

00:00	I'll come to a recapitulation of last week in a moment. Now I want to begin directly why sense-certainty. There is a problem with sense-certainty - a problem that is more radical than any other form of consciousness. Every form of consciousness that we're going to look at is internally complex. And it's in virtue of that internal complexity that we're going to be able to find difficulties and contradictions and the like. Sense-
1:00	Certainty wants to be the immediacy of pure determinate nothing. So sense-certainty wants to claim that it lacks internal complexity. And I take it our initial problem is how to understand this claim of lacking internal complexity, how it is that we begin here, why we should begin here rather than anywhere else. I take it for granted that since the introduction set up the issue of modern philosophy in terms of epistemology that the entire section on consciousness is about
2:00	Epistemology. So consciousness here means epistemology as first philosophy. That's what the first section is about. And furthermore, I take it that all the forms of consciousness we're going to look at are realist in the sense that ultimately, there is some ultimate fact of the matter, which makes a claim true. That facts are exactly the sort of things that makes statements and sentences true. And that's what realism ultimately means. The proper definition of realism as Hegel understands it is there is some ultimate fact of the matter
3:00	That is a truth-maker. And that thought there is ultimate fact of matter that makes statements true is stated just seems patently true. Snow is white.. because snow is white. Snow being white is what makes it true. But the more you think about the idea of truth-making, the more puzzling it's going to get. And in a way all of consciousness is about that puzzle, that anything might be a truth-maker in a naïve sense. Sense-certainty is a particularly
4:00	intriguing form of that thesis. And its intrigue is the same, by the way, as the intrigue of high romanticism. That is, the intrigue of immediacy. Read Jeffrey Hartman's first book. It's idea of immediacy. But anyway,
5:00	The notion of immediacy is one of those human temptations that occurs in varieties of form. That's why I mentioned the Wordsworth and the romantic ideal because it goes right into 20 th century Rilke. So we have to figure out what's going on with this claim to immediacy. And at least I want to understand it as it occurs here as an epistemological thesis, an epistemological thesis. Which is to say, this is one place where Harris just goes wrong. I don't think

6:00	That sense-certainty is a common sense thing at all. It's a highly constructed view. Now what I want to understand is construction and therefore why we're starting with it. If anything deserves to be called the common sense view of.. perception I think it's the chapter on perception itself. Sense-certainty, I want to argue, has to be understood as self-conscious withdrawal from the turmoil of perceptual life. Now what distinguishes self-certainty is that it expresses the desire for knowledge to escape all conditions. So rather than
7:00	Think of immediacy as immediate - that's the wrong view - I'm suggesting that immediacy is itself an expression of a desire to escape from conditionness. Mediation. It wants to escape from the burden that we have to tell the difference between true and false. And that, in deed, in knowledge we are responsible in some way for truth-telling and therefore, distinguishing truth from false. It is therefore not an accident as to give some evidence for this, which seems like too strong a thesis, it's not an accident that the chapter on perception. The issue for perception is
8:00	How to make sure that falsity lies in the subject. That is, the whole chapter works by consciousness showing that it is responsible for falsity. And indeed, Hegel even uses the expression responsibility in paragraph 118. So he says there in the middle of the paragraph - what's happening at this point is there's a growing need for a certain kind of reflection. After all, the sub-title of the perception chapter deception is going to be located in subject.
9:00	<p>And therefore he says in 118:</p> <p>This return of consciousness into itself, which is directly <i>mingled</i> with pure apprehension [of the object]---for this return into itself has shown itself to be essential to perception----alters the truth. Consciousness at once recognizes this aspect as its own and takes responsibility for it; by doing so it will obtain the true object in its purity.</p> <p>So even if perception, although perception is going to be naïve in its own way, is going to take responsibility for telling the difference between true and false and sorting things out as the moment of reflection. Sense-certainty wants to deny there's an issue of responsibility. Wants to deny there's an issue of reflection. Wants to</p>
10:00	Escape from all of that. In other words, the immediacy of sense-certainty is a fantasy of knowledge that arises from the discovery that knowledge is fragile and problematic and susceptible to skeptical undermining. Remember that it's the fear of error is the fear of truth. This is the deepest expression of the fear of error. This is it in a nutshell. We want to, as it were, make error impossible.

11:0 0	And therefore it shows that error is everywhere here conditioning the possibility of this form of consciousness. So what sense-certainty expresses is an awareness of knowledge as problematic and it's the attempt to escape that problematic character. And remember that this is, for me, methodological in a sense. That for me, all of philosophy concerns temptations to deceive the world in various ways. And therefore every form of consciousness has bouted a fantasy of a certain kind. We're interrogating forms of consciousness and we're also interrogating fantasies about our being in the world and what makes that
12:0 0	Being in the world coherent. The fantasy here is one of absolute security. Namely, absolute epistemic security. But absolute epistemic security should not be thought of a dry philosopher's thinking because the presumption here is that we're related to the world by means of knowing or representing the world. And therefore, the desire for certainty here is a desire to ground our relation and connectedness to the world to give us a place in the world. And the greatest threat to that is to be to discover that our presumptively
13:0 0	Uncertain ventable presumptions of the world is nothing but a dream, nothing but a fantasy, nothing but a conceptual scheme, nothing but words getting in the way of ideas - One of Locke's anxieties. Now this, fantasy of absolute security has a logical character to it. It's nothing to make fantasies and logic separate. And the logic is one of defining the position by a series of negations. Roughly, what sense-certainty does
14:0 0	is negate anything that might count as a form of mediation as something that might step between me and the world and claim that they play no part in my contact with the world. So the contention is that all mediations are - that could be relevant - play no role. And it follows from that that sense-certainty is a derived position that emerges out of the quagmire of epistemological reflection.
15:0 0	It's privilege here, therefore, is neither epistemological or logical or historical. It's not logically the most primitive thing. There is no logical primitive thing. It's certainly not historically first. And epistemology may not bind itself to sense-certain. We're going to go on to positions. Rather, it's primacies itself phenomenological. That is, it's the simplest expression of the anxiety that defines epistemology as first philosophy.
16:0 0	So you could only have sense-certainty as first once you have an overview of what epistemology looks like. And then put its various possible instructions into some phenomenological order. Roughly, from most simple to most complex. Where it turns out that complexity will not only be mediation, but the role of the mind in those acts of knowing. How much space is given to mental - The mind determining the world. It is important for all the view of consciousness that they want determinacy

