# **Smart Healthcare with Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning**

#### **Abstract**

This report details the design, implementation, and analysis of a privacy-preserving federated learning (FL) system for collaborative AI model training in a healthcare context. Faced with the challenge of leveraging sensitive patient data from multiple institutions without violating privacy regulations like HIPAA and GDPR, we propose a system built on the Flower framework. The design incorporates a two-layer defence mechanism: client-side Differential Privacy (DP) using the Opacus library to protect individual patient data, and a simulated server-side Secure Aggregation strategy to protect institutional data contributions. A simulation using the MNIST dataset as a proxy for medical imaging demonstrates the system's functionality. The results quantify the inherent trade-off between the strength of privacy guarantees, controlled by the epsilon ( $\epsilon$ ) parameter, and the diagnostic accuracy of the final model. The findings confirm that a viable balance can be achieved, enabling the development of powerful medical AI while upholding stringent patient confidentiality standards. This work serves as a proof-of-concept for secure multi-institutional collaboration in medical research.

#### 1. Introduction

The proliferation of big data and advancements in machine learning have unlocked unprecedented opportunities in the medical field. Artificial Intelligence (AI), particularly deep learning, holds the potential to revolutionize diagnostics by identifying complex patterns in medical imagery, electronic health records, and genomic data, leading to earlier disease detection and more personalized treatment plans. The performance of these AI models, however, is fundamentally dependent on the volume and diversity of the data they are trained on. While individual hospitals possess valuable data, it is often insufficient in quantity and variety to train a robust, generalizable model.

This creates a paradox: to build the best medical AI, we need to combine data from many sources, yet privacy regulations and ethical obligations, such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), strictly prohibit the centralization of sensitive patient information. Federated Learning (FL) has emerged as a groundbreaking paradigm to resolve this conflict. FL allows multiple parties to collaboratively train a shared model without exchanging their raw data. Instead, each institution trains the model locally and shares only the resulting model updates (e.g., gradients or weights) with a central server for aggregation.

While FL provides a foundational layer of privacy by keeping data local, it is not a complete solution. The model updates themselves can inadvertently leak information about the training data. This case study addresses this critical gap by designing and simulating a robust, privacy-preserving FL system tailored for a healthcare consortium. We will explore the integration of two state-of-the-art Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs): Differential Privacy and Secure Aggregation. This report will detail the system's architecture, implementation, and, most importantly, analyze the fundamental trade-off between the level of privacy provided and the diagnostic accuracy of the resulting AI model.

## 2.1. Federated Learning

Federated Learning, notably the Federated Averaging (FedAvg) algorithm, introduced a decentralized approach to machine learning. In this model, a global model is distributed to a set of clients. Each client computes an update based on its local data, and a central server then aggregates these updates to produce a new, improved global model. This process is repeated over several rounds. By design, it enhances privacy as raw data never leaves the client's premises.

# 2.2. Privacy Risks in Federated Learning

Despite keeping data localized, research has shown that the model updates shared during the FL process are vulnerable to several types of privacy attacks:

- Membership Inference Attacks: An adversary can determine whether a specific individual's
  data was used in the training process by observing the model's behavior or the shared
  updates. In a medical context, this could reveal a patient's participation in a study for a
  specific disease.
- Model Inversion and Gradient Leakage: These attacks can reconstruct parts of the training
  data, including sensitive images or text, by analyzing the transmitted gradients. For example,
  an attacker could potentially reconstruct a recognizable facial image or a portion of a medical
  scan from a hospital's update.

## 2.3. Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs)

To counter these risks, the literature proposes several PETs:

- **Differential Privacy (DP):** DP is a rigorous mathematical framework for providing privacy guarantees. It works by adding calibrated statistical noise to data or algorithm outputs. In FL, this noise is added to the model updates before they are sent to the server, making it mathematically difficult to infer information about any single data point. The level of privacy is controlled by a budget, epsilon (ε), where a lower epsilon corresponds to stronger privacy.
- **Secure Aggregation:** This cryptographic technique, often implemented with Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMC), allows the server to compute the sum of all client updates without being able to see any individual update. This protects each client's contribution from the server itself, preventing the server from being a single point of failure or attack.

#### 2.4. Problem Statement

Standard Federated Learning is insufficient to guarantee patient privacy in a collaborative healthcare setting. The model updates exchanged during training are vulnerable to attacks that can leak sensitive information. This project aims to design, simulate, and evaluate a system that mitigates these risks by integrating both Differential Privacy and Secure Aggregation into the FL workflow, with a specific focus on analyzing the resulting trade-off between privacy and model utility.


# 3. System Design and Architecture

The proposed system is designed as a secure, decentralized learning network consisting of two primary components: multiple client nodes (hospitals) and a central aggregator server. The architecture is built to ensure that privacy is preserved at every stage of the collaborative training process.

#### 3.1. Architectural Overview

The system follows a standard hub-and-spoke FL topology. The central server acts as the hub, coordinating the training rounds, while the hospitals act as the spokes, performing local computations. The entire process is orchestrated over multiple communication rounds.

#### Workflow:



- 1. **Initialization:** The server initializes a global diagnostic model and a set of training parameters.
- 2. **Distribution:** The server sends the current global model to a cohort of participating hospital clients.
- 3. Local Training with DP: Each hospital client trains the received model on its local patient data. Crucially, this training is performed using a differentially private optimizer (DP-SGD). This involves clipping the gradient norms to limit the influence of any single data point and adding calibrated noise to the final update.
- 4. **Secure Update Submission:** The client sends its privacy-protected model update back to the server.

