Candidate Ideology and Vote Choice in the 2020 US Presidential Election*

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WORKING PAPER, COMMENTS WELCOME

Abstract

Canonical theories predict that moderate candidates perform better in general elections. 2020 Presidential election polling ostensibly challenges this prediction: Bernie Sanders performs as well as more moderate Democratic candidates in many head-to-head polls against Donald Trump. To understand this pattern, we analyze a large national survey we conducted ($n = 40,153$) with head-to-head questions between the leading Democratic candidates and Trump. In this data, approximately 11% of Democrats and Independents under 35 answer as if they will only turn out if Sanders is nominated but would not if a more moderate Democrat were nominated, increasing Sanders' estimated vote share against Trump. However, Trump *also* receives more votes in a head-to-head against Sanders than against more moderate Democrats: ≈2% of Republicans in this data answer as if they would vote for Trump if Sanders were nominated but not if a more moderate Democrat were nominated. As a result, we find that Sanders performs similarly to more moderate Democrats against Trump in our survey only when assuming that (1) young people vote at much higher rates than they usually do and (2) young Sanders supporters who claim they will only vote if he is nominated are answering accurately. However, when we do not make these assumptions and instead (1) weight our data to the 2016 electorate (downweighting young people) and (2) disregard self-reported turnout intentions by imputing votes to partisans who currently refuse to express a preference, the more moderate candidates win more votes against Trump than Sanders does by a statistically significant ≈2 percentage points. These patterns are robust to showing attacks against the Democratic candidates and in battleground states. These results raise caution about dismissing long-standing findings regarding more moderate nominees' electoral advantage based on Sanders' polling in the 2020 election.

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"I don't think there is any chance for [Bernie Sanders] to beat Donald Trump."

– Michael Bloomberg

"...We are the strongest campaign to defeat Donald Trump." – Bernie Sanders

Quotes from the February 19, 2020 Democratic debate

Canonical theories predict that moderate candidates will typically perform better than less moderate candidates in general elections (e.g., Downs 1957). Empirical research has generally supported this prediction (e.g., Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan 2002; Hall 2015). For example, Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan (2002, p. 133) find that Members of Congress who cast 3 to 4 additional high-profile votes aligned with the extreme of their party receive 1 to 3 percentage points (pp) fewer votes in the next election. Abramowitz likewise finds that Democratic US House candidates who supported Medicare For All in 2018 received approximately 2.2pp fewer votes than their peers in similar districts who did not.[1] However, whether moderate nominees are usually 'more electable' is far from settled, and reasonable skepticism remains (e.g., Cohen et al. 2016; Achen and Bartels 2016).

In this short paper we consider a prominent example that skeptics of moderates' electoral advantage have pointed to as important contrary evidence: many polls report that Bernie Sanders fares similarly well in head-to-head polls against Donald Trump as do Democratic candidates perceived as more moderate, such as Joe Biden, Michael Bloomberg, and Pete Buttigieg—if not better in some cases. Democratic primary voters appear to have absorbed what these polls indicate, as subsequent polls find that Democratic primary voters think Bernie Sanders is the candidate with the best chance of beating Donald Trump in the 2020 election.[2]

Evidence from one election will never provide a dispositive test of enduring theoretical

[1] See `http://centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/medicare-for-all-a-vote-loser-in-2018-u-s-house-elections/`. Abramowitz reports a vote margin difference, which we divide by 2 to calculate the implied vote share difference.

[2] See `https://www.newsweek.com/72-democratic-voters-believe-bernie-sanders-would-beat-trump-2020-election-new-poll-shows-1488010`.

predictions. However, this prominent case is significant, especially given the stark ideological differences between candidates such as Bernie Sanders and Michael Bloomberg. We more closely consider this case and whether the data in fact supports the conclusion that Bernie Sanders appears similarly "electable" despite being perceived as significantly less moderate.

Data

As part of surveys for other projects, we collected 40,153 unique survey responses during January – February 2020. In these surveys, we asked respondents how they would choose in a contest between Donald Trump and one of the Democratic nominees. We asked about the five leading Democratic contenders as of January 2020: Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, Joe Biden, Michael Bloomberg, and Pete Buttigieg. We asked each respondent about only one randomly selected Democratic candidate in order to limit strategic responding, resulting in approximately 8,000 observations per candidate. This large sample size allows us to detect shifts in candidate choices across Democratic candidates that, while small in absolute terms, could be enormously electorally consequential.

We conducted this survey using the online platform Lucid, which Coppock and McClellan (2019) validate as relatively nationally representative. We strongly caution against drawing firm conclusions about the absolute value of Trump's likely popular vote margin over Democrats' from this one online survey conducted early in the election season. However, the large size of its sample does allow us to make unusually precise comparisons between the Democratic candidates, especially as compared to typical national polls with under 1,000 responses.

In the survey, after other content for other studies, we first gave respondents a brief preamble about the upcoming election and asked how they would vote in a contest between Republican Donald Trump and a randomly selected one of the five leading Democratic candidates. If respondents said they were unsure or preferred a third party, we asked them if they leaned towards

Trump, leaned towards the Democrat, or were completely undecided. During the second half of our field period, we added a "would not vote" option.

We also conducted an experiment that allows us to check whether our findings would differ if respondents were shown attacks against the Democratic candidates. This allows us to investigate whether our answers might change were respondents more fully informed or exposed to the general election campaign. For respondents in an "Attacks Shown" condition, we showed some respondents attacks against the Democratic candidates before they selected between Trump and the Democratic candidates.[3] In the first half of the field period, we randomly sampled two of several attacks for each Democratic candidate; in the second half, we showed the three most effective attacks on each candidate as judged by the first half of the data. Respondents in a control condition saw no attacks. In our main analyses we pool across these conditions; later on, we show our results are similar across the conditions.

We compute two sets of survey weights. Our first set of weights uses the general population as the target, as many public polls do, computed using the Census (ACS). We also compute a second set of weights that weight to the demographics of the 2016 electorate, as computed from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study's (CCES) (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2017) validated voting information. A third set of weights checks the robustness of our findings when using estimates of the demographic composition of the 2016 electorate from Catalist, a political data vendor that maintains a national voter file, instead of the CCES.

Appendix B provides more details on the sample, weighting, and procedures. Appendix C gives the question wordings. Appendix E shows the attacks we used in the "Attacks Shown"

[3]For example, one of the anti-Bloomberg attacks was: "When he was mayor New York City, Michael Bloomberg created a controversial program known as stop and frisk. Under the program, police officers detained millions of black and Hispanic young men in heavily black and Hispanic neighborhoods for random searches and questioning. Under the program, people could be detained simply because a police officer suspected they might commit a crime, even if there was no sign they had done anything wrong. During these stops, officers would often stop random black or Hispanic men on the streets, put them against the wall, and put a gun to their head – even if they were simply on their way to work in the morning. Over 5 million such stops took place during Bloomberg's term as mayor of New York. After announcing his run for President and trying to court Hispanic and black votes, Bloomberg apologized for the program and said it was a mistake – even though he had defended it as recently as six months ago." See Appendix E.

condition. For all our estimates, we condition on baseline covariates we asked for the other studies prior to asking the questions we analyze here to increase the precision of our comparisons across candidates.