17:00	Without mental determination. That is, it's not the mind that's going to give determinacy to the object via concepts via language via attention, all the various ways that we've now come to think the mind does determine. And this is the most extreme form, the phenomenologically simplest form, of that determinacy without determination. So sense-certainty thinks it is without structure. And therefore, it is Hegel in a certain way, that
18:00	Imposes a structure on it, namely, the structure that is already given us in the introduction. That is, as a form of knowing and in itself. He's going to say has that logical form despite itself. And therefore, he is saying things of it that it would never admit to saying itself. Now it's just this fact that led Foyerbach to say that Hegel was wrong. That Hegel was imposing a structure of self-certainty. That he was making sense-certainty write things on
19:00	The board and making sense-certainty speak and that all that sense-certainty subject had to do was not respond. Now in a certain way, because this is a phenomenological analysis, then Hegel is kind of counting on the form of consciousness as responding and acting and therefore, the Foyerbach-ian refusal - I just know I'm immediately aware of this - has a kind of force against Hegel.
20:00	I do not think - some of my friends do - but I do not think there is a direct Hegelian answer to Foyerbach. That doesn't mean that Foyerbach is right. Foyerbach is completely wrong. But the reason he's wrong - the argument against Foyerbach - is to be found in Kant who demonstrates that intuitions without concepts are blind. Hegel, in this case, would have to rely on the Kantian retortation. Which is to say - and I want to be open about this - not every argument is refutable from
21:00	One perspective. That Hegel has to - is counting on the sub-Hegelian view is being refuted by pre-Hegelian philosophers. And that's got to be true, that's what makes philosophy really historical. It's really historical. Now of course, we, in going through the analysis of sense-certainty, will have our own reasons to come to think that Foyerbach and sense-certainty are false. But logically, those reasons as it were are question-begging because what they presuppose are methodology. And our methodology, and this is the point I'm trying to get to -
22:00	Our methodology is Kantian. That is, our methodology presupposes the standpoint of self-consciousness. And this, by the way, is going to be called consciousness, not self-consciousness. So Hegel is claiming in opposition to Kant that epistemology itself doesn't belong to self-consciousness. That all of epistemology is a form of consciousness, namely mirroring or representing the world. And that self-consciousness, we already know, is a determining of a concept of an object and then knowing

23:0 0	In relationship to it. That famous sentence - self-conscious in relation to an object separates itself from it and within itself has an experience itself of knowing. That's the structure of our method again. So everything in this chapter falls below the level of our methodology. That is, in some phenomenological, theoretical way, positions we're looking at are ones that would not acknowledge this structure.
24:0 0	And therefore, in using this structure to analysis them, the argument could be made that Hegel's argument was circular or question-making. And you will see, as you read through the analyses of all of the first three chapters, that there's some anxieties on the part of the commentators. Maybe his argument is question-making, maybe.. of course I already said we don't have a pre-suppositionalist starting point. I've agreed it's historical. I've suggested that this is whole analysis is from the perspective of we Kantians. So I'm not actually upset by that. But I do have to say something about what it means for our understanding of the
25:0 0	Question of the status of consciousness. And my thought is this. That Hegel begins with consciousness because he wants to - and this is the clear project of the chapter - to overcome epistemology itself. So epistemology is going to be disposed of by the end of this chapter. Everything we've said about philosophy - done in the first three chapters. Gives us another 500 pages. That only when we reach self-consciousness do we reach a position that is at least structurally
26:0 0	At a level with our own methodological starting point. So the hypothesis that I am operating with is that because consciousness is at a phenomenologically lower level than the methodology employed to refute it, then we must read this portion of the text as a genealogy. Namely, as a genealogy of self-consciousness. That is, he's going to try to trace a path, a chronological path, of which the chapter on self-consciousness - the famous
27:0 0	master-slave dialectic - will get us up to the level of our methodological starting point. And therefore, and the reason for doing this therefore, the stakes of this - I'll say a lot more about this next where by the way you should all read force and understanding for next week. The stakes of it is to redefine the meaning of self-consciousness in self. And what I mean by that is quite simple. You will discover the chapter force and understanding is a
28:0 0	Sophisticated account of a form of scientific realism. Complicated, but virtually some form of scientific realism. In short, it's a sophisticated view of what a scientific reading of reading Kant as someone who believes in science. A sophisticated reading of Kantianism, at least the first critique, as a doctrine of science. And by putting that sophisticated view of science in a chapter called consciousness, he is going to be claiming, therefore, that that

