

Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918–1965

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CHAPTER

3 Spain

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Abstract

This chapter discusses political Catholicism in Spain. It shows that after Vatican II, the Spanish Church was broadly divided into traditionalists and critics. Franco's difficult relations with Pope Paul VI helped to accentuate this cleavage, which killed any surviving notions of political Catholicism. However strenuously those in the bunker denied it, the old absolutes were gone forever. There was now no single Catholic position. Aware that sincerely religious men and women were to be found in all political groups, from the Falange to the underground communist party, Spanish Catholics largely gave up the attempt to define a particular political space for the Church.

Keywords: political Catholicism, Spain, Spanish Catholics, Spanish Catholicism, political activity, Spanish Church

Subject: European History, History of Religion, Political History, Modern History (1700 to 1945), Social and Cultural History

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On 31 May 1919 King Alfonso XIII consecrated Spain to the Heart of Jesus. Unveiling a new monument, which depicted the Spanish nation prostrate before Christ's Sacred Heart, Alfonso led his government in the act of reparation, lamenting those who 'cast you aside, scorning your commandments'. Together, king and government implored God to ensure that 'the world from pole to pole' resounded with praise for 'the divine Heart, through whom we have reached salvation'. This 'enthronement' on the Cerro de los Angeles—a hilltop just outside Madrid which marks the geographical heart of Spain—was the culmination of a long campaign to have images of the Sacred Heart erected in every public place in the land. These statues, with their concomitant cults of reparation for the ingratitude of the modern world, came to represent the aspirations of those who desired an integral, totally Catholic society, where Church and State were as one. Carved into the base of the statue which now adorned the Cerro were the words 'You will reign in Spain'.[1]

The conflation of earthly and heavenly kingship apparent in this ceremony was characteristic of contemporary Spanish Catholicism. Enthronements of the Sacred Heart were invariably accompanied by the

sound of the royal march, which was also played at the elevation of the host during mass. Just as Jesus Christ was to reign in the hearts and minds of Spaniards, so the house of Bourbon was to reign in Spain, protecting the Church against the ravages of republicanism, separatism, and socialism. The principle of monarchy went unchallenged amongst Catholics: those who did not look to Alfonso to secure the position of the national Church were Carlists rather than republicans, supporters of the Bourbon pretender rather than the Bourbon incumbent.[2]

p. 98 To those taking part in the elaborate ceremony held on the Cerro there was only ↳ one way of being Spanish and that was to be Catholic. The construction of a totally Catholic nation was a constant aspiration for the generations of polemicists, preachers, and politicians who carried the Church's banner in the public life of twentieth-century Spain. In general, these men and women assumed that this would be assured by a benevolent confessional state. Political agitation was a last resort, used only in adverse circumstances, such as those created by the Second Republic (1931–6). Under the Catholic monarchy, however—as under the Catholic dictatorship of Franco—the great majority of the faithful were content to hymn the eternal values guaranteed by the State.

Yet, even in 1919, and despite the self-confidence apparent among the notables on the Cerro de los Angeles, theirs was a beleaguered position. The map of Spanish Catholic practice revealed extremes of both adhesion and alienation.[3] In most parts of northern Spain more people than not attended church on a regular basis. In the Basque regions, Catholic practice was overwhelming, as much a part of the local identity as was language, or scenery; among the peasant smallholders on the plains of Castile, or in the foothills of Aragon, Catholicism was also ubiquitous, automatically entrusted with communal and family ritual, even if mass-going was not so predominant as among the scrupulous Basques. Further south, numbers shaded off. In the huge, latifundia-dominated, dioceses of Extremadura, New Castile, and Andalusia, non-practice was usual and anticlericalism common. Nor was geography the only variable affecting religious practice among Spaniards: throughout the land, more women than men were to be found swelling the ranks of the faithful. The image of the pious woman, be she mantilla-clad *beata* or the priest-ridden harridan of anticlerical fable, was a familiar cliché. Although in parts of the north as many men as women could be found in the pews, some discrepancy—in forms of practice if not in actual attendance—was common.[4]

Class proved a sterner determinant of Catholic identities than did either geography or gender. Proletarian districts, even in the great Basque city of Bilbao, saw far fewer of the faithful filling the pews on Sundays. In part, this reflected a lack of pastoral structures in industrial areas. No new parishes were established in Barcelona, the largest city in Spain, after 1877; in 1907 some of the city's parishes contained over 60,000 souls. Similarly, by 1935 the Madrid parish serving working-class Vallecas contained an impossible 80,000 people. The Catholic nation was not to be found here: pastors caring for industrial flocks gave vivid testimony of working-class indifference and hostility. Maximiliano Arboleya, canon of Oviedo cathedral in
p. 99 the mining region of Asturias, wrote to his bishop in January 1922 about parishes where, ↳ despite an abundance of children, the priest could not count on 'even one little girl for First Communion'.[5]

It was neither coincidence nor accident that those urban areas which were well provided with Catholic churches, schools, and hospitals were those occupied by the bourgeoisie. The Church's capacity to save souls seemed dependent upon the privilege and protection offered by both the upper classes and the Spanish state. In the words of the Jesuit trade-union organizer Gabriel Palau, 'We have the idea that all Spain is Catholic and can never cease to be so.... Many Catholics believe that only governments have a duty to defend religion.'[6] The fates of Throne and Altar were thus inextricably intertwined.

Like Arboleya, Palau was actively engaged in the reconversion of industrial society. Catholic trade unions were the favoured instruments of these urban evangelists and by 1918 a clear distinction had emerged between the patronal syndicates established by Palau and his fellow Jesuits, and the 'free' or independent unions founded by Arboleya and the Dominican fathers Gerard and Gafo. Whereas the first were paternalist

and confessional bodies, mirroring the natural order of society in their distinction between 'protected' and 'protectors', both of whom were welcomed as members, the second were workers-only unions which imposed no religious criteria for membership and acted independently of employers.[7] Both initiatives failed. In Asturias, for example, Arboleya's persistent efforts to establish independent workers' syndicates were consistently defeated, not least by the opposition of local Catholic employers, while Father Palau's unions were seen by other workers as a breeding ground for blackleg labour, and by the employers as 'a prophylactic against socialism'.[8] Throughout northern Spain, Catholic unions were regarded as 'yellow'. In Barcelona, concerted efforts to evangelize the working class, led by Palau, created a body reviled by other unions as 'a sacristy of scabs'. The city's only free syndicates degenerated into free-shooting *pistoleros*, often in the service of military authority.[9]

Only in the Basque Country did Catholic industrial unions experience any lasting degree of success. Founded in 1911—and later affiliated to the Basque Nationalist Party—Basque Workers' Solidarity (SOV) appealed largely to white-collar workers, and its membership rose steadily, if not spectacularly. By the time of the
p. 100 Second ↳ Republic the SOV recorded between 37,000 and 40,000 members, though it had still made few inroads into industrial Vizcaya.[10] The SOV's relative strength, however, owed much—if not everything—to nationalism. Rather than breaking the mould, the Basque union did little to allay the impression of failure conveyed by the history of Catholic unions in Spain.

To some extent, the project of Catholic unionism was rent by contradiction from the very outset. Leo XIII's encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (1891), which had endorsed Catholic syndicalism, rejected outright the notion of class struggle, maintaining that

> it is a great mistake to imagine that class is spontaneously hostile to class...Just as the different parts of the body unite to form a whole so well proportioned as to be called symmetrical, so also nature has decreed that in the state these twin classes should correspond to each other in concord and create an equilibrium.

This fundamentally corporative vision of organic harmony meant that Catholic unionists never admitted the possibility of conflicting class interests, still less capital-labour dialectics.[11] Yet, the very real nature of such struggles—which were well defined by 1919—determined the ultimate failure of confessional unionism in Spain; if internal conflicts weakened the Catholic unions, external conflicts decided their fate.

While Catholic trade unions ossified, Catholic agrarian syndicates thrived. Religious practice was high throughout most of the northern countryside, which was lauded by Catholic propagandists as a repository of unchanging values. More practically, much was made of papal teaching on private ownership. Property—clearly understood to be land—was the key to social harmony; the acquisition of 'some little property' would enable workers to become small proprietors, thus ensuring that 'class would move closer to class'.[12] The National Catholic Agrarian Confederation (CNCA), founded in 1917, oversaw a network of agricultural syndicates, rural savings banks, co-operatives, and insurance schemes which spread throughout northern and eastern Spain. The CNCA created a formidable apparatus of agrarian defence, albeit one which failed to make any impression on the latifundia districts of the south.[13] Amongst Catholic smallholders, however, loyalty to the Confederation proved strong, not least because of the technical and insurance services it provided. This fidelity persisted, despite the markedly paternalistic character of the CNCA, which had been profoundly influenced by the Society of Jesus. Papal doctrine on the sanctity of property undoubtedly found an echo among peasant proprietors, particularly once the Confederation instigated some much-vaunted redistribution schemes.

p. 101 The CNCA came into existence in the year in which labour unrest, regionalist grievance, and military discontent threatened not only the incumbent government but also the monarchical system itself.[14] Though in 1917 the immediate crisis was averted, the complex and corrupt system of power-sharing which had

developed since the Restoration of the Bourbons in 1875 had entered its death-throes. The Restoration system was dependent upon the brokerage of local patrons, or *caciques*, and was thus increasingly threatened by the burgeoning forces of mass politics. While there were some attempts to come to terms with this changing political arena—the Conservative leader Antonio Maura, for example, attempted to introduce a project of 'revolution from above', at least in rhetorical form—these had little impact. Constitutional agitation, agrarian unrest, and the rapid growth of republican and socialist alternatives all testified to the crisis of the Spanish state.[15]

In such circumstances—with the Catholic nation apparently threatened with dissolution—news of Don Luigi Sturzo's foundation of the Italian People's Party (PPI) in 1919 was received with some interest. The Catholic daily *El Debate* commented favourably on the news, although it feared the PPI's political programme would undoubtedly 'give scandal' to many of 'our friends'. *El Debate*'s influential editor, Angel Herrera Oria, was president of an elite Catholic lay organization, the National Catholic Association of Propagandists (ACNdeP), which had long harboured ambitions of uniting Spanish Catholics in a single political grouping. The Propagandists—who were immensely influential in the CNCA—were impressed by Sturzo's acceptance of modern political methods but found his party's progressive policies and aconfessional nature far less appealing.[16]

Unsurprisingly, when a Spanish version of the PPI emerged belatedly in 1922, its mentors were not to be found among the ranks of the ACNdeP. The People's Social Party (PSP) was, instead, formed around Severino Aznar's Christian Democrat Group, established in 1919 as a forum for debate and discussion. The Group had brought together leading social Catholics—including Aznar himself, Arboleya, Gafo, and the like-minded Augustinian Bruno Ibeas—in an attempt to provide a coherent, Christian analysis of Spain's social problems. Both Jesuits and Propagandists were conspicuous by their absence; Herrera Oria, for instance, refused to put his name to the group's manifesto.[17] If conservative responses to the Christian Democrat Group were tepid, the integrist reply was far more heated. These factional followers of the Carlist pretender—for whom the 'social reign of Jesus Christ' was an attainable political reality—claimed the word 'democrat' smacked of 'forbidden fruit'. Yet, the concept of democracy espoused by the Group's members
p. 102 would have been virtually unrecognizable to post-Second World War Christian democrats. Far ↳ from reflecting pluralist political ideology, the term 'democrat' was chosen only to reflect the Group's ambition to reconcile Catholicism and the modern world. Used in this sense, the expression dated back to Leo XIII, who had firmly declared the term to be devoid of any political significance, a ruling reaffirmed by Pius X in 1910.[18]

However, the 1922 grouping firmly declared itself to be a political party—rather than a federation or a union—and so adopted the language of liberal democracy, still viewed askance by many on the Catholic right. This self-definition meant that the PSP represented the first attempt Spain had seen to establish a modern conservative political party. The PSP forms a key point in what may be seen as a modern historio-graphical project to search for the roots of Christian democracy in pre-Franco Spain. The work of historians such as Domingo Benavides and Javier Tusell explores the ideology of non-integrist Catholics, suggesting continuities with later conservative movements. The standard work on the PSP is by Oscar Alzaga, who went on to an active political career in Adolfo Suárez's Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) during Spain's transition to democracy, before establishing his own small Christian democrat party in July 1981. He cites the opinion of PSP veterans, such as Manuel Giménez Fernández—reformist minister of agriculture under the Second Republic and later a leader of the Christian democrat opposition to Franco—as to the PSP's uniquely Christian democrat nature.[19]

