



00:00	JMB begins by claiming that in this course he has not yet been producing an argument—and he won't today
	<p>Today we will continue to introduce Kant's language, structures of thought, terminology, etc. We will also begin to move into the paralogisms (which is largely put off until next week).</p> <p>In all of this we will try being trying to get at Kant and the "I think" and do so in a way that follows JMB's deflationary strategy by showing how fundamentally uninteresting the "I think" is.</p>
1:00	<p>And also the strategy here is to build up all the bits and vocabulary and get all his ducks in a row so that suddenly when we are ready to produce the Transcendental Deduction it should all come out like a walk in the park.</p> <p>But first we build up the structures, get a handle on the strategies, and then ideally it should all just gel together in a scintillating gestalt that will change our lives forever.</p>
1:45	Sorry for the background noise—my bad.
2:00	<p>Today we will pick up where we abruptly dropped off last time—in the middle of the threefold syntheses: apprehension, reproduction, and recognition (in concepts).</p> <p>And all of this we'll remember is an attempt to begin to get at whatever Kant might mean by his combination of synthesis—that is the idea that we have to put the manifold together, we have to synthesize it, we have to combine it into a unity of some kind.</p> <p>And the principle Kant is operating with is for cognitive purposes nothing will count as unified, as being a unity, unless unified.</p> <p>That is, for every product in the Kantian world there is an active process underlying it.</p> <p>We can collapse this into a handy motto: no product without process.</p>

4:00	Kant's thought here is—and this maybe is the thought of the whole book—we have products, awarenesses of the world, and underlying them is a complicated process, and he is unearthing the nature, character, and structure of that process, of that synthetic activity, to reveal the meaning of what we already have.				
4:30	So in that way the revelation is a revelation of how human activity structures and orients the world as it is always already experienced.				
	<p>We have suggested that the synthesis of apprehension involves the recognition of a manifold as a manifold.</p> <p>In broad terms, this means recognizing spatial and temporal complexity.</p> <p>We also suggested that even though the synthesis of apprehension never occurs on its own, it always occurs in tandem with the synthesis of reproduction.</p>				
	<p>(see class #6, second half, 25:30)</p> <table> <tr> <td>Apprehension ← → Reproduction</td><td>Recognition</td></tr> <tr> <td>Can't have one without the other</td><td>but need not have recognition</td></tr> </table>	Apprehension ← → Reproduction	Recognition	Can't have one without the other	but need not have recognition
Apprehension ← → Reproduction	Recognition				
Can't have one without the other	but need not have recognition				
5:30	But Kant separates it out <i>analytically</i> as a separate moment				
	He separates them out in order to underline the fact that synthesis is a sensible response to the world.				
6:00	All of this is about how we are responding to or what we are doing with the <i>given</i> . It is a matter of how we are taking it up and working it through in order to finally make a judgment and that these forms are precisely that—forms of synthesis, patterns of our activity.				
	<p>We also said the synthesis of reproduction kind of comes close to what Derrida calls "iterability" which is his linguistic reformulation of his critique of what Heidegger means by the critique of presentness or the critique of the present to show that there is no present on its own.</p> <p>And that the way in which Kant does this is by suggesting...</p>				

8:00	<p>So all of this is about what we can simply call the "now" or the "present" and its logical secondariness—its derivability—its non-primitiveness.</p> <p>That is what is all the heavy breathing in Heidegger and Derrida is about. You think something grand is happening, well it is kind of grand, it is grand to know that the now is never now.</p> <p>But why not?</p>
	<p>The argument that Kant uses...and for Derrida it is a version of the "yes" being always a "yes, yes"—his Molly Bloom moment, the last line of Joyce's <i>Ulysses</i>, which he is consciously aping.</p> <p>It is the thought that there cannot be a first without a second.</p>
9:30	<p>The thought is that there cannot be a first without a second.</p> <p>But how to think about this? First we will do it mentalistically is in cognitive terms, nothing can count as first unless there is a second that follows it.</p> <p>Nothing can count as the number one, the number one cannot be primitive.</p>
	<p>One cannot be primitive unless and until there is a number two.</p> <p>So in a certain sense it is only in light of number two that one becomes one. Therefore it is only in light of a later moment that an earlier moment can count as the present it was.</p>
10:30	<p>Every present is the present of an existing past. Therefore it is not present by itself but only present in light of that past.</p> <p>The way to think about this is to consider simple examples in which our capacity to think of something as a beginning requires the holding in mind of that beginning. And the holding in mind—this is what the reproductive imagination does—it holds in mind a first moment to be completely by a second moment.</p>