29:0 0	Form of knowing, A does not belong to self-consciousness and that self-consciousness when we come to it is going to be a form of practical reason. So what his opening section is about - epistemology - the primacy of theoretical reasons over practical reason. You may have already got that from the end of the chapter on sense-certainty. That may be already obvious. But also it's to say that self-consciousness, when understood properly, really cannot be understood in terms of the Copernican turn. If the Copernican turn is understood as fundamentally an epistemological position.
30:0 0	That self-consciousness... because the principle behind this is that every form of consciousness is self-determining. It determines a concept of an object and a conception of knowing. But if it's self-determining and that's what self-consciousness really is - a form of self-determination - then self-consciousness is really about freedom. So the argument that's going to get us from consciousness to self-consciousness is going to be - and this by the way is also the structure of logic - no determination of the
31:0 0	Object world without self-determining subjectivity. And therefore, without free or autonomous subject, whatever Hegel's going to mean by free or autonomous subjects. So the elaborate beginning, what I say is the genealogy, I mean it has to as it were find the resources within epistemology - which again, is where the introduction started - using the his new methodology to recover the possibility of that standpoint.
32:0 0	Therefore, at that level you might say that all of consciousness is questioned, not just the chapter on sense-certainty. And that that is inevitable given the nature of the methodology. So we're starting somewhere in order to, as it were, find our beginning. So we're beginning before the beginning and there'll be a sense - and Hegel makes it explicit - that when we get to consciousness then we'll be beginning again.
33:0 0	There's a lot of beginnings here. And that's why I keep saying that beginnings are immensely difficult. Why? Because we're always trying to abstract ourselves from the reality of our situation and make our abstract self-conception sufficient for our being in the world. And that we always have to recover even the possibilities of undergoing the activities we're undergoing. So like I said, it will take again the whole book in order to get to the beginning and even writing the book. So this is, in a sense, the extreme form of what goes on in the whole book, which also means - should I tell you this?
34:0 0	I'll tell you and you'll hate me for this. This isn't his real methodology - it changes when we get past self-consciousness as it must. It kind of works for a reason, but something totally different happens in spirit. In spirit, the methodology begins to look an awful lot like the causality of fate. We'll get to that in about 15 or 16 weeks. Let me take a deep breath. We haven't even started sense-certainty yet. I told you it isn't easy to begin. Are you all.. any questions about why there's a

35:0 0	Problem here and why I'm suggesting we think about where we are in relation to that problem? I can see puzzled looks. Okay, just keep in mind then in a nutshell, the methodology we're using to analyze sense-certainty is more logically sophisticated than the position it's analyzing and therefore, it's question-begging against it. And we have to understand how we're entitled to do that and I've said we're entitled to do that because this is not a pre-suppositionalist analysis. There is, in a sense, the analysis is not for the sake of starting from the
36:0 0	Real beginning. The sense is to ask the question - who are we? That's the question of the book. Who are we? By which I mean, what does it mean to be we Kantians? So Hegel's assumed that we Kantians - that's to say we knowers - are unknown to ourselves. To quote somebody. And we have to get behind our own prejudices. [Student's question about anxiety - how does sense-certainty work in relation to anxiety]
37:0 0	Sense-certainty is the personification of anxiety. It is, by my analysis, simply the way of saying that that anxiety is intolerable. And therefore, must be escaped from. And that we are going to try to
38:0 0	phenomenologically look at what happens when you try to escape from your responsibilities as a knower, mainly your conditionness. The voice of the we in this chapter, as you may have noticed, is slightly hectoring. And it's hectoring because it doesn't take this stuff too seriously and therefore, it really is there less for the sake of dealing with those anxieties.
39:0 0	After all, the crack about the animals at the end, the joke, is a way of saying to sense-certainty, "Get a life." "Stop standing there and looking at the road and do something." So it sees self-certainty as a form that's going to occur in a lot of other forms. That'll be much more interesting. The most interesting version of which is the beautiful soul. The description of the beautiful soul is going to be interesting. That's what it is to escape conditionalist complexity. In that case, it's going to be moral complexity. That's the thing we're going to try to be saying. Although we're trying to get rid of sense-certainty as a naïve methodological position,
40:0 0	The fantasies motoring it are going to function on higher and higher levels. And that's one of the ways we will see this book is also a process. That forms of consciousness, that when you begin to see them, you're going to see that later ones have, as it were as part of their logical infrastructure, earlier ones worked up in a new way. It's going to carry on. So this is not the sense-certainty, only the end of epistemology. [Student's question]
41:0 0	Because of paragraph 92. It sounds cheap. But it's because of the way he sets it up. Paragraph 92 gets rid of the idea because what he says in actual sense-certainty is not merely pure immediacy but an instance of it. He means sense-certainty as