Yet, during its brief political life the PSP never amounted to more than an amorphous grouping of essentially disparate elements, brought together through common concern at threats to the established order. Notwithstanding its brave espousal of the language of party, the PSP had more in common with the old Catholic leagues and unions than with modern political machinery. Although some Propagandists—

notably Giménez Fernández and Gil Robles—availed themselves of the 'full liberty' the ACNdeP gave its members to collaborate with the new party, Gil Robles, for one, preferred to regard what appeared to be 'a constituted party' as a 'meeting of "men of goodwill" '.[20] Similarly, Carlists like Salvador Minguijón and Victor Pradera viewed the PSP, in Pradera's words, as providing the possibility of 'a minimum programme of association or coincidence for rightist elements'. Rather than represent 'an ultra-democratic coterie', the party's slogan should be 'everything by and for the union of Catholics'. In stark contrast to this corporatist caution, the PSP's leader, Angel Ossorio y Gallardo, spoke of 'fervent democratic action' and truly representative parliaments. The new party, he declared, should be aconfessional, democratic, and popular.[21]

p. 103 However, Ossorio was far from being a representative figure. Several PSP party orators spoke in corporative terms of 'the organic reconstruction of society', and the rejection of liberal laicism in Spain, where Catholicism served as both 'social and political law'.[22] The PSP leader's view of religion as a private emotion found little echo; the great: majority of Spanish Catholic leaders shared the monolithic vision articulated by Pradera. Spain should be recognized as a totally Catholic society, with the Church's unique position as sole purveyor of the truth confirmed by law. Hence, when in September 1923 King Alfonso XIII acquiesced in General Miguel Primo de Rivera's abrogation of the constitution, the resulting military regime was greeted with jubilation by virtually all sectors of the Spanish Church. The coup was a fatal blow for the PSP which, in Manuel Azaña's words, broke up on its 'first real encounter with reality', providing enthusiastic collaborators for the new regime.[23] In the words of *El Debate*, 'national life' had to triumph over 'formal legality'; democracy was simply government by quantity rather than by quality.[24]

The Restoration Monarchy's legacy of corrupt government and violent social disorder ensured that the prospect of a military regime engendered widespread optimism. Many on the Catholic right would have welcomed any form of authoritarian solution: *El Debate*, for instance, insisted that the new government be 'of dictatorial type'.[25] Under the patriotic guidance of the army, the new state would ensure the Church's privileged position, enabling it to carry out its mission for the salvation of Spain. Ten bishops were guaranteed seats in Primo's corporatist-inspired National Assembly, a body greeted with enthusiasm as a way forward from the internecine party squabbles of liberalism. The new regime also guaranteed Catholic standards of public morality and, more importantly, education: religion and patriotism became the watchwords for both teachers and pupils.[26]

Catholics were not only the educators and moralists of this new state, they were also its politicians. Primo de Rivera's new agent of political mobilization, the Patriotic Union (UP)—envisaged as a single mass party on the Italian model but defined as an official 'anti-party', in which all members were required to be practising Catholics—provided ample opportunity for Herrera and his Catholic Propagandists.[27] As *El Debate* had predicted, '[w]hen Spain is reborn, it will be our men and our organizations who occupy the new channels of citizenship.'[28]

p. 104 The ACNdeP's first aim was to provide political leadership in defence of the Spanish Church. In the words of the Association's founder, Angel Ayala SJ,

> religion and politics cannot be separated. If politics is the art of good government, how can religion want no part in that government on which depends material and religious prosperity, men's temporal and eternal welfare? In this sense, religion is essentially political.[29]

Though his own Association was to remain an élite, under Primo Herrera immediately began to create 'a broad movement of citizenship', comprising 'unions…of men of goodwill, concerned above all else with municipal and provincial problems'.[30] Building skilfully on the network of agrarian syndicates established by the CNCA, the Propagandists achieved in the UP the first effective mobilization of Spanish Catholics at local level.[31] The most fervent supporters were to be found among the small and medium proprietors of northern Spain, though anti-separatism severely limited the UP's appeal among the Basques. Typically,

local ‘unions’ were led by members of the Catholic bourgeoisie, already prominent in the agrarian syndicates but, on the whole, new to politics.

In the 1920s the ACNdeP, though still discreet in operation and small in numbers, became the commanding presence on the Catholic political stage. The new men of the UP would not simply retire from public life when Primo fell from power. This new political class was not, as yet, interested in party politics; the ACNdeP was typical in its commitment to any government that ‘guaranteed public order and the principle of authority’.[32] The first Patriotic Unions were to give depth to the dictatorship rather than lead to a full-scale Catholic political mobilization, something which would only happen in opposition to a secularizing republic. But, some of the foundations for such a mobilization were laid under Primo. The language of anti-communism and anti-parliamentarism became common currency among the Spanish right, which rapidly espoused the watered-down corporatism advocated by Primo on the Italian and Portuguese models.[33]

Anti-liberalism, together with a confessional addiction to corporative theory, had also led more radical Catholics to welcome Primo’s regime. Canon Arboleya, for instance, had hoped and believed that the dictatorship would provide state-sanctioned opportunities for implementing social Catholic teaching. Yet, by the time of his fall, it was widely agreed that the general’s rule had been a wasted opportunity for social Catholicism.[34] The new corporative agencies had provided little more than patronage structures and similar
p. 105 charges could be laid against the UP. The political and ↳ administrative personnel had altered, but the most dramatic change in the country’s political climate was the now deafening clamour for democracy and a republic. Yet, among Catholics, the number of democrats was as exiguous as ever. By 1930 the Church’s political spokesmen were younger, more professional, and more widely heard, but their political message was still inextricably intertwined with monarchical privilege.

The only exceptions were to be found in the Basque Country and Catalonia where, under the governance of a centralizing dictatorship, the regional churches became significantly more dissident. While the Basque episcopate raised no protest at Primo’s Castilianizing policies, the dictator’s bloodless persecution of the signs and symbols of the Basque nation did much to alienate—and democratize—young Basque Catholics, among them the Propagandist José Antonio Aguirre, future president of an autonomous Basque republic.[35] In Catalonia, Cardinal Françesc Vidal i Barraquer of Tarragona—second in importance only to the primatial see of Toledo—led his fellow bishops in determined opposition to the government’s injunction that all Church business be conducted in Spanish.[36] In both regions, the experience of centralizing dictatorship created an oppositional current of Catholic politics which was to become genuinely democratic. Even before Primo’s dictatorship, calls for regional autonomy had become increasingly clamorous; in his wake, the groundswell in favour of devolution became unstoppable. By the time Primo—now a discredited and solitary figure—resigned in January 1930, Catalonia was overwhelmingly republican. When his ineffectual successor, General Dámaso Berenguer, called municipal elections for the following April in a doomed attempt to oversee a return to constitutional government, even the local Catholic newspaper, *El Matí*, declared, in Catalan, that it was ‘completely indifferent’ to their outcome.[37]

In contrast, *El Debate* declared parliaments to be decadent institutions and warned that a change of regime would open the floodgates to ‘an epoch of anarchy’ and ‘Russian experiments’.[38] Even in the face of the crushing republican victory—which, as Gil Robles subsequently recalled, came as ‘a bitter surprise’ for ‘the world of the [P]ropagandists’[39]—Herrera’s paper argued vehemently against seeing the election result as a plebiscite in favour of the king’s abdication. Such a momentous decision should only be taken by the nation. Superior to, and greater than, the plebs, the nation ‘signifies, in spiritual terms, ideas, feelings, traditions, interests, hopes…, [a] hundred values that one word decided by the masses, with more or less careful reflection, cannot destroy in a moment’.[40] This distinction between nation and people echoed the contemporary Catholic emphasis on national, as opposed to popular, will.

p. 106 In Catholic political thought, the general good determined political action; popular sovereignty was a misguided notion which gave rise to the atomization of liberal democracy. As the general good found expression in the nation—understood as a continuing historical process, even a providential destiny—so the interests of the national community overrode those of individual citizens. But, in the heady days of April 1931, popular sovereignty held sway. The new regime was swept in on a massive popular vote, leaving erstwhile monarchists contemplating the harsh reality of failure.

The first question to be asked was, of course, why they had lost. Surprisingly, however, very few Catholic representatives seemed willing to pose the question. A rare exception to this reluctance to look inwards to explain the republican victory was a report, prepared for the Holy See, which baldly declared: 'In Spain religion is dying little by little under the protection of the State'. Under the monarchy, 'The official nature of Catholicism in Spain', instead of being 'of undeniable advantage for the Church, obscures the religious reality of the country'.[41] The ritual splendours of Restoration Catholicism contrasted sharply with the extraordinarily low levels of practice which characterized many parts of Spain. José Gafo, in a rare public analysis of the April revolution, declared,

> Excellent things are *novenas, processions, pilgrimages, enthronings* [of the Sacred Heart], *statues, flags*, all the *symbols* of Catholicism, the splendours of the *cult, solemn confessions of faith*, the *legal recognitions* and *official acts* of religiosity, in which Catholic activities have predominantly, almost *exclusively* concerned themselves, and which now suffer the same fate as the *symbols* of the Monarchy; but there are more fundamental, more solid...and more productive things which should not have been abandoned as they were.[42]

Dramatic proof of this confusion of symbols occurred on 11 May 1931 when—in response to a monarchist provocation—churches, convents, and religious schools were burnt in Madrid as a wave of incendiarism spread to other Spanish cities. In retrospect, this violent popular attempt to extirpate the signs of the old order was portrayed as the occasion for a concerted Catholic entry into politics, in particular, that of the ACNdeP.[43] In fact, Herrera's Propagandists had been active for some weeks before; the coming of the Republic might have left its opponents ideologically paralysed but the organizational response was immediate.[44] The Association had created a permanent machinery, effective at both national and provincial level. The expertise and leadership—not to mention the propaganda organs—for any new Catholic initiative were already in place.

As early as June 1930, in a lecture to the Madrid Propagandists' study circle, Herrera Oria had articulated Pope Leo XIII's doctrine of accidentalism: all power came from God and all constituted authorities were therefore worthy of respect.

p. 107 Legislative character was far more important than legal form and Catholics should work for their beliefs within the constituted legality.[45] Though doctrinally scrupulous, accidentalist dogma was essentially pragmatic. If the form of regime were irrelevant, all Catholics could work together in defence of fundamental principles. Accidentalist leaders made overtures to fellow Catholics in the Alfonsist and Carlist 'catastrophist' camps—who rejected any co-operation with the Republic—in the hope of establishing a mass political presence.[46] *El Debate* launched National Action (AN)—an 'organization of social defence'—simply as a vehicle for those who had campaigned against the Republic. The new group's monarchist inheritance was apparent in its motto, 'Religion, Fatherland, Order, Family, Property'. The word 'monarchy' was deliberately omitted for pragmatic reasons. Herrera and his circle were aiming for as wide an 'anti-republican concentration' as possible: 'Above all Spain; or, in the words of Leo XIII, "the general good".'[47]

Though scrupulously avoiding the language of party—which was not only tainted by liberalism but might also suggest that the entire Catholic religion could be reduced to a single manifesto—National Action, soon

renamed Popular Action (AP), could not retain catastrophist loyalties, although co-operation, particularly at a local level, remained common.[48] To both Carlists and Alfonsists, not only was the dynastic question fundamental, but also—and more importantly—the Republic would never be defeated by legal means. The Carlists had taken up arms against the First Republic and were, even in 1931, training their militia, the Requeté, to do so again against the Second.[49] The difference between the accidentalist and catastrophist camps was, however, essentially tactical. Both were fundamentally hostile to the Republic. *El Debate* quickly substituted the term 'anti-revolutionary' for 'anti-republican', but it was clear that, although AP was prepared to work within the law to achieve its aims, it was no loyal opposition.[50]

Even before the church-burnings of 11 May, Republican Spain was believed by many Spanish Catholics to be at the mercies of Soviet Communism. True Spain was laid low; the victory of anti-Spain at the polls in April was given concrete reality by the following month's arson attacks. This simple distinction between Spain
p. 108 and anti-Spain proved a fruitful source of rhetoric for the new accidentalist right. Not ↳ only did such terms have a political resonance—explaining, among other things, the April defeat—they also echoed the near-Manichaean division between good and evil, the Church and the world, the spirit and the flesh, which characterized so much contemporary Spanish piety. One Jesuit-run pious magazine, for instance, summed up political choice in the crude question 'Rome or Moscow?'.[51] The language of Christ and Antichrist could also be employed against those who sought to blur the distinctions, and present both political and religious choices in less simple a manner.

