

00:00	Some announcements.
1:00	
2:00	Professor Bernstein has rewritten his lecture on FU to fill in the gaps.
3:00	<p>we are re-framing the question of FU from what Adam gave to professor last week.</p> <p>first 2 steps to the frame:</p> <p>first our reading of Hegel's phenomenological method in which we can phenomenologically look on, we can look can because consciousness examines itself. And consciousness examines itself because</p>
4:00	<p>every form of consciousness poses its own conception of truth, what Hegel calls in-itself, and a corresponding conception of knowing, what cognizing that kind of that kind of in-itself must be like in-itself, this, the form of knowing, SC.</p> <p>and we suggested that this method, the way in which there is an internal relationship between it-self and fore-consciousness, truth certainty, is in fact nothing but a generalization of Kant's Copernican Turn, in which self-consciousness relates to objects, by projecting upon the world a concept of an object in general.</p>
5:00	<p>so my operating assumption all along is that we Kantians have that idea i.e. we face the world by projecting upon it some concept of an object in general, and the phenomenological methods that we assumes that for every possible form of consciousness.</p> <p>second frame of thought. The entire chapter on self-consciousness i.e. SC, Perception, and FU, those 3 forms of consciousness, all of which are called consciousness by Hegel. What makes them all consciousness is that they are pre-Kantian and hence pre-Copernican in their assumptions about how they relate to the world.</p>
6:00	<p>and each of those 3 forms assumes that there is an in-itself, the this, the object of perception, the one and the many, and force that it is the ultimate matter of fact that makes knowledge true.</p> <p>now to say that these are pre-Kantian or pre-Copernican makes it sound as if they are making a dumb mistake. But they are not.</p> <p>so we want to step back and say that what is important about these forms of consciousness, what they are assuming is in-fact deeply intuitive.</p> <p>namely what they are assuming is that the fundamental structure of knowing</p>

7:00	<p>involves us in matching our representations to the world. So the world is the measure of our knowing. And hence the world is the measure of truth.</p> <p>as oppositely now so the world and then the knowing world relationship. The world determines knowing. So the direction is from the world to knowing.</p> <p>as oppositely we suppose, and this is why this is deep, in action, we assume that we determine or make the world.</p>
8:00	<p>that is, we make the world correspond to our plans, ends, desires, goals, needs.</p> <p>and this structure that the direction of knowing runs from the world to mind, while the direction of action runs from mind to world is the difference between knowing and acting.</p> <p>that in knowing we are trying to get our representations correspond to the world. While in action we are trying to get the world to correspond to our actions. Which is why Marx got so upset with Feuerbach.</p>
9:00	<p>so the overwhelming assumption is that how knowing differs from action is in their fundamental direction. That the direction of knowing is that the world determines me, and hence there must be a deep stratum of passivity in the phenomenon of knowing in order for objectivity to be possible.</p> <p>while conversely the direction of action is that I determine the world, hence a fundamental stance of activity. So knowing and action are different stances towards the world as if in knowing we</p>
10:00	<p>contemplate the world, that is why it is often thought of as contemplation, and in action we make the world.</p> <p>so now looking at this structure it may look familiar to you since in fact we often think that this way of thinking, this passivity gives us the idea that the world determines mind causally. While action determines the world through freedom.</p>
11:00	<p>and we look at that structure, suddenly it starts looking at Kant's third antimony, where every cause has another cause, no cause without a first cause. And we will come back to this structure in a moment.</p> <p>but the thought here is that consciousness is playing out this stance. Consciousness is assuming this structure which is just the intuitive, traditional, classical structure of the difference between knowing and action. and it makes just one or rather two further assumptions.</p> <p>first that I am in the world and hence I have a world</p>

12:00	<p>only through my representations of the world. So that its representations that gives me a world in general.</p> <p>and second that the fundamental meaning of knowing is that the world determines me and hence I am passive with respect to the world.</p> <p>Force and Understanding in this setup is hence the scientific picture of this structure and hence the idea that the meaning of consciousness is being given by a certain kind of representation of the world namely the kind of representation of the world that is assumed in modern natural science.</p>
13:00	<p>But also in reasons that we will come to in a moment in Plato. Plato and modern natural science share many similar structures.</p> <p>so those are the two background assumptions governing this set up.</p> <p>An aside.</p> <p>as we will see later the structural view that knowledge in the last instance requires a stance of passivity and action in the last stance requires one of absolute activity</p>
14:00	<p>that structure, world determining me, me determining world, exactly as is the structure of Kant' 3rd antimony on causality and freedom, and is equally the structure of the first 2 chapters of the phenomenology.</p> <p>this is structure of consciousness as a whole and this is going to be the structure of self-consciousness as a whole, action determining world. That is where we are going.</p> <p>now both views are false. You knew that was coming.</p> <p>and unlike Kant</p>
15:00	<p>what Kant does is say that both views must be true. And in order to make both views true, he draws a line between them, and calls this side phenomenon [FILL] and this side noumenon.</p> <p>and that is how Kant solves or preserves the ultimate structure of this way of doing things.</p> <p>Hegel is not going to resolve this antimony by adopting a notion of noumenal freedom. He is going to argue that consciousness cannot sustain its posture of passivity---this is what we will read about today why consciousness is forced into become a stance of agency.</p>

16:00	<p>but we are equally going to discover that self-consciousness is going to have to acknowledge absolute dependency or passivity.</p> <p>so this is a complicated story here. but roughly we are going to join these and their joining is going to be reason.</p> <p>so we are going to get a different resolution to this fundamental deep structure. and we are saying that this deep structure is very much the structure of what knowledge means.</p> <p>And if you read analytical philosophy they assume this structure all the time. This is what analytic philosophy is all about, this structure, and how the two sides hang together and its all variations on the Kantian solution.</p>
17:00	<p>or even worse just subsuming this side into that side, just making it all passive, just make it passivity all the way down.</p> <p>even Sellars this becomes the manifest image and this becomes the scientific image and it becomes incoherent at that very point. And Sellars knew this. He has something called FILL where he tries to worry about this problem.</p> <p>okay end of the aside. that is the structural setup.</p> <p>here is the third moment, which Prof. Bernstein was reminded to say, the third element of the framing.</p>
18:00	<p>Hegel supposes that despite the fact that all of consciousness is pre-Copernican and despite the fact that our method itself is Copernican, what Hegel is trying to do in the chapter on consciousness is phenomenologically demonstrate the necessity of the Copernican Turn.</p> <p>he wants to demonstrate how consciousness cannot sustain its fundamentally passive stance and it cannot continue to deny its own constitutive role in making objectivity possible and that it is somehow---and here is the problem you were all suffering with last week---</p>
19:00	<p>that it is somehow forced, made, pushed to turn upon itself and to take responsibility for its knowing. Now we put it this way---it is forced to take responsibility for its knowing, we are not saying it is forced to become active because consciousness has been active almost from the beginning, but it explicitly becomes active already in consciousness. It is active when it says I am responsible for falsity, but it just tries to make that activity non-constitutive of the conditions of objectivity.</p> <p>so the shift is going to be</p>

