

0:00	<p>We will begin by developing a direct argument that goes from Sceptical Consciousness to inter-subjectivity, in order to show that exactly how movement into the Master Slave is meant to solve the problem of Consciousness.</p> <p>since he already says Spirit appears, so we need to see if it solves the problem we began with.</p> <p>that is what we will do in the first hour and then we will spend time really digging away at the logic of inter-subjectivity, which is peculiar.</p> <p>And in the second hour we will go through the details of Master Slave elements itself.</p>
1:00	<p>so for next week our aim is to finish the Master Slave, talk about the Derrida FILL problem. And then begin Scepticism, Stoicism, and Unhappy Consciousness.</p> <p>Let us return to the problem with which the book began.</p> <p>Epistemology's anxiety that our representations of the world do not guarantee that we are in touch with the world. The problem that there may be a veil of perception that actually our representations cut us off from the world.</p>
2:00	<p>and this anxiety as it got inherited in German idealist thought has its most perspicuous presentation in Kant, and hence Kant's doctrine that we know appearances only and not things in themselves.</p> <p>Hence the difference between empirical realism and transcendental idealism. The thought that we know appearances only, not things in themselves, was consistently interpreted by post-Kantians as a sophisticated form of Scepticism. That there really was something that we did not know. Things in themselves.</p> <p>And the reason why that was a problem is because Kant said that even representations had to be representations of something different from themselves.</p>

3:00	<p>So the question was of the origin of sense impressions, the origins of ideas. Those thing that our will and imagination have no power over.</p> <p>and the philosopher who kept beating Kant on this was Jacobi. And Jacobi was again struck by the thought that Kantian representations may be representations, he said, of nothing at all.</p> <p>and because they are representations of nothing at all, he suggested that Kantianism might be a philosophy of nothingness. Or as we nowadays call it nihilism.</p> <p>So this is the introduction to t he idea of nihilism.</p> <p>Nihilism is truly the skeptical thought that we know nothing by knowing appearances.</p>
4:00	<p>that is the worry about Kant that got this whole story going.</p> <p>and Hegel attempts to shift from Consciousness to Self-Consciousness, to inter-subjectivity, to what we call this new grid of recognition, to be the core of his answer to the problem of skeptical nihilism.</p> <p>we have not shown that yet. Last week we barely mentioned this.</p> <p>the details will follow in the next hour but the clear and simple thought is simply this.</p> <p>against Cartesianism, of which Kantianism and Fichteanism is a version, the thought is that self-knowledge as a rational being</p>
5:00	<p>self-knowledge is only possible through mutual recognition.</p> <p>that you cannot know yourself by yourself. That in order to know yourself, it has to be mediated by another.</p> <p>So X knows itself only if it grants the other the same status as it would have the other grant itself. And the self knows itself through the other as the other knows itself through self.</p> <p>without recognition of the other, the self cannot prove, demonstrate, have assurance of its claim to being a rational being, to be self-consciousness</p>

6:00	<p>and so cannot know itself as rational.</p> <p>now if this is right, and there is no reason to think that it is, if it is right, and this is just the point we want to make, then there is no longer a privileged realm of subjectivity. That even in my self-knowledge, I am already posited outside of myself.</p> <p>Hence even in self-knowledge I am in touch with an independent other and the world outside of myself.</p> <p>That is why Hegel thinks to get into subjectivity, to have a certain structure, this would simply eliminate the problem of skeptical nihilism.</p>
7:00	<p>As we suggested last week, this generates another problem, the whole changing the topic, the new conceptual grid, namely how can I work out my relation with the other.</p> <p>This is a different problem. It is not the skeptical problem.</p> <p>let's see how we solve the skeptical problem, and succeed in changing the topic. Or learning how to forget about epistemology.</p> <p>Now it is evident that simply the move to self-consciousness by itself does not solve the problem. On the contrary that is the problem. It does not solve the problem of consciousness, but only on the contrary, gives its most demanding Kantian and Fichtean form.</p>
8:00	<p>And from the reference to I=I, and from reading FILL and from reading Fichte, we know that it is really Fichte that Hegel is thinking about here.</p> <p>and Fichte was aware that despite the primacy of self-consciousness, theoretical self-consciousness, remains finally a form of consciousness.</p> <p>let us say this again.</p> <p>theoretical self-consciousness that is this kind of self-consciousness in which I am aware of the world, theory versus practice, is itself a form of consciousness.</p> <p>that is it goes back to the previous moment. And the reason for that is just for the reason we just gave.</p>

9:00	<p>That is whenever I am conscious of something distinct from myself, then my consciousness is conditioned by an object that is independent from it.</p> <p>where do sense impressions come from? I don't create sense impressions, I don't create the ideas that are imposed upon me.</p> <p>So my will, my imagination, is bound down by what is not me.</p> <p>so the objective world provides the materials for cognitive and perceptual experience. But if this is true, which we take it to be, then the Kantian dilemma about things in themselves remains.</p>
10:00	<p>and self-consciousness cannot show that self-knowledge is absolute, which is what we were claiming that self knowledge is absolute. That is, to know anything at all is only to know itself.</p> <p>now let us put this in Hegelian [FILL]</p> <p>this is the problem of establishing the identity of identity and non-identity.</p> <p>how come?</p> <p>let us see if we can translate that into terms that make sense.</p> <p>Self-knowledge, all by itself, is a subject-object identity.</p>
11:00	<p>Self-knowledge for a Fichtean, for Descartes, for Kant, is subject-object identity.</p> <p>Because the subject of knowledge, the knower, and the object of knowledge, what is known, is the same, namely the self. Maybe in different relations but I=I, there is subject-object identity.</p> <p>Ordinary experience, seen objects in the world, however, involve subject-object non-identity. Because the object is given for the subject and appears as again independent of will and imagination.</p>

12:00	<p>Hence for Fichte there must be and cannot be an identity of identity and non-identity.</p> <p>There must be such an identity because subject object identity, $I=I$, the cogito, the TUA, [Transcendental Unity of Apperception] is the principle of all knowledge. So there must be subject-object identity because the I think is the principle of all knowledge.</p> <p>Conversely there cannot be such an identity because the principle of subject-object identity literally contradicts the subject-object non-identity, that is constitutive of ordinary experience.</p>
13:00	<p>We would not want to be otherwise. We would not want the thought of touching the world to be just touching the self. In the sense that we touch the world, we want the world as something different than us.</p> <p>We want our subject-object dualism. At least a little bit.</p> <p>It is here that Fichte shifts from theoretical reason to practical reason or what Fichte calls striving.</p> <p>Self-consciousness, Fichte argues, can strive in its moral actions, to make the objective world conform to its own moral law.</p>
14:00	<p>That is, to make the is, whatever is given, into what it ought to be.</p> <p>So it is not the case that there is subject-object identity in the first instance.</p> <p>Rather it comes to be by a process of transforming the given and bringing it into accord with the norms of reason itself.</p> <p>And this, thought by the way, this idea of consciousness as striving to take the objective recalcitrations of the world out of the world and bringing this into harmony with human desire is very important to Marxist thought.</p>

