooses to focus on the pre-1914 era and the years after the Second World War while passing over in silence the anti-democratic Catholic movements which flourished in Europe during the 1930s.[6]

The relative neglect of the phenomenon of political Catholicism has several origins. Historians tend to share the assumptions of their environments and, especially among British and North American historians of twentieth-century Europe, there has often been an unstated belief that Catholic political movements were no more than the dwindling manifestations of a Catholic religion which itself was destined to disappear with the gradual development of a secular society. More generally, however, the dominant interpretation of European history since the First World War has portrayed Europe as a battlefield between conflicting secular ideologies of left and right, each of which offered an alternative model of political, social, and economic organization. Catholic movements, both by virtue of their religious inspiration and their reluctance to identify with the conventional categories of left and right, fit uncomfortably into this schema. Consequently they have tended to be subsumed somewhat awkwardly into secular political categories. Hence, the willingness of many Catholic movements in the inter-war years to side with the anti-democratic right gave

rise to the often misleading concept of 'clerico-fascism'; while, conversely, the emergence of substantial Catholic political parties which worked within the democratic structures of post-war Western Europe has encouraged historians to regard all Catholic political movements after 1945 as manifestations of 'Christian democracy'.

p. 5 This reluctance to consider movements of political Catholicism in their own terms ↳ has had a number of consequences. Most obviously, it has served to marginalize the significance of Catholicism as a political force in the history of twentieth-century Europe. By drawing attention away from the remarkable number of Catholic political movements which emerged in Europe from the First World War to the 1960s, it has inhibited an appreciation of the political ideals espoused by many European Catholics. Despite a number of valuable general accounts of Catholic politics, there remain many aspects of the subject which await scholarly examination. In addition, however, the neglect of Catholic political movements has warped historical understanding of the role of Catholicism in twentieth-century Europe. It has been customary to consider 'Catholicism' and 'politics' as essentially separate realms which only came into contact as an accidental consequence of conflicts between the rival jurisdictions of Church and State. This interpretation, which owes much to the liberal definition of religion as an essentially private matter of conscience, is at odds with the stance adopted not only by the Catholic Church but by many of the Catholic laity who made no distinction between their religious beliefs and their actions in the public sphere. Catholicism, for them, was not a private matter of conscience but a faith which determined both their private morality and their public actions. How close a connection Catholics made between their religious faith and their political choices depended on a wide variety of factors but, as the success of many Catholic political movements demonstrated, for large numbers of Catholics in twentieth-century Europe religion could not be divorced from politics. Far from being an artificial oxymoron, political Catholicism was therefore a logical reality.

The evidence of the vitality of Catholicism both as a religious and a political force within twentieth-century Europe is substantial. Though levels of religious practice declined steadily in almost all areas of Europe during the nineteenth century, the first half of the twentieth century saw a modest renaissance in Catholic fortunes. In some areas, notably in Spain and Portugal, urbanization and industrialization caused this downward trend to continue, but elsewhere the numbers of those participating in the Catholic religion appear to have stabilized or even increased modestly.[7] More important than such quantitative trends, however, was the transformation which took place in attitudes among the Catholic faithful. Though a number of recent works have rightly undermined the image of the nineteenth century as one of remorseless secularization,[8] it was in the first decades of the twentieth century that the Catholic faith fully recovered a mood of self-confident optimism. Encouraged by a wide range of political, social, and cultural changes which weakened the structures of nineteenth-century liberalism while simultaneously providing a new impetus to religious faith, Catholics practised their religion with a new assertiveness and energy.

p. 6 Participation in pilgrimages, parades, and political campaigns as well as the rapid ↳ expansion in the membership of Catholic associations, all bore witness to the newfound eagerness of the laity to commit themselves publicly to their faith and to place the values of Catholicism at the centre of their lives.[9]

Catholicism was, thus, for much of the twentieth century emphatically not a religion in decline and the chapters in this volume are intended to serve as a corrective to the marginalization of political Catholicism in the historical literature of twentieth-century Europe. They do not make any pretence to being definitive either in their coverage or in their interpretations. Much research remains to be carried out on political Catholicism before such judgements can prove possible and the contributors have been encouraged to write interpretative essays rather than providing comprehensive accounts of their subject. This explains in part the diversity evident in the approach adopted by the contributors. While some have adopted a largely chronological format, others have treated the subject in a more thematic manner. Diversity is also evident in the interpretations provided by the contributors. Though all the authors share a belief in the importance of analysing political Catholicism, the delineation and explanations of this phenomenon provided in the

individual chapters differ in a number of important respects. This diversity will, it is hoped, act as a stimulus to further research and debate.

Despite these differences of interpretation, this volume is based on the twin premisses that a distinctive Catholic political tradition has been evident in many—if not all—of the countries of Europe during the twentieth century; and that sufficient similarities existed between these manifestations of political Catholicism for it to be possible to consider it as a European phenomenon. Neither of these premisses is incontrovertible. Much of the historical literature of twentieth-century Catholicism has assumed that there existed a number of divergent definitions of Catholic political engagement which at their most extreme gave rise, for example, to those Catholics who supported the Mussolini regime in Italy and those Catholic radicals favourable to a Catholic-Communist alliance in France during the 1940s. Such an interpretation does not necessarily minimize the importance of Catholic politics but it does imply that political Catholicism was no more than the sum of its competing parts. Similarly open to question is the assumption that political Catholicism transcended to a greater or lesser degree national boundaries. Though the Catholic faith has consciously sought to present itself as a universal Church, the nature of Catholicism has clearly been moulded by socio-economic, political, and ideological factors internal to individual countries which have given rise to distinctive national Catholic mentalities. Here again, such an interpretation, while not denying the existence of Catholic politics, would suggest that the points of convergence between Catholic political movements in different European nation-states were, at best, of secondary importance and, at worst, no more than an illusion. These issues are addressed in this introduction as well as in the chapters which follow.

2. Factors of Unity and Division

The nation-states of twentieth-century Europe provided very different circumstances for the development of movements of political Catholicism. It was inevitable therefore that Catholic political movements should have reflected the particular national environments in which they emerged. These national influences were both historical and contemporary in nature. The structures, mentality, and character of Catholicism differed markedly in individual states of Europe as a consequence of a rich heritage of historical factors. The Catholicism of, for example, twentieth-century Germany differed therefore from that of France, not only as a consequence of differences in the size and socio-economic composition of the Catholic population but also because of the influence of particular historical events on the character of the Catholic faith. These differences remained evident in the nature of the Catholic political movements in the two societies. In France, for example, a deep-rooted antipathy to the Republic as the historical legacy of the anticlerical Revolution of 1789 continued to exert a powerful influence on Catholic political choices up to and beyond the Second World War. In Germany, on the other hand, it was the minority status of the Catholic community within the Prussian-led German state of the nineteenth century which remained the principal influence on Catholic politics. Protestant Prussia, and more especially the Hohenzollern dynasty, was seen as the historical opponent of German Catholicism and led Catholics to favour a federal political structure protective of Catholic interests.[10]

In addition, contemporary political circumstances also exerted considerable influence on Catholic political movements. In states such as Belgium, the Netherlands, or Italy after the Second World War where the balance of electoral politics enabled the Catholics to exercise sustained political power, there was an evident incentive both for Catholics to unite behind a single political party and to identify with the parliamentary political system.[11] On the other hand, in non-democratic states such forms of political organization were not possible and the nature of political Catholicism depended to a large extent on whether the regime was sympathetic to Catholic ideals and ambitions. Thus, for example, in Nazi Germany or, to a lesser extent, the Mussolini dictatorship of the latter 1930s, Catholics were forced into a stance of *de facto* opposition—if not

resistance—to regimes which opposed Catholic political ideals and sought to minimize Catholic influence in society.[12] Catholic attitudes towards the Austrian dictatorship of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg during the 1930s and the long-standing Franco and Salazar regimes in Spain and Portugal were different again. All three regimes owed their origins at least in part to the support of Catholics and all accorded the Catholic Church a privileged role within both State and society. The consequence was to draw many Catholics into alliance with the regimes, even if with the passage of time the identity between Catholic interests and those of the regime carne to diverge.[13]

p. 8 The extent to which national 'peculiarities' determined the form adopted by political Catholicism within different nation-states was, however, accompanied by substantial similarities in the nature and the ideals espoused by Catholic movements in different European countries. The existence of this distinctively Catholic political tradition in the era from the First World War to the 1960s can be defined in both negative and positive terms. Negatively, almost all forms of political Catholicism—be they the advocates of authoritarian political reforms in the 1930s or the Christian Democrat parties of the post-1945 era—defined themselves against other socialist, liberal, and right-wing political traditions. Alliances—of convenience or of principle—with such non-Catholic groupings were of course possible (and frequently concluded) but there remained an implicit or explicit awareness that these other movements possessed different intellectual and social principles from those of Catholicism. In positive terms, it was this awareness of a distinctive corpus of Catholic social and political ideas which gave coherence to the different manifestations of political Catholicism.