20:00	<p>it must acknowledge the constitutive role of its activity i.e. its responsibility---and we will get to this in a moment---for articulating the relationship between identity and difference, the one and the many.</p> <p>this is the kicker. We must demonstrate the necessity of the Copernican Turn, and it is interesting that Hegel takes this as his job because it is exactly what Kant did not do and thought could not be done.</p> <p>on the contrary if you recall</p>
21:00	<p>Kant introduced the Copernican Turn as already happening. As a conjecture or hypothesis, in his terms. So he does not demonstrate that we have to turn, he asks that, and now quoting from B16 in the introduction:</p> <p>We must therefore make trial [a] whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics if we suppose that our objects must conform to our knowledge. That they must conform to us not we conform to them.</p> <p>[a] We must therefore attempt.</p>
22:00	<p>This is an extraordinary thing to say. The Copernican Turn is asking or rather demanding that knowledge, the world must conform to it.</p> <p>you might be thinking that Kant is looking weirder by the second.</p> <p>but of course only at the level of form not at the level of content. The form is the concept of the object in general, the world-hood of the world, that is what we project. The actual content often comes from the world. Nonetheless that is the thesis. So he says a page earlier in the introduction when he is actually talking about how he is reading modern science,</p>
23:00	<p>Bxiii</p> <p>"They learned that reason has insight only into that which it produces after a plan of its own, and it must not allow itself to be kept, as it were, in nature's leading strings..."</p> <p>that will be the conclusion of Force and Understanding. We get insight only after a plan of our own.</p> <p>so that is the frame.</p> <p>so we have to demonstrate the necessity of making the Copernican Turn. But of course it is slightly question begging because</p>

24:00	<p>again it is a Copernican methodology that will lead us there.</p> <p>we should be clear about the set up, a reasonable frame of problem anticipating. Then let us now move to the puzzle.</p> <p>now this is where Professor thinks he screwed up last week.</p> <p>what kind of failure is occurring in Force and Understanding. What kind of defeat does this form of consciousness undergo and why, to push this thought even further</p>
25:00	<p>why does this form of failing force it into Copernicanism. That is the micro-grain of argumentation that we have not yet gotten fully perspicuous. And we will try to make this perspicuous now.</p> <p>in Sense Certainty, just as a reminder, the failure occurred, the nature of the failure occurred because consciousness could not achieve the determinacy that its own stipulation, its notion of the in-itself, required.</p>
26:00	<p>so it kept wanting to say this and the this never appeared. So the indeterminate, the determinate pointing always become the indeterminate and indeed the universal.</p> <p>the former failure in Perception is different. This is kind of interesting all by itself and we ought to be thinking about how the different forms of consciousness fail and they will fail differently.</p> <p>the form of failure in Perception occurred not because of lack of determinacy, the determinacy was given by the complex of universals, that is how objects are determinate. It failed because it could not hold together the two components of its concept of an object, the one and the many.</p>
27:00	<p>That is it could not figure out how the determinacy from the many was the many of a one.</p> <p>so what it could not think is the word of. Why are these properties of the thing? It could not hold that together and it kept falling apart.</p> <p>the most important thing to notice about the one in the chapter on Perception is that it is a bare substratum. That is, it was not itself actually a perceptual item.</p>
28:00	<p>but rather it was kind of a posit or pre-supposition necessary to hold the many properties together.</p> <p>why is that important? It is because Hegel is being sneaky. What he is doing is little by little phenomenologically introducing the idea that in order to have a determinate cognitive awareness of an object or an event, there must be some feature of that object or situation namely its oneness, what makes it a determinate one that is not itself perceptual or sensible.</p>

29:00	<p>think of Hume or Locke, they have a lot of stuff going on, but they cannot figure out the notion of one. They cannot figure out the notion of one because the notion of one itself is not another perceptual item. Which of course is what Hume was thinking that there is no idea of the substance, there is no idea of the underlying.</p> <p>but the opposite thought should be ticking away which is Kant's thought. That indeed the one is not another perceptual item. And therefore the necessary condition for the possibility of object awareness is that there be a</p>
30:00	<p>non-sensible one collecting or holding together the sensible many.</p> <p>in the handout from Kant FILL there is any place where he is making the Copernican Turn. Is there any place in CPR where Kant actually does the Copernican Turn, it is A109. and professor wrote half on this passage which is favourite passage.</p>
31:00	<p>A109: we want to look at:</p> <p>"Appearances are the sole objects which can be given to us immediately, and that in them which relates immediately to the object is called intuition. But these appearances are not things in themselves; they are only representations, which in turn have their object----an object which itself cannot be intuited by us, and which may, therefore, be named the non-empirical, that is, transcendental object=x"</p>
32:00	<p>now what he is thinking about in the transcendental object equals X is Locke's new way of ideas. And Locke's idea is that we have these some things, these properties, and there must be something underlying them, which is a something I know not what. That is why it is an X. because it is not another perceptual item. It is a something I know not what and it is the source of the unity.</p> <p>now consciousness in Force and Understanding is searching for that transcendental object.</p>
33:00	<p>it is looking for the X which will confer upon the appearances a unity. And it is positing that, and it is doing so in order that it can satisfy the dilemma raised by Perception which had the one and many falling apart.</p> <p>so what Force and Understanding is going to do is say that there must really be an underlying something and therefore there must be a 2-tiered account of the concept of the object in general</p>

34:00	<p>where the unity of the object is derived from a non-sensible ground or what Hegel calls an unconditioned universal.</p> <p>so the whole movement of the chapter on Force and Understanding is an exploration of the various non-ideal candidates for the non-sensible unity of experience.</p> <p>so each of the things that are going to go, forces and laws and all that kind of stuff, all that is going to be the transcendental object equals X, it is going to be place holders for the X. it will be values of that variable.</p>
35:00	<p>so making Locke's account truly metaphysically 2-tiered as we will not go through the story it really was not Locke and Locke was not really an empiricist but a scientific realist.</p> <p>now what was said last week may make more sense. We will not repeat what was said last week, we will move forward, so you have to stick in the missing bits.</p>
36:00	<p>but the first argument last week concerned in moving to the 2-tiered model we posited the notion of force as the underlying source of unity.</p> <p>and recall that we chose force because force by its very nature is something that must express itself, i.e. the in-itself of force, what force is, is to be for another, that is to create the appearances.</p> <p>now our argument last week was that this move did not really take us past the dilemma that we already saw in the chapter of Perception.</p> <p>let us think of it this way by doing a variation on this and tie it to contemporary views in the philosophy of science.</p>
37:00	<p>if we ask ourselves what makes a particular underlying force the force it is, the answer is going to be that it gives rise to exactly these appearances. So the meaning of the force which was supposed to be the explainer is given by what it explains.</p> <p>there is much literature on this.</p>
38:00	<p>a version of this in moliere. Where someone says opium has a secret [FILL] power. What is that power that opium has? It makes you fall asleep. Well, the question is what more do we learn about the meaning of power than we fall asleep when we take opium. That is, the upshot of the claim that something has a certain power is simply the appearances it gives at the end of the day.</p> <p>and this by the way is the standard empiricist instrumental critique of scientific realism and theories of powers and force,</p>