Results

First, we verify that Americans perceive the expected ideological differences between the candidates. We asked respondents at the end of our survey to place the major candidates and Trump on a 7-point ideological scale. Figure 1 shows that respondents place Bloomberg, Biden, and Buttigieg at more moderate positions on the scale than Warren and Sanders. In fact, a majority of respondents who place Sanders at all place him at the most extreme point on this scale ("Extremely liberal").

Sanders' ostensibly strong performance in many public head-to-head polls against Trump is puzzling in light of the general pattern that moderates perform better in general elections and the consensus among Americans that Sanders is the least moderate candidate for the Democratic nomination.

We can replicate the finding from other polls that Sanders does well in head-to-head questions against Trump in our data when we follow similar procedures as many public polls. Figure 2 shows that, among all respondents when weighted to be nationally representative, Democrats get the most votes with Sanders as the nominee. Moreover, subtracting the share of the vote Democrats get with Sanders as the nominee (46.1%) from the share of the vote Trump receives against him (41.8%) reveals that Sanders enjoys a 4.3 percentage point "vote margin" advantage, larger than most other Democratic candidates'.

Figure 1: Placements of Trump and Democratic Candidates on Left-Right Ideological Scale



Note: Each plot shows the distribution of responses to the ideological placement question by candidate. The red square is the mean. This is calculated excluding respondents who did not know. Below each candidate is the percentage of respondents who did not know how to place the candidate on the ideological scale. These estimates are unweighted. Figure A1 shows the results by party.

The Reason Sanders Appears Equally Electable

Two important patterns lurk beneath the headline finding that Sanders appears equally electable as the leading more moderate Democrats.

First, Trump also wins more votes when against Sanders than he does when against a more moderate Democrat. In particular, Figure 2 shows that Trump *also* gets 0.9-1.5pp *more* votes in head-to-heads against Sanders (and Warren) than in head-to-heads against any of the moderate candidates. As can be seen when we examine where these differences come from by party in Figure 3, this is driven in part by Republicans being 1.8pp more likely to say they would vote for

Figure 2: Vote Choice – Entire Sample



Notes: 83% confidence intervals surround point estimates. This Figure uses General Population (ACS) weights. Point estimates are predicted probabilities from a multinomial logistic regression when conditioning on pre-treatment covariates to increase precision. With these modeling choices, when the 83% confidence intervals for two candidates do not overlap, this indicates the differences have reached statistical significance at the 0.05 level. Figure A3 breaks down these results by party.

Trump if Sanders were the nominee; with one of the moderate candidates as a nominee, most of these Republican votes flow to the Democratic candidate.

Second, Sanders' similar number of Democratic votes against Trump relative to the leading moderates is driven by him bringing respondents who otherwise say they have no preference, would vote for a third party candidate, or would not vote into the Democratic column. Figure 2 found that Democrats receive 1.0-3.4pp more votes in head-to-head questions with Sanders as the nominee than if one of the other Democrats is named. However, as we saw, this is not because Sanders wins votes from Trump. Instead, Figure 3 shows this advantage is a sum of two main dynamics: despite *losing* an additional 0.4% of Democrats, (an imprecisely estimated) 0.9% of Independents, and 1.8% of Republicans to Trump, Sanders converts approximately 3.7% of Democrats from answering "Neither/Would not vote" to saying they would turn out to vote for

Figure 3: Vote Choice by Party: Sanders' Nomination Increases Votes for Trump, Decreases Votes for Democrats Among Republicans Relative to More Moderate Democrats



Notes: 95% confidence intervals surround point estimates. This Figure uses General Population (ACS) weights. Figure A2 shows means.

Democrats.

This offsetting dynamic appears key to understanding why Sanders appears relatively electable in our data: *Sanders converts just enough Democrats and Independents from saying they are indifferent or would not vote to supporting Sanders to offset his losses of votes from the Democratic column to Trump's column*.[4]

These results also appear in battleground states, as shown in Figure A5.

Sanders' Equal Electability Case Requires Large Increases in Youth Turnout

Investigating which demographics convert from being indifferent or not voting to voting for Democrats with Sanders in head-to-head questions can help inform the plausibility of the case that Sanders is equally electable as the more moderate candidates.

In Figure 4, we show that Sanders' conversion of votes from the neither/would not vote

[4]An explicit "would not vote" option was only present in half our data; Figure A4 shows that these results are mostly driven by changes between the "Democratic candidate" and "Would not vote" category. In Appendix D, we discuss how reducing third party voting alone does not explain how Sanders can offset increases in Trump voting.

category to the Democratic candidate category is driven almost entirely by Democrats and Independents under 35 years old. The top two panels show this pattern holds similarly for both white and non-white Democrats and Independents under 35. For both, the magnitude of this claimed increase in intent to turn out when Sanders is the nominee is extremely large, or around 11 percentage points (pp) on average.

This "Bernie or bust" pattern is almost entirely limited to young people and is not evident among other demographics, such as whites without college degrees. The bottom two rows show that moderate candidates fare better against Trump than Sanders does among the rest of the electorate, including among whites without college degrees over 35 and among all others, respectively. Figure A6 similarly shows that younger Americans are especially likely to say they will turn out to vote if Bernie Sanders is in the match-up but not otherwise.[5]

Figure 4: Vote Choice by Demographics – Comparing Sanders and Moderate Candidates



Notes: 95% confidence intervals surround point estimates. This Figure uses General Population (ACS) weights. Figure A7 shows means.

Figure 5 examines in further detail which response categories these "Neither/Would not vote" votes from left-leaning young people come from when Sanders is the nominee. We find that the

[5]Age 35 is an arbitrary cut-off, of course. Figure A6 shows that there are smaller increases in stated intention to turn out among those over 35. These increases are slightly larger for non-white Democrats than others, but are still much smaller than the stated increase in intent to turn out among those under 35.

vast majority of these responses are driven by left-leaning young people who switch from saying they would not vote to saying they would vote for the Democratic candidate.

Figure 5: Among Under 35 Democrats and Independents – Comparing Sanders and Moderate Candidates



Notes: 95% confidence intervals surround point estimates. This Figure uses General Population (ACS) weights. See Appendix D for further discussion of how we code third party voting. Figure 4 uses the entire dataset whereas this Figure uses only the second half of the data, which included an explicit "I would not vote" option; this is why Sanders' effect on Democratic votes among this subgroup is not identical to the number in Figure 4.

Sanders' electability case thus appears to rest on the proposition that nominating him will increase turnout among Democrats and Independents under 35 by approximately 11pp, offsetting his inferior performance among the rest of the electorate.[6]

[6]See similar results in polling from Morning Consult at `https://morningconsult.com/2020/01/14/why-bernie-sanders-is-electable-too/`. However, they do not weight to the likely electorate, as we do below.