This Catholic political tradition did of course change over time. While in the troubled circumstances of the 1930s, many Catholics rallied to visions of an authoritarian political system and corporatist social order, in the post-1945 years it was a cautious acceptance of a democratic system and of a neo-capitalist social market economy which characterized much of Catholic politics. Nevertheless, these changes—as well as the diverse and often divergent forms in which they were expressed—should not be allowed to disguise the existence of a common core of beliefs. A commitment to the defence of the Catholic religion was of course one such rallying-point but so too was the vision of a communitarian (but not socialist) social order in which the disruptive influences of liberal individualism and of untrammelled capitalism would be offset by new social institutions which would reinforce the bonds of community. Greatly encouraged by the role enthusiastically assumed by the Papacy as the intellectual guardian of a unitary Catholic truth, such ideas run as a common—if twisted—thread through the Catholic politics during the fifty years after the First World War.

These ideological bonds were nevertheless rarely, if ever, sufficient to offset the manifold sources of division which bedevilled attempts at political unity within Catholic ranks. Common adherence to the religious faith and to the social and political ideas of Catholicism were precarious and generally insufficient bases upon which to build Catholic political unity. In countries such as France, despite the transient success of General de Castelnau's Fédération Nationale Catholique after the First World War or of the Mouvement Républicain Populaire after the Second World War, no Catholic political movement ever emerged which could claim to be the dominant political expression of the French Catholic community.[14] Moreover, even in countries such as Germany, Italy, or the Low Countries where powerful Catholic parties enjoyed a quasi-monopoly over Catholic electoral loyalties both before and after the Second World War, these parties were
p. 9 often little more than coalitions of different ↳ Catholic social and political organizations, whose common loyalty to the party went hand in hand with a desire to reinforce their own position at the expense of other elements within the party.[15]

Internal division was always inherent to the Catholic politics of Europe. The sources of division ran deep. If papal teachings dismissed class conflict as one of the many heresies of Marxist socialism, it rarely proved possible to insulate the Catholic community from the impact of such tensions. Despite the decline in religious practice among much of the industrial working class of Europe during the nineteenth century and

the rise in support for Socialist parties, there remained a strong Catholic working-class tradition. Especially, in regions such as the Ruhr, the Basque country, and certain industrial regions of France and Belgium, Catholic workers formed a large and self-confident force.[16] With the broader democratization of society, such workers were increasingly reluctant to follow passively the guidance of predominantly bourgeois Catholic political leaders. Catholic trade-unionism grew rapidly after the First World War and in Germany, France, and Belgium gave rise to increasingly powerful Catholic trade-union confederations which demanded a reorientation of Catholic political priorities towards a concern for the working class. Such working-class Catholic activism was mirrored by the emergence of Catholic organizations similarly determined to protect the interests of the peasantry and of the bourgeoisie. Already in the 1890s, peasant associations were a prominent feature of rural Catholic politics, while the economic crisis of the inter-war years gave rise to manifold Catholic movements of middle-class defence. To mediate between these divergent and increasingly assertive interest groups was therefore imperative for any Catholic political movement which sought to pose as the representative of Catholic opinion.[17]

Nor were tensions of social class the only such source of division. Differences of region, of generation, and of intellectual outlook and temperament between the advocates of an intransigent Catholicism uncompromisingly hostile to the evils of the modern era and those more inclined to find some form of accommodation with the reality of a pluralist, industrial, and urban society were always close to the surface and remain evident in present-day Catholicism. These manifold sources of division provided the fault-lines within political Catholicism, and it was along these lines that Catholic political unity tended to splinter in times of crisis. Thus, in Italy after the First World War, it was predominantly the Christian democrat groups
p. 10 which remained loyal to the Partito Popolare Italiano led by Don Sturzo while much of the ↳ Catholic middle class chose to ally itself with Mussolini against the liberal parliamentary system.[18] A broadly similar pattern of events arose with regard to Catholic attitudes towards the Vichy regime in wartime France[19] while in the 1960s it was these various sources of division which finally destroyed any sense of Catholic political unity in much of Europe. In the light of such tensions, many historians have therefore chosen to dissect political Catholicism in terms of a number of distinct and largely self-contained Catholic political traditions. Hybrid terms such as ‘Christian democracy’, ‘clerico-fascism’, ‘liberal Catholicism’ and ‘ultramontane Catholicism’ have become commonplace in analyses of Catholic politics. Yet, as historians have long been aware, such summary descriptions often suggest a clarity which is misleading.[20] The struggle to define the contours of different Catholic political traditions[21] simplifies the complex links which existed between various groups and individuals, and attempts to isolate a particular Catholic tradition from the wider political context must inevitably appear somewhat arbitrary.

These difficulties have been particularly evident in the approach adopted to the phenomenon of ‘Christian democracy’. The dominant historiographical analysis of twentieth-century political Catholicism has tended to prioritize the existence of a distinct Christian democrat political tradition which first emerged in the nineteenth century and gradually grew in strength until it emerged as a dominant force in the democratic Catholic politics of much of Western Europe after the Second World War. There are several reasons for the emphasis placed on this interpretation. In part, it reflects the ascendancy among historians of Catholicism of a progressive Catholic intelligentsia, sympathetic to the goals of Christian democracy and eager to acknowledge the achievements of those historical figures who shared their ideals.[22] Coupled on occasion by a reluctance to acknowledge the significance of other forms of Catholic politics, this historical tradition inevitably tends towards a teleological interpretation of political Catholicism, in which pre-Second World War Catholic political movements are perceived largely in terms of how they laid the basis for the democratic Catholic politics of the future. As the chapters in this collection make clear, there is much that is of value in such an interpretation. It is indeed true, as James McMillan makes clear in his chapter on France,[23] that the dominant phenomenon in the history of political Catholicism in much of Western Europe has been the gradual abandonment of a natural identification with the politics of the conservative right and the emergence of a Catholic political tradition of the centre-left. Yet the danger inherent in the application

of hindsight is that it highlights only a particular 'canon' of significant Catholic movements and individuals at the expense, for example, of those many Catholic movements of the inter-war years which opposed any identification with the values and structures of liberal democracy.[24]

p. 11 Moreover, such an interpretation can also lead to the anachronistic belief that those who described themselves as 'Christian democrats' in the circumstances of the 1890s or the 1920s shared the political ambitions of those who described themselves as such in the post-1945 years. This belief in an essentially unchanging Christian democrat political tradition provides a somewhat flawed account of the historical reality. As a number of historical studies in recent years have made clear, the use of the term 'Christian democrat' in the 1890s and the early years of the twentieth century encompassed a wide range of Catholic beliefs, many of which were opposed to a liberal democratic political system. Often influenced by the paternalist notions of the late nineteenth century with its nostalgic vision of a pre-industrial society of natural hierarchies, such 'Christian democrats' were precursors of post-1945 Christian democrats in name only.[25]

The undoubted existence of different subsidiary trends within political Catholicism should not therefore be allowed to disguise the countervailing forces which worked in favour of political unity among Catholics. Not only did Catholic political movements possess a distinct identity derived from allegiance to a common Catholic intellectual heritage, but this unity was fostered by other more tangible realities. The influence of the Church itself, so anxious in the Netherlands after the First World War or in Italy after the Second World War to guarantee the political unity of all Catholics,[26] was one such factor in favour of cohesion but so also was the milieu in which many Catholics lived. Confessional differences, be they between Catholics and Protestants or between Catholics and non-believers, were part of the daily fabric of the social experience of many European Catholics during much of the twentieth century. Especially in states such as the Netherlands, Switzerland, or Germany where Catholics formed a minority grouping, the sense of Catholic distinctiveness was reinforced by an imposing array of educational, cultural, and social confessional institutions which provided an all-embracing environment for the Catholic faithful. Finally, political unity on a national level was also encouraged by the need to defend the particular interests of the Catholic population and its religion. Though the great heyday of anticlericalism was, at least outside Spain and Portugal, long since past, the defence of the Church and of its affiliated schools, youth associations, and other institutions provided a range of political issues which especially during election campaigns served as a rallying-point for the Catholic faithful. Similarly, the experience of Fascist rule in Italy and Nazism in Germany, as well as of foreign occupation elsewhere in Europe during the Second World War, provided further occasions for Catholics to unite to defend the institutions of the Catholic faith.

p. 12 Political Catholicism was, thus, in most countries during this period a delicate balance between centrifugal and centripetal forces. In the 1960s, the pendulum swung decisively in favour of the centrifugal forces, breaking asunder any sense of unity and inaugurating a new era in terms of Catholic political engagement. But the eventual collapse of the forms of political Catholicism which characterized the era considered in this volume should not lead one to assume that their existence was in some sense artificial. On the contrary, the remarkable dedication with which millions of European Catholics joined, supported with their labours and financial donations, or simply voted for political movements which were inspired by Catholic ideals reflected a reality which historians underestimate at their peril. Movements of political Catholicism which transcended divisions of region, ethnicity, generation, or social class in the name of a shared commitment to the values of Catholicism were always to some extent seeking to act in defiance of the gravity of historical reality but it is nevertheless the electoral and political success of these movements rather than the many inevitable instances of their failure which remains their most prominent feature.