39:00	<p>namely that there is no more content in force or power talk than the regularity of the appearances that it was meant to explain, that is it is sort of empty.</p> <p>we already know, take some opium to fall asleep. Now we have a causal regularity. Take some opium, fall asleep.</p> <p>now the scientific realist says, ah I know why. Because it has the power. Now you will ask but what is that power. It makes you fall asleep.</p> <p>so we cannot seem to get any extra content out of the postulation of forces, or powers, or intellection or with whatever other stuff you think is going on there.</p>
40:00	<p>and even in contemporary philosophy of science this is a standard critical gesture. The most sustained version of it you can find in FILL writings. But there are versions e.g. FILL Nancy Cartwright, a wonderful book called "Why do laws of nature lie" which is a bit more complicated than that argument but nonetheless a kind of assumption that ultimately the postulation of these things puts cash value on the regularities themselves.</p> <p>so think of this as the standard empiricist instrumentalist critique of scientific realism.</p> <p>flip side now. In contrast to this the empiricist is going to argue</p>
41:00	<p>that since the contents of these theories just is the appearances themselves, then scientific theories and laws are really simply best understood as forms of inductive summations of those appearances.</p> <p>that is, so causal laws are really about regularities in the appearances. And we have these laws because they enable us to make these predictions and the like.</p> <p>to know that B regularly follows A, i.e. falling asleep regularly follows taking opium.</p>
42:00	<p>is to know why B occurs namely A. that is I took the opium.</p> <p>if you have an iota of curiosity as a human being this is terribly unsatisfying since this merely re-describes what happened without really providing an answer to why. Which is why scientists are interested in mechanisms.</p>
43:00	<p>so if you really want to know why, you have to start using power, force and mechanism talk all over again. So we can see that this is the structure of an on going debate between empiricists and rationalists i.e. one of them suggesting that we need to posit a second tier and the other arguing that the second tier is nothing but a rather metaphysical way of stating what is already there in the appearances.</p> <p>of course here in Hegel we are not actually debating the status of</p>

44:00	<p>scientific theory, Hegel arguments nonetheless exactly mimic this debate. But what Hegel's concern is the philosophical and metaphysical corollary which presumes that these theories just are our connectedness with the world i.e. they represent how we have a world at all, by having a model of the world that represents the world like that.</p> <p>and remember last week we said that we are committed to this because it is already implied by Perception itself. That we have to go into the 2-tier scientific view.</p>
45:00	<p>now in the dialectic of this chapter when faced with the emptiness of the inductive empiricism we are offered increasingly complicated accounts of the underlying forces. Forces, and now going onto Hegel's next thing, soliciting and being solicited by one another. And what we want to say here, and this is the point, that apart from details the arguments here are going to be, every single one of them, just a repetition of what we have already seen</p>
46:00	<p>namely the upshot of all these forces is simply going to be the appearances. Again so §141 what they are,</p> <p>"they are [a] only in this middle term and in this contact" [b]</p> <p>[a] i.e. what these forces are [b] that is, the contact that happens at the level of appearances.</p> <p>and in the same paragraph §141 Hegel begins hinting of where he is going.</p> <p>"Thus the truth of force remains only the <i>thought</i> of it;"</p> <p>of course the only is going to become the truth. That is, the thought of it is going to be the real thing and not merely an hypothesis.</p>
47:00	<p>now all of this presses Understanding into a more desperate attempt to generate a non-sensible but not non-ideal condition that can plausibly ground the appearances, collect them up, unify them, without skeptical remainder.</p> <p>so that is the project. Every step in this chapter is searching for a non-sensible but non-ideal, non-mentalistic condition of possibility to unify the appearances and that can be shown to be underlying them.</p> <p>however the important extra gesture that happens at this juncture is that the understanding now recognizes that the</p>

48:00	<p>non-sensible condition must be really able to be, as it is, be super-sensuous.</p> <p>so in saying that it is simply not non-sensible, not immediately there, but it must be super-sensuous i.e. it must be the kind of non-sensible condition that is, we want to say thought like, almost an ideal. So a super-sensible world that is actually metaphysically there.</p>
49:00	<p>think Plato first of all, Galileo second of all, Newton third of all.</p> <p>which is why Hegel shifts his account from a discussion of forces to a discussion of law. But law not conceived of as things we make but law as already the structure of the universe. So law read Platonistically, law as the metaphysical truth lying behind or regulating the appearances.</p> <p>so for example the graffiti at MIT says "god said... and then a whole series of equations and then there is light.</p>
50:00	<p>but that is the thought here. Einstein thought this. See his letters. He said that God thought in mathematics. Mathematics is the true underlying structure of the world. So law is not something we posit, it is a metaphysical reality, is the thought.</p> <p>so law is the quiet unchanging structure. law does not change. But law is the law of everything that does change.</p> <p>so law is the unity, the unchanging, the underlying something of something that does change.</p>
51:00	<p>notice again that consciousness is taking the non-sensible ground again to be kind of like itself, kind of thought like.</p> <p>and again Hegel's first go with this new thinking of the non-sensible ground namely we just postulate it, there must be this non-sensible ground and we must assume that we can have---</p> <p>how on earth did Plato see the idea, he had some sort of weird intellectual intuition. And Hegel imagines here that someone imagines that they can have this some sort of weird intellectual intuition and simply see these ideas as the truth of the universe.</p>