The elections of July 1931 returned an overwhelming Republican majority to the Constituent Cortes, which could only have been won with at least some Catholic votes.[52] At national level, Miguel Maura's Conservative Republicans were proclaiming the compatibility of Catholicism and democratic pluralism and similar options were proving viable locally. Three Catholic deputies elected for Catalonia chose to sit with the Esquerra—the broad left Catalan group on the government benches—rather than join the Catholic opposition groups, even though these included the Basque Nationalists. Even in Castile, Segovia elected the Republican canon Jerónimo García Gallego, while Avila returned the great medieval historian Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz who, unusually, combined Catholicism with membership of Manuel Azaña's Republican Action.

In the face of this unacceptable confusion of what were, to the old monarchist right, antithetical positions, the accidentalists and their allies sought to equate republicanism and anti-religion. In so doing, they were undoubtedly helped by the crude anticlericalism of the republican constitution, which looked to eliminate Catholicism from the public sphere by removing crucifixes from schoolrooms, banning processions, and secularizing cemeteries. Such moves—along with those directed against the religious orders—were opposed by all Catholic politicians.[53] Catholic Republicans, however, were prepared to accept the constitutional separation of Church and State and the introduction of freedom of worship, both of which were bitterly opposed by the self-styled defenders of the faith.

All cherished integrist ideals of the construction of a totally Catholic nation were laid to waste by the constitution. In a determined rearguard action, the self-proclaimed Catholic deputies used the debates on the constitution to show, repeatedly, their refusal to accept political and cultural pluralism.[54] When, as was inevitable, the religious clauses of the constitution were passed, they walked out in protest. Several of the constitution's provisions were scarcely compatible with those democratic liberties it otherwise enshrined—a contradiction that was pointed out again and again by Catholic republicans.[55] However, for the majority of
p. 109 Catholic politicians, ↳ the constitution was the inevitable consequence of parliamentarism. As both accidentalists and catastrophists frequently observed, there was no such thing as a conservative republic. Even before the offending document had been passed formally by the Cortes, Herrera's Propagandists launched a campaign ostensibly calling for a revision of the constitution on religious grounds. Yet, the campaign's organizers and orators were equally opposed to the articles allowing for the creation of

autonomous regions and, in particular, the redistribution of property. Those protesting against the constitution were, in effect, mobilizing against the Republic itself.[56]

As the men of AP set about creating Spain's first mass party of the right, religion proved their most potent rallying cry. Their first concerted appeal was to the newly enfranchised women of Spain, who were widely seen as a 'natural' source of support.[57] Untainted by collaboration with Primo, Catholic women came into politics to show how the campaign against the constitution represented a new epoch in Spanish electoral life. The spokeswomen of AP presented themselves as apolitical creatures, driven into the public sphere by the secularizing onslaught of the Republican government. For both male leaders and female followers, the mobilization of women was an emergency response to an emergency situation. Female branches were customarily involved in catechesis and charity work, a reflection of the proper concerns of Catholic womanhood. Though the main agenda of these mothers and home-makers remained domestic, female labour—usually unpaid, though not necessarily unskilled—was essential to the creation of a modern party machine. AP's women workers built up voting registers; they organized and electioneered, campaigning tirelessly against civil marriage, divorce, and secularization. Such issues were perceived as particularly important to women, but their use of the religious question as shorthand for a whole series of other moral and political choices reflected the way in which the Catholic right used the banner of defence of the faith to spearhead a far wider attack on the economic and political bases of republicanism.

Economic issues came to the fore in mobilizing the agrarian bedrock of Catholic politics. AP's ambitious young leader, José María Gil Robles, was also national secretary of the CNCA and his vehement defence of property rights struck a chord with the Castilian smallholders who made up the bulk of the CNCA's membership. Already suffering economically, these peasant farmers were alarmed at the legal weakening of property rights—the terms of which were regularly exaggerated by CNCA orators—and alienated by the incompetent implementation of agrarian reform. Intended to alleviate conditions in the south rather than the north, the Republic's agrarian reform law offered nothing to the Castilian peasantry while the worsening economic conditions and spiralling social unrest affected them greatly. In such circumstances, it
p. 110 was unsurprising that support for AP continued to grow, ↳ particularly given the new party's skilful manipulation of agrarian rhetoric and CNCA organization.[58]

By November 1933, the date of the next elections, the CNCA's bulletin could declare: 'Fortunately, all the forces which defend the principles of social catholic doctrine (religion, family, property and order), upheld by our organization are united'.[59] In these Catholic Agrarian eyes, such forces were united in the CEDA (Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Right-Wing Groups), founded under Gil Robles's leadership in February 1933. CEDA was a permanent, rather than an *ad hoc*, electoral organization committed, like its predecessor AP, to affirming 'the principles of Christian civilization', and thus the revision of the Republican constitution. Looking to lead the Spanish right into the age of mass politics, CEDA maintained its open-door policy, announcing that it would welcome all 'rightist organizations that agree fundamentally with Popular Action's ideology and tactics'.[60]

This umbrella structure not only ensured that such well-established regional sectors of the accidentalist right as Luis Lucia Lucia's Valencian Regional Right (DRV) maintained their autonomous identities, but also continued AP's appeal to as broad a cross-section of the Catholic population as possible. '[I]n the political-religious order', declared the CEDA, it could have no other programme than 'the doctrine of the Catholic Church'. The 'principal aim and fundamental reason for its existence' was to work for 'the empire of the principles of Christian public law in the governance of the State'.[61] This rather presumptuous statement was characteristic of the way in which AP/CEDA unwaveringly categorized its actions and manifestos as 'Catholic'. Despite their scrupulous avoidance of party rhetoric, the Propagandist leaders of AP clearly harboured ambitions of becoming the faithful's only acceptable electoral choice.

Although the new confederation dismissed the idea of party as 'a rigid fiction', the run-up to the parliamentary elections of November 1933 showed it to have possibly the most successful party organization in Spain.[62] Various Propagandists—including Gil Robles and Herrera Oria—had made research visits to Italy and Germany, often under the aegis of *El Debate*.[63] Their observations of the 'new movements' in these fascist states helped inspire the CEDA to swamp entire localities with election publicity in the autumn of 1933. The scale of the campaign was unprecedented; CEDA was the only party of the right seen to be mounting an effective campaign against the Socialist Party (PSOE).

p. 111 The CEDA made much of this Christian-socialist dichotomy. Claiming the elections as a confrontation between redemption and revolution, CEDA orators sought to present all republican options as communist while keeping the Catholic label exclusively for themselves. Thus, Miguel Maura's Conservative Republican party was referred to as 'those who consent to Spain being lit by burning churches'; Sánchez-Albornoz was accused of hypocrisy and corruption by the Avila branch of the AP/CEDA youth movement (JAP); and, in neighbouring Salamanca, the provincial Catholic daily mounted vituperative attacks on two centrist deputies, one of whom was both a practising Catholic and a Conservative Republican.[64] In the increasingly polarized political world of the Second Republic, personal faith had come to seem an inadequate definition of Catholicism.

After the elections, the CEDA was the largest single party in the Cortes; though not asked to form a government, it occupied a hegemonic position on the right of the parliamentary spectrum. This position—together with the federal structure which allowed an unusually wide range of opinions to gather together in one party—partly explains why some scholars have sought to carve a niche for the CEDA in the history of Spanish Christian democracy. Richard Robinson, for instance, has argued, not only that Gil Robles turned the CEDA into 'a republican party in all but name', but also that it 'was really the Spanish counterpart of other European Christian-democrat parties. Its first loyalty was to the Church and the question of the form of government was unimportant.'[65] Leaving aside the question of the extent to which Christian democrat parties existed anywhere in Europe before 1945, the presumed indifference of democrats to forms of government seems distinctly odd. Such an interpretation relies essentially upon a literal, even a credulous, reading of CEDA rhetoric. In contrast to Robinson's view, the limits of accidentalism are accepted by other historians who, though anxious to trace Christian democrat continuities into and from the CEDA, follow the schema discerned by Giménez Fernández and Gil Robles. Both protagonists remembered the CEDA as fragmented; while there was a reformist wing—and, according to Gil Robles, an initial Christian democrat impulse—this was defeated by those landowning groups within the party whose prime concern was with the defence of property rights. The deliberate scuppering, by exactly those elements, of various moderate and papally inspired agrarian reform measures put forward by Gimenez Fernandez during his time at the ministry of agriculture was widely cited in support of this analysis.[66]

The existence of a Christian democratic tendency within the CEDA is seldom disputed, although a cursory examination of those who are deemed to have comprised this reformist wing reveals far less unanimity.
p. 112 Javier Tusell follows Gil Robles in ↳ arguing that, if the CEDA had split, or at least rid itself of reactionary elements, it would have provided the basis of a true Christian democrat party; historians like Jose Montero and Paul Preston argue, in contrast, that such a label is, at best, applicable only to a reduced nucleus around Giménez Fernández and Lucia Lucia.[67] Giménez Fernández himself, writing in 1971, looked to those who 'followed the line of...Herrera', thereby extending the definition to encompass the Propagandist-inspired party mainstream.[68]

The case for seeing the CEDA—at least in part—as heir to the PSP and forerunner of the early anti-Franco opposition is strengthened by the fact that some individuals can be traced through all three groups, notably Gimenez Fernandez and Gil Robles. But, although such men had weighty social Catholic credentials, their past—if not their future—careers as democrats were chequered. Gil Robles's pre-war commitment to democracy was particularly tenuous. Visions of a Christian democrat CEDA core, stripped of all contrary or

apathetic elements, and with the potential to develop into a modern conservative party, may have found favour among historians, but there is little evidence that such plans would have appealed to the CEDA leader. Gil Robles never contemplated restricting party membership to convinced democrats, nor in the 1930s did he accept the prospect of political pluralism. As one, admittedly hostile, observer has put it, Gil Robles, 'distanced from the philosophy of the rights of man,...was outside the ideological preoccupations common to the founders of the Republic'.[69]

Essentially the CEDA was an anti-republican party, and its anti-republicanism translated into anti-pluralism. Though, like Catholic parliamentary groupings throughout Europe, it looked to fill the conservative space in the political arena, the weakness of the moderate conservative tradition in Spain meant that the CEDA soon careered rapidly to the right. The common currency of the CEDA was not Christian democracy but Christian corporatism. In the wake of the impetus provided by *Quadragesimo Anno*, Catholic intellectuals spent much time on corporative theory and the practical examples offered by the new European dictatorships.[70] Such concerns became more general after the left's electoral defeat in 1933, which finally allowed Catholic politicians to envisage a time when, once again, the State would be theirs. Visions of a new order informed the rhetoric not only of the CEDA but also of small fascist groupings which in February 1934 united under José Antonio Primo de Rivera as the Falange Española de las JONS.

Rather than rule Catholic fascism as illegitimate a political option as Catholic republicanism, CEDA leaders depicted the Falange simply as misguided. To those who shared the new, Catholic, corporatist vision of the
p. 113 State, fascism was not pernicious, ↳ simply unnecessary.[71] Anti-Marxism, a thirst for immediate social justice, and a corporatist vision of the State were not unique to the Falange. JAP, the CEDA youth movement, baptized its bulletin with the banner headline 'We want a new state'; its programmatic '19 points' included an explicit declaration of 'Anti-parliamentarism' and its members gave half-Roman salutes, professed unquestioning devotion to the *jefe*—who 'never makes mistakes'—and demonstrated their loyalty, discipline, and patriotism at mass rallies.[72] There were many who saw fascism in the JAP. José Antonio responded to Gil Robles's call for a purge of 'Judaizing Freemasons' with the words, 'these are fascist principles; he may reject the name, but the name is not the thing'.[73] Similarly, when the JAP rejected charges of fascism by asserting 'we are ourselves', at least *one falangista* understandably asked for a more precise differentiation.[74] Such goading could not disguise the great success of the JAP. Larger and more united than the Falange, the JAP, unlike the fascist party, had a genuine national presence and drew from the same potential membership.[75] The similarities between the two groups were thrown into stark relief in the spring of 1936 when, having failed to achieve 'all power for the *jefe'* through the ballot box, *japistas* exchanged their green shirts for blue ones in a general exodus to the Falange.

