

00:00	<p>The strategy we will follow rather oddly will be to discuss the transition to Lordship and Bondage that is second on the truth of Self Certainty. So the discussion up to more or less \$166 to \$175.</p>
1:00	<p>and then we want to go on and frame the entire discussion of master/slave without going in the detail. We will give our own particular stance. Details of master/slave will come next week.</p> <p>so our object is no longer a discussion of sensuous particulars. Or unities of universals and particular objects directly perceived or essences lying behind appearances.</p>
2:00	<p>we thought we were talking about those objects. That is, in Sense Certainty we thought we were really talking about sensuous particulars, we thought in Perception, we were really talking about objects, we thought Force and Understanding we were talking about the essences lying behind appearances.</p> <p>but we discovered that what was truly at stake in those maneuvers were not those objects but rather the structures in accordance with which we understood the world. So that what was at issue in those maneuvers was how we took the world, what our concept of an object was.</p>
3:00	<p>so the existence of sensuous particulars remains. But the object of our reflection is now our taking of them in that way. That is, our ways of taking the world and not the world itself.</p> <p>We have come to understand that we have to look at the fact that we look at the world and its ways and modes, and investigate our habit of so doing.</p> <p>that is, how is it that we take the world in this way rather than that, which is to say that we have to examine ourselves, as the kinds of beings who interpret the world as one thing or another, so we are moving from the consciousness of the world to a consciousness of taking the world like this or that</p>
4:00	<p>which is to say that we are moving to a self-consciousness because ways of taking the world is investigating ourselves i.e. how we take the world.</p> <p>So Self-Consciousness is an awareness of one's conceptual activity of one's determining the world, even if that activity is mis-described and even if the world is mis-described.</p> <p>so for example, rather the now would no longer be an immediate object but it would refer to our construing something in a contextually determined way in the temporal schema. So a way of interpreting.</p>

5:00	<p>that said, the title of this chapter is almost an oxy-moron. The truth of Self-Certainty i.e. there is a tension between the notion of truth and the notion of certainty. You would have thought that if you have certainty, you don't need truth. So what is the truth of self-certainty?</p> <p>well the truth of self-certainty is going to be not self-certainty, it will be un-certainty, it will be Self-Consciousness.</p> <p>but you need already to be in a mode of dis-equilibrium even before you begin.</p> <p>So we already know that truth cannot be reduced to certainty.</p>
6:00	<p>that was the first thing we learnt. That was the lesson of Self-Certainty. Nonetheless the displacement attempted of truth by certainty is or was the project or aspiration, is the project and aspiration, of both the empiricist myth of the given immediacy, and Descartes cogito ergo sum. I=I.</p> <p>that is, the desire, the aspiration, to ground our relationship to the world in a moment of certainty</p>
7:00	<p>at one level is the certainty of representation, at this level, at the level of Self-Consciousness is the certainty of I=I, where the Fichtean formula of the cogito ergo sum, one I is the knowing I, but since the knowing I in order to know must exist, then the other I is the I that exists, and therefore the I that is self-aware is both a knowing and a being.</p> <p>this is the kind of originary Fichtean interpretation of Descartes.</p> <p>so the aspiration to certainty in that, that here knowing is an activity, and the activity of knowing is a knowing of activity.</p>
8:00	<p>so the knowing I is both the knower and the known. It is Self-Consciousness, not a very good notion of Self-Consciousness we should add, but a notion of Self-Consciousness.</p> <p>and more importantly for where we are going, the I is the content of the relation.</p>
9:00	<p>That is, the movement of the cogito ergo sum is the relating of the knowing to the being as its fundamental activity, so that neither knowing nor being is separate from the I, which is in fact the relating of them.</p> <p>so the idea that the I is the relation between the in-itself of the object and the being-for-another of an object. So this is a primitive subject-object.</p>

10:00	<p>that is supposed to be the thought here. and it is that thought that Hegel for example echoes at the very last line of §166.</p> <p>"Opposed to an other, the 'I' is its own self, and at the same time it overarches this other which, for the 'I', is equally only the 'I' itself."</p> <p>So I is both the subject and object and the relationship between the subject and object.</p> <p>can't do better than that.</p>
11:00	<p>so Self-Consciousness is the truth of consciousness in the sense that the contradictions of consciousness are overcome in self-consciousness.</p> <p>we can resolve them by taking them into our way of taking the world, rather than thinking themselves as a truth about the world.</p> <p>And the certainty of consciousness is here shown to be a false certainty.</p> <p>now this is an interesting notion, a false certainty. You would have thought that certainty is sort of thing that cannot be false. And yet that of course is the argument of Sense Certainty.</p> <p>and this indicates 2 things.</p>
12:00	<p>the first thing it indicates is that the notion of certainty has a suppressed element, namely the desire for certainty, or as we may put it, a desire with a contact with the world, and that is what has changed.</p> <p>That the desire for contact with the world, remember, is a way of making sure that our existential comportment to the world works out all right.</p> <p>So we may say that our desire for certainty is our desire for an existential or even metaphysical self-reassurance of our habitation of the world. That is what we are looking for in knowledge. We wanted to make sure that our being-in-the-world was okay,</p>

13:0 0	<p>and okayness was going to be given by the fact that our way of representing the world and the world corresponded, and it did so immediately. And if that immediacy could have held, we would have been happy, satisfied.</p> <p>[Question: what would it mean not to be okay?]:</p> <p>that is what we mean by suffering, despair.</p> <p>it is a moment of despair. That is why it is a history of despair. It is not okay because we discover that the way we thought life was meaningful, how it was meaningful, namely I touch the world turned out not to be true, so it turns out that whatever gives life its order and meaning cannot be that. So it is that moment of disillusionment.</p> <p>this is what a lot of the rest of the book will be about, structures of disillusionment.</p>
14:0 0	<p>we can think of phenomenology as not unlike Flaubert's sentimental education, which is really not about building but about disillusionment, the end of hope.</p> <p>much of the phenomenology is a process of disillusioning us about our fantasies about how we are connected to the world.</p> <p>so that our thought here is that, when we say certainty fails, we also mean that our search for our way of anchoring ourselves in the world, fails. And we have to go on to a new way of anchoring ourselves in the world. We have to find a different kind or mode anchoring.</p> <p>but the thought here is, and we have to get this out as this will come over and over again is that certainty hides the desire for something. What it hides the desire for, is what we are calling, self-reassurance.</p>
15:0 0	<p>i.e. I am a person in the world that is meaningful, that is an intelligible structure.</p> <p>so let us call it ontological self-reassurance.</p> <p>and everything in the phenomenology ultimately, now that we get on to the right level, is going to be about the desire for, and searching for the correct kind of self-reassurance. And that is becoming more explicit. That is what the stakes of the argument are about.</p> <p>the second thing that follows from the notion of false certainty is that if the original certainty is false, then a good hypothesis at least, that true or false, that truth cannot be reduced to certainty.</p>

