



00:00	<p>The strategy of this session is to begin by looking at the second and third paralogism, then turn to the problem of spontaneity, which we ended with last time.</p> <p>The problem of spontaneity, as we will see of the next couple weeks, will turn out to be a version of the problem of §16 of the B deduction.</p> <p>So the strategy of today is to find that we are already in the middle of the B deduction.</p>
1:30	<p>So the second paralogism (of simplicity) begins at A 351:</p> <p><i>"That, the action of which can never be regarded as the concurrence of several things acting, is simple.</i> <i>Now the soul, or the thinking 'I', is such a being. Therefore, etc."</i></p>
2:00	<p>Kant calls this the "Achilles of all dialectical inferences in the pure doctrine of the soul"—which is to say it is the one he thinks get us close to the center of the crucial issues.</p> <p>Remember from last time that we can represent a subject of representations <u>only</u> from a subject's point of view.</p> <p>The thought here, and this is important, is that for Kant there is ultimately no adequate third person perspective on first person experience.</p> <p>If you have outsider's point of view, if you think about other people's behavior, then you not thinking of them as subjects, but you are rather thinking of them but as objects—this is objectification.</p>

4:00	<p>Objectification is not to see something from the inside but to see it from the outside. You are seeing it as a matter of phenomenal regularity.</p> <p>To see it from the inside, on the other hand, is to put myself in the other's place.</p> <p>Part of this comes from the fact that the 'I think', as we saw last time, is an experience but not experience sensitive.</p> <p>That curious and hard thought is to say that each of us has the experience of being the subject of thought, of judgment, e.g. 'I judge the wall is white,' and that is an awareness of the wall from a first person point of view.</p> <p>In that judgment we have it from a first person point of view—that is what makes it an experience.</p> <p>However, it is not an experience which has any discriminatory features. It is not as if I could also judge the wall from a non-first person perspective.</p> <p>There is nothing about the wall that would allow me to discriminate it from something else. That is, it has no complex empirical characteristics which themselves could be objects of judgments.</p>
6:30	<p>So the very nature of the 'I think' has about it both an experiential but also an irreducible character.</p> <p>It doesn't pick out any...when we judge a thing, we can say 'it is red and not yellow nor blue,' so we pick out the red, but when we do the 'I think' I am not picking it out as <i>against you</i> thinking it.</p>
	<p>That is part of what makes the 'I think' <u>both</u> experiential <u>and</u> transcendental at the same time.</p> <p>That is, not part in the experience we judge about but an experience that is a condition for the possibility of experience. Hence the notion that it is not experience sensitive.</p>
	<p>To put it another way, the concept of thinking is that of a being having experiences.</p> <p>The idea of the concept of a thinking being is that of a being having experiences.</p> <p>At A 350 Kant says that there is no intuition here that I bring under a concept.</p> <p><i>"The 'I' is indeed in all thoughts, but there is not in this representation the least trace of intuition, distinguishing the 'I' from other objects of intuition."</i></p>

8:30	<p>We simply can't make a mistake where we would wonder, who was it that had this thought, I think it was me but it might have been that elephant. This is a mistake we cannot make.</p> <p>So if you are analytic philosopher you might say that the "I" is not quite a referring expression because with other indexicals we can ask about which objects.</p> <p>For example, if someone says, "it is blue" we can ask "what is blue?" If someone says "he is jealous" we can ask "who is jealous?".</p>
9:30	<p>When I say "I am thinking" I cannot say "wait a minute, who was thinking" apart from being the problem of being brainwashed or ironical—</p>
	<p>The pronoun "I" cannot fail to hit its target.</p> <p>You can't mistake the "I" for something else. You can make a mistake of any other object of experience.</p>
10:30	<p>So there is something really something extraordinary about the "I"</p> <p>Which is what Descartes' "cogito ergo sum" is all about. That was Descartes' point.</p>
	<p>So it follows that we cannot form pictures of ourselves except as a unity.</p> <p>If I got no distinguishing features, then there is no characteristics, no features, nothing discriminates, but if there is nothing discriminate I cannot think of it as complex or composite, therefore if I cannot think of it as complex or composite, then I cannot think of it as anything other than a unity, namely, as a single subject of representations.</p>

11:30	<p>So the thought is because of the picture of the "I think"—and notice how phenomenological Kant is being here, he is trying to do a phenomenology of the "I think"—because our picture of the "I think" somehow leads us to the idea that the unity we picture is incompatible with compositeness.</p> <p>The whole structure of this argument is very Wittgensteinian because it is all about pictures and how pictures lead us astray.</p> <p>The point is that our picture of the "I think" because it has no discriminatory characteristics to it, leads us to the idea that the unity that we picture—and notice now we have turned the subject into object, the unity that we picture in thinking of ourselves as the unity of representations, the unity that we picture is incompatible with compositeness, with complexity, with difference, with empirical characteristics.</p>
13:00	<p>One of the ways people play with this is using Lockean thought experiments. Say that if I walk through a machine and I am bifurcated.</p> <p>Half of me will go off and live in Peru and the other half is going to live in Brooklyn.</p> <p>The point is that if you actually think of the division happening, you have to assume that you identify with the one and not the other—you can't conceive of them as both of them being you.</p> <p>You don't think of it as if, 'well now I am both here and here'.</p> <p>We must always picture ourselves in an irreducible, unified way.</p>

