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| 00:00 | <p>Last time we ended with the thought that empirical concepts do not require the schema because they are intrinsically applicable to the appearances.</p> <p>In those cases they have been derived from the appearances.</p> <p>So it is natural to think of standard everyday empirical concepts, mathematical concepts, and even the standard concepts of natural science as being their own schemata.</p> <p>That is to say there is no problem to worry about. The thought that there could be the problem of 'how do I apply an ordinary concept' misses the point because ordinary concepts just are intrinsically applicable.</p>   |
| 1:00  | <p>Schematism is an issue only where there is a genuine gap between concept and object. And we've discovered that the only place there is a genuine gap between concept and object are those special concepts of transcendental philosophy – namely the pure concepts of the understanding.</p> <p>Categories are not yet cast in terms of properties and/or relations that can actually be manifested by objects given through sensibility.</p>  |
| 2:30  | <p>And Kant argues that in order for this to be the case we require something that will create a homogeneity or something that is of the same between concept and object.</p> <p>At A 138 Kant says:</p> <p><i>"Obviously there must be some third thing, which is homogeneous on the one hand with the category, and on the other hand with appearance, and which thus make the application of the former to the latter possible. This mediating representation must be <u>pure</u>, that is, void of all empirical content, and yet at the same time, while it must in one respect be intellectual, it must in another be sensible. Such a <u>representation</u> is the transcendental schema."</i></p> |
|       | <p>There are a few things I want to point out from this passage:</p> <p>--there must be a difference between "pure" and "empty". "Empty" is a concept devoid of any intuition whatsoever. "Pure" on the other hand is a concept whose intuition or intuitive content is not empirical.</p> <p>Keep in mind the weight that "pure" has to carry in the project of a "Critique of <u>Pure Reason</u>"</p> <p>--the schematism is itself a <u>representation</u>.</p>  |
| 4:30  | <p>So as we discovered last time that which mediates between the pure concept and the sensible is going to be located in the imagination. The imagination is the source of the mediation between the intelligible and the sensible.</p> <p>So Kant addresses one of the many problems Plato failed to solve.</p>  |
|       | <p>I am not sure the divided line in the <i>Republic</i> doesn't gesture this way by the move from the second to third segments – which may not be a move at all but another way of looking at the same segment from two different perspectives.</p>  |

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| 5:30 | <p>Despite our reference to Plato, all this here is still Hume's problem.</p> <p>The thought here is that there is no impression of necessary connection. That is, I see a billiard ball move, and then I see it collide with another ball, and then I see the other ball move.</p> <p>But we never <i>see</i> the one ball moving the other. Rather all we <i>see</i> is the one ball move and then the next ball move.</p> <p>That is all that we <i>intuit</i>—that is to say that is all that is available at the level of apprehension.</p>   |
|      | <p>By "intuit" Jay must mean here "empirically intuit" because it seems to me that what the schematisms—as representations—do is allow us to intuit what is not given in apprehension. Otherwise the schematisms themselves would be merely "empty" and not "pure".</p> <p>So the point is that we actually do "intuit" causality—and that precisely is the problem because we never <i>perceive</i> causality. We can only intuit it if we provide it.</p>  |
| 6:30 | <p>We'll see throughout the analogies that Kant uses that word "apprehension" because it is apprehension that so to speak that is devoid of what we need here—namely something that would connect the one ball moving and the other one moving.</p>  |
|      | <p>So there is no impression of the necessary connection between the one thing happening and the other. Nor do we have, according to Hume, an impression of existence in addition to the impression of the external properties of particular objects.</p> <p>Causality and externality for Hume are his [?] properties which should be presented in empirical intuition, but he could not find. And because he could not find them he was a skeptic.</p> <p>There was a gap and so severe a gap in our empirical knowledge that he had to find some analogue of causality that cohered with the evidence presented.</p>  |
| 8:30 | <p>Kant concedes Hume's problem. There really is a lack of an intuition here. And again the whole strategy of the CPR is that <i>we</i> through our forms of synthesis are going to supply the missing item.</p> <p>But that would be tawdry anthropomorphism if we arbitrarily projected upon the world what we would like to find there. So that can't be the way it happens.</p> <p>The way it happens has to run through the idea that the use of these pure intellectual concepts—concepts which we do not find instantiated in the world—are nonetheless necessary conditions for the very possibility of the simplest bit of empirical knowledge.</p> <p>And indeed they are necessary—as we will see in the "Refutation of Idealism"—necessary for the possibility of experience <i>überhaupt</i>.</p> |

