

CSCE 465 Computer & Network Security

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
Hash Functions

Roadmap

- Hash function lengths
- Hash function applications
- MD5 standard
- SHA-1 standard
- Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC)

Hash Function Properties

Hash Function



- Also known as
 - Message digest
 - One-way transformation
 - One-way function
 - Hash
- Length of $H(m)$ much shorter than length of m
- Usually fixed lengths: 128 or 160 bits

Desirable Properties of Hash Functions

- Consider a hash function H
 - Performance: Easy to compute $H(m)$
 - One-way property: Given $H(m)$ but not m , it's computationally infeasible to find m
 - Collision Resistance:
 - Given $H(m)$, it's computationally infeasible to find m' such that $H(m') = H(m)$.
 - Computationally infeasible to find m_1, m_2 such that $H(m_1) = H(m_2)$

Length of Hash Image

- Question
 - Why do we have 128 bits or 160 bits in the output of a hash function?
 - If it is too long
 - Unnecessary overhead
 - If it is too short
 - Birthday paradox
 - Loss of strong collision property

Birthday Paradox

- Question:
 - What is the smallest group size k such that
 - The probability that at least two people in the group have the same birthday is greater than 0.5?
 - Assume 365 days a year, and all birthdays are equally likely
 - P(k people having k different birthdays):
 $Q(365,k) = 365!/(365-k)!365^k$
 - P(at least two people have the same birthday):
 $P(365,k) = 1-Q(365,k) \geq 0.5$
 - k is about 23

Birthday Paradox (Cont'd)

- Generalization of birthday paradox

- Given

- a random integer with uniform distribution between 1 and n , and
 - a selection of k instances of the random variables

- For large n and k , to have at least one duplicate with $P(n,k) > 0.5$ with the smallest k , we have

$$k = \sqrt{2(\ln 2)n} = 1.18\sqrt{n} \approx \sqrt{n}$$

- Example in the previous case

- $1.18 * (365)^{1/2} = 22.54$

Birthday Paradox (Cont'd)

- Implication for hash function H of length m
 - With probability at least 0.5
 - If we hash about $2^{m/2}$ random inputs,
 - Two messages will have the same hash image
 - Birthday attack
- Conclusion
 - Choose $m \geq 128$


Hash Function Applications

Application: File Authentication

- Want to detect if a file has been changed by someone after it was stored
- Method
 - Compute a hash $H(F)$ of file F
 - Store $H(F)$ separately from F
 - Can tell at any later time if F has been changed by computing $H(F')$ and comparing to stored $H(F)$
- Example tool: Tripwire
- Why not just store a duplicate copy of F ???

Application: User Authentication


- Alice wants to authenticate herself to Bob
 - assuming they already share a secret key K
- Protocol:



User Authentication... (cont'd)


- Why not just send...
 - ...K, in plaintext?
 - ...H(K)? , i.e., what's the purpose of R?

Application: Commitment Protocols

- Ex.: A and B wish to play the game of “odd or even” over the network
 1. A picks a number X
 2. B picks another number Y
 3. A and B “simultaneously” exchange X and Y
 4. A wins if $X+Y$ is odd, otherwise B wins
- If A gets Y before deciding X , A can easily cheat (and vice versa for B)
 - How to prevent this? 

Commitment... (Cont'd)

- Proposal: A must **commit** to X **before** B will send Y
- Protocol:





- Can either A or B successfully cheat now?

Commitment... (Cont'd)

- Why is sending $H(X)$ better than sending X ?
- Why is sending $H(X)$ good enough to prevent **A** from cheating?
- Why is it not necessary for B to send $H(Y)$ (instead of Y)?
- What problems are there if:
 1. The set of possible values for X is **small**?
 2. B can **predict** the next value X that A will pick?

Application: Message Encryption


- Assume A and B share a secret key K
 - but don't want to just use encryption of the message with K
- A sends B the (encrypted) random number R1,
B sends A the (encrypted) random number R2
- And then... 



- R1 | R2 is used like the IV of OFB mode, but C+H replaces encryption;

Application: Message Authentication


- A wishes to authenticate (but not encrypt) a message M (and A, B share secret key K)




- Why is R needed? Why is K needed?

Application: Digital Signatures

Generating a signature



Verifying a signature



- Only **one party** (Bob) knows the **private** key


Modern Hash Functions

- MD5
 - Previous versions (i.e., MD2, MD4) have weaknesses.
 - Broken; collisions published in August 2004
 - Too weak to be used for serious applications
- SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm)
 - Weaknesses were found
- SHA-1
 - Broken, but not yet cracked
 - Collisions in 2^{69} hash operations, much less than the brute-force attack of 2^{80} operations
 - Results were circulated in February 2005, and published in CRYPTO '05 in August 2005
- SHA-256, SHA-384, ...