14:30	<p>So Kant says at A 352, in a slightly different language:</p> <p><i>"For suppose it be the composite that thinks: then every part of it would be a part of the thought, and only all of them taken together would contain the whole thought. But this cannot consistently be maintained. For representations (for instance, the single words of a verse), distributed among different beings, never make up a whole thought (a verse), and it is therefore impossible that a thought should inhere in what is essentially composite."</i></p> <p>This is another version of the problem of the "I think" which must accompany all our representations.</p> <p>It can't be that bits of me think "Whose words these are I think I know" and then another bit of me thinks "His house is in the village thought".</p> <p>I need one self to be the self of the whole poem, holding the whole together, surveying and unifying it.</p> <p>And therefore its unity presupposes my transcendental unity.</p>
16:00	<p>Back to the passage, but this time with an additional final thought or inference:</p> <p><i>"For suppose it be the composite that thinks: then every part of it would be a part of the thought, and only all of them taken together would contain the whole thought. But this cannot consistently be maintained. For representations (for instance, the single words of a verse), distributed among different beings, never make up a whole thought (a verse), and it is therefore impossible that a thought should inhere in what is essentially composite. It is therefore possible only in a single substance, which, not being an aggregate of many, is absolutely simple."</i></p> <p>Now this final sentence (the sentence in boldface) is a false inference.</p> <p>This whole argument is fallacious. But what is the fallaciousness of it?</p>

17:30	<p>In Kantian jargon, the problem with this inference is that we are conflating the transcendental with the empirical.</p> <p>The human way of discussing this point is to say that the "I think" is a <i>function</i>, that is it represents the point of view of synthesizing activity.</p> <p>So again a necessary presupposition for the possibility of any thinking is that the "I think" must accompany all my representations as the point of view that is held together in a unified perspective.</p> <p>It is the unified perspective that makes us think that the part of view unifying them is <u>one</u> but we take the oneness of unity seeing and fallaciously transfer it into the object so it becomes the unity of seer. That is you make the activity into a thing.</p> <p>It is a work of reification. You transform the activity of unification into a substance that itself is simple and non-differentiatable.</p> <p>But there is no reason to think that there is such a simple substance.</p>
20:30	<p>So the origin of this thought, the simplicity of the substance of the soul, which is a very classical doctrine, has always been about the transcendental unity of apperception.</p> <p>So at A 355:</p> <p>" 'I am simple' means nothing more than that this representation, 'I', does not contain in itself the least manifoldness and that it is absolute (although merely logical) unity."</p> <p>It is the <u>logical</u> unity of the "I think" which fallaciously becomes the substantial unity of the notion of an ego or self or soul.</p>
21:30	<p>And indeed if you think it is simple then you might even think that it has to be immaterial.</p> <p>Which is why the notion of simplicity is so important here, because simpliciter, its non-compositeness, seems to be obviously incompatible with spatial extension—which is at least always conceptually divisible.</p> <p>But if the "soul" is simple and hence non-divisible it cannot be extended at all and thus it is non-material. And if it is non-material, therefore you can go on and do all your traditional metaphysics of the soul.</p> <p>But Kant argues that none of that follows.</p>

22:30	<p>A 355 cont.:</p> <p><i>"Thus the renowned psychological proof is founded merely on the individual unity of a representation, which governs only the verb in its relation to a person. It is obvious that in attaching 'I' to our thoughts we designate the subject of inherence only transcendently, [1] without noting in it any quality whatsoever—in fact, without knowing anything of it either by direct acquaintance or otherwise...[2]</i></p> <p><i>...But the simplicity of the representation of the subject is not eo ipso knowledge of the simplicity of the subject itself...</i></p> <p><i>...for we abstract altogether from its properties when we designate it solely by the entirely empty expression 'I', an expression which I can apply to every thinking subject."</i></p> <p>[1] Where we see "transcendental" here we can now say only <u>functionally</u>, <u>not metaphysically</u>, where transcendental is something we must presuppose, a job that must be carried out, but tells us nothing about the metaphysical substance.</p>
24:00	<p>[2] So this is a claim of <i>both</i> metaphysical neutrality and noumenal ignorance.</p> <p>It is metaphysically neutral because Kant at least here is claiming that what he says about the "soul" has no implications for materialism, immaterialism, or any big metaphysical thesis—it just doesn't matter.</p> <p>If function replaces substance, then we don't know anything about substance. So substantial characterizations—materialism, idealism, soulism—all these things just vapourize.</p>
25:30	<p>The simple way of thinking about this is to say that this "I am simple" simply derives from the fact that the "I think" provides an awareness of features that could not be split.</p> <p>That is how the illusion arises.</p>
26:00	<p>So why is Kant putting these moves in place here in the second paralogism?</p> <p>He is trying to dig away at the idea of what it means to think transcendently, and why transcendental philosophy—the Copernican turn—is both a critique of metaphysics and therefore a freeing of us from dogmatic illusion.</p> <p>We are suddenly free...so notice that there is a ground to the second paralogism—we have every reason in the world to think that the soul is simple, that captures something important about the "I think", namely that it is an experience of our features that can (not?) be split about and divided.</p> <p>So there is a real structural reason for thinking this—but the inference to simplicity and therefore immateriality is false.</p>