11:30	<p>What is it about the first part of a familiar rhythm that gives them their philosophical character?</p> <p>It is as if they are opening out, anticipating, looking for, that their character as first is not a raw datum, that in light of the second we suddenly recognize that the first was vectorial—it was a stretching out and an openness towards the second of which it is suddenly completed by the second.</p>
13:30	<p>We only have that in light of our memory. So this anticipatory moment is actually a product of our holding in mind. So this holding in mind of the past is the way we lever ourselves toward the future-or "get thrown" toward the future.</p>
14:00	<p>That is why pastness is throwness for Heidegger.</p> <p>Heidegger says this in his typically turgid way pp 127-128 (pp. 186-87 in my edition) where he is looking at the synthesis and reproduction:</p> <p><i>"An essent experienced earlier would be completely lost with each additional now if it were not capable of being retained. Therefore, if the empirical synthesis is to be possible, the no-longer-now as such must, in advance and before all experience, be capable of being brought back to the present and unity with the actual now."</i></p> <p>So that this is the transcendental...so the point is that the very way in which our cognitive apparatus works is that we are always holding in mind the previous moment and being launched into the future.</p>
16:00	<p>It is like the experience of waking up in the middle of the night and having the experience of where am I and how old am I?</p> <p>Waking up is typically a moment in which there is no previous moment so I am not holding and therefore it almost feels sometimes that we are starting from scratch until we quickly re-orient ourselves.</p>
17:00	<p>In both the Heidegger and the waking up example, we have a critique of the present. The now has lost its grip as a now. What should be the most authoritative experience is the experience with no authority because it is cut off from its past for which it is the present—which is the terror or amnesia, and the like, or whatever empirical corollary you like.</p>

17:30	<p>The thought here is that by themselves, apprehension and reproduction constitute the possibility of minimum cognitive awareness.</p> <p>We have access to some "x", we are geared to it cognitively, that is we are responding to <i>it</i>, which is to say that information about it is present to the mind such that my behavior with respect to it can be explained only by how it represented not how it actually is. That is the crux.</p>
19:00	<p>But who would disagree with this characterization? Who are we here arguing with and why?</p> <p>There is in the non-Kantian literature and various analytic theories of perception, a theory of information that is not what it looks like but is really about causality.</p> <p>Being causally affected by something alters my states, and information theory, that will be a packet of information since it is 'differential'.</p> <p>The suggestion for us here is that we are not interested in mere causal differentiability. We are suggesting that by means of apprehension and reproduction, we can explain our behavior in light of the object, not in light of its affects upon me but upon my representational relationship to it. That is I am looking at it, reflecting on it, interrogating it, trying to figure it out.</p> <p>For example, I might want to know what country am I in, what room am I in, who is my wife, and what are these children doing here?</p>
20:30	<p>By means of apprehension and reproduction we might say that I can attend, scrutinize, search, and interrogate. And I do all these things without being able to recognize the object attended to—meaning, I can fail, I can get lost, I can be disoriented.</p> <p>My cognitive quest can come up empty handed.</p> <p>But that does tell me that it is a quest I am on, and the quest is the third moment: recognition in a concept.</p>
21:30	<p>Remember that each of these are synthesis that are only typically analytically separate—typically they all happen simultaneously.</p> <p>Recognition in a concept adds this <i>what</i> of what it is I am attending to. It is not some fuzzy blob in the sky but it is a "bird".</p> <p>In making this recognition, I employ the categories.</p>

22:00	<p>I note its quantity—it is one, not two, it is one thing, not an event, it has a certain shape, it has a quality like wingshapes, etc.</p> <p>Furthermore I am really seeing it and not merely imagining it. So the kind of mental act involved is present, and the like.</p>
23:00	<p>The crux here is that nothing but a concept will tell me what sort of complex happening I am responding to.</p> <p>For example, like last week, hearing Big Ben. I must not only hold the rings in mind, but I must hold them in mind as rings of a clock. Otherwise it is just big noise.</p>
24:00	<p>The point is that we have got to conceptualize it not just noises, not just tones—some noises can be in rhythm and melody, e.g. church bells do a certain tune <i>prior</i> to ringing the time.</p> <p>You have to know the difference between listening to the tune and then counting the rings of the time. These are two different acts. Each is a listening to the bells but under different conceptual descriptions.</p> <p>Therefore discriminating the way in which I counted the tones, whether I bother counting them, whether I synthesize them as a tune, etc.</p> <p>Without those activities, what we have is simply orderly noise. But concepts make that noise into song or string of the time or whatever.</p>
26:00	<p>We are looking at the Heidegger because Jay thinks it can feed into an account that is non-Heideggerian.</p> <p>That is, an account of the threefold synthesis is in a way fine, although it goes in ways he doesn't suppose.</p>
	<p>What is clear is that this recognition in a concept is driving the entire process. Because how I anticipate what I am listening—what sort of cognitive projection, will inform my apprehensions and reproductions.</p> <p>So that "the last shall be first".</p>
27:00	<p>So although this is a movement from the present into the past into the future—that is the structure of ecstatic time in Heidegger, as we will see.</p> <p>But it is here driven by recognition.</p>