16:0 0	<p>that certainty is always going to be disappointed in its desire. Hence the first moment of self-consciousness is self-certainty, where self-certainty is taken to be the truth of sense-certainty. That is, the illusion of sense-certainty is an abstraction of self-certainty.</p> <p>so the hypothesis goes something like, okay I am not in immediate touch, I don't have any givens, but I am still a self-certain being, and we'll give an interpretation of what a self-certain being is.</p>
17:0 0	<p>that I can re-assure myself that life is meaningful and in a mode of getting or acquiring some kind of certainty of that.</p> <p>[Question: about how this is different than Descartes]</p> <p>if you read carefully the Discourse which professor recommends reading Descartes before reading Meditations because the Discourse tells you what the Meditations is all about, they give you the story, and it is a desire for self-reassurance.</p>
18:0 0	<p>so we wants to say that the cogito aims to be just that, a form of reassurance above all against the most terrible threat, and the most terrible threat for Descartes, which many people don't understand is always just God, God is the most terrible threat, faith, the doubt of the evil demon, which is the highest form of faith, it is just the thought of faith itself is the most extreme form of self doubt and the whole point of the cogito is to demonstrate that you cannot have faith because you cannot doubt yourself.</p>
19:0 0	<p>you cannot put God above yourself, that there is a necessary self-assertion.</p> <p>so at this point, we are not trying to do that. What we are introducing here, or will be introducing is the notion of desire. That is what Descartes suppresses.</p> <p>Cogito suppresses the structure of desire subtending it because we just said that if we lose certainty then there must be a desire for certainty. And therefore we have to say how desire works in order to see how desire might be satisfied, or make itself certain.</p> <p>that is going to b e the structure of the argument.</p>
20:0 0	<p>whenever Hegel reads Descartes, he says, we have reached home ground. This is the land of truth. Hegel loves Descartes, not his individualism and all that, but the thought of subjectivity. And subjectivity is this, it is the primitive formula for self-consciousness.</p> <p>And we will say what he means by that and why he says that in a moment.</p> <p>so self-certainty, we know, like sense-certainty will give way and become uncertain and so give way to self-consciousness.</p>

21:0 0	<p>but this also tells us something very important which we will try to ground in the second hour. Namely this. That the notion of certainty, the notion of conviction, the notion of inwardness, the notion of self-consciousness, the idea of self-affirmation, or what we will later call, necessary narcissism, the subject for itself, subjectivity, all these notions, can and will return at higher levels.</p> <p>they will keep on returning. They will return as faith, as the law of the heart, as conscience. There are endlessly sophisticated forms of these things that mean that this moment of certainty which is always false has a moment of truth in it.</p>
22:0 0	<p>and this speaks, professor thinks, to 2 things.</p> <p>formally it is going to tell us that no matter how mediated, no matter how complicated a form of consciousness is, there is a way in which we inhabit that consciousness immediately.</p> <p>we just reached a notion of self-certainty that pre-supposes all that other stuff. It is all in there Hegel tells us. But yet it appears to its self as an immediate relation to the world.</p> <p>so those other moments get congealed, and there is a moment of the return of immediacy.</p>
23:0 0	<p>this of course is the notion of natural consciousness. Consciousness taking itself as natural.</p> <p>secondly, that the truth, whatever that is, must have a moment of inwardness, of subjectivity, its being for self, the self for itself, in opposition to the object.</p> <p>call this the need for subjectivity or the need or demand for self-affirmation.</p> <p>we should remind ourselves that our most sophisticated thinkers return to this moment.</p>
24:0 0	<p>so for Nietzsche, of course it is affirmation itself, in Heidegger it is anticipatory resoluteness, in Derrida it is the Joycean yes yes.</p> <p>the return to an affirmation that is supposed to, and Hegel disagrees with this, what is wrong with all these theories is that want an affirmation that is antecedent to any negative, any lack.</p> <p>that is what all these theories share, and Hegel is going to contest, and we will contest later.</p> <p>so there really are metaphysical stakes here. but nonetheless it is that moment of sense-certainty that is returning in anticipatory resoluteness, oh yes yes.</p>

25:0 0	<p>in light of this what Nietzsche says about the ascetic ideal namely that it is its world denial as the power it does because secretly it is a mode of self-affirmation, that the very act of try to deny ourselves, Descartes, is necessarily an act of affirmation, because we create God, cannot get rid of him, and therefore a defense against de-generative life becomes for Hegel methodological.</p> <p>That is, we are going to move forward in Hegel by uncovering, or seeking to uncover, a mode of self-affirmation, that is not self-destructive.</p>
26:0 0	<p>so we will see that this is the problem of the Unhappy Consciousness. That most of our modes of self-affirmation tend to be self-defeating. So what we are looking for are modes of self-affirmation and self-reassurance that do not destroy themselves or deny themselves.</p> <p>so still working through the opening paragraph of 2.</p> <p>Hegel says that the previous modes of consciousness do not disappear altogether. They are now implicitly present in an encounter with a thing,</p>
27:0 0	<p>but they disappear as realities, as independent existences. They get their role or meaning from the way self-consciousness encounters the world.</p> <p>so in §167 he goes through all those moments and he says that they are</p> <p>"...abstractions or distinctions which at the same time have no reality for consciousness itself, and are purely vanishing essences. Thus it seems that only the principal moment itself has been lost, viz. the <i>simple self-subsistent existence</i> for consciousness. But in point of fact self-consciousness is the reflection out of the being of the world of sense and perception, and is essentially the return from <i>otherness</i>. As self-consciousness, it is movement; [a] but since what it distinguishes from itself is <i>only itself as itself</i>, [b] the difference, as an otherness, is <i>immediately superseded</i> for it;..."</p> <p>[a] just to distinguish myself from myself, my hand from my knowing. [b] I=I</p>
28:0 0	

29:0 0	<p>professor likes to remind people that David Wiggins used to give a lecture course at the University of London on $a=a$, about 40 hours of lectures on just $a=a$. it is not a simple proposition.</p> <p>so the problem with the I am I as a pure return of the self out of otherness is that as Fichte avows that this isn't really possible, it is an idea, it is not an actual experience.</p> <p>or as Hegel puts it, it lacks a being-for-consciousness.</p>
30:0 0	<p>so it is not quite yet self-consciousness.</p> <p>so that return $I=I$ is too quick.</p> <p>what was sought was to see the truth of consciousness which is a relation to the otherness of the world as in truth a mode of self-relation.</p> <p>so let us say this again ads this is the Copernican Turn.</p> <p>my relationship to the world is in truth a self relation because how I see the world is in terms of my concept of an object.</p>
31:0 0	<p>so what looks like the relation to the world is superseded because what we are interested in is a mode of our understanding of the world.</p> <p>so what we now see is what is at stake is or what the claim needs to be is that our relationship to the world is always necessarily grounded in a self-relation.</p> <p>that is what self-consciousness means.</p> <p>that our relationship to the world is always necessarily grounded in a self-relation, in our concept of an object.</p>
32:0 0	<p>that is why Descartes thinks from the cogito he can deduce everything because he thinks the relationship to the world is grounded in self-relation.</p> <p>and of course Kant cannot on earth figure out what Descartes is thinking. So he introduces the idea of form in order to get the idea that it is our self-relation that is, the TUA Transcendental Unity of Apperception, that is just Kant's word for I think.</p> <p>so the I think, my self-relation, is the ground for my relationship to the world.</p> <p>this is modernity. This is the meaning of subjectivity.</p>