27:30	<p>So the awkward moment is that he has left the door open to transcendent materialism.</p> <p>We will return to this later and suggest that this door shouldn't have been left so open.</p>
28:00	<p>So onto the Third Paralogism:</p> <p>A 361:</p> <p><i>"That which is conscious of the numerical identity of itself at different times is in so far a person Now the soul is conscious, etc. Therefore it is a person."</i></p>
	<p>So what is Kant worried about here?</p> <p>He is worried about the problem of personal identity and what we might call the strict identity of a person through time.</p> <p>That is the thought that a person necessarily remains the very same person through all of his or her experiences.</p> <p>You find arguments to this effect all over in both empiricism and rationalism.</p>
29:30	<p>Bishop Butler in his <i>Analogy of Religion</i>, writes:</p> <p>"Every person is conscious that he is the same person or self as far back as his memory reaches. Since when anyone reflects upon a past action of his own, he is just as certain of the person who did the action, namely himself, the person who now reflects upon it, as he is certain that the action was at all done."</p>
30:00	<p>So Butler is saying, when I think back to my conversation this afternoon and I think 'I really said that to her'—I don't have any doubt that it was me who was making that utterance.</p> <p>I am as certain as it was me as I am that that terrible thing was said.</p>

31:00	<p>An empiricist-realist, Reed, in <i>Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man</i>, says:</p> <p>"The conviction which every man has of his identity as far back as his memory reaches needs no aid of philosophy to strengthen it.[1] And no philosophy can weaken it without first producing some degree of insanity. My personal identity implies a continued existence of that indivisible [2] thing which I call myself."</p> <p>[1] This is Reed in his progressive, experience will take us right to the world, mood.</p> <p>[2] And for indivisible we can read "simple" as in the second paralogism.</p>
32:00	<p>This well known metaphysical argument of "strict identity" is one of the presuppositions for one of the arguments for the immortality of the soul.</p> <p>Because if the self is going to be differentiated rather than a strict identity then there is no soul that can survive. So if I am going to survive my death it better be me who survives it and not someone else.</p> <p>And therefore the immortality of the soul really requires strict identity. So a requirement for the immortality of the soul is personal identity—that is, it is me throughout the whole history of my existence, and that identity is absolute and not relative—think of Hume for whom the identity of the self is relative.</p> <p>[Parfit ?] has numerous articles showing that identity of self is relative more like the identity of a baseball team.</p> <p>Because of all the personnel changes, although the team has the same name and has the same style of play and management, there is no strict identity.</p> <p>Jay thinks (on behalf of Kant?) that the self cannot be like that, although Hume and Parfit (?) think it is.</p> <p>But the idea is that its strict identity and therefore simplicity is what it allows it to survive death—</p>
34:00	<p>So these ideas are all deep in that they go right to the heart of classical metaphysical conceptions of soul.</p>
	<p>But Kant wants to say that memory does not yield knowledge of identity, let alone strict identity.</p> <p>Kant's question would be, when an earlier subject appears in memory to be me and no one else, is it then logically or necessarily true that it is me?</p> <p>Kant's answer is 'no'.</p>

35:00	<p>Consider the scenario in which two people are telling a story about the past and each is absolutely convinced they are telling the story right but they have major and contradictory versions of certain events and characters.</p> <p>The problem is when we assume that because we have a memory of something, then we cannot be wrong about it.</p> <p>But of course we can be mistaken in memory even about our own role and contribution, especially in activities that include a group of people.</p> <p>For example, like we are telling a story about a conversation we were having and I chip in that at the time I had remarked, but someone might correct me and remind me that it was in fact someone else who made this point.</p>
36:00	<p>The puzzle is that we feel absolutely certain.</p> <p>Where does that experience come from?</p>
	<p>I get an impression of identity of subject in cases where an early representation is available to me because I remember having had an earlier impression.</p> <p>So, for instance, your sister might remember of herself doing something that you are in fact sure that you had done. But now that she is remembering having this impression, therefore she assumes that was her who was the subject of that action.</p>
	Memory always occurs from the inside.
38:00	<p>A 363:</p> <p><i>"The identity of the consciousness of myself at different times is therefore only a formal condition of my thoughts and their coherence, and in no way proves the numerical identity of my subject. Despite the logical identity of the 'I', such a chance may have occurred in it as does not allow of the retention, and yet we may ascribe to it the same-sounding 'I' which in every different state, even in one involving change of the [thinking] subject, might still retain the thought of the preceding subject and so hand it over to the subsequent subject."</i></p>

39:00	<p>The argument here is that a sense of identity across time is engendered by assuming a strict parallel with present case experience, and then simply extending it.</p> <p>So, e.g., case 1: I perceive the circle. Case 2: I perceive the whole poem.</p> <p>So we think of 2 as an extended version of one. Just as I gather that I am the unified perceiver of the circle, so I am overtime, even of short poem, the extended subject of 2.</p> <p>We might add to this a third case, e.g., reading <i>Remembrance of Things Past</i>, and we think that reading it is like the poem, and like seeing the circle—so we think that any past event remember...</p> <p>So we drawing a series of winding analogies of carrying experience over time, and what allows us to do that is that memories themselves are always in the present.</p>
42:00	<p>A memory from the past is not in the past but is in the present.</p> <p>Therefore we kind of forget that fact and we think of a present, an extended present, a memory from the past, and then from the far past, as all version of the same, and of course they are not.</p> <p>After all, I do remember having experiences I have not in fact had.</p>
43:00	<p>But there is no parallel in the present—so present experience, even if extended, at a certain moment really does morph into something else.</p> <p>So the self as it carries through time is unlike the self at a time.</p>
	<p>Part of the reason this happens—and this is the impression of depth—and this is what <i>Remembrance of Things Past</i> is about—it starts with this, it will end with how the experience in the now shoots up the past, collapses that, which becomes the trigger for the extended meditation that is the book itself.</p> <p>And the impression of depth is created because acts of memory place the intentional objects of memory in the past.</p>
44:30	<p>So when Marcel remembers Maman, he doesn't have the sense of Maman present, he has the sense of Maman...</p> <p>But that is the project of a present memory into the past, not the stretching of himself into that past.</p>
45:00	<p>You can think about the phenomenon as just another version of having to see things from the first person point of view.</p>