Gil Robles later admitted that the patriotic 'anti-politics' of the JAP had, in fact, resulted in 'totalitarian politics'. Yet, as a comparatively young man himself, he was convinced that leading Spain towards the new order was a youthful task. 'Who knows', he asked, 'if, in the inscrutable plans of providence...the hard task of harmonizing new political trends with the immortal principles of our Christian religion' might not fall to the JAP[76] In this quest for a new order, which would reconcile traditional Catholic values with the apparatus of the modern state, increasing numbers of CEDA sympathizers—young and old—looked towards Dollfuss's Austria. The government assault on the Austrian Socialist Party in February 1934 was greeted with particular approval in the Spanish Catholic press; according to *El Debate*, it was 'a lesson to us all'.[77]

Authoritarian solutions to problems of 'disorder' were widely quoted, particularly among those who regarded the Austrian fighting as a prelude to what would inevitably succeed in Spain.[78] Liberal democracy
p. 114 was disintegrating; communist violence ↳ lay in wait. When in October 1934 the Spanish Socialist Party led an ill-conceived insurrectionary general strike—in part, a response to the announcement of three CEDA ministers—Gil Robles's party was clamorous in its demands for swift and stringent action. The JAP orchestrated a movement of civil defence as the defiant Asturian coalfields—the only area of determined proletarian resistance—were subjected to brutal military repression. In these circumstances, *El Debate's*

December call for a corporative constitution had an ominous resonance. The previous month Gil Robles had outlined his vision of an organic state in which power would be reinforced, governmental stability increased, and popular assemblies restricted to specific legislative functions.[79] Even the most socially conscious *cedistas* seemed unconcerned with civil rights. Giménez Fernández, for instance, had no qualms about closing PSOE offices in Badajoz, the province he represented in the Cortes.[80] He also joined his two fellow CEDA ministers in resigning from the cabinet when it voted to commute the death sentences passed by an army tribunal on two Socialist deputies.

A recent biographical study argues persuasively that Giménez Fernández, in marked contrast to most of his accidentalist CEDA contemporaries, was a convinced republican.[81] To distinguish between accidentalism and republicanism, however, does not necessarily address the wider issue of democracy. Certainly, if the question is construed in terms of democratic rights for socialists, then there was little to separate Gimenez from his monarchist co-religionaries. His reputation as the Christian democrat conscience of the CEDA rests on the basis of his time at the ministry of agriculture. The defeat of Giménez Fernández's agrarian reform proposals was, according to Edward Malefakis, 'one of the central tragedies of the Republic. The transformation of the CEDA into a socially conscious Christian democratic party, which was [G]iménez's central purpose, was never accomplished.' Yet, the furious, obstructive response of the landowning right must have been anticipated. More damaging was the local opposition the minister encountered, notably in Seville, his native province, and Badajoz.[82] Rather than revealing proto-Christian democrat support, the minister's proposals split the party at every level. Indeed, the only CEDA grouping which unanimously accepted his reform plans was the JAP.[83]

The Christian democrat nature of Giménez Fernández's proposals often goes unquestioned. Yet, no legislative proposals should be divorced from their political context. Though appointed beforehand, Gimenez only took office at the ministry of agriculture in the wake of the October rising. He analysed Spain's agrarian problems in religious terms, as befitted a professor of canon law. The landless should
p. 115 become landholders, though not necessarily outright owners. Such reform would lead, in ↳ papal terms, to that 'reform of morals' without which no restoration of society could be accomplished.[84] The minister's proposals thus had a moral rather than an economic premiss, as was evident in his emphasis on the obligation of landlords to act in the common good. They were seen as part of a post-Asturias strategy which would ensure order through a policy of repression while wooing workers away from socialism with a programme of social legislation.[85]

The minister's agrarian proposals also had to be seen in corporative terms. *Quadragesimo Anno* explicitly set out in 1931 a corporative reorganization of State and society as the way forward from evils of individualism and the consequent class struggle between capital and labour.[86] Just as, in *Rerum Novarum*, access to property had seemed to offer a way between liberalism and socialism, so the current interest in corporatism was presented as a way forward from the competing creeds of capitalism and communism. Such alternatives would steer between the Scylla and Charybdis of warring classes, protecting the community against either absorption by the State or dissolution in the face of liberal individualism. The illegitimacy of liberalism as a political option for Catholics perhaps does most to explain Giménez Fernández's refusal to accept a place on the Republican slate which contested the 1933 elections in Seville. Nor was he driven out of the CEDA in the wake of the agrarian reform fiasco. A Propagandist first and foremost, he consulted Angel Herrera as to his situation and agreed with the ACNdeP president that his personal position was secondary to 'social Catholic representation'.[87] Party cohesion was to be put before all else.

Only when the right was defeated in the elections of February 1936 which brought the Popular Front to power, did Giménez Fernández and his fellows attempt to strengthen centrist links in support of the now-threatened Republic.[88] From the end of March Gimenez Fernandez and Lucia were in contact, not only with their co-religionaries Miguel Maura and Claudio Sanchez-Albornoz, but also with Azaña and the Socialists Besteiro and Prieto in a vain attempt to establish a national government.[89] Even had the CEDA deputies been

able to establish preliminary dialogue at governmental level, they now had no following to bring with them. Luis Lucia, who had once commanded a strong regional power base in Valencia, retained only a nominal leadership of the DRV, which had become the first CEDA organization to embrace direct action, organizing a clandestine militia, and from May making direct contact with military conspirators.[90] As Lucía was well aware of developments in Valencia, his attempts to forge a Republican solution to the problems of spring 1936 were futile.

p. 116 Lucía's and Giménez Fernández's desire to replace the—in their eyes—calamitous reality of a Popular Front government with a national coalition also suggests an idiosyncratic definition of the democratic process. Even in 1936 the left wing of the CEDA is better defined as social Catholic than Christian democrat. And social Catholicism was far removed from democratic political assumptions. For example, the Dominican doyen of Catholic trade-unionism, Jose Gafo, was genuinely neutral towards the Republic and had in January 1934 written of how, to those on the right, 'Any social reform, which has necessarily to imply sacrifices, is termed *socialist'*. Yet, despite clearly occupying a position on the Catholic left, Gafo's name appeared alongside those of die-hard monarchists on the manifesto for Calvo Sotelo's Bloque Nacional, a corporatist initiative launched by far right elements in December 1934. Gafo was attracted by Calvo Sotelo's vision of a new, integrative state which would ensure historical continuity and enforce 'a distributive social justice'. A true concern for his fellow men had never altered Gafo's opinion of an inorganic suffrage, the 'essential vice of parliamentarism, classical liberalism and false democracy'.[91]

Throughout the Second Republic, only minority Catholic groups, principally in the northern peripheries of the Basque Country and Catalonia, were exploring explicitly democratic political options. Here local Catholic republican parties developed, although only the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV)—which was founded in 1895—maintained a national presence after 1933. Conservative in moral and religious matters, the PNV sat with other Catholic opponents of the new regime in the Constituent Cortes. Yet, the PNV was passionately committed to regional autonomy, a subject which was anathema to most *cedistas* and reduced Alfonsists to apoplexy. The frustration of regional aspirations under Primo's dictatorship had left a legacy of distrust among the Basques which the Castilian Catholic right did little to allay. The well-known links between catastrophist groups and the Spanish army—not to mention the military hero-worship which swept through the Catholic press in the wake of the Asturian revolt—caused further disquiet.

As the CEDA veered to the right under the Republic, so the PNV moved to the left. By February 1936 the two parties were clearly on different sides; in this final electoral confrontation between Spain and anti-Spain, the PNV stood alone.[92] Although the Carlists retained some residual support, the majority of Basque Catholics voted for the PNV. Such unanimity was not apparent in Catalonia—which had far lower levels of religious practice—despite similarities between the two regional churches. After 1931 most Catalan Catholics, including Cardinal Vidal, supported the Lliga Regionalista, a conservative nationalist grouping whose deputies voted with the right on religious questions and with the left on regional ones. Established in an age of faction rather than party, the Lliga never fully succeeded in defining a modern role for itself.[93] The
p. 117 popular vote was taken by the broad left Esquerra ↳ Republicana, which enjoyed a hegemony in Catalan politics lasting as long as the Republic.

The perceived inadequacies of the archaic Lliga, together with the secularism of the Esquerra, led to the foundation of the Unió Democrática de Catalunya (UDC) in November 1931. The UDC had very little electoral strength. Its single parliamentary affiliate, Manuel Carrasco i Formiguera, had been elected for the Esquerra and was not returned when he stood for the UDC in November 1933. Only Pau Romeva, a deputy in the Catalan regional assembly, the Generalitat, successfully fought an election for the UDC. Yet, despite these very real limitations, the party represented a new development in Catholic politics. It was not explicitly confessional, nor was it founded to defend the Church against the Republic, a task the Lliga had claimed as its own. Rather, the new grouping was nationalist, democratic, and republican, standing on a platform of autonomy, liberty, and social reform—including recognition of the legitimate rights of the Church.[94]

The UDC and PNV were most sharply differentiated from their Castilian counterparts by their acceptance of democratic pluralism. Both parties, of course, belonged to regional subcultures, which, particularly in their use of local languages, already demanded the recognition of cultural pluralism in Spain. The UDC fostered the use of Catalan, and looked outside Spain for its intellectual inspiration. The party's founders were inspired, not only by early Catalan nationalists like Bishop Torras i Bages and Joan Maragall, but also by G. K. Chesterton—whose collected works were translated by Romeva—and the French Thomist thinkers Jacques Maritain and Emmanuel Mounier.

These intellectual influences were also apparent in José Bergamín's Madrid journal, *Cruz y Ray a*, which first appeared in April 1933 and whose ideological frame of reference was much wider than was commonly seen in Spanish Catholic publications of the time. It featured work by Chesterton—in Azaña's translation—, Pablo Neruda, and Luigi Sturzo while, most importantly, the journal acted as a Spanish forum for Mounier's *Esprit* group. *Cruzy Raya's* political concerns were equally unusual: from its pages, Bergamin mounted a fierce attack on the repression that followed the Asturias revolt while other columnists condemned Nazism, commenting particularly on the attraction it seemed to have for so many Spanish Catholics.[95] In contrast to the ideas of *raza* and *hispanidad* being developed by right-wing ideologues,[96] or the belief in Basque lineage, first articulated by the xenophobic Sabino Arana, which still informed much Basque political thought, *Cruz y Raya* condemned racism as unchristian and immoral. The editors' philosophical and cultural concerns were thus far removed from those found in the anti-Semitic right-wing circles which dominated Catholic politics under the Republic.

p. 118 Unsurprisingly, those few Catholics who stayed loyal to the government in the Civil War belonged to precisely these pluralist, republican groups. The PNV and the UDC were the only Catholic political parties to remain with the Republic, and the Basques provided the legitimate government with its only significant popular Catholic support. Theirs was not an easy decision.[97] The first weeks of the war had seen the unleashing of a fearful wave of anticlerical violence which was to cost the lives of 13 bishops, 4,184 diocesan priests, and 2,648 religious—283 of them female.[98] Despite republican claims to the contrary, these men and women were killed simply because of the office they held. Most were murdered, in the first days of fighting, by hit-squads whose activities ceased as the government regained control of law and order. But, the infamous Paracuellos massacres of November 1936—when the gaols of Madrid were emptied in the belief that the city was about to fall—claimed the lives, not only of José Gafo, but also of the Brothers of St John of God who had cared for the inmates of the region's mental asylum. Church property was desecrated; the bodies of nuns were disinterred and displayed on the streets of Barcelona; the towering statue of the Sacred Heart on the Cerro de los Angeles was ritually executed by a republican firing squad.[99] In the face of such atrocities, it is hardly surprising that Catholics became bitter opponents of the Republic. Some Catalan clergymen, for instance, were forced to conclude that the Republic was their persecutor, even though they had voted for it in 1931.[100].

Not all churchmen who reached this conclusion perceived Franco as their saviour. Vidali Barraquer, for instance, had been smuggled out of Catalonia in grave danger from the violence which claimed the life of his auxiliary bishop, but later refused to sign the collective pastoral letter drawn up by Cardinal Gomá y Tomás which roundly declared that God was on Franco's side.[101] Only Bishop Múgica of Vitoria had joined Vidal in refusing to endorse the July letter. A conservative prelate, who had been exiled by the Republic, Múgica was sympathetic to Basque nationalist aspirations and had been horrified by the execution of fourteen Basque priests by insurgent troops in October 1936.

