



1:30	<p>The 3<sup>rd</sup> Analogy argues that – and typically Kant has real problems figuring out what it is he want to argue; the arguments in the A and B editions are different and each worth considering.</p> <p>In the A edition it is all <i>substances</i> – and notice that Kant has dropped event talk altogether and is utterly clear that he is talking about substances – medium-sized dry goods.</p>
2:30	<p>And we see that all substances, so far as they exist, stand in thoroughgoing community – that is, mutual interaction.</p> <p>The thought here is that what the notion of “community” means is <i>mutual</i> interaction, that is, mutually acting on one another. This is the claim that all the substances that exist at the same time in the universe are either directly or indirectly – as we will see in a passage – causally influencing one another.</p>
3:30	<p>In the B edition Kant realizes that the statement of the A edition is totally ontological. There is no mention of <i>knowledge</i> anywhere in it. So in the B deduction he has to tie it into knowledge.</p> <p>So there he says that all substances, <i>in so far as they can be perceived</i> to coexist in space are in thoroughgoing reciprocity.</p>
4:30	<p>At least the B version makes it clear that he is interested now in the analogue problem that we have been gesturing at all along – namely, how objects that can be perceived to coexist – the condition of possibility of that is that there must be a rule that says they are mutually determining one another.</p>
5:30	<p>So the thought behind this comes out nicely at A212 where he says...and this is the contrary hypothesis:</p> <p><i>“Now assuming that in a manifold of substances, as appearances, each of them is completely isolated, [a1] that is, that no one acts on any other and receives reciprocal influences in return, [a2] I maintain that their coexistence would not be an object of a possible perception and that the existence of one could not lead by any path of empirical synthesis to the existence of another. For if we bear in mind that they would be separated by a completely empty space, the perception which advances from one to another in time would indeed, by means of a succeeding perception, determine the existence of the latter, but would not be able to distinguish whether it follows objectively upon the first or whether it is not rather coexistence with it[a3].”</i></p>
	<p>[a1] So we begin by assuming the opposite of causal interaction.</p>

	<p>[a2] Notice that the language here tells you in part what Kant means by causal interaction. Things are causally interacting with one another either simultaneously or over time only in so far as they <i>act</i> with one another.</p> <p>And we have to figure out eventually why he is using the language of 'action' here. But he thinks of substances as acting on one another. And in acting on one another they do things with one another, influence one another.</p> <p>So he uses a language and vocabulary drawn from the language and vocabulary of agency and subjectivity. We'll come back to this since it is part of the metaphysics of causality for Kant.</p>
	<p>[a3] That's the <i>reductio ad absurdum</i>. The thought is, if I have two objects and I have empty space between them, then sure enough I can see first A and then turn and look at B, I can certainly be aware that I am seeing first one thing and then another, but if there is nothing here that would connect them, then I would have no grounds for claiming that they exist at the same, so that they would be coexistence.</p> <p>Rather, I would always have an A then B then A1 then B1 then A2 then B2. But I could never be assured of their coexistence.</p> <p>What I requires therefore is a <i>rule</i> that would allow me to connect them – and the rule would have to connect with something in the world; it can't be just an idle rule.</p> <p>The rule would have to be such that the reason we suspect that A and B are existing at the same time is because they are mutually influencing each other.</p> <p>And this is exactly what he says in the next paragraph of A 212:</p>
10:30	<p><i>"There must, therefore, [b1] besides the mere existence of A and B, be something through which A determines for B, and also reversewise B determines for A, its position in time, because only on this condition can these substances be empirically represented as coexisting. Now only that which is the cause of another, or of its determination, determines the position of the other in time. Each substance (inasmuch as only in respect of its determination can it be an effect [Folge]) must therefore contain in itself the causality of certain determinations in the other substance, and at the same time the effects of the causality of that other; that is, the substances must stand, immediately or mediately, in dynamical community, if there coexistence is to be known in any possible experience. [b2]"</i></p>
	<p>[b1] Notice that part of the problem arises because by itself an object cannot determine its place in time. Objects do not come labeled with their temporal location. Temporal location has to be something we achieve through the coordinating of objects through rules of perception.</p> <p>And of course the premise here as everywhere is that time itself cannot be perceived. So figuring out what time something is at means getting a system of temporal relations in play.</p>