What if Youth Turnout Does Not Increase?

Whether young Democrats and Independents would in fact turn out at 11pp higher rates if Sanders were nominated is impossible to reliably forecast. We further discuss the plausibility of this increase below. However, we first wish to illustrate how crucial this assumption appears to be to interpreting public polling as supporting Sanders' equal electabiltiy to the more moderate candidates'.

To illustrate this point, we begin by analyzing our data in a manner consistent with most public polls. We focus on the control group shown no attacks to match public polls; in the next section we consider what happens when respondents were shown attacks against each candidate.

In the top panel of Figure 6, we show the average "vote margin"[7] when we weight our sample to match the general US population. These results are broadly similar to much contemporaneous public polling; we find Sanders performs slightly better against Trump than Biden and Buttigieg but not as well as Bloomberg.

However, in the next panel, we weight our sample's demographics to the demographics of the 2016 electorate using the CCES. Simply weighting to the 2016 electorate reduces Sanders' edge over Trump relative to all the moderates because Sanders' support is disproportionately driven by a demographic that votes at low rates – those under 35. In addition, the rest of the electorate, which in aggregate votes for Sanders at lower rates than the other moderates, now gets more weight.[8] This indicates that Sanders' electability case is helped by the fact that many pollsters do not weight their samples to the demographics of the likely electorate, which contains an age gradient stronger than those present in likely voter questions.

Finally, given the evidence that self-reported intent to turn out correlates poorly with actual turnout decisions (Rogers and Aida 2014), we conduct a final analysis that imputes votes to partisans who currently express no preference or say they will not vote: i.e., that self-identified

[7] More precisely, the mean of a variable set to 1 for supporters of the Democratic candidate (including leaners), -1 for supporters of Donald Trump (including leaners), and 0 otherwise.

[8] Figures A9 and A10 show the full results when weighted to 2016 turnout.

Democrats who say they will not vote at all will support the Democratic nominee, and that self-identified Republicans who say they will not vote at all will support the Republican nominee. With this recoding rule, the young Democrats who say they will not vote at all if Sanders is not nominated are now coded as supporting Democrats – although the responses of all young respondents are now downweighted given their low turnout rates. (Recoding respondents without a preference according to their partisan affiliation also helps adjust for differences in name recognition across candidates.) We do not recode any respondents who say they would vote for a third party and do not lean towards either side. We still weight by turnout. In essence, using this scheme we trust 2016 data on which demographics actually turn out and disregard what respondents tell us about whether they would vote, substituting in respondents' partisanship when they refuse to list a preference although taking them at their word if they insist they will vote for a third party or the out-party candidate. In this last scenario, Sanders runs 0.6 to 3.9pp behind the moderates in terms of performance against Trump. (Warren runs 2.6 to 6.5pp behind the moderate candidates in terms of performance against Trump.)

We again stress that there is no data to definitively determine whether a Sanders nomination would move 11% of young Democrats and Independents off the sidelines and into the Democratic column. Rather, we conduct this exercise to show that assuming this will occur may be required in order to interpret public polls as indicating that Sanders is similarly electable. In the Discussion, we turn to our assessment of the plausibility of this assumption.

Would Moderates' Advantage Survive Attacks?

One alternative explanation for the moderate candidates' advantage is that, in the face of attacks from Trump and Republicans in the fall campaign, the electorate would ultimately perceive any moderate nominee as extreme, reducing that nominee's support to the same level of support Sanders would also receive. However, this line of reasoning neglects the possibility that Sanders' support may also fall in response to attacks.

Figure 6: Estimated Vote Margin by Weighting Decision and Handling of "Neither"/"Will Not Vote" Responses

Notes: 83% confidence intervals surround point estimates. This Figure uses the weights specified in the subfigure labels. Figure A11 shows that the results in the third panel are robust when weighting to Catalist's estimate of the demographic composition of the 2016 electorate. This Figure shows results for the control group shown no attacks only.

There is no way to simulate for survey respondents what the fall campaign will look like with complete accuracy. However, to examine the results in the scenario when all Democratic candidates are faced with strong attacks, we focus on the subset of our data where we showed

respondents the most effective attacks against each Democratic candidate. We first identified which attacks on each candidate would be most effective at reducing each Democrat's support against Trump during the first half of our data collection. To do so, we randomly sampled two attacks from a list of several attacks we composed against each candidate and showed these attacks to respondents before asking the vote choice question. Respondents in a control group saw no attacks. We then exploit the random assignment among attacks to compute the effect of each attack. For example, we find that when we show respondents the fact that Pete Buttigieg is gay and met his husband online, his vote margin versus Trump does not decrease (it actually increases slightly, although this is statistically insignificant). Appendix E gives all the attacks we tested.[9] Finally, we selected the three most effective attacks, and during the second half of our data collection always showed respondents in the "Attacks Shown" group these three most effective attacks.

Unsurprisingly, all the candidates perform more poorly after respondents see attacks against them. However, moderates' electability advantage over Sanders (and Warren) remains in the presence of these attacks against all the candidates. Figure 7 uses the same weighting and recoding strategy as the last panel in Figure 6 but just among the group shown these effective attacks. We find that all three moderate candidates appear to outperform Sanders, although Bloomberg and Buttigieg do especially well.

Discussion

Several public polls indicate that Bernie Sanders appears to fare similarly to more moderate Democrats in head-to-head contests with Donald Trump. This polling has raised doubts about longstanding findings that moderate candidates enjoy an edge in general elections. Our evidence

[9]For Sanders, the most effective attacks were his large increases in proposed government spending, his unusual positions on national security issues (e.g., calling for the CIA to be abolished), and his Medicare-for-All proposal's provision banning private health insurance. For Bloomberg, the most effective attack is stop and frisk.

Figure 7: Vote Margin by Scenario When Most Effective Attacks Shown



Notes: 83% confidence intervals surround point estimates. This Figure uses 2016 Electorate weights and, as in the last panel in Figure 6, imputes votes to partisans who refuse to express a preference. The full results by treatment and outcome category when weighted to the ACS are in Figures A12, A13, and A14.

suggests that Sanders' strength against Trump in public polling may be overstated. In particular, we found:

- In a large dataset we collected, we were able to replicate the finding that Sanders appears similarly electable to the leading more moderate Democratic candidates – but only when assuming that (1) the electorate demographically reflects the US population and (2) individuals accurately report whether they will vote.

- However, we found evidence consistent with Sanders' extremely liberal positions losing some voters: respondents of all parties, including white respondents without college degrees, are more likely to say they will vote for Trump if Sanders is the nominee than if one of the more moderate Democrats is nominated. The size of this "Sanders penalty" appears to be roughly 1-2pp in vote share (or ≈2-4pp in vote margin). This is similar in size to estimates

in the literature of the reduced vote share extreme candidates receive (Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan 2002). Warren faces a similar, if not slightly larger, penalty.