52:00	<p>so they can see or directly perceive this super-sensible beyond.</p> <p>so at §146 beginning:</p> <p>"The inner world [a] is, for consciousness, still a <i>pure beyond</i>, because consciousness not as yet find itself in it. [b] It is <i>empty</i>, for it is merely the nothingness of appearance, and positively the <i>simple</i> or <i>unitary</i> universal. This mode of the inner being [of Things] finds ready acceptance by those who say that the inner being of Things is unknowable."</p> <p>[a] that is what this is, the inner world. [b] That is the self-repudiation at work here.</p>
53:00	<p>and §147 beginning just to see the dialectic:</p> <p>"The inner world, or supersensible beyond, [a] has, however, <i>come into being</i>; it <i>comes from</i> the world of appearance which has mediated it; in other words, appearance is its essence and, in fact, its filling."</p> <p>[a] that we have been discussing</p>
54:00	<p>§146 is the rationalist 2-tiered model, §147 the instrumentalist reductive critique. That the real content of the inner is simply the outer and what appears. And thus the same structure all over again.</p> <p>hence we are brought back to the appearances determining or giving determinacy to what is supposed to be their ground.</p> <p>and so the dialectic here remains the same. For the sake of explanatory content, we posit some extra-empirical item to provide the world with a true metaphysical 2-tiered structure whose second tier is found to require appearances in order to explain its determinacy so the explainer is explaining by what it explains.</p>
55:00	<p>hence the explainer is turned into the explained. Hence the relation between the two is an inversion.</p> <p>and in fact as we will see in a moment everything that we are seeing is about a series of inversions. Sensuous becoming the super-sensuous, the super-sensuous, the truth in super-sensuous becoming the sensuous.</p> <p>so the whole chapter is a series of inversions.</p>
56:00	<p>so let us stop here because we are about to get to the inverted world, Hume is coming. We will come back and talk about law and then the inverted world.</p>

BREAK

00:00	Hegel now runs exactly the same argument all over again with respect to law. On the one hand, the very idea of appearances obeying laws, if such laws are not going to be mere repetitions of those appearances, requires what I call conceptual assent, that is that we get insight into the meaning of diverse phenomenon by saying things that look different
1:00	turn out, if we go up another level, to be obeying the same law. That is, there is a law at the level of appearances and then there is an over-arching law and the example that he uses here, the example that blew everyone's mind is Newton's unification of the laws of terrestrial and celestial mechanics under one single set of laws of motion and gravity.
2:00	<p>and that just looks right, we don't understand how would that be a form of insight.</p> <p>and Hegel then goes on to argue that we must imagine this conceptual assent happening to the point at which there is only one law or if not only one law, then even just the idea of lawfulness itself. And at this moment he says we might get queasy and be puzzled about how there can be just one law that is the truth of everything. That is it seems as if we have once again lost the very determinacy, just to state the universe square law, the does not seem that it can be an account of everything.</p> <p>said like this, this would have to be the worst argument in the entire chapter.</p>
3:00	<p>it is a bad argument because there really is something deep about conceptual assent, it is a form of insight, and therefore he does not seem to be taking into account what is going on in systematization and building up deductive systems and the like.</p> <p>so what is he thinking about here? What is underlying what looks like just that argument? We can take it that what Hegel is driving at is that when we get at the highest level of unity, when get to the idea of lawfulness itself,</p>
4:00	<p>first he seems to utterly cut off from the empirical world, but cut off from the empirical world in a particular a way, it seems that this what he is hinting at that the very idea of lawfulness is not something that we can read into the phenomenon but rather it is something that we must stipulate as a form of understand.</p> <p>that is he is assuming</p>

5:00	<p>and Kant was the person who thought about this the hardest. Kant tried to demonstrate in the second analogy that the principle of causal effect is not a given, is not a structure of the universe, but a form of understanding.</p> <p>so what Hegel is doing here is suggesting that when we look at the notion of one law we have a certain moment of opacity.</p> <p>we have a moment of opacity in the sense that we have a kind of necessity which we don't understand. We don't understand it because we treating it as given. Because we are taking the notion of law as a given and therefore as empty of content.</p>
6:00	<p>while again conversely, when look at the many laws, we are just getting a mere repetition of appearances.</p> <p>so what he is thinking here is that the debate between empiricism and realism over law is actually a debate asking the question is truth analytic or synthetic.</p> <p>and of course you might say that the [FILL?] nihl idea of science, those of you who read the first chapter of the Dialectic of Enlightenment, the nihl [FILL] idea of science is to make the whole world nothing but an analytic judgment as if everything should follow from one transparent idea.</p>
7:00	<p>and of course it was Leibniz project, Leibniz actually did think that the universe is nothing but an analytic judgment. Scary. And then conversely that everything is synthetic.</p> <p>and now we have got content that repeats the world and structure that is simply empty. And we don't know how to put these two sides together.</p> <p>so the one law, many law, as we can hear Hegel struggling with it, is not working because at the extreme, both sides are unusable.</p> <p>we can think that is what he is supposing.</p>
8:00	<p>now it is this situation which brings us to the question of the inverted world.</p> <p>now remember the orienting question we asked, namely what kind of difficulty or failure in consciousness is going to force consciousness to change its fundamental stance towards the world i.e. change the direction of the arrow.</p>

9:00	<p>so what we are talking about is not just changing a particular thought because we argued that the difference between knowledge and action is one of fundamental stance.</p> <p>and we are asking what kind of failure is going to force consciousness to alter its stance, which is to say to give up, we are asking, to give up the idea that the constitutive differences we find in reality are determined by reality.</p> <p>that reality does not just divide itself up in cups and saucers, but in substances, causal events, things with causes, all that.</p> <p>it has to give up that idea and it has to adopt the idea that the kinds of differences</p>
10:00	<p>in reality that matter and hence the kinds of unities and differences that matter must come from consciousness i.e. we must force consciousness to itself make the Copernican Turn.</p> <p>and thus far all we have seen are higher level failures of the kind that beset perception, with two provisos, first that there is now the demand that identity and difference be somehow internally related to one another, the in-itself of force is for-another.</p>
11:00	<p>and secondly, we have begun to suppose that the identity as the ground of difference derives from an object that is thought like. Kind of ideal</p> <p>this is kind of interesting when you think of Plato. Why Plato chose ideas to be the metaphysical reality. The answer is that they are like thoughts. They are the very thing we think with.</p> <p>so he is thinking what is deep about the structure of reality, is the idea of reality, but he just postulated it up there.</p> <p>now Hegel's first mention of the idea of an inverted world is announced as the consequence of the positing of a second super-sensible world.</p>

12:00	<p>\$157:</p> <p>This <i>second super-sensible</i> world is in this way the <i>inverted</i> world and, moreover, since one aspect is already present in the first super-sensible world, the inversion of the first. With this, the inner world is completed as appearance. For the first super-sensible world was only the <i>immediate</i> raising of the perceived world into the universal element; [a] it has its necessary counterpart in this perceived world which still retained <i>for itself the principle of change and alteration</i>. [b] The first kingdom of laws lacked that principle, [c]but obtains it as an inverted world.</p> <p>[a] that is the move we have been looking at all along. [b] that is the empiricist come back. [c] that is the inner world lacked the idea of change in itself but obtains it as an inverted world.</p>
13:00	<p>here is Leibniz.</p> <p>that is, if we have read this coherently, this is a version of the same dialectic that we have been using throughout.</p> <p>That is throughout we have been seeing that the truth of the appearance is really what does not appear, hence inverted.</p>
14:00	<p>and conversely the actuality of the super-sensible or force or law is inverted, i.e. the appearances.</p> <p>hence the truth of the sensuous is the super-sensuous and the truth of the super-sensuous is the sensuous, and each is an inversion of the other.</p> <p>Pippin nicely states this on page 137 where he says:</p> <p>To the extent that such realities and such legislation are empirically independent, they simply invert the sensible world into something else, and do not explain it. [a] To the extent that they are not independent, to the extent that the empirical manifold is the sole criterion of knowledge, the sensible world inverts itself, is unintelligible without the super-sensible world, already caught on the first [FILL] of the dilemma.</p> <p>[a] the classic case, he says, is Aristotle's critique of Plato. Aristotle simply asks, what are you are gaining by saying that the universal is up there rather than in the thing itself. There is no explanatory force there.</p>
15:00	<p>if this is right, and let us step back for a moment before we go on, then the idea of inversion or perversion, either will do here, is not a new moment.</p>