	<p>[b2] So the <i>state</i> of A – which is what he means by “determination” – must be such that its having that state is in part determined by the influence of B. And conversely, at least in part, the state of B must be determined by the force and action of A.</p> <p>Here it is clear that Kant does have something like a force and field model in mind in which the states of objects are vectoral.</p>
14:30	<p>The thought is, if two substances with attractive forces – and at this point in history the background has got to be gravitation, although in the next paragraph he uses the example of light traveling from a distant planet, which will give us the same set of issues – are three feet apart at one moment in time – and here's the trick – both their distance from one another (that they are three feet apart) and the strength of their attractive forces will determine how much closer they will move.</p> <p>This by the way is why Hume got everything completely wrong.</p>
16:00	<p>He great problem of causality for Hume is the solipsism of the present moment. That is, being in a perceptual state, Hume wonders how he can know what is going to happen next.</p> <p>He has the difficulty of thinking of knowing that there is no intrinsic connection between the present, the past, and the future.</p> <p>But we want to say that both atomism and event ontology precipitate that problem. That is, the problem is as much ontological as it is epistemological.</p> <p>This is because the truth of an atomistic universe is that state of an atom at T1 is complete and independent of its past and future states. That is, an atom just is a “presence”.</p> <p>Now in a force field, to say that two objects are a certain distance apart is to say that their state at T1 is a <i>consequence</i> of T0 and is directed towards T2.</p> <p>[compare <a href="#">determinacyallthewaydown</a> below]</p> <p>That is, a “field” just is that notion of the connectability between an object past and present. So that what we typically think of looking at a force field at a time, we typically think of looking at it at a time ‘slice’. We ‘slice’ what is in fact a dynamic movement.</p>
19:00	<p>The claim here then is that an atomistic universe is intrinsically non-dynamic, which is why they have a God that kicks starts them. Even Newton thinks that God is necessary to keep things in motion.</p> <p>So there is no notion of force, energy, power, or any of these concepts. Our suggestion is that in solving the problem of causality. Kant thinks that that the underbelly of that is a transformed metaphysics of causality.</p> <p>The crux of his book <i>The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science</i> is the construction of a force theory of matter.</p>

20:00	<p>Kant recognized perfectly that you could not overcome the solipsism of the present moment and have an effective conception of causality without reconceiving the nature of objects and their causal powers.</p> <p>The point here is that relational properties depend on two things. In part on the <i>intrinsic</i> properties of objects—what their powers are. And on the context they find themselves in.</p> <p>So an object in this [?] state will be in this state because of its intrinsic properties and its relationship to surrounding objects—and those surrounding objects will be...so that every object will be in this way connected. So that its properties and determinations will be mutually effective.</p>
21:30	<p>That also explains what an event ontology cannot allow why it must be mutual. Namely, that if the...as the second substance is the condition of change for the first substance so the first substance is not in fact capable of changing itself without a causal contribution from another substance.</p> <p>In other words, if they lack mutuality, you would have a state of affairs whereby the state of a substance would be determined by itself alone—its actions—and not by any it received.</p> <p>And that would in a sense rip it out of its causal context.</p>
23:30	<p>So we get in the next paragraph a kind of fulfillment of this—this passage has been interpreted in a lot of different ways.</p> <p>So jumping down to the first full ¶ in A213:</p>
	<p><i>“The word community is in the German language ambiguous. It may mean either <i>communio</i> or <i>commercium</i>. We here employ it in the latter sense, as signifying a dynamical community, without which even local community (<i>communio spatii</i>) could never be empirically known. We may easily recognize from our experiences that only the continuous influences in all parts of space can lead or senses from one object to another. The light, which plays between our eye and the celestial bodies, produces a mediate community between us and them, and thereby shows us that they coexist.”</i></p> <p>[jump to <a href="#">sixthemes</a> or #5 <a href="#">f5</a>]</p>

25:00	<p>A Kantian should find something strange in that passage.</p> <p>It implies that I can only have a perceptual awareness of those celestial bodies if and only if <i>my body</i> is in the same space as those bodies. And therefore my perceptual accounting of them is in part determined by my empirical spatial location. And empirical spatial location, being one which provides therefore a necessary empirical condition for perception of coexistence.</p> <p>So suddenly, rather surprisingly, it turns out that I can only be aware of two objects that are coexisting and are spatially separated from one another if I am in the same space as they are in, and then a whole series of further conditions, namely that that space is regular, I am at a certain distance, is operating.</p>
27:00	<p>It turns out that there are causal conditions of perception—causal conditions that mean that only a certain type of spatially embodied perceivers can have perceptions of alteration and simultaneity.</p> <p>We will come back to this. But this is one of those fleeting passages that after finishing the CPR Kant began to think harder about as recorded in his “Notebooks”. That is, to acknowledge the role of embodiment in our perceptual activities.</p>
28:00	<p>Give or take, that is the argument of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Analogy.</p> <p>We want to now turn to the metaphysics of causality—we have been suggesting that the prior discussion precipitates a certain set of metaphysical commitments.</p> <p>As we suggested last week, the two additions are that we are going to replace event ontology with substance ontology, and secondly we are going to say that a substance can cause a change in the determinate state of another substance only in so far as it contains the ground that determines the successive states of the other substance.</p>
29:00	<p>Remember that logically cause and effect points back to ground and consequence.</p> <p>So the notion of ground and consequence, we are now suggesting, which has a purely logical meaning, but Kant wants to give that a metaphysical reading. That is, he wants to argue that in order for causality to occur, then something must be the <i>ground</i> of the successive state of the other object.</p>
30:00	<p>In the case of mutual interaction, the grounds or powers of substances will jointly determine one another's states, in such a way that these states can be understood as simultaneous.</p>