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| 10:00 | <p>So we want something to make the categories homogenous with appearances. And we might think that there are three criteria that this mediating medium must have:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. If this is really going to do the work Kant wants it to do, it better apply to <u>all</u> appearances. It has to be an aspect that holds universally of all appearances. Otherwise it would be just contingent.</li> <li>2. If it is to hold universally, then it needs to be something that can be known a priori, and therefore preserve the a priori status of the categories.</li> <li>3. And whatever it is, it must be sufficiently complex, sufficiently heterogeneous, sufficiently diverse so that the logical properties and relations that it possesses can have different interpretations. Otherwise it would only work for one category. But we need something that is sufficiently rich so that it works not just for one category but all the different things that categories do, and get articulated thereby.</li> </ol> <p><a href="#">[goback1930]</a></p> |
| 12:00 | Kant says that only one item magically fulfills all three criteria: and that is <u>time</u> .  |
| 12:30 | <p>So continuing on from the passage above at A 138:</p> <p><i>"The concept of understanding contains pure synthetic unity of the manifold in general. Time, as the formal condition of the manifold of inner sense, and therefore of the connection of all representations, contains an a priori manifold in pure intuition <a href="#">[a1]</a>. Now a transcendental determination of time is so far homogeneous with the category, which constitutes its unity, in that it is universal and rests upon an a priori rule. But, on the other hand, it is so far homogeneous with appearance, in that time is contained in every empirical representation of the manifold <a href="#">[a2]</a>. Thus an application of the category to appearances becomes possible by means of the transcendental determination of time, which, as the schema of the concepts of understanding, mediates the subsumption of the appearances under the category. <a href="#">[a3]</a>"</i></p>  |
|       | <p>What "category" are we talking about here? "The Category" is mentioned twice. Time can't be "the category" can it? Because time is intuition, right? Or as a formal intuition maybe it is also a category?</p>  |
|       | <p>[a1] So time as the form of inner sense – which is to say, of <i>anything</i> I may experience inner or outer, because even things that I experience as outer must also be perceived and therefore be experienced and therefore affect my inner sense.</p>  |
| 13:30 | <p>So only <i>time</i> holds of <i>all</i> our experiences.</p> <p>Further more, because time is the form of inner sense, it is knowable a priori.</p>   |

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|       | <p>So what we are going to find is that what was this pure intuition in time is subject to a priori determinations. That is, prior to and in anticipation of all possible experience, we must conceive of time as having a certain structural complexity and unity. And this structural complexity and unity is precisely the application of the pure categories to it in such a way that thereby anything that appears in time becomes subject to those categories.</p> <p>So it is via the transcendental determinations of time that the categories reach out and determine, not just the conditions for the possibility of experience, but the conditions for the possibility of the <i>objects</i> of experience.</p> <p>Because time is a form of inner sense, therefore of sense and therefore of the passivity therefore a condition of anything appearing to us.</p> <p>[continue at <a href="#">A138b</a>]</p> |
| 16:00 | <p>[a2] So on the one hand as a priori it is on the side of the categories. On the other hand because it is the form through which anything can affect us it is on the side of sense.</p> <p>So time is necessarily both purely a priori and sensible at the same time.</p>  |
| 17:00 | <p>[a3] Only time, and not space, is fully universal.</p> <p>However, as Kant will repeat, throughout the analogies, and even more so in the "Refutation of Idealism" time is not itself directly or immediately perceivable.</p> <p>We will circle back to this argument later on, but the thought is that particular temporal relations are not directly perceived, and this will entail that particular determinations of temporal relations...</p>   |
| 18:30 | <p>There really are only two temporal relations: things are either at the same time and hence simultaneity or they are in some order of succession.</p> <p>So that particular determinations of those temporal relations of succession of simultaneity of any given appearance will turn out to depend upon the cognizance of some spatial relation.</p> <p>Even though spatial relation are also not directly perceived – just to keep matters complicated. And recognition of them will depend upon the dynamic relations of objects in space.</p>   |
| 19:30 | <p>So as we suggested last time there is going to be a mutual determination of time and space even though there is a logical or transcendental priority of time over space – for the reasons we saw above of the threefold criteria of the schematism.</p> <p>[See <a href="#">threecriteria</a> above]</p>  |