- In this data, Sanders' ostensibly strong performance against Trump despite this headwind is driven almost entirely by Democrats and Independents under 35 claiming they will turn out at much higher rates (≈11pp higher) if Sanders is nominated. Concluding based on current polling that Sanders would perform similarly to leading moderate candidates against Trump therefore appears to require the assumption that young people would turn out at much higher rates if Sanders were nominated. Without this assumption, all moderate candidates appear somewhat better positioned against Trump in our data.

- Consistent with this, when weighting our sample to reflect the 2016 electorate instead of the general population and imputing votes to partisans who refuse to express a preference – trusting historical turnout patterns instead of self-reported turnout intentions – Sanders falls behind the more moderate candidates against Trump. This pattern helps contextualize well-publicized results from public polling.

- These findings hold in battleground states and when we expose respondents to effective attacks against the potential Democratic nominees.

Bernie Sanders himself has been explicit that increasing turnout would be key to his victory. At the February 19, 2020 Democratic Presidential Debate, Bernie Sanders said, "in order to beat Donald Trump, we're going to need the largest voter turnout in the history of the United States." The survey data we collected suggests that the case for Sanders' electability based on public polling in fact does appear to hinge on this "need" in a way that other candidates' do not.

Given how many voters say they would switch to Trump in head-to-heads against Sanders compared to the more moderate candidates, the surge in youth turnout Sanders would require to gain back this ground is large: around 11 percentage points. Further, an argument that he is *more*

electable than the moderate candidates based on the public polling requires an even large turnout boost than this.

Is It Plausible Sanders Would Inspire a Youth Turnout Surge this Large?

It is beyond the scope of this short paper—and indeed likely impossible—to determine whether nominating Sanders would in fact stimulate an 11pp or larger increase in turnout (or decrease in third party voting) among Democrats and Independents under 35 than would otherwise occur if another Democrat were nominated. It may well be that nominating Sanders would increase turnout among this group some. However, other results help contextualize how large a turnout increase of a full 11pp among under 35 Democrats and Independents is. As a point of comparison, data from the CCES indicates that approximately 37% of Americans in this demographic voted in the 2016 Presidential election. An 11pp increase would represent an increase to approximately 48%, or an increase in percentage terms of 30%.[10] Figure 8 visualizes what an 11pp increase in youth turnout would look like relative to historical youth turnout trends using data from the Current Population Survey (which over-reports turnout some). This 11pp increase would be significantly larger than the aggregate effects of entire Presidential campaigns on voter turnout (Enos and Fowler 2018), larger than the effects of nominating black candidates on black voter turnout (Washington 2006), larger than the increase in black turnout when Barack Obama ran for President in 2008,[11] and approximately the size of the difference between typical midterm and Presidential election turnout.[12]

[10] A recent historical precedent for such an increase is that turnout among those age 18-29 increased from 20% in 2014 to 36% in 2018, a 16pp increase. See `https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2019/04/behind-2018-united-states-midterm-election-turnout.html`. However, turnout among other age groups also increased by nearly this amount in 2018 and Sanders was not on the national ballot in 2018. Sanders' 11pp turnout increase among young people in 2020 must occur *in addition to* any turnout increase that would otherwise occur if another Democrat were nominated.

[11] Using validated voter turnout, McKee, Hood III and Hill (2012, Table 2) find an 8 percentage point increase in African American turnout in Georgia from 2004 to 2008.

[12] See `http://www.electproject.org/home/voter-turnout/demographics` for this and other comparisons.

Figure 8: Turnout in Previous Elections Among Americans 18-29, Current Population Survey



Notes: This Figure shows turnout among voters in the Census Current Population Study. These statistics are known to over-report turnout, so the baseline turnout rate is higher than the CCES validated voting data indicates. To illustrate how large of a turnout increase among young voters 11pp represents, we show an 11pp increase in youth turnout as measured in the CPS. An increase in turnout of this size entirely attributable to Sanders' nomination would need to materialize in order to interpret the survey data as consistent with Sanders' similar electability.

Evidence to date suggests that a turnout boost of this magnitude is fairly unlikely to materialize solely due to Sanders' presence on the ballot. Turnout in the 2020 Democratic primary has not exceeded 2008 levels so far, including among young voters, consistent with a concern that the increase in intended turnout found in survey questions may reflect expressive responding that would not translate into real behavior.[13] This concern is not unreasonable: "The

[13]Turnout in the New Hampshire Democratic primary was 47% in 2008, 40% in 2016, and 43% in 2020. See `https://twitter.com/jon_m_rob/status/1227600608888315904`. 2020 numbers have been updated since the original tweet. Youth turnout in New Hampshire was 19% in 2020. The most recent comparable election is 2004, when youth turnout was 18%. See `https://circle.tufts.edu/latest-research/half-young-voters-back-sanders-propel-him-new-hampshire-victory`. Also see `https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/24/us/politics/bernie-sanders-democratic-voters.html`.

2016 American National Election Study, for example, found that 75 percent of eighteen to twenty-nine year olds interviewed before the election reported that they intended to vote, but less than half were found to have actually voted when administrative election records were checked after the election" (Holbein and Hillygus 2020, p. 180).[14] This discussion also neglects the potential effects of nominating a very liberal candidate on Republican voter turnout (Hall and Thompson 2018), which surveys are unlikely to be able to reliably capture given the large number of people who say they will vote.

At the same time, we hasten to note the many caveats to these findings. First, our survey is not a random probability sample and should be viewed accordingly. Our sample is large and relatively representative on observable characteristics, and we are principally concerned with differences across candidates, not in establishing an overall level of public support, making this of slightly less concern. However, caveats remain given the nature of the sample. Second, given how poorly predictive self-reported turnout intentions are of actual behavior (Rogers and Aida 2014), there are reasons to doubt many of the people who claim they would vote in our data will actually vote, and it is difficult to determine how these respondents might be systematically different. Weighting our sample to the 2016 electorate helps address this concern, but there still may remain differences between voters and non-voters even conditional on demographics. Finally, and most fundamentally, any polling early on in an election season is not guaranteed to correspond with later results; with time, voters may change their minds about any of the candidates as they learn more information or new events occur, or may act less expressively and more instrumentally as the election approaches. The Democratic candidates could also have differences in fundraising ability, volunteer recruitment, or other advantages not captured in current polling. For all these reasons, our findings should not be interpreted as dispositive.

[14] We are also aware of no studies finding that nominating more extreme candidates increases turnout among young voters, and in fact Hall and Thompson (2018) finds evidence that nominating less moderate candidates may increase turnout among the *other* party's base. Holbein and Hillygus (2020) also find that increasing youth turnout is likely to require more systematic educational and electoral reforms: "drumming up political motivation...[has] very modest effects on [youth] voter turnout" (p. 186-7).