16:00	<p>but rather it is making explicit a fundamental gesture that consciousness has been rehearsing at every single step along the way. All along, consciousness has suffered inversion, beginning with Sense Certainty. So we discover that the truth of Sense Certainty, its this here now, was the universal, the very opposite of the inverse of what it claimed. And hence it said opposite of what it intended. The truth was inverted on it. Or the structure of failure operated on inversion.</p>
17:00	<p>Namely, the thing from the many to the one. So the many requires the one, the many pre-supposes the one, and the one pre-supposes the many. So each turns out to be inversion of the other, that is the structure of Perception, and here we have been looking at a shuffling back and forth between an empty super-sensible unity and a indeterminate sensible many.</p> <p>if this is right, that the notion of inversion is actually the structure of consciousness's movement at every stage, then the whole structure of consciousness is nothing but a series of inversions,</p>
18:00	<p>and if it is true that the entire movement of consciousness is nothing but a series of inversions, then consciousness can only progress if it inverts its inversions. That is, it must make a turn out of its inversions and do what is going to count as or ask itself the question, what will count as inverting the method of inversions.</p> <p>roughly the thought here is that consciousness must come to recognize that all the difference ways that have arisen for accounting for reality namely accounting for as the this,</p>
19:00	<p>as the one and the many, as forces, as laws, all these different ways of seeing reality have come from it.</p> <p>And hence what has looked to be like changes in the world have not been changes in the world but changes in our comprehension or the way in which we take the world.</p> <p>saying it like this is too quick and does not quite work. But it is only a little false. Let us see if we can make it deeper.</p>

20:00	<p>let us look at the text:</p> <p>\$156 opening paragraph.</p> <p>Thus this change is not yet a change of the thing itself, but rather presents itself as pure change by the very fact that the <i>content</i> of the moments of change remains the same. But since the <i>Notion</i>, <i>qua</i> Notion of the Understanding, is the same as the <i>inner beings</i> of things, this change becomes for the Understanding the law of the inner world. The Understanding thus <i>learns</i> [a] that it is a <i>law of appearance itself</i>, that differences arise which are no differences, or that what is <i>self-same repels</i> itself from itself; and similarly, that the differences are only such are in the reality no differences which cancel themselves; in other words, what is <i>not selfsame</i> is <i>self-attractive</i>.</p> <p>[a] first time we have seen the word learn something here. so something is happening here. even though it looks very dark and mysterious. Hegel thinks he is saying something here, that something is happening to the understanding.</p> <p>what does it learn? It learns that it is a law of appearance itself...back to quote....</p>
21:00	
22:00	<p>something is going on here that is an insight, there is a learning and there is a mistake here, and hence that is what structures Hegel's argument, this is a moment of insight era, insight blindness.</p> <p>so what is it? Well there is a positing here of a second law, and a second super-sensible world. Since understanding now gives the law of the inner world. So a second law now arises in which what was formally characteristic of the law of appearances and said to lay outside the inner world finds itself in the region of the inner world.</p>
23:00	<p>that is, consciousness has come to the thought that, it kept wanting to put stability here, change here, unity here, many here, [FILL on board] and therefore it kept the two world separate, and because of that separateness it had what we saw as the problem of shuffling.</p> <p>so now it is saying that, we must put, as it were, both elements, in the same inner world. So what understanding now understands, what it has learned, is that the one and the many, appearance and reality, changing and unchanging, identity and difference,</p>

24:00	<p>must all belong to one domain.</p> <p>That the problem was the separation of domains.</p> <p>So he talks about the problem as a difference sustaining element. So we can only get by this problem by making sure that it is all in one domain. No longer a 2-world, a 2-tier view. But somehow he must be talking about the structure of one domain, and this domain is now identified as the inner of things.</p> <p>so both elements, again the one and the many, changing and unchanging, all belong to one domain and it is the way it is articulated.</p> <p>now the particular confusion that arises here</p>
25:00	<p>arises because when this second super-sensible world appears, it appears as just another inversion as just another movement in the shuffling that we have been looking at. And not an inversion of an inversion.</p> <p>so we must separate.</p> <p>so just another inversion versus an inversion of an inversion, that is what we must distinguish here.</p> <p>but the point here is that because it appears as just another inversion it appears absurdly.</p> <p>and to say it appears absurdly is to say that it appears in</p>
26:00	<p>all the crazy ways that the paragraph following §157 talk about.</p> <p>roughly and this is what we understand Hegel is doing here. understanding, having grasped the idea, that identity and difference belong to one integral reality, that is the insight, presumes that if that is the case then anything must be capable of turning into its opposite since that is what the structure has been, things turning into its opposite.</p>
27:00	<p>so if what has held them apart is thinking that they are in two domains, but if we now put them all in one domain, then we can say that anything can turn into its opposite, north can become south, sweet can become sour, and we get all these crazy stories, that Hegel tells.</p> <p>what on earth is he talking about?</p> <p>here is professor's guess.</p> <p>professor thinks that he is saying that at this point the understanding has gone too far and that has appropriated the idea of identity and difference solely to itself. Solely to itself.</p> <p>and left the actuality or the world wholly outside.</p>

