

00:00	<p>We will do get through Perception and then get through Force and Understanding. These are the hardest 21 pages in Hegel undoubtedly.</p> <p>Quick summary of SC. We want to underline that Hegel arguments work on a series of level. The arguments of SC concerns metaphysical, epistemological, and phenomenological arguments.</p>
1:00	<p>At the metaphysical level the argument for SC repeats the metaphysical exposition of space and time in Kant.</p> <p>That is, it does exactly this discovery that the notion of the now generates a series of different nows, and that the cycle of nows will give us the conception of a temporal totality.</p>
2:00	<p>And as we saw last week that the notion of now is infused with the past and future. That the now is not the "not not yet" and "not not has been."</p> <p>Secondly the notion of here is possible only when there are different heres and we discovered that this has to with the spatial structure dependent on the human body. That is, that there is no here without the there, above and below, right and left, front and back etc. that there is a primitive spatial schema built in the upright person.</p>
3:00	<p>That gives you your metaphysical conceptions of space and time or minimal metaphysical conceptions of space and time.</p> <p>At the epistemological or semantic level we discovered that the concepts now and here do not by themselves pick out a determinate object. That epistemologically you can only use these concepts as universals and once they are universals they are mediated and as mediated, they have an inbuilt negativity and complexity.</p>
4:00	<p>Now we said all this because there are lots of different ways in which you can get the metaphysical and epistemological arguments concerning the here, now space and time.</p> <p>These are not unique to Hegel. Indeed these are Kant's arguments. So what is unique to Hegel is not the arguments itself but the means of the arguments. It is the phenomenological level which is central. And what makes it central is the experience of this form of consciousness.</p> <p>That is what you won't find in other writers such as Kant and Sellers or any other authors who make these now standard arguments. They were not standard in Hegel's time.</p>
5:00	<p>There are four elements.</p> <p>First is the experience of the loss of certainty. The first thing that SC discovers is that its certainty over this gets lost. And the rest of the chapter is trying to do something with that loss.</p>

6:00	<p>So it discovers that the fixity is impossible. So it discovers that there is a movement from night to day. And that movement from night to day is emblematic for Hegel.</p> <p>Second, what is experience (§96, §97) if we attempt to hold the now steady. The key to keep it fixed is not the this day or that night but the whole.</p> <p>So that SC keeps wanting to say this and it ends up saying the exact opposite.</p>
7:00	<p>So the experience, again it is the experience which is crucial is the experience of meaning to say something determinate but only being able to say something universal. Now.</p> <p>So what means, as we saw last week, to be the most concrete, most specific, most determinate richest experience turns out to be the emptiest. The most indeterminate and the most in that sense un-true.</p> <p>Thirdly, in moving to the level of I mean where the meaning and something being mine</p>
8:00	<p>So the German meaning and mine are connected.</p> <p>So what I mean or intend the experience, the attempt to fix our object and the loss of self.</p> <p>I can't say what I mean. And if I can't say what I mean then there is no mine of this experience. And if there is no mine to this experience then there is no me to have it.</p> <p>So the very act of intending does not only generates a loss of concreteness, loss of certainty, but a loss of self.</p>
9:00	<p>One of the things that Hegel does not answer in this chapter is who am I. who is the I that speaks.</p> <p>And this will point all the way forward to desire.</p> <p>Finally Hegel tells us, level four, that SC is nothing else but this history of losses. That SC has no content. Because it needs to have everything. But because it has nothing it has no content. So the only content it can have is the history it goes through in discovering its emptiness.</p>
10:00	Question:
11:00	Question:

12:00	<p>The reason why Professor Bernstein thinks Hegelian is going back to Kant's account, reproductive imagination, 3-fold synthesis and therefore the Husserlian to protention and retention, or the Heidegger's ecstatic temporality, why its that structure, is precisely because Leibniz does have a notion of presence.</p> <p>It is true that any present is pregnant with the future. That is because of the out-rhythm underlying it. It's all there. So every moment is pregnant.</p> <p>If you want to see another notion of the pregnant moment, the best account is Lessing's FILL. That is the whole question of how something spatial can represent something temporal. That is the question of representation in addition to the question of time itself.</p>
13:00	<p>Professor Bernstein was using a phrase that was lying around, this notion of the present pregnant with the future can be said from any number of metaphysical standpoints but for different reasons.</p> <p>This is why Professor Bernstein keeps wanting to understand Hegel's precise reasons. Why he wants the phenomenological level and not merely the metaphysical and epistemological level.</p>
14:00	<p>Let us move to §113 which is a nice transition.</p> <p>So it is clear that what SC lacks, one of the necessary conditions that it needs in order to say this, what it refused to acknowledge is existence of universal.</p> <p>So the next form of consciousness is going to be a form of consciousness, we want to keep it minimal. So we want to keep consciousness passive and perceptual. I just want to look at the world.</p> <p>But now instead of seeing a this, I am going to see objects as composed of universals.</p> <p>So that this process of seeing this will be described and this is why we wanted to go to §113, it will remind us of the notion of determinate negation and what Hegel means by sublation. All of that is here and we get the whole structure of the concepts from introduction.</p>