Nevertheless, our results do raise caution about dismissing long-standing findings regarding more moderate nominees' slight electoral advantage based on Sanders' polling in the 2020 election. Inferring Sanders is equally electable as more moderate candidates based on public polling appears to require a strong assumption that nominating Sanders would increase youth Democratic and Independent voter turnout by at least 11 percentage points from its 2016 level of 37%.

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Online Appendix

Contents

A Additional Tables and Figures

Figure A1: Perceptions of Candidate Ideology, by Party



Note: Each plot shows the distribution of responses by candidate.
The red square is the mean. This is calculated excluding respondets who did not know.

Notes: This reports Figure 1 in the main text, but broken down by respondent party.

Figure A2: Vote Choice by Party: Sanders' Nomination Increases Votes for Trump, Decreases Votes for Democrats Among Republicans Relative to More Moderate Democrats



Notes: 83% confidence intervals surround point estimates. This Figure uses General Population (ACS) weights. Point estimates are predicted probabilities from a multinomial logistic regression when conditioning on pre-treatment covariates to increase precision. Figure A3 breaks out this data by individual candidate and includes Independents.

Figure A3: Vote Choice by Party



Notes: 83% confidence intervals surround point estimates. This Figure uses General Population (ACS) weights. This is Figure 2 broken down by party.

Figure A4: With Separate Would Not Vote Category



Notes: 83% confidence intervals surround point estimates. This Figure uses General Population (ACS) weights. This graph only reflects the second half of our data collection, as the first half did not contain a "would not vote" response option.

Figure A5: Results in Battleground States Only

(a) All Respondents



(b) By Party

Notes: 83% confidence intervals surround point estimates. This Figure uses General Population (ACS) weights. This Figure reports the results of Figure A3 but only within states not deemed "safe" by the consensus forecast at `270towin.com`.

Figure A6: Self-Reported Intent to Turn Out by Age by Whether Sanders is in Match-Up



Notes: 83% confidence intervals surround point estimates. This Figure uses General Population (ACS) weights. Younger voters report large increases in intention to turn out when Sanders is present in the match-up.

Figure A7: Vote Choice by Demographics – Comparing Sanders and Moderate Candidates



Notes: 83% confidence intervals surround point estimates. This Figure uses General Population (ACS) weights. Figure A8 shows these statistics for all individual candidates.

Figure A8: Vote Choice by Demographics



Notes: 83% confidence intervals surround point estimates. This Figure uses General Population (ACS) weights.

Figure A9: Entire Sample, Weighted to 2016 Electorate (CCES)

(a) All Respondents



(b) By Party



Notes: 83% confidence intervals surround point estimates. This Figure uses 2016 General Election (CCES) weights.

Figure A10: Entire Sample, Weighted to 2016 Electorate (Catalist)

(a) All Respondents



(b) By Party



Notes: 83% confidence intervals surround point estimates. This Figure uses 2016 General Election weights, but using Catalist's estimates for the demographics of the 2016 electorate to construct the weights.

Figure A11: Vote Margin when Weighted to 2016 Electorate Using Catalist Weights



Notes: 83% confidence intervals surround point estimates. This Figure uses Catalist weights. This shows results for the control group shown no attacks only.

Figure A12: Control Group Only

(a) All Respondents



(b) By Party



Notes: 83% confidence intervals surround point estimates. This Figure uses General Population (ACS) weights.

Figure A13: Specific Attacks Shown (Both Halves of Data Collection)

(a) All Respondents



(b) By Party



Notes: 83% confidence intervals surround point estimates. This Figure uses General Population (ACS) weights.

Figure A14: Most Effective Attacks Shown (Only Second Half of Data Collection, Containing Most Effective Attacks)

(a) All Respondents



(b) By Party



Notes: 83% confidence intervals surround point estimates. This Figure uses General Population (ACS) weights.

B Additional Details on Sample and Weighting

The data for this research came from two surveys using the online convenience sample Lucid Theorem. The first survey was run from 21 January - 9 February, 2020. The second survey was run from 9 - 24 February, 2020. Except for some small differences (described in detail in Section C), these surveys were identical. Lucid provides survey responses that are balanced to be nationally representative based on participants' age, gender, ethnicity, and region. Coppock and McClellan (2019) find that Lucid generally tracks nationally representative baselines on gender, education, age, income, voter turnout, and partisanship.

We limited our analysis to respondents who provided their consent and correctly answered two attention check questions. After providing consent, the first question always asked: "For our research, careful attention to survey questions is critical! We thank you for your care." Respondents were shown "I understand" and "I do not understand" in a randomized order. If a respondent did not select "I understand", they were removed from the survey. Similarly, the second question always asked: "People are very busy these days and many do not have time to follow what goes on in the government. **We are testing whether people read questions.** To show that you've read this much, answer **both** 'extremely interested' **and** 'very interested."' Respondents were shown "Extremely interested", "Very interested", "Moderately interested", "Slightly interested", and "Not interested at all". If a respondent did not select both 'Extremely interested' and 'Very interested' and nothing else, they were removed from the survey.

Weights

To correct for any over- or under-representativeness in our sample, we constructed survey weights to match either national data provided by the Census (2018 5-Year Estimates American Community Survey) or the 2016 electorate (constructed using validated voter turnout from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2017)).

We constructed survey weights using entropy balancing (Hainmueller 2012). Weights were constructed overall, combining both survey rounds.

For the ACS, we weighted on age bin (18-24; 25-44; 45-64; 65 and older), gender, household income[15] (under $15,000; $15-20,000; $20-25,000; $25-30,000; $30-35,000; $35-40,000; $40-45,000; $45-50,000; $50-60,000; $60-75,000; $75-100,000; $100-125,000; $125-150,000; $150-200,000; $200,000 and over), ethnicity/race (African-American; Hispanic; Asian; Native American; Other), education among Whites[16] (White some high school or less; White high school graduate; White other post high school vocational training; White completed some college; White Associate's degree; White Bachelor's degree; White Graduate degree)[17], and region (Northeast; Midwest; South; West).

For the CCES, we constructed weights to match the 2016 voting electorate using the CCES's validated voter turnout and survey weights. We then weighted on age bin (18-24; 25-34; 35-44; 45-64; 65 and older), gender, household income (under $20,000; $20-30,000; $30-40,000; $40-50,000; $50-60,000; $60-70,000; $70-80,000; $80-100,000; $100-150,000; $150-200,000; $200-250,000; $250,000 and over; prefer not to say), ethnicity/race (African-American; Hispanic; Asian; Native American; Other), education among Whites (White some high school or less; White high school graduate; White completed some college; White Associate's degree; White Bachelor's degree; White Graduate degree).

Table A1 presents descriptive statistics of the sample unweighted, weighted to the ACS, and weighted to the 2016 electorate using the CCES.

[15] If a respondent chose prefer not to say, we imputed a household income of $55,000.

[16] If a respondent chose prefer not to say, we imputed an education level of completed some college.

[17] We limit education weighting only to White respondents because the education gap in political views is most pronounced among Whites. See `https://www.people-press.org/2018/03/20/wide-gender-gap-growing-educational-divide-in-voters-party-identification/`.