	<p>From all of this, standard accounts of Kant have him committed to three theses:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Empirical Dualism—in the empirical phenomenal world, there are minds and there are bodies. 2. Noumenal ignorance—we do not know what the true substance mind or world is, we don't know what lies behind appearances, we know appearances and not things in themselves, and that includes the self as well. 3. Metaphysical neutrality—since we don't know what is going on down there in the dark noumenal world, then it follows that entire Kantian metaphysics of experience is metaphysically neutral. It makes no claims about there is or must be. <p>This is where Gabe asked a question last time.</p>
47:00	<p>The question is whether it is true of the theory is metaphysically neutral, and if not, then #2 could be false as well.</p> <p>So there really is a lot at stake here. Is the Kantian system..</p> <p>If Metaphysical neutrality is false, so might be noumenal ignorance.</p>
48:00	<p>Most of the deep evidence for metaphysical neutrality comes from the Paralogisms. Which is why we are going through them.</p> <p>Part of what we are doing is try to think about what the "I think" means and how Kant thinks about it. But part of it is, he thinks about in part as getting clear the commitments of transcendental versus metaphysical forms of thought, and therefore he seems to think—this is the weight of the paralogisms—that the paralogisms consistently block immaterialism, idealism, what you may call any metaphysically anti-materialist arguments.</p> <p>Because after all it is the rationalist psychologist who suggests the arguments of the paralogisms. It is the rationalist psychologist who are going to defend the immortality of the soul and all that stuff.</p> <p>Kant doesn't want that, so in knocking down the arguments of the rationalist psychologists, he also knocks down traditional anti-materialism.</p> <p>Which means, <i>sub specie eternitas</i>, the argument must go if metaphysical neutrality is real, then <i>sub specie eternitas</i> Kantian metaphysics of experience is compatible with materialism.</p>
50:00	<p>Readers of Wilferd Sellars will recognize that Sellars aims to get at his two images of man—one as living in a phenomenal world, and then Kant is wrong, we [can have ?] materialism too.</p>

	<p>Is Kant right? We were suggesting at the end last time was that are a whole bunch of passages on spontaneity that undermine Kant's claim for formalism.</p> <p>So the thesis we are trying to suggest here—and this argument is made by Pippin in "Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind", (<i>Canadian Journal of Philosophy</i>, 17/2 (1987)) that what Kant has to say about the spontaneity of the subject is incompatible with his own formalism.</p> <p>Therefore it is incompatible with metaphysical neutrality, therefore it is incompatible with noumenal ignorance.</p>
51:30	<p>So there are these whole bunches of passages, e.g. the footnote on B 158:</p> <p>We also see similar moves at the footnote at B 422, and a long passage at B 574-5.</p> <p>Notice also that two of these passages are footnote. In Kant footnotes are a sign of anxiety</p> <p><i>"The 'I think' expresses the act of determining my existence. Existence is already given thereby, but the mode in which I am to determine this existence, that is, the manifold belonging to it, is not thereby given.[2] In order that it be given, self-intuition [3] is required; and such intuition is conditioned by a given a priori form, namely time, which is sensible and belongs to the receptivity of the determinable [in me]. Now since I do not have another self-intuition which gives the determining in me (I am conscious [1] only of the spontaneity of it)[4] prior to the act of determination, as time does in the case of the determinable [5], I cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active [6] being; all that I can do is to represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought, that is, of the determination; and my existence is still only determinable sensibly, that is, as the existence of an appearance. But it is owing to this spontaneity that I entitle myself an intelligence."</i></p>
	<p>[2] So it is the act of determining. If you are Husserl you think here of what it means that "I can"—this is one way of getting at the idea of determining.</p> <p>I can...so the 'I think' is like 'I can lift the bottle, look at the watch, do this or that'. It is the act of determining, not the thing determined, its potentiality.</p>
	[3] What is this "self-intuition" talk about?
	<p>[4] When I am aware that I can lift the bottle, look at the watch, think the thought—I do not a thought of a previous determining now determining that determining.</p> <p>So there is something original or absolute about that determining. It has no anticipation.</p>
	[5] So this is not like a temporal series.