33:0 0	<p>subjectivity is the thought that I am not grounded in the world by my relationship to it. Rather my relationship to the world is grounded in a fundamental self-relation.</p> <p>which is why Husserl thinks he can bracket everything. And just make it all sex. Husserl is the greatest exponent of this wild thought. The bracketing of everything, lifting it all up, and making it the internal correlate of the I think.</p> <p>so he grounds the being in the world...[]</p>
34:0 0	<p>secondly we have to think of how the world appears as independent. How the moment of that appearing independent of us,</p> <p>and then second as a second moment we must be able to show how that appearance is in fact dependent or regulated by my fundamental self-relation.</p> <p>how might we do that?</p>
35:0 0	<p>well the first way Hegel does it is to suggest that my relationship to the world is organized by the notion of desire.</p> <p>why desire and why does desire produce self-certainty.</p> <p>first of all remember that we said that the structure of self-consciousness was rather than the world determining me, it is going to be me determining the world, and therefore denying the world any absolute independence from me.</p> <p>that the very nature now is to go from a stance of knowledge, which is a stance of passivity, to a stance of activity and determining.</p>
36:0 0	<p>let us think about desire for a moment.</p> <p>the original thought here, we have already suggested that hidden beneath the certainty is a desire for certainty. And now we want to read that thought into the structure of desire itself.</p> <p>That the desire itself is intrinsically a desire for affirmation and certainty of self.</p>
37:0 0	<p>and the thought runs something like this that primitively it might be claimed that things have a meaning or a sense or a significance only in relation to my desire or its opposite my aversion for it.</p> <p>that is that things...</p> <p>I have a project, that is to walk to the back of the room. That is already a desire. So I have a desire to walk to the back of the room. Every desire is already a desire. once I have that desire then everything here is</p>

38:0 0	<p>interpreted with respect to either aiding or blocking my desire.</p> <p>so I am walking this way. This is seen as obstruction. This is seen as a path way and other things become just neutral, shadow, indifferent.</p> <p>that is the minute you have a desire, you automatically have a world schema. A schema for the interpretation of each and every object as facilitating, aiding, ordering and related to those desires.</p> <p>so the world appearing appears in relationship to my desires.</p>
39:0 0	<p>The world is edible because I desire food.</p> <p>the world is combustible because I desire warmth.</p> <p>the world is inhabitable because I can make this log into a house or a boat.</p> <p>in other words the very ways in which things appear are fundamentally structured around whether or not and how they satisfy or resist my desires.</p>
40:0 0	<p>but, this is the huge but, further that in so far as an object does satisfy my desire, it is claiming to independence disappearance.</p> <p>There is that apple, sitting on a tree, an object, independent and all that. No it is not. Like an animal, I take it, I eat it, it is gone.</p> <p>so the meaning of the object is given by my desire, and the object in so far as it satisfies my desire has no significant independence.</p> <p>so the first thing here is 2 things.</p>
41:0 0	<p>one is that objects appear to me in relationship to desires and the projects they give on to.</p> <p>so the whole structure of the appearing world is really a kind of hologram of desire.</p> <p>but my certainty of myself, that the world is meaningful, that I am anchored in the world as a meaningful being is given by the satisfaction of desire.</p> <p>so my self-certainty is what? That is the source of meaning in the universe.</p>

42:0 0	<p>this is what every [Fill] is.</p> <p>the sense of myself as the center of the universe, as the origin of meaning and intelligibility and structure is given by desire and the satisfaction of the desire, and hence my self-certainty is confirmed every single time I bite out of the apple, every time the shady tree gives me relief from the sun, every time the world satisfies my desires.</p> <p>now we will see that this structure fails in all sorts of ways.</p>
43:0 0	<p>but it is a level of seeing. After all I am aware of myself. We missed one step here.</p> <p>how did desire became self-aware, namely that you like something. The very experience of desire throws you back on yourself.</p> <p>so if we are reading. And reading, lets say is the paradigm is self-forgetfulness, I am absorbed in the text, then my stomach rumbles, and I can no longer concentrate, I am thirsty. Any time that desire rises up, I can no longer attach myself to the world as consciousness</p>
44:0 0	<p>rather I am aware of myself via what I lack. Via an absence that demands satisfaction.</p> <p>so first of all, the most primitive notion of self-awareness, of awareness of self in opposition to the world, is in the experience of desire. Desire itself is a form of self-awareness, is a form of self-consciousness, and is equally a form of self-certainty.</p> <p>which is why, just to state the obvious sub-text of all this, why Hobbes is as original a modern thinker as Descartes.</p> <p>Descartes starts with the I=I, Hobbes with the I desire, and we will come back to this.</p>
45:0 0	<p>the I desire Hobbes is all over this bit of Hegel.</p> <p>so what Hegel means by self-consciousness is this moment of negativity, whereby self-consciousness as desire negates the appearing independence of the object, and shows its nothingness in relationship to self-consciousness. So the very nature of desire we might say is idealistic.</p>
46:0 0	<p>because both the meaning of the object and its disillusionment is all in relationship to me. It has no absolute meaning independently of me. And it finally has, if I am strong enough, whatever that means, no final independence from me.</p> <p>so to show that self-consciousness is desire and negation is equally to show that self-consciousness is, as we suggested last week, practical activity. Hence the claim with respect to consciousness is now become something like this,</p>

47:0 0	<p>first knowing itself must be understood as a mode of acting, as one of the ways in which we articulate the world and our relationship to it.</p> <p>secondly, a totally modern thought, namely that knowing is for the sake of action. That it is a moment, is a moment that enables a practical self that satisfies its desires and builds a world for itself.</p> <p>and third, that we are in the world, this is the big, deep, difficult one that we have been looking at for the next couple of weeks, that we are in the world, in the world, primarily as agents and not as knowers.</p>
48:0 0	<p>not as spectators. The world is not like going to the movies. The primacy of knowledge is a very odd thought, as if the world were for the sake of being looked at or spectated on.</p> <p>hence our relationship to the world is not one of knowing or what we think of as knowing, this is why we introduced desire. My relationship to the world is not exactly knowing at all.</p> <p>in fact we will say in about 20 mins is something like recognition. This is another way of relating to the world which is not knowing the world but engaging the world as an agent.</p> <p>we will come to all this very shortly.</p>
49:0 0	<p>we need to make a little detour through \$168-\$174 before the break. This must have caused a great deal of heart ache What was all that about? Well here is the best we can do with that.</p> <p>let us start with the obvious. after all, methodologically we know that in Hegel if a form of knowing alters, then so must its concept of an object. So our form of knowing at the moment, he says self-consciousness is desire, that is our immediate idea of knowing, desiring.</p> <p>what is the object of desire? That is the question of interrogation here.</p>
50:0 0	<p>well, Hegel sets it up like this. He says that the self-relation or the independence of self-consciousness, its saying that the world is nothing to it, so if consciousness is looking at the world, then self-consciousness is turning its back at the world and looking at itself.</p> <p>so Hegel says if self-consciousness turns its back on the world, then the object must do the same thing. The object must turn its back away from the self</p>