15:00	<p>See Tom Rockmore's book on Fichte and Marxism.</p> <p>This is what de-reification is. To take something that is reified, thing like, independent of you and you de-reify it by bringing it into accord with the norms of reason, desire and humanity.</p> <p>so there is a whole aspect of continental thought, of which Marx is just one example, where this Fichtean trope of striving to overcome the independence of the object by bringing it into conformity with our own ideals of reason, normativity, and the like.</p> <p>Northern Fry, who professor likes, says that the fundamental gesture of Western thought</p>
16:00	<p>is the imaginary that goes from the transformation of the given natural world into the farm.</p> <p>Beautiful Fichtean image.</p> <p>We can take the raw prairies of Nebraska, and eventually you get the raw prairies of Nebraska or a farm with wheat etc.</p> <p>All the Fichtean idea.....</p> <p>Hegel for the moment drops the concern about normativity and focuses simply on the striving or on the desire.</p> <p>And desire we suggested last week is a way of constituting the world as essentially mine. As seeing the world through the lens of what I want it to be, what I desire to be.</p>
17:00	<p>And making it mine by satisfying those desires.</p> <p>The movement of desire is therefore a logic in which we make different the same. The movement of desire is the reduction of the non-identical to the identical. The logic of desire is a logic of consumption. So a logic of negating the otherness or independence of the world. And again reducing [deducing? FILL] the difference to the same.</p> <p>as we remember at the end of sense-certainty the animal was not flummoxed by looking at the object, it just devoured it.</p>

18:00	<p>so now we are repeating that moment explicitly. we are the devouring animal deducing the object.</p> <p>in §175, Hegel says that this logic fails 3 times over. This logic does not provide what it hopes to provide.</p> <p>In this satisfaction, however, experience makes it aware that the object has its own independence. Desire and the self-certainty obtained in its gratification, are conditioned by the object, for self-certainty comes from superseding this other: in order that this supersession can take place, there must be this other. Thus self-consciousness, by its negative relation to the object, is unable to supersede it; it is really because of that relation that it produces the object again, [a] and the desire as well. It is in fact something other than self-consciousness that is the essence of Desire; and through this experience self-consciousness has itself realized this truth.</p> <p>[a] again and again.</p>
19:00	<p>Well what does it realize? Why does the project of desire fail 3 times over?</p>
20:00	<p>First, there must really be an object that might satisfy desire. And the object that satisfies that desire is independent of that desire. What we mean by that is the simple following thought.</p> <p>That it is only an object with certain properties that allow me to satisfy my thirst, my desire, to slake my thirst. So only something with the properties of H₂O or the like makes possible the satisfaction of desire.</p>
21:00	<p>So the desire itself is not independent of the object. Indeed the [FILL] desire is absolutely dependent on the object facilitating its satisfaction.</p> <p>So it is really dependent on the qualities of the object and it does not stipulate them. It only stipulates its need for them, which is not the same at all. So the object is truly independent.</p> <p>Second is what professor calls the Chinese dinner syndrome.</p> <p>We all know when we eat Chinese food, we are hungry an hour later. That turns out to be one of the deepest truths in all of Western thought.</p> <p>Because the desires themselves recur.</p>

22:00	<p>So desire is not permanently satisfied. Every satisfaction needs the satisfaction of another desire, another desire, another desire, as Hobbes says unto death. Unto death</p> <p>For Hobbes the desire is the source of human motion. It is the psychology of the law of inertia. That is, whatever is in motion stays in motion until it is stopped. Stopped for Hobbes means being killed. Or dying. And what keeps you in motion is desire. So he says that a desire is desire unto death. So desire is in principle in this form non-satisfiable. There is infinite regress.</p>
23:00	<p>Third. So let us say we have a good meal. You consume the object, you are satisfied, now we just return to identity with ourselves. We have no relationship to the object.</p> <p>So the moment of consumption leaves us, as we know after a meal, wanting to fall asleep. As everyone does after satisfaction.</p> <p>But satisfaction is the disappearance of the object, disappearance of the desire and the return to simple identity.</p> <p>Something we see recurring at a different level with the master. That is why we can mention it here.</p>
24:00	<p>Hence there is strangely now, we look at this logic, there is either non-identity, the object that is independent of you or identity. But not the identity of identity and non-identity.</p> <p>So we have a perfect failure of desire to satisfy the original problem.</p> <p>It is at this juncture that Hegel changes the topic introducing another self-consciousness.</p> <p>why?</p> <p>well let us look at the problem simply formally. That is from the perspective of failed desire.</p>

25:00	<p>What we want to do is to avoid the extremes of simple non-identity or simple identity. That is what desire left us with.</p> <p>And in order to do that, we require first an object that is truly non-identical with the ego.</p> <p>That is, we require an object that, shall we say, that the ego cannot consume but is truly different from it.</p> <p>So we require real non-identity, or real difference, that is in some sense non-consumable. This is by the way, not an a-priori argument against capitalism.</p>
26:00	<p>Secondly, we need from that very same object the satisfaction of the principle of identity. That the ego sees its identity in its object. So that the object is not completely alien to it.</p> <p>This condition is required so that the ego does not lose its absolute independence and depend on something completely outside itself.</p> <p>And these 2 conditions must be joined so that consciousness seeks the identity of identity and non-identity.</p>
27:00	<p>Well this is satisfied by another self-consciousness which can while remaining independent negate its otherness to the subject.</p> <p>And it negates its otherness, I negate my otherness from you, by freely recognizing it.</p> <p>So I, as it were, hand you back yourself, your stature, by letting my own self freely go for you.</p>
28:00	<p>So at least in formal terms, and we are just talking formally now, and will get to the logic in a second, in strictly formal terms this should do the trick.</p> <p>Namely mutual recognition satisfies the condition of non-identity because both persons are equal and independent. Independent in their freedom or autonomy.</p> <p>it also fulfills the condition of identity because the self is self-conscious, conscious of itself, only through its other.</p> <p>It sees itself in the other as the other sees itself in the self.</p>