	<p>[6] <i>Selbstätig</i>—this is one of Fichte's famous phrases. This is the Fichtean moment in Kant, as we suggested last time.</p> <p>So we are aware of ourselves as self-active.</p>
56:30	<p>So there is something that the story of the paralogisms does not get at in terms of the 'I think'. That is that every act of the 'I think' is a determining, a self-activity.</p> <p>And a self-activity that, and here is the crux of the matter, on the thesis we are trying to urge here, this is one thing that can never be phenomenal. It cannot be reduced to a moment in a causal series.</p> <p>But if the "I think" cannot be reduced, cannot be phenomenal, then the "I think" is not metaphysically neutral.</p>
57:30	<p>The thought here is that property of spontaneity which is that in virtue of which I call myself an intelligence, can never be a kind of property a merely phenomenal subject could logically have.</p> <p>So spontaneity is incompatible with phenomenality.</p>
59:00	<p>It is not that Kant is unaware of this, it is rather that he just wants to say that the subject of experience, to say that the subject of experience is not exclusively phenomenal is not equivalent to proving that it is a thing in itself.</p> <p>That is the whole work of the paralogisms.</p> <p>Kant wants to say over and over again that demonstrating that the subject of experience cannot be exclusively phenomenal is not equivalent to claiming that it is a thing in itself.</p> <p>And that should not be inconsistent with the claim that the self is completely unknowable.</p>
60:00	<p>What we are urging against this is that there is a hedging here and the reason that the hedging slides past is because of "illegitimate segregation".</p> <p>It is not separate but equal.</p> <p>And what is not separate but equal is the relation between text and footnote and what goes on is what brings the text and the footnotes together is that the act of spontaneity that he says cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility is what he elsewhere calls "pure apperception".</p>

61:00	<p>So, if his argument is that all thinking is apperceiving—and we are suggesting that is what he is claiming—then he must claim that all thinking is spontaneous, therefore he must claim that all thinking is incompatible with phenomenality and therefore he must claim that we know at least one thing about the thing in itself, namely, it can't be material.</p>
62:00	<p>So why do problems arise here? They arise because apperception and therefore spontaneity is implicit in every thinking and not explicit.</p> <p>By this we mean two things.</p> <p>1) we first mean—this is the obvious one—that the “I think” which must be able to accompany all my representations in part means that “I think” is involved in every thinking even when we are not explicitly aware of it.</p> <p>The question of explicit awareness is what leads to all the problems because what is really going on here is a series of misinterpretations of what Kant means by apperception.</p> <p>We have been suggesting that apperception is <i>not</i> self-awareness. To apperceive is not to be aware of myself, to have some idea about myself, to be thinking about myself.</p> <p>2) Further, we have said repeatedly that apperception is not an act of self-identification—[as if ?] I must be aware of myself as different from the things that surround me—all that stuff in Strawson and Bennett.</p> <p>So this self-awareness argument, this is Dieter Henrich, who really does think, which is why he misreads Fichte as well, that self-awareness is really awareness of <i>self</i>, that apperception is awareness of the self—nor is it Strawson and others self-identification as opposed to being able to discriminate myself from objects around me.</p>
65:30	<p>Rather our claim is that apperception is non-isolatable and that it is the adverbial character of all mental activity—namely I apperceptively perceive, think, imagine.</p> <p>Alternatively we can say that I judge the world from a particular first person point of view. But there is no thought of the self there, rather it is implied or implicit in the act of judgment itself as its condition of possibility.</p>
66:30	<p>So of course we are not normally consciously aware of our spontaneity, indeed if we were ordinary life would be intolerable.</p> <p>What we are aware of is the object of awareness, of these people here, of these things at hand. It is not that I am aware of my seeing, judging them, if you are aware like that, that is what it means to be self-conscious.</p>

67:30	<p>Sartre had this just right, the "I think" is absolute world awareness, but from a point of view.</p> <p>But if that is right, it shows it is implicit, but if it is implicit, if pure apperception is the same as spontaneity then the notion of spontaneity as the metaphysical bearer of judgment is a necessary condition for the possibility of experience, then metaphysical neutrality and noumenal ignorance are false.</p>
68:00	Question:
	<p>We are not denying that there are self-intuitions of spontaneity. "I can"—that is why we are referring to the Husserl here. But Kant's example is attention, I shift my attention from one object to another. I attend.</p> <p>(on attention, see footnote B 157)</p> <p>That is spontaneous. But what our argument is that he isolates that moment of spontaneity into this explicit awareness of it, as if it was not implied everywhere else in the text.</p> <p>So this way of answering the question is to say that Kant's other name for spontaneity is pure apperception. And pure apperception doesn't have that notion of explicit awareness.</p> <p>Indeed it usually does not, hence gets buried or lost, and then you may think that the two things are separate, namely my awareness of my freedom on the one hand, and my judging on the other.</p> <p>And spontaneity and the I think get separated out. We are saying that if that passage and the one's like it mean anything, it must be about the "I think" itself.</p> <p>But the "I think" in its normal form is non-isolatable. It is rather the "the wall is white" kind of thing.</p> <p>And this is an "I judge the wall is white".</p>
71:00	Follow-up question:
	But what we are saying is that our awareness of spontaneity is indeed a separable experience.

