A) middlemen and informational problems!

B (same-B') mechanism

lang)

C') (lang) INCENTIVES of using middlemen and officerry Considerations. Cost. to eg touts ( C > poor deiner )

A > Bribe from

optimal (C) good duiving + effort.)
A) few of bribe etc.) can I use in terms of language? MARKETS- middlemen in markets of manipulation, expert - lach er cost

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Relation to inequality - wealth and information experts - identification of signal from narior (when too much refol) Application-Shadow economies implication dispriment on through. nanipulation by sleeption more PARADOX-more info, mon voise Certainty Relevant info mining Exists in physician agency. specialist doctor

(GP) partient. Relation to choice inhibition and bounded rationality middleman as the beidge updation of beliefs-healizes during of some deal of pool deal s herd ment ally why middleman - PROBLEM OF DIRECT ACCESS - where power index, instruction of lawpower, high passer

power as informational power, lapert 1 > Leads to rational promotination ant of effect to gain info-Belief of yes but inhoher time, effort -> my pia lets seek middleman. Irrational fousigne of a 1 good deal (foresignt of trust in middlemen) Joptimal choices, complex information—t Adaptive choicel—herd mentality I (safe-the work gets done) (Assuming issa averse)

Threat of princip howent group submit your self to experts and their inventive I me chamis on of self interest. but not so much (subtly- probably through use of language (had b/w the lives I to prevent back ward bending De havioe -> several experts but as a collinion (one peup) as monopoly un into

Affirmative action in this context—
Access to market without puishment.
and group dynamics, officency?

> Rational ignorance to Ranonal partient ily
dissolution of power (Status?) effects