	<p>So what do we mean by “ground” – what is distinctive about a “ground”?</p> <p>A ground determines the state of another's substance <i>not</i> through a determinate state of its own, or indeed even its mere existence – both of these statements would hold for event ontology.</p> <p>Event ontology would hold that what determines the state of affairs is a <i>previous</i> determinate state of affairs or the existence of a previous determinate state of affairs.</p> <p>We are going to argue that rather the ground determines the state of another substance through an <i>indeterminate</i> – through a <i>temporally indeterminate</i> activity that is <i>incapable</i> of every becoming determinate itself.</p>
33:30	<p>The thought here is that the activity of the liquid on the back of one's throat, through what Kant will call an “infinite, continuous series of changes” [] changes the state of the back of one's throat from dry to quenched.</p> <p>The point is that the water is not an event. The water is a substance. And its activity, whatever those powers are, they are working the whole time, effecting the back of my throat and changing its state.</p> <p>But the power that is allowing that change is not itself changing – so if you ask about the temporal location of the power: and that is what we are saying is indeterminate.</p> <p>In order to imagine a power acting on an object. That power itself cannot be another determinate state, because then there would have to be something else determining it.</p> <p>And of course this is the fancy of event ontology: complete determinacy all the way down</p>
	<p>I am a little unclear of how this description of event ontology is not in contradiction with the one above?</p> <p>Compare <a href="#">presence</a> above.</p>
34:30	<p>So we are suggesting that Kant, before Derrida, before Heidegger, before Wittgenstein understood that determinacy is always the <i>effect</i> – being in a determinate state and therefore being temporally determinate – of a continual action of a temporally indeterminate power.</p> <p>And the power is indeterminate, not just temporally, but also as a state. Because what do we know of a substance? We know its powers. But how do we know its powers? <i>Through what they determine.</i></p> <p>That is to say, all the determinacy that we are going to get here is through the effects of the action.</p>

35:30	<p>About this, in a way, Locke was right. Locke said that even if we had microscopic eyes, so that when we see the water we would see H<sub>2</sub>O and when we see the back of one's throat we would see the actual interaction – we would still see things interacting, but that wouldn't give us the connection. The connection is still going to be understood by a rule that is at a certain level simply inductive.</p>
36:30	<p>The thought here then is that several of the most fundamental properties of bodies – like filling a determinate space and communicating motion – are to be explained, finally for Kant, in terms of the exercise of attractive and repulsive forces.</p> <p>We won't go through this. People used to care about this stuff. Schelling's longest critique of Kant is whether or not we need repulsive forces; why there must be two forces rather than one. And this was a huge debate in the philosophies of nature at the turn into the 19<sup>th</sup> century.</p> <p>But for us we just note here that it was a fundamental part of Kant's theory. And further Kant thought that if we could understand that ultimately attractive and repulsive forces are so to speak the ultimate constituents of the universe – they are the 'prime matter' so to speak – and since they are themselves not further conditioned...</p> <p>Some of the arguments in the <i>Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science</i> show how you can generate the minimum necessary conditions for a material world just using attractive and repulsive forces.</p> <p>Which is to say that a Newtonian world, mechanics, is matter in motion. So what you have to give an account of is how there can be laws of motion. And then Newton's three laws of motion have to be accounted for. And that is what Kant tries to do there.</p> <p>If he can do that by showing just that attractive and repulsive forces alone will do it, then he can show that there are unchanging grounds upon which all motions of objects depend.</p> <p>And if the grounds are unchanging, which is to say that if the conditions that would lead them to change are never present, or the conditions that keep them in place are always present, if that is the case it makes those laws necessary laws – unchanging.</p> <p>So that the possibility of strong causal laws will in a sense depend on these unchanging grounds.</p>
40:00	<p>Kant's theory of law is really complicated so we are not going to go into it.</p>



	<p>So for Hume, we explain the world in terms of completely discrete, instantaneous mental snapshots.</p> <p>[I am still unclear whether <a href="#">presence</a> is the same as <a href="#">determinacyallthewaydown</a>]</p> <p>And that is the problem. And that is both his epistemology – but we are suggesting here that his epistemology stands in a one-to-one relationship with his ontology.</p> <p>And you could retell the history of early modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant strictly through their theories of matter. That is, in each case, their theories of matter precipitate their other epistemological and rational commitments.</p> <p>We will abstain from saying whether the epistemology is determining the ontology or the ontology is determining the epistemology.</p> <p>But it is interesting and important for us because empiricism gets such a heavy hearing that we need to remind ourselves that once upon a time that philosophers cared about such things.</p> <p>Epistemology almost by definition is empiricist – and this makes us ontologically stupid. And Kant is struggling to bring us out of that stupidity, that is part of what the Copernican Turn is all about.</p>
42:00	<p>So we see that a cause is required to bring about a succession of states and its effects. And a cause therefore need not be an event, it need not be prior to its effect, and it need not have any specific characteristics at all.</p> <p>Event models trivially can make absolutely no sense of simultaneity – this would just be a contradiction in terms. And it is for that reason that Schopenhauer banished mutual interaction from the world.</p> <p>Watkins quotes this passage from Schopenhauer on page 238 of his book (where in Schopenhauer?):</p>
	<p><i>“Only in so far as a state A precedes a state B in time, but their succession is necessary and not contingent, only to that extent is state A the cause and state B the effect. The concept of mutual interaction states, however, that both are the cause and both the effect of the other. But this means the same that each one is both the earlier and the later event, [c1] which is absurd [ungedanke] for that both states are simultaneous and necessarily so cannot be accepted because a necessarily correlate of simultaneous they constitute only one state. [c2]”</i></p>
43:30	<p>[c1] If you think of events as instantaneous then if A is the cause of B and B is the cause of A – which is what mutual interaction amounts to – then B is prior to A and A is prior to B.</p> <p>And you can see why Schopenhauer would think that this is absurd, which is what he says.</p>