42:0 0	epistemological thesis. The reason so that the notion of example here, and Harris is probably right, he's probably poking fun at Yacobi, who was a defender of sense-certainty. And he's probably saying, look you can't have sense-certainty as an epistemological thesis because if you do that, the actual sense-certainty because an example of the universal. So be careful about how you yourself operate. But then he lets Yacobi off the hook there and he says when we reflect on this distance, we find that neither one nor the other is immediately present in sense-certainty, but each is at the same time, mediated.
43:0 0	I have this certainty through something else, namely the thing. And it similarly is in sense-certainty through something else, namely through the eye. So he's started out by saying that the very construction of sense-certainty, that we're now going to examine, presupposes this logical structure. And then he says, just to deepen it - this is what I mean by complexity - and in paragraph 93 he says, it's not only we who set it up this way. Sense-certainty cannot help but do this itself. So he says, literally it's not just we who makes this distinction between essence and instance. But sense-certainty is going to have to do the same thing as well. So it's going to start by saying
44:0 0	This is the essence. And the sense awareness is essential. And it's going to switch. The essence of being certain and therefore unessential. So he's setting up a structure that is already in all of this. So that's why I'm saying that he is kind of pushing sense-certainty in a way that it embodied knowledge. [Student's question:
45:0 0	Couldn't Hegel claim that he's not question-begging but merely translating. Realists do make that claim right and that doesn't fit into that structure] It does here because the only way in which - and when we say essence here equals "it is" - and hence why we're interested in why this correlates on the logic on being. The only reason that when this turns out
46:0 0	To run into problems, we go to the eye side. Because the eye side was there all along. And it's that that we're claiming that is the mediated character of the various moments into essential and into inessential is exactly what deprives the position of the pure immediacy it wants for itself. That's the thought. So we haven't started yet. As I've said this turns out to be a little more complicated than it first appears.
47:0 0	Let's see if we can get started with a little bit of an analysis. How much more... You all are clear about how this all connects the idea of providing foundations for knowledge. Let me just say a few words to set it up and then we'll have a break and come back. Just a few more words of setting the thing up. Again, this is part of a representational understanding of knowledge. And

48:0 0	That the trick of this particular formulation, what I think makes it particularly interesting, is that the project of sense-certainty is to collapse a object of knowledge into the sensory state in which it is apprehended such that the distinction between fact and knowing collapses. This is why I'm saying that mediation is a problem. That this thing only works, I mean after all, all this depends on is that there is an epistemic state of being aware. And a separate thing of which you
49:0 0	Are aware which you distinguish yourself from and relate yourself to. Now sense-certainty is not going to be able to do that if it allows that complexity so what it wants to do is have the notion of epistemic state and the notion of awareness collapse into one another. And it's going to have different versions now - the object version and the state version - of that collapse of fact and state. That's the first thing I want to say. The second thing I want to say is this move is also supposed to answer the question
50:0 0	Of which every epistemologist wants the answer to - how do I know that my awareness is really awareness of it? That is, it's not an illusion that I'm not cut off from the world. And the thought is I have to somehow get outside all the various things that cut me off from the world, namely language, conceptualization, prejudices and the like. And open my eyes, ears, and fingers to the world so that the model here, I think, is not the perception.
51:0 0	I think the model is touching. I think what sense-certainty wants is the touch of the world. And we know - and this is meant to underline the collapse of fact and knowledge - we know from Merleau Ponty and from everyone else - there's something queer about touching. Namely, when I touch the table, I can either have it as feeling the table and pressing on the table or feeling my finger pressing on the table. There is this doubleness. Touching touch. That is involved in touching, that doesn't seem to be the case in any other modalities. There's something about that. And the thought here is that
52:0 0	If we have the perception were perception, where the touch of the world. The touch of the world. Then I would have shot right through all my language, all my preconceptions and I could then begin - and this is the thought - I would have foundations for my knowledge. This. And then I can erect everything on top of these absolutely certain foundations. And they are just immediate, etcetera, etcetera. So immediacy is also the thought that knowledge has foundations and the foundations are
53:0 0	Immediate awareness of the things of the world. And that the face of knowledge is going to built on it. Okay. Maybe that's a good place to stop since we haven't started yet. Have a deep break, a little break. And when we come back, we'll just go right into the text.
	BREAK

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1:00	<p>So of course the argument here is going to have an ironic form because the claim or hope is going to be that Sense Certainty is the most richest form of knowledge (§91), it will not be bound in any way, it would be unconditioned, immediate, full, complete and it will be the most empty or the emptiest kind of knowledge.</p> <p>And that inversion will not be accidental.</p> <p>So the very desire, you might say, of wealth turns out to be a sure road to poverty.</p> <p>If only that was true.</p> <p>And §94 says that lets stop arguing about self-certainty and let us start talking about phenomenology. So he explicitly makes a distinction between the philosophical set-up and the phenomenological analysis.</p> <p>He says we do not have to reflect or ponder on whether it is true or not. Let us just consider or take what it says about itself.</p>
2:00	<p>And then he starts with what this is and says now is night. And when Heidegger does this on his lectures on phenomenology he has a lot of fun with this moment as he writes on the board "now is night." And the next day when I saw this the next morning the cleaning man had written this across it, and even the cleaning man knows what this is.</p> <p>This is Hegel's argument in §95.</p>
3:00	<p>So you write "now it is night." And when we come back 12 hours later, suddenly that is no longer true. And you may think that the truth cannot be lost in the process of writing it down because now it seems that now is day.</p>
4:00	<p>Think of sense certainty. Something about the now allows it to be true about it to be different nows. Now is day and now is night etc.</p> <p>So now has something in it which sense certainty tries to, avoid namely something negative about it, which is that it can be the negative of each of its instances. Only by being the negative of not night can it become now is day but that is to say that it cannot be reduced to any of its instances. But it cannot be reduced to any of its instances then the now is not a determinate particular but a universal.</p>