	<p><i>Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics</i> p 191 (me edition):</p> <p><i>"The synthesis which, according to the description of the empirical genesis of concepts, is the third is precisely the first, i.e., the one which governs the other two described above. It anticipates the, as it were. Kant gives this synthesis of identification a name which is most appropriate. Its mode of unification is a recognition [reconnoitering, in Jay's version]. It pro-spects [erkundet] and "investigates" that which must be pro-posed in advance <u>as identical</u> [1], in order that they syntheses of apprehension and reproduction can find a closed field of essents within which they can fix and receive as essent that which they bring back or encounter."</i></p> <p>[1] So this is how the notion of unity and sameness gets introduced</p> <p>So Heidegger's thought here is that this whole structure has about it an anticipatory foreshadowing opening-up to the world as a mode of continual encountering of the given for the sake of the telos of making a conceptual identification.</p>
29:30	<p>In a handout that is being passed around, Longeuness describes this as a kind of mental "conatus".</p> <p>p 208:</p> <p><i>"The one and only condition for relations representations to objects is the capacity to form judgments. The intentional relation of any of the three syntheses considered in the A Deduction to an object depends on this capacity. To borrow a term from Spinoza and Leibniz, one might speak of an actual conatus, a continual effort, to shape the representation of what affects us in order to exercise our judgment. This conatus is what makes our apprehension an act of "running through and holding together," what orients the reproductions of imagination toward judgment, and finally what enables these reproductions to be recognize under concepts. This does not mean that apprehension and reproduction always lead to recognition. On the contrary, we may be affected by sensations that we apprehend without reproducing them, just as we may reproduce without the resulting reproductions leading to recognition, that is, to discursive judgment. But sensation leads to intuition of an object only if it is apprehended in such a way as to be reproduced, and reproduced in such a way as to be recognized, by virtue of one and the same intellectual conatus. The actualization of this conatus is the "action of understanding on sensibility," namely the synthesis speciosa, the figurative synthesis carious out by imagination."</i></p>
32:00	<p>We'll come to the notion of figurative synthesis in the B deduction.</p> <p>But by bringing in this terms she is underlying the point that the A deduction and the B deduction are doing the same work.</p>



	<p>What we want to underline here is a sense the beginning of this passage, namely that what is driving all of this first of all is...we say recognition in a concept, but we have already learned that there is only one thing we can do with a concept—that is, make a judgment.</p> <p>So recognition in a concept is just another word for the process underlying or making possible the making of a judgment.</p> <p>Furthermore, what judgments do, going back to the 'transcendental object = x' argument is that they are the way in which we relate representations to object.</p> <p>That is, making a judgment just is relating representations to objects, and nothing else.</p> <p>There is nothing more in my relationship to the object than making a judgment about it. And making a judgment about it is the consequence of the threefold synthesis.</p>
34:00	<p>So we now have the sense that what sounded a bit like a strange kind of psychology is really something else. It is trying to understand the elemental moments that belong to judgment making and the kinds of elemental moments that appear when judgments fails—not when judgments are false but when we don't get to the end of the process in various ways.</p> <p>So it is trying to understand how the product, the brown lectern, e.g., is a consequence of a complex synthetic process that is governed by and oriented by an ideal of making a judgment, and as we will come to see, making a judgment is governed by the categories.</p>