44:00	<p>[c2] This just is a description of the position of event ontology. It literally finds the idea of mutual interaction unintelligible.</p> <p>Which is why all those Kantians who look at the 2<sup>nd</sup> Analogy and not the 3<sup>rd</sup> miss the depth of Kant's analysis.</p> <p>We have been arguing all along that you need all three analogies, but it is the third that has the ontological bite because it shows the depth of his departure from event ontology.</p>
44:00	<p>So once you have all this in place, then a variety of other things follow.</p> <p>We won't go through all the complications here, but Kant solves the problem that you do not need temporal precedence to have causal precedence.</p> <p>The common example for this is the cannon ball on the pillow.</p>
45:30	<p>What causes the dent in the pillow? Is it the welcoming arms of the pillow?</p> <p>[]</p> <p>Because what you need is ground and effect.</p> <p>This is a problem of the metaphysics of causality – how can an effect be simultaneous with its cause? The answer is, the effect can be simultaneous with the cause if it [?] is the ground?</p> <p>[]</p>
	<p>So grounds are what endure through change of the states they cause, whereas events are ephemeral. Grounds determine states and therefore are responsible for the kind of necessity between it and its effects.</p>

46:30	<p>Whatever necessity means here it means something like “natural” necessity. Simply, this is what water does to a dry throat. It has powers that do that. This is what it is to have a power. That is the circularity in part.</p> <p>Powers are not distinct from their effects in the way that events must be. We know a power so what counts as a vicious circularity in the traditional metaphysics of causality...</p> <p>Philosophers take the Moliere-line: opium has a dormative power. But a dormative power is one that makes us sleepy.</p> <p>The problem is if you are an empiricist, that is circular, because your only definition of the power is its effect. Therefore the notion of power drops out.</p> <p>But we are suggesting that once we have an appropriate metaphysics of substance, ground, and effect – and further understand that we know the powers of a substance through its actions, then hopefully that circularity does not seem virtue.</p>
48:00	<p>Nonetheless, we might say, what on earth is it that you mean by “power”?</p> <p>And why would we think that substances <i>act</i> and <i>influence</i> things?</p>
49:00	<p>Kant's language here should tell us that he is in fact basing his understanding of causality on his understanding of human agency.</p> <p>So that the power of the “I think” is to bring about – and it's a power we are aware of – and these are all the passages that we will go through in the second half where he says that we are aware of the spontaneity of the “I think” – Kant is saying that we are aware of our own synthetic activity.</p> <p>The thought here is that actively producing, say ‘drawing a line’, becomes a model and an analogue for understanding the motion of objects.</p>
	<p>So Kant says [where?]:</p> <p><i>“Even time itself we cannot represent save in so far as we attend in the drawing of a straight line merely to the act of synthesis of a manifold whereby we successively determine inner sense and so doing attend the succession of its inner determinations.”</i></p>

51:00	<p>So we have a pre-theoretical awareness of action.</p> <p>In fact this is something a baby develops – developmental psychology has interesting things to say here.</p> <p>Alice Crary was saying that her young daughter had recently discovered a new causal law: you scream and you get something.</p> <p>So the daughter is acquiring the idea of action at a distance. And then there will come a time when she has got to figure out those things she is really effecting and those she only thinks she is effecting.</p> <p>But the point is that this discovery is a discovery of our very powers to change and alter the world. So we have a very good idea that doing something makes a change in the world and therefore something else can do it too.</p> <p>We think that our action [which we perform] is analogous to other actions [which we observe].</p>
52:30	<p>So we model that notion of power. And that notion of having...so that objects <i>act</i>.</p> <p>Therefore our anthropomorphically stupid way of speaking is not so stupid. For instance, when we say, 'the door gave me a bruise' – it is true that had I not myself bumped into the door, then the door would not have given me the bruise. But it was the causal powers of the door – it had a sharp corner and enough resistance that it was able to injure me.</p> <p>So the door in that sense did act, and something with different materials or differently shaped wouldn't not have produced that result.</p> <p><i>Objects act.</i></p>
54:00	Question:

	<p>Certainly it is more rational than the empiricists.</p> <p>The problem is that the disenchantment of the world often rids the world by thinking that anything that is anything like or based on a human projection <i>must be illusory</i> which ends up ripping out of the world its own most characteristic powers.</p> <p>That is the thought. It certainly is an argument that science should not be interpreted as a process of disenchantment – which it has been.</p> <p>And that will go all the way down to our understanding of explanation. Explanation ultimately will be a story about bringing certain things about.</p> <p>So the model of explanation is not just nomological deduction, as pretty as that is. As everyone knows, a pure mathematical law – if you cannot model it sufficiently then you cannot give an account of what it is supposed to do, or generate experiments and the like.</p> <p>And modeling is in fact the activity of showing the connection between the theory and the actual physical structure of the world, sufficient for experimentation, to produce certain effects.</p> <p>That is what experiments do – they bring things about.</p>
56:30	<p>So causality is a brining of things about.</p> <p>So alteration then in the world is going to be a second problem that Kant solves. Event ontology...events are simultaneous...if you have a substance then what you have is the idea that alteration is a continuous change through an infinite number of degrees to bring about an effect – not something that is instantaneous.</p> <p>And that of course allows you to ideally do more science. You can try to be detailed about the bringing about of effects. Once you begin to think that then you can say 'how does water do things?' and then you can ask about such things as chemical reactions between the water and the back of the throat, etc.</p>
57:30	<p>It is the structure of causal laws, their asymmetry, that explains, the causal relationship.</p> <p>A ground <i>determines</i> a consequence. That is the crux. It is the asymmetry – not the temporal order. That is Kant says that asymmetry replaces temporal order.</p> <p>So a ground determines a consequence. So when we talk about water having the power to...</p> <p>So when we talk about the ground of my throat being quenched, we are talking about the water doing it. Conversely, a consequence entails the existence of <i>some</i> ground, but no particular ground.</p>

58:30	<p>That will preserve that asymmetry indefinitely.</p> <p>Finally, a power – interestingly enough, and there is a huge amount of metaphysical literature on this – a power is neither a substance nor an accident.</p> <p>Roughly because we use powers to <i>explain</i> what accidents a substance has, and therefore if we identified it with the accident there would be no explanation, while if we identified it with the substance there would be only properties but nothing having those properties.</p>
60:00	<p>This does commit us to all sorts of problems but it turns out that this does commit us to an indeterminate conception of substance.</p> <p>So powers are necessarily indeterminate, they are known through their effects.</p> <p>That is all we are going to say for now about the metaphysics of power.</p>
60:30	<p>We probably didn't suspect when we began reading Kant that we were going to end up here, but at least here – and this is the challenge on Jay's reading – the first part of which is easy – Jay thinks that all of this is necessary in order to make sense of the three analogies.</p> <p>Without this kind of metaphysics the three analogies are just not going to model anything coherent.</p> <p>But the second claim and this is our segue into the second half of class today is that we should take deeply seriously that Kant is a transcendental idealist. And he says that Transcendental Idealism entails Empirical Realism.</p> <p>[Which is what I have suspected all along. See my schema <a href="#">..\diagrams\Diagram, from the world and back to it.doc</a>]</p>
61:30	<p>And Kant seems to really mean "realism". Kant isn't any kind of phenomenalist. What he is really talking about is thick, heavy weight realism at the empirical level. And he thinks that you only get that kind of realism – the kind of realism that gets you substances and powers and all the like, as we soon see in the Refutation of Idealism – if you have Transcendental Idealism.</p>
1:02:30	Remember that Kant started with the claim that <i>only</i> the idealist can be a realist.
	***End of Part I***
	***Break***
	***Part II***
00:00	<p>It of course follows from what we have just overly-dramatically said that in the second half of the lecture next week we will have to return to where we started. That is, the problem of appearances and things in themselves and [?] Transcendental Idealism.</p> <p>And we will get on to that next week. Which is the obvious crux of the Copernican Turn.</p>

1:00	<p>There are six large themes that are now beginning to emerge.</p> <p>Before we note these six themes, we will first look at a bunch of passages in the B deduction about the relationship between the “I think” and the inner sense, as a way of leading into the Refutation of Idealism.</p>
2:00	<p>So first we look at B 153-4.</p> <p>These are all going to be there in §§24, 25 of the B deduction.</p> <p>Here at B 153 in the new paragraph Kant is talking about the effect of apperception on inner sense. And he says:</p> <p><i>“What determines inner sense is the understanding [d1]. And its [d2] original power of combining the manifold of intuition, that is, of bringing it under an apperception, upon which the possibility of understanding itself rests [d3]. Now the understanding in us men is not itself a faculty of intuitions, and cannot, even if intuitions be given in sensibility, take them up into itself in such a manner as to combine them as a manifold of its own intuition. Its synthesis, therefore, if the synthesis be view by itself alone, is nothing but the unity of the act, of which, as an act, it is conscious to itself, even without [the aid of] sensibility [d4], but through which it is yet able to determine the sensibility.”</i></p>
	[d1] So inner sense is our capacity for receptivity and what determines it is the activity of the understanding.
	[d2] Notice the terminology here
	[d3] So the work of the understanding, of synthesis, is its activity, its power of acting on inner sense, and therefore what is received by inner sense.
	<p>[d4] This is the [?] performative thesis. That is, even without the effect of the act, of joining, we are aware of the act of determining, qua act, and that therefore we are aware of the <i>difference</i> – and this is what we need to get clear – the difference between pure apperceptive self-awareness and self-knowledge – knowledge of our inner sense.</p> <p>These are two different things altogether.</p> <p>We will suggest in a moment that there are actually three different levels of awareness of a self.</p> <p>But here we can be aware of an act, qua act, and then when the act determines inner sense we can be aware of the world or aware of our perception of the world.</p>
5:30	<p>Secondly, just to hammer in the action and its autonomy thesis, at B 155 Kant says:</p> <p><i>“How the ‘I’ that thinks can be distinct from the ‘I’ that intuits itself (for I can represent still other modes of intuition as at least possible), and yet, as being the same subject, can be identical with the latter; and how, therefore, I can say: ‘I as intelligence and thinking subject, know myself as an object that is thought [e1], in so far as I am given to myself [as something other or] beyond that [I] which is [given to myself] in intuition, and yet know myself [e2], like other phenomena, only as I appear to myself, not as I am to the understanding’[e3] – these are questions that raise no greater nor less difficulty than how I can be an object to myself at all, and, more particularly, an object of intuition and of inner perceptions”</i></p>