	<p>The claim is that that experience, to see the depth of the meaning of spontaneity, however, is to see that it is in all experience qua apperceptive.</p> <p>So the claim is spontaneity qua experience is an isolatable experience, it is one of those moments when you attend to the determining and not what is determined, and there is a pleasure in that. For instance, we can take pleasure in our ability to remember a whole poem.</p> <p>But we want to say that in the first case what that experience is an experience of is the same thing that is there in every judgment.</p> <p>But we want to deny that there is any experience of spontaneity in those cases—they are just sublimated away, correctly. That is why referred to Sartre.</p>
73:00	<p>Sartre has that great passage in <i>Transcendence of the Ego</i>—a very find book compares Sartre's "I think" to Kant's by [?]-but Sartre has that great example of when I am aware of the road in the heat of, I am out there in the dust, feeling the heat, I am not aware of myself [as a spontaneous subject—since in those cases we often are aware of ourselves as bodies as a burden to ourselves].</p> <p>And yet no one could have a more gentle conception of subjectivity than Sartre—pure negativity, nothingness—maybe he goes a little too far.</p>
74:00	<p>Question:</p>
	<p>We are not saying that the metaphysical non-neutrality is not "immaterialism" but is rather "anti-materialist". It is that we cannot have a purely causal conception of subjectivity.</p> <p>There is no room for neutrality or ignorance here.</p> <p>We can never, we are never going to be able to detach ourselves from the claim of the spontaneity of the subject.</p> <p>So Kant seems to have fought to hard to neutralize what he is up to. He tried to make it all into modes. Into functions, functions without substances.</p> <p>We are saying here there is a little bit of substance sneaking back in, namely the spontaneity of the self as how we necessarily must conceive of ourselves in a manner that is logically and transcendentally incompatible with causal accounts of the nature of experience.</p>

75:30	<p>So, for example, Dennett also tries to do the metaphysical neutrality bit. What is intentionality for Dennett? It is the stance, you take an intentional stance.</p> <p>He calls it the stance stance. He says you can treat any domain as either an intentional system or a causal system, and that is simply a descriptive choice.</p> <p>But we want to ask, what kind of being can take up that kind of stance in the first place? Who can be a stance stance? And that is not metaphysically neutral on our reading. And so that is going to be the spontaneity that is going to get back in and defeat the claim that it is a matter of stance <i>only</i>.</p> <p>So you can see Dennett as a kind of Kantian neutrality. But if you are Kantian [of the Bernsteinian stripe] you are not going to want to go that far.</p> <p>Down that line is really a belief in materialism.</p>
	<p>After the break, we will turn to the B deduction by using a chart out of Dickerson's <i>Kant on Representation and Objectivity</i>.</p>
	Break

Part 2 tracks its way through the following diagram taken from pp. 201-203:

"...In order to draw together the results of that reading [of the B-Deduction], I will now give in summary form my interpretation of the central argument of the B-Deduction—that is, of Kant's analysis of the concept of human cognition.

The representationalist background

1. All cognition occurs via the mind's immediate awareness of its own internal representational states. (Kant's representationalist starting point.) [point1](#)
2. These representations are not intrinsically available to the subject's awareness; that is, unconscious representations are logically possible. (Leibnizian claim.) [point2](#)
3. Therefore, cognition must involve a special reflexive act of brining representations to awareness—that is, it must involve the *apperception* of representations. (From 1 and 2.) [example3](#)
4. A discursive mind is a mind that is *receptive* in cognition to an independent reality. (Definition of 'discursive'.) [discussion4](#)
5. Therefore, in cognition the discursive mind apperceives its own internal states as presenting an independent objective world to itself. (From 3 and 4.) [point5](#)
6. That is to say that discursive cognition is the apperception of sensible intuitions. (From 5 and the definition of 'sensible intuition'—as a determination of the faculty of receptivity (or sensibility) which the subject grasps as presenting an object.) [discussion6](#)
7. All objects of sensible intuitions are represented *as* complex. (Implicit assumption—certainly valid in the case of human cognition; for in representing objects in space and/or time one thereby represents them as complex (e.g. as potentially divisible into parts).) [discussion7](#)
8. Therefore, discursive cognition is the apperception of unified complex representations. (From 6 and 7.) [point8](#)

The master argument (§16)

9. To apperceive unified complex representations is to apperceive all of the component representations as hanging together in a unity. (The 'principle of the necessary unity of apperception'—an analytic truth.)
10. Such 'unity of apperception' is possible only if the apperception of a unified complex representation is holistic rather than atomistic, and therefore involves a spontaneous synthesis. (The master argument of §16.)
11. Therefore all apperception of unified complex representations must involve a spontaneous synthesis. (From 9 and 10.)
12. Therefore, (α) all discursive cognition must involve a spontaneous synthesis. (From 8 and 11.)

The objectivity criterion (§§ 17-18)

13. The discursive subject's spontaneous synthesis can result in an objectively valid representation (i.e. a cognition) only if that synthesis is necessarily and universally valid (i.e., would be performed the same way by all logically possible discursive cognisers). (From analysis of the concept of objectivity.)
14. Therefore, the discursive subject's spontaneous synthesis can result in a cognition only if it is 'pure' or non-empirical—that is, grounded solely upon essential features of the discursive cognizing subject. (From 13.)

Judgment (§ 19)

15. The act of discursive cognition (the act of cognizing an object *in* one's internal states) is a judgment. (Kant's analysis of the concept of judgment.)
16. Therefore, the discursive cognizing mind is essentially a judging mind. (From 15.)