29:00	<p>The trick is to figure out what the structure of the exchange is.</p> <p>Amongst others, the person who gets its most wrong is Lacan. He thinks that it is a mirroring structure and it is not a mirroring. And professor wants to explain why it's not a mirroring relationship and that it is much more complex. And as professor is explaining the complexity, he will show why Kojève's account which he loves is false. But false not for the reasons usually charged.</p>
30:00	<p>and 2 best texts that get right the logic of cognitive relations are Robert Williams and Paul Redding FILL. Those are the best texts that really nail the structure.</p> <p>Well we are invited to think of a struggle between desiring beings who are brought into conflict by their desires. That is their desire to be all reality.</p> <p>We want to stay with the original premise, and therefore marginalize the Kojevian story.</p> <p>We still have to imagine these original characters, who are these Fichtean desiring beings, desiring to demonstrate that they are all reality.</p> <p>And now they bump into another. The two meet up in a dark park at night. We know we are in trouble.</p>
31:00	<p>Both of them desire to show themselves to be all reality. And that if I am to be all reality, I can be all reality if I can show that I am independent of any other by consuming the other. Which is to say that by removing the competition, by killing the other. So what emerges is a battle. And what emerges in the battle itself, is a re-cognitive structure.</p> <p>What is the re-cognitive structure?</p>
32:00	<p>We will give the 2 combatants philosophical names. We will call them X and Y. it is usually the name philosophers give beings. Or let us say George and Fred.</p> <p>If George recognizes his own intention to kill Fred as expressed in Fred's actions towards him.</p> <p>Let us say this again.</p>

33:00	<p>If George recognizes his own intention, I recognize my own intention to kill Fred, in Fred's intentions to kill me, it cannot be the case, that it is Fred's particular intention that I am recognized.</p> <p>It cannot be just his particular intention that I am recognizing as his intention to kill me.</p>
34:00	<p>Rather the intention to kill this particular being, the intention to kill me In seeing that, I am recognizing the intention by Fred to kill whoever is Fred's other. And I can understand myself to be that other, just as I recognize that Fred is my other.</p> <p>Let us press on. We have to get this or else the whole thing falls apart completely.</p> <p>Let us sum it up this way.</p>
35:00	<p>What each of us has is the same intention. We have the same intention namely to kill the other. So we share an intentional content and we recognize that we share an intentional content. So we both have the same intention namely to kill the other.</p> <p>but simultaneously our intentions which are exactly the same are completely opposed to one another.</p> <p>They are opposite. They are opposites because I want to kill him, and he wants to kill me.</p> <p>So I am struggling to make my life, while Fred is struggling to bring about my death.</p>
36:00	<p>So what we have is a common intentional content, call it a universal. Common intentional content with inverted or opposed indexicality or subjectivity.</p> <p>That is, this is a contradictory structure of identity with an opposition, and it occurs because each of us must simultaneously sustain two opposed points of view. We must sustain two opposed points of view.</p>

37:00	<p>First there is my point of view. And my point of view is I want to kill him and save my life.</p> <p>But I can only battle with him by understanding that he has his own point of view which is the opposite of mine, namely his subjectivity, in which he wants to save his life by killing me.</p> <p>So I need at the same time to both, so I have to have one bit of indexicality, one logic of indexicality, that is subject centered, and another recognition of another indexicality that comes from the object.</p>
38:00	<p>Otherwise without the opposed indexicality, we simply have the same intentional content, the desire to kill the other. But it is not that. We are enemies. We are trying to kill each other.</p> <p>So we actually have something very complicated namely a simultaneous recognition of two points view.</p> <p>So one indexicality is centered on my particular desire in which the other, Fred, counts as the object of that desire. and another point of view which escapes my centering on myself, which de-centers me,</p>
39:00	<p>Which is reflected in the through the others point of view in which I am the object of the others desire namely to get rid of me.</p> <p>so it is by means of this intermediary of another opposed consciousness that I can achieve a double bearing on an object, have a double take on it.</p> <p>Grasping it both from my own particular point of view while simultaneously conceiving of that object as existing independently of me as being independent of my point of view. By having its own point of view on me and therefore de-centering me because it has its own point of view.</p>
40:00	<p>now this thought of de-centering by the acknowledging what we are calling the structure of double indexicality with same intentional content is granted throughout continental philosophy.</p> <p>it is in Husserl's fifth Cartesian meditation where ego gets de-centered where Husserl mentions the obvious point that until the other de-centers me I don't even have a whole body. Ego and its alter in Husserl's fifth meditation.</p>

41:00	<p>Where does it happen in Sartre?</p> <p>The park is one of them.</p> <p>There is another even more famous one.</p> <p>It is the key hole.</p> <p>I thin I am the whole world. And suddenly I hear the footsteps. And suddenly from the seer I become seen. Ashamed. The original scene of shame in Sartre.</p>
42:00	<p>The same movement of suddenly seeing myself seen. And to see myself seen is actually to generate a structure of uni-local intentional content with opposed indexical structure. so you are both inside and outside yourself at the same time as a necessary condition for recognizing the situation you are actually in namely the battle in which me and Fred are trying to kill one another.</p> <p>And of course there is a version of this in Levinas everywhere. Levinas cheats.</p> <p>so de-centering occurs because there are opposed perspectives, but not just opposed perspectives, if we needed that we could read Nietzsche, we need more than just opposed perspectives, we need opposed perspectives bearing on our own action.</p>
43:00	<p>So that the very thing I am doing is seeing double. Necessarily.</p> <p>We did not know that we were that clever that we would have this propositional content with double [FILL].</p> <p>But we do it all the time. That is what being self-conscious being in.</p> <p>So that I can recognize the others behaviour as intentional behaviour because it is directed towards an object and I am that object. That is why he chooses the battle. There is no doubt that I am the object. And unless I recognize it for what it is I am in deep trouble. Unless I recognize his desire to kill me I am not going to do well in that situation.</p>

44:00	<p>Hence because it is directed at me then I cannot avoid it.</p> <p>Hence in order to cognize the situation at all accurately I need the notion of a double structure of intentionality.</p> <p>Hence each recognizes himself, me and Fred recognize, each of us recognizes ourselves in the recognition of the acknowledgment that is given to us by the other. That is, in the others act.</p> <p>That he is trying to kill me because he recognizes that I am trying to kill him means that I am recognizing him as a self-moving intentional being.</p>
45:00	<p>Of course all this occurs in the context of the battle in which we philosophers can see this as double structure of intentionality at work but the participants cannot. Or not fully. Because in the context of the battle they are remaining in the sphere of life.</p> <p>So we will come back to why it is only in the resolution of the battle in the master-slave relationship itself does this double structure become perspicuous. But we are suggesting that it is there in the battle itself. And it is what structures the battle</p>
46:00	<p>And hence emerges as a structure of recognition in it.</p> <p>We will return to the battle in a moment.</p> <p>We want to say something more about this logical structure. Because this is what Hegel is getting so excited about in §177.</p> <p>So we have skipped ahead to talk about the battle in order to be able to talk with some coherence about §177 where he talks about the spirit and all that.</p> <p>So we want to show that the logic just given is the logic Hegel thinks he is announcing in §177 where he says the I is a we and the we is an I, and what that amounts to.</p>
47:00	<p>the picture we get of spirit is of a circular inter-subjective structure within which two self-consciousnesses</p>