In quantitative terms, fourteen priests are scarcely significant when compared to the 6,845 priests and religious killed by the other side. But, none the less, shooting ordained Catholic clergy is a curious activity for those fighting in the name of God. Mugica's gradual disillusionment with Franco's crusade was not unique. The massacre of Republican prisoners at Badajoz in August 1936, the sustained repression of dissidents in the Nationalist zone, above all the bombings of the Basque towns of Durango and Guernica, led

some Catholics to distance themselves from, and even to condemn, the Nationalist cause. In Spain, Ossorio y Gallardo and Bergamín were among those protesting at massacres shrouded in incense. They were joined
p. 119 by the ↳ French writers Mauriac and Bernanos, as well as Jacques Maritain, who insistently rejected neo-Thomist identifications of Franco's crusade with Aquinas's 'just war' Though less influential, the English voices of Greene and Attwater were among those raised in protest at the Condor Legion's indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets. This spectrum of dissident opinion encompassed both antipathy towards Franco and active support for the Republic.[102] Its small, and often stifled, dissident voice was crying in the wilderness in the 1930s but was to inherit the kingdom after the 1960s.

In 1936, however, the great majority of Catholics acclaimed Franco as the paladin of their Church, protecting Christendom from the ravages of communism. In Spain, this majority was overwhelming. With the outbreak of hostilities, true Spaniards could once again look forward to the day when a Catholic head of state would wield the absolute authority conferred by outright victory. In Cardinal Gomá's words, '[t]he war cannot be ended by compromise, by arrangement, or by reconciliation…Pacification is only possible by arms.'[103] Franco's crusade was a war of conquest; territory was taken, but the cost was heavy and, as in all wars, the price was paid by the young. Boys abandoned their Catholic youth groups for the militias; girls forsook philanthropy for voluntary war work. In general, they took up their duties with enthusiasm, convinced that they were part of God's purpose. A new society was being forged by the war: even at the front, young soldiers were exhorted to conduct themselves as 'armed apostles', observing a minute's prayer for the dead, for instance, rather than the 'emptiness' of a minute's silence. These new crusaders were to be 'the most valiant, the most obedient', worthy heirs to the mantle of St James the Moor-slayer.[104]

Those who fell were not simply heroes, they were martyrs. Their names became litanies, their lives, the stuff of pious legend. The last moments of the clergy killed in the revolutionary violence of July and August were recounted—and minutely illustrated—by hagiographers, as was the physical damage inflicted on ecclesiastical buildings.[105] Yet, out of suffering came redemption. Spain would be purified by the blood of its martyrs who were, in the words of one young nun, the 'living stones' of the new monument the Heart of Jesus was building in Spain.[106] For this young woman, daughter of a fiercely integrist family, the social reign of Jesus Christ was becoming a reality. In those, largely Traditionalist, circles nurtured on apocalyptic prophecies and visions—such as those that occurred in the Basque village of Ezquioga in 1931—the Crusade had a clearly millenarian purpose.

p. 120 Though integrist millenarianism was the province of a minority of Spanish Catholics, the determination to construct a new, post-war society was universal. Like all civil wars, the Spanish conflict was a vicious, fratricidal struggle to determine the future shape of the nation. In the Republican zone, Franco's crusaders saw a competing and antithetical vision of society: the anti-Spain which had to be extirpated if the true Spain were to flourish. Secularism and party politics were consigned to the past as Franco marched victorious into Madrid in April 1939, once again asserting the triumphant existence of the Catholic nation. Spanish Catholics attended mass rosaries rather than mass rallies, celebrating their *caudillo*' triumph with Te Deums in every church in the land. The ancient hymn of thanksgiving rang out again when Franco was anointed, at the hands of the cardinal primate, in a ceremony of consecration which combined the medieval liturgy of the kings of Castile with devotion to the Christ of Lepanto, at whose feet Franco's sword was laid.[107] Centuries of Christian history apparently culminated in the *caudillo*, whose reign would ensure the preservation of the Spanish Church. Secure in the new identification of Church and State, Spanish Catholics abandoned politics, often with relief. Even the Propagandists now eschewed the public world of politics: Herrera Oria had entered a seminary and Gil Robles was an exile in Portugal. The ultimate failure of their tactic under the Republic had traumatized the ACNdeP; the new president, Fernando Martin-Sanchez Julia, vowed that he would 'not join any political party nor occupy any public office'.[108]

Paradoxically, the Franco regime represented both the end and the culmination of the Catholic political option. Certainly, Catholic political parties were banned along with all others, but the party strategy had

only ever been adopted as an emergency measure against the Second Republic. Carlists and Falangists were forcibly merged into the Francoist 'Movement', much against the will of their leaders. Most members, however, happily gave Franco their fervent support as did virtually all others who had long yearned for the reassertion of the Catholic nation. State service now replaced party loyalty: whatever their original political affiliation, Franco's bureaucrats, administrators, publicists, and ministers were all Catholics.[109]

During the first decades of the Franco regime, Catholicism was the common currency of its adherents. Some Catholics were particularly loyal servants: eleven members of the ACNdeP held cabinet posts during the war and its immediate aftermath, doing much to ameliorate the international ostracism which followed the Second World War. While Spain was reviled as a pro-fascist power, the Propagandists forged links with foreign Catholic groups in a systematic attempt to improve Spain's standing abroad. For example, Pax Romana—an international Church organization originally founded by Martín-Sánchez Juliá—was persuaded to hold a congress in Spain as early as 1945. Some historians, notably Javier Tusell, have
p. 121 restricted the Catholic label to precisely these groups of Propagandists, working to bring Spain ↳ back to the international fold.[110] Not only did their efforts help to rehabilitate the regime but their contacts with the outside world also brought some of them—particularly Joaquín Ruíz Giménez—into the Christian democratic current which dominated the post-war mainstream of Catholic politics in Europe. Yet, the Spanish Church's utter reliance on State protection re-emerged in the 1940s and 1950s just as strongly as under the Restoration. Far from being a dissident tendency within the early Franco regime, Propagandist diplomats—among them Joaquin Ruiz Giménez—negotiated the 1953 Concordat with the papacy, which not only confirmed Spain's return to the international community but also marked the high point of post-Civil War Church-State relations.[111]

The Concordat began by recognizing Catholicism's unique and privileged position in Spain. The Church was to be the moral guide of the new state, and was exempted, to a certain extent, from its censors. In return, Franco retained anachronistic presentation rights in regard to the Spanish episcopate. The identification of Church and State was completed to the satisfaction of all parties. Far from being simply a pseudo-fascist embarrassment, Spain had been recognized as a truly Catholic nation—the 'spiritual reserve of the West'. In this sense, the Concordat was the culmination of the rechristianization campaigns that had swept post-war Spain. The first aim had been to make good the enormous physical damage sustained by the Spanish Church during the war: desecrated chapels were scrubbed by pious volunteers—some refusing to yield the task to 'Marxist' prisoners—, works of art were returned to religious buildings, and liturgical items were donated by foreign congregations.[112] New recruits flocked into the depleted seminaries, while mission fathers, often Jesuits, travelled the country reconverting lapsed communities.[113] These intense and emotional visitations would culminate in a spectacular, if shortlived, display of popular religiosity. A similar effect was achieved in the mass pilgrimages of the time: one went to offer the blood of '7,000 martyrs of the Crusade' to the Virgin of the Pillar, spiritual patron of the Reconquest, another led 18,000 pilgrims to Franco's birthplace, El Ferrol del Caudillo, while regular homages were paid to the Sacred Heart on the Cerro de los Angeles, rebuilt immediately after the war.[114]

Any notion that Catholicism and 'Spanishness' were not synonymous was stifled by this surge of liturgical triumphalism. The faithful were urged to rechristianize every aspect of Spanish life, thereby finally creating
p. 122 a totally Catholic society. ↳ Republican legislation on divorce, civil marriage, and lay education was all repealed as, of course, was the Catalan wartime statute on abortion. Campaigns for the moralization of contemporary society dominated post-war Catholic activity, particularly among women.[115] Self-sacrificing, modest, and devout, the true Christian woman was to ensure morality and piety, first in her family and then in society at large. Her greatest task was that of motherhood: she was exhorted to create Christian families, to foster vocations among her sons and to reinstate traditional pious practices. Church and State worked together on pronatalist campaigns which would restock the race, make good the awful damage inflicted by the war, and allow women to find true fulfilment.[116]

Under Franco, and in marked contrast to the Republican period, Catholic women were confined firmly to the domestic sphere. Within six months of its first issue in 1941, even *Medina*, the Falangist women's magazine, had eschewed ideological comment for beauty tips. Though most pronounced—and earliest—among women, this political anaesthetization was soon apparent among the whole population.[117] Though partly a response both to the still-vivid memory of the war and the hunger and privation which followed, this alienation from the political process also reflected the brutal fact that Franco's new state, complete with rechristianization project, depended upon vicious repression.

Franco's victory speech had warned that the spirit of the 'anti-Spanish revolution' still breathed in 'many a breast': 'We welcome to our camp all who have repented and wish to collaborate in the greatness of Spain; but if they sinned yesterday they must not expect applause until they redeem themselves by deeds.'[118] In fact, erstwhile sinners were redeemed by imprisonment, exile, and, not infrequently, death. Prisoners were 'spiritually cultivated': Women's Catholic Action established a subsection for prison visitors while the Society of Jesus provided chaplains for many gaol camps.[119] In this systematic policy of repression, which lasted into the 1960s, the danger of recidivism was constantly emphasized, not least by references to the international conspiracy of Marxists, Masons, and Jews. The struggle of Spain and anti-Spain continued; peace had merely brought a change of front.[120]

As this good fight was no longer to be waged in the political sphere, Catholics looked to other areas, most notably education. The Francoist education law of 1938 recognized Church schools and ensured that state schooling would be Catholic. In 1943 religious education was even made compulsory for university students.
p. 123 This ↳ Catholicizing of the Spanish education system was only made possible by the purging of all Republican and otherwise unsuitable teachers. The challenge of meeting the resulting shortfall in an already inadequate service was undertaken by various Catholic groups, including the Propagandists, who set about the conquest of university chairs with their customary assiduity and achieved their customary success, most notably in law. The project of élite formation continued, although new cohorts were now formed by professors rather than politicians: the ACNdeP organized a university section in 1942 and opened its first *colegio mayor*—a students' residence with some teaching and pastoral functions—in Madrid in 1950.[121] This colonization of higher education continued unabated, but the ACNdeP did not find the field free for very long. New competitors were emerging, notably that most characteristic organization of post-war national Catholicism, Opus Dei.

Nominally established in 1928, Opus Dei only emerged in its public form after the Civil War. While its aims were, in some respects, similar to those of the ACNdeP, the Opus represented both a new model of lay Catholicism and a new form of the religious life, becoming known as a Secular Institute.[122] Though the membership included priests—and two categories, *numerarii* and *oblati*, enjoined celibacy—the Opus was primarily concerned with the secular sphere. Its tenets were set out in *El c amino (The Way;* 1939), a handbook of maxims penned by the founder, José María Escrivá. Most members, the *supernumerarii*, did not live in community but were free to marry and lead family lives, though they were reminded that such an option was Tor the foot-soldiers, not for the General Staff of Christ'.[123] All members were exhorted to pious, unquestioning obedience and, notoriously, to 'discretion'.[124] *La obra* combined child-like pietism and theological conservatism with professional training and an enthusiasm for business. All members were expected to enter education and many had higher degrees, often in scientific subjects. Like the ACNdeP, the Opus was to provide leaders; unlike the Propagandists, however, some *opusdeistas* lived in community and all took vows. Moreover, the constitutions, membership, and inner workings of the Opus were all veiled from public scrutiny.[125]

Like the ACNdeP, the Opus launched its bid to form the lay leaders of post-war Spain from the universities. Members of both associations competed for professorial posts under rules which favoured governmental candidates. The Opus opened *colegios mayores* all over Spain and in 1952 founded an institute of higher education in Navarre, recognized as a university in 1961–2.[126] Opus Dei did not, however, restrict itself to

p. 124 academic leadership. Indeed, its preferred fields were vocational and ↳ technical: the University of Navarre became distinguished for business studies and journalism. Individual members achieved notable success in business and commerce and, although the Opus strenuously denied constructing a financial empire, a syndicate of Opus Dei members took control of the Banco Popular Español in the early 1950s and, in the same decade, built up a substantial publishing empire. When Opus Dei ministers finally entered Franco's government in 1957, it was on a specific programme of state-controlled economic modernization.