5:00	<p>So to SC's surprise it means to say something concrete and particular but it in uttering the now it says something universal.</p> <p>We will come back to universal. We don't and Hegel did not in the encyclopedia think of the now as a universal but it is an indexel.</p> <p>We will come back to universals and indexels. But for the moment lets pretend that it is a universal.</p>
6:00	<p>That is whatever the case, it does not matter for the particular things I want to talk about, what is important about the now is that if it is an indicator of a determinacy is that it can be used up by multiple particular instances.</p>
7:00	<p>Now you may want to say that we are not talking about language. What we meant was this now. Now there is a puzzle which will come back is that language betrays SC.</p> <p>And we suggested at the very beginning that language will betray SC and that is why it is SC because it thinks that somehow get past the mediation of language.</p> <p>Is the use of language going to be question begging and we will come back to it.</p> <p>There is a whole claim that in asking SC to write this down, enforcing it to put its thought in language</p>
8:00	<p>that it is necessarily being forced to mediate what it claims cannot be mediated.</p> <p>Hegel wants to say, in opposition to SC, language is more truthful and language is more truthful, because it is through that the concept now is something</p>
9:00	<p>reusable and re-applicable in multiple instances and therefore in that sense a universal.</p> <p>Well, is it the case, that we are being unfair to SC here by forcing it to speak in a form of phenomenological coercion?</p>
10:00	<p>Ask yourself first, why does Hegel choose this here now. This here now. Why does he use this here now as a term to get inside or to understand SC.</p> <p>It looks as if anything is going to correspond to what we imagine to be the notion of what immediacy must signify, it must be the here and the now.</p> <p>That is space and time, and the simplest notions of the here and now, lets call it the present, present to me</p>

11:0 0	<p>so the notion of this is the wildest fantasy of pure present. Since space and time in the context of what we know from Kant, and of course much of this will concern Kant in this chapter, and much of this will be a repetition of transcendental aesthetic, and the setting up of space and time as the ultimate framework in which experience thinks.</p> <p>But if SC is going to have any chance of satisfying its imaginary it will have to be through the spatial and temporal forms of pure presence.</p>
12:0 0	<p>And what it wants out of pure presence is determinacy.</p> <p>Remember the idea of SC is not a mystical state of oneness with the universe, though that is what it ends up as more or less, it ends up saying nothing, it ends up just saying Being because it has no term for its determinacy.</p> <p>But it starts with the this because the this is the imaginary that I am immediately aware of something touching it. So the terms here and now look to be because they are indicators of presence look to be the only terms that he could use that would not be question begging.</p>
13:0 0	<p>That is they capture what is wanted here.</p> <p>So hence the terms themselves look like they are the right terms but nonetheless look like they are bits of language. So is SC question begging with respect to language. Many Derrideans will say yes it is question begging. Why would deconstructionists want to argue that?</p> <p>The right answer to this is given by Pippin on page 119.</p>
14:0 0	<p>And the question that Pippin rightly asks is that the argument against Hegel will take the following form:</p> <p>Is Hegel begging the question here by pre-supposing that a form of consciousness must be able to say what it means for it to be able to mean at all.</p> <p>This seems to be the thesis here.</p> <p>Now if this were true and some general thesis about the relationship between language and experience were being introduced here</p>
15:0 0	<p>then we would expect Hegel to make much more of this than he does. And we would especially expect Hegel to in the following chapters a kind of language test, can you say it, can you express it, would recur and that Hegel would justify this.</p> <p>This never happens again. Hegel never uses language in this way, he does not have an expressability thesis. So what are we supposed to suppose here?</p>

16:0 0	<p>I take it that the argument is, quoting Pippin, that the impossibility of a direct apprehension of a determinate object is shown to be a consequence of the restrictions inherent in the kind of putative experience itself namely that is a consequence of the latter of that experience containing any determining capacity.</p> <p>Because the problem here is the indeterminacy. The problem is that I mean to say now is night but I cannot determine that because I am not allowing</p>
17:0 0	<p>that there are any determining capacities. And it is because SC takes and strips away all determining capacities whether they are linguistic or not, that makes the experience essentially indeterminate.</p> <p>So all that SC could experience would be such an indeterminate presence. The question is could there be such an experience that SC is imagining, that has the concreteness that SC is imagining, but with everything else withdrawn, with no concept, no language</p>
18:0 0	<p>no setting up a context. Everything that would give the experience its determinacy is being withdrawn but if it is being withdrawn then the experience itself is indeterminate.</p> <p>It is not that it cannot express what it means. It cannot mean what it is imagining, because what it is imagining is something determinate and determinacy requires a lot of stuff.</p> <p>And we will learn that determinacy requires a lot of practice, knowing about indexicals, and knowing about the re-application of them and the like.</p>
19:0 0	<p>So the thought here is that there can be given what SC has available no determinate relationship to an object. Opening your eyes, so to speak, does not generate a determinate relationship to an object.</p> <p>And therefore nothing about the notion of experience here has been established.</p> <p>And hence the difficulty of expressing a sense certain experience in language is the difficulty it is because SC defines experience is necessarily indeterminate.</p>
20:0 0	<p>It is indeterminate. That's why.</p> <p>And since it is indeterminate then the reference to language does not play a justificatory role but merely an explanatory role.</p> <p>So the use of language here is not question begging in any problematic sense.</p> <p>Rather, and now we can see what Hegel was thinking when he says language is the truer, namely language is showing the indeterminacy of SC's actual experience. That is its experience which is indeterminate.</p>