	<p>One of the things you may want to ask yourself when reading the critique is why is Kantian cognition different from Cartesian cognition.</p> <p>That is, why is Kant not a mind-body dualist in the same way that Descartes is?</p> <p>We do want to say that the role of sensibility and embodiment is much thicker in Kant and therefore sensibility is much thicker in Kant.</p>
40:00	Question:
	<p>First of all the three syntheses are <i>analytically</i> separate which is not to say that they are <i>actually</i> or <i>logically</i> separate.</p>
	<p>Pastness allows is that movement towards openness—so that the deep affect of pastness is to show the vectorial character of every now. So reproduction makes apprehension futural.</p> <p>And if it is futural, since obviously reproduction comes after it, then the futural has to get picked up in a truly futural moment: recognition in a concept.</p> <p>Which is why it is interesting that Longeuness decided to use the word "conatus" as the notion.</p> <p><i>Conatus</i> is the notion of a primitive drive and it is what Nietzsche will call "Will to Power". So it is desire simply as forward movement—not desire as lack.</p> <p>It is that orientational movement, but it is structured here by a continual movement towards judgment.</p>
42:30	Question:
	<p>Yang notes that he thinks that in the text Kant says that time is only a form of intuition—thus judgments are not in time.</p>
43:30	<p>But Jay is trying to convince us that this is not Kant's position. He thinks the Longeneuss passage anticipates and addresses this objection already.</p> <p>What the temporalizing movement...the reason we refer to the idea of ecstatic temporality is to try to convince us that insofar as time is the form of inner sense, this is the fundamental structure.</p> <p>There is no awareness of time below this.</p>

45:00	<p>To anticipate, what we should all be looking for is to see how to make good on Jay's suggestion that there is no <i>isolatable self</i> in Kant.</p> <p>That the notion of self is just a pole of judgment. There is no such thing as "the self" that is aware of stuff...That is just a mischaracterization of what Kant means by the Transcendental Unity of Apperception. Jay wants to show that the TUA is rather just this structure itself.</p> <p>Although Yang's objection follows closely the classical one and we will have to deflate it.</p>
	<p>Question:</p> <p>Mike: memory replaced by number, we don't need reproduction.</p>
	<p>To be aware of time passing turns out to be immensely complicated and in fact we can't do it without spatial awareness: and this will be the Refutation of Idealism.</p>
	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Outline of Critique Of Pure Reason:</u></b></p> <pre> graph TD     Prefaces --&gt; Intro["Introduction (§§I–VII)"]     Intro --&gt; PartI[Part I]     Intro --&gt; PartII[Part II]     PartI --&gt; TDE[Transcendental Doctrine of Elements]     PartII --&gt; TDM[Transcendental Doctrine of Method]     TDE --&gt; FPA[First Part Transcendental Aesthetic]     TDE --&gt; SPL[Second Part Transcendental Logic]     FPA --&gt; S1["§1. Space"]     FPA --&gt; S2["§2. Time"]     SPL --&gt; DI[Division I Transcendental Analytic]     SPL --&gt; DII[Division II Transcendental Dialectic]     DI --&gt; IntroDA[Introduction]     IntroDA --&gt; B1I[Book I Analytic of Concepts]     B1I --&gt; VA[version A]     B1I --&gt; VB[version B]     IntroDA --&gt; B2I[Book II Analytic of Principles]     B2I --&gt; C1I[Chpt I Schematism]     B2I --&gt; C2I[Chpt II System of all Principle of Pure Understanding]     C2I --&gt; S1S["§1"]     C2I --&gt; S2S["§2"]     C2I --&gt; S3S["§3 Systematic Representation of all the Synthetic Principles"]     S3S --&gt; R1[1. Axioms]     S3S --&gt; R2[2. Anticipations]     S3S --&gt; R3[3. Analogies]     S3S --&gt; R4[4. Postulates]     R4 --&gt; RI[Refutation of Idealism]     DII --&gt; IntroDD[Introduction]     IntroDD --&gt; B1D[Book I Concepts of Pure Reason]     IntroDD --&gt; B2D[Book II Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason]   </pre>
46:30	<p>The notion of time passing is complicated for Kant, but it is unavoidable. There is always passing time, even on a lazy Sunday afternoon.</p>
	<p>Question:</p>
47:30	<p>Question:</p>

	<p>What the argument of the 'transcendental argument =x' and what the transcendental deduction is going to try to convince you of is that in expressing that judgment, you are in relation to an independent world. There is nothing above that. That is our relationship to the world.</p> <p>The deep question...the reason we are trying to underline that this is a deflationary reading is remember Locke and Hume and Descartes are asking 'how can I get into relation to the world'. For them it is hovering out there, and I can't get there, and Descartes brings in God, or theodicies, or imagination, and then if you are Hume then you despair.</p> <p>All of this for Hume is in order to avoid madness. This is one of the deep moments of pathos in Western philosophy—skepticism threatens madness. We can talk about Hume and madness another time, but Hume realized that his own skeptical imagination unworlded him in a terrifying way.</p>
50:00	<p>So Kant's strategy is to try to convince us that we are already in touch with the world, so that we don't have extra efforts.</p> <p>So that the product, the judgment that we are starting with is a process of judgment—and informing that judgment are representations—and the phrase he uses over and over again—is "relation to an object".</p> <p>That is what it is to be in touch with an object. When I form the judgment "it is twelve" that <i>is</i> my relationship to big ben, the thing out there.</p>
51:00	<p>In part two of this class we will finally start talking about the self, which we have put off for 6 weeks.</p>