28:00	<p>now the consequence of this is that it makes every difference a mere difference. Or we now say as post-modernists a diacritical difference.</p> <p>so this idea of the inverted world is actually bad Saussurian difference.</p> <p>that is, this is really about the arbitrariness of the sign. And it is saying that if you assume that identity and difference all come from a single domain in which it has no content then anything can count as the opposite of anything else, or remember the laughter act, the two bathrooms with different pictures,</p>
29:00	<p>it doesn't matter just as long as they are different, so they have lost any content.</p> <p>so the fact of the difference and opposition comes to dominate hence and hence becomes groundless and hence becomes arbitrary.</p> <p>Hegel's thought, and professor does not know how else to read this idea, except that difference becomes mere difference.</p> <p>And if it becomes mere difference then anything can be, granting that it is a necessity from [FILL?] differences, that is an insight, but if it is arbitrary, then anything can turn into the opposite of itself, since it is given its position just by being marked as the opposite</p>
30:00	<p>so if it is the opposite, then the opposite can be the opposite of it, so north can become south, sweet can become sour.</p> <p>and that is plainly crazy. Which is what is equally plainly crazy about the arbitrariness of the sign. It makes no sense.</p> <p>professor does not know how else to read this possibility of inversion as the notion of difference being a firm without content. That is clearly the thought here.</p> <p>so Hegel's thought here must be that the movement from one to many, from identity to difference, must be a true self-movement of the world</p>
31:00	<p>not a positing, that's the dangerous Fichtean word, of unity behind difference, or arbitrarily marking differences, but a comprehending of the movement of reality as self-differing where the comprehension of reality as self-differing is not different from reality as a whole.</p> <p>The comprehension of reality as self-differing is actually just the structure of reality itself. That you cannot separate the reality from its comprehension.</p> <p>so in §158 Hegel illustrates this idea. Now we have to see if this works out in content by talking about crime, law, and punishment, in which each can say the opposite. So let us say what they do here.</p>

32:00	<p>In another sphere, revenge on an enemy is, according to the <i>immediate law</i>, the supreme satisfaction of the injured individuality. [a] This law, [b] however, which bids me confront him as himself a person who does not treat me as such, and in fact bids me destroy him as an individuality--- this law is <i>turned round</i> by the principle of the other world into its opposite: the reinstatement of myself as a person through the destruction of the alien individuality is turned into self-destruction. [c] If now, this inversion, which finds expression in the punishment of crime, is made into a <i>law</i>, [d] it, too, again is the only the law of one world which is confronted by an <i>inverted</i> supersensible world where what is despised in the former is honoured, and what in the former is honoured, meets with contempt. The punishment which under the law of the <i>first</i> world disgraces and destroys a man, is transformed in its <i>inverted</i> world into pardon which preserves his essential being and brings him to honour.</p> <p>[a] immediately, at the level of appearances, revenge is the spontaneous response to injury. Hegel always assumes, by the way, that this is the case. That every action has an equal and opposite reaction. Someone kills, you kill back.</p> <p>[b] this very law</p> <p>[c] so the problem with revenge is, what I mean by revenging myself and killing the other, is to have rectified the past. and all that happens, of course, is that I set myself up, to be killed in return. So the only way I can act on the law of revenge, which is the given law of appearance, is to be destroyed.</p> <p>call that the empiricism of injury. That is Hegel's [Fill] here.</p> <p>step 2, now we will get a kind realism of injury.</p> <p>[d] now we are moving behind, we are moving into realism, we are moving into the idea that if there is a killing there must be a law which says that he or she who kills is punished.</p>
33:00	
34:00	
35:00	<p>what is Hegel talking about here? by the way he thought you should have laughed. So take it that he is making a joke.</p> <p>what is the joke here? who is he making fun of? where is the criminal who trespasses honour?</p>

36:00	<p>Christianity.</p> <p>so Christianity is just the inversion of the other structure. so if you have killed, and you are a sinner, then you are going to be the first one to get into heaven. He is a sinner and everyone is a sinner.</p> <p>so the point here is that he does not take Christianity seriously because it is simply an inversion.</p> <p>but if it is just an inversion, then equally you can just do the same in another way.</p>
37:00	<p>so what looks like honour in one world is awful in another world, and what is awful here is honoured in another.</p> <p>well what is going to stop that move? \$159</p> <p>The <i>actual</i> crime, however, has it inversion and <i>its in-itself</i> as <i>possibility</i>, in the <i>intention</i> as such, but not in a good intention; for the truth of intention is only the act itself. [a] But the crime, as regards its content, has its reflection-into-self, or its inversion, in the <i>actual</i> punishment; this is [c] the reconciliation of the law with the actuality opposed to it in the crime. [c] Finally, the <i>actual</i> punishment has its <i>inverted</i> actuality present in it such a way that the punishment is an actualization of the law, [d] whereby the activity exercised by the law as punishment <i>suspends itself</i>, and, from being active, the law becomes again quiescent and is vindicated, and the conflict of individuality with it, and of it with individuality, is extinguished.</p> <p>[a] By the way that is the Hegelian principle. That is the anti-Kantian Hegelian principle. Truth of intention is the act itself, we don't care about intention as Hegelians. We will spend a lot of time on this later. Hegel takes that absolutely essential. Intentions are like a furry Platonic background to action. Hegel is not interested in intention.</p> <p>[b] notice the word that he uses chooses. Reconciliation. Suddenly we are reconciling something with something else, we are bringing two things together that have been held apart, and finding in them an internal relationship. This whole book will be about reconciliation. That will be the structure. instead of truth, we are hearing reconciliation. We don't know what that means right now.</p> <p>[c] Punishment is the reconciliation of the law with the crime.</p> <p>[d] notice actualization. potential actualizing itself.</p>
38:00	
39:00	

40:00	<p>this is pointing towards Hegel's own odd theory of punishment.</p> <p>and Hegel's odd theory of punishment has the following odd character. It is this.</p> <p>Hegel says we cannot actually believe that a law is a law if you do not equally agree to punish the transgression of the law.</p>
41:00	<p>and the reason for this is because what makes us think what counts as a law if people break it and we do nothing.</p> <p>so if there is a law and people break it all the time, in what sense is it a law.</p> <p>so the actuality of the law, the law itself only reveals itself as actual in the act that transgresses it, and our further punishment of that crime.</p> <p>so notice now that the law itself is now differing from itself.</p> <p>the law is not up here and all the other stuff down here.</p>
42:00	<p>the law is articulating its own internal meaning by saying that a transgression of the law will bring about a punishment. And the punishment will, and now Hegel says something really shocking, [FILL someone who has worked in a prison] that punishment is something that the criminal deserves or merits as a person.</p> <p>and you may say this is absurd. But it is actually what we do think. And the reason why we know we think is because if we think someone is not free, not a person, we don't punish them.</p> <p>if someone is mad or underpaid, or all the extenuating circumstances we don't punish them.</p> <p>so punishment is something that only persons truly merit, deserve as persons. And hence what looks like the opposite law is actually a way of reconciling,</p>
43:00	<p>bringing that individual back in accord with the law. And therefore re-instating that law as the structure of that relationship.</p> <p>now this is a theory. This is a theory of law and punishment that not every one likes. But we are interested in the metaphysics of that theory.</p> <p>and the metaphysics of that theory is that this entire movement, everything that happens, is both the law differing from itself. What can be more opposite to law than transgression? What can be more awful than punishment?</p>

