## **STRIDE Threat Model**

Threat	Property Violated	Example / Focus	Mitigation Principle
S – Spoofing	Authentication	Fake identity, forged	MFA, Authenticator
		credentials	Pattern
T – Tampering	Integrity	Modifying code/data	Hashing, Digital Signatures
R – Repudiation	Non-repudiation /	Delete or deny logs	Immutable Logs, Audit
	Accountability		Trails
I – Information	Confidentiality	Unauthorized read	Encryption, Access Control
Disclosure			
D – Denial of Service	Availability	Overload / Disable	Rate Limiting, Redundancy
E – Elevation of Privilege	Authorization	Bypass roles	Least Privilege, RBAC/ABAC

## **LINDDUN Privacy Threat Categories**

Letter	Meaning	Typical Violation
L – Linkability	Linking records across contexts	Pseudonymization
I – Identifiability	Re-identifying subjects	Anonymization
N – Non-repudiation	Can't deny actions → privacy breach	Policy separation
<b>D</b> – Detectability	Existence of data visible	Obfuscation, padding
<b>D</b> – Disclosure of Information	Unauthorized exposure	Encryption
U – Unawareness	No user knowledge/consent	Notice, Transparency
N – Non-compliance	Breach of law/policy (e.g., GDPR)	Data Minimization, Purpose Limitation

# **Security Patterns**

Pattern	Type / Scope	Problem Solved	Key Design Concept
Authenticator	Design	Verify identity centrally	Central Auth Service validates credentials →
			issues token/assertion
Multi-Factor Auth	Mechanism	Strengthen user	Combine ≥ 2 factors: Knowledge (pwd),
(MFA)		verification	Possession (token/HOTP), Inherence (biometric)
Gatekeeper / Security	Structural /	Central enforcement	Intercepts requests → validates token → applies
Proxy	Implementation	before business logic	policy → logs access
RBAC (Role-Based	Architectural /	Manage authz by roles	Map user → role → permission matrix
Access Control)	Design		
ABAC (Attribute-	Architectural /	Contextual decisions	Evaluate subject/object/environment attributes
Based Access Control)	Design		
Secure Channel	Implementation	Confidentiality +	Mutual certificate verification; encrypt data
(mTLS)		authenticity in	
		transport	
Input Validation	Code-level	Prevent injection/XSS	Sanitize inputs before processing

### **Access & Authentication Concepts**

#### • Authentication vs Authorization

 $AuthN = who you are \mid AuthZ = what you can do$ 

## • Tokens / Assertions

- o JWT: iss, sub, aud, exp, scope, role
- o SAML / OIDC: signed XML or JWT assertions

## • Lifetimes & Scopes

- o Short-lived tokens (≤ 15 min) → refresh via Authenticator
- Scoped permissions (e.g., billing.read, mission.write)

#### • Service-to-Service Auth

- Use client certs (mTLS) + service JWTs (aud = target API)
- No password sharing between microservices

### Auditability

o Immutable logs + time-stamped token IDs + user context

## **Principles for Secure Architecture**

- Least Privilege: Grant minimal required access.
- **Defense in Depth:** Layer controls (Gatekeeper + RBAC + mTLS).
- **Complete Mediation:** Check every access, every time.
- Fail Secure: If auth fails, deny access safely.
- **Separation of Duties:** No single entity can perform destructive actions alone.
- Accountability: Trace every action to an identity.
- Secure by Default: Opt-in for risk, not for protection.