3. The Papacy

Throughout the period considered in this volume, the direct and indirect power exerted by the Papacy constituted the most significant single influence on the character of Catholic political action. It is easy to exaggerate the centrality of the Papacy to European Catholicism. Both a long-standing anticlerical tradition inherited from the nineteenth century, as well as the aggrandizing pretensions of the Popes themselves, have tended to attribute to the Papacy an importance—as a force for good or evil—which clearly exceeded the real extent of its power.[27] Nevertheless, the era under consideration in this volume did undoubtedly witness what Étienne Fouilloux has aptly described as 'I'apogée de la romanité au sein du catholicisme'.[28] From the First Vatican Council of 1869–70 on wards, the Papacy under the leadership of a series of like-minded and determined Popes used every means at its disposal to assert its central role in the defence, propagation, and definition of the Catholic religion. Their ambitions always exceeded their achievements; yet the reality of the increase in the power and prestige of the Papacy was incontrovertible. In part, this change reflected the new methods of communication. Photography enabled the physical image of the Pope to be widely diffused among the faithful. The railways which annually brought thousands of pilgrims to Rome to pay homage to the Popes and Vatican Radio (established by Marconi in 1931) which enabled the Popes to speak directly to the faithful throughout Europe provided the means for the Papacy to acquire an unprecedented tangible presence in the lives of Catholics. But it was also a revolution in the structures of the Catholic faith. The Papacy became the administrative, ideological, and emotional focus of Catholicism, the guardian of orthodoxy and the agent of change.[29]

p. 13 Despite certain modest differences in emphasis, the Popes were united in the purpose to which they intended to dedicate their power. During the pontificates of Pius IX (1846–78), Leo XIII (1878–1903), Pius X (1903–14), Benedict XV (1914–22), and more especially those of Pius XI (1922–39) and Pius XII (1939–58), the Papacy became the absolute monarchy of the Catholic faith. Profoundly suspicious of the social, economic, and political trends of the modern era, the Popes—assisted by the powerful Vatican bureaucracy, the Curia—defiantly sought to assert the distinctiveness of the Catholic religion. Amidst a world in crisis, the Church and above all the Papacy should, they believed, serve as a supernatural fortress. Their consistent purpose was to remodel the internal structures of the Catholic Church in order to create a strict hierarchy from the supreme authorities in Rome, through the national ecclesiastical hierarchies and the priesthood to the laity. Metaphors derived from the secular worlds of the military or civilian bureaucracy permeated papal declarations, and unquestioning obedience was demanded from their followers. The autonomies long enjoyed by national ecclesiastical hierarchies were steadily eroded; papal responsibility for all key appointments was asserted; and new centralized forms of doctrinal training were introduced in seminaries.[30] Above all, the Papacy sought to propagate a distinctively Roman form of religious piety. The cults of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, of the Christ King, of the Pope, and, above all, of the Virgin Mary were prominent features of twentieth-century Catholicism which, though they clearly derived much of their strength from the manner in which they responded to the aspirations of the faithful, were to a significant extent shaped by papal initiatives and encouragement.[31]

The increase in the organizational and religious importance of the Papacy was matched by the remarkable energy which the Popes devoted to declarations not only on matters of doctrine but on a wide range of social, political, and cultural issues. No fewer than 185 papal encyclicals were issued between 1878 and 1958[32] as well as innumerable messages, radio broadcasts, and speeches to a vast array of different audiences. This vast range of papal pronouncements has come to be regarded—especially by sympathetic Catholic commentators—as constituting a coherent and unitary corpus of Catholic doctrine. This was certainly the wish of the Popes who intended that their teachings should provide comprehensive guidance for the faithful on all matters from Communism to tourism.[33] In reality, however, this impression of unity was to some extent spurious. Significant differences both of emphasis and content existed between many

papal declarations, while others were often deliberately couched in such general terms that their meaning was open to a variety of different interpretations.

p. 14 The unity of the papal pronouncements therefore arose not so much from their specific instructions as from their consistent preoccupation with a number of central concerns.[34] Foremost among these was an insistence that Catholicism alone offered a solution to the problems of the modern world. As Pius XI unambiguously declared: 'The first and principal cause of every form of disturbance and rebellion is the revolt of man against God.' Consequently, the goal of the Papacy was, in the words of Pius XI again, 'the re-establishment of the Kingdom of Christ by peace in Christ'.[35] This universal project derived much of its tone of confident certainty from its reliance on neo-Thomist Catholic philosophy which, since the promulgation of the encyclical *Aeterni Patris* of 1879, had come to form the basis of theological orthodoxy for the modern Papacy. The writings of Thomas Aquinas provided the Popes with an architectural vision of a world created and sustained by God's divine purpose. The sins of men had led them into error and had brought disorder into this rationally ordained universe and it was only through a return to the teachings of the universal Church—as made known through papal declarations—that a just world could be recreated.[36]

This 'ultramontane fundamentalism', as it has been termed,[37] not only justified the pre-eminent position of the Papacy within Catholicism but also encouraged the Popes to give expression to their vision of an alternative social and political order. Central to this papal message was a commitment to a social order of communities in which the anomie and self-interest of liberal individualism as well as the statist collectivism of socialism and fascism would give way to a new spirit of personal fulfilment and mutual assistance. Major political reforms formed an essential element of this somewhat nostalgic vision. Though the Papacy occasionally expressed its commitment to a 'real democracy' (notably in Pius XII's Christmas Message of December 1944),[38] there was little doubt that the Papal political ideal was far removed from the individualist and secular principles of a liberal parliamentary system. At the same time, the Papacy repeatedly expressed its opposition to Italian Fascist and German Nazi glorification of the State. Quite apart from the threat which such doctrines posed to the autonomy of the Church, the Papacy rejected these 'totalitarian' ideas as subordinating the will of the individual to the false secular deities of nation and race.[39] Instead, the political structure envisaged by the Papacy was one in which a strong central authority was combined with the maximum possible devolution of power. As Pius XI's enthusiasm for the dictatorial regimes of Salazar in Portugal and Dollfuss in Austria during the 1930s illustrated, a strong central power was regarded as essential to maintain social and political order but it was to be accompanied by the
p. 15 application of the principle of subsidiarity, by which responsibility for many ↳ socio-economic issues should be devolved from the central state to the 'natural' communities of region, profession, and family.[40]

The social doctrines of the Popes were similarly concerned to avoid the twin evils of statist centralization and anarchic individualism. As articulated in perhaps the most influential single encyclical of modern times, *Rerum Novarum* issued by Leo XIII in 1891, and reiterated both in Pius XI's encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* of 1931 as well as numerous other public statements, the Papacy expressed its firm opposition to the ethos and structures of the capitalist economy.[41] The notion of a hidden hand which worked to ensure the common good held no appeal for the Popes who saw in the free-market system—and more especially in its apparently remorseless tendency towards monopoly—only the selfish desire of individuals to satisfy their own material ambitions at the expense of others. It was above all the industrial workers who were the victims of unrestrained economic growth and from the 1890s onwards papal declarations repeatedly denounced the material sufferings and social marginalization of the proletariat. Papal solicitude did not, however, imply support for a socialist reorganization of society. Socialism and communism were rejected by the Papacy not merely because of their atheistic and materialist ideology but because their collectivist notions of economic organization threatened both family life and the right to private property which papal teachings deemed to be essential to a just society. Caught between capitalism and collectivism, the Papacy tried to articulate a 'third way' which would control the abuses of capitalist competition while retaining

personal ownership of property. Its most tangible expression was the enthusiasm expressed by Pius XI in *Quadragesimo Anno* for a corporatist reorganization of society in which networks of socio-economic corporations would bring together employers and employees to resolve conflicts of interest as well as ensuring the ascendancy of social justice.[42] In this rather Utopian manner, the individual competition and class conflict of the modern world would, so papal statements proclaimed, be replaced by an organic community in which all of the elements of society worked together for the common good.