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics by Survey Weights

	Unweighted Mean	National Weight (ACS) Mean	2016 Electorate Weight (CCES) Mean
Male	0.37	0.49	0.47
Age 18-24	0.19	0.12	0.08
Age 25-34	0.21	0.18	0.14
Age 35-44	0.18	0.16	0.14
Age 45-64	0.27	0.33	0.41
Age 65 and older	0.14	0.21	0.24
White some high school or less	0.02	0.04	0.06
White high school graduate	0.18	0.17	0.23
White completed some college	0.16	0.13	0.18
White Associate's degree	0.07	0.06	0.08
White Bachelor's degree	0.18	0.14	0.15
White Graduate degree	0.10	0.09	0.09
African-American	0.09	0.12	0.11
Hispanic	0.09	0.15	0.05
Asian	0.04	0.06	0.02
Native American	0.01	0.01	0.01
Mixed or other race	0.05	0.04	0.03
Democrat (including leaners)	0.45	0.45	0.41
Pure Independent	0.16	0.15	0.15
Republican (including leaners)	0.39	0.39	0.43
Observations	40153	40153	40153

C Question Wordings

The surveys had the following questions and response options:

1. We are interested in what people learn from the media. We will show you a recent media story and would like to hear your reaction. Please read the story, then we will ask you a question about it. [I understand]

2. Please read the example media story below. All the information in it is true. Please read the story, then click next when you are done reading.

3. **Control Group:**

    - The 2020 election for US President is getting started. Donald Trump and his supporters have been making many arguments about why Americans should not vote for the Democrats running for President. One of the Democrats running for President is [DEM CANDIDATE]. Some of Trump's supporters have argued [DEM CANDIDATE] should not be President.

4. **Treatment Group:**

    - The 2020 election for US President is getting started. Donald Trump and his supporters have been making many arguments about why Americans should not vote for the Democrats running for President. One of the Democrats running for President is [DEM CANDIDATE]. Criticizing [DEM CANDIDATE], some of Trump's supporters have said:
        - [STATEMENT 1]
        - [STATEMENT 2]
        - [STATEMENT 3]

5. Below is the story we showed you on the previous page: [INSERT SAME STORY AS CONTROL/TREATMENT GROUP]

6. What words would you use to describe this story? Select all that apply. You can select no words if none apply. [Inspiring, Sad, Biased, Entertaining, Interesting, Funny, Unexpected]

7. Finally, we want to learn more about you and your views.

8. If the 2020 election for President of the United States were held today between Republican Donald Trump and Democrat [DEM CANDIDATE], who would you vote for? [**Round 1 Responses:** Republican Donald Trump, Democrat [DEM CANDIDATE], Undecided, A third party candidate]. [**Round 2 Responses:** Republican Donald Trump, Democrat [DEM CANDIDATE], Undecided, A third party candidate, I would not vote].

9. [If Undecided, third party, or would not vote] If you had to choose, would you lean towards Republican Donald Trump or Democrat [DEM CANDIDATE]? [**Round 1 Responses:** Lean towards Republican Donald Trump, Lean towards Democrat [DEM CANDIDATE], Completely undecided] [**Round 2 Responses:** Lean towards voting for Republican Donald Trump, Lean towards voting for Democrat [DEM CANDIDATE], Completely undecided, I definitely would not vote]

The last two questions made up our outcome measure. We coded this as -1 if the respondent said they support or lean towards Donald Trump; 0 if they are completely undecided or would not vote after being asked the branching question (in some graphs, we separate these); and 1 if supporting or leaning towards the Democratic candidate.

For the statements, respondents always saw either specific or vague arguments against the Democratic candidate. In Round 1, a respondent would either see two vague statements or two randomly sampled specific statements. There were 9 specific statements for Biden, 11 for Sanders, 7 for Warren, 8 for Buttigieg, and 7 for Bloomberg. These were meant to encompass the most

common attacks that were likely to be levelled against each Democratic candidate in a general election. The statements are given in full in Appendix E.

In Round 2, a respondent would either see three vague statements or three specific statements. The specific statements used in Round 2 were those found to be most effective at decreasing Democratic support in Round 1. The statement-level treatment effects are presented in Section E. The vague statements used in Round 2 were paired to match the specific statements.

D Third Party Voting

In the main text, our primary analyses treat not voting and third party voting equally, given that our outcome is Democratic vote margin. In this section we consider how much of Sanders' electability claim is based on mobilizing young people who otherwise would not vote compared to persuading young people who would otherwise vote for a third party candidate to instead support his campaign. Note that our survey did not ask about specific third party candidates since the third parties have not yet selected nominees as of this writing.

First, past data from the 2016 CCES suggests that it is reasonable to group non-voters and third party voters together, especially among young non-Republicans. In the 2016 CCES, when a young non-Republican said they planned to vote for a third party candidate in the pre-election survey, 67% of them ended up not voting (using validated voter turnout), 10% voted for Clinton, 3% voted for Trump, and 20% voted for a third party candidate. This data supports our primary coding scheme in which a stated preference for a third party followed by a preference for the Democratic candidate in a follow-up question is treated as a likely Democratic vote, whereas a third party vote with no subsequent preference is treated as a likely genuine third party vote.

As a robustness check, we consider an alternative coding scheme in which we separately code whether someone plans to vote for Trump (including leaners who were initially undecided, voting third party, or not voting), someone who plans to vote for the Democratic candidate (including leaners as well), someone who plans to vote for a third party candidate (selects a third party and then "Completely undecided" in the leaning question), or does not plan to vote (selects "I definitely would not vote" in the leaning question).

With this coding, we continue to find that around two-thirds of Sanders' electability claim is based on increasing the voter turnout of Democrats and Independents age 18 to 34 with only one-third explained by reducing third party voting among this demographic. Figure A15 presents these results.

Figure A15: Means by Candidate, With Separate Third Party Category

(a) All Respondents



(b) By Party



Notes: 83% confidence intervals surround point estimates. This Figure uses General Population (ACS) weights. This graph only reflects the second half of our data collection, as the first half did not contain a "would not vote" response option.

E Attacks Used Against Democratic Candidates

The statements below are sorted by candidate. In the first period of data collection, respondents in an "Attacks Shown" group saw a random sample of two of these attacks. In the second period, respondents in this condition saw the first three attacks listed for each candidate.

Note that these statements were intended to simulate likely attacks on the Democratic candidates in the fall election campaign and were displayed to survey respondents as if they came from third parties criticizing the candidates. They were not presented as neutral factual statements.