15:00	<p>§113</p> <p>The This is, therefore, established as <i>not</i> This, or as something superseded; and hence not as Nothing, but as determinate Nothing, the Nothing of a content, viz. of This. [a] Consequently the sense-element is still present, [b] but not in the way it was supposed to be in [the position of] immediate certainty: not as a singular item that is 'meant', but as a universal, or as that which will be defined as a <i>property</i>. [c] <i>Supersession</i> [d] exhibits its true twofold meaning which we have seen in the negative: it is at once a <i>negating</i> and a <i>preserving</i>. [e] Our Nothing, as the Nothing of the This, preserves its immediacy and is itself sensuous, but it is a universal immediacy. [f] Being, however, is a universal in its virtue of its having mediation or the negative within it; when it <i>expresses</i> this in its immediacy it is a <i>differentiated, determinate</i> property. As a result <i>many</i> such properties are established simultaneously, one being the negative of another.</p>
16:00	<p>[a] so I can't say this, I am forced to another way of holding it. I am forced to acknowledge the now, the new form of consciousness, have to acknowledge what the previous form of consciousness would not acknowledge. That is why it is determinate negation because it negates the emptiness of the previous stand point but it still wants to hold onto immediate awareness but the immediate awareness is now going to be of something else. Not of this but of the this with universals.</p> <p>[b] that is why it is called Perception.</p> <p>[c] we will go over why notion of property in a moment.</p> <p>The new standpoint has to preserve the intention of the previous stand point, and ask the question how might that intention, opening my eyes and looking, be an awareness of a determinate object. And it will be in virtue of having before it a thing with properties.</p> <p>[d] overcoming.</p> <p>[e] we negate the particularity, and preserve the sense element in order to carry on.</p> <p>[f] So perception will be immediate and sensuous. But it is universal immediacy.</p>
17:00	
18:00	<p>So perception is the next simplest form of consciousness which preserves the original intention of SC but does what is necessary to accomplish its original intention namely immediate sense awareness.</p>

19:00	<p>So the new form of consciousness will be called Perception, which is a form of knowing, and its object is going to be things with properties.</p> <p>If FU is a killer this is the easiest moment in the book.</p> <p>The issue is that how a passive perceiver can be said to be experience plural qualities as properties of a thing where things are one and properties are one.</p>
20:00	<p>So Hegel and everyone takes it that this is our simple ordinary conception of a thing. We are not talking about deep substances. We are talking about medium sided dry goods as called in England like watches, tables etc which have a human dimension etc.</p> <p>We take it that the things are a one, that is different from other things, and what makes a thing one, everyone agrees, is its properties. That is the simple phenomenological description of the model we are using without any fancy metaphysical stuff.</p>
21:00	<p>And we are thinking that it is in virtue of this combination of the one with many properties that things have their determinacy. This table, that watch etc.</p> <p>And we are considering these things simply as perceptual givens. So we just see the world as composed of these medium sized dry goods, each of which is one thing, and each different from the other thing, and each manifesting a range of properties.</p>
22:00	<p>Let's get more precise.</p> <p>For such a consciousness the determinacy of the this is given through, we should say, a thing with properties. One many.</p> <p>So whatever this and the next chapter is about, it is about the metaphysical structure of the universe, one and many. Just at a very low level.</p>
23:00	<p>The problem of the one and many is the puzzle that will drive through this and the next chapter. How are the one and many connected and relate to each other. Why do we need both the notions of the one and many to think of things. What is a thing that it has the structure namely the idea of being a one with many properties.</p> <p>So for such a consciousness the determinacy of this is given through a manifold or complexity of elements and that these elements must we now believe be universals.</p> <p>Why? Well let's say I have something in my hand which is firm, round, juicy, sweet, and red, in my hand.</p>

24:00	<p>None of those predicates would have content if each of them were a logically proper name, that is they cannot be names of unique particulars which would make each perceptual episode radically individual and therefore radically different from every other perceptual episode.</p> <p>So what makes the episode comprehensible is that those predicates are repeatable properties. So we see them again and again manifested in different ways. We see round and red in different settings.</p>
25:00	<p>Something about this object is how it collects up those otherwise universal properties.</p> <p>So the specificity of the this is being gotten through its way of holding together these otherwise universal properties.</p> <p>So indeed we need universals here, otherwise we are back in SC.</p> <p>Further these qualities cannot be independent existences because if they were independent existences they would not have anything to do with the thing.</p>
26:00	<p>I would have various experiences of redness or juiciness or roundness but not experience of an object.</p> <p>So in order for these universals to play that kind of role, namely to make something determinate, they must be what we call properties, that is they are properties of something. That is in here, or at here, or connect to some object.</p> <p>So they are not things in themselves, they are not self-sufficient.. There are views of universals that are like that. Namely Plato. But that won't do for objects.</p> <p>We need properties. And therefore items that are instanced in things, in here, and the like.</p>
27:00	<p>And this entails that a mere succession of properties does not itself discriminate a thing. Since a mere succession of properties, some mad Humean fantasy, if they are truly mutually indifferent to one another will not give us anything.</p> <p>So we really need is that the idea that somehow the notion of the thing collects the many.</p> <p>So what we need to think about the question of what is the difference between a mere concatenation of properties however proximate.</p>

28:00	<p>Right now this bottle is perfectly contiguous with my fingers. So it has got all the notions of continuity, succession, contiguity, causal inherence. Why is the bottle not me?</p> <p>What is it? An empiricist would hope this is a deep question.</p> <p>What is it that makes a thing a thing rather than a mere succession of properties?</p> <p>We are taking mere succession of properties in light of what CD Broad (one of Professor Bernsrein's favourite philosophers). He took seriously this empiricist line and had a regularity theory of objects.</p>
29:00	<p>He said if I regularly see (think Locke) round, juicy, firm, and these things always repeat together, then that's what makes it a thing. So it's simply their regularity of their hanging together.</p> <p>But that looks very contingent.</p> <p>No one in this room has seen me without my glasses. So it has all the features of continuity, connectedness and regularity, yet nonetheless they are not the same as me no matter how much we think of the thesis.</p> <p>So there is a real metaphysical puzzle here.</p>
30:00	<p>And this chapter is about how to handle that metaphysical puzzle from the standpoint of perceptual passivity.</p> <p>That is what possibilities are open to someone who believes in the immediacy of perceptual awareness (Locke, Hume, or Reed) in order to provide such an account.</p>
31:00	<p>Hegel thinks that there are 2 possible strategies open to Perception. Not overall but to Perception. Namely the strategies that would allow it to remain passive, remain apprehending, without comprehending.</p> <p>And they are this. Either unity follows from succession, which he calls also, or what Professor Bernstein calls concatenation model, to give it a nice metaphysical name, which is more or less the CD Broad model.</p>
32:00	<p>Or unity precedes succession which he calls the one. In metaphysical literature this already has a name the bare substratum model. And it was very hot in 1950s and 1960s because of Gustav FILL Iowa.</p>
33:00	<p>The reason why this chapter is simple is that these possibilities generate a straight paradox. And the paradox work like this.</p> <p>The problem with succession, i.e. unity following, that is the also model, the concatenation model, is that there is no determinate way in which we can stop knowing when making cutoff points.</p>