The elaboration and diffusion of these general statements of social and political principle formed only one part of papal involvement in European politics. Though the Papacy consciously sought to present itself as a primarily spiritual institution, its position at the head of the manifold branches of the Catholic Church as well as its quasi-sovereign status as the ruler of the Vatican State obliged the Papacy to engage with the world as it was. Encyclical statements of principle therefore always went hand in hand with diplomatic and political initiatives intended to ensure protection for the Catholic Church in an often hostile world. During
p. 16 both world wars, the ↳ Papacy remained rigorously neutral, condemning the belligerence of the participants and calling on them to renounce war in favour of a compromise peace.[43] This was an often unpopular stance which, especially in the aftermath of the Second World War, led to accusations that the Papacy could have acted more effectively to protect the victims of Nazism,[44] but it also undoubtedly enhanced its position as an institution which stood above the conflicts of nations. In times of peace, the Papacy was also at pains to stress its neutrality in political conflicts and proved willing to reach agreements with regimes of different political characters. Especially during the pontificates of Pius XI and Pius XII, the Papacy energetically set about concluding treaties, termed concordats, with a large number of European states. No fewer than forty such concordats were concluded during the inter-war years, including, most notably, those with Poland in 1925, Mussolini's Italy in 1929 (the so-called Lateran Treaties which settled the long-standing dispute between the Vatican and the Italian state), Nazi Germany and Austria in 1933, and eventually Spain in 1953.[45] The purpose of the Papacy in reaching these quasi-diplomatic formal agreements was both defensive and offensive. Its primary aim was to ensure that there could be no return to the anticlerical policies which had been pursued by a number of European regimes in the latter nineteenth century. Especially in the uncertain atmosphere in Europe in the years after the First World War, the Papacy feared a new wave of attacks on the Catholic faith. Thus, by concluding these treaties, the Church sought to provide legal protection for the Church and its manifold affiliated social, educational, cultural, and economic institutions, as well as resolving long-standing points of grievance over matters such as payment of clerical salaries and ownership of Church property.[46]

At the same time, however, the concordats also reinforced the power of the Papacy within the Catholic Church. By concluding agreements directly with national governments, the Vatican served to tie the national ecclesiastical hierarchies more closely to the Papacy. The treaties reinforced the status of the Church as an international institution centred on Rome and the Papacy was always careful to ensure that the agreements enabled it to make the principal ecclesiastical appointments within the national churches. In this respect, therefore, the concordats formed an integral element of the Papacy's consistent aim of imposing its own priorities and leadership on the Catholic Church. The concordats concluded with Fascist
p. 17 Italy and Nazi Germany were, for example, notable for their lack of attention to the protection ↳ of the political freedoms of the Catholics of Italy and Germany. Instead, it was the interests of the Church and more especially those of the Papacy which they sought to protect.[47] The superficial political neutrality represented by the concordat policy was therefore largely illusory. Though the concordats were in part no more than an overdue settlement of relations between Church and State, they also served the Papacy's quest for a more centralized and authoritarian Catholic Church able to act largely independently of state interference. Those states willing to accord the Church such a status were rewarded with expressions of papal sympathy while those, such as the Spanish Republic of the 1930s or, in their latter years, both Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, which refused to accord the Catholic Church any special rights were strenuously denounced.

It was during the pontificate of Pius XII from 1939 to 1958 that the autocratic power of the Papacy reached its fullest expression. An aloof, austere figure who had spent his entire adult life in the service of the Vatican bureaucracy, Pius consciously sought to reinforce the hold which the Papacy exercised over all aspects of the life of the Church. Ecclesiastical power was further centralized in Rome and a long series of papal messages provided guidance for the Catholic faithful on religious, social, and cultural matters. Despite initiating some significant liturgical reforms, Pius XII's vision was essentially that of an unchanging—even immobile—Church which, as his most influential encyclical *Humani Generis* of 1950 declared, rejected innovations in the teachings and structures of the Church. Dissidents who contravened the theological and political orthodoxies of the Papacy were expelled from positions of influence while strenuous energies were devoted to encouraging those forms of piety favoured by the Papacy. This was most evident in the further impetus given to devotion to the Virgin Mary. Marian shrines such as Fátima in Portugal and Lourdes in France were the objects of particular Papal solicitude and the bull *Munificentissimus Dei* issued in 1950 gave to the Marian cult a new status by declaring the doctrine of the assumption of the Virgin Mary into heaven.[48]

In the last years of the pontificate of Pius XII, it became increasingly evident that the attempt to freeze Catholicism in a particular mould was encountering resistance from elements of both the clergy and the laity, notably in France, Germany, and the Low Countries. Nevertheless, few would have predicted the speed and the scale of the ecclesiastical and doctrinal changes which occurred after the death of Pius XII in 1958. By summoning the Second Vatican Council (the first general assembly of the Church since the First Vatican Council of 1869–1870), the new pope, John XXIII, made himself the catalyst of a series of radical reforms which in their collective impact on the Church, the Papacy, and the Catholic faith have been described as the most important event in the history of Catholicism since the Council of Trent which ↳ launched the Catholic Counter-Reformation of the sixteenth century.[49] The wider political impact of the Second Vatican Council which opened in October 1962 and, after the death of John XXIII in June 1963 and the subsequent election of Paul VI, finally concluded in December 1965 is considered both later in this introduction and in the subsequent chapters. Its impact upon the Papacy as an institution was, however, considerable. The new constitution of the Church, *Lumen Gentium*, proclaimed in 1964, substantially dismantled the authoritarian internal structure of the Church. Though the Papacy remained the central headquarters of the Church, the Pope exercised his power not as an absolute monarch but as the head of the collective council of bishops. The symbolism and pomp of monarchical hierarchy was replaced by a novel emphasis on collegiality, a change symbolized by the adoption of the phrase 'people of God' to describe the manner in which all elements of the Church—bishops, clergy, and laity—were active participants in the life of the Catholic faith.[50]

p. 18

Similarly revolutionary was the change which the Second Vatican Council brought about in the attitude of the Church towards the modern world. The siege mentality of the early twentieth century which had oscillated between the defence of the faithful against alien modern influences and an offensive spirit of Catholic reconquest, was dispensed with in favour of what the declaration *Gaudiam et Spes* issued in the final session of the Council in December 1965 portrayed as an active engagement with contemporary society. No longer did the Church claim to possess a monopoly over truth and, just as the Papacy began a policy of *rapprochement* with the Protestant and Orthodox churches, so the Catholic clergy and laity were encouraged to engage in dialogue with their fellow non-Catholic citizens.[51]

Not all the reforms initiated by the Second Vatican Council have been carried through and, especially during the pontificate of John Paul II, there has been a determined attempt to return to a more authoritarian structure for the Church by which the Papacy has sought to recover its role as the guardian of Catholic orthodoxy.[52] Nevertheless, the central reforms initiated by the Council have remained in place and have had an incontrovertible impact on European political Catholicism. By abandoning any attempt to direct the political engagement of the Catholic faithful, the Council did much to encourage—even if it did not entirely

cause—the new disparate forms of Catholic political engagement which emerged in much of Europe during the 1960s.[53]

4. The Evolution of Political Catholicism 1918–1965

p. 19

The rapid emergence of Catholicism as a political force in much of Europe in the years following the First World War was the culmination of trends evident during the previous half-century as well as the product of the manifold changes wrought by the war itself. The 'politicization of Catholicism'[54] which took place in many European countries in the late nineteenth century had been partly imposed on Catholics by the actions of others, The state-directed policies of discrimination against Catholics in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Bismarckian Germany during the so-called *Kultürkampf* of the 1870s as well as anticlerical campaigns by liberal political groups in France, Italy, and Spain had in effect obliged many Catholics to become conscious of their collective identity.[55] But the gradual emergence of a sense of community among Catholic populations also owed much to changes taking place within the Catholic faith. Encouraged by the Papacy and by national ecclesiastical hierarchies, this was nevertheless primarily a force 'from below'.[56] Increasing levels of education and urbanization fostered a new, more modern, religious identity, in which religious belief gradually came to stand alone as something distinct from expressions of communal identity and the observance of rites of passage. It would be wrong to exaggerate the extent and pace of the transformation which had taken place; nevertheless, the Catholics of Europe in 1914 were on the whole much more inclined than had been their forefathers to think of their Catholic identity as a conscious personal choice. Ritual and tradition was gradually giving way to a new Catholicism which was more individualist and, as it encouraged Catholics to think of themselves as a distinct community bound together by shared beliefs, also more collective.[57]

This Catholic identity spilled over from the religious sphere into other areas of social, cultural, and—ultimately—political life. The late nineteenth century witnessed a remarkable boom in the membership of Catholic associations throughout Europe. Women's groups, youth and educational movements, co-operatives, peasant leagues, sporting associations, workers' guilds, and trade unions; all participated in the rapid development of what particularly in Germany, Switzerland, and the Low Countries came to take on the character of a Catholic subculture isolated from the wider society.[58] This 'closed' model of Catholicism has long attracted the attention of sociologists and political scientists who have seen in it a process of
p. 20 'ghettoization' or ↳ 'pillarization' in which a Catholic network of schools, associations, and religious institutions provided an all-enveloping milieu for the faithful.[59] In fact, although this was the undoubted aspiration of many Catholic clergy, its extent should not be exaggerated. Even in the Low Countries and Britain where the trend towards Catholic segregation was most pronounced, the reality rarely accorded entirely with the ideal.[60] Nevertheless, the boom in Catholic confessional associations undoubtedly served as both the manifestation and the catalyst of a new more assertive Catholic identity.