44:00	<p>But each of these things turn out to be moments of the law articulating itself, and re-instating it, he says, in its quiet non-stability.</p> <p>so this is the idea of an identity differing from itself, if the la says don't kill, killing happens. But in the movement the identity of the law is attained. So the identity of the law only occurs through the very things that are different from it, and oppose it. And therefore make the law, a law. The whole cycle.</p>
45:00	<p>now this is where Hegel is going.</p> <p>so before we turn to §160, lets stop here. that is our concrete illustration.</p> <p>and make sure we have gotten our model of the difference between 2-world and 1-world, that is what we are trying to get.</p> <p>We are trying to see that the idea of the one, and many, of identity and difference, does not require a 2-tiered structure but an idea of a self-moving actuality sustaining itself through its various moments by which it becomes the in-itself it already was.</p>
46:00	<p>[Question on causality]:</p> <p>we have not gotten [FILL?] causality of a structure yet.</p> <p>this is actually a very formal theory of punishment, which says that there is something right about the retributive theory of punishment.</p>
47:00	<p>Kant and Hegel believe in the retributive theories of punishment.</p> <p>but they try, and the line that Hegel adopts, and the line professor just gave us, is a fair summation of the Philosophy of Right, more or less. We have not gotten to that structure yet. We will not get that till later.</p> <p>[Question]</p>
48:00	<p>he is using a slightly more naïve exception here. there he is looking at law as the opposite of reality, here he is looking at the whole structure of law, transgression, punishment, as the way in which, after all [Hume says FILL?] the criminal is brought back into the community as one of us. That is we do think that the criminal has done his time, and the slate is clean.</p> <p>the law is where it is and the individual is no longer a transgressor but is now again one of us.</p> <p>so all this hurly burly, everything starts back to where it was. That is what he is interested in here.</p>

49:00	<p>so what we are suggesting for the moment is forget about Spirit of Christianity and its Fate, it will just be confusing. Professor had "Spirit of Christianity and its Fate" in the margins but now he thinks that was wrong and the account he just gave is what he thinks Hegel is actually thinking.</p> <p>Hegel is not taking these as natural laws. He is taking them as positive laws.</p> <p>He is going to take natural laws as not natural.</p> <p>That is why this case is easier, that is why it is interesting when you discuss this, it is hard to see how these [FILL?] is going to get there in those other cases.</p>
50:00	<p>so I am using this as a model of self-differing reality. I will come back and explain this when we get back to the notion of nature in Plato.</p> <p>[Question]:</p> <p>one of the things that Hegel thinks that Freud thinks is that there is no law without the transgression of law. So there has to be a moment of objection as a condition of identity. But it is also to say that [] no identity except from one opposes that identity as a condition of the identity.</p>
51:00	<p>Chris Hegel [FILL?] has a Hegelian way of reading the object.</p> <p>\$160</p> <p>"From the idea, then, of inversion, which constitutes the essential nature of one aspect of one supersensible world, we must eliminate the sensuous idea of fixing the differences in a different sustaining element;"</p>

52:00	<p>There is no structural divide between the one and the many. There is no divided line, there is no noumenon-phenomenon difference. All those ways of trying to fix the difference actually is the cause of a series of inversions.</p> <p>so we have to get rid of the idea of what equals the difference sustaining elements and once we do that he says then this absolute notion of the difference must be represented and understood purely as inner difference.</p> <p>that is something can only be different from itself or to use Hegel's language self-othering. Or again in Hegel's language:</p> <p>\$160</p> <p>"...and this absolute Notion of the difference must be represented and understood purely as inner difference, a repulsion of the self-same, as self-same, from itself, and likeness of the unlike as unlike."</p>
53:00	<p>all of this must be understood as this model of the law achieving its status as law by what differs from it, transgresses from it, and must be reconciled back with it in order for it to be itself.</p> <p>so it needs its opposite, not as another world, but as its own internal corollary, so no identity would have difference, and the difference is always the difference of an identity constituted by that difference.</p> <p>\$160</p> <p>"But just because I have the 'opposite' here in and for itself, it is the opposite of itself, or it has, in fact, the 'other' immediately present in it."</p>

54:00	<p>so the other is not absolutely other. If it was absolutely other, they would be back in the world of inversion. It cannot be absolute otherness.</p> <p>we will argue about this all semester long. Let us wait and argue about it in master and slave. But Hegel denies a strong version of absolute otherness because it just generates the logic of inversions.</p> <p>For all sorts of reasons this is a contestable idea.</p> <p>but in this case, the other is the object. The identity is the self. So we are talking about subject-object dualism. So we want to overcome the subject-object dualism. That is what is at stake here.</p> <p>\$160</p> <p>"Thus the supersensible world, which is the inverted world, has at the same time overarched the other world and has it within it; it is <i>for itself</i> the inverted world, i.e. the inversion of itself; [a] it is itself and its opposite in one unity. Only thus is it difference as <i>inner</i> difference, or difference <i>in its own self</i>, or difference as an <i>infinity</i>.</p> <p>[a] this is the inversion of the inversion professor promised.</p>
55:00	<p>what these awkward locutions are pressing is the thought that</p> <p>(1) consciousness is not going to find anything outside itself to articulate or ground the relation of identity and difference.</p> <p>and hence second</p>
56:00	<p>(2) the structure of identity and difference is going to be a self-differing of consciousness itself or what is the same consciousness's act of self-determining will become the source or ground for distinguishing and holding together a perceptual manifold.</p> <p>the idea of infinity for Hegel is the same as the idea of necessary self-determination, freedom, because he is contending that nothing outside consciousness can determine the categorical forms of experience.</p>

57:00	<p>Nothing outside consciousness can determine the categorical forms of experience.</p> <p>hence possible knowledge claims cannot be measured against the standard of, say whatever you want to be the outside, so the non-inferentially warranted given, the apprehension of universals, sense properties, the intellection of a non-sensible ground, or reliance on law.</p> <p>those are the things you want to measure your knowledge against but you cannot. That is what we have seen to be impossible.</p>
58:00	<p>so the possibility of consciousnesses or autonomous self determination can now only be measured against itself.</p> <p>consciousness has become self-consciousness.</p> <p>or that is the Copernican Turn. That's it. You have done it, all by yourself. That is what you have done in accepting this move.</p> <p>now this seems meager and disappointing compared to Kant. And let us puzzle that out for the rest of fifteen minutes. Why this movement of Hegel's having struggled so hard to get here seems so flat. This seems odd.</p>
59:00	<p>we will suggest that its flatness is going to be the source of future depth. How are we going to do this?</p> <p>Let's go back to Kant and see what he does at this moment and what Hegel does and then see why we are going one way about this rather than other.</p> <p>to pick up on where we left last time.</p> <p>remember transcendental object = X. all these Lockean ideas which now seem to be force and law and all these other notions.</p>