34:00	<p>So if you had just experienced what happens in this room you would have to say the glasses is part of me. That is they fulfill all the criteria of continuity, contiguity and the like.</p> <p>So there is no place to stop. In other ways we cannot really get going unless we pre-suppose a one.</p> <p>We already have some idea of the independence of the object, that it is a one, and that will give us what we need.</p> <p>But the bare substratum is false. Why?</p>
35:00	<p>[We can play with negation as Perception does].</p> <p>Where is the determinacy going to come from? From the also. Throwing back to the other moment. The throwing back to the many properties.</p> <p>The problem with bare substratum is that you think of a core of appleness, a substratum of appleness holding together all these things, but how can you know it apart from the red, juicy etc.</p>
36:00	<p>So the bare substratum may do the job of collecting. But you lose the determinacy. So it begs the question.</p> <p>So now that you see the puzzle, what Perception is going to do is to distribute the moments. So it will distribute the moments by sometimes saying that the object is really essentially one but only appears to me as many. So it puts the oneness in the object and the maniness in me.</p>
37:00	<p>Or it will do the opposite and say that the object is really the many and I am the source of the unification, the oneing of it.</p> <p>And all the problems that I mentioned will come back.</p> <p>But what is happening here by distributing the moments out is that what Perception is forced to do, as we mentioned last time is to take responsibility for error or falsity.</p> <p>that is it acknowledges that there is a problem here and its strategy is to say that</p>
38:00	<p>the error is always in me. The object is what it is independently of me, this is after all still consciousness and I simply wrongly in one way rather than another.</p> <p>so perception is always trying to keep the object as an in-itself so the truth is still be in-itself and subjectivity becomes a source of error.</p> <p>so an object can appear to the Perception as many.</p> <p>you can think of this as a crude anticipation of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities which will come up in the next section.</p>

39:00	<p>in which case the object becomes indeterminate. It becomes indeterminate because there is nothing that makes it it. And that shows that secondary properties cannot be secondary. They cannot be secondary because they will not mean whatever whatever is supposed to be the one would have no determinacy without them, the redness, juiciness.</p> <p>let's look at the text quickly to see how this works out.</p>
40:00	<p>so all that will happen is a working of this paradox. And FU is already here in Perception and you have to try hard for it not to emerge in discussion of Perception.</p> <p>so let us begin with §117 and the reason why we begin there is because everything up till then is a philosophical over view and §117 is where the phenomenological analysis itself begins. Remember we have to segregate philosophical exposition, what we understand, from the actual phenomenological working through. And the phenomenological working through happens at §117.</p>
41:00	<p>§117 makes six or seven different movements for Perception in order to make it good. It goes very quickly. Just pushes Perception to say what it wants to say and it is forced to say a variety of different things.</p>

42:00	<p>Let us see what consciousness experiences in its actual perceiving. <i>For us</i>, this experience is already contained in the development of the object, and of the attitude of consciousness towards its given just now. It is only a matter of developing the contradictions that are present therein. The object [a] which I apprehend presents itself purely as a <i>One</i>; [b] but I also perceive in it a property which is <i>universal</i>, and which thereby transcends the singularity [of the object]. The first being of objective essence as a <i>One</i> was therefore not its true being. But since the <i>object</i> is what is true, the untruth falls in me; [c] my apprehension was not correct. [d] On account of <i>universality</i> of the property, I must rather take the objective essence to be on the whole a <i>community</i>. I now further perceive the property to be <i>determinate</i>, <i>opposed</i> to another and excluding it. Thus I did not in fact apprehend the objective essence correctly when I defined it as a <i>community</i> with others, [e] or as a continuity; on account of the <i>determinateness</i> of the property, I must break up the continuity and posit the objective essence as a <i>One</i> that excludes. [f]</p> <p>In the broken up <i>One</i> I find many such properties which do not affect one another but are mutually indifferent. Therefore, I did not perceive the object correctly when I apprehended it as exclusive; on the contrary, just as previously it was only continuity in general, so now it is a universal <i>common medium</i> [g] in which many properties are present as sensuous <i>universalities</i>, each existing on its own account and, as <i>determinate</i>, excluding the others.</p> <p>[a] to begin chronologically. [b] whatever I perceive I perceive as one. [c] that was the stake where the oneness lies....I actually need the universal. [d] on to the next model. Sentence by sentence it shifts... [e] so it has already gone from object, to universal, to community, and now we are at the fourth version already. [f] so the puzzle that we the phenomenological observer had was that he wants that determinacy. Universal on its own won't do it. Community won't do it because we have to let the individual properties do their individual work as individual properties and hence I have to break up the continuity of the object and realize that the very nature of the properties is to exclude other properties. So we now have the next model, the broken up one, the sundered one. [g] that is I needed a particularity but I needed a particularity to be held together. Now I will say that there is a common medium that is holding these things together in which many properties are present as sensuous universalities....</p>
43:00	
44:00	