Catholic political parties were at least in origin the corollary in the political sphere of the defensive mentality which had provided much of the impetus for the emergence of Catholic associations. Just as in so many areas of social and cultural life these associations were intended to protect the faithful from discrimination and corruption, so the parties acted as the guardians of Catholic interests in the national parliaments and municipal councils which had become the norm in much of Europe by 1900. Beginning with the establishment in the 1870s of the Centre Party in Germany and the Catholic Party in Belgium, the trend towards separate Catholic political representation gradually spread during the subsequent decades to the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, and, to a lesser extent, France and Italy. By 1914 only Portugal and Spain of the principal Catholic states of Europe lacked a distinct Catholic political grouping of some importance, while in Germany, Austria, and Belgium, Catholic political representatives already exercised substantial power.[61]

The Church rarely played a pre-eminent role in the creation and development of these parties. Though individual priests (such as Seipel in Austria or Sturzo in Italy) were often of considerable importance, national ecclesiastical leaderships and the Papacy tended to look with some suspicion on the active participation of the clergy in the political process. The attitude of the Papacy was, of course, much influenced by the particular circumstances of Italy where the Popes continued until 1929 to refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the post-unification Italian state.[62] Instead, it was more frequently the Catholic laity, and more especially men drawn from the expanding ranks of the Catholic bourgeoisie, who directed the new parties. Their primary motive—and the self-proclaimed justification of the parties—was to protect the Catholic Church and the faithful from anticlerical assaults. This often proved necessary. In Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal, the turn of the century was characterized by renewed anticlerical and, more particularly, anti-Catholic campaigns.[63] Nevertheless, the logic of participation in the parliamentary and
p. 21 electoral process also obliged Catholic parties to develop and articulate more wide-ranging political ↳ platforms. In doing so, the parties went beyond a rhetoric of defence to present their solutions to the problems of society as a whole. This was not always easy. As early as the 1890s Catholic political groupings were already affected by differences of attitude and policy between their predominantly bourgeois leaders and 'Christian democrat' elements who called for greater attention to be paid to the needs of the working class.[64] Nevertheless, all Catholic elements could unite in opposition to the pernicious effects of liberalism which, as well as drawing the peoples of Europe away from loyalty to the Catholic faith, was held responsible for encouraging moral corruption and the evils of an individualist economic system. Anti-liberalism therefore provided the defining focus of pre-1914 Catholic parties and, in its place, they gradually came to develop a positive vision of a restored popular community, united by a common morality and by new socio-economic institutions—such as guilds—which would dissolve the class antagonisms of industrial society.[65]

The First World War accelerated the development of Catholic political action. The war's initial impact was to draw Catholics in combatant states such as France and Germany into national alliances with their erstwhile electoral foes but this newfound sense of common patriotic purpose was soon accompanied by a fear of the possible political consequences of the war. These apprehensions were amply fulfilled in the immediate aftermath of the war. The euphoria of military victory enabled national coalitions to remain in place in France and Belgium but in Central Europe and northern Italy the wave of social and political upheavals during 1918 and 1919 seemed to presage militant Socialist revolutions directly prejudicial to Catholicism. In fact, the revolutionary tide gradually receded but the political changes brought about by the war proved to be a more durable stimulus to Catholic political action. The establishment of the Weimar Republic in Germany and of the new nation-states in Central and Eastern Europe created democratic parliamentary regimes in which Catholics were obliged to unite politically in order to advance their interests. Similarly, in victorious countries such as Italy and Belgium, as well as in a number of neutral states including Switzerland and the Netherlands, reforms introduced after the war created a more democratic social and political system enhancing the need for Catholic political unity and action.[66]

The immediate post-war years therefore witnessed a rapid expansion in Catholic political movements. Long-established parties such as the German Centre Party, the Christian Social Party in Austria, and the Belgian Catholic Party were now joined by more recent groupings such as the RKSP in the Netherlands, the Italian Partito Popolare (PPI), the Partido Social Popular in Spain, the Christian Democrats in Lithuania, and the Parti Démocrate Populaire and the Fédération Nationale Catholique in France.[67] Political Catholicism
p. 22 was now indisputably a Europe-wide ↳ phenomenon and one which played an increasingly assertive role in parliamentary politics and government.

The upsurge in Catholic political organization also owed much to a new mood of confidence among the Catholic laity. The election of Pius XI in February 1922 brought to the head of the Church a Pope determined that Catholicism should play a more militant role in the modern world. As his initial encyclical, *Ubi Arcano*

Dei, published in December 1922 illustrated, he believed that the Catholic faith must assert its ascendancy over the values and structures of State and society.[68] The centrepiece of his programme was the priority which he gave to movements of Catholic Action. Though the term had been used by his predecessors, it was Pius XI who gave great impetus to the development of these movements of the Catholic laity acting under the leadership of the clergy to bring about a recatholicization of modern life. Catholic Action movements were first established in Italy and then spread rapidly to other countries of Europe during the 1920s where they became the focus for the energies of a younger and more militant Catholic laity.[69]

The success of Catholic Action groups was one manifestation of this new mood of Catholic militancy. The rise in participation in pilgrimages, Marian processions, mass rallies, and spiritual associations were all further indications of a more ostentatious, or even triumphal, Catholicism which sought to challenge publicly the secular character of modern life. This Catholic renaissance was not universal. It was always strongest among those younger elements of the Catholic bourgeoisie who, partly as a consequence of the gradual expansion since the late nineteenth century of Catholic secondary and higher education, were influenced most directly by the declarations of the Papacy and of Catholic intellectuals. Universities played a central role in this process. Catholic universities such as those of Nijmegen in the Netherlands, Louvain in Belgium, Salamanca in Spain, and Coimbra in Portugal were often ancient institutions but it was at the end of the nineteenth century that they emerged as a major focus of Catholic intellectual life. They diffused Catholic social and political ideas and served as a focus for the energies of a new generation of Catholic militants. For these young enthusiasts, Catholicism seemed to provide an exclusive source of salvation for the ills of modern society. Nineteenth-century secular ideologies of liberalism, nationalism, and socialism had culminated in the horrors of the First World War and the barbarism of Soviet Russia and only some form of Catholic reconquest of society offered the prospect of a just social and political order.[70]

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The impact of this militancy on Catholic political parties was ambivalent. On the one hand, it encouraged Catholics to identify more strongly with their faith and to support its political representatives. On the other hand, there was an underlying tension between the priorities of the leaders of the Catholic political parties and the advocates of a new, more radical Catholicism. Pius XI himself felt that Catholic political parties were outmoded and, after Mussolini's acquisition of power in Italy in 1922, accepted the destruction of the Catholic Popolari as a political force.[71] For him, as for many of the young enthusiasts who rallied to Catholic Action, spiritual campaigns of reconquest were of primary importance and they looked with some disdain on the more modest aims of Catholic political leaders and on the compromises which they were obliged to conclude with non-Catholic political groupings. It was the youth organizations of Catholic political parties which were most directly affected by this mood of alienation among many younger Catholics. Some declined markedly in size, while others drifted towards the authoritarian right.[72]

The spiritual radicalism of these younger figures was not the only challenge faced by Catholic political parties. The general expansion in Catholic associations after the First World War also benefited Catholic working-class movements. The rise in membership of Catholic trade unions and other affiliated organizations as well as the emergence of the Jeunesse Ouvriére Chrétienne provided a new powerful voice for Catholic working-class demands. Some Catholic worker groups broke away to form their own political organizations or to seek alliances with socialist groupings, while Catholic parties tried not always successfully to incorporate Christian democrat aspirations without antagonizing their middle-class and rural electorates. The difficult balancing-act was one which often served to undermine the coherence of the parties, especially in the economic crisis of the early 1930s when working-class demands for employment measures clashed directly with the orthodoxies of financial retrenchment.[73]

Thus, by the 1930s, political Catholicism was both more omnipresent and more fractured than at any point during the previous half-century. The fortunes of Catholic political parties varied. In Belgium and the Netherlands, they remained influential coalition partners in government but elsewhere their influence was threatened not only by internal divisions but by the more general fragility of parliamentary political

structures. Mussolini's seizure of power in Italy in 1922 had cut short the expansion of the Popolari in Italy and, though the Lateran Treaties of 1929 guaranteed a certain autonomy for Catholic organizations, Catholic Action groups were frequently the targets of government harassment during the subsequent decade.[74] In Spain, Primo de Rivera's coup in 1923 had similarly cut short parliamentary politics, but his fall
p. 24 from power in 1930 and the subsequent establishment of the Second ↳ Republic created a new impetus for Spanish Catholics to organize in the political domain. This led to the creation of the first mass Catholic Party in Spain, the CEDA, which combined—somewhat awkwardly—participation in a number of the governing coalitions of the Republic with a deep antipathy to its institutions and values.[75] The difficulties faced by Catholic political movements were nowhere more intense than in Germany where, though the Centre Party played a prominent role in the politics of the Weimar Republic, the party never identified fully with the post-war political system. Splits by left- and right-wing groups exacerbated the problems faced by the party which experienced a steady decline in its hold over Catholic political loyalties. The rise of the Nazi Party from the late 1920s onwards presented a further challenge for the party. The Catholic Church and the Centre Party opposed the Nazis both because of their 'pagan' nationalist and racialist ideology and, perhaps above all, because their policies seemed to threaten a return to the anti-Catholic *Kultürkampf* of the 1870s and Catholic electoral support for the Nazi Party was always below the national average. Nevertheless, in some areas, Catholics were attracted by the Nazi rhetoric of economic protest and national regeneration and the Centre Party proved unable to prevent either the Nazi seizure of power in January 1933 or the forced dissolution of the party which occurred soon afterwards.[76]