Table A2: Estimates and Standard Errors for all Democratic Candidate Statements

Bernie Sanders	Bernie Sanders has proposed many new government spending programs. Independent analysis of his proposals show that they would cost a total of $9.7 trillion per year, or $32,000 per year for every man, woman, and child in America. To pay for these programs, Sanders has proposed increasing taxes by $2.3 trillion per year – that's $7,600 more in taxes every year for every man, woman, and child in America. Sanders himself admits that his plans would increase taxes on almost all Americans, including middle-class Americans. However, because these new taxes would not cover the cost of his programs, the government would have to borrow money to pay for the rest of them – meaning his programs would also add trillions of dollars to the national debt every year.
Bernie Sanders	Bernie Sanders has often held unusual positions on US national security issues. For example, he has called for the CIA to be abolished. Likewise, he supported Nicaragua's communist government in the 1980s, even telling a CBS reporter you are worms for their reporting on the repressive regime.

Candidate	Statement
Bernie Sanders	Bernie Sanders's Medicare-For-All bill would ban private insurers from offering competing coverage to the new government plan. Per NBC, that means everyone with comprehensive employee benefits or a private plan through the Affordable Care Act today would be moved onto Medicare. Under his plan, anyone with private health insurance from their employer would have to give up their current health insurance and receive government health insurance instead.
Bernie Sanders	Bernie Sanders often criticizes millionaires and the top 1 percent, but he is in fact a millionaire himself. Forbes estimates that Bernie Sanders has a net worth of about $2.5 million. When asked about this, Sanders said I wrote a best-selling book. If you write a best-selling book, you can be a millionaire, too.
Bernie Sanders	Bernie Sanders's wife Jane Sanders ran the small Burlington College from 2004 until she was forced out in 2011. When Jane Sanders ran the college, the college got a loan from a bank to buy millions of dollars in land nearby – even though the college could not afford the loan. Law enforcement opened an investigation into whether Senator Bernie Sanders pressured the bank to give his wife's college the loan anyway.
Bernie Sanders	In 1985, Sanders suggested that bread lines were a sign of a healthy economy, saying It's funny, sometimes American journalists talk about how bad a country is, that people are lining up for food. That is a good thing! In other countries people don't line up for food: the rich get the food and the poor starve to death.
Bernie Sanders	In 1972, Bernie Sanders wrote an essay discussing male and female rape fantasies. When this was brought up in 2015, his campaign called the article a dumb attempt at satire.

Candidate	Statement
Bernie Sanders	Bernie Sanders wants to cancel $1.6 trillion in student debt. This means that anyone who took out student loans to attend college would no longer owe any more money, and that the government would pay for their loans instead. This would cost over $5,000 for *every* American despite the fact that most Americans do not have student debt. Americans with student loans are more likely to be wealthy, meaning this program would give more money to rich than poor Americans – including Americans who make hundreds of thousands of dollars per year. The program would also not credit Americans who had paid off their loans early – meaning that people who didn't pay their loans or only paid the minimum amount would receive a benefit that Americans who paid back their loans early would not receive.
Bernie Sanders	While campaigning in October 2019, 78 year-old Bernie Sanders had a heart attack and did not admit it until three days later, after the media insisted he and his campaing provide answers. The episode raised questions about whether he is healthy enough to hold office. If elected, he would be the oldest person to ever assume the presidency.
Bernie Sanders	Bernie Sanders is a socialist. He'll overthrow capitalism in the United States. Bernie Sanders is an isolationist who is too naive to lead our armed forces. He can't be trusted as commander in chief.
Bernie Sanders	Bernie Sanders describes himself as a socialist and says he wants a revolution in the United States.

Candidate	Statement
Elizabeth Warren	Elizabeth Warren has proposed many new government spending programs. Independent analysis of her proposals show that they would cost a total of $4.9 trillion per year, or $16,000 per year for every man, woman, and child in America. To pay for these programs, Warren has proposed the largest tax increase on Americans in American history. However, because these new taxes would not cover the cost of her programs, the government would have to borrow money to pay for the rest of them – meaning her programs would also add trillions of dollars to the national debt every year.
Elizabeth Warren	Elizabeth Warren supports banning all private health insurance and requiring Americans to instead receive healthcare from a government-run program. Under her plan, anyone with private health insurance from their employer would have to give up their current health insurance and receive government health insurance instead.
Elizabeth Warren	Elizabeth Warren is a Massachusetts liberal who wants to make government bigger at the expense of small businesses and middle-class taxpayers. Elizabeth Warren changes her mind so often about who she is that she can't be trusted on the issues that matter.
Elizabeth Warren	When Elizabeth Warren was a law professor, she worked side jobs as lawyers for corporations – earning her over $2 million from corporations over the last few decades. In one case, a steel company was required by Congress to pay millions of dollars into a fund for its retired coal miners' health care. Elizabeth Warren defended the steel company by writing a petition to the Supreme Court arguing that the company should not have to pay for its retired miners' health care. She was paid $10,000 for this work, and worked on many other similar cases for corporations.

Candidate	Statement
Elizabeth Warren	Forbes estimates that Elizabeth Warren has a net worth of almost $12 million, putting her in the top 1% of all Americans. Her house in Cambridge, Massachusetts alone is estimated to be worth $3 million.
Elizabeth Warren	When Elizabeth Warren was a Professor at Harvard Law School, she claimed that she was part Native American despite not being a member of a Native American tribe. Lying about being Native American may have helped Elizabeth Warren get hired at Harvard through their affirmative action policies. Years later, she did a DNA test to show she did have some very small amount of Native American ancestry. Native Americans called her doing the test offensive.
Elizabeth Warren	Elizabeth Warren wants to repeal the law that makes it a crime for immigrants to enter the United States without permission and then to give government healthcare benefits to the 11 million illegal immigrants currently living in the United States.
Elizabeth Warren	Elizabeth Warren supports the federal government issuing reparation payments to black Americans whose ancestors were economically affected by slavery. Warren is also a supporter of creating a special government program only racial minorities are eligible for that would help them purchase homes.
Joe Biden	Joe Biden has long supported freezing government spending on Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and Veteran's Benefits. While he was a US Senator, he tried to cut these programs at least four times. Under Biden's proposal, Social Security and other benefits would not keep up with inflation, meaning these programs' value would decrease over time as prices rise, leaving seniors and veterans unable to maintain their current standard of living and or care.

Candidate	Statement
Joe Biden	If elected, Joe Biden would be the oldest person to be President. Many have worried that Biden is showing signs of his age. During the Democratic debates, he's often been seen stuttering and sometimes appears to not understand the questions. In fact, after the September 2019 Democratic debate, multiple news articles labeled the question of Biden's mental fitness for office difficult to ignore.
Joe Biden	Joe Biden helped write the 1994 crime bill that created the three strikes law and instituted truth in sentencing laws. These laws have dramatically increased the number of people serving in prison. Biden also supported and wrote several crime bills in the 1980s that helped create bigger racial disparities in prison time, such as treating crack and powder cocaine differently – changes that have left black Americans serving longer prison sentences than white Americans despite committing similar offenses.
Joe Biden	While Joe Biden was Vice President and oversaw U.S.-Ukraine relations, his son Hunter served on the board of a Ukrainian gas company. Biden's son Hunter was paid $50,000-$80,000 each month for several years on this company's board. Hunter Biden had no prior experience in the gas industry or Ukraine, raising questions about why the company decided to employ Hunter Biden. When asked whether it was proper for his son to be paid by the Ukrainian gas company, Joe Biden defended him, saying He did not do a single thing wrong.
Joe Biden	In 2005, Joe Biden helped write and pass a new law that changed the bankruptcy process in the United States. The new law made it harder for Americans to file for bankruptcy and get out of debt. Credit card companies had pushed for this change for years, hoping to collect more money from people who filed bankruptcy.