The categories (§20)

17. Therefore, the discursive subject's spontaneous synthesis can result in a cognition only if that synthesis is grounded solely upon the essential features of the act of judgment. (From 14 and

00:00	Part 2 begins a close reading of the B-Deduction by following through Dickerson's chart above.
	<p>What we are going to do is lean on the hand out from Dickerson's <i>Kant on Representation and Objectivity</i>. We are going to use his outline to make certain critical comments about Allison and others along the way.</p> <p>But at this point we need to note that although we don't yet know it, we have already got in our possession all of the elements of the second edition (B) Deduction.</p> <p>There is almost nothing in it that we have not already covered. We just haven't run it through yet as an argument as a whole.</p>
2:30	<p>The crux of ¶¶ 15-16, which is what we will zero in on today, and next week we will do the rest.</p> <p>Again, we have by now all the pieces, we just need to draw them together.</p> <p>The hint here is that there are three things we have already talked about that are secreted in the structure of the B-deduction.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The argument we just gave [at the end of part 1] about the non-isolatability of the 'I think' and its implication in every judgment. That is, 'the 'I think' must be able to accompany all my representations'. 2. [Sorry, I dropped the recorder on the floor]. The strange argument about 'The Transcendental Object = X'. Namely that Kantian Transcendental Idealism is a transcendental reinterpretation of the new way of ideas. It is a transcendental reinterpretation of Lockean idealism and empiricism. That is right there in ¶¶ 15-16, we are going to see. 3. It is all about the Metaphysical Deduction. That is, it is all about the logical functions of judgment and the relation between them and the categories. <p>So all of that we already we know is the argument from ¶15 to ¶20.</p>
5:00	<p>So on all accounts we will have heard the rumor that the arguments of the transcendental deduction comes in two parts:</p> <p>Roughly, and there is variations on this, the argument runs from ¶15 through ¶21. And then it is concluded in ¶26, which is part 2, and then there is material in between that we will look at.</p> <p>We will look at this two-part strategy next week.</p>

6:30	<p>So turning to ¶¶15-16.</p> <p>Dickerson lays it out that the fundamental background of the entire thing is representationalism. And when you hear representationalism we should hear a version of Lockeanism.</p> <p>That is, we are aware of representations of objects. So our awareness of objects is intentional.</p>
7:30	<p>This argument begins (topofchart):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. All cognition occurs via the mind's immediate awareness of its own internal representational states. (Kant's representationalist starting point.) <p>This is just step one. So if you are a representationalist—if the way we have cognition of the world is by having representations of the world.</p> <p>And what are the alternatives here? If you are not a representationalist, you are going to be some kind of realist. And realism always just looks like it is going to be problematic because it is going to make no sense of judgment, activity, or illusion.</p> <p>So we all have perceptual realist intuitions, 'I am aware of the thing', but that can't be right, I can't be directly aware of the thing, rather I have a representation of the thing.</p>
9:00	<p>topofchart</p> <p>Step 2:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. These representations are not intrinsically available to the subject's awareness; that is, unconscious representations are logically possible. (Leibnizian claim.) <p>Let's try to find some unconscious representations. Consider driving down the highway and when we suddenly notice that we are 40 minutes and 40 miles from the last time we considered where and when we were. We wonder, 'how did I get here?'.</p> <p>We don't remember, we weren't aware of the road along the way, our consciousness may have been attending to an argument we just had with a family member. But somehow I managed to drive 40 miles.</p> <p>Well it is right to say that what has occurred here is representations because I have been triggering my response to the world in light of what I have been perceiving even if wasn't consciously apperceiving that input.</p>

11:00	<p>Of course life would be terrifying if it were like that all the time.</p> <p>But the point here is that unconscious representations are possible but cognition, actual cognition, making claims about what is there and being aware of it and being able to draw inferences from it and the like, therefore involves more than merely having representations, it involves a special form of bring representations to awareness, which is what we are going to call apperceiving them.</p>
11:30	<p>So the "I think must be able to accompany all my represtnations" in order for there to be a cognitive claim.</p> <p>So we need to be aware now that what we are analyzing is our cognitive states.</p> <p>We will come back to this next week, but for now we have to be clear that the premise for JMB of the entire Deduction is that we have cognitive awareness of the world—that is not in dispute.</p> <p>But what we are doing is giving an analysis of that—we are not asking the totally different question of how we move from subjective experience to objective awareness.</p> <p>That is what lots of writers want Kant to be doing, but we are saying he doesn't do, and furthermore it doesn't seem like it is a task that can ever be done.</p> <p>That is, defeating skepticism in that sense is impossible. So we can be skeptical about the possibility of anti-skeptical arguments.</p> <p>The reason why—which we'll return to—is going to be that there is no cognitive path from the non-cognitive to the cognitive. And this path seems to be what an anti-skeptical argument would have to be to be convincing—a cognitive path from the cognitive to the non-cognitive—but as we can see that this must be a contradiction in terms.</p>

14:00	<p>[Discussion of 4] topofchart</p> <p>Another way of saying the same thing, which we will see Dickerson state over and over again, is we begin "holistically". There is no lower level of cognition beneath the judgment.</p> <p>So judgment is where start from, not where we get to.</p> <p>So we want to say that subjective states, we can call them states of non-knowledge, are not the conditions of knowledge but the collapse of knowledge.</p> <p>We will say more about why anti-skepticism is a mistake, but now we want to set up what we mean by holism—that we must start with the whole—and from the whole analyze the parts.</p> <p>This is not to move from the parts through some magical synthesis or progression and thereby get to the whole. This is what is known as the progressive argument.</p> <p>Here we are offering rather a <i>regressive</i> argument rather than a synthetic or progressive argument.</p>
15:30	<p>What we are analyzing is cognitive states. But cognitive states of what or whom? Well cognitive states of what Kant says over and over again is a discursive mind, where a "discursive mind" is the opposite of an intellectual intuition [e.g. a God].</p> <p>A discursive mind, by definition for Kant, is a mind that is receptive of a world that exists fully independently of it.</p>