The MD5 Hash Function

MD5: Message Digest Version 5

- MD5 at a glance




Processing of A Single Block



Called a compression function

MD5: A High-Level View




Notation

- $\sim x$ = bit-wise complement of x
- $x \wedge y, x \vee y, x \oplus y$ = bit-wise AND, OR, XOR of x and y
- $x \ll y$ = left circular shift of x by y bits
- $x + y$ = arithmetic sum of x and y (discarding carry-out from the msb)
- $\lfloor x \rfloor$ = largest integer less than or equal to x

Processing a Block -- Overview

- Every message block Y_i contains **16 32-bit words**:
 - $m_0 m_1 m_2 \dots m_{15}$
- A block is processed in **4** consecutive passes, each modifying the MD5 buffer (the *digest*) d_0, \dots, d_3 .
 - Called $\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{I}$
- Each pass uses one-fourth of a 64-element table of constants, $T[1\dots 64]$
 - $T[i] = \lfloor 2^{32} * \text{abs}(\sin(i)) \rfloor$, represented in 32 bits
- Output digest = input digest + output of 4th pass


Overview (Cont'd)



Four Passes of MD5

- $\mathcal{F}(x,y,z) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (x \wedge y) \vee (\sim x \wedge z)$
 - $\mathcal{G}(x,y,z) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (x \wedge z) \vee (y \wedge \sim z)$
 - $\mathcal{H}(x,y,z) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (x \oplus y \oplus z)$
 - $\mathcal{I}(x,y,z) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} y \oplus (x \vee \sim z)$
-
- Every pass has 16 processing steps (each step involves calculation using above functions and circular shift)

Logic of Each Step



(In)security of MD5

- A few recently discovered methods can find collisions in a few hours
 - A few collisions were published in 2004
 - Can find many collisions for 1024-bit messages
 - More discoveries afterwards
 - In 2005, two X.509 certificates with different public keys and the same MD5 hash were constructed
 - This method is based on differential analysis
 - 8 hours on a 1.6GHz computer
 - Much faster than birthday attack

The SHA-1 Hash Function

Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)

- Developed by NIST, specified in the Secure Hash Standard, 1993
- SHA is specified as the hash algorithm in the Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
- SHA-1: revised (1995) version of SHA

SHA-1 Parameters

- Input message must be $< 2^{64}$ bits
- Input message is processed in 512-bit blocks, with the same padding as MD5
- Message digest output is **160** bits long
 - Referred to as five 32-bit words **A, B, C, D, E**
 - **IV:** **A** = 0x67452301, **B** = 0xEFCDAB89, **C** = 0x98BADCFE, **D** = 0x10325476, **E** = 0xC3D2E1F0
- Footnote: bytes of words are stored in big-endian order

Preprocessing of a Block

- Let 512-bit block be denoted as sixteen 32-bit words $W_0..W_{15}$
- Preprocess $W_0..W_{15}$ to derive an additional sixty-four 32-bit words $W_{16}..W_{79}$, as follows:

for $16 \leq t \leq 79$

$$W_t = (W_{t-16} \oplus W_{t-14} \oplus W_{t-8} \oplus W_{t-3}) \ll 1$$

Block Processing

- Consists of **80 steps!** (vs. 64 for MD5)
- Inputs for each step $0 \leq t \leq 79$:
 - W_t
 - K_t – a constant
 - **A,B,C,D,E**: current values to this point
- Outputs for each step:
 - **A,B,C,D,E** : new values
- Output of last step is added to input of first step to produce 160-bit Message Digest

Function $f(t,B,C,D)$

- 3 different functions are used in SHA-1 processing

Round	Function $f(t,B,C,D)$	Compare with MD-5
$0 \leq t \leq 19$	$(B \wedge C) \vee (\sim B \wedge D)$	$\mathcal{F} = (x \wedge y) \vee (\sim x \wedge z)$
$20 \leq t \leq 39$	$B \oplus C \oplus D$	$\mathcal{H} = x \oplus y \oplus z$
$40 \leq t \leq 59$	$(B \wedge C) \vee (B \wedge D) \vee (C \wedge D)$	
$60 \leq t \leq 79$	$B \oplus C \oplus D$	$\mathcal{H} = x \oplus y \oplus z$

- No use of MD5's $\mathcal{G}((x \wedge z) \vee (y \wedge \sim z))$ or $\mathcal{I}(y \oplus (x \vee \sim z))$

Processing Per Step

- Everything to right of “=” is input value to this step

```
for t = 0 upto 79
```

```
    A = E + (A << 5) + Wt + Kt + f(t, B, C, D)
```

```
    B = A
```

```
    C = B << 30
```

```
    D = C
```

```
    E = D
```

```
endfor
```

Comparison: SHA-1 vs. MD5


- SHA-1 is a stronger algorithm
 - brute-force attacks require on the order of 2^{80} operations vs. 2^{64} for MD5
- SHA-1 is about twice as expensive to compute
- Both MD-5 and SHA-1 are **much** faster to compute than DES

Security of SHA-1

- SHA-1
 - “Broken”, but not yet cracked
 - Collisions in 2^{69} hash operations, much less than the brute-force attack of 2^{80} operations
 - Results were circulated in February 2005, and published in CRYPTO '05 in August 2005
- SHA-256, SHA-384, ...

The Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC)

MD5 Revisited




Extension Attacks

- Given $M1$, and secret key K , can easily concatenate and compute the hash:
 $H(K|M1|padding)$
- Given $M1$, $M2$, and $H(K|M1|padding)$ easy to compute $H(K|M1|padding|M2|newpadding)$ for some new message $M2$
- Simply use $H(K|M1|padding)$ as the IV for computing the hash of $M2|newpadding$
 - does not require knowing the value of the secret key K

Extension Attacks (Cont'd)

- Many proposed solutions to the extension attack, but **HMAC** is the standard
- Essence: digest-inside-a-digest, with the secret used at both levels
- The particular hash function used determines the length of the message digest = length of HMAC output

HMAC Processing



Summary

- Hashing is fast to compute
- Has many applications (some making use of a secret key)
- Hash images must be at least 128 bits long
 - but longer is better
- Hash function details are tedious ☹️
- HMAC protects message digests from extension attacks