48:00	<p>recognize both their identity, their like-mindedness, their we-ness, their connectedness, or to be boring their sharing of the same propositional content, propositional content that is the same for both.</p> <p>And their difference and opposition, their Iness.</p> <p>With the formula I that is a we and we that is an I, just the same in German FILL, Hegel is trying to capture the fact that this structure, now here is the FILL</p>
49:00	<p>That this structure cannot be interpreted either atomistically nor wholistically. Neither atomism nor wholism will do it. Neither through a logic of internal relations nor through a logic of external relations will do it.</p> <p>How come?</p> <p>Well let us do it through the problem of internal and external relations.</p> <p>Could recognition could be a matter of external relations or atomism? External relations are equal to atomism.</p>
50:00	<p>Let us say a word about this.</p> <p>External relations are relations in which all our objects, all our relations are what we call one place predicate, is red.</p> <p>So red, on this reading, is a non-relational property.</p>
51:00	<p>And the philosopher who really believed in this was Leibniz. Leibniz thought that there are only external relations i.e. that you needed to reduce all internal relations of predicates to external relations.</p> <p>Why?</p> <p>Because this was a belief that the basic building blocks of the world were atomistic substances. So this is the theory of substance or atomism.</p>

52:00	<p>So for example if you are a Leibnizian if you had the predicate I am taller than Danny. How would you reduce it? How would we get rid of taller than and reduce this to one-place predicates.</p> <p>So $X=6$ feet tall and $Y=5$ feet all.</p> <p>so that is Leibnizian reductionist program.</p> <p>Why?</p> <p>Because we want all properties to be properties of self-sufficient substances or monads.</p>
53:00	<p>Conversely you may believe that all relations are internal relations. For example, according to Kant space and time.</p> <p>That every time is simply a part of time as a whole. And every space is a part of space as a whole.</p> <p>So right and left are irreducible. Right is just the right of left and cannot be further reduced.</p> <p>So these are 2 different metaphysical models.</p> <p>Roughly the belief in internal relations usually goes with idealism and wholism.</p> <p>While the belief in external relations usually goes with appearances and atomism.</p> <p>That is the standard way.</p> <p>Well we may say that the structure of internal and external relations exhaust the metaphysical possibilities.</p>

54:00	<p>That is what you are told when you read Russell. And he changes his mind, first it's all internal relations, then its became all external relations.</p> <p>Recognition cannot be an external relation. If it were then my relation with the other would not be constitutive of my subjectivity. That is, I would not need the other. It would just be an occasion for me to get some bit of self-knowledge by seeing how the other sees me.</p> <p>And Hegel wants to claim now that I can only have self-assurance of myself as a self-conscious rational being by being recognized by the other</p>
55:00	<p>Therefore the other's FILL must be internal to my self-consciousness.</p> <p>So internal to self-consciousness is the moment of what we called last week connectedness.</p> <p>That the other mediates my relation to myself constitutively.</p> <p>This will obviously be the case for the slave. The slave can only be the slave of the master. There is not other outside that he can have. So he has to work through that.</p>
56:00	<p>Conversely recognition cannot be a matter of internal relations either. Because then, neither of us would have a moment of independence from one another. No way in which we can separate ourselves from the other. No way in which we can be free of the other, the word Hegel uses.</p> <p>So professor is claiming that re-cognitive relations can be neither internal or external relations but it must be the synthesis of the two of them.</p>
57:00	<p>Last week we called the notion of independence separateness.</p> <p>So recognition is a union, a togetherness, of both separateness and connectedness.</p> <p>Or as we put it last week it is a matter of infinite separateness from the other and infinite dependence on the other.</p> <p>What might be another word for the absolute separateness of one human being from the other? What makes me absolutely separate from you? If I am an individual, what makes me an individual?</p>

58:00	<p>You and I both have a body.</p> <p>What about will? I can be coerced. Will is a part of it.</p> <p>I can always no. that is the notion of negativity.</p> <p>Desire? No. that connects me to the other.</p> <p>Freedom is the will again.</p> <p>What is my absolute separateness?</p> <p>What does Heidegger say about this separateness? Death.</p> <p>So it is not an accident that when Hegel talks about negativity, he talks about death.</p>
59:00	<p>And what is our image of absolute connectedness? Love.</p> <p>So the argument is something like, the re-cognitive structure, the structure itself, which is a structure of infinite connectedness, like love, and infinite separateness like death.</p> <p>So recognition is about the relationship, we may say the always relationship, the ongoing relationship forever, the entwinement of love and death.</p> <p>So every act of love is also an act of something that is absolutely independent of you i.e. will die proving its independence from you.</p> <p>So love is your absolute jointure and your absolute separation.</p>

60:00	<p>So Hegel says in §158 in Philosophy of the Right, just to pick up the internal and external relations.</p> <p>Love means in general the consciousness of my community with another so that I am not isolated on my own for myself but gain my self-consciousness only through the renunciation of my independent existence and through knowing myself as the unity of myself with another and of the other with me. But love is a feeling that is ethical life and its natural form in a state that is no longer present. There one is conscious of unity as law. There the contents must be rational and I must know it. But the first moment in love is that I do not wish to be an independent person in my own right and that if I were I would feel deficient and incomplete. The second moment is that I find myself with another person, that I gain recognition in this person who in turn gains recognition in me. Love is therefore the most immense contradiction. The understanding cannot resolve it. *&* Love is both the production and resolution of this contradiction. As a resolution it is ethical unity.</p> <p>*&* the reason why understanding cannot resolve it is because understanding demands either internal relations or external relations. It wants me to be either in myself, separate, or immersed in this unity, which I cannot separate myself from.</p> <p>We are suggested there is no whole. You cannot do it either wholistically or atomistically.</p>
61:00	
62:00	<p>So the argument here is that the we does not result from the combination of totally separate existences. Because then they would be complete in themselves prior to the relationship.</p>
63:00	<p>Nor is the we conceivable in which the I's are merely derivative parts of an all encompassing whole.</p> <p>Which is the bad old reading of Hegel.</p> <p>The bad old reading of Hegel is that the spirit is that all encompassing whole, of which we are merely a part of the whole.</p> <p>The reason why professor thinks this is boring reading because the professor will show that this is false and will always be false. And we will make this clear.</p> <p>spirit or wholeness is not the same as an existing thing.</p>

64:00	<p>And above all spirit or weness is not an existing thing with its own point of view.</p> <p>there is no point of view of spirit.</p> <p>There is my point of view and your point of view and our shared intentional content. But the shared intentional content always occurs from an indexical position. From a perspective. From an individual point of view.</p> <p>So weness only exists in so far as it is dispersed or split into parts. That is those of mutually recognizing self-consciousnesses.</p> <p>And this just to remind ourselves is exactly how Hegel talked about the structure of nature in §171.</p>
65:00	<p>now the code word for spirit is life here.</p> <p>§171 page 108</p> <p>Thus the simple substance of Life is [a] the splitting-up of itself into shapes [b] and at the same time the dissolution of these existent differences; and the dissolution of the splitting-up is just as much a splitting-up and a forming of members.</p> <p>[a] is. What is life? It is. [b] independent shapes</p>
66:00	<p>And that is because individual living organisms have their own point of view. They strive to be alive. That is the trope.</p> <p>So in the same way that life is not a thing with its own point of view but it works itself through the things that are its parts.</p> <p>But the parts are both more and less than the whole. So is the same with spirit.</p>
67:00	<p>[Question about the justification of the anthropomorphic premise on which the logic starts]</p> <p>Professor will justify the premise after the break. And it will be easy.</p> <p>We must be clear about this idea of a unified structure with opposing perspectives. This will ripple along in many different levels in this text. And this is what is distinctive. This is what is meant by inter-subjectivity.</p>