	<p>[e1] So the subject in Kant appears both in the subject position and in the object position.</p> <p>And those two – Kant is here claiming – can never be reduced to one another. The I as subject is irreducible to the I as object.</p> <p>This thought get clarified even more radically as he continues.</p>
	<p>[e2] And here is the crux.</p>
	<p>[e3] So that when I have true self-knowledge I am appearing to myself in a way that is just like my knowledge of other phenomena.</p> <p>And therefore I am appearing as defeasible, as falsifiable, as subject to error, as is my knowledge of objects.</p>
8:00	<p>At B 157, §25, he is going to say:</p> <p><i>“On the other hand, in the transcendental synthesis of the manifold of representations in general, and therefore in the synthetic original unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am.”</i></p>
9:00	<p>So the third thing that we are about to learn, is that when we have awareness of ourselves as actor, we do in fact have an awareness of ourselves, but we do not have knowledge of ourselves as things in themselves, but only sheer knowledge of our existence.</p> <p>So that although it is a kind of awareness. Kant elsewhere even calls this a “clear empirical awareness,” it is nonetheless not phenomenal knowledge. And he says similar things at B 158-9.</p>
10:00	<p>B 158:</p> <p><i>“Accordingly I have no knowledge of myself as I am but merely as I appear to myself. The consciousness of self is thus very far from being a knowledge of the self...”</i></p> <p>We have to be very careful because he changes his vocabulary in all of this. But what we are trying to see is that he always maintains this same distinction between awareness of the activity versus empirical knowledge, where empirical knowledge is going to be the empirical knowledge we would have of anything else.</p>
10:30	<p>Turning then to 159:</p> <p><i>“I exist an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of combination; but in respect of the manifold which it has to combine I am subjected to a limiting condition (entitled inner sense), namely, that this combination can be made intuitable only according to relations of time, which lie entirely outside the concepts of understanding, strictly regarded.”</i></p>



11:00	<p>The power of activity is a power of both self-affection <i>and</i> self-determination.</p> <p>So as a power of self-affection and self-determination, we find the footnotes at B157 and B 158, which we have seen before.</p> <p>[For "attention" see class 9 and brief comments in 6 and 10. For an extended discussion see also Q&amp;A week 8. This theme is also pursued in Q&amp;A weeks 10 and 13]</p> <p><i>"I do not see why so much difficulty should be found in admitting that our inner sense is affected by ourselves. Such affection finds exemplification in each and every act of attention. In every act of attention the understanding determines inner sense, in accordance with the combination which it thinks, to that inner intuition which corresponds to the manifold in the synthesis of the understanding. How much the mind is usually thereby affect, everyone will be able to perceive in himself."</i></p> <p>When I attend to something I am both affecting my inner sense and determining it. I am determining where my attention is going. And analogously I am aware that I determine the synthetic manifold, and am not determined by it.</p>
12:30	<p>Lastly, the relationship between space and time at B 156—so these are all the passages we didn't do when we did the deduction:</p> <p><i>"Indeed, that this is how it must be, is easily shown – if we admit that space is merely a pure form of the appearances of outer sense – by the fact that we cannot obtain for ourselves a representation of time, which is not an object of outer intuition, except under the image of a line, which we draw, and that by this mode of depicting it alone could we know the singleness of its dimension"</i></p>
	<p>So the thought here is that the minimal gathering between any two times can be represented by a straight line.</p> <p>As a straight line is the image of the relation between any two points. And therefore there is no way of gathering the unity of time – and this is a question of how we gather or get a picture or representation of the unity of time – we must depict it spatially.</p>
14:30	<p>So this really gives us an indication of the six themes that are beginning to emerge as structural at least for Kant's way of proceeding.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Temporal awareness if and only if spatial awareness.<a href="#">[f1]</a></li> <li>2. Inner parasitic on outer <a href="#">[f2]</a></li> <li>3. Inner is intelligible only as free <a href="#">[f3]</a></li> <li>4. The primacy of practical reason <a href="#">[f4]</a></li> <li>5. Outer sense if and only if embodied <a href="#">[f5]</a></li> <li>6. Freedom requires causality, materiality <a href="#">[f6]</a></li> <li>7. Only agents are knower <a href="#">[f7]</a></li> </ol>