Perhaps the most significant development in European Catholic politics in the 1930s was the enthusiastic support given by Catholic groupings to the authoritarian regimes established in Portugal and Austria. In both cases, the demise of the democratic regimes was a complex process but one in which Catholic groups played a significant role. In Portugal, Salazar, who became the head of the government in 1932 and who replaced the republican constitution by the authoritarian Estado Novo (New State) in the following year was a young academic from the University of Coimbra who had long been active in Catholic spiritual and political campaigns.[77] In Austria, Dollfuss, the architect of the new non-democratic constitution promulgated in May 1934 was similarly a Catholic political leader whose explicit reliance on papal teachings in his public declarations brought him extravagant praise from Pius XI as well as from numerous Catholic groupings elsewhere in Europe.[78]

Events in Austria and Portugal encouraged Catholic militants throughout Europe impatient to break with
p. 25 the defensive policies adopted by the established Catholic ↳ parties. The early 1930s was a period of unprecedented volatility in Catholic politics as new groupings came to the fore inspired by opposition to what they perceived to be outmoded democratic parliamentary systems and eager to bring about Catholic-inspired social and political reforms. It was the young and, more especially, students and intellectuals who were to the fore in these movements. Groups such as the Christus Rex (Christ the King) movement led by Léon Degrelle in Belgium, the Blue Shirts in Ireland, the youth groups of the SKVP in Switzerland, and even at this time some of those intellectuals associated with the French periodical *Esprit* were all products of distinct national circumstances but they shared a militant rhetoric of Catholic revolution derived from neo-Thomist theology and papal teachings such as the highly influential encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* issued by Pius XI in 1931. Their common goal was to bring about a truly Catholic political system which would, they claimed, provide a 'third way' for Europe between the twin evils of liberal democracy and fascist and communist totalitarianism.[79]

How far such Catholic groups constituted a distinct political movement in Europe in the 1930s has been the subject of some historical debate. Writers such as Zeev Sternhell have seen *Esprit* and similar groups in France as manifestations of a unitary fascist phenomenon, while a number of other historians have sought to underline the differences between Catholic radicals and secular movements of the radical right.[80] In fact, much depended inevitably on national circumstances. If events in Austria, for example, conspired to draw a

distinct line between Catholic groups and other elements of the non-democratic right, in Spain a shared antipathy to the Second Republic led many Spanish Catholics to ally themselves closely with the emerging coalition of right-wing and fascist groupings which in 1936 supported the Nationalist military revolt against the Republic.[81]

Efforts to put forward a distinct Catholic political alternative, did, however, gradually become more difficult during the 1930s. In Austria Dollfuss was assassinated in a Nazi-inspired revolt in 1934 while Salazar's regime in Portugal gradually distanced itself from its initial Catholic inspiration.[82] Elsewhere, Nazi persecution of Catholic organizations in Germany gathered pace after 1933, prompting Pius XI to issue the encyclical *Mit brennender Sorge* in 1937 which roundly condemned the ideology and policies of the Third Reich. In Belgium, the Rexist movement reacted to electoral reverses by adopting the trappings of Nazism
p. 26 while in France the election ↳ of the Popular Front government in 1936 restored the traditional battle-lines between the Socialist and Republican supporters of the Third Republic and their right-wing opponents.[83]

It was the Spanish Civil War which symbolized the problems faced by Catholic political groupings. The war presented an awkward dilemma for many European Catholics. Though some Catholics supported the legitimate Republican government, many others—from a wide variety of backgrounds—joined their Spanish co-believers in giving their tacit or declared support to General Franco's crusade against atheistic communism.[84] Above all, the Spanish Civil War demonstrated the wider difficulties faced by all Catholic political movements as they were obliged to choose between the emerging rival camps of the democratic Western powers and the German-Italian Axis alliance. As Europe moved towards a general war, any third way—both in domestic and international politics—was increasingly difficult to find and Catholics were obliged to choose between two camps neither of which fully represented their aspirations. The Western powers—France and Britain—symbolized the despised secular values of liberalism while the anticlerical actions of the German and Italian regimes during the 1930s served to harden Catholic attitudes throughout Europe against the evils of 'totalitarian' fascism.[85]

Unlike in 1914, the declaration of war in September 1939 was met with little enthusiasm in Europe. Catholics, in common with the vast majority of their fellow citizens, rallied behind their governments while hoping that Europe would still be saved from a return to the horrors of the previous conflict. The Papacy reiterated its neutrality and sought to act as an intermediary in negotiations between France and Britain and dissident elements within the Third Reich.[86] Peace, however, could not be resurrected and the German western offensive in May and June 1940 and the subsequent entry of Italy into the war embroiled most European Catholics (except neutral Switzerland, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal) in the sufferings—and political choices—of the war. The rapid and seemingly irreversible German military victory in the summer of 1940 obliged Catholics in the Low Countries and France to adapt to the new political situation. In Belgium and the Netherlands, Catholics were prominent in efforts to create new political groupings and institutions which accepted the reality of German hegemony and sought to introduce a vaguely defined 'New Order'.[87] A
p. 27 similar pattern of events occurred in France where, despite the trauma of ↳ the national defeat, both the Catholic Church and much of the Catholic laity rallied enthusiastically to the Vichy regime led by Pétain which appeared to offer the prospect of a government more sympathetic to Catholic interests and ideals than the Third Republic.[88]

Nor was it merely in Western Europe that Catholics were active participants in the new political circumstances created by the Nazi military triumphs. If German policies prevented the resurrection of a political process in Poland, elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, the war provided the opportunity for Slovakia and Croatia to become independent states under German tutelage. Catholicism had long formed an integral element: of the identity of both nations and the Catholic Church and Catholic political figures featured prominently in the new states. In Slovakia, after its declaration of independence from the defunct Czechoslovak state in March 1939, a priest—Mgr. Tiso—became the first head of state and the new official party, the Slovak People's Party, enacted policies derived from an amalgam of Nazi and Catholic

principles.[89] In Croatia, the Catholic influence was, if anything, even more emphatic. The new leader, Anton Pavelic, appointed with German support after the Nazi conquest of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941, declared a constitution based on Catholic principles and the local Church hierarchy, led by Archbishop Stepinac of Zagreb, lent their enthusiastic support to the new regime. Church-State relations subsequently cooled but Pavelic was nevertheless received privately by Pius XII in May 1941 and Catholic activists remained prominent figures within his regime.[90]

Catholic support for the regimes of Slovakia and Croatia proved durable, but elsewhere in German-Occupied Europe Catholics soon retreated from participation in the efforts to construct a 'New Order' Europe. Their actions in 1940 had been based on the twin premisses that the war was to all intents and purposes at an end and that the Third Reich was willing to allow a certain degree of political freedom to the defeated populations. In the event, neither of these proved to be the case. The German failure to defeat Britain and the subsequent invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 revealed that the outcome of the war was far from certain while German actions in the Occupied territories demonstrated that plunder and repression were the principal determinants of Nazi policy. In these circumstances, political action seemed to be neither desirable nor necessary and Catholic participation in programmes of New Order political reform in Belgium and the Netherlands came to an end. Even in France, the Vichy regime proved to be a disappointment for Catholic hopes. Though Pétain's regime made much of its symbolic commitment to Catholic values, it
p. 28 proved to be a diffuse amalgam of different political tendencies, not all of which were ↳ sympathetic to Catholic interests. Support for Pétain always remained strong but Catholic attitudes towards the Vichy government had become more circumspect by 1941 and hardened markedly in subsequent years as the regime became primarily an agent of pro-Nazi collaboration.[91]

Despite the German attack in June 1941 on atheist Bolshevism as represented by the Soviet Union, instances of Catholic support for the Nazi cause during the latter years of the war were isolated. The Nazi crusade against Bolshevism did lead some to see a German military victory as essential for the survival of the Catholic faith. Though Spain did not formally ally itself with the Axis powers, Franco provided various forms of assistance to Germany and Spanish volunteers fought on the Eastern Front.[92] In Belgium, the pro-German Flemish Nationalists of the Vlaams Nationaal Verbond and the Rexist movement led by Léon Degrelle rallied some Catholic support while in France Catholic militants such as Philippe Henriot, the Vichy regime's influential Minister of Propaganda, and Paul Touvier, the head of the pro-German Milice in Lyon, bore witness to the tortuous path which led some erstwhile advocates of militant Catholicism to support for the Nazi cause.[93] These examples were, however, greatly outweighed by the instances of Catholics who were gradually drawn towards active opposition to Nazism. Catholic Resistance was a diffuse phenomenon which incorporated many different trends, some of which were more concerned to pre-empt Communist revolution than to defeat Nazism. But in the latter war years a wide range of Catholic groups emerged throughout Occupied Europe (as well as in Italy and to a limited extent in Germany) which sought to counter the actions and values of the Third Reich. Priests and laity participated in acts of individual valour protecting Resistance fighters, Catholic worker organizations were to the fore in efforts to help workers threatened with deportation to Germany while Catholic intellectuals participated in the burgeoning clandestine press.[94]

More significant, perhaps, than these actions was the change in political mentality which they represented. The sufferings of the war and experience of Nazi oppression destroyed much of the appeal which projects of authoritarian political reform had exercised over many Catholic militants during the previous twenty years. The notion of a true Catholic state in the mould of Dollfuss's Austria or Salazar's Portugal lost its charm and in its place the war years witnessed a renewed Catholic interest in democratic and participatory political structures. This change also reflected an evolution in the purposes of Catholic political action. If much of Catholic involvement in politics since the late nineteenth century had been devoted either to the protection
p. 29 of specific Catholic interests or to the achievement of a distinctly Catholic political order, ↳ the Second

World War encouraged a new openness in Catholic political attitudes, Especially among Catholic worker organizations and those intellectuals and other elements of the Catholic laity who participated in Resistance organizations, notions of the protection of a Catholic ghetto or of an offensive, triumphalist Catholicism gave way to a willingness to work with non-Catholic elements in a pluralist society in which Catholicism's influence would be more indirect but also perhaps more pervasive.