68:00	<p>This is the idea that we are constitutively outside of ourselves.</p> <p>[Question about seeing the others intention]</p>
69:00	<p>Professor's claim was that it is simply that situation in which unless you did so you would miss what was going on. So professor is simply saying that that is the necessary condition in order to show us that the situation in which, and that is all Hegel is trying to get.</p> <p>Professor still has to answer Adam's question that is necessarily the situation. But once I acknowledge the situation the beauty is that I can only be in that situation. Because unless I am I am dead. I would just think you are here to make friends with that knife, the whole thing. I don't see the intention to kill, I won't see you or what you are doing.</p> <p>so professor is suggesting that there is something about that situation in which is, here we can see why Lacan was thinking of mirroring, because we both share the same desire. So it looks like we are mirror images of one another. But professor is saying the notion of mirroring does not get the indexicality i.e. the doubleness of the structure that we have to hold in mind in order to have this situation and an [FILL] out.</p>
70:00	<p>[Question about distinguishing a stream roller which does not have the intentionality coming towards us]</p> <p>That is just a direct threat that you have to learn through induction that it is dangerous and that is how you recognize it.</p> <p>And Hegel is not suggesting here that this is how we learn about intention. He is not giving a story about the origins of intentions or the like.</p> <p>\$187 page 114 and we will come back to this when answering Adam's question.</p> <p>The individual who has not risked his life may well be recognized as a <i>person</i>, but he has not attained to the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness.</p>

71:00	<p>So Hegel is suggesting here that a person who has not risked his life may be a member of a tribe and the tribe gets on amiably and everyone recognizes you as a tribe member. And we do everything, everything's fine.</p> <p>We just don't yet know that when we recognize one another as members of the tribe.</p> <p>What we don't have yet is any notion of what it means to be [FILL] ourselves as self-conscious persons.</p> <p>So we are recognized as person. We are given stature. We have all the rights and duties as members of the tribe.</p> <p>But the notion of the truth of that, what that means, what that amounts to, how that status is earned and justified, none of that is yet clear.</p>
72:00	<p>[Question whether in the tribe the problem is that only one of separateness and connectedness is recognized]</p> <p>In the tribe it is actually not recognizing either. Because it is not recognizing the structure. It is recognizing different kinds of structures. Let us call it the structure of belonging in [FILL], of belonging to the tribe or family in which every one has a role and a place.</p> <p>So slightly organicist view.</p> <p>but it does not actually know that it is the structure of self-consciousness or how that recognition</p>

73:00	<p>The person has recognition. it is recognized as a person.</p> <p>But it does not know the truth of that. It does not know what that means yet in full.</p> <p>[Question]</p> <p>No you are not seeing yourself in reverse. You are seeing that I am opposed to you.</p> <p>So in the mirror I do see myself as reversed but I do not see myself as opposed to me.</p> <p>So the question is not one of simply a mirroring but of a de-centering.</p> <p>So when I look in the mirror I am decentered. If anything I get a narcissistic kick.</p>
74:00	<p>Professor is claiming that this is the opposite of a narcissistic kick. Namely it is the interruption of my centeredness.</p> <p>So it is the interruptive character we are looking at.</p> <p>That is why Levinas works so hard to beat Hegel over the head because he recognizes that the Hegelian structure is about the interruption of subjectivity as a condition of subjectivity. Lo and behold. The very thing that is the same.</p> <p>and this Fichtean [FILL]</p> <p>So it is the interruption [FILL]. It is the de-centering.</p> <p>That is why we use Husserl, Sartre, Levinas to try to get the non-mirror quality.</p> <p>The not me is not simply opposed to me but also de-centering me.</p>
75:00	<p>So we need more than different. I need interruption.</p>

BREAK

0:00	Everything up till and through \$185 in the text is the philosopher talking, and there is no phenomenology. The phenomenology of self-consciousness only begins at \$186. And so everything till then is the talk about it rather than the phenomenological account of it.
1:00	<p>If we look hard at \$187, we can perhaps immediately see that Kojève's thought that there is a battle for recognition, a battle for recognition, a battle for pure prestige is unjustified.</p> <p>What Hegel says is that they engage in a life and death struggle, because they must raise their certainty of being for themselves to truth. That is before the struggle, they are still at the level of self-certainty, i.e. they are still at the level of this as an inward conviction,</p>
2:00	<p>and they need to go beyond that, and he says on page 114 top:</p> <p>They must engage in this struggle, for they must raise the certainty of being <i>for themselves</i> to truth, both in the case of the other and in their own case; [a] And it is only through staking one's life that freedom is won; only thus is it proved that for self consciousness, its essential being is not [just] being, not the <i>immediate</i> form in which it appears, nor its submergence in the expanse of life, but rather that there is nothing present in it which could not be regarded as a vanishing moment, that it is only <i>being-for-self</i>.</p> <p>[a] That is they must know that the other is a self conscious being and they must know that about their own case. And then he says, nothing about recognition here, then he says...return to quote.</p>
3:00	So the thought here is that the desire is simply the desire to demonstrate that I am self-consciousness.
4:00	That is to say to demonstrate that my point of view on the world is complete or absolute, and that nothing escapes it. And therefore I must, and here is our puzzle, how can I reveal that I am more than just a card of this life world of lion eat lion, dog eat dog, tribe eat tribe.