	<p>[f1] And that is going to be self-awareness, since time is the form of inner sense, so temporal self awareness if and only if spatial awareness. And that is going to be the gut of the argument of the Refutation of idealism.</p> <p>But if that is right, #2 follows...</p>
	<p>[f2] The inner can only be comprehended and understood in relationship to the outer. And now we are beginning to collapse the whole rationalist and empiricist universe.</p>
	<p>[f3] The inner is intelligible if and only if spontaneous, if and only if free. So the notion of the inner is the notion of spontaneity, and if the notion of spontaneity is our governing conception, of subjectivity, that power of inwardness and self-determination in spontaneity – then for the entire Kantian system, this is going to entail the primacy of practical reason.</p>
	<p>[f4] That notion of agency that has been kicking around throughout – we see here that even in the CPR we are emerging as knowers only qua agents. It is only as agents that we are knowers. And knowing we are beginning to see is a form of human agency.</p> <p>Granted it is a restrictive form, but nonetheless a formation of human agency.</p>
	<p>[f5]</p> <p>So the whole inner business is going to press hard on the notion of agency and freedom. How about the outer stuff? If we are going to be outer – if we think about that passage about the celestial bodies [jump to <a href="#">celestial</a> above] and the our eyes and the intervening things, we can have outer sense only if we are embodied, and that that embodied self is part of the same causal world as the objects it encounters.</p>
	<p>[f6] If we put together #3 and #4, then it would follow that you can only be a free self-determining agent in the context of a causal world.</p> <p>So freedom presupposes causality or unfreedom. Which is to say that freedom presupposes materiality. So freedom is part of a material universe in which it exists.</p>
	<p>[f7] And finally the inference we already drew above is that only agents are knowers.</p>
20:30	<p>These themes are kicking around the Analogies and the Refutation of Idealism, and the Third Antimony.</p> <p>They also are themes that project from Kant onto later Kantians like Schiller and German Idealists like Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.</p> <p>But it is important that we got here from the Transcendental Deduction. That is, we got here by “the I think must accompany all my representations” – that is the condition for getting all of this out.</p>

21:30	<p>With this format – this is why Kant is so suggestive – we are sort of thinking that there is not as Kant himself supposes that there is a massive gap between theoretical and practical reason.</p> <p>That even in the CPR he is beginning to draw them together, well before the third critique.</p> <p>And further we can see therefore that freedom and causality should probably not be handled in an utterly dualistic manner. Some how they are far more mutually implicated with one another.</p> <p>Thinking about what it is to be an agent and what it is to inhabit a causally determined world so that we need not think – although it raises problems, and we will come across these problems in the Third Antimony – but nonetheless if our interpretation of the second and third analogies and the refutation of idealism are going to get going at all we have to see these as not antagonistic moments.</p>
23:00	<p>The Refutation of Idealism, the interesting version only appears in the second edition, in the first edition, the relevant argument appears as the fourth paralogism [I don't think we discussed the fourth paralogism either in week 8 or 9]. And in that argument what Kant was meaning to dispute was the Cartesian belief which is the belief of all modern epistemology that self-knowledge could be indubitable while knowledge of the world remained problematic.</p>
24:30	<p>The argument for Descartes for Locke and Hume is that self-knowledge is immediate while knowledge of the external world is an inference from existing states or representational states themselves.</p> <p>So at least in the fourth paralogism, Kant's fundamental strategy is show that self knowledge and knowledge of the world are on all fours with one another.</p> <p>That is, neither has any priority, neither is more immediate than the other, neither is inferential. Both are relatively immediate and both are subject to falsification.</p>
25:30	<p>For example he says at A 371:</p> <p><i>"In order to arrive at the reality of outer objects I have just as little need to resort to inference as I have in regard to the reality of the object of my inner sense, that is, in regard to the reality of my thoughts. For in both cases alike the objects are nothing but representations, the immediate perception (consciousness) of which is at the same time a sufficient proof of their reality.</i></p> <p><i>The transcendental idealist is, therefore, an empirical realist, and allows to matter, as appearance, a reality which does not permit of being inferred, but is immediately perceived."</i></p>
26:30	<p>So that in both cases we are simply making judgments. I judge that I'm perceiving a cup. And I judge that it appears to me as if I'm perceiving a cup. That is it – they are on all fours with one another.</p> <p>Therefore he thinks that given his notion of space as outer sense, we get this equality.</p>

27:30	<p>Hence at A 373 he says:</p> <p><i>"But it is not of this that we are here speaking, but of the empirical object, which is called an external object of it is represented in space, and an inner object if it is represented only in its time-relations[g1]. Neither space nor time, however, is to be found save in us [g2]."</i></p>
	<p>[g1] So what makes something inner or outer is simply spatially configured or merely temporally configured. That's it. That's all there is to inner and outer as representational states.</p>
	<p>[g2] That's transcendental idealism. So there is no inferential guessing. This is just the way things are.</p>
28:30	<p>Finally, at A 375 he says:</p> <p><i>"All outer perception, therefore, yields immediate proof of something real in space, or rather is the real itself. In this sense empirical realism is beyond question; that is, there corresponds to our outer intuitions something real in space. Space itself, with all its appearances, as representations, is, indeed, only in men, but nevertheless the real, that is, the material of all objects of outer intuition, is actually given in this space, independently of all imaginative invention. Also, it is impossible that in this space anything outside us (in the transcendental sense) should be given, space itself being nothing outside our sensibility."</i></p>
30:00	<p>So in the fourth paralogism, Kant is just convinced that all by itself this theory of inner sense and outer sense, and the fact that these are just modes of awareness, makes inner knowledge and outer knowledge equal, and therefore destroys the thought that it could be the case that self-knowledge was somehow indubitable while knowledge of the world somehow was problematic.</p>
	<p>But on reading Kant's critique, nobody believed him.</p> <p>It is just this space in us that makes us think that ultimately he must be some kind of phenomenalist and therefore that ultimately he has the same problem of the external world that Descartes and the like had.</p>
31:00	<p>And the Refutation of Idealism was added to the second edition, in order to refute not full blasted skepticism but what he calls "problematic idealism".</p> <p>And he puts it in the context of the postulates, because the postulates are concerned with actuality. And Kant's presumption there is that actuality is in all cases either direct perceptual awareness or something that is <i>connectable</i> to direct perceptual awareness.</p>