21:0 0	<p>That is because there is nothing within it that is an account of what makes it possible, (namely nothing makes it possible except your eyes), that could generate determinacy. Even a minimal attempt which we will get to. The minimal one needed, which Bernstein thinks of when he reads this chapter, is attending. This is a great philosophical concept that has not been worked out.</p> <p>SC wants to attend to, pay attention to a particular. For Kant the primary form of self-determination is attending. This is very complicated and has a huge footnote in the critique.</p>
22:0 0	<p>So the reason why SC says now and ends up saying the universal is because that is what it has at its disposal. It has no means to get to the very thing it wants.</p> <p>Now Hegel is not claiming that we cannot be aware of particular instances. He is not claiming that in being aware of particular instances we become aware of them via our senses. He is merely claiming that SC's way of thinking about that is mistaken.</p>
23:0 0	<p>And that mistake gets repeated with the here. Here is the student and here is the blackboard. Here can be any here depending on where I am.</p> <p>I, you say, well lets think of the I and that is just what Hegel suggests. He moves in §100 to the I.</p>
24:0 0	<p>Now we have made the object not the essence, we have made the object in-essential.</p> <p>And now let us make the I essential, the state of SC. Now we are looking at the other side of the structure.</p> <p>Now we will say that now is they because I say it.</p> <p>So the they is indexed to my perceiving it. I see they. I am on the telephone with a friend in Australia and he says "now I see night."</p>
25:0 0	<p>Again the problem is that I is supposed to index a certain SC moment. It is supposed to be the minimal unit. So again it holds up every possible I something we know Descartes counts on in Discourse on Method.</p> <p>So the problem turns out to be the same with I.</p> <p>So it is of course the case that neither here nor now nor I are universals. Universals are concepts and therefore we tend to think of I here and now as indexals.</p>

26:0 0	<p>Hegel says this in §418 of encyclopedia. He came to this realization that his formulations here were not quite adequate.</p> <p>So what is the difference between indexals and universals?</p> <p>[indexals are tied to speaking the way universals are not. Cat is not context dependent as I here now etc are].</p>
27:0 0	<p>Indexals are not only context dependent but that the very nature of indexicals are for the sake of generating context of utterance. That's what they do.</p>
28:0 0	<p>Indexals do not have meaning the way concepts have meaning. For example meows and has four legs. Indexicals have use rather than meaning. And their use is picking out a context of utterance and thus what we are aware of particularly aware of in SC varies with context.</p>
29:0 0	<p>So therefore what SC lacks is any way of constituting a context of utterance or context of awareness that is determining. That is it wants to use the logical powers of this here now I without incurring any of the responsibilities that go along with the employment of those powers.</p> <p>The powers are of course to generate the notion of something that should be present.</p> <p>So it wants indexicals but without acknowledging that they are terms that have a certain set of uses. That their uses are like singular descriptive references e.g. "the dog is in the manger" in a variety of ways.</p>
30:0 0	<p>For example a change of context entails a change in reference.</p> <p>Secondly, a definite description, a blank, requires completion with a definite predicate but this requires completion as well that is they are incomplete expressions. They have plural forms. They invoke a conceptual scheme that allows one to make inferences even minimal inferences, that is if something is this then it is not that.</p>
31:0 0	<p>If it is I that is speaking then it is not you. There are some inferential powers etc.</p> <p>All of this is very nicely covered in the article by William [Fill name?] "On Hegel in Reference and Knowledge."</p> <p>So Hegel says he is talking about universals but what he is really talking about up till now is really indexicals.</p> <p>But the same point holds because indexicals are multiply usable and they are indifferent to any particular context and they get their sense from their context of usage this here now.</p>
32:0 0	<p>And they do this as we said by being context generating.</p> <p>Question.</p>

33:0 0	<p>So the thought has to have both sides. What SC does not know that if it were to get any determinacy it would have to use indexicals in the ordinary way. That is it would have to depend on language.</p>
34:0 0	<p>But it thinks it has access just by virtue of the terms now and here to a now and here which are not being used but we might say quoted.</p> <p>So the problem with SC is that it does not use the indexicals it quotes them. Imagining that it is a content, that now is a content namely the present rather than an act of determining a content which gives or makes things present.</p> <p>Question:</p> <p>The problem is activity.</p> <p>We will find this again and again that consciousness wants determinacy without determining activity, the activity of consciousness.</p>
35:0 0	<p>The concept of consciousness determined by an apperceptive self awareness. That is the whole thing about self-consciousness, it is the determining of a concept of an object and therefore generates its extended space with a palpable profile. SC wants none of that.</p> <p>We were talking about indexicals for the sake of people who not unreasonably think that the words I should not be lumped with words cat and dog or universals.</p>
36:0 0	<p>So the original attempt fails.</p> <p>Now Hegel says that let us see if we can make the notion of SC work by putting the two notions together. And now something like an attending happens. Namely something that occurs in the very opening of Wittgenstein's Investigations namely act of pure ostention.</p> <p>Namely pointing. You can think of this as a mental pointing or an attending.</p> <p>And the thought is that if we put together the "I" with the "this" here "now", and put it all in one the we might get the experience of SC.</p>
37:0 0	<p>And the trick has to be that it has to be very fast.</p> <p>This is exactly Hegel's argument. The point is to put it all together must be putting it together without any act of determining.</p> <p>If I was willing to be determining, "this hour in this room" I can relax because I have all I need a time and place.</p>