	<p>And it is just now that Kant's analysis begins to get difficult.</p> <p>And everything is going to hang on this notion of unity.</p> <p>Kant's argument works with increasing complexity in roughly the following way, to be aware of something is to be aware of a complex whole.</p> <p>Which is to say a unity of some sort. We are laying this down as a challenge, try to think of a whole that is not a complex unity of some sort.</p> <p>All knowledge involves articulations therefore of a complex unity.</p> <p>From the 'transcendental object = x' argument we know that unity of the object is not <i>in</i> the object.</p> <p>For example, the unity of the lectern is not exactly in the object but rather is something that is revealed by its concept. That is, it is the concept of an object, and namely its being the concept of <i>this</i> object, in this case its being a lectern, that will give me the kind of unity that it possess and therefore give me the requisite kinds of things I can say about it.</p>
53:30	<p>So the thought here, very schematically is that there is going to be a unity of a object if and only if there is a unity of consciousness.</p> <p>And there is going to be a unity of consciousness if and only if there is going to be a unity to the acts of recognition.</p>
55:00	<p>So unity is again, never given in Kant, it is always an achievement and maybe he overdoes it but he thinks it is a very fragile achievement to get he kind of unities we do.</p> <p>So we will have those acts of recognition, those syntheses, now if and only if we have the unity of "apperception" which we haven't yet figured out what this means.</p>
	<p>So somehow all this unity folds back on the unity of the self —this moment of apperception.</p>
56:00	<p>Before we launch into the Transcendental Unity of Apperception we will take a short break.</p>
	-Break-
00:00	<p>Imagination is reproduction.</p> <p>Why is it imagination? It is very simple. Imagination is awareness of what is not present.</p> <p>Therefore the work of reproduction is the work of imagination. It holds on to what Husserl calls the retentive synthesis.</p>

	The threefold syntheses are Husserl's retentive and protentive syntheses.
	<p>The idea here is that it is imagination because whenever you are aware of something that is not present—that is simply what the word imagination means.</p> <p>And it is now this structure of holding on to a past as past for the sake of a particular future.</p>
1:00	<p>OK, Apperception, apperceptive self-awareness, the I think which must accompany all my representations...what is all of this about?</p> <p>We'll start at a low, basic level and then work our way into the complications, and then we'll talk about the paralogisms as a way of clarifying the meaning of it.</p>
	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Outline of Critique Of Pure Reason:</u></b></p> <pre> graph TD     Prefaces --&gt; Introduction["Introduction (§§I –VII)"]     Introduction --&gt; PartI["Part I Transcendental Doctrine of Elements"]     Introduction --&gt; PartII["Part II Transcendental Doctrine of Method (see below)"]     PartI --&gt; FirstPart["First Part Transcendental Aesthetic"]     PartI --&gt; SecondPart["Second Part Transcendental Logic"]     FirstPart --&gt; S1["§1. Space"]     FirstPart --&gt; S2["§2. Time"]     SecondPart --&gt; DivI["Division I Transcendental Analytic"]     SecondPart --&gt; DivII["Division II Transcendental Dialectic"]     DivI --&gt; IntroA["Introduction"]     DivI --&gt; IntroB["Introduction"]     IntroA --&gt; BookI1["Book I Analytic of Concepts"]     IntroA --&gt; BookII1["Book II Analytic of Principles"]     BookI1 --&gt; VA["version A"]     BookI1 --&gt; VB["version B"]     IntroB --&gt; BookI2["Book I Concepts of Pure Reason"]     IntroB --&gt; BookII2["Book II Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason"]     BookII2 --&gt; Ch1["Chapt. I Paralogisms"]     BookII2 --&gt; Ch2["Chapt. II Antimonies"]     BookII2 --&gt; Ch3["Chapt. III Ideal"]   </pre>