45:00	<p>the thought here is that Perception is being forced to continually revise its metaphysical model to account for the two aspects of the thing.</p> <p>so what is causing the problem is that it needs both. It needs some notion of oneness and it needs determinateness that is to be given through the manifold of properties.</p>
46:00	<p>and what he does, in the next step we didn't read, he gets to the notion of universals as properties. So phenomenologically Perception discovers that properties is what is wanted. But we know that that will not answer the problem. It just now generates a fuller model in which we can explore it.</p> <p>then in §119 Perception does as we suggested it would, it starts digging the one and many between the inside and outside.</p> <p>so the one is out there and the many in me via my sensory modes.</p>
47:00	<p>so it is because I have touch, taste, eyes, ears and the like that it appears to me as firm, juicy, red. So all those things are in me as its way of appearing. And thus we become the medium where they gather.</p>
48:00	<p>but that makes the many inessential again and hence fails to explain how this one excludes the other ones. And you get back to the thought that secondary properties cannot be truly secondary.</p> <p>you could try as he does in §123 to thinking of the object as getting its determinacy by excluding other objects. so negativity via the exclusion of others. So bottle is not table is not floor.</p>
49:00	<p>the reason for this thought is to evade the notion of the bare substratum. We just think that these properties by their nature exclude other properties, that is the strategy here.</p> <p>the reason why this will not work is that an object cannot exclude another object if it does not possess a moment of self-subsistence.</p> <p>So the logic of exclusion is fine. It is a relation to itself by excluding others. But the question is why. And the answer is because it is one. And then we are back to the mystery of one again.</p>
50:00	<p>What is the problem here? Why is Perception in this difficulty? What do we need in order to somehow deal with the one many problem?</p> <p>What kind of work does understanding do? What is the new way of thinking is it?</p> <p>We want to stay with one and many and solve this problem with the thought that the way we are thinking of one and many is too simple.</p>

51:00	<p>there is a metaphysical problem here. And God putting equations in my head won't solve it.</p> <p>what is the nature of force? What do we mean when we say someone or something is a force of nature?</p> <p>try to get an intuitive feel of why he uses the word force?</p>
52:00	
53:00	<p>what is a force?</p> <p>a force is something whose very nature is to express itself this way and that way.</p>
54:00	<p>so people say my mother was a force of nature it means she would insult this and destroy that.</p> <p>so the answer is that the very nature of a force, a one, is to express itself in a diversity of ways.</p> <p>so the problem with the one/many in the original thing was that they were both in herbs, and we want to move to a real 2-tier model of object, in which the very nature of the in-itself is for another. That is what a force is.</p> <p>that is the nature of force is to be forceful, to do something.</p> <p>[German is power]</p>
55:00	<p>and he will be thinking of different notions of forces such as forces of gravity, forces of attraction and repulsion, energia, intellection FILL</p> <p>force is a very basic metaphysical concept. And what makes the notion of force attractive is that it has this way of having a duality in itself.</p>
56:00	<p>so the next step is to move to a real 2-tier model in which appearances are appearances of a non-sensible but real essence. essence is the word he uses.</p> <p>but an essence that will now be, another word he uses is unconditioned universal, and the nature of this thing will be like Locke thinks of his 2-tier model with primary and secondary properties.</p>

57:00	<p>what are primary properties? They are the properties that have the power to cause secondary properties.</p> <p>so the structure of the object causes me to see it as red, and taste it as juicy and the like.</p> <p>so we have an appear/reality structure FILL?</p> <p>And this unconditional universal does not appear so we are still keeping the bare substratum in one sense and now we are just giving it more metaphysical puff. We have given it the power to express itself in terms of many.</p> <p>The thought here is that this is just the way things are.</p>
58:00	<p>So the thought of the 2-tier model is not the result of any complex act of theory construction. On the contrary this is just a kind of awareness of the way the world works.</p> <p>So think of Newton when he said "I make no hypotheses." His point was that he thought he was not constructing anything. He thought he had made a simple act of discovery.</p> <p>so he thought that his discovery of the universal law of gravitation to unite terrestrial and celestial mechanics, was not any great work but just an act of discovery. Oh yeah there it is.</p>
59:00	<p>Why call it understanding? Why use the word understanding here as opposed to Perception? What is that extra bit?</p>
60:00	<p>We understand something because we have a question about why. When we can answer the why then we say oh now we understand it. So everything in this chapter is going to be a movement of discovering why things are so and so. Or saying that things are so and so because of or in the light of.</p>
61:00	<p>So we are now at a way of thinking about the world where we are not just perceiving the world but also comprehending it in some way, though this is a very modest comprehension, in the sense that the very nature of the structure of force and understanding means that we are thinking about answering questions not merely experiencing.</p> <p>So we are saying that something is because it is because. So there is always a question of why of which the force or the universal or the law or whatever would count as essence is going to be the answer.</p> <p>so we are at the level of thinking of at least question and answer. Even though the level of question and answer is not yet at the level of theoretical construction.</p>

62:00	<p>because we think what we are doing is simply iterating why things are as they are. They are as they are because force is expressing itself in a certain way.</p> <p>we do not want to lose the original question from perception the one and the many. Think that everything that is going to happen in understanding is going to be a further answering of that very question. So it is just going to be a more sophisticated model.</p>
63:00	<p>and we have to ask ourselves whether that sophisticated model will do what we originally wanted it to do, oh now I know how I am related to the world, I am related to the world by seeing it as appearances of essences.</p> <p>that is a sophisticated way of seeing the world one informed by natural science but it is still just a way of seeing the world and saying that's how things are. Its understanding the perceiving of the world.</p> <p>And now we have to think why couldn't things be just like that.</p>
BREAK	
00:00	<p>We will do this as simply as we can. Let us briefly outline where we are going so it is not a mystery.</p>
1:00	<p>In Professor Bernsrein's reading what Hegel has to do here is to provide a phenomenological re-capitulation of the Copernican Turn.</p> <p>that is, he has to achieve that idea by the internal working out of how understanding proceeds to try to make sense of things, to show that instead of the world being structured like that, we have to come to discover that we demand that the world be structured like that.</p> <p>and therefore at the end of the day we cannot separate how the world is from how we must think about the world and hence we overcome subject-object dualism in doing that.</p>
2:00	<p>And discover that what we can only understand what really is not by looking at the world but by thinking about the structure of self-consciousness.</p> <p>it is that easy. Unfortunately getting there is not so easy.</p> <p>[Question. Is different for Kant]:</p> <p>it is certainly Kant and what is going to be different is that when we discover when we get to thinking of self-consciousness, it will turn out that we cannot think of self-consciousness in the way that Kant does.</p>