This change in the purposes and spirit of Catholic political action undoubtedly helped to lay the basis for the remarkable flowering of Christian Democrat political parties which occurred in much of Western Europe during the years following the Second World War. It would, however, be wrong to exaggerate the extent of this change. Geographically, it was limited to the Catholic heartlands of Western Europe. In Eastern Europe, the events of the Second World War and the predominant role of the Soviet Union created a very different political situation and one which was much less favourable to Christian democracy[95] while in Great Britain and the Irish Republic Catholicism remained deprived of direct political representation. Nor did Christian democracy spread to the Iberian peninsula—isolated from the effects of the war by the decision of Spain and Portugal to remain neutral—where Catholic political attitudes remained for the most part frozen in the triumphalist mentality fostered by the reliance of the regimes of Franco and Salazar on the trappings and structures of the Catholic faith to protect themselves against internal and external opposition.[96]

Nor should the extent of the change wrought in Catholic mentalities within Western Europe during the war years be overestimated. If some Catholics emerged from the war with a new willingness to collaborate with non-Catholic political groupings, the events of the war also served to reinforce more traditional Catholic attitudes. The rise in religious practice amidst the chaos and dangers of war encouraged a mood of religious optimism in which the Catholic faith once again seemed to offer the sole remedy to the evils of the modern age. The mood of spiritual crusade and reconquest spilled over into the immediate post-war years, fuelling a marked upsurge in pilgrimages, parades, and movements devoted to the Virgin Mary.[97] This also owed much to enhanced Catholic fears of atheistic communism in the ensuing Cold War. Both on an international level and within the domestic politics of countries such as France and Italy, Communist parties built upon their role in the anti-German resistance to emerge as a powerful political force after the liberation. Catholic fears of a Soviet invasion or of a Communist-inspired domestic uprising were a dominant feature of the post-war
p. 30 years and, strongly encouraged both by the Papacy and by national ↳ ecclesiastical hierarchies, served to foster a defensive mentality among Catholic political groupings.[98]

Thus, fears of atheistic communism and the upsurge in religious devotion brought about by the war were just as much features of Catholic wartime experience as were the new ideas of Christian democracy. In these circumstances, it is therefore perhaps not surprising that the Second World War failed to prove to be a decisive watershed in the development of political Catholicism. Much did indeed change as a consequence of the war. The social, political, and ideological transformations it brought about (or for which it served as a catalyst) inevitably had an impact both upon the Catholic faith and its political expression. This was particularly so in the immediate post-war years when innovations such as the 'worker-priest' movement in France and Belgium and the left-wing Christian democrat groups in Germany and Italy appeared to herald a decisive break with the conservative affiliations of many European Catholics.[99] But, with the gradual consolidation of the post-war political order and the integration of the states of Western Europe into Cold War alliances, so more traditional mentalities came to the fore and set the tone of Catholic political action during the late 1940s and the 1950s.

This was particularly evident in the course followed by the Christian Democrat parties of Western Europe. These marked in many respects a decisive new development in Catholic politics. The Christian Democrats of Germany and Italy, the CVP/PSC in Belgium, and, perhaps most strikingly, the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP) in France were new political creations often founded by a younger generation of Catholic figures whose political attitudes had been forged by the experiences of the war years. They broke with both the defensive separatist mentality of the long-established Catholic parties and with the authoritarian

Catholic temptations of the inter-war years in favour of a new personalist ideology which embraced a democratic political system and a social market economy of free enterprise combined with state intervention and enhanced welfare provision. In Germany, this change was all the more radical because the new Christian Democrat Party was a cross-confessional party, incorporating both Protestant and Catholic militants. This new political programme was accompanied by a new attitude towards the Catholic Church. Rather than presenting themselves as the defenders in the political sphere of the Catholic Church, the new parties consciously stressed their independence from clerical guidance and declared their wish to win the support of all voters regardless of their confessional or social background.[100]

These parties enjoyed considerable electoral success. In France, the MRP won 28.2 per cent of the vote in the elections of 1946, while in Germany, Italy, and Belgium, the Christian Democrats had established
p. 31 themselves by the end of the 1940s as ↳ the largest single party and the dominant party of government. In part, this success was due to their policies which in the years after the liberation responded to the widely felt desire for social and political change. There were, however, other reasons for their broad appeal. Fear of a Communist revolution led many middle-class voters—regardless of their religious background—to see in the Christian Democrat parties the most effective guardian of their material interests. This was reinforced by the absence from the post-war political stage of many of the pre-war parties of the right. Discredited by their involvement in fascist or authoritarian adventures, the demise of these parties left many voters in post-war Europe without a political home. The Christian Democrats, with their marked anti-communism and commitment to private property, were the obvious point of refuge for these voters, prompting their left-wing opponents to accuse them of depending on the votes of erstwhile fascists. Finally, the support of the Catholic Church also contributed to Christian Democrat success. For all their protestations of autonomy, the parties benefited considerably from the Church's instructions to the faithful to vote for Christian Democratic parties, most notably in Italy where the Papacy used its considerable resources to the full to ensure Communist defeat and Christian Democrat success in the decisive parliamentary elections of 1948.[101]

Initial expectations that the Christian Democrats would be the agents of a programme of Catholic-inspired wide-ranging social and political reforms were therefore disappointed. Except in France, where the MRP went into rapid electoral decline after the elections of 1951, the Christian Democrat parties established themselves as parties of government, devoted to a Cold War political agenda of capitalist economics and defence of Western Europe against the Soviet Union. Only their commitment to the process of limited European integration, in which the Catholic political leaders De Gasperi, Adenauer, and Robert Schuman played a prominent though far from determinant role, remained as an indication of their initial reforming agenda.[102] The momentum of domestic reforms rapidly evaporated, provoking a mood of often bitter disappointment among Catholic trade unions and other working-class Catholic organizations. Instead, in matters of domestic policy, the Christian Democrat parties of the 1950s became advocates of a moderate conservatism or came to rely on the traditional Catholic rallying-calls of the defence of the Church and its institutions against the supposed anticlerical ambitions of liberal and socialist parties.[103]

This reorientation of the Christian Democrat parties was not, however, without its difficulties. Minority groups within all of the parties continued to press for them to adopt more radical agendas. More generally, the parties had difficulty in maintaining the support of an increasingly sophisticated and assertive Catholic
p. 32 electorate. Though Pius XII continued to present a vision of a hierarchical Catholic community, ↳ it was one which was at variance with the reality of the more diverse and integrated society emerging in much of Western Europe. Despite the substantial network of Catholic confessional social and cultural institutions, it was impossible to maintain the separateness of the Catholic population. The rapid pace of social and geographical mobility, the unprecedented rise in living standards in much of Europe during the 1950s and the new educational and professional opportunities which economic development provided were all changes which undermined the homogeneity of Catholic communities with the consequence that the maintenance of a single Catholic political identity came to seem increasingly artificial.[104]

The death of Pius XII in 1958 and the decision of his successor John XXIII to summon the Second Vatican Council (1962–5) led to far-reaching theological and ecclesiastical innovations which inevitably had considerable consequences for the nature of political Catholicism. It would be wrong, however, to attribute all the responsibility for the changes which took place in Catholic political action during the 1960s to the impact of the Second Vatican Council. Though the Council's impact on the faithful was immense,[105] it was only one factor among several. At the heart of the transformations of the 1960s remained the driving-force of social and economic change which continued to erode Catholic distinctiveness and also led to a marked and sustained decline in levels of religious practice in many European countries.[106] This was reinforced by wider political changes which saw new political forces emerge and which prompted many liberal and socialist parties to abandon their anticlerical heritage. Deprived of their traditional adversaries, the forces of political Catholicism no longer possessed the same rationale for their own existence.