5:00	<p>That is I am more than just the desire for life. That the drive for self-preservation does not drive me, I drive it. I drive it.</p> <p>Therefore I have to show that my I is in excess of any desire that I may have. And therefore my life is nothing for it.</p> <p>That is, that the life is not somehow the standard or norm or criterion, staying alive, that judges me. I have to judge life. And I can only judge life by revealing that I am more than life. And get anyone else who is around to recognize that I am more than life.</p>
6:00	<p>Now Kojève, when he sees this moment, thinks that the only thing that goes beyond a given desire is another desire. And therefore in order, and this is how he gets his argument going, and that the combatants must therefore be desiring the others desire.</p>
7:00	<p>That is, I desire, that you desire, my desire.</p> <p>And of course, this Kojève says, the very definition of love.</p> <p>Page 6: FILL RECHECK</p> <p>Thus in the relationship between man and woman for example desire is human only if one desires not the body but the desire of the other. If he wants to possess or to assimilate the desire taken as desire. That is, if he wants to be desired or loved or rather recognized in his human value in his reality as a human individual. Likewise desire directed towards a natural object is human only to the extent that it is mediated by the desire of another directed toward the same object. [a] Thus an object may be perfectly useless from a biological such as metal or a flag can be desired because it is the object of other desires. Such a desire can only be a human desire and human reality as distinguished from animal reality is created only by the action that satisfies desires. [b] Human history is the history of desires desires.</p> <p>[a] And this is what generates his whole view because he then says....back to quote.</p> <p>[b] and then the great Kojevian conclusion. Human history is the history of desires desires. Nothing else.</p>
8:00	
9:00	<p>What goes wrong with this is that Kojève's argument, although it makes sense in its premise, is its premise that is that the battle is for recognition.</p>

10:00	<p>And the best refutation of Kojève, not on reading list, is essay by Paul Redding "Hermeneutic or Metaphysical Hegelian: Kojève's dilemma." The Owl of Minerva, 1991, Number 22, pages 175-189.</p> <p>The problem with Kojève's account is that it is circular. The struggle according to Kojève is motivated by a distinctly human motive. That is, the desire of the essentially non-vital end of pure prestige.</p>
11:00	<p>While simultaneously the struggle is seen as providing the necessary condition for the emergence or birth of the only sort of being that can have that moment.</p> <p>So Kojève wants the battle of recognition to be two things that are incompatible. On the one hand he wants the struggle to be the emergence of the human, an explanation of how truly human stuff emerges. On the other hand he wants it to be an account of what is already completely human, namely the desire for recognition.</p>
12:00	<p>So the desire for recognition is playing two roles. It is both explaining the human and it is constitutive of the human. It is asking to do too much.</p> <p>Page 192 in Kojève:</p> <p>According to Hegel man is nothing but desire for recognition.</p> <p>Then he quotes Hegel in German.</p> <p>Man is recognition.</p>
13:00	<p>Man is recognition is Hegel's thesis. Not man is desire for recognition. Although such a desire does emerge.</p> <p>so for Hegel, the struggle and its institutional outcome is presented as structures of recognition, and which professor is claiming agreeing with Redding simply allows the existence of doubly structured consciousness essential for intentionality.</p> <p>The struggle will eventually generate a being, maybe the slave, who does desire recognition.</p>

14:00	<p>And even the master who desires recognition.</p> <p>But that is the outcome of the struggle. The struggle itself is not a struggle for recognition. It is a struggle to attain the truth of self-certainty. It is a struggle to attain the truth of self-certainty. That is, that I am the center of the world.</p> <p>It turns out that what these beings discover is that they can only achieve that by being recognized. But that is a lesson learnt not the premise of the story. They learn that what they want is recognition.</p>
15:00	<p>So whereas the struggle itself cannot constitute a stable enduring re-cognitive relationship, the master-slave can. And it represents, as we will come to in a moment, a minimal institutionalized pattern of mutual recognition.</p> <p>And hence something that can be objectified in the spirit, albeit in an inadequate form.</p> <p>So the non-vital end that emerges in the life and death struggle is freedom.</p> <p>And it should be intuitive, it must be freedom.</p> <p>Because again it is still self-certainty that is at stake here, it is still a struggle that will end. [FILL]</p>
16:00	<p>And freedom is the natural upshot of the desire for absolute independence. That is what they want. Absolute independence. I am the world. I am independent of everything. I depend on nothing. That is what draws me in the struggle.</p> <p>And that is why Hegel says that the individual who has not risked his life may well be recognized as a person, but he has not attained to the truth of this recognition.</p>
17:00	<p>So it turns the truth is that we are the sorts of being who are self-determining, free.</p> <p>That is part of what is meant, must be meant in us being the center of the world.</p> <p>That freedom reveals itself, now trying to answer Adam's and the other question, freedom will reveal itself through the risk of life.</p> <p>That we are non-natural beings.</p> <p>so this is the ultimate [FILL] possibility.</p>

18:00	<p>So the very notion of being a self conscious being is a being who has a relationship to the world through their self-relationship.</p> <p>And my self-relationship is what makes me independent of the world. The world here is just life. So I must demonstrate for myself and for the other that life is not the highest value.</p> <p>Otherwise I am just another natural being, just another animal, tiger etc.</p> <p>So why is this recognizing the truth of personhood? Because to be a person is a status role not a natural given.</p> <p>To be a person is to have a certain standing with respect to the world.</p> <p>To be able to act in accordance with norms.</p>
19:00	<p>We will see all sorts of stuff that will get worked out.</p> <p>But where all this is first brought to life is the risk to life.</p> <p>And we take it that this is why, now going back to those tribes, almost all tribes have initiation into manhood that involve the risk of life.</p> <p>Whether it is walking about or something else....</p> <p>you have to demonstrate that you are capable of being part of the tribe, that is being capable of living in accordance with norms and values and are not driven merely by desire.</p> <p>And the risk of life is the first moment of that. Which is why we all always test ourselves, think and wonder about this and ask ourselves, what would I die for?</p>
20:00	<p>Which is only to ask yourself the question who am I, what do I care about.</p> <p>Do I care about anything? And we think that if we are not willing to risk our lives then we are not sure we know to care about anything whatsoever. To have your life as the only need is to be somehow beyond care and to be trivial.</p> <p>So there has to be a moment.</p> <p>And Hegel is going to come back to that moment where we have a self-consciousness of ourselves as the kind of beings for whom life is not the highest good.</p>

21:00	<p>Now professor cannot say everything needed.</p> <p>The question of freedom is not really accessible from this place. But the professor wants to say a few words about why Hegel says that recognition is about freedom.</p> <p>And here professor is recommending an essay by Robert Pippin called "What is the question for which Hegel's theory of recognition is the answer." And the question is what is freedom?</p> <p>And Pippin says 2 things that are relevant to us here.</p>
22:00	<p>First he says that, this is another way of thinking about what is happening in the battle, struggle, for life and death.</p> <p>What is freedom? And the question is what conditions must be satisfied such that all my various needs and projects, all my various doings can be experienced by me as being mine.</p>
23:00	<p>That is as my deeds, as my projects.</p> <p>And here the issue is that they must be experienced in some way as happening at all because of me. That they are mine because of me not because I have been given them etc. they require me.</p> <p>Now this is the case. But if we push this thought too far, and here is the problem with the Fichtean Kantian line, they think that I can only establish this mineness if I can exempt myself, tear myself out of,</p>
24:00	<p>All my dependencies, all my given roles, all my socialization, all my relationship to nature, and have a moment of absolute spontaneity. That the mineness, called the moral law is my distance from everything.</p> <p>And that just looks insane.</p> <p>So that model of freedom, that something can be mine, professor is suggesting and he wants to be very clear, professor is suggesting that crazy belief, that something can be mine only if I exempt myself from all conditionality, from all dependence, from all socialization, is exactly the thought of the being who enters into the battle of life and death.</p>