3:00	<p>that we have to think of self-consciousness as form of human activity rather than as a form of reflection.</p> <p>so this path is going to bring us to an acknowledgment of a role of ourselves.</p> <p>remember what everything in consciousness does is Consciousness is that form of relating to the world, that is the truth is its understanding, perception, grasp of the world, the world is essence, and I simply get it.</p> <p>And hence the nature of consciousness wants to repudiate the role of its own activity in the constitution of experience.</p>
4:00	<p>what we see in SC, Perception, and what we will see even more violently here is that understanding trying to make the world have this structure, without acknowledging that a structuration like this is unintelligible apart from the needs and demands of understanding itself.</p> <p>to cut a long story short. Explanation is not a factual relation of 2 independent matters. Explanation is something that human beings do and only certain ways of doing it provide satisfaction.</p>
5:00	<p>once we acknowledge what is at stake here is ultimately not the 2-tier model itself but finding an adequate ways of explaining the world, and then understanding that explaining the world is a way of thinking about the world, then how the world appears turns out to be not independent from how we think about the world.</p> <p>that is what is going to happen.</p>
6:00	<p>so what we have needed, and what Perception could not manage, is it could not resolve the contradiction between something that was self related, a one, and something that was other related, the notion of many.</p> <p>the very nature of the notion of force is a concept of the identity of being-for-self by or through being-for-another, the force of nature. So very nature of something that is a force of nature is that it is a force of nature by or through doing this or that.</p>
7:00	<p>so a force is only itself in so far as it forces i.e. utters or expresses itself. It can realize its identity i.e. its self-identity, only by entering into relations with others.</p> <p>force, further, is not immediately a perceptible reality.</p>
8:00	<p>a force is only recognizable only by going beyond the immediate and recognizing it as the inner of some multiple expressions.</p> <p>therefore to recognize a force is to now understand that a single identity is manifesting itself through some total panoply of instances.</p>

9:00	<p>Hence the thinghood of the thing is itself an inner of some sensible multiplicity. It is a provenance.</p> <p>and that should tell us, just to show that we have a transition here, that understanding was complicity at work even in Perception.</p> <p>because we are claiming that even in Perception we always were recognizing that the many properties were expressions of the one and that is what made them the properties they were. so we were already understanding but did not recognize it.</p>
10:00	<p>and this is to say, to deepen the thought here, because the model of understanding of course is a scientific model of understanding the world. I count Plato a scientist.</p> <p>That is you are always looking behind the appearances to something else that is the essence and looking at them as doing what is the explanation.</p> <p>and this is very important here. In this sense we are construing science as the continuation, as the necessary continuation, of our ordinary perceptual activities.</p>
11:00	<p>so it is not that there is an independent world of everydayness and ordinary life and then science is going to laboratories and do weird stuff.</p> <p>the transition between Perception and Understanding is arrived necessarily in operating in our ordinary logic of things, let us call it our thoughtless logic of the perception of objects.</p> <p>We have already committed ourselves to a scientific 2-tier account of things.</p> <p>so it is not surprising that very early on in Western civilization, even before Plato, we have explainers, God etc. the idea that there was a reality behind the appearances that was bringing them about.</p> <p>so the problem is still the problem of one and many.</p> <p>and so the dialectic here will be various moments that will in a certain sense re-capitulate the dialectic of perception.</p>
12:00	<p>and hence I have not done all of them but I was wanting to show how the perceptual model of the one and many maps onto a further more complicated model of the one and many of the kind that Hegel operates with. so these are some of the variations on these structure that Hegel was operating with. And that is why this chapter is agony.</p> <p>and of course behind that operation, all along, is a Kantian idea of appearances and things-in-themselves.</p>

13:00	<p>so consciousness to this point has been active but does not yet recognize or acknowledge its activity.</p> <p>so force and understanding will bring, that is the meaning of dialectic here, is to bring consciousness to a recognition of its active role in the constitution of the structure of its comprehension of the world. And all the fundamental differences that it tries to attribute to the world turn out to be internal to it.</p>
14:00	<p>that is its way of thinking about the world and not somehow the world in itself independently of being thought about that is at work here.</p> <p>and when we discover that then it will turn out that consciousness is not limited since the thing now is not an obstruction, whatever it is doing it is doing in virtue of the way I find I must think about it.</p> <p>So the things are no longer a limit to my understanding of them but rather are internal to understanding. And again the relation between the subject-object dualism break down.</p>
15:00	<p>And finally essence will migrate into consciousness.</p> <p>remember Hegel's claim that science appears.</p> <p>Keep that claim in your mind throughout this section.</p> <p>because Hegel's view is there can be nothing hidden.</p>
16:00	<p>Whatever is essential must appear. If that is true that there is nothing hidden. Then it follows that there is nothing behind or beyond the world of appearances.</p> <p>we might want to construe the world of appearances in very complicated ways, as structured in certain ways, but it is not as if there is anything other than the way things appear.</p> <p>in the preface, which we have not read yet. Hegel discusses this in §38, what is the big deal about appearances.</p>
17:00	<p>Now because the system of the experience of Spirit embraces only the <i>appearance</i> of Spirit, the advance from this system to the Science of the <i>True</i> in its <i>true shape</i> seems to be merely negative, and one might wish to be spared the negative as something false, and demand to be led to the truth without more ado. Why bother with the false? [a]----The view already discussed, namely, that we should begin with Science straight away, is to be answered at this point by examining the nature of the negative in general regarded as what is <i>false</i>.</p> <p>[a] appearances</p>