2:00	<p>What is Kant interested in talking about apperception?</p> <p>Well, one thing he is not interested in is the ontological unity of the mind.</p> <p>Nor is he interested in the problem of criteria for personal identity.</p> <p>Nor is he interested in the ownership of mental states.</p> <p>But what if anything does that leave?</p>
	<p>We are going to suggest that apperception is simply the reflexive act in which the mind grasps its own representations as representations.</p> <p>Which is a way of saying that apperception turns out to be no different than judgment.</p>
3:00	<p>The word "apperception" is a Leibnizian word.</p> <p>In Leibniz it involved reflexive awareness of the self or "I"—the monad being aware of itself. The question then will become why did Leibniz coin such a turn, what was he thinking about, and why did Kant decide to appropriate such a word for his own purposes.</p>
4:00	<p>The answer is that Leibniz discovered the unconscious, as every history of psychoanalysis tells us.</p> <p>Leibniz called the unconscious <i>petite perception</i>—little perceptions so little you don't even notice them. So for Leibniz it was an obvious thing that there could be perceptions of which we were unaware—very low grade ones.</p> <p>For Leibniz it further followed that because there were ideas of which we are unaware of unconscious that thought required something other than ideas or perception.</p> <p>Well what is the other thing that is required for thought if not merely having ideas or perceptions? Namely that there we apperceived, that is apperceived for me.</p> <p>So apperception is for Leibniz necessary for thought.</p>
6:00	<p>Regardless of the details, this background is important for Kant. It doesn't follow from the having or there existing or being ideas or perceptions that they play a functional role in cognitive activity—they can play other kinds of roles.</p>
	<p>Kant is going to want to say that to be conscious of my representations as representing, which we are saying apperception is...</p> <p>Why say to be representations as representing is the work of apperception? It sounds like there is a missing step. And the missing step is that representations are coming to function as a point of view for me.</p>



7:30	<p>That is a judgment just is my view onto something. So that it is the implied judger in the judgment—because every judgment is going to be made by a judger.</p> <p>Another way to put it is that all conscious thought or perception involves a ineliminable first person perspective.</p> <p>Insofar as we are thinking, we are individually taking a stand upon judging what occurs. And that is ineliminable, it cannot be written out of the story.</p>
8:30	<p>There is of course a Tractarian analogue here.</p> <div data-bbox="537 632 1203 1066" data-label="Image"> </div> <p>When Wittgenstein says 'if I were to write a story of the world as I have it, I would have a complete description of the world, but there would be something missing, namely the eye seeing the world.</p> <p>The suggestion here is that in a technical way, the thought is that just as in the <i>Tractatus</i>, every judgment is a point of view onto the world from which the I from which it is seeing is ineliminable.</p>
10:00	<p>Kant has to show that the role of that 'I' in making that possible.</p> <p>Of course, like Leibniz, Kant says in various places that there can be unconscious ideas.</p>
	<p>So he is going to say that in virtue of apperceiving a representation I represent or perceive the object of that representation.</p> <p>And this is he beginning of our deflationary strategy.</p>

11:30	<p>So the upshot of apperception is object awareness. Apperception just is in a certain way object awareness.</p> <p>So what Kant has to convince us of is object awareness contains within it this 'I think' moment as a non isolatable moment. It is not separable from the judgment itself or rather our awareness of the object.</p>
12:00	<p>To put it another way, to apperceive a representation is just to engage in synthesis.</p>
	<p>Let's examine how Kant builds up this idea in the first edition deduction and then we will turn to how he deflates it in the paralogisms.</p> <p>There he does the job of teasing us away from thinking we have discovered something deep here about the nature of the self.</p> <p>So first he wants to inflate the role of the self and make it fundamental, and then deflate the fact that we may have discovered anything interesting about the self since the whole story is going to be cashed out in terms of judgment.</p>
13:30	<p>Starting with B 133:</p> <p><i>"For the empirical consciousness, which accompanies different representations, is in itself diverse and without relation to the identity of the subject."</i></p> <p>What does this mean? What is this "empirical"?</p> <p>The thought is low-grade Humean. If I am having a perception of the lectern, and I look inside my mind and ask myself what am I experiencing—if I hunt around I will find lectern-like experiences and cup experiences and Barry experiences.</p> <p>But I won't have <i>me</i> experiences.</p>
15:30	<p>So my empirical consciousness—that is the actual psychological stuff of my mind—so empirical consciousness is now the actual psychological flow of life, and that is pretty much just as Hume described it and just as diverse. And when we look inside we don't stumble upon an idea or an impression of the self—we just stumble upon the stuff of experience.</p>