32:00	<p>So Kant thinks anything is real or actual that either is or can be conceived or is connectable to what is or can be perceived.</p> <p>For example, it is perfectly compatible with Kantian idealism and realism that there be in principle theoretical particles that are invisible—just as long as they are causally connected—that is, we can get the effects of them perceptually.</p> <p>And this is what we think today. There is no mystery about quarks and the like, about sub-atomic particles, their existence is not directly perceptible, but their effects can be perceived—a particle going through a cloud chamber leaves a line. We don't see the thing but we see its effect on its medium that allows us to record its movement in a cloud chamber.</p> <p>That's all Kant means by connectability. So everything must be causally connected.</p>
33:30	<p>Now the skeptical worry here is that <i>all</i> of this—the whole of categorially structured experience—might appear to be nothing more than a consistent dream.</p> <p>And Kant concedes in the New Preface, that this is indeed a “scandal”. At B xl in the Preface, in the footnote:</p> <p><i>“...it still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the existence of things outside us (from which we derive the whole material of knowledge, even for our inner sense) must be accepted merely on faith, and that if anyone things good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof.”</i></p>
35:00	<p>Of course Heidegger is going to say that it is a scandal that anyone should try to prove such things.</p>
	<p>And then Kant gives another statement of the Refutation of Idealism that is in the text.</p>
	<p>So the idea of the Refutation of Idealism is that self-knowledge of our determinate mental states, which is to say at least knowledge of the temporal location of our inner sense, our inner space, is only possible through our experience of objects in space.</p> <p>The premise of the argument is that the Cartesian “I think,” the cogito, is equivocal. And it is equivocal between what we now can see are the two notions of self-knowledge that Kant separates and that Descartes did not—namely the bare ‘I think’ which is the activity of thinking only and on its own, Kant says, this is only an ‘empty thought I,’ it is the ‘logical subject of thought’ and not a cognition of a determinate thinking being.</p>
37:00	<p>For that, for knowledge of a determinate thinking being, intuition is required.</p> <p>And therefore even in the most rudimentary experience of self-knowledge, for example I am perceiving a white wall, rests at least on inner sense and its conditions.</p>
38:00	<p>We're running out of time today, so what we'll do with the rest of class today is sketch the argument of the Refutation of Idealism and then next time we can discuss it in more detail.</p> <p>We'll just get a feeling how the argument is going to go and next time we'll look more carefully at the steps of the argument.</p>

38:30	<p>So what is going to be at stake here is real self-knowledge rather than mere self-awareness.</p> <p>So it is going to require that I am aware of <i>subjective objects</i>—representations and the like—and that these will need to be—and the problem is going to be—datable states. And the question is going to be their datability.</p> <p>The problem with representations is that they are fleeting, they disappear. Our representational states are changing all the time and our representations are disappearing rapidly—this is more than mildly disturbing.</p> <p>So the question is what is the condition...how am I going to generate a knowledge of the temporal order of these states that is not going to be just punctual awareness of each state. How are we going to be aware of their succession?</p>
40:00	<p>Kant is going to argue again, depending in part again on the first analogy, that we are going to need the backdrop thesis—that is, change can only be seen against the backdrop of non-change.</p> <p>That if this is not quite absolutely the case, it at least has to be relatively the case. There has to be some stability against which we see change.</p> <p>Now because all inner intuitions are in flux, as Hume stated, and even if the self is apperceptively self-aware, we don't have anything in inner sense, inner sense again is just the flux of representations, that could be that backdrop.</p> <p>So there is nothing in my mind that could form or do the work of being the unchanging backdrop.</p>
41:30	<p>Therefore, almost be a process of elimination Kant thinks that if the permanent can't be found within me then it has got to be found outside of me—it must <i>be</i> outside of me, and not merely represented as outside of me but really outside of me.</p> <p>And of course it is this inference—not merely represented as outside of me but really outside of me—that is the source of all the argumentations about the Refutation, and it is about this that the footnote we took a passage out of above is meant to address.</p> <p>See B xl ff (Kemp Smith 34-36)</p>
42:30	<p>We can take it that the argument runs something like: inner sense has no manifoldness of its own, that could generate even a representation of outer sense.</p> <p>So even a representation of outer spatial awareness must come from the data of outer sense, and therefore even if it is the case that sometimes our representations of things as outer are false, we could not have any veridical knowledge of our own inner states unless we usually had veridical knowledge of our outer states.</p> <p>Hence self-knowledge depends on, and indeed is parasitical on, knowledge of the external world.</p>

44:00	<p>That is the way the argument is going to run.</p> <p>We'll go through all the passages and the arguments about this next time. And then finally we will move on to the Third Antimony.</p>
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