51:0 0	<p>that is, the object must have a moment of being for itself in opposition to any particular knower.</p> <p>so what is for the object to be related to itself rather than related to the world. And Hegel's answer to that is, that is what an organism is.</p> <p>an organism is something that has a border and boundaries that takes things from the world for the sake of its own reproduction. So a living thing is a thing that has a moment of being for self. has a notion of self.</p>
52:0 0	<p>indeed Hegel thinks this, and Aristotle certainly thinks this, there is no realistic notion of an object, lower than the level of an organism, except artifacts that are made by intention.</p> <p>but in order for something to be an object, a one, it has to have a way of a principle of unity. And hence it is way in which it is for-itself in opposition to the world and wanting to sustain itself in opposition to the world. And that is what organisms do.</p> <p>so life, a living thing, is both independent, it is a relation to an outside that excludes the other from itself, or tries to</p>
53:0 0	<p>and it is further self-differentiating. It is an object that is internally complex, self-differentiating into its various parts, and the parts are for the sake of the whole.</p> <p>so what is at stake here, just so we on the page here, this is Hegel in a way breaking off his analysis in order to say something about his philosophy of the organism or life for his commitment to naturalism.</p> <p>following Shelling, Hegel believed that living nature provided a</p>
54:0 0	<p>also following Aristotle, but Shelling was always in the background here that living nature provided the necessary pre-history of reason.</p> <p>that only, only living things, that is things that lived and died could be self-conscious.</p> <p>this is widely different from Descartes, Hume, Locke, Berkeley, Kant, Fichte, well Fichte is another story.</p> <p>emphatically nothing can be a self-conscious being unless it is a living being that can live and die.</p>

55:0 0	<p>hence in the Logic, professor does not have exact reference, he says the following: FILL FIND REFERENCE</p> <p>"Life as such is for spirit partly a means and as such spirit opposes itself to life [a]. but partly spirit is a living individual [b] and life is its body and partly this unity of itself with its living corporeality is born from spirit itself to the ideal."</p> <p>[a] that is the living world is a means to my survival. I eat it. I make things out of it. All that kind of stuff. I plant. So life is an external medium, it is an instrument that I need.</p> <p>[b] Spirit. Whatever spirit is.</p>
56:0 0	<p>so he is saying 3 things here.</p> <p>life is the body of spirit. It is its necessary material, instantiation and moment. But the body is a living thing, not a res extensa, not atoms, but a living being. Hence body is spirit in its unconscious form. What spirit is in itself but not yet for itself.</p>
57:0 0	<p>because it is a process of self-relating, self-differentiating, it has all the structural aspects of spirit.</p> <p>and if you read FILL Markowzer's work on Hegel's theory of historicity, he will claim that Hegel's idealism is in fact derived from the problematic paragraphs. And that the entire theory of idealism depends on a notion of living motility.</p> <p>so it is an extraordinary attempt to read Hegel out of these paragraphs on life.</p> <p>this is the materialist construal on this.</p>
58:0 0	<p>this by the way is the PhD thesis that Markowzer FILL wrote on Heidegger. This is on Hegel's theory of historicity.</p> <p>so roughly in §169, we are getting the idea that, or what Hegel is suggesting is the idea of the living earth as a complete eco-system, which is to say that the entire world or earth is a living thing.</p>
59:0 0	<p>And the reason why he thinks that he can say this is because both the organic and the in-organic are components and passing elements of one life which is produced and re-produced throughout the earth and shared by all its members.</p> <p>therefore he thinks that the notion of infinitude is appropriate here, because there is, if you think of the world as a eco-system, a unified one, there is no absolute differences, all differences are internal to the self-reproducing process of the earth as a whole. So he is picturing the whole earth as a single organism, this is the Hegel Schellingian conceit here</p>

60:00	<p>and that is a primitive idea of what he means by the infinite.</p> <p>there is no outside, there is no limit to it. it is a complete self-relating system.</p> <p>so this is part of his model in thinking about spirit. And that is important to see what is happening in these paragraphs.</p> <p>so the pure motion of this whole system is this cyclical reproduction, which is time. And in space, the total organic system is a structure of dispersed but mutually dependent organisms.</p> <p>so the eco-system has a both fundamentally integrated, temporal, and spatial, structure. both the diachronic and synchronic aspect.</p>
1:00	<p>\$170 says that the independent members, by that he means particular organisms, and in that respect he is talking about how the life world appears to us, but he wants to say that these independent organisms, the tree, the flower, the bumblebee, etc, the rock, the stone, the earth, the worm, are not really independent because they are moments of the life process where the change, the whole cycle, is the reproduction of one whole, that stays the same through its continual change.</p> <p>it still stays the same thing, the earth, through all its changing.</p>
2:00	<p>and this of course occurs through sex and generation.</p> <p>hence \$171 is the attempt to re-cast the entire life process in its structural forms.</p> <p>that is to explain the relationship between 3 things.</p> <p>independent organisms that go through a process of development, hence the role of eating and nourishment and the like, second the idea of sex and death and generation of new forms, of independent shapes,</p>
3:00	<p>and then third, the element in which all this comes together, namely with the reminder that at the biological level, the role of individual organisms is for the sake of the species.</p> <p>that they have their significance in the survival of the species not in their own individuality.</p> <p>hence giving rise to the thought that maybe individuals have their significance in the role they play in the generation of....</p> <p>and further the species have their role in the reproduction of the life process itself.</p>

4:00	<p>at §171 end last sentence,</p> <p>"Life consists rather in being the self-developing whole which dissolves its development and this movement simply preserves itself."</p> <p>so life is the whole process. There is no essence of life, there is no vitalism here, life is the process by which all this occurs.</p> <p>and secondly the whole part logic works at every level.</p>
5:00	<p>§172 then says that while the reproduction of the individual preserves the species, seeing individuals as, as having a role in species reproduction, seeing the species in the individual.</p> <p>That is, for example, seeing the lionhood in the individual lion, seeing rosehood in the individual rose, is something that is only done, by consciousness.</p> <p>that is the intelligibility of that structure is not internal to</p>
6:00	<p>its structure but to its comprehension.</p> <p>so let us look at the paragraph, bottom page</p> <p>"It is the simple genus which, in the movement of Life itself, does not <i>exist for itself qua</i> this <i>simple</i> determination; on the contrary, in this <i>result</i>, Life points to something other than itself, viz. to consciousness, for which Life exists as this unity, or as genus."</p>
7:00	<p>that is, there is a structure here but it is a complicated structure namely the individual has its significance of being the instantiation of the species. As individual knowing that, the rose, the bowl, don't know [FILL]</p> <p>so that the structure is only for consciousness.</p> <p>we can read this in 2 ways.</p> <p>the crazy way is Peirce's way where he says something like nature grows knowers to know itself. Which is a weird compromise of a weird version, of Hegel and Schelling. This is naturalism gone wild.</p>
8:00	<p>Hegel's thought is much simpler. And the simpler thought is that there are structures in the world, structures whose character qua structure requires a differentiation that no individual object can itself carry out, but can only be carried out by the thought about that object.</p>