38:0 0	<p>But because the this here now are not thought of having any structuring capacities but meant to be pure designations of pure presence, then all they can do indeterminately pick out a moment and the indeterminacy of that moment is that the now has already passed.</p> <p>So Hegel argues is that now is a has been. This must be a linguistic joke for him.</p>
39:0 0	<p>And it is a has been, and this will also turn out to be the notion of essence, which is to say that the now is not now, that the now comes about as something that is already passed.</p> <p>In §107:</p> <p>(1) I point out the 'Now', and it is asserted to be the truth. I point it out, however as something that <i>has been</i>, or as something that has been superseded; I set aside the first truth. (2) I now assert as the second truth that it <i>has been</i>, that it is superseded. (3) But what has been, <i>is not</i>; I set aside the second truth, its <i>having been</i>, its super-session, and thereby negate the negation of the 'Now', and thus return to the first assertion, that the 'Now' <i>is</i>. The 'Now' and pointing out the 'Now', are thus constituted that neither the one nor the other is something immediate and simple, but a movement which contains various moments.</p>
40:0 0	<p>The same thought is §459 encyclopedia.</p> <p>Here is his definition of the present in encyclopedia.</p>
41:0 0	<p>"The present is [a] only because the past is not. The being of the now has the determination of not being. And the not being of its being is the future. The present is this negative unity.</p> <p>The not being replaced by the now is the past. The being of not being contained in the present is the future. If one considers time positively one can therefore say that only the present is. But the concrete present is the result of the past, it is pregnant with the future."</p> <p>[a] and this is what he has just argued and is now laying it out chronologically.</p>
42:0 0	<p>So the logical form of the now for Hegel, so the now is going to be found by a series of negations.</p> <p>Now as "not no longer" and "not not yet."</p> <p>So the now is composed of two negations of negations.</p>

43:0 0	<p>The past is the no longer and the future is not yet and the present is the "not no longer" and the "not not yet."</p> <p>If you are a Husserlian you will say that the present is a moment of retention of the past and a protension towards the future.</p> <p>If you are a Kantian you will say that it includes the reproductive imagination and the recognition of the object and the concept.</p>
44:0 0	<p>And if you are a Heideggerian, you will say this is ecstatic temporality. What all these views share is that they do not begin with a presence and they all view the present that is generated as a relational moment between the past and the future.</p> <p>It is only in light of a result of a past and pregnancy with a future that there can be any now.</p>
45:0 0	<p>So Hegel's first thought here about the now, and this comes about Hegel says, he generates this not crazy logical account of the meaning of presence phenomenologically from the experience of losing the now. That is the only way I can eventually get to the now is by acknowledging that the now that I have is a has been. And the now that will come about is not yet. And that therefore by relating myself to these two nows I can have a now.</p> <p>So the now comes out of the experience of the loss of presence. Or as he says that it is the discovery that it is a movement.</p>
46:0 0	<p>That the now is an experience in its passing and its loss.</p> <p>And that he says the pointing out of the now is thus likewise itself the movement which expresses what the now is in truth namely <u>a result</u>. We started by saying that the now was a simple indicator of the present. This now cannot be simple but must be a result.</p> <p>And you can bet that everything will be a result.</p>
47:0 0	<p>That if you cannot get to the now without two double negations then nothing else will be logically any simpler than that.</p> <p>And that is learning that the now is a certain power within this context.</p> <p>Now the notion of the here is much more interesting and much more anthropological. Bernstein is surprised at how no commentators mention how anthropological this is. By anthropological Bernstein means that this is very unlike what he says about space which is a bit Newtonian, a bit geometrical.</p>

48:0 0	<p>\$108</p> <p>The <i>Here pointed out</i>, to which I hold fast, is similarly a <i>this Here</i> which, in fact, is <i>not</i> this Here, but a Before and Behind, an Above and Below, a Right and Left.</p> <p>The three steps are curious. Think of not just any body but a human body. They are indexed to the upright forward looking human posture.</p>
49:0 0	<p>The Before and Behind, well you must have eyes set in the head, that look forward.</p> <p>Right and Left we know from Kant. The problem with Right and Left is that they are qualitatively identical and the only difference between them is that they are right and left. That rightness and leftness are irreducible to anything else. That they are in this sense primitive concepts.</p> <p>And at least Above and Below, at least as used here, assume a stand point.</p>
50:0 0	<p>So it seems correct that the notion of this here is that the co-ordination between the map and the body does not work (e.g. think of a map that says you are here but you are not exactly here but there).</p> <p>I am always here, where else will I be.</p> <p>Hegel's point is that the notion of here is regimented in some indicator of my bodily presence.</p> <p>So the primitive notion of space and pointing out the lets calls it the visual anthropology of visual space and a gentle space projected upon the moving human body.</p>
51:0 0	<p>The minimal notion of spatiality possible for perceptual awareness.</p> <p>So it turns out that both here and now require space and time for their condition of possibility.</p>
52:0 0	<p>And this is exactly the argument of Kant's transcendental aesthetic where he says space and time are forms of intuitions, that are wholes of which particular moments are parts. So you cannot start with the here and now, rather the now is composed of many nows and here is composed of many heres.</p> <p>Hegel now says \$109:</p> <p>It is clear that the dialectic of sense-certainty is nothing else but the simple history of its movement or of its experience, and sense-certainty itself is nothing else but just this history. That is why the natural consciousness, too, is always reaching this result, learning from experience what is true in it; but equally it is always forgetting it and starting the movement all over again.</p>