18:00	<p>and he answers this question of true and false after discussing it for a bit in §47.</p> <p>Philosophy, on the other hand, has to do, not, with <i>un-essential</i> determinations, but with a determination in so far as it is essential; its elements and content is not the abstract or non-actual, but the <i>actual</i>, that which posits itself and is alive within itself----existence within its own Notion. [a] It is the process which begets and traverses its own moments, and this whole movement constitutes what is positive [in it] and its truth. This truth therefore includes the negative also, what would be called the false, if it could be regarded as something from which one might abstract. The evanescent itself must, on the contrary, be regarded as essential, not as something fixed, cut off from the True, and left lying who knows where outside it, any more than the True is to be regarded as something on the other side, positive and dead. [b] Appearance is the arising and passing away that does not itself arise and pass away, but is 'in itself' [i.e. subsists intrinsically], and constitutes the actuality and the movement of the life of truth. [c] [d] The True is thus the Bacchanalian revel in which no member is not drunk; yet because each member collapses as soon as he drops out, the revel is just as much transparent and simple repose.</p> <p>[a] all perfectly obscure.</p> <p>[b] so this is not just something that can be thrown away and that simply some behind which you cannot get in touch with.</p> <p>And all this is suggested in the next sentence.</p> <p>[c] in the chapter we are reading that distinction is appearance and appearance as appearance. so there is no behind appearance. What is essence is this process of "arising and passing away that does not itself arise and pass away....."</p> <p>[d] that famous incomprehensible sentence.</p>
19:00	
20:00	
21:00	
22:00	<p>the difficulty that he is trying to get past is our great temptation, whether Leibniz, Descartes, Galileo, Plato, Aristotle, it doesn't matter. Every philosopher wanted not merely the appearances, but something lying behind that was the true thing, and that was somehow independent of them, not contaminated by them, is truly a thing-in-itself.</p> <p>But he says that would be dead if it was that. Whatever is on the left hand must be a way of thinking of what is on the right hand side and not separate two realms.</p>

23:00	<p>Understanding is going to find ways of relating them that keep them separate. That keeps something as truly essence that will be independent of appearances and will [and this is why Perception is helpful here] and will continually run into exactly the same problems, that professor FILL nicely helped us to see before. Namely that every time we think there is an inner that is an essence behind a manifold outer</p>
24:00	<p>we are going to ask what is the content of that inner and the inner is going to be given by the determinacy of these appearances.</p> <p>that is whatever the inner is, it would be empty, indeterminate nothing, without appearances and their determinacy and complexity.</p> <p>and therefore the search for a something that would really explain them, and really here means that it is independent of them or is not contaminated by them.</p> <p>and Hegel says if you really do that you end up with something positive and dead.</p> <p>that is the whole way in which every single moment of this chapter works.</p>
25:00	<p>so this chapter logically recapitulates the structure of Perception.</p> <p>so there is an irony between the simplicity of Perception and the incomprehensibility of this chapter in that they both have the same things going.</p> <p>even a cursory reading of this chapter says that it lacks a phenomenological feel. It feels less phenomenological than any other chapter in this book. And it feels like some other kind of argumentation is going on. And the question is why. It is phenomenological but it feels different and the question of why.</p>
26:00	<p>it is because a 2-tier model of the object is at one level, namely scientifically or metaphysically, true.</p> <p>Hegel is not denying that some story about gravitation, forces of attraction and repulsion, negative and positive charges and electricity. So he is not denying the scientific story---he has his own wild philosophy of nature but some version of this is perfectly okay.</p> <p>hence Hegel is not disputing at least here the general validity of Newtonian physics or theory of magnetism or electricity although it can seem that way.</p>

27:00	<p>so if he is not contesting the content what is he is doing.</p> <p>what he is contesting is not its scientific or even metaphysical content, he is contesting the philosophical understanding of that metaphysical content.</p> <p>so what is at issue here is not a philosophy of science but rather a taking of a scientific view of the world and making it into a philosophical or metaphysical story about the world.</p> <p>so he is contesting a form of what we nowadays call scientism</p>
28:00	<p>or reductive naturalism, and we'll see different versions of this later on in the book, different versions of scientific reductionism that he will contest, in the chapter on reason, and therefore what he is doing is take, as Locke did, I want to be under-labour to Newton, and simply say that I clear away the under-brush so that story about how the world looks from the point of view of science is the whole story.</p> <p>that is what he is contesting, that you can translate that scientific understanding into how the world is.</p>
29:00	<p>so we may say that one thing that science does not understand, it understands the world, that's fine, it does not understand itself.</p> <p>so it is a scientific misunderstanding of the meaning of scientific activity, that is at stake in this chapter.</p> <p>and hence what is going to happen in this chapter is that at every moment when understanding should be moving to as it were a philosophical self-understanding, moving to an activity of self-reflection, it does something else, it concocts another screwy scientific model.</p>
30:00	<p>it just wants this structure to work and does not want to ask what it is doing thinking about the world in accordance with this structure.</p> <p>so again it's a refusal to acknowledge its own activity.</p> <p>so what this chapter will do is to make explicit through the phenomenological movement, and there is a phenomenological movement here, where understanding will be forced to see that it itself is the issue and not the object.</p> <p>[Question: Understanding or Perception?]</p> <p>Understanding. So understanding is the one that does these various ways to concoct this.</p>
31:00	<p>okay let us look at the text a little bit. Let us begin at §134</p> <p>So we are operating with a genuinely 2-tier model in which being-for-self is being-for-another</p>

32:00	<p>and he says that only in this way can an object have a self-identical essence.</p> <p>so something can be self-identical which is what Perception and SC wanted only if it has that double movement. It is in-itself by being for another.</p> <p>and the first modeling of that happens in §136</p>
33:00	<p>§136:</p> <p>"One moment, then, appears as the essence that has stepped to one side as universal medium, or as the subsistence of independent 'matters'."</p> <p>all the best philosophers have problems here. we don't know where he is getting this stuff from. Some of it is from Shelling, some of it is from "Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science" maybe from FILL Boskovich, not sure, but there are probably other screwy philosophies of nature as well as sciences of his own time going on.</p> <p>and the difficulty here is that he is doing what he always does which is he takes things out of context and he schematizes them in order to present the general philosophical position.</p>
34:00	<p>so you just have to wait and let the structure of what he is trying to say come through and not get thrown by technical vocabulary. Almost never is technical vocabulary important, it always comes down to conceptual structures.</p> <p>§136:</p> <p>"But the independence of these 'matters' is nothing else than this medium; in other words, the [unconditioned universal] is simply and solely the <i>plurality</i> of the diverse universals of this kind. [a] That within itself the universal is in undivided unity with this plurality means, however, that these 'matters' are each where the other is; they mutually interpenetrate, but without coming into contact with one another because, conversely, the many diverse 'matters' are equally independent."</p> <p>[a] so the unconditioned universals is nothing but its plurality of its diverse universals.</p> <p>and then skipping a couple of sentences:</p>
35:00	<p>"In other words, the 'matters' posited as independent directly pass over into their unity, and their unity directly unfolds its diversity, and this once again reduces itself to unity. But this movement is what is called <i>Force</i>. One of its moments' the dispersal of the independent 'matters' in their [immediate] being, is the <i>expression</i> of Force; but Force, taken as that in which they have disappeared is Force proper."</p>