16:00	<p>That relation comes about not simply through my accompanying each representation with consciousness--relation to the self does not come about by giving each event...let's look at a complex event.</p> <p>So imagine walking out into an apartment hallway and smelling the bacon and eggs of the neighbor's kitchen.</p> <p>In my mind, I've got a bacon smell and I smell eggs. That is to say that I can accompany each with an "I"--but that is not relation to the self according to Kant.</p>
18:30	<p>So the relation is not the lifting up of something and saying "I am conscious of it".</p> <p>Rather the consciousness occurs only insofar as I can <i>conjoin</i> one representation with another.</p> <p>That is "I" smelling bacon and eggs.</p>
19:00	<p>What is involved here is the work of conjoining them in a single thought. Kant says that the I is aware of that conjoining.</p> <p>What does it mean to be aware of that conjoining?</p>
20:00	<p>It means that you aware that you are smelling bacon-n-eggs.</p> <p>So that your awareness of the I is your awareness that you are having a complex awareness. It is your awareness that you are having a complex awareness that is your awareness that you have combined them.</p> <p>It is not that you are aware of an activity--he is not saying something like that. He is saying that you are aware of the synthesis if you are aware of the complexity itself.</p> <p>This is the unity-complexity point.</p>
	<p>So to up the ante, he is going to say that only insofar as I can unite a manifold of given representations in one consciousness is it possible for me to represent the identity of the consciousness in or throughout these representations.</p> <p>What does that all mean?</p>
22:30	<p>For the moment we are keeping it simple and staying with given manifolds--we will mention non-given manifolds later.</p> <p>A given manifold of bacon-n-eggs smell is all we need here.</p> <p>In one consciousness is it possible for me to represent the identity of consciousness in or throughout those representations.</p> <p>What is the thought here?</p>

23:30	<p>What does it mean for it to be possible for me to represent to myself the identity of my consciousness throughout these representations?</p> <p>The thought is simple. It is that only if I can form a unity of bacon-n-eggs is it possible for me to think of the experience as <i>my</i> perspective onto the world.</p> <p>If there was no unity here then there would be no point of view upon the world. But there is a point of view onto the world independent of me, precisely because I can identify the complexity of the world as there.</p>
25:00	<p>So in unifying them in a judgment, I make my representation of them as an object, 'I smell bacon-n-eggs' and therefore implicitly acknowledge that it is one and the same being that is having egg smells and bacon smells and judging them and holding that judgment together in one time and in one place.</p>
	<p>So this unity of consciousness is something that cannot be empirical, that is, it is not the unity of a...</p> <p>When I am aware of 'I smell bacon-n-eggs' I don't have anything as rich as the claim 'the very person Jay Bernstein is smelling bacon-n-eggs'.</p> <p>There is no thought of who the identify of the self of the judgment.</p> <p>So the self here is not a thick self.</p>
27:00	<p>But furthermore the unity given here—bacon-n-eggs—is not formed by the mere empirical conjunction of the two.</p> <p>So Kant says at B 134:</p> <p><i>"The thought that the representations given in intuition one and all belong to me, is therefore equivalent to the thought that I unite them in one self-consciousness, or can at least so unite them; and although this thought is not itself the consciousness of the synthesis of the representations, it presupposes the possibility of that synthesis. In other words, only in so far as I can grasp the manifold of the representations in one consciousness, do I call them one and all mine. For otherwise I should have as many-colored and diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious to myself."</i></p>
29:00	<p>So this goes back to the empirical consciousness thought. The unity cannot be empirical because the unity is above and beyond of the mere content of the judgment.</p> <p>Rather it is the unity—not of the content—but of the <i>form</i> of the judgment, or the unity of judgment itself.</p> <p>Otherwise there wouldn't be a—and this is all we need from the word "mine"—there wouldn't be my point of view onto the world.</p>

30:00	<p>So what Kant is thinking of here is something like, and this is the example everyone always gives from James:</p> <p>If I assign each individual one word of say a poem. If each of them said their word but didn't listen to the others, you wouldn't get a thought.</p> <p>What makes a thought is not that each [thought] is accompanied by consciousness—each of those utterances of the word are perfectly well accompanied by consciousness it is that the unity of them is what makes the thought—otherwise it is gibberish.</p>
31:30	<p>So the idea is that there has to be more than a mere association of ideas—that is the subtext of all this—the association of ideas will not yield a thought.</p> <p>The mere association of whenever I smell eggs I smell bacon—or there are bacon smells and there are egg smells, won't be a thought about my relationship, my having the experience of smelling bacon-n-eggs.</p> <p>What makes it my smelling of bacon and eggs is not an association of ideas but their unity.</p>
	<p>So it is their synthesis that does the work.</p> <p>So what then is this synthesis and what is it I am aware of in uniting them?</p> <p>Of course it is provocation here that we are leaping between the A and B deductions as if there is no difference.</p> <p>But looking at A 108, we get a kind of classic statement of what Kant is thinking about.</p>
	<p>A 108 (Kemp-Smith 137)</p> <p><i>"For the mind could never think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this identity a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act, whereby it subordinates all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, thereby rendering possible their interconnection according to a priori rules."</i></p>
34:00	<p>The identity of the act is the key thought here.</p> <p>What Kant is certainly suggesting here is the following. What must stay the same throughout all our encounters with the world is the functions of judgment. There would literally be no point in judging that the chair is green if one could not recognize that one was involved in the same activity when judged that the chair next to it is blue.</p>