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|       | <p>Thus the contents of the transcendental schemata are supplied by the several transcendental determinations of time.</p> <p>However, the <i>use</i> of these schemata – not the schemata themselves, but their actual use – and thus the categories themselves require objects in space.</p>   |
| 21:00 | <p>So the premise of all of this stuff, and what is going to be governing the argument of the Analogies is Kant's reiterated claim that <u>time cannot be perceived</u>.</p>   |
|       | <p>He states this both as an introduction to the Analogies of Experience at B 219:</p> <p><i>"For apprehension is only a placing together of the manifold of empirical intuition; and we can find in it no representations of any necessity which determines the appearances thus combined to have connected existence in space and time [b1]. But since experience is a knowledge of objects through perceptions, the relation [involved] in the existence of the manifold has to be represented in experience, not as it comes to be constructed in time but as it exists objectively in time [b2]. Since time, however, cannot itself be perceived, the determination of the existence of objects in time can take place only through their relation in time in general, and therefore only through concepts that connect them a priori [b3]. Since these always carry necessity with them, it follows that experience is only possible through a representation of necessary connection of perceptions."</i></p> |
|       | <p>I first want to just point out a couple claims made here.</p> <p>i. "Experience" = <i>knowledge</i> of objects through perception.</p> <p>The point is that the conditions for the possibility of experience at all are the conditions for the possibility of knowing objects. In other words, without already <i>assuming</i> that objects in space and time endure through time we would not have experience at all but chaos or inchoate confusion. To have an experience is to have an object is to assume it sustains itself through time.</p> <p>ii. Kant explicitly claims "time...cannot itself be perceived"</p> <p>iii. Apprehension itself – something like bear perception – is already that placing together or gathering up into a unity empirical "data" so to speak.</p>  |
| 22:00 | <p>[b1] That is a restatement of Hume.</p> <p>[go back <a href="#">B219</a>]</p>   |
|       | <p>[b2] That is, what we want to know is 'what is the real temporal order of event?' And we will see in a moment why that is a problem.</p> <p>But the premise of this all is the next sentence.</p>   |