36:00	<p>It just so happens that we can diagram this.</p> <p>So we are beginning with a many one structure. And this is where we left things in the world of Perception. And the problem is how they will be connected.</p> <p>and we will now say that they will be connected via force. And force will have two aspect to it, force proper, and the expression of force.</p>
37:00	<p>what does the diagram tell us? Or not tell us. FILL with diagram.</p> <p>do you feel satisfied the way you did before?</p> <p>that we actually have not gotten very far. We have done some mediations. We have got something going down here.</p>
38:00	<p>but all we have done is complicate the original story by saying that it is the nature of the one to express the many.</p> <p>but we still want to know why does it...now it just is... so now you have proper in expression and you are repeating the same structure all over again.</p> <p>so the issue here is, very top of next page Hegel says</p>
39:00	<p>\$136</p> <p>"When we thus preserve the two moments in their immediate unity, the Understanding, to which the Notion of Force belongs, is strictly speaking the <i>Notion</i> which sustains the different moments <i>qua</i> different; for, <i>in themselves</i>, they are not supposed to be different."</p> <p>[a] i.e. us observers</p> <p>In other words what is doing the work here, if anything is doing the work here is thinking about what the notion of force means, the notion, and not some metaphysical positing.</p> <p>But the understanding wants to construe this notion realistically as a being apart from thought.</p>
40:00	<p>so that each mode here is going to be the attempt to keep the internal difference, the thought difference between one and many, force proper and force and its expression, to keep that internal difference external. A real external relation.</p> <p>so what understanding wants is a structure in which x explains y, where the crux for it is the nature of the reliance.</p>

41:00	<p>everything in this chapter can be shifted to a matter of intonation.</p> <p>what Hegel wants to say x explains y.</p> <p>and he is going to shift all the thinking about what is important into how we think about how they cannot be connected and not into the structure of the items connected.</p> <p>Hegel's language then throughout this chapter is neutral with respect to particular metaphysical theories since he is here making a phenomenological point about an epistemic temptation.</p>
42:00	<p>namely the epistemic temptation to explain the manifold of appearances through the unity of what itself does not appear and what is configured as a metaphysically or ontologically independent realm.</p> <p>it is important that this be the invisible.</p> <p>and once you have realized that this is the invisible, force proper as the invisible explaining the [FILL], or the intelligible explaining the sensible, then you begin to think that we can put a lot of different things into this place.</p>
43:00	<p>you can as he is doing here go below, and think we can put forces, or atoms, or primary qualities, underneath.</p> <p>or you can do it above and say it is Platonic universals or laws or anything else you want to say that is separate from and independent from the appearances.</p> <p>so for example §137-§141 are the attempt to show that the postulation of force,</p>
44:00	<p>and what force is doing here is forming the glue holding the many together, must contain a logical complexity.</p> <p>and it turns out that that logical complexity must eventually work its way back into the notion of force itself.</p> <p>that is one force cannot do all the work that the notion of force must do if it is to succeed in explaining how there are things or objects at all.</p>
45:00	<p>so we can suppose that he is thinking something like Proposition Six in Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Let us read it briefly because it is fascinating by itself. This became a massive source of argument in Germany after Kant. What Kant will do here is attempt to show that a-priori there must be at least 2 forces. That you cannot have the world with just one force.</p>

46:00	<p>And Proposition Six reads by mere attraction, maybe gravity, without repulsion no matter is possible. That is the thesis.</p> <p>And Kant says, we will not read the whole thing, but it actually quite simple. Kant says that:</p> <p>Attractive force is that moving force of matter whereby it compels another to approach it. Consequently when such forces found among all parts of matter then it endeavours by means of this force to diminish the distance of its parts from one another and hence the space they together occupy.</p> <p>imagine a world with only one force, everything will collapse into an instant. And that is exactly what Kant is going to argue.</p>
47:00	<p>Nothing can hinder the action of a moving force except another moving force opposed to it. The force that is opposed to attraction is repulsive force. Therefore by mere approach and without repulsive forces all parts of matter would approach one another without hindrance and diminish the space that matter occupies..</p> <p>so therefore there would be no space and matter would just be a black hole. So therefore there must be at least 2 forces for matter to be possible.</p> <p>Hegel's analysis here simply underlines Kant's conclusion here namely</p>
48:00	<p>these two, whether they are attractive or whatever, belong inseparably to the concept of matter. Therefore there must be a minimum of 2 forces. And therefore we now have an a-priori account of the constitution of matter.</p> <p>§141:</p> <p>"...their essence rather consists simply and solely in this, that each is solely through the other, and what each thus is it immediately no longer is, since it is the other. They have thus, in fact, no substance of their own which might support and maintain them."</p>
49:00	<p>the point that Hegel wants to make here is that force remains only through the thought of it.</p> <p>Now Kant is attempting in fact such an a-priori constitution.</p> <p>Hegel's point is that the metaphysical oomph, which is supposed to allow force to be the kind of ontological glue, the cement of universe, is nothing but a reflective construction. Exactly the kind of construction we just read. That is why we read the passage.</p>