Of all Catholic institutions, the Opus Dei was most closely associated with the Franco regime. Categorized by the German theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar as the most important repository of modern integrism, the Opus remained faithful to a regime its members clearly found congenial.[127] The *generalisimo's* penultimate prime minister and appointed successor, Admiral Carrero Blanco, was widely recognized as an Opus fellow-traveller. Indeed, the Institute proved a fruitful source of politicians and public figures throughout Franco's lengthy rule and, unlike other Catholic bodies, never became a source of dissidents.

The same could not be said of the Opus's rivals in the Society of Jesus, nor of its precursor, the ACNdeP. Even in the immediate post-war years, when Francoist triumphalism was at its height, some Propagandists were dissidents. José Antonio Aguirre, ex-president of the short-lived Basque Republic, was, of course, in exile, as was Gil Robles, who did not return from Portugal until 1953. Returning to his monarchist roots after the war, Gil Robles attempted to construct a conservative anti-Franco opposition around the Bourbon pretender, Don Juan. Gil Robles's antipathy to Franco, though genuine, was undoubtedly related to his own thwarted political ambitions; far from embracing democracy, his proposed corporative constitutional monarchy was inspired by Salazar's dictatorship.[128] Within Spain, Gimenez Fernandez also drew away from his initial, unquestioning support for Franco. As with Gil Robles, personal experience had taken its toll. Immediate adhesion to the crusade had not persuaded the local Falange that Giménez Fernández had abandoned his idiosyncratic brand of republicanism; only General Queipo de Llano's intervention saved him from the firing squad. Critical of the hollowness of triumphalism, Giménez developed his own rapidly evolving political thought in response to papal encyclicals and the work of foreign theologians, including Maritain and Mounier. As his opposition to the dictatorship crystallized, so did his commitment to democracy and in 1957 the ex-CEDA minister finally accepted the leadership of a small Christian democrat party.[129]

Earlier in the same decade, some Catholic intellectuals—among them the Propagandist José Luis Aranguren
p. 125 —had begun exploring the concepts of political and ↳ cultural pluralism, particularly in the context of Spanish history.[130] The ACNdeP had never abandoned dialogue: the study circle at Alcoy had discussed Cardinal Gomá's pastoral 'The lessons of war and the duties of peace' even after it had been banned by the government.[131] Similarly, as minister of education after 1951, Ruiz-Giménez used his position to liberalize the universities, introducing appointment criteria similar to those employed under the Second Republic and elevating Pedro Laín Entralgo—whose scholarly work was committed to cultural heterogeneity—to the rectorship of Madrid University. These early signs of intellectual dissent took on a political complexion after February 1956, when a skirmish between Falangist and anti-Falangist students at Madrid University led to police intervention. In the aftermath of this first instance of bourgeois protest against the regime, Ruíz-Giménez was removed from office.

The year gave its name to the so-called 'generation of 56', that age-cohort which had not fought the civil war but which nevertheless lived in its shadow. Reared amid the suffocating orthodoxies of crusade Catholicism, these young men and women were to be profoundly attracted by the universal Church headed by John XXIII.[132] In 1956, however, the innovations of French pastoral practice and German theology were largely unknown in Spain. The national Church was intensely insular. Its history was that of the crusade: on the eve of the Second Vatican Council most Spanish bishops were over 75 years old and 90 per cent had been ordained before 1936.[133] In contrast, the clergy was among the youngest in the world.

It is no coincidence that those Catholics who first seemed uncomfortable with the conformities of national Catholicism were those with links outside Spain. It was while in Rome as ambassador to the Holy See from 1948–51 that Ruíz Giménez realized that Spanish Catholicism was merely a province of the universal Church: 'there were other, far more open, ways of living as a Catholic'.[134] Others were reaching the same conclusion. Lili Alvarez, a former Wimbledon champion and the only woman to feature prominently in this early debate, had pleaded that priests cease to treat the laity as 'little children, in need of continuing tutelage'.[135] Yet, despite these early critics the impetus for *aggiornamento* came from outside the national Church. The summoning of the Second Vatican Council in January 1959, the publication of *Mater et Magistra* in 1961, and, particularly, the opening of the first session of the Council in October 1962, initiated an extraordinary period of *apertura* (opening) in the Spanish Church. The resonance of Vatican II could not be muffled by state censors; starved of change, and greedy for news, the 'generation of 56' fell upon conciliar pronouncements, particularly *Pacem in Term* (1963), as manna in the desert.[136]

p. 126 Yet, the appetite for change which was so apparent among these Spanish Catholics was very much the product of their own experience. Many were concerned with what they perceived as a discrepancy between rhetoric and reality. Ruíz Giménez's time at the ministry of education, for example, had shown him that, despite promises of reconstruction, there was no money to build schools and little interest in doing so.[137] Similar concerns were voiced by those involved in pastoral work at a less exalted level, particularly among the young activists in the JOC (Catholic Workers' Youth) and HOAC (Workers' Brotherhoods of Catholic Action). Always concerned with social issues, these increasingly militant organizations were involved in wage disputes and strike action from the early 1950s. This stance brought JOC and HOAC into direct conflict with the State, particularly as their activists became increasingly vocal critics of human rights abuses and the lack of social justice in Spain.[138] At the same time, Catholic sociologists, influenced by the French school of Gabriel Le Bras, were finding that, despite the years of rechristianization, the missions, the pilgrimages, and the triumph of the Catholic arms of Franco, the Spanish working class was as indifferent or as hostile to religion as ever. In 1955, an early survey of the Catalan textile town of Mataro found that a mere 14 per cent of workers were practising Catholics and only 5 per cent attended Sunday mass. As one lay commentator pointed out, after years of effort, Spain had proved not to be different after all.[139]

In the late 1950s and early 1960s concern at the real state of Spanish Catholicism became more widespread. Sociological surveys, pastoral concerns, and the biblical emphasis of the post-1945 liturgical movement combined to make many Spaniards conscious of the shortcomings of their national Church. This was particularly true in Catalonia and the Basque Country, where clandestine nationalist sentiment was a potent force. The great Benedictine abbey at Montserrat emerged as a focus for Catalan nationalism from the late 1950s while, in the Basque Country, an increasingly radical secular clergy began on a path of opposition which was soon to lead to confrontation with the State.[140] The separatist terrorist group ETA had developed out of Catholic youth groups; many of its members were known to those priests who sheltered them or refused to co-operate with the security forces searching for them.

Yet, taking Spain as a whole, full-scale dissent only truly emerged in response to Vatican II. As Ruíz Giménez remembered, abandoning Franco's regime was very difficult for those who recalled the anticlerical horrors of the Civil War. He resolved this personal 'crisis of conscience' only while a lay observer at the
p. 127 Council.[141] In effect, a higher authority had undermined many of the basic tenets of Francoism and, ↳ like many of his contemporaries, Ruíz-Giménez responded with a call for dialogue, both within and without the Church. In 1963 he founded the journal *Cuadernospara el Diálogo (Notes towards Dialogue*) which, although published in Paris, became an important forum in Spain's cultural transition. The new periodical was intended [c]to facilitate the communication of ideas and feelings between men of different generations, beliefs and basic attitudes'; its editorial stance was 'open, progressive, in the postconciliar tradition... respecting the religious liberty of all men'. In a word, this new intellectual forum, open to Catholics and non-Catholics alike, was democratic.[142]

In the 1960s important sectors of the Spanish Church finally embraced the notion of plurality. The idea of religious liberty was hardly revolutionary to North American Catholics, nor, perhaps, to their northern European cousins, but in Spain, before the conciliar deliberations leading up to *Dignitatis Humanae* (1965), such a notion was simply unthinkable. Of all the conciliar decrees and constitutions, this ruling on religious freedom had the most impact. Generations of Spanish Catholics had fought—with words, with votes, and eventually with arms—for an absolute and unique truth. In the words of the Jesuit periodical *Aún*, 'until now we have won our battles by eliminating the adversary or ignoring him. From now on we will have to win them by recognizing and accepting him. And we will have to see in him the dignity of a son of God.'[143]

Aún greeted the new developments, particularly the much-vaunted process of dialogue, with palpable excitement. It called for ecumenical dialogue within the Church and opened a formal discussion in its pages on the conduct of the Spanish bishops in Rome. The world, according to the editorial column, 'had been opened to dialogue'. Some columnists, notably Eduardo Manrique, even looked to open the way for a dialogue with communism, a project which had already been undertaken in practice by various militants in JOC and HOAC.[144] Indeed, as Alfonso Comín recognized in an article in November 1965, talking to communists seemed simpler than talking to conservative Catholics.[145] Wide-ranging though the post-conciliar project of dialogue was, it always failed to encompass the right, *as Aún* found out to its cost the following year when a special issue calling for dialogue with the episcopate led to its closure by the State. Targeting the concepts of authority and obedience had brought these turbulent priests up against the limits of dialogue in Franco's Spain.

Throughout this time *of apertura*, some sections of the Spanish Church kept their ears closed. While some members of religious orders, especially Jesuits and Dominicans, travelled the long way from crusade to council, others remained faithful to their *caudillo*, who was himself genuinely convinced that Vatican II was the work of Freemasons. Not all Spanish Catholics had greeted news of the council with enthusiasm:
p. 128 Women's Catholic Action, for instance, had declared that it was a 'question for ↳ the Hierarchy and theologians' in which the faithful had simply to wait 'with a spirit of submission'.[146] Many Spanish Catholics felt no need to look beyond the certainties of national Catholicism. At its most extreme, this loyalty to the past led to the bizarre schism of the self-styled 'Gregory XVII' at the apparition site of Palmar de Troya in Seville.[147] Very few Francoists, however, became schismatics. Most remained, like their political counterparts, in an ideological bunker defined by the divisions of the Civil War.

After Vatican II, the Spanish Church was broadly divided into traditionalists and critics. Franco's difficult relations with Pope Paul VI helped to accentuate this cleavage, which finally killed any surviving notions of political Catholicism. However strenuously those in the bunker denied it, the old absolutes were gone for ever. There was now no single Catholic position. Aware that sincerely religious men and women were to be found in all political groups, from the Falange to the underground communist party, Spanish Catholics largely gave up the attempt to define a particular political space for the Church. Ruíz Giménez even refused to use the term 'Christian democrat'; he was, he said, simply 'a Christian and…a democrat'.[148] By 1965 there was no longer a political Catholicism in Spain although, in the decade leading up to Franco's death in 1975, there were to be more political Catholics than ever before.

Notes

* I would like to thank Frances Lannon and Paul Hey wood for their comments on an earlier draft of this article.

1 A reference to the 'Great Promise'—that Christ's Sacred Heart would 'reign in Spain and with more veneration than in other countries'—revealed to Bernardo de Hoyos SJ in 1733. Quotations from 'Acto de Consagración al Sacratísimo Corazón de Jesús', repr. *Boletin Eclesidstico del Obispado de Salamanca* (1936), 204.

2 The Carlists were originally the followers of Don Carlos, pretender to the throne of Isabella II (1833–68). By the end of the Second Carlist War (1872–6), support for this counter-revolutionary cause was largely confined to Navarre; it survived into

the 20th cent, as a regional movement, until revived in the 1930s. See M. Blinkhorn, *Carlism and Crisis in Spain 1931–1939* (Cambridge, 1975), 10.1017/CBO9780511561047 ch. 1

3 See F. Lannon, *Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy: The Catholic Church in Spain 1875–1975 (Oxford*, 1987), ch. 1.

4 Duocastella found that in 1962 in the Basque diocese of Vitoria, 84.2% of men as well as 86.3% of women attended Sunday mass, 'Géographic de la practique religieuse', *Social Compass*, 12 (1965). Anthropological observers have, however, regularly commented on women's greater readiness to receive the sacraments, even in northern Spain, e.g. W. Christian, *Person and God in a Spanish Valley* (rev. edn.; Princeton, 1989), S. Tax Freeman, *Neighbors: The Social Contract in a Castilian Hamlet* (Chicago, 1970), and C. Lisón Tolosana *Belmonte de los Caballeros* (repr. Princeton, 1983).

5 D. Benavides Gomez, *Elfracaso social del catolicistno español* (Barcelona, 1973), 529–31. For Vallecas in the 1930s see the account by the incumbent,F Peiró, *El problema religioso-social en España* (Madrid, 1936). Other figures from A. Shubert, *A Social History of Modern Spain* (London, 1990), 151; 10.4324/9780203421215 Lannon, *Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy*, 16–17.