25:00	<p>That that being wants its mineness, the mineness of everything, to be gotten through the exemption, the denial of all those attachments.</p> <p>Hence Hegel is going to take a different route. And he is going to take a different route is surprising because the route he is going to be taking is about this inter-subjective world and the inter-subjective world can look like a compromise of my will with the will of others.</p> <p>So a partial subjection of my freedom to the freedom of another.</p>
26:00	<p>So freedom as sociality seems contradictory.</p> <p>And Hegel's thought in opposition to this is that there could not be anything like an individually free will apart from social challenge and response.</p> <p>That my freedom is a claim. And that is only in making a claim, that is establishing a social relation in which my deeds could be conceived of as truly free,</p>
27:00	<p>And hence a form of dependence, in which independence is achieved.</p> <p>So this notion of freedom that we are having here and beginning with is problematic because it is part of a fantasy about freedom.</p> <p>That freedom is absolute independence. And that turns out to be the standard definition of freedom. This is the libertarian account of freedom. That freedom is nothing but freedom from...</p> <p>And Hegel is going to re-route it.</p>
28:00	<p>Hegel is going to turn freedom into a claim that gets acknowledged or measured against others.</p> <p>So we have the battle. What next?</p> <p>Well the very situation of the battle is clearly unsatisfactory. That is, it is not going to give either combatant what they want.</p> <p>And it is not going to give either combatant what they want because what they want to know is that they are all a reality.</p>

29:00	<p>and if they kill the other then the condition of changing their certainty into truth i.e. having it externally vindicated, externally validated, acknowledged, granted, seen to, disappears.</p> <p>Not only can dead men not wear plaid, but they cannot have recognition either.</p>
30:00	<p>So we want to suggest 2 things that Hegel is pushing on us here.</p> <p>Both the necessity of the struggle for life and death, and its necessary failure. It cannot end in success. It is a bad strategy for attaining the very thing it wants.</p> <p>Now the battle therefore can only end by a recognition that the risk of life for the sake of making my sense of myself as independent truth is self defeating because you cannot have self-consciousness without life. Self-consciousness depends on life.</p>
31:00	<p>So the very thing it abstracted from, I must risk my life, in order to demonstrate my self-consciousness is the first thing it must reverse itself on.</p> <p>Literally.</p> <p>It must say no life is necessary for self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is dependent on living being.</p> <p>Hence the thought secondly that a combat victory, in slaying the other, does not give me what I want.</p>
32:00	<p>So the battle can end only if both the future master and the future slave recognize both these theses.</p> <p>That life is necessary for self-consciousness and that victory is not worth while since the death cannot offer validation.</p> <p>The difference between the future master and the future slave is how they weigh these 2 theses.</p>

33:00	<p>Those who weigh the first thesis higher, namely the risk of life for the sake of self-recognition is self-defeating are going to be future masters.</p> <p>All those who weigh the second clause higher, are going to be the future slaves.</p> <p>That is, they both have to recognize it.</p> <p>Why?</p> <p>Because the master has to let the slave live in order to provide him with the acknowledgement even if it would rather die than be a slave.</p> <p>He nonetheless has to recognize the necessity of life for self-consciousness in order to have a slave.</p>
34:00	<p>The slave recognizing the thought that there is no victory to be had here would rather live than fight another day. So he finds the risking no longer worthwhile.</p> <p>So that gives us the structure of master and slave. And what Hegel now does is give an analysis of each which reveals what is at stake in this.</p> <p>Remember what professor said last week.</p>
35:00	<p>Professor takes it that this is a minimal and recurrent form of self-consciousness.</p> <p>Which is to say, that it belongs, not to a temporal episode in the past, but it is, as it were, a moment in every self-consciousness that is part of its structure.</p> <p>So it belongs, we suggested last week, to meta-psychology.</p> <p>Who is in the master?</p> <p>The master famously regresses back to animal's desire.</p>

36:00	<p>The master treats the slave consciously only as a means, as an instrument, to satisfy his desires.</p> <p>And we say consciously treats it.</p> <p>Part of the difficulty of thinking about the master slave relationship is that it is both conscious, and unconscious, or pre-conscious structures.</p> <p>So professor is suggesting that consciously the master thinks of the slave as mere instrument for satisfying his desires.</p> <p>But unconsciously the master is recognizing the slave as an intentional human being</p>
37:00	<p>For example because he gives him orders. And expects the orders to be understood etc etc etc.</p> <p>So there is both a recognition and a non-recognition going on. And some of the recognition and some of what is happening is conscious, and some of what is happening is unconscious.</p> <p>So consciously the master treats the slave as only the means. As an instrument.</p> <p>So master is still in a means ends relationship.</p> <p>And secondly the master simply consumes the product of the slaves labour.</p>
38:00	<p>He himself does not gain independence of the object through labour of his own. Hence in his account in §190 in the paragraph on the master.</p> <p>page 115 and 116 of §190</p> <p>The lord relates himself mediately to the bondsman through a being [a thing] that is independent, for it is just this which holds the bondsman in bondage; it is his chain from which he could not break free in the struggle.....[a]</p> <p>[a] we will come back to this. Turn the page.</p> <p>For the lord, on the other hand, the <i>immediate</i> relation becomes through this mediation the sheer negation of the thing, or the enjoyment of it.</p>

39:00	<p>Remember the problem with desire is that the object had this independence.</p> <p>But now, it no longer has independence, because the slave gives it to him.</p> <p>He does not have to worry about whether or not there is water, or whether the meat is cooked. No.</p> <p>the slave goes out and</p> <p>All the master has to do is to enjoy the thing, consume it, without acknowledging its independence.</p>
40:00	<p>What that means is that he is a pure identity for itself.</p> <p>Why is Hegel saying this?</p> <p>And not just for the Marxian reason that the Bourgeoisie are just lazy slobs. But why is he saying this? Why is he underlining this idea of pure enjoyment?</p> <p>[What is the obvious thing to say about FILL]</p> <p>Not only because there is no action being done. But there is no reason to act.</p> <p>So this is a static position. This is a position that is going nowhere. It is non-dynamic. It has no developmental position in it. He is just identity for himself. And all he wants is just to stay in that identity.</p>
41:00	<p>Which is why masters are so tyrannical.</p> <p>Secondly, of course, the master is getting his status of mastery from the slave. So he is a master only because he is recognized by the slave as a master. And hence being the master is totally dependent on the other that he does not recognize.</p> <p>So he is recognized by the being that he does not recognize. And therefore he negates the conditions of his own recognition.</p>
42:00	<p>So there is something brutal here.</p> <p>He has nothing but disdain for the being who gives him his status as the master.</p> <p>So the recognition of the master is inadequate because the slave in accepting slavery renounced his claim of being an independent self-consciousness.</p>