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| 23:00 | <p>[b3] And he repeats that premise in each of the Analogies.</p> <p>B 225 – First Analogy “Principle of Permanence of Substance”<br/> B 233 – Second Analogy “Principle of Succession in Time, in accordance with the Law of Causality”<br/> B 257 – Third Analogy “Principle of Coexistence, in accordance with the Law of Reciprocity or Community”</p>   |
|       | <p><i>I think the premise runs something like, time obtains in the order of objects themselves, but we never fully see it there in empirical intuition, therefore we must know of that objects exist in time through the concept of time.</i></p>  |
| 23:30 | <p>At B 291-2 (this is in the “Refutation of Idealism” section of the “Postulates” [see <a href="#">outline</a>]), he connects that problem of time determination to space. And, by the way, all of this should be taken as proleptic – we are going to detail these arguments.</p> <p><i>“But it is an even more noteworthy fact, that in order to understand the possibility of things in conformity with the categories, and so to demonstrate the objective reality of the latter, we need, not merely intuitions, but intuitions that are in all cases outer intuitions.”</i></p> |
|       | <p>The person who failed to understand this profoundly was Heidegger in <i>Being and Time</i>. [Lillian? Allweis?] has a good book on this topic. It shows that there is a temporal monism in Heidegger and a failure to really take seriously the problem of externality.</p> <p>And Heidegger in this regard is unlike Husserl who was a good Kantian.</p>   |
| 25:00 | <p>At A200/B245 [Second Analogy “Principle of Succession in Time, in accordance with the Law of Causality”] Kant explains what he means by this doctrine.</p> <p>Here we have the argument about empty time and time not being perceivable.</p> <p><i>“Now since absolute time is not an object of perception, this determination of position cannot be derived from the relation of appearances to it. On the contrary, the appearances must determine for one another their position in time, and make their time-order a necessary order.”</i></p>                                  |
| 26:30 | <p>Given that time is the form of inner sense, then the appearance of successiveness can be granted as given at least in some sense.</p> <p>We’ll quibble about that later.</p>  |
|       | <p>The thesis is that individual appearances do not come with their correct temporal location labeled on them, nor do we have access to some measure of their temporal position.</p> <p>So to return to the example we used last week:</p>   |

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| <p>Week 11,<br/>part 2,<br/>25:00</p> | <p>What we mean by this is that the order of my representations is not the temporal order of the objects. This is the principle of everything that is going to follow.</p> <p>So the temporal order or relations of objects is not the same as the order of my representations of them.</p> <p>To illustrate this point, look for instance at an object on one side of the room, say a hat. Then turn your head and look at an object on the other side of the room, like a projector.</p> <p>First we see the hat, then we see the projector.</p> <p>The order of my representations is <i>first</i> the hat, and <i>second</i> the projector. And I can't see them both at the same time because they are too wide for my peripheral vision.</p> <p>But what is the temporal order of those two objects?<br/>They are <i>simultaneous</i>—how do we do that? How are objects that are represented in an order get taken as <i>simultaneous</i>?</p> |
| <p>28:00</p>                          | <p>So we have an order: hat – projector – hat.</p> <p>But where in time (better, “when”) are these two objects?</p> <p>Of course they are in the same time. But how do we <i>know</i> that? That is simply the puzzle.</p> <p>How do we know that they are at the same time when I see them successively?</p>   |
|                                       | <p>What we are missing here, what we would want, is a little clock above every object that would give there place in absolute time.</p> <p>But they don't come labeled like that—and yet we do not that they are simultaneous.</p> <p>So Kant is not contesting that we do know that they are at the same time, he is taking for granted that we know that. The good old transcendental question is 'how is it possible' that we know this?</p>   |



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| 30:00 | <p>So dynamic interactions among the objects are going to be required because although spatial extension unlike temporal succession actually exists in one moment of time.</p> <p>That is, the hat just is there in space. We don't need a synthesis for its extension.</p> <p>[Is that right? Otherwise how would I have a "hat" as a determinate object and not a "hat-peg-wall" intuition? ]</p> <p>Therefore spatial objects can be objects of a singular representation.</p> <p>Position in absolute space is not given in a single representation.</p> <p>No more does the hat come with its vectorial counters with respect to everything else or its exact location in absolute space. Rather existing objects which cannot be simultaneously perceived, can be no more directly perceived than position in absolute time.</p> <p>That is, even spatially I have got to know that the projector is to my left, for instance. I have to be able to map things out in relation to one another. Therefore I have to set up relations between these objects in order to get their spatial location.</p> |
| 32:00 | <p>All of this is going to be ratcheted up a notch when we come to the "Refutation of Idealism" where Kant denies that even knowledge of successiveness of perceptions in inner sense can be known without foundation.</p> <p>That is, even successiveness of perceptions in inner sense has its own conditions of possibility – namely, knowledge of the independent existence of objects in space.</p>  |
| 33:00 | <p>So Kant is going to argue that inner awareness is dependent on outer awareness and therefore deny the premise, the very premise, of all rationalism and empiricism: namely that we begin with autonomous inner awareness and build out to the world.</p>   |
|       | <p>Question:</p>  |
|       | <p>Inner sense is the medium. And inner awareness is our knowledge of what is going on in the inner sense.</p> <p>Inner sense is just his label for 'the theater' of consciousness. It is knowable no more and no less than outer experience.</p> <p>There is no privilege of the inner over the outer. So the very foundations of all modern philosophy didn't even make it 150 years.</p>   |