50:00	<p>what we want to say is that what understanding is doing is doing something like Kant' a-priori construction of matter in which the intelligibility of the world is being gotten by showing that there must be more so on and so forth.</p> <p>and then say no no its not a-priori. It is projecting that out into saying this is the way world is.</p>
51:00	<p>the suggestion we want is that our willingness to consider that the world is composed of attractive and repulsive forces does not get its power, or what we are calling its metaphysical oomph from the notion of force itself but from the thought process of the a-priori construction whereby we are able to conceive of a world in terms of 2 forces in a way we cannot conceive of a world in terms of one force.</p> <p>so the difference between the 2 here is the difference between thinking of this situation metaphysically and thinking of it constructively.</p>
52:00	<p>Understanding wants all the insight allowed by the a-priori construction while repudiating that it gets its insight that way, it wants it to come from the matter itself.</p> <p>[Question: can we switch terminology? is the many the exponent and the one the explanandum]</p>
53:00	<p>Yes. And that will be the problem. So part of the issue is that there is exponent and explanandum.</p> <p>and what Hegel will do is to continually show that the exponent is not what it thinks it is without the explanandum.</p> <p>[Question]</p>
54:00	<p>the question concerns the role of the understanding itself in the construction of these relationships.</p> <p>we can come back and fill out the rest of the story next week but for now let us get to the end of story to clarify some things and see if we can work backwards.</p> <p>so infinity. We knew we would get there.</p>

55:00	<p>\$163</p> <p>"Infinity, or this absolute unrest of pure self-movement, in which whatever is determined in one way or another, e.g. as being, is rather the opposite of determinateness, this no doubt has been from the start the soul of all that has gone before; but it is in the <i>inner</i> world that it has first freely and clearly shown itself. [a] [b] Appearance, or the play of Forces, already displays it, but it is as '<i>explanation</i>' that it first freely stands forth; and in being finally an object for consciousness, as <i>that which it is</i>, consciousness is thus <i>self-consciousness</i>. [c] The Understanding's '<i>explanation</i>' is primarily only the description of what self-consciousness is. It supersedes the differences present in the law, differences which have already become pure differences but are still indifferent, and posits them in a single unity in a Force."</p> <p>[a] that bit we already read. [b] this is the part we want to talk about. [c] one explains many. Think about that.</p> <p>"But this movement, or necessity, is thus still a necessity and a movement of the Understanding, or, the movement as such is not the Understanding's <i>object</i>; on the contrary, in this movement the Understanding has as objects positive and negative electricity, distance, force of attraction, and a thousand other things which constitute the content of the moments of the movement. The reason why '<i>explaining</i>' affords so much self-satisfaction is just because in it consciousness is, so to speak, communing directly with itself, enjoying only itself; [d] although it seems to be busy with something else, it is in fact occupied only with itself.</p> <p>[d] the slightly embarrassing phrase</p>
56:00	
57:00	
58:00	<p>why is this the conclusion?</p> <p>because the search of the one and many is to find a structure that will answer the question why. That is what we are doing, we are trying to get structure that will answer our why. How do we explain the many.</p> <p>and therefore what we are looking for is a good explanation. That is what we are really looking for.</p>

59:00	<p>but things do not explain things. That is simply mixing up two vocabularies.</p> <p>Explaining, and there are two ways of explaining, induction and deduction. We can explain something by deducing it or explain something by providing an induction that will get us to the law. Those are human activities of comprehension.</p> <p>So when we finally try to understand what is going to work here what we are asking for is what is going to count as a good explanation. not what is the structure of the universe but what is going to count as a good explanation of the universe</p>
60:00	<p>and in order to do that we have to think about nature of scientific inquiry. Not nature of the world but nature of scientific inquiry, why we would prefer one kind of theory over another kind of theory.</p> <p>and once we realize that that is what we are going to be doing, that is not trying to understand the world but try to understand scientific theory construction, then our object, the truth of science, is not science but the meaning of science.</p> <p>the truth of science, the reason science matters, the reason why we care about science is not merely because of its content</p>
61:00	<p>but because it allows us understanding of the world. But understanding of the world is a matter of our finding good explanations that have models to them, that have a certain bunch of criteria. But who sets up this criteria, who determines what is going to count as good science, and the answer Hegel will give is we do.</p> <p>we as a community in dialogue with one another work out the terms for an adequate theory of science. And we operate with criticisms.</p> <p>so Professor Bernstein is gripped by the fact that two books have come out saying that string theory isn't it.</p>
62:00	<p>and its fascinating because string theory has been the theory of Physics for the last twenty years and the mathematics of it is astounding and it turns out that it is empty, it is just good mathematics. It is great mathematics but so far it made no difference in the physical understanding of anything. And this is the problem. It is perfectly empty.</p> <p>who says that? We say that.</p> <p>so there is no ultimate theory but rather it is will it fulfill the role of doing a job and the answer is will it provide a good explanation.</p> <p>so Hegel's kicker is, when we are doing science, this is the embarrassing phrase, we are communing with our own model of understanding.</p>

63:00	<p>so of course we say I suspect this theory is true because it is simple and elegant and powerful. But what does simple and elegant have to do with force and expression? It doesn't. but it does.</p> <p>we cannot talk about force and expression without talking about theories that are simple and powerful and deductively rich.</p> <p>why is this important?</p> <p>because the stand point of consciousness, which is what this section is about, is claiming that the truth of human beings in the world was their representations of the world. That their being-in-the-world via their representations.</p> <p>and the theory of force and understanding was to be the most robust version of that representational self-understanding of human beings.</p>
64:00	<p>so the meaning of this is that we are not related to the world via our representations of it because science is not fundamentally a representational activity.</p> <p>science fundamentally is an explanatory activity. And activity of achieving good or adequate.</p> <p>so what Hegel is trying to do in looking in these passages is to show that the understanding is trying to get in the world, by the way it talks about essence and appearance, a connection between them, that cannot be had between things, between objects.</p>
65:00	<p>that the connection that would make it work is not about the world, it is about an adequate comprehension of the world, that is about explanation. So it puts its interest in the wrong place.</p> <p>next week we will go more over Force and Understanding. we will think about the movement. We are trying to do the Copernican Turn here. And we will do the transition into self-consciousness.</p>