6 Quoted E. de Vargas-Zúñiga, 'El problema religioso en España I', *Razóny Fe* (1935).

7 There is a succinct account of Catholic unionism in Benjamin Martin, *The Agony of Modernization: Labor and Industrialization in Spain* (Ithaca, NY, 1990), ch. 6; Lannon, *Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy*, ch. 6 places the unions in their wider church context.

8 A. Shubert, *The Road to Revolution in Spain: The Coal Miners of Asturias 1860–1934* (Illinois, 1987), 113–14; id., 'Entre Arboleya y Comillas: El fracaso del sindicalismo católico en Asturias', in *Octubre 1934: Cincuenta añospara la reflexión* (Madrid, 1985), 243–52; J. Andres-Gallego, *Pensamiento y acción social de la Iglesia en España* (Madrid, 1984), 321–7; Benavides Gómez, *El fracaso social*, 44–53 emphasizes the Jesuits' hostility to independent unionism.

9 See C. Winston, *Workers and the Right in Spain* (Princeton, 1985) and, more widely, J. J. Castillo, *El sindicalismo amarillo en España* (Madrid, 1977).

10 J. P. Fusi, *El Pais Vasco: Pluralismo y nacionalidad* (Madrid, 1984), 43–60; id., *Politica obrera en el Pais Vasco* (Madrid, 1975), esp. 193–203.

11 *Rerum Novarum*, **§ 14, § 16, §43; see also** *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931).

12 *Rerum Novarum*,**§47**.

13 J. Cuesta, *Sindicalismo católico agrario en Espańa (1917–1919)* (Madrid, 1978); J. J. Castillo, *Propietarios muy pobres: Sobre la subordinación politica del pequeño campesino en Espańa (La Confederación Nacional Católico-Agraria, 1917–1942*) (Madrid, 1979).

14 See J. A. Lacomba Avellán, *La crisis española de 7917* (Madrid, 1970).

15 R. Carr, *Spain 1808–1975* (2nd edn.; Oxford, 1982), ch. 12; M. Suárez Cortina, *El reformismo en España* (Madrid, 1986).

16 J. Tusell, *Historia de la democracia cristiana* (2 vols.; Madrid, 1974), i. 55–7,104; Benavides Gómez, *Democracia y cristianismo en la España de la Restauración 1875–1931* (Madrid, 1978), 359; see also O. Alzaga, *La primera democracia cristiana en España* (Madrid, 1973), 120–3.

17 Issued on 7 July. 1919 and discussed in Tusell, *Historia de la democracia cristiana*, i. 100–4.

18 H. Jedin (ed.), *The Church in the Industrial Age* (London, 1981), 233–45,473–6; Tusell reckons that only the radical clerics Arboleya and Ibeas were democrats in the political sense, *Historia de la democracia cristiana* i. 103.

19 Interview with G. Fernández quoted Alzaga, *La primera democracia cristiana*, 14; on Alzaga's political career, see P. Preston, *The Triumph of Democracy in Spain* (London, 1986), 209–10.

20 J. M. Gil Robles, *Lafea través de mi vida* (Madrid, 1975), 82–4. The 'heterogeneity of the com ponent elements' led him later to see the PSP's demise as inevitable, ibid. 87–8.

21 Alzaga, *La primera democracia cristiana*, 149; Tusell, *Historia de la democracia cristiana*, i. 107,114; *El Debate*, 19 June 1923. Carlist collaborators with the PSP were followers of the corporatist thinker Juan Vazquez de Mella: Blinkhorn *Carlism and Crisis*, 21–7, 35–6.

22 Reports of PSP rallies, *El Debate*, 24 Mar., 11 May, 19 June 1923. Ossorio's prominence in the PSP was especially mistrusted by Herrera Oria: Gil Robles, *La fe a través de mi vida*, 85; Tusell, *Historia de la democracia cristiana*, 112.

23 M. Azaña, *Obras completas* (4 vols.; Mexico, 1966–8), i. 481–3. Ossorio, in contrast, remained in opposition.

24 *El Debate*, 22,23,25 Sept.; 2 Oct. 1923.

25 Ibid., 14 Sept. 1923.

26 See S. Ben-Ami, *Fascism from Above: The Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain* (Oxford, 1983), 102–8.

27 J. L. Gómez Navarro, *El régimen de Primo de Rivera* (Madrid, 1991), 207–60; Ben-Ami, *Fascism from Above*, 129–60.

28 Quoted Tusell, *Historia de la democracia cristiana*, i. 121–2; see also Gil Robles, *Lafe a través de mi vida*, 88.

29 A. Ayala, *Formación de selectos* (Madrid, 1940), 407–8, quoted G. Hermet, *Los católicos en la España franquista* (2 vols.; Madrid, 1985), i. 249.

30 A. Herrera Oria, 'En la muerte del Padre Ayala', *Obras* (Madrid, 1963), 840–9; memoirs of José Maria Gil Robles and Fernando Martin-Sánchez Juliá, quoted M. Fernández Areal, *La politica católica en España* (Madrid, 1970), 94–5.

31 A process examined in detail in J. L. Gómez-Navarro, 'Unión Patriótica: Análisis de un partido del poder', *Estudios de Historia Social*, 32–3 (1985).
32 Herrera's presidential address 1925, repr. *ACNdeP* (Boletin de la Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas) (1950), 459–60.
33 For the ideological development of the regime, see Ben-Ami, *Fascism from Above*, 174–89.
34 See M. Arboleya Martinez, *Sermón perdido* (Madrid, 1930).
35 See J. A. Aguirre y Lecube, *Entre la libertad y la revolución 1930–1935* (2nd edn.; Bilbao, 1976); Tusell, *Historia de la democracia cristiana*, ii. 13–18.
36 See R. Muntanyola, *Vidali Barraquer, el cardenal de la paz* (Barcelona, (1971); Ben-Ami, *Fascism from Above*, 199–202; J. Massot i Muntaner, *L'esglesia catalana entre laguerra i lapostguerra* (Barcelona, 1978), 10–12.
37 H. Raguer, *La Unió Democrática de Catalunya i el seu temps* (Montserrat, 1976), 37–8,80–1; Tusell, *Historia de la democracia cristiana*, ii. 127–38.
38 *El Debate*, 14 Feb., 12 Mar., 10 Apr. 1931.
39 Gil Robles, *La fe a través de mi vida*, 97–8.
40 *El Debate*, 14 Apr. 1931.
41 M. Batllori and V. M. Arbeloa, *Arxiu Vidali Barraquer: Església i Estat durant la Segona República Espanyola 1931–1936* (4 vols.; Montserrat, 1971–7), ii. 72–83.
42 *La Ciencia Tomista* (May/June 1931), 397–412.
43 e.g. *Ya*, 17 May 1959, reprod. in F. Areal, *La politica católica*, 99–100.
44 On the early weeks of the Republic, see P. Preston, *The Coming of the Spanish Civil War* (London, 1978), 27–34.
45 A. Herrera Oria, *Obras Selectas* (Madrid, 1963), 11–15; see also Leo XIII, *Immortale Dei* (1885), *Cum Multa* (1882), and *Au milieu des sollicitudes* (1893). Leonine political teaching is summarized in R. Aubert, *The Church in a Secularised Society* (London, 1978), 9–15,41–5.
46 'Catastrophists' were so-called because of their conviction that the regime would only be changed by catastrophic, i.e. violent, means.
47 *El Debate*, 15,21,29 Apr.; 7 May 1931.
48 e.g. the Carlist José María Lamamié de Clairac stood alongside accidentalists in Salamanca in all elections held under the Republic.
49 A. Lizarza Iribarren, *Memorias de la conspiración: Cómo sepreparó en Navarra la Cruzada, 1931–1936* (Pamplona, 1953); M. Blinkhorn, 'Right-Wing Utopianism and Harsh Reality: Carlism, the Republic and the "Crusade"', and P. Preston, 'Alfonsist Monarchism and the Coming of the Spanish Civil War', in M. Blinkhorn (ed.), *Spain in Conflict 1931–1939: Democracy and its Enemies* (London, 1986), 160–82, 183–205
50 A contrary view is **put** in R. A. H. Robinson, *The Origins of Franco's Spain: The Right, the Republic and Revolution, 1931–1936* (Newton Abbot, 1970); against Robinson, see Preston, *Coming of the Spanish Civil War*.
51 *La Estrella del Mar* (Organo de la Confederatión Mariana de España), 24 Aug. 1931, p. 427.
52 As was recognized by J. M. Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz* (Barcelona, 1968), 32–3.
53 With the rare exceptions of Sanchez-Albornoz and Nicolau d'Olwer.
54 *Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Constituyentes de la República Española* (Madrid, 1933), 664–6, 764–70, 951–2, 1528–36, 1548–55. See also F. de Meer, *La cuestion religiosa en las Cortes Constituyentes de la II República Española* (Pamplona, 1975) and Lannon, *Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy*, 181–6.
55 Maura resigned from the government on 14 Oct.; the three Catholic Esquerra deputies crossed the floor during the constitutional debates.
56 Preston, *Coming of the Spanish Civil War*, ch. 2, esp. pp. 35–6.
57 J. R. Monteiro, *La CEDA: El catolicismo social y politico en la II República* (2 vols.; Madrid, 1977), i. 656–708; see also the case study by M. Vincent, 'The Politicization of Catholic Women in Salamanca 1931–1936', in F Lannon and P. Preston (eds.), *Élites and Power in Twentieth-Century Spain* (Oxford, 1990), 107–26. Women were given the vote in the 1931 constitution.
58 Castillo, *Propietarios muy pobres*, 361–89; Preston, *Coming of the Spanish Civil War*, 30–41; and esp. A. Lopez López, *El hoicot de la derecha a las reformas de la Segunda República: La minoria agraria, el rechazo constitutional y la cuestión de la tierra* (Madrid, 1984), 153–207 on the opposition to art. 44 of the constitution, which allowed for the expropriation of property.
59 *Revista Social y Agraria*, 31 Oct. 1933.
60 'Reglamento del congreso de Derechas Autónomas de febrero-marzo de 1933', in Montero, *La CEDA*, ii. 618–21; see also 'Estatutos de la CEDA', ibid. 637–8.
61 'Programa votado por el primer congreso de la CEDA (febrero-marzo de 1933): Conclusiones aprobadas',ibid. 621–36.
62 *CEDA* (Organo de la Confederatión Española de Derechas Autónomas), 1 (20 May 1933).
63 Montero, *La CEDA*, 651–2; A. Viñas, *La Alemania nazi yel l8 de julio* (Madrid, 1974), 143–50.

64 *JAP* (Periódico quincenal de la JAP de Avila) and *La Gaceta Regional* (Salamanca), Nov. 1933 *passim*.

65 R. A. H. Robinson, 'The Parties of the Right and the Republic', in Carr (ed.), *The Republic and the Civil War in Spain* (London, 1971), 46–78, esp. 70.

66 Gil Robles, *Nofue posible la paz*, 199–200, id., *Lafe a través de mi vida*, 94–6; memoir of Giménez Fernandez given in C. Seco Serrano, 'Estudio Preliminar', in Gil Robles, *Discursos parlamentarios* (Madrid, 1971), p. xlix. See also E. Malefakis, *Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain* (New Haven, 1970), 347–63; Tusell, *Historia de la democracia cristiana*, i. 282–312.

67 Tusell, *Historia de la democracia cristiana*, i. 362–6; Preston, *Coming of the Spanish Civil War*, ch. 6; Montero, *La CEDA*, vol. ii, ch. 8.

68 Quoted I. Molas, *El sistema de partits politics a Catalunya (1931–1936)* (Barcelona, 1972), 38–9.

69 J. Becarud, 'La acción politica de Gil Robles (1931–36)', *Cuadernosde Ruedo Ibérico*, 28–9 (1970–1), 59–66.

70 e.g. various series of articles by Narciso Noguer SJ, *Razón y Fe*, Mar., May, June, Aug., Sept., Nov. 1934; May, July–Aug., Sept. 1935.

71 See e.g. the dialogue, 'JONS ¿Para qué?', between Eduardo Jiménez del Rey and the JONS leader Onesimo Redondo, *La Gaceta Regional* (Salamanca), 2,8, and 14 Dec. 1933 and the supplementary article, 'Los puntos de la FE son los nuestros', 3 Jan. 1934. Both Jiménez and Redondo were Propagandists.