9:00	<p>and here the exact example Hegel is pointing to is the way in which particular organisms play roles. Hence the intelligibility of the organism itself is only comprehensible via the role that it plays in the reproduction of the species of which it is a part.</p> <p>But the notion of the species is not in the object. It is in the necessary comprehension of the object given the structure of its role.</p> <p>the great thing about that thought, which we will argue about at the break, is that it is utterly indeterminate between idealism and realism.</p> <p>because it is a claim that the very nature of this structure is such that</p>
10:00	<p>its character, logical complexity, is something that resides necessarily outside it because it has a relationship to something that it is not. Namely it is an individual but it is an individual as member of a species, and you cannot understand anything about what it does without understanding that. And that is a claim about it, and the necessity of it being for consciousness.</p> <p>let us have a break and we will do recognition via [FILL]</p>
	BREAK
00:00	<p>The 3 pieces of the puzzle that we introduced in the last hour.</p> <p>1) first the idea that instead of consciousness being related to the world, it will be related to its ways of comprehending the world.</p> <p>so the movement of consciousness to self-consciousness.</p> <p>that consciousness is interrogating itself, its ways of relating to the world.</p>
1:00	<p>2) secondly we said that the kind of being that does this is an acting and desiring being. So the primacy of desiring and agency.</p> <p>3) and third we got this story about life.</p> <p>and the question is how do they all hang together.</p> <p>and the answer professor will not tell us because we are right to be puzzled. Hegel does not bring these 3 things together in this section. They will only come together in the master-slave relationship itself.</p> <p>so you have to be very patient and let these things hang as so far moments that are each motivated</p>

2:00	<p>by the argument to date but each is not clear how they inter-connect.</p> <p>so what we want to do in the next hour is to introduce a massive aside and the aside is what this transformation in the book is about and what it means.</p> <p>and the important thing here is that the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness in fact emerges as a complete transformation of the conceptual grid of modern philosophy.</p> <p>and we want to talk about this complete transformation of this conceptual grid. It is not completely un-anticipated</p>
3:00	<p>it is a little bit in Herder and a little bit in Fichte but it really does not come together until Hegel.</p> <p>And what is going to change is that instead of a relation between a subject and an object is going to be relation at least between two subjects. Hence a story about inter-subjectivity. Instead of a relation between a subject knowing or cognizing an object, it is going to be a relation of recognition.</p> <p>and we will say what that word means, what the word recognition means.</p> <p>hence whatever it is, it is more than and different from a pure cognitive encounter.</p>
4:00	<p>that our way of being in the world is not by cognizing the world.</p> <p>instead of the relation being external, a subject knowing another independent subject, and vice versa.</p> <p>the relation is going to be an internal relation. That is, my relation to the other is going to be a component of my self-relation. So that my fundamental relationship to myself, who I am for myself, hence who I am, and what it means to be me, becomes essentially mediated through my relation to another.</p>
5:00	<p>finally because the relation between self and other is going to be both internal and external, then what is at stake in recognition is not the grasping of a truth external to myself but lets say the quality of my relation to the other.</p> <p>we will elaborate on all these points in a bit.</p> <p>as Hegel says in §184</p> <p>"They <i>recognize</i> themselves as <i>mutually recognizing</i> one another."</p> <p>He seems to be suggesting that normatively recognition requires equality and mutuality.</p>

6:00	<p>it is often assumed that equality and mutuality often together require absolute symmetry, like a mirroring relationship, but we shall be arguing that this is not the case. Mutuality requires reversibility not symmetry.</p> <p>any of you say they have been in love with a person recognize that thought.</p> <p>so reversibility not symmetry.</p>
7:00	<p>nonetheless what follows from this is a new form of human failure is announced. Let us call it misrecognition.</p> <p>misrecognition is the form of non-correspondence to the other governing human social relations.</p> <p>misrecognition is what causes a form of consciousness to become dissatisfied.</p> <p>and misrecognition is that which engenders a mode of encounter as self-defeating.</p> <p>or rather that is the crux of Hegel's argument.</p>
8:00	<p>that is, he must show that all acts of misrecognition are equally forms of self-defeating forms of behaviour.</p> <p>so misrecognition for Hegel is the source of inequality and unfreedom. Misrecognition is hence the type of failure intrinsic to human sociality. And therefore misrecognition is equally the source of what professor calls a moral injury.</p> <p>that is the way in which one human being harms another human being as a human being.</p> <p>You can harm people in a variety of ways, but harm as a human being, we will argue is misrecognition, and therefore it is a fundamental form of injury.</p>
9:00	<p>and therefore think of master/slave relationship as the paradigmatic form of moral injury and misrecognition.</p> <p>all these forms of failures are going to be announced in the encounter between the master and slave.</p> <p>misrecognition and the dissatisfactions it generates also are the ultimate cause for the fundamental forms of world denial. What Nietzsche calls the ascetic ideal and Weber calls the fundamental forms of world rejection.</p>

10:0 0	<p>and these are analyzed in the chapters on Stoicism, Scepticism, and Unhappy Consciousness.</p> <p>that is a lot. And therefore we better be clear what is going on here.</p> <p>all this stuff that the professor said is going on in the master-slave so we better stand back and figure out what this shift is about and what its stakes are.</p> <p>recognition is Hegel's successor term to love and life. Love will hence become one form of re-cognitive relation. But there are many many many others.</p>
11:0 0	<p>to say that recognition is the successor term to love means that roughly that recognition involves eliciting and isolating the conceptual infrastructure of the kind of inter-subjective relation which love relations exhibit.</p> <p>so we are doing what everyone says should not be done namely to find within love a conceptual infrastructure that articulates why it is meaningful in the way it is.</p> <p>further recognition as a successor concept to love aims at a form of satisfaction.</p>
12:0 0	<p>which is we guess is Hegel's word for happiness. That is, analogous to the kind of satisfaction that love relationships normatively embody.</p> <p>so recall that in love we find the meaning and worth of our life in the other. That we cannot detach how things are for us, the waning and waxing of my life, from the life of the other. And that the miseries of love derived from the fact that, again to quote crossing the colours, from the fact that lover and the beloved come from different countries.</p> <p>what distinguishes love from recognition is that erotic love is driven by a fusion model while recognition is not.</p>
13:0 0	<p>hence recognition elicits normative element in love relations apart from its other qualities.</p> <p>recognition FILL GERMAN is a form of cognition FILL GERMAN.</p> <p>so like cognition, recognition has a double structure.</p> <p>it is a relation between a self and an object. And as a relation between a self and itself.</p>