43:00	<p>Hence the recognition is precisely like the coerced confession of a prisoner.</p> <p>We know that coerced confessions are hollow.</p> <p>If I twist your arm and say tell me I am beautiful, tell me I am beautiful. You are beautiful.</p> <p>Well I am going to despise you for saying that you are beautiful because it shows you are weak.</p> <p>But it also means I am not so pretty.</p> <p>So there is a dissatisfaction in the master too.</p> <p>Because the master is receiving recognition from the being he despises.</p>
44:00	<p>That said, we want to point out the obvious, this master slave relation is exactly structurally what we said the structure of recognition would be like.</p> <p>So from one point of view the master and slave look like one dynamic organism.</p> <p>Because the slave does the work of the master. The slave converts the master's desires into actions. We will come back to this in a moment since this is the turning point in the story.</p> <p>And therefore the action of the slave is itself the action of the master.</p>
45:00	<p>The master says make me a castle and there is a castle. So it is like the slave is just a prosthesis.</p> <p>And hence Hegel says that what the bondsmen does is really the action of the lord. What the slave does is really the action of another.</p> <p>Secondly, therefore, at one level, the institution has to be thought of wholistically. Because the roles, master and slave, mutually pre-suppose one another.</p> <p>To be a master means to have a slave. And to be a slave means, is constituted by the other being, the master.</p> <p>Hence the wholistic side.</p>

46:00	<p>However from the other point of view, the slave cannot be a part of the master. Nor is there any super individual perspective of which the two are mere parts.</p> <p>Rather the two of them, and it is simply the two of them in this relationship. But this relationship is constitutive of them beings persons or individuals at all.</p> <p>So there is no single consciousness or point of view which they share.</p>
47:00	<p>And they mutually pre-suppose differently embodied and opposing points of view.</p> <p>So as it were the structure makes explicit the idea of opposing consciousnesses that exist within a unified structure.</p> <p>That is, nonetheless nothing more than their relationships to it.</p> <p>So the master has nowhere to go. The slave does. Namely the slave can become a master.</p>
48:00	<p>So the slave has something it might or could achieve.</p> <p>Not only that, his situation as slave is so structured so as to lead him to mastery.</p> <p>Or that is what Hegel wants to show. That the very structure of slavery engenders a structure that leads to the desire for mastery.</p> <p>So to say that he desires mastery is to say that he desires the value represented by the master namely some notion of independence.</p> <p>How is this going to get going?</p>
49:00	<p>Hegel says, and this is what we want to end on today, and pick up next week.</p> <p>So to say that the master is true to the slave is to say that the master is both the super ego and the ego ideal. We mentioned that last week. [WHERE? FILL]</p> <p>Now how this gets going is through the role of death.</p> <p>And it is the role of death that sets the relationship or makes it dynamic.</p> <p>So the question is, I say that I want to in the struggle to overcome all my natural desires, I want to be just free of them, and the like.</p> <p>And that strategy did not work out.</p>

50:00	<p>This is Hegel's account of the fear of death. It is the fear of death that is structuring the life of the slave.</p> <p>And that is what the master is.</p> <p>The master is nothing but a memento mori</p> <p>\$194</p> <p>For this consciousness [a] has been fearful, not of this or that particular thing or just at odd moments, but its whole being has been seized with dread; [b] for it has experienced the fear of death, the absolute Lord. In that experience it has been quite unmanned, has trembled in every fibre of its being, and everything solid and stable has been shaken to its foundations. But this pure universal movement, the absolute melting-away of everything stable, is the simple, essential nature of self-consciousness, absolute negativity, <i>pure being-for-self</i>, which consequently is <i>implicit</i> in this consciousness. This moment of pure being-for-self us also <i>explicit</i> for the bondsman, for in the lord it exists for him as his <i>object</i>.</p> <p>[a] the slave [b] FILL GERMAN. That is why the slave submitted.</p>
51:00	
52:00	<p>What will allow me finally to overcome my desires, to give them up, to surrender my desires, is fear.</p> <p>And the point about fear is that it is a mechanism of detachment from the given.</p>

53:00	<p>You think you love your children more than anything else. Choose which one will die or they both die.</p> <p>All that you do is introduce death. And anything that looks solid, looks stable, looks like it is given, becomes surrendered.</p> <p>So the slave is someone who will surrender all his desires, needs, anything, just so long as he/she can stay alive.</p> <p>So the fear of death is the de-naturalization of the self.</p> <p>The fear of death is what rips the individual out of their life-world</p>
54:00	<p>And it is what sets up the idea of negativity in me.</p> <p>So you are sitting here thinking that you wish the professor would stop so you can go to the restroom. But the fear of the lord is the beginning [FILL] of wisdom. So you hold it.</p> <p>So a natural need...</p> <p>so the thought here is that you don't know what your desires are, you don't own any of your desires, you don't know what ownness of desires are, you act on the desires of the lord.</p>
55:00	<p>So the negativity is implicit for the slave he says. It is implicit because the slave is giving up these things.</p> <p>But it is explicit in the object. Why? Because the master is death.</p> <p>That is what the master means to me. The threat of death.</p> <p>I do the wrong act, I die.</p> <p>That is what it means to be in a master slave relationship.</p> <p>Hence I have no life that is my own. Hence I have no ownness. So the very notion of mine and ownness have been lost. They were natural mine and own.</p> <p>So I have lost my natural mine and own.</p>

56:00	<p>And only on the condition of losing my natural mine and own will eventually another mine, a real mine, will arise.</p> <p>But first I have to give it up.</p> <p>But what desires do I have if not mine? I act on the desires of another.</p> <p>So the slave is a being whose desires are not his own desires but the desires of another. And I make those desires my desires. My lord desires bread. I desire that there be bread. But I cannot claim it. It is not mine. It's the lords.</p> <p>So my desires are an internalizing of the desires of another.</p> <p>And yet the product of that still belongs to me.</p>
57:00	<p>So this is a process in which I learn of the malleability of all desires.</p> <p>Or to put it in another way, and now we are moving into the structure of self-consciousness, I learn that I can stand in a self conscious that is a reflective relationship to my desires.</p> <p>That is what I have learnt.</p> <p>I have learnt that I can evaluate my desires, consider them, and think which one I should act on and which one not. If I ditch a man like this what will happen?</p> <p>So we have learnt that the desires are not self measuring. To have a desire is not to mean that it has to be satisfied.</p> <p>It means that it should be something that should be reflectively deliberated on</p>

58:00	<p>And maybe repressed, or denied altogether, or maybe I think that I can just [FILL]</p> <p>The whole point is that I am now in a reflective relationship to myself.</p> <p>Every desire I now have is a question.</p> <p>But the reflective relation to myself is not a self-relation, it is my relation to the other.</p> <p>That is, my self-relation is that mediated relation to the other demanded by the other being the origin of desire.</p> <p>We will finish master slave next time. We will talk about Derrida FILL.</p> <p>And we will talk about Scepticism and Stoicism etc</p>
59:00	