60:00	<p>Kant CPR A109:</p> <p>The pure concept of this transcendental object, [a] which in reality throughout all our knowledge is always on and the same, [b] is what can alone confer upon all our empirical concepts in general relation to an object, that is, objective reality. This concept cannot contain any determinate intuition, [c] and therefore refers only [d] to that unity which must be met with any manifold of knowledge which stands in relation to an object. [e] This relation [f] is nothing but the necessary unity of consciousness, and therefore also of the synthesis of the manifold, through a common function of the mind, which combines in one representation.</p> <p>[a] transcendental object X</p> <p>[b] so the function of transcendental object = X, is what remains same throughout all reality and it is what can alone confer...back to quote...</p> <p>[c] it is not another perceptual given because it is what anchors things, show that they are parts of reality</p> <p>[d] now he absolutely does the Copernican Turn right in front of our eyes.</p> <p>[e] so far it refers only to the unity. But what unity?</p> <p>[f] So far it could be a Locke, it could be a substance I know not what. It could be law. It could be the Good in Plato. It could be any of those things. But what does he say it is? The relation is nothing but the necessary unity of consciousness....back to quote.</p>
1:00	
2:00	<p>so the professor's interpretation of Kant actually says is that the transcendental picture is the transcendental re-interpretation of Locke's new way of ideas.</p> <p>that is what is exactly going on here. He is re-interpreting Locke to say no it is not some substance that grounds reality, it is consciousness that grounds the unity of the object.</p> <p>this claim that consciousness does it, transcendental unity of apperception TUA, brings us back to A163 which is where we ended last week and seems that we will end this week.</p>

3:00	<p>Hegel is here, as he is all along, after a great deal of huffing and puffing in the previous paragraph over the self-identical being self-sundering, is trying to explain what this new idea of infinity amounts to.</p> <p>and if you remember last week we read the overblown and somewhat embarrassing passage about explanation providing so much self-satisfaction because in it consciousness is enjoying only itself.</p> <p>now the reason that Hegel takes us here is not only the idea that understanding in the world through forms, here explanation</p>
4:00	<p>that are as anthropocentric as could be. It is not just that. It is the introduction of the notion of satisfaction that is meant to be pressing the argument forward.</p> <p>the truth of consciousness is that it can get no satisfaction.</p> <p>so the whole thing is just [FILL?]</p> <p>if there is satisfaction, and here is what consciousness lacks, if there is satisfaction, then there is a desire that is being satisfied.</p> <p>why is this important? It is just at this point that Hegel is going beyond Kant.</p> <p>Kant immediately assumes that the discovery of the forms for integrating the perceptual manifold are simply going to be the necessary conditions for the possibility of self-consciousness.</p>
5:00	<p>and this pre-supposes all of Kant's theories of forms of intuitions, and inner time consciousness and the like.</p> <p>Now Hegel assumes that assessing the terms through which we evaluate what concepts or categories we need in order to comprehend the world must answer to what we want from those forms or categories.</p>
6:00	<p>while Hegel agrees with Kant that the link between the non-sensible and the sensible, between pure concepts and sensory manifold, is supplied by consciousness itself, his claim is that we cannot make sense of that activity of consciousness directly, as if it were an immediate question.</p> <p>well what would that question be?</p> <p>Kant's question seems to be, how are representations of the world possible?</p> <p>but if that is Kant's question, then it is a very bad question that we opened up in the introduction that said it was the fear of truth.</p> <p>so that is the very question that denies knowing.</p>

7:00	<p>hence in order to circumvent Kant, Hegel presses the Copernican Turn, that is the announcement of infinity, but does so in a manner that presses consciousness outside the idea of bare representational knowing of the world.</p> <p>that is Kantianism is still a representational account of knowing even though of course it requires activity.</p> <p>and the way Hegel gets beyond the representational account of knowing is to press the thought that the self-determining activity of knowing is really (and professor does not know how to do this except singing loudly) is activity, and it is really action.</p>
8:00	<p>And it is action in the real sense and not action in some [FILL ?] sense.</p> <p>it is not action in the form of knowing, it is really a form of action.</p> <p>so the thought here is that knowing itself must be framed as a component of the life of being towards centrally agents.</p> <p>so you may say, this is not news. Kant and Fichte say as much. Isn't this implied by the Copernican Turn and the idea of spontaneity and synthesis and the like?</p>
9:00	<p>Hegel wants to argue that what keeps Kant and Fichte pigeonholed is that they do not actually believe what they say. Since they argue as if we are still grounded in the world via our representations of the world. That is, they are still taking it, that the fundamental relationship between subject and object is representational knowing.</p> <p>That is, they express or press the case of agency, and they do, both of them talk about knowing as a form of agency, and then they withdraw that view at the same time, by making the representational relationship to the world the ground of our relationship to the world. So they say that we are agents and then they say that it is just representations.</p>
10:00	<p>hence they suppress, and this is the professors thesis, the very activity that they introduce by suppressing it as the activity of a being who is essentially an embodied agent in the world.</p> <p>if we can only know what we have made, which is what all this is about, a version of the makers knowledge thesis, then what we need here is a more serious understanding of human beings as makers or determiners of the world.</p> <p>hence the transition to a new form of consciousness has not one but two aspects.</p>

11:00	<p>the infinity of thought is that consciousness can only discover the grounds of the structure of identity and difference by examining itself. Consciousness must become self-consciousness.</p> <p>this move now seems easy.</p> <p>but second, that self-consciousness must be truly active, truly world-forming or determining, hence truly the work of an agent, i.e. a being whose needs and desires lead it to act so as to determine the world.</p> <p>so the problem with Kant's synthetic forms of synthesis is that they are acts without desires. And if they are acts without desire then they lack the fundamental structure of agency.</p>
12:00	<p>so there is something about them that is both and act and not an act. And Kant's way of saying that they are both act and not an act is bundle it all up in the world, spontaneity, it happens, we do it.</p> <p>but it seems we do it intentionally.</p> <p>so what Hegel wants to say is this business of satisfaction. Knowledge must be fundamentally satisfying to agents. And therefore it must be a true structure of agency at work in determining which categorial sets, what frames, what ideas, we use for the sake of knowledge getting, if knowledge getting is an activity we do.</p>
13:00	<p>hence the assumption in all this is simply that there can be no action without there being a spring of actions and the spring of an action must be at least minimally starting at the most simplest level, a need or desire.</p> <p>hence to move to self-consciousness, which is where we are heading, is equally to move to a different relationship to the world, the one in which the agent is originally related to the other by desiring it.</p>
14:00	<p>so my simple thought is here is actually that the problem in Kant is it action without desire. And it is desire we need to get beyond the bad form of transcendental idealism and move to a conception of knowing that treats knowers as true agents.</p> <p>that is why Hegel talks about satisfaction. Hence that funny passage about satisfaction is indeed, that very phrase is a critique of Kant's version of Copernican Turn to Hegel's account.</p>
15:00	<p>next week we go to self-consciousness.</p>