14:0 0	<p>as a relation between a self and object recognition denotes a special kind of object, an object that is a subject. Because the object is a subject then recognizing is not a matter of fact epistemic achievement. Like distinguishing between apples and pears. It is not a matter of classifying, not a matter of knowing the object's properties.</p> <p>therefore not everything that is involved in recognizing the other as a subject can be cashed out in purely cognitive terms. It cannot be cashed out in terms of epistemic discrimination i.e. in picking up just those properties which only subjects possess.</p>
15:0 0	<p>rather recognizing another involves according him or her a certain status or worth. And responding to them in light of that status and worth.</p> <p>so when Israel fails to recognize the Palestinians, they are not making an epistemological error. They are not fusing the Palestinians with the Iranians. Or thinking that they are secretly Syrians.</p> <p>rather they are not according them the same value or worth that they would want others to accord them.</p> <p>so recognizing is a way of treating another, responding to another that acknowledges a certain standing or value or worth.</p>
16:0 0	<p>let us say to recognize another as a subject is to accord them a certain value in themselves, as valuable in themselves.</p> <p>so self-conscious agents, that is you and me, conceive of ourselves as sources of value.</p> <p>at the very least that thought is given by the desire model. Just by desiring, I am a source of value and meaning. Things have value and meaning through my desiring them. and therefore expect others to so regard them.</p>
17:0 0	<p>now we typically think of according some one or group a status as being of a certain worth as driven by certain feelings, of respect, of sympathy, of esteem, and the withholding of recognition causes the object to feel disrespect, to lack the opportunity for self-esteem, to feel existentially isolated.</p> <p>from this, just this notion of recognition is right, 2 things immediately follow.</p> <p>first recognition is as much a practical relation between selves as it is epistemic, cognitive, or theoretical.</p> <p>I have to both recognize you as having certain features and treat you accordingly.</p>

18:0 0	<p>that is a practical fact that has to be grounded in an assessment of you. Hence there is a practical character to it. hence the transition again from consciousness to self-consciousness is a transition from primacy of theoretical reason to a primacy of practical reason.</p> <p>to say that the relationship is practical is to say that the manner of my regard entails the motives for action and a manner of engaging or encountering the other. A mode or form of treatment.</p>
19:0 0	<p>it requires a stance, or orientation, or attitude.</p> <p>recognition therefore corresponds to what Stanley Cavell calls acknowledgement. Where acknowledgement provides the practical normative binding between selves above and beyond knowledge itself.</p> <p>so just to remind you what Cavell's argument is to see what the stakes are here. Cavell says that the problem of the other minds, how do I know that the person in front of me is another subject, another mind like my own.</p> <p>Cavell says the mistake has been to think that it is an epistemic question, that is searching for a certain amount of evidence. And the thing is that no amount of evidence will satisfy me that another is another subject like me</p>
20:0 0	<p>that evidence is the wrong kind of thing to look for.</p> <p>and Cavell says that, this is what Cavell means by the truth of Scepticism, that Scepticism says that any evidence that is going to give me that you are another subject is never going to be enough.</p> <p>Cavell says that is true.</p> <p>but that means that my relationship with the other is not a matter of consciousness, where we just were.</p> <p>the search for definitive evidence, that the other is another subject, the search for definitive evidence, that my wife truly loves me, is bound to fail.</p>
21:0 0	<p>Hence in Cavell's account nothing is going to count for Othello having perfect evidence that Des Demones FILL loves him. And yet that is what he seems to want. Othello seems to want evidence and the attempt to elicit that evidence and find proof of it kills her, kills him, destroys him.</p> <p>so it is because self-consciousness is a practical relation of self to world that Hegel places all the complex epistemic reflections of the understanding under the heading of consciousness and not self-consciousness.</p>

22:0 0	<p>for Hegel the TUA Transcendental Unity of Apperception, the form of self-consciousness Kant described to be understanding is not truly self-conscious.</p> <p>remember the argument from 20 minutes ago where we said that reading a book, being self-conscious, I am not self-aware, only as I have a desire, I get hungry..</p> <p>so the pure contemplating theoretical self is not aware of itself as a self-conscious being.</p> <p>it is not that he or she is not a self-conscious being. It is that it is a moment in which a self-consciousness is suppressed.</p> <p>to actually conceive of knowing as a self-conscious achievement is again to think of it as a practical engagement with the world.</p>
23:0 0	<p>secondly, now agreeing with Kant, to regard another as another subject is to regard her as an end in herself.</p> <p>only now the regarding of others as ends in themselves is not merely a reflection on my motives and my intentions but directly a mode of perception and encounter. A way of seeing the others and the modes of activities involved.</p> <p>so recognition and mis-recognition finally come to replace all the relationships between self and law, self and moral law, self and the principle, that Kant had put there.</p>
24:0 0	<p>Hegel thinks that all happens between you and me. So let us from now on what is at stake, and let us put this as hyperbolically as we can, is the slow discovery that the other is the fact of reason.</p> <p>remember the fact of reason in the Critique of Practical Reason was my awareness of myself as free and self-determining. So the awareness of the moral law lifts me out of myself and makes me aware of myself as a self-conscious being.</p> <p>now it is the other that exposes me to my own freedom and rationality. And hence the other is herself the fact of reason.</p>
25:0 0	<p>people are so surprised that professor despises Levinas. Of course Levinas gets that the other is the fact of reason, he beats the thought to death, and that is the problem, he does not think it, he just beats the thought to death.</p> <p>Hegel wants to ask the question how it we come to learn and experience the other as a fact of reason. And he assumes that it is something that has to be learnt and developed through a complicated process.</p>

26:0 0	<p>and cannot be, cannot be, understood in its normative significance in terms of an immediate model of infinite obligation.</p> <p>There is no immediate infinite obligation to the other. As we are about to see, my first response to the existence of the other is kill her.</p> <p>of course it is my exposure to the other. Levinas is right about that. But he refuses everything, everything that is difficult for thought.</p> <p>Professor does not understand and is puzzled about why he does not like Hegel.</p>
27:0 0	<p>so to say that my relations to myself are mediated through my relations with others is to say that the quality or character of my relations to myself, my very being for myself is mediated through my being for another.</p> <p>but this is to say that the question of recognition embeds my standing for myself, my status of being self identical in relation to others.</p> <p>that is how I take myself in its simplest and most primitive form only emerges and takes on a characteristic through my relations with others and has no moment of independence from that.</p> <p>there is no cogito ergo sum, There is no I=I, independently of these complex mediations of self and others.</p>
28:0 0	<p>so Hegel is going to say that my very subjectivity, my self-consciousness is socially constituted. That the most obvious fact about me that I am self-aware of myself as being in the world is a social product. Indeed a social achievement of a certain kind.</p> <p>crudely my being for myself has two fundamental senses.</p>
29:0 0	<p>first it denotes the actualization of an indeterminate potentiality, hence a becoming of who you are through your efforts of creative self-transformation. Where creative self-transformation is Hegel's jargon the externalization of being in itself.</p> <p>second, my being for the being for itself involves, and now we will go through 2 moments.</p> <p>my absolute independence from the other. Hence an affirmation of my freedom as achieved through efforts of self-determination.</p>