Candidate	Statement
Joe Biden	Joe Biden has been in Washington for decades. He won't bring change – he'll just be more of the same. Joe Biden is a corporate Democrat – he's backed corporate interests for as long as he's been in Washington. We just can't trust him to fight for the little guy.
Joe Biden	While a Senator, Joe Biden voted for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In the months following the invasion, Biden remained committed to the war. In September 2003, almost six months after the invasion, Biden continued supporting the Iraq War, saying on CNN that he had no regrets over his decision. Donald Trump has criticized the decision to invade Iraq.
Joe Biden	Joe Biden supported allowing US companies to buy products from other countries instead of having to make them in America. In particular, Biden supported both the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Obama administration's Trans-Pacific Partnership plan. NAFTA has been accused of leading to an exodus of U.S. manufacturing jobs to Mexico.
Joe Biden	Joe Biden does not have a strong record of supporting women's right to have an abortion. For example, Biden supports banning the use of federal funding for most abortions. In the 1970s and 1980s, he also voted to prohibit Medicaid money from being used to fund abortions needed due to rape or incest.
Joe Biden	Joe Biden was almost broke after serving as a Senator for many years. However, he cashed in when he left the White House, making over $15 million dollars in two years, mostly from paid speeches. This money allowed him to buy a 4,800 square foot beach house as a second home.

Candidate	Statement
Michael Bloomberg	When he was mayor New York City, Michael Bloomberg created a controversial program known as stop and frisk. Under the program, police officers detained millions of black and Hispanic young men in heavily black and Hispanic neighborhoods for random searches and questioning. Under the program, people could be detained simply because a police officer suspected they might commit a crime, even if there was no sign they had done anything wrong. During these stops, officers would often stop random black or Hispanic men on the streets, put them against the wall, and put a gun to their head – even if they were simply on their way to work in the morning. Over 5 million such stops took place during Bloomberg's term as mayor of New York. After announcing his run for President and trying to court Hispanic and black votes, Bloomberg apologized for the program and said it was a mistake – even though he had defended it as recently as six months ago.
Michael Bloomberg	Michael Bloomberg was formerly the chief executive of a financial company. In 1997 a former sales executive charged that Bloomberg told her to Kill it when he learned that she was pregnant. The executive sued Bloomberg for sexual harassment and he settled the case for an undisclosed amount of money.
Michael Bloomberg	Michael Bloomberg was a major supporter of invading Iraq in 2003. When asked recently, he said that he did not regret his prior support of the Iraq War.
Michael Bloomberg	Mike Bloomberg is one of the ten richest Americans and has spent years giving money to politicians, including Tom DeLay, the former Republican Congressman who went to jail for money laundering. In 2018 alone, he gave over $94 million to politicians and PACs.

Candidate	Statement
Michael Bloomberg	Mike Bloomberg is completely out of touch with regular Americans. Mike Bloomberg changes his party and positions to suit the poltiical winds. He isn't a straight shooter and can't be trusted.
Michael Bloomberg	As mayor of New York City, Michael Bloomberg embraced a controlling approach to promoting a healthy lifestyle. Bloomberg supports forcing retailers to keep tobacco products out of sight of customers, limiting the size of soda cups to 16 ounces, and imposing a tax on soda. Bloomberg said that these policies would help poor people the most because they don't have the ability to take care of themselves.
Michael Bloomberg	Mike Bloomberg is a billionaire founder of a financial company and often sides with banks. He said that two people from investment bank Goldman Sachs saved America from the financial crisis of 2008, which was created in large part by risky behavior of investment banks like Goldman Sachs. He was also a supporter of the Troubled Asset Relief Program in which the federal government invested hundreds of millions of dollars in banks involved in the financial crisis.
Michael Bloomberg	Michael Bloomberg is a major supporter of banning access to guns. He has spent over $50 million of his own money trying to convince politicians to pass new gun control laws. Bloomberg has also said that he thinks it is pretty stupid for people to own and keep guns in their homes for self-defense.

Candidate	Statement
Pete Buttigieg	Pete Buttigieg has been mayor of South Bend, Indiana, a city with a large black population. As mayor, Pete Buttigieg fired South Bend's popular black police chief Darryl Boykins. Boykins had recorded white police officers using racist language about him. Buttigieg fired Boykins for making these recordings. Boykins later won a $50,000 settlement from South Bend for racial discrimination. He was replaced as police chief with a white police officer who was later the subject of complaints about racial discrimination from black officers.
Pete Buttigieg	The health clinic Women's Care Center attempted to open a facility in South Bend, Indiana while Pete Buttigieg was mayor there. Women's Care Center provides counseling to pregnant women as an alternative to abortion. Buttigieg overturned the South Bend Common Council and banned the Women's Care Center from opening. Instead, he supported the opening of a clinic that would provide abortions to women.
Pete Buttigieg	In 2007, Pete Buttigieg served as a business consultant to the health insurance company Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan. He worked on a team that helped Blue Cross Blue Shield reduce its costs and raise its prices so it could make more money. Blue Cross Blue Shield then reduced its costs by firing many of its workers – a total of 10 percent of them. It also increased the costs it charged people in Michigan for health insurance.
Pete Buttigieg	Since Pete Buttigieg became mayor of South Bend, Indiana, violent crime there has increased 70%. This makes South Bend an outlier – in the rest of the country during that time, violent crime actually declined 2%.

Candidate	Statement
Pete Buttigieg	Pete Buttigieg is woefully inexperienced and simply not ready to be commander-in-chief. Pete Buttigieg is a corporate sellout who doesn't have any real beliefs and can't be trusted to stand up for working people.
Pete Buttigieg	Pete Buttigieg has been criticized for paying more attention to helping companies make money than how everyday Americans are doing economically. While mayor of South Bend, Indiana, the poverty rate increased by 2% to 54%. Nationally, the poverty rate has been falling.
Pete Buttigieg	Pete Buttigieg often reminds voters that he is a military veteran, and has put photos of himself posing in uniform and holding military guns on his campaign website and in his advertisements. However, although he did serve in the military, he never saw combat. By his own admission, he spent most of his time behind a sophisticated computer terminal in a secure area.
Pete Buttigieg	If elected Pete Buttigieg would be the youngest person to ever assume the office of the presidency – barely 3 years older than the minimum specified in the Constitution.
Pete Buttigieg	In 2015, Pete Buttigieg came out as openly gay. He now lives with his husband, Chasten Buttigieg, in South Bend. The couple met on a gay online dating site in 2015 and got married in 2018.