72 e.g. those held El Escorial, Apr. 1934, and Uclés, May 1935;*JAP* (Organo nacional de las Juventudes de Acción Popular de España), 27 Oct. 1934, and 1 June 1935. Manifestos are given in Montero, *La CEDA*, ii. 642, and the 49 points' in Robinson, *Origins of Franco 's Spain*, 169–70.

73 Quoted Preston, *Coming of the Spanish Civil War*, 214.

74 *FE* (Organo de Falange Espanola), 1 Feb. 1934; *JAP*, 25 May 1935; *Arriba* (Seminario de la Falange), 13 June 1935.

75 Blinkhorn, 'The Iberian States', in Detlev Miilberger (ed.), *The Social Basis of European Fascist Movements* (London, 1987), 320–48.

76 Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, 196, 207–8; on his return from Germany, he had declared his admiration for fascism's 'youthful enthusiasm', 'Antidemocracia', *La Gaceta Regional* (Salamanca), 8 Sept. 1933.

77 *El Debate*, 14–17 Feb. 1934.

78 e.g. *La Gaceta Regional* (Salamanca), 15 Feb. 1934; see also *El Debate*, 11–14 Feb. 1934.

79 *El Debate*, 22,23 Dec. 1934; interview with Gil Robles, reproduced *JAP*, 24 Nov. 1934.

80 He had favoured suppressing the local branch of the socialist FNTT during an earlier strike in 1934; I am grateful to Dr Timothy Rees for this information.

81 J. Tusell and J. Calvo, *Giménez Fernández, precursor de la democracia española* (Seville, 1990), 38,44, 116.

82 Malefakis,*Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution*, 355; Tusell and Calvo, *Giménez Fernandez*, 99–100 and 162–5 on his deselection in Badajoz and difficulty in rinding another seat.

83 *JAP*, 24 Nov. 1934;27 Apr., 1 July 1935.

84 *Rerum Novarum*, §27, 59; *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931), §15, §127–9.

85 See e.g. Jiménez del Rey's editorials in *La Gaceta Regional* (Salamanca), 13,14 Oct.; 7 Dec. 1934.

86 *Quadragesimo Anno*, §81–7,91–8.

87 Tusell and Calvo, *Giménez Fernández*, 43,112.

88 Similarly, only in this context did some *cedistas* point to a lack of social content in the party pro gramme.

89 Tusell, *Historia de la democracia cristiana*, i. 357–9; Preston, *Coming of the Spanish Civil War*, 192–3; J. Avilés Farr;, *La izquierda burguesa en la II República* (Madrid, 1985), 305. Azaña dismissed Giménez Fernández as a 'conservador utópico,…destinado al fracaso y la soledad, sobre todo entre las clases con-sevadores',*Memorias politicas de guerra* (2 vols.; Barcelona, 1981), ii. 20.

90 R. Valls Montés, *La Derecha Regional Valenciana (1930–1936)* (Valencia, 1992).

91 *La Ciencia Tomista*, Sept. 1933, and Jan./Feb. 1934; R. A. H. Robinson, 'Calvo Sotelo's *Bloque Na clonal* and its manifesto', *University of Birmingham Historical Journal*, 10 (1966), 160–84.

92 Tusell, *Historia de la democracia cristiana*, ii. 106–19.

93 See I. Molas, *Lliga Catalana: Un estudi d'Estasiologia* (2 vols.; Barcelona, 1972).

94 Manifesto given in Raguer, *La Unió Democrática de Catalunya*, 89–92. See also ibid. 249–89; Tusell, *Historia de la democracia cristiana*, ii. 123–204.

95 *Cruzy Raya*, May and Aug. 1933; Feb., Oct., Nov. 1934.

96 Esp. Gimenez Caballero, *Genio de España* (Madrid, 1932); R. de Maeztu, *Defensa de la Hispanidad* (Madrid, 1934).

97 See J. de Iturralde (pseud.), *La guerra de Franco, los vascos y la iglesia* (San Sebastian, 1978).

98 A. Montero Moreno,*Historia de la persecution religiosa en España 1936–1939* (Madrid, 1961).

99 R. Fraser, *Blood of Spain* (London, 1979); R. Carr, *Images of the Spanish Civil War* (London, 1986).

100 F. Lannon, 'The Church's crusade against the Republic', in Preston (ed.), *Revolution and War in Spain*, 35–58.

101 J. Iribarren, *Documentos colectivos del episcopado español 1870–1974* (Madrid, 1974), 219–42.
102 A. Ossorioy Gallardo, *La guerra de España y los catolicos* (Buenos Aires, 1942); J. Bergamín, *Detrds de la cruz* (Mexico City, 1941); G. Bernanos, *Les Grands Cimetiéres sous la lune* (Paris, 1938); Maritain's introd. to A. Mendizabal, *Aux origines d'une tragedie* (Paris, 1837); *Tablet*, July–Aug. 1937. See also Lannon, 'The Church's Crusade against the Republic', 35–58.
103 Address to International Eucharistic Congress, Budapest (May 1938), quoted J. Chao Rego, *La iglesia en el franquismo* (Madrid, 1976), 35.
104 *Signo* (Organo de la Juventud de Acción Católica), 4 and 20 Nov. 1936.
105 e.g. A. Castro Albarrán, *La gran victima* (Salamanca, 1940).
106 M. T. Camarero–Nuñez, *Mi nombre nuevo* "*Magnificat*": *Maria del Pilar Lamamié de Chirac y Alanso ACJ 1915–1954* (Madrid, 1960), 193.
107 P. Preston, *Franco* (London, 1993), 330; *Tablet*, 3 June 1939.
108 *ACNdeP*, 224 (1938); see also F. Areal, *La política católica*, 96.
109 The only exceptions were those few Falangists inspired by national syndicalism.
110 J. Tusell, *Franco y los católicos* (Madrid, 1984).
111 G. Hermet, *Los católicos en la España franquista* (2 vols.; Madrid, 1985), ii. 197–242; Tusell, *Franco y los católicos*, 227–83. The Holy See's relations with Franco were more circumspect than the oft-cited public pronouncements may suggest, A. Marquina Barrio, *La diplomacia vaticana y la España de Franco (1936–1945)* (Madrid, 1983). Text of the Concordat given in R. García-Villoslada (ed.), *La iglesia en la España contemporánea* (Madrid, 1979), 755–70.
112 *ACNdeP*, 225, 227 (1938); *Tablet*, 22 and 29 Apr. 1939,25 May 1940.
113 Against a low point of *c* 7,500 in 1934, the number of seminarists rose to 16,317 in 1947,18,536 in 1951, and 24,179 in 1961, S. Aznar, *La revolución española y las vocaciones eclesiásticas* (Madrid, 1949), 74. The Jesuit province ofLeón organized 38 missions in 1931,64 in 1939,131 in 1941,and 174 in 1942, *Bodas de Plata de la Provincia de León SJ 1918–43* (n.p. [Lēon?], n.d. [1943?]).
114 *Signo*, 31 Aug. and 7 Sept. 1940; *Bodas de Plata de la Provincia de León SJ*. See also G. di Febo, *La santa de la raza* (Barcelona, 1988) and A. Oresanz, *Religiosidad Popular Espaéñol, 1940–1965* (Madrid, 1974).
115 See F. Blazquez, *La traición de los clérigos en la España de Franco: Crónica de una intolerancia (1936–1975)* (Madrid, 1991), 63–89.
116 *Senda* (Revista mensual del Consejo Superior de Mujeres de AC de España), 1–7 (1941), *passim;* M. Nash, 'Tronatalism and motherhood in Franco's Spain ', in G. Bock and P. Thane (eds.), *Maternity and Gender Politics* (London, 1991), 160–77.
117 A. López Piña and E. Aranguren, *La cultura política de la España de Franco* (Madrid, 1976), 63–72.
118 Speech broadcast 20 May 1939, text given *Tablet*, 27 May 1939.
119 e.g. Juan Lamamie de Clairac SJ was responsible for the 'spiritual cultivation' of a staggering 50,000 Republican prisoners in León, 1937–9. He was transferred, somewhat abruptly, in 1940: *Bodas de Plata de la Provincia de León SJ*.
120 See e.g. 'La cruzada no terminó con el último disparo', *Signo*, 12 Mar. 1939.
121 *ACNdeP*, 295 (1942); 449 (1950).
122 *Provida Mater Ecclesia* (1986)
123 *El Camino* (27th Sp. edn.; Madrid, 1973), maxim 28.
124 Ibid., maxims 53,457,614–29,639–56,832,941.
125 The 'secret' nature of the Opus has attracted much attention in a large and polemical literature. D. Artigues (pseud.), *El Opus Dei en España, 1928–62* (2nd edn.; Paris, 1971); J. Ynfante, *La prodigiosa aventura del Opus Dei: Génesis y desarrollo de la Santa Mafia* (Paris, 1970), and M. Walsh, *The Secret World of Opus Dei* (London, 1989) are all highly critical. In contrast, see D. Le Tourneau, *El Opus Dei* (1986) and R. Gómez Pérez, *El franquismo y la iglesia* (Madrid, 1986), 251–63, 300–1.
126 Artigues, *El Opus Dei*, 43–60; N. Cooper, *Catholicism and the Franco Regime* (London, 1975), 24–5, 27.
127 Quoted J. Georgel, *Elfranquismo: Historia y balance 1939–1969* (Paris, 1971), 201.
128 J. M. Gil Robles, *La monarquíapor la que yo luché: Páginasde un diario (1941–1954*) (Madrid, 1976). The, always very small, Catholic monarchist opposition is exhaustively studied in J. Tusell, *La oposicion democrática al franquismo* (Barcelona, 1977).
129 Tusell and Calvo, *Gimenez Fernández*, 225–85; Tusell, *La oposición democrática al franquismo*, 327–36; interview with Gimenez Fernández in S. Vilar, *La oposicion a la dictadura: Protagonistas de la España democrática* (Barcelona, 1976), 455–66.
130 See Blázquez, *La traición de los clerigos*, 120–5; E. Diaz, *Pensamiento español en la era de Franco (1939–1975)* (Madrid, 1983), 52–8,62–86.
131 *ACNdeP*, 274 (1941); *Tablet*, 21 Oct., 9 and 16 Nov. 1939.
132 C. Floristan, introd. to J. Chao Rego, *La iglesia en el franquismo* (Madrid, 1976), 15–16.
133 N. Cooper, *Catholicism and the Franco Regime* (London, 1975), 30.
134 Interview with Ruíz Giménez: Vilar, *La oposicion a la dictadura*, 404.

135 Alvarez, 'Examen de conciencia', *Senda*. 1958.

136 Lannon, *Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy*, 246–52; Diaz, *Pensamiento español*, 116–23. On the Vatican Council, see H. Jedin (ed.), *The Church in the Modern Age* (London, 1981), 96–151; Aubert, *The Church in a Secularised Society*, 624–38; W. M. Abbot (ed.), *The Documents of Vatican II* (London, 1967).

137 Interview in Vilar, *La oposición a la dictadura*, 410.

138 For an account by a protagonist, see J. Castaño i Colomer, *La JOC en España (1946–1970)* (Salamanca, 1977).

139 A. L. Marzal, 'España es diferente', *Cuadernos para el Diálogo*, 4 (1964).

140 Stanley Payne dates the beginning of clerical opposition to a protest letter of May 1960, signed by 339 Basque priests: Payne, *The Franco Regime 1936–1975* (Madison, Wisc, 1987), 500. See further,Lannon, *Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy*, 106–13.

141 Vilar, *La oposicion a la dictadura*, 409.

142 *Cuadernospara el Diálogo*, 1 (1963); Vilar, *La oposkión a la dictadura*, 415; Díaz, *Pensamiento español*, 112–5.

143 'Miedo a la libertad religiosa', Aún, 65 (1964).

144 *Aún*, 55 (1963), 57 and 58 (1964). On Catholic-Communist dialogue, see Manrique's articles, *Aún*, 52 (1963), 59 (1964); A. Comín, *Cristianos en el partido, comunistas en la iglesia* (Barcelona, 1977); S. Balfour, *Dictatorship, Workers and the City: Labour in Greater Barcelona since 1939* (Oxford, 1989), 22–30, 69–83.

145 'Un diálogo dificil', *Aún*, 68–9 (1965).

146 *Senda y Alba*, July 1959.

147 R. Perera, *Las creencias de los españoles: La tierra de María Santísima* (Madrid, 1990), 185–93.

148 Vilar, *La oposición a la dictadura*, 416.