<p>30:0 0</p>	<p>we will be generating a paradox.</p> <p>we will say that we have a moment of absolute independence, absolute being for self, an infinite self-regard, and simultaneously, and structured in it, and mediated by it, an infinite dependence, and therefore an infinite relation to the other.</p> <p>and we will call these the moments of separateness and connectedness.</p> <p>[Question]</p> <p>both are infinite and that is why it is a real paradoxical relation. And we will have to show how that is possible that both moments can be infinite in the appropriate way.</p> <p>[Question]</p>
<p>31:0 0</p>	<p>so there is a sense in which I am unconditionally independent of the other.</p> <p>[FILL the source of that is that I can always say no...possibly in activity]</p> <p>the other cannot touch my freedom. That is my infinite independence.</p> <p>my infinite dependence is that my freedom is always mediated through a regard for the other. Hence I am always in a situation of passivity.</p> <p>Hegel calls these moments independence and dependence.</p> <p>professors uses the phrase separateness and connectedness.</p> <p>so professor is saying that there is a fundamental structure of the human in its status of being a self-conscious being that is a structure of separateness and connectedness.</p>
<p>32:0 0</p>	<p>and that is going to raise all sorts of issues if you have got these 2 utter unconditional moments.</p> <p>so the first moment, that moment of independence is, what in psychoanalytic language is the moment of narcissism.</p> <p>and Elliott Juris FILL EXACT REFERENCE nicely states the thought, he says,</p> <p>"Narcissism explains the tendency to obscure that we are also constituted as being for another. For Hegel however being for itself is not necessarily antithetical to being for another. In particular there is no reason to assume that narcissism in and for itself is pathological. It becomes pathological only in so far as it pushes consciousness to disregard being for another."</p>

33:0 0	<p>so because we have this structure of being for ourselves, then there is going to be a continual temptation to disregard and play down our being for another. And this disregard can be played out structurally. For example, structurally, it is nothing but the history of patriarchy. Or structurally it is nothing but the history of racism.</p> <p>These are means and modes and mechanisms of disregarding,</p>
34:0 0	<p>that give us the kind of assurance that our narcissism demands by making sure that there are objects that can be disregarded and therefore assure us of our infinite worth in response to their infinite abjectness.</p> <p>so on this account patriarchy is even nastier than it looks on most accounts. Professor thinks that only Hegelianism can actually make sense of the history of patriarchy. Simone de Beauvoir thought that too.</p> <p>conversely being for another is Hegel's way of articulating that human agency is defined by dependence and connectedness.</p>
35:0 0	<p>Put this way, we may say that Hegel's terms almost by themselves, and we need to be clear that it is almost, almost by themselves seem to project a normative ideal of subjectivity. Namely an adequate conception of subjectivity involves a maximum acknowledgment of each as separate from every other as truly being for itself through an acknowledgment of each's utter connectedness to every other.</p> <p>we will suggest that this is not an a-priori norm, this is not a principle, this is nothing. It is something. We will call it a function and explain what that means.</p>
36:0 0	<p>but this is what we want to get to, it is hard to understand what this is, this structure of, this is what we will tease out in this lecture, what Hegel means but this structure of connectedness and separateness and what that implies, and how that is somehow going to be meaningful for the rest of the structure of the book.</p> <p>so the difficulty of human relations for Hegel, and this is really what he thinks is the difficulty, not the only difficulty that human beings face. People can face hunger, starvation, drought, that is not a difficulty in human relations. That is another kind of difficulty. It can be both. For example, sometimes starvation is caused by human relations, namely expropriation of resources etc</p>

37:0 0	<p>The difficulty of human relations for Hegel is the quest for a state of affairs in which human independence is balanced by our dependence, by our indefinite or unconditional connectedness to others, by being our bound and bonded to others. The bonds that connect us will not be bonds of love. The bonds that connects us are what Hegel calls spirit, the title of the book.</p> <p>whatever spirit is. it is the bonds of connectedness. Spirit is nothing but structures of separateness and connectedness. Every form of spirit is a certain structure of separateness and connectedness.</p>
38:0 0	<p>hence what we called above the conceptual core of love that recognition elicits can now be specified as denoting a complex logic of separateness and connectedness.</p> <p>and hence the quality of the relationship necessary for successful recognition, whatever is meant by equality and mutuality, is in fact a relation in which the demands of separateness and connectedness are maximally satisfied.</p> <p>so what professor is trying to do is to drive out of our heads the idea that mutuality or equality or freedom or any of these are primitive terms for understanding human beings. They are not.</p>
39:0 0	<p>professor is suggesting that the primitive terms for the fundamental understanding of human beings is a structure of separateness and connectedness and as we articulate the meanings of those moments, the notions of equality and mutuality and freedom and the like will emerge as features of it. And not as independent moral norms or epistemic episodes.</p> <p>so we will say something like the fundamental structure of our relationship to others as it works itself out in certain ways is going to engender by its forms of defeat, by its forms of dissatisfaction and failure, certain ideals of lets call them again mutuality, or equality or the like</p>
40:0 0	<p>but that these cannot be thought of as fundamental primitive terms in the comprehension of the human.</p> <p>so when professor says that Hegel is introducing a new conceptual grid via the notion of recognition, he means it.</p> <p>Hegel thinks that this is going to be the term through which every other fundamental concept gets its traction in its relationship to the polity of human life.</p> <p>so this is a huge conceptual shift.</p> <p>hence if you are feeling well, you are feeling well, you are bound not to. Because he is re-interpreting the whole conceptual territory.</p>

41:0 0	<p>we said something about the maximal satisfaction of the demands of separateness and connectedness would be the satisfaction of self-consciousness in general.</p> <p>as it turns out, as professor has been hinting, it turns out that figuring this out is long and difficult because the norm of human relations is various forms of misrecognition.</p> <p>and professor will talk a bit about that.</p> <p>let us put it this way. What is going to count as a state of affairs in which both separateness and connectedness get their due cannot be determined a-priori.</p> <p>Repeat.</p>
42:0 0	<p>What is going to count as a state of affairs in which both separateness and connectedness, that structure, that relationship of self and other that we call self-consciousness...</p> <p>and by the way professor says he has not explained why my relationship to you should be called the relation of self-consciousness. That is for next week.</p> <p>we ought to be thinking of this. Why does Hegel put this in the chapter on self-consciousness when it is about a relationship to the other. Why not call other-consciousness. Inter-subjectivity. Why is this in the chapter of self-consciousness.</p> <p>something else that is hanging in the air.</p>
43:0 0	<p>whatever that fundamental structure is, it cannot be determined a-priori. you cannot derive a transcendental deduction of it. you cannot deduce it from structural imperatives.</p> <p>none of this.</p> <p>professor has suggested that there is a normative logic here. but the terms of that logic are themselves indeterminate.</p> <p>under what conditions will a subject rationally feel that her demands for separateness, the demands for independence, and freedom, and self-determination, and subjective satisfaction, are themselves satisfied.</p> <p>under what conditions will her independence adequately acknowledge her connectedness with others, will her connectedness with others feel satisfied, and found to be satisfied.</p>