The impact of the Second Vatican Council was most evident in the change which it brought about in the attitudes of the ecclesiastical hierarchy towards Catholic political parties. Though John XXII's successor, Paul VI, was in many respects a conservative figure who remained strongly supportive of the Italian Christian Democrat party, the dominant trend was for the clergy to abandon their efforts to direct the political action of the faithful. The bishops in the Netherlands and Belgium, for example, no longer instructed Catholics to vote for the 'official' Catholic party while even in Spain and Portugal a new generation of younger bishops and clergy, strongly influenced by the reforms of the Second Vatican Council, began to disentangle the Catholic Church from its close bonds with the Salazar and Franco dictatorships.[107] Even the hostility of the Papacy and of the Church towards communism began to give way to a more conciliatory posture. Concordats were signed with a number of East European states and in the 1970s the
p. 33 Italian Christian Democrats were drawn towards a historic compromise with the Communist Party.[108] ↳ This 'liberation' of the laity led to a flowering of new forms of Catholic political action. Socio-cultural organizations such as Catholic trade unions and youth organizations broke away and forged their own political allegiances, while Christian Democrat parties were obliged to seek new secular identities. Those that failed to do so—such as the MRP in France—disappeared, while others—such as the German, Dutch, and Belgian Christian Democrat parties—continued to prosper, thanks to a broad coalition of largely middle-class and rural voters. Though Catholic influences remained evident in their social and cultural policies, these parties were no longer primarily Catholic in inspiration or composition. Instead they gradually became predominantly centrist parties, committed to capitalist economics, welfare provision and European integration.[109]

Thus, the political, social, and economic changes which took place during the 1960s brought about the demise of the model of political Catholicism which had developed in Europe since the late nineteenth century. The Church no longer sought to control Catholic political activities while the laity no longer saw any automatic connection between their Catholic faith and a particular political allegiance. This in no sense indicated that Catholicism had withdrawn from the political realm. The Church continued to speak out on matters of particular concern, such as legislation on birth-control, while Catholic political movements and individuals remained prominent in European political life. What did largely disappear was the notion of political parties devoted to the defence of the particular interests and values of Catholicism. Instead, a new —and perhaps more truly Christian democrat—vision emerged of Catholics working as an active influence within a range of non-Catholic parties and movements. A particular form of political Catholicism had gone but the intimate connection between Catholicism and politics remained.

Notes

* I would like to thank my co-editor Tom Buchanan for his help in preparing this introduction. We are also grateful to Jim McMillan, John Pollard, and Mary Vincent for their comments and helpful advice.

1 In particular, it has unfortunately proved necessary to omit Austria and Switzerland. *Re* Austria, see A. Diamant, *Austrian Catholics and the First Republic* (Princeton, 1960); L. Gellott, 'Defending Catholic interests in the Christian State: The Role of Catholic Action in Austria 1933–1938', *Catholic Historical Review*, 74 (1988), 571–89; E. Weinzierl, 'Austria: Church, State, Politics and Ideology 1919–1938', in R. J. Wolff and J. K. Hoensch (eds.), *Catholics, the State and the European Radical Right 1919–1945* (Boulder, Colo., 1987), 5–30. *Re* Switzerland, see U. Altermatt, *Der Weg der Schweizer Katholiken ins Ghetto* (Zurich, 1972); id., *Katholizismus und Moderne: Zur Sozial-und Mentalitätsgeschichte der Schweizer Katholiken im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Zurich, 1989); E. L. Evans, 'Catholic Political Movements in Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands: Notes for a Comparative Approach', *Central European History*, 17 (1984), 91–119 10.1017/S0008938900016423 ; R. Ruffieux, *Le Mouvement chrétien-social en Suisse romande 1891–1949* (Fribourg, 1969).

2 See, notably, F. Lannon, *Privilege, Persecution and Prophecy: The Catholic Church in Spain 1875–1975* (Oxford, 1987); J. Pollard, *The Vatican and Italian Fascism 1929–1932* (Cambridge, 1985) 10.1017/CBO9780511562945 ; M. Winock, *Histoire politique de la revue 'Esprit' 1930–1950* (Paris, 1975); J. Hellman, *Emmanuel Mounier and the New Catholic Left* (Toronto, 1981); J. Gergely, *A politikai katolicizmus Magyarországon (1890–1950)* (Budapest, 1977).

3 e.g. G. Cholvy and Y.-M. Hilaire, *Histoire religieuse de la France contemporaine*, 3 vols. (Toulouse, 1985–8). See also the highly comprehensive survey J.-M. Mayeur (ed.), *Histoire du Christianisme*, xii (n.p., 1990) and R. Aubert, *The Church in a Secularised Society* (London, 1978). The most authoritative synthesis of the 20th-cent. development of the Catholic religion is provided by H. Jedin, K. Repgen and J. Dolan (eds.), *History of the Church, x. The Church in the Modern Era* (London, 1981).

4 J.-M. Mayeur, *Des partis catholiques á la démocratic chrétienne* (Paris, 1980); K.-E. Lönne, *Politischer Katholizismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt a. M., 1986). On the 19th cent., see also P. Misner, *Social Catholicism in Europe: From the Onset of Industrialization to the First World War* (London, 1991).

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6 M. Fogarty, *Christian Democracy in Europe 1820–1953* (London, 1957). See also pp. 10–11.

7 e.g. Y.-M. Hilaire, *Matériaux pour l'histoire religieuse du peuple français XiX* e *-XX* e *siècles*, ii (Paris, 1987), 9–10; J. Wolffe, *God and Greater Britain* (London, 1994), 68–74.

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9 E. Fouilloux, 'Courants de pensée, piété, apostolat: Le Catholicisme' in Mayeur (ed.), *Histoire du Christianisme*, xii. 117–21.

10 See pp. 35–6 and 156–7.

11 See pp. 192 and 245–6.

12 See pp. 82–5 and 170–6.

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14 See p. 35.

15 See pp. 162–7 and 190.

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18 See pp. 80–1.

19 See pp. 55–8.

20 J.-M. Mayeur, 'Catholicisme intransigeant, catholicisme social, démocratic chrétienne', *Annales Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, 27 (1972), 483–99.

21 See the attempts at definition in A. M. Pazos (ed.), *Un siglo de catolicismo social en Europa 1891–1991* (Pamplona, 1993).

22 e.g. Fogarty, *Christian Democracy in Europe* 1820–1953.

23 See p. 34.

24 See pp. 24–5.

25 The adoption of the term 'democrat' by such groups in francophone and southern Europe (in German-speaking Europe, the term *Volk* was more usual) was intended only to indicate their popular orientation. It did not imply support for a democratic model of politics. See E. Poulat, 'pour une nouvelle compréhension de la démocratic chrétienne', *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, 70 (1975), 5–38; Mayeur 'Catholicisme intransigeant', 483–99; P. Nord, 'Three Views of Christian Democracy in Fin de Siécle France', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 19 (1984), 713–27 10.1177/002200948401900407 ; Misner, *Social Catholicism in Europe*, 194–7 and 222–3.

26 See pp. 86–7 and 228–9.
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32 M. J. Schuck, *That They Be One: The Social Teaching of the Papal Encyclicals 1740–1989* (Washington, 1991), 45.
33 Agostino, *Pie XI*, 77–8; J.-B. D'Onorio, 'Eccesacerdos Magnus', in J. Chelini and J.-B. D'Onorio (eds.) *Pie XII et la Cité: la Pensée et l'action politique de Pie XII* (Aix, 1988), 36.
34 Schuck, *That They Be One*, x and 173–80.
35 Ibid., 55 and 70–2.
36 Ibid., 67–9; Fogarty, *Christian Democracy in Europe*, 433; O. Köhler, 'Teaching and Theology', in H. Jedin and J. Dolan (eds.), *History of the Church*, ix. *The Church in the Industrial Age* (London, 1981), 307–18.
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52 A. Hastings, 'Catholic History' in id. (ed.), *Modern Catholicism*, 8–9. The encyclical *Veritas Splendor* issued in 1993 represents the most categorical attempt by John Paul II to return to a vision of the Papacy and of the Church based on the model of Pius XII. See J. Wilkins (ed.), *Understanding Veritas Splendor* (London, 1994).
53 See pp. 32–3.
54 Lönne, *Politischer Katholizismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, 10–11.
55 See pp. 35–6, 70, 156–7, and 219–20, Blackbourn, *Marpingen*, 106–112; Altermatt, *Der Weg der Schweizer Katholiken ins Ghetto*; Lannon, *Privilege, Persecution and Prophecy*, 136–8.
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61 See pp. 39–40,76–7,157–8, and 191–2. Evans, 'Catholic Political Movements in Germany, Switzer land and the Netherlands', 97–107; J. W. Boyer, *Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of the Christian Social Movement 1848–1897* (Chicago, 1981), 122–83; M. L. Anderson, *Windthorst: A Political Biography* (Oxford, 1981).

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63 See pp. 39 and 131–2. D. L. Wheeler, *Republican Portugal: A Political History 1910–1926* (Madison, Wise, 1978), 67–72.

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67 See pp. 41–6, 77–81, 101–3, and 227–8; K. Von Klemperer, *Ignaz Seipel: Christian Statesman in a Time of Crisis* (Princeton, 1972); V. S. Vardys (ed.), *Lithuania under the Soviets: Portrait of a Nation, 1940–1965* (New York, 1965), 30–2.

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