35:00	<p>What makes it meaningful is not the raw having together of chairness and blueness together or chairness and greenness together, it is rather the awareness that I am judging—subject, predicate form—this chair is blue, this chair is green.</p> <p>And I am aware that I am doing the same act each time, and it is the same act each time that gives significance to the individual experiences themselves and allows me to relate them.</p>
36:00	<p>You have to be aware that this is doing the same, because if it isn't doing the same, then you are doing nothing.</p> <p>And here is the pitch: to be aware of it as the same is low and behold to be aware of yourself. That is what it is to be aware of yourself.</p> <p>That is, so <i>I</i> am judging this chair to be blue, this one to be green.</p> <p>So to be aware of participating in the same act in each case, subordinating each apprehension to the same form, is the way Kant puts it here, this means being aware that it is <i>I</i> who take a point of view on the chair's being blue or green and connecting them as being different colored chairs.</p>
37:00	<p>Otherwise it is nothing. It is the bringing the logical form of the judgment to it that is the form of my relationship on to it and makes it my point of view onto the world.</p> <p>So that what I spontaneously contribute to the situation—what is not there in the greenness or the blueness of the chair is the judgmental form.</p> <p>And the judgmental form that treats objects as being things with properties—that is what I contribute.</p>
38:00	<p>Of course Kant is by no means saying that there are not things in the world.</p> <p>But things in the world do not come in forms in which the logical functions of judgment can get a grip on them. We bring that to our encountering and that is how our encountering becomes our relationship to the object.</p> <p>From this it follows—since this is what we contribute to the world, its form, what powers we have—that we can distinguish ourselves from the objects of judgment.</p> <p>Since the form is not in the thing, as every single page of Hume testifies, since he misses the form.</p>

39:00	<p>This is why Hume couldn't distinguish himself and why he ran into his terrible skeptical dilemmas.</p> <p>It is in virtue of the deployment of the logical functions of judgment that I can distinguish myself from the objects of judgment.</p> <p>So the I here is a spontaneous self which judges.</p>
40:00	<p>Looking at B 132, this spontaneity:</p> <p><i>"That representation which can be given prior to all thought is entitled intuition. All the manifold of intuition has, therefore, a necessary relation to the 'I think' in the same subject in which this manifold is found. But this representation is an act of spontaneity, that is, it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility."</i></p>
41:00	<p>So it is the spontaneity by means of which I contribute these logical functions that allows me then, implicitly now, to separate the self that judges from the thing judged.</p> <p>And it follows from this that we must be able—to give the Kantian punch line—that we be able to add the "I think" that is the judging self to each judgment or one of the necessary conditions for judging would not be fulfilled.</p> <p>Spontaneity is a condition because there are logical forms and logical forms are not in the world, they are products of spontaneity—but what is spontaneous, well <i>I</i> am.</p> <p>But then I must be able to add the self to the judgment or the conditions of judgment would not be fulfilled.</p> <p>Therefore to make a judgment is an act of self-consciousness. Because it precipitates the difference between self and object. That is, you cannot make a judgment without being aware of your difference from the thing judged. That is what is involved in the judgment.</p>
43:00	<p>And we are not suggesting that this is separable.</p> <p>We are not saying that this is any different than saying 'damn, those bacon and eggs smell good'. That is self-awareness.</p> <p>As soon as I say 'damn', it is my point of view on the object. I've got an object of which I am aware. That is the "I think".</p>

	<p>The question then becomes—which we won't have time for today—how thick or thin is this self?</p> <p>How much do we learn about the self by requiring this spontaneity, and what are its implications for the understanding of what we call subjectivity.</p> <p>We will start with those questions next week—which is to say that we will start with the paralogism.</p>
	<p>So next week we will have a look at the paralogisms and wrap up the A deduction and that will give us the materials for getting a hold of Kant's core argument.</p> <p>We are not trying to make an argument here but get the pieces of an argument motivated so that when the time comes they can fall into place.</p>
	<p>Question:</p>
	<p>For Kant unconscious judgments is a contradiction in terms.</p> <p>Because setting up a judgment is making a self-world distinction. In a sense we could talk about subconscious judgments or implicit judgments, but they all have a certain structure.</p>
	<p>-Class finished--</p>