44:0 0	<p>Well Hegel tells us in §177 that we enjoy perfect independence and freedom only with an I that is a we and a we that is an I.</p> <p>that is serious.</p> <p>professor takes it that I is the moment of independence and separateness and we the moment of connectedness.</p> <p>and they obviously switch places. A we that is an I and an I that is a we.</p>
45:0 0	<p>all the structures of I and we, inadequate and adequate, are called geist or spirit.</p> <p>but this is just about as empty as saying that there be maximal separateness and connectedness, narcissistic enjoyment and bound relation to others.</p> <p>so how are we to get going here. how will any of this work.</p> <p>Elliott Juris FILL EXACT REFERENCE nicely says</p> <p>"Satisfaction is impossible without fathoming dissatisfaction."</p> <p>so the problem with traditional philosophy is that they wanted to know what the good is, what was satisfaction. And therefore it looked in the wrong place.</p>
46:0 0	<p>so we might put it this way if satisfaction is impossible, impossible without fathoming dissatisfaction, this is because misrecognition is unavoidable.</p> <p>then the fact of misrecognition and its unavoidability engender certain strategies of accommodation rather than emancipation.</p> <p>that is, rather than admit our dissatisfaction, we make up stories about the meaning of our dissatisfaction that are meant to be satisfying.</p>
47:0 0	<p>god, the revolution, utopia, the moral law, truth.</p> <p>all of these are fantasies of accommodation that hide the very dissatisfaction that we desire.</p> <p>we might say that we can only discover, we can only discover, or uncover, or generate what is going to count as a correct and adequate balancing of connectedness and separateness through a series of experiments and attempts to find a way of life that does the work of acknowledging both demands.</p> <p>satisfaction then is going to be something like a life achievement and finally a historical and cultural achievement.</p>

48:0 0	<p>that for Hegel is going to be true that the whole histories of human beings have been histories of human misery. That history is a slaughter bench. And that the possibility of human satisfaction is a very very vague late arrival and at that only a trace within the present life. Because we are beginning to understand what it means.</p> <p>but all this again to say that it not a question of an a-priori norm. that there really is a history. And it is the history of these attempts to find the forms of life that answer to fundamental structures of separateness and connectedness.</p>
49:0 0	<p>so this tells us something about the argument of the chapter on self-consciousness. Which on the face of it, the status of the chapter, is deeply obscure. And Hegel's way of proceeding does little to clarify the obscurity.</p> <p>at what level are we to take this. Where is this situated. What does this mean in relationship to what we are talking about.</p> <p>we can read the text, the master-slave dialectic, the master does this, the slave does this. What is this about?</p> <p>that is why we need to take a step back. It is unclear what it is about.</p>
50:0 0	<p>here is professor's working hypothesis.</p> <p>the chapter on self-consciousness as a whole corresponds to what Freudian analysis or psychoanalysis goes under the name of meta-psychology.</p> <p>what we mean by that is that the chapter on self-consciousness is not about psychology, that is for sure.</p> <p>but professor takes it that Freud's great achievement was to de-psychologize psychology.</p>
51:0 0	<p>the important thing about what goes on in Freud is that when we often ask what is psychology about? We are asking what are the mental mechanisms.</p> <p>what Freud shows is that mental mechanisms are not merely how the mind works but they are fundamental structures of human relations.</p> <p>so what we talk about in psychology is not simply what the mind does, it is how the human being has a world at all, in virtue of those things.</p> <p>so Freud takes the psychology out of psychology and gives it what we might call structural significance.</p> <p>the chapter on self-consciousness, in it we will be faced with a primitive story, and now let us think about what happens, very briefly.</p>

52:0 0	<p>in this chapter we are faced with a primitive story about how self-consciousness first appears as self-consciousness.</p> <p>so we are not asking about the origin of self-consciousness.</p> <p>Hegel says that we have self-consciousness. The question is how does it appear on the scene. How do we become aware of ourselves as self-conscious beings.</p> <p>or more exactly, what is the path we take to assure ourselves that we are truly self-conscious beings.</p> <p>that is what the people who will be entering the battle are asking.</p> <p>not if they are self conscious.</p> <p>but how can I assure myself that my being self-conscious of myself as being center of the world is true.</p>
53:0 0	<p>how do we get affirmation, assurance, re-assurance of my standing as an utterly independent being.</p> <p>well in this account it turns out that originally we are utterly dependent on very very powerful others.</p> <p>about how the story goes on those very powerful others come to stand for us as both ideals of what we want, we all want to be masters, so they are ego ideals, and as fearful powers we must obey, since we are utterly dependent on them.</p>
54:0 0	<p>so about in that experience of dependence we learn to repress and internalize our natural desires. So the other is also a super-ego.</p> <p>so the master is ego ideal and super-ego.</p> <p>and learning how to repress our desires, that is learning how to mediate each and every desire through the other, through the master, learning that no desire is given, learning that there are no natural desires, learning that there are no desires that I can call my own immediately, we learn a different relationship to objects.</p> <p>Hegel calls this work as opposed to mere doing.</p> <p>and about how in learning the discipline of work we discover another root to our independence than the one of struggle originally pursued, say make a world.</p>

55:0 0	<p>now Hegel is going to go on and specify certain fundamental ways in which we imaginatively work through the complex experience of bondage, of being these little people, who have these dominating masters.</p> <p>and therefore our disappointments and dissatisfactions, and that is what Stoicism, Scepticism, and the Unhappy Consciousness are all about.</p> <p>They are imaginary ways of living this unsatisfactory situation.</p>
56:0 0	<p>said this way, and professor thinks this is the way we need to take it, Hegel's story, which is sometimes read as something like a state of nature, is best understood, or sounds awfully like an account of basic moments of infant development reaching through the adolescent years, but stopping well short of adulthood.</p> <p>in this light the demands of separateness and connectedness, that both regulate the narrative, and develop out of it, both become aware of it, these structures of separateness and connectedness emerge as the formal and therefore the abstract</p>
57:0 0	<p>normative functions of subjectivity independently of what is going to count as satisfying them.</p> <p>so that professors suggestion is that understanding this emergence of this structure of the master-slave, which is going to be this structure of separateness and connectedness, says that there are certain functional requirements for being a self-conscious human being that must be satisfied in part and in certain ways.</p> <p>but that there is no telling from the mere functional requirement anything, anything that is going to count as a human relationship will have a structure of separateness and connectedness.</p>
58:0 0	<p>even the master and slave is a structure of recognition.</p> <p>everything that is human is a structure of recognition. Shot through with misrecognition and failure.</p> <p>so we are always working within a structure certain functional requirements that are both necessary, but their necessity is never, in the forms that they originally arise, satisfied.</p> <p>hence the fundamental structure is going to be a form, but a functional form, that has certain demands</p>

59:0 0	<p>but we do not know what is going to count as the satisfaction of those demands and the only way we can discover what is going to count as the satisfaction of those demands is through dissatisfaction, hence despair.</p> <p>so we can put it this way.</p> <p>We will discover that every form of recognition has a moment of it [FILL] as misrecognition which then will engender by itself a demand for further transformations of the structure of our relationship between us.</p>
60:0 0	<p>we will start with master-slave itself, §174-175, next week.</p>