16:30	<p>So two things here.</p> <p>One is the notion of independence. When God thinks 'let there be light' there is light. The thought and the thing absolutely identical.</p> <p>So God's notion of intellectual intuition, there is never a difference between possibility and actuality. That is rough and readily the notion of an "intuitive intellect": one in which there is no gap between possibility.</p> <p>For example, I really want a nice cold beer. But God wouldn't have to wait—the thought of a cold beer is enough for there to be cold beer and the soothing of thirst.</p> <p>So God for Kant cannot be soothed, because that would be passive.</p> <p>Rousseau says that this is the sad thing about being a God, he never knows comfort or solace. Because he never has needs. Only a needing God can receive comfort or solace.</p> <p>And even if there is a God, says JMB, it is pathetic [], it is not a being you would want to be.</p>
18:30	<p>The second thought here goes along with this difference between possibility and actuality is that we are therefore...and the world is independent of us...from this it follows that we have to be receptive.</p> <p>We are passive with respect to the world. There has to be a moment of irredeemable, irreducible passivity, there has to be a sense in which the world must affect us or connect with us or impact on us in order for us to have cognition of it.</p> <p>And this we can now see gets rid of all rationalism, which has no thought of passivity at all.</p>

	<p>So a discursive mind is a receptive one, therefore, step 5: topofchart</p> <p>5. Therefore, in cognition the discursive mind apperceives its own internal states as presenting an independent objective world to itself. (From 3 and 4.)</p> <p>So if I am discursive intelligence, and if all knowledge is representation and all representation is apperceptive [] what the an apperceptive mind apperceives are its own internal states as representing an independent world.</p> <p><u>Discussion of #6:</u> Since an independent world is a world capable of being sensed, then all discursive cognition is apperception of sensible intuitions—that is, things in space and time.</p> <p>[6. That is to say that discursive cognition is the apperception of sensible intuitions. (From 5 and the definition of ‘sensible intuition’—as a determination of the faculty of receptivity (or sensibility) which the subject grasps as presenting an object.)]</p>
20:30	<p>We have to be affected by them—that is what it means to be sensible—but if I have to be affected by must themselves be sensible, further all objects of representation are complex.</p>
	<p><u>Discussion of #7:</u> Complexity follows merely from sensibility. Because, at least if it is spatial or temporal, it is going to be divisible.</p> <p>[7. All objects of sensible intuitions are represented <i>as</i> complex. (Implicit assumption—certainly valid in the case of human cognition; for in representing objects in space and/or time one thereby represents them as complex (e.g. as potentially divisible into parts).)]</p> <p>So we never have an awareness of something that is absolutely simple, simplicity is always the result of the analytic work of the mind, even a sound can be analyzed into timbre, volume, tone.</p> <p>But the point is that even when you are listening to one note when the orchestra is tuning, you are listening to a manifold itself.</p> <p>This is the reason we say that some people have perfect pitch and others don’t—if it was absolutely simple, we would all have perfect pitch.</p> <p>[]</p> <p>But we don’t have perfect pitch because actually it is a complex manifold that needs to be intuited and reproduced in certain ways. So we are always aware of an intuitive manifold.</p>

22:30	<p>Therefore, step 8, but notice that so far there is no argument here, we are just analyzing. topofchart</p> <p>8. Therefore, discursive cognition is the apperception of unified complex representations. (From 6 and 7.)</p> <p>That is just what discursive cognition is.</p> <p>And now that is our background, that is what we are going to analyze. Discursive cognitive will be our object of analysis.</p> <p>This is not where we are going but where we are starting from. We are thinking about what are the necessary conditions for the possibility of us having discursive cognitive, having this apperceptive awareness of a unified, complex representation.</p>
23:30	<p>Well, the first sentence of ¶16, the most famous in all of the text:</p> <p><i>"It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me."</i></p> <p>The meaning of that claim is a claim about—we will suggest—is really a claim about unity.</p> <p>To say that the "I think" must be able to accompany all my representations means that I must be aware of this complex field as hanging together in a unified way.</p> <p>That is, I must be aware of it as some sort of whole.</p>
25:00	<p>Dickerson claims, rightly, that this is still an analytic claim—it is still about discursive cognition. That it is an analytic claim is a claim about what it is to be aware of something.</p> <p>And that is still compatible...</p> <p>For example, sometimes when people think about Locke, they confuse physical images with Lockean ideas.</p> <p>A Lockean idea is not the same as an image on the retina of my eye.</p> <p>When I hold up a bottle, I have one idea even though each of my eye's has a reversed image of the thing imprinted upon of. But that is not what I am aware of, even as a Lockean.</p> <p>So a Lockean idea is still itself an intentional object. Not the physical thing that comes in, but the one thing I am aware of that I know.</p>
27:30	<p>We will pick up here on this Dickerson chart next week.</p>