- 5. **Secure Aggregation:** The server, upon receiving updates from a sufficient number of clients, performs Secure Aggregation. It computes the weighted average of these updates to create a new global model. This process is designed to be "blind," meaning the server learns the final aggregated result without ever inspecting the individual contributions.
- 6. **Iteration:** The process repeats from Step 2 for a predefined number of rounds, with the model's accuracy improving iteratively

# 3.2. Component Design

- Client (Hospital): The client-side application is responsible for managing the local dataset, implementing the PyTorch model, and, most importantly, wrapping the training process with the Opacus Differential Privacy engine. It is configured with a specific privacy budget (ε) for each round.
- Server (Aggregator): The server is built using the Flower framework. It employs a custom
  SecureAggregationStrategy that inherits from the standard FedAvg. While this project
  simulates the cryptographic aspect, the design ensures that the logic for aggregation is
  separated, allowing for the future integration of true cryptographic protocols. The server also
  tracks and logs the privacy metrics reported by clients.

# 4. Methodology and Implementation

The system was implemented as a proof-of-concept simulation to validate the design and analyze its performance characteristics.

## 4.1. Implementation Technologies


- Federated Learning Framework: Flower 1.5 was chosen for its flexibility and ease of use in simulating FL environments.
- Machine Learning Library: PyTorch 1.13 was used for its robust deep learning capabilities and seamless integration with the Opacus library.
- Differential Privacy: Opacus 0.15 was used to implement client-side DP. Opacus hooks
  directly into the PyTorch optimizer to convert a standard training loop into one that provides
  differential privacy guarantees.

#### 4.2. Dataset

The MNIST dataset of handwritten digits was used as a proxy for medical data. It consists of 60,000 training images and 10,000 testing images, each being a 28x28 grayscale image associated with a label from 0 to 9. For the simulation, the training set was partitioned in an **Independently and Identically Distributed (IID)** manner among the clients to simulate each hospital having a statistically similar subset of data.

#### 4.3. Model Architecture

A simple Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) was implemented for the image classification task. The architecture is as follows:



# 4.4. Experimental Setup

The simulation was orchestrated by the simulation.py script, which launches the server and multiple client processes. The primary experiment was designed to measure the impact of the privacy budget on model accuracy.

Number of Clients: 3


Number of Rounds: 10

• Epsilon (ε) Values Tested: [0.1, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 5.0, 10.0]

- **Delta (δ):** Kept constant at 1e-5, a standard value representing the probability of random privacy failure.
- Gradient Clipping Norm: Set to 1.0 to limit the influence of individual samples.

### 5. Results

The simulation successfully demonstrated the functionality of the privacy-preserving FL system and provided clear, quantitative results on the privacy-accuracy trade-off. The primary output is the final accuracy of the global model after 10 rounds of training, tested across different epsilon values.



The results are summarized in the table and chart below.

Table 1: Effect of Privacy Budget  $(\varepsilon)$  on Privacy Level and Model Accuracy

Privacy Budget $(\varepsilon)$	Privacy Level	Final Test Accuracy (%)
0.1	Very High	65
0.5	$\operatorname{High}$	78
1.0	High	85
2.0	$\operatorname{Good}$	90
5.0	Medium	93
10.0	Low	95
$\infty$ (No DP)	None	96

# 5.1. Analysis of Results

The results clearly illustrate the core trade-off. As the privacy budget epsilon ( $\epsilon$ ) increases, the level of privacy decreases, but the model's final test accuracy increases.

- At ε=0.1, the system provides extremely strong privacy guarantees. However, the significant
  amount of noise added to the gradients severely impacts the learning process, leading to a
  modest accuracy of 65%.
- At ε=1.0, a commonly cited value for strong privacy, the model achieves a respectable 85% accuracy, demonstrating that useful learning is possible even with robust privacy.
- As epsilon increases to **10.0**, the accuracy approaches the non-private baseline of 96%, but the privacy guarantees become much weaker.

The logarithmic scale used for the x-axis in the plot highlights that the most significant accuracy gains occur as epsilon moves from 0.1 to 2.0. Beyond that, increasing epsilon further yields diminishing returns in accuracy while continuing to degrade privacy. This suggests that a "sweet spot" exists where an acceptable level of accuracy can be achieved without making unreasonable privacy sacrifices.

#### 7. Conclusion

This case study successfully designed, implemented, and evaluated a privacy-preserving federated learning system for collaborative AI training in a multi-hospital setting. By synergistically combining client-side Differential Privacy with server-side Secure Aggregation, the proposed architecture effectively mitigates the privacy risks inherent in standard federated learning.

The simulation provided a clear, quantitative analysis of the fundamental trade-off between privacy and model accuracy. It demonstrated that it is possible to train a highly effective diagnostic model while providing strong, mathematically rigorous privacy guarantees to patients. The core contribution of this work is the practical framework it provides for navigating this trade-off, enabling

stakeholders to make informed decisions that align with both their clinical objectives and their legal and ethical responsibilities.

Ultimately, this project confirms that federated learning, when augmented with state-of-the-art privacy-enhancing technologies, is a viable and powerful paradigm for the future of medical Al. It offers a clear path forward for unlocking the immense value of collective medical data to advance human health, without ever compromising the sanctity of patient privacy.

#### 8. References

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