53:0 0	<p>That is SC and this is really where we began and not a bad moment to end on, SC has no content, and it has no content because it does not allow determinacy. Because it denies structure. this is where we started.</p> <p>So Hegel is saying that the content of SC is its history. It is its learning that it is content-less.</p>
54:0 0	<p>And since it has no content and does not say anything all we can say about SC is that history by which it experiences its loss of its pure now pure here pure I, and then it puts it all together I see this now, that speedy moment, and then losing that, and in losing that discovering that this structure is required.</p> <p>That is we can only have the now by the double negations of the "not not longer" and the "not not yet" and we can only have "here" by acknowledging the determinacy of the human body itself.</p>
55:0 0	<p>That it has a fundamental structuring and orientating capacity.</p> <p>Now the best example of the latter of Barnett Newman's zip painting. People are surprised how a single strike in a colour field can be so powerful. But there is a reason why vertical zips work and the horizontal ones don't because the horizontal ones generate the notions of horizon, perspective all the things that he is trying to avoid.</p>
56:0 0	<p>The beauty of the zip paint is that it realizes that the vertical line is itself a symbol of the entire uprising of the human and its creation of spatiality. So when we look at the zip, and of course Barnett Newman intends this, it feels like we are experiencing the birth or origin of meaning. He gives them really heavyweight Biblical titles to tell you in the beginning to tell you that it is the emergence of meaning itself. All this stuff is emergence of meaning itself not because there are two colours in the world but because there is the upright human being face forward left and right above and below.</p> <p>Immensely powerful.</p>
57:0 0	<p>Question:</p> <p>Read the words: here is before and behind, above and below, right and left.</p>

58:0 0	<p>Bernstein is looking for the minimum condition for spatiality. It is of course correct that these are also objective ones.</p> <p>But Bernstein is suggesting that Hegel is suggesting that in order to utter here we will have to have at least those six operators and those six operators are just the operators of what it is to be have a human body in spatial terms.</p> <p>Hegel could have said what Kant says that the here has to be relative to every other space. That space is a whole and that every space is related to another space. But he does not say that.</p>
59:0 0	<p>That is the point that he very carefully picks out the human terms.</p>
60:0 0	<p>This is underlined by the fact, to go to the joke at the end, this is underlined by the fact that if he turn to practice. this is not as if we turn to practice, that is so speak the faint. That these mysteries are not so mysterious. That the ".....animals do not stand idly....."</p> <p>\$109:</p> <p>.....for they do not just stand idly in front of sensuous things as if these possessed intrinsic being, [a] but, despairing of their reality, and completely assured of their nothingness, they fall without ceremony and eat them up. And all Nature, like the animals, celebrates these open Mysteries which teach the truth about sensuous things.</p> <p>[a] watch out for Miller's translation. He does weird things with essence. Intrinsic being is essence.</p>
61:0 0	<p>What is that truth? That they eat them? Well yes. But what is that truth?</p> <p>That they are transient and contingent. They are not essential things at all. That is the first thing. There is a fetishism by saying, what SC imagines is that this will save my soul. So that is strange. And yes so it is transient.</p> <p>But we are transient too so that cannot be the worst thing that can happen?</p> <p>What does the animal do with it? What's the story there?</p> <p>It is essential but then it disappears.</p> <p>It certainly turns it upon itself and what is important about that?</p>

62:0 0	<p>It is certainly negating it. And what is important about that?</p> <p>It is using it. It has a purpose. It is caught up in a series of practical purposes. So the sensuous thing is not something we just look at. It will get its meaning as we will see in about three chapters or if you like, from reading Being and Time, by being in a circuit of objects that are related to one other by the practical purposes they fulfill in our practical lives.</p> <p>So we might say if there is a motto that will be pressing us forward, motto from [FILL name?], all knowledge is for the sake of action.</p>
63:0 0	<p>That all knowledge belongs in a context in which we are practical beings. That we look at things not just for the sake of looking at them, although there is beauty, which is a puzzle, but that is the experience of merely looking. Mostly looking is looking as part of a practical experience and that is what the animal knows and its not just looking but puts it to practical purpose.</p> <p>He is suggesting here that we are already caught up in a fetishism of the contemplative perspective. As if perceiving or knowing or looking is the highest human activity.</p>
64:0 0	<p>Question: [on reconciling with genealogy if forcing SC to speak].</p> <p>We force SC into a phenomenological structure.</p> <p>Question follow up: [on phenomenology being descriptive].</p> <p>Phenomenology is descriptive in that its structure itself, we watch it perform it. So once we agree that it has a structure, even if it denies that it has a structure, then we don't need to have a criterion, we</p>
65:0 0	<p>can simply ask that if in its own terms it matches its SC with an awareness of a this. That is does the experience deliver determinacy. That is what we are asking.</p> <p>And what we discovered is that in looking at its performing that claim that it turns into the very opposite.</p> <p>[FILL]...Genealogy of that the whole of consciousness is going to be the genealogy of self-consciousness. Phenomenological genealogy. The re-achieving of that and thus a re-determining of its meaning by its phenomenological placement.</p>