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|  | <div><div><div>TABLE OF CATEGORIES:</div><div><div>I</div><div>Quantity</div><div>Universal</div><div>Particular</div><div>Singular</div></div><div><div>II</div><div>Of Quality</div><div>Reality</div><div>Subsistence</div><div>Negation</div><div>Dependence</div><div>Limitation</div><div>Community</div></div><div><div>III</div><div>Of Relation</div><div>Of Inherence and</div><div>Of Causality and</div><div>Of</div></div><div><div>IV</div><div>Of Modality</div><div>Possibility – Impossibility</div><div>Existence – Non-existence</div><div>Necessity – Contingency</div></div></div></div> |
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|       | <p style="text-align: center;"><b>I--Axioms</b><br/>of <u>intuition</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>II --Anticipations</b><br/>of <u>perception</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>III – Analogies</b><br/>of <u>experience</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>IV --Postulates</b><br/>of <u>empirical thought</u></p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>“TABLE OF TEMPORAL CORRELATES”:</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>I--Axioms</b><br/>Of Quantity = “Time Series”<br/>?<br/>?<br/>?</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>II --Anticipations</b><br/>Quality = “Time Content”<br/>?<br/>Substance<br/>?<br/>causality<br/>?<br/>Community</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>III – Analogies</b><br/>Relation = “Time Order”<br/>First Analogy – Permanence of<br/><br/>Second Analogy – Succession and<br/><br/>Third Analogy – Coexistence and</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>IV --Postulates</b><br/>Modality = “Time Scope”<br/>?<br/>?<br/>?</p> |
| 37:00 | <p>It doesn't seem worth detailing all of this because it is a kind of derivation in which he goes from the category and comes up with the temporal determination matching it.</p> <p>This is just Kant at his most architectonic and it is utterly unconvincing.</p> <p>In the “Principles” (see <a href="#">outline</a>: does Jay mean “Postulates” here? The Analogies are in the “Principles” so I don't know what he means to be point to) he does something more interesting – he does not overtly or explicitly rely on the logical functions of judgment or the list of categories but precedes as if he was simply providing each with an appropriate temporal determination.</p> <p>Rather he proceeds there as if from the very notion of time order as a problem.</p> <p>So the point is that you don't have to believe this elaborate architectonic junk because Kant really does the hard work in the Analogies.</p>   |

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| 39:00 | <p>To put it in another way, the results transcendental deduction do not explicitly structure the Analogies of Experience.</p> <p>Rather he works directly from the problem of the determination of time.</p>  |
| 40:30 | <p>So for want of time we will not look at the Axioms and the Anticipations of Perception.</p> <p>We are skipping the Axioms and Anticipations because they are not really about time determination at all.</p> <p>For another reason, the "<u>Axioms</u>" represent Kant's argument why nature is completely mathematizable, and it is roughly because of time as being pure forms of intuition—then the empirical representations of any empirical object must have some extensive magnitude, as space and time does—be countable, measurable and the like.</p> <p>And we have already seen in a way the argument for the "<u>Anticipations of Perception</u>"—namely that objects corresponding to sensations must have some intensive magnitude. This is an argument that we will later suggest really turns on Kant's theory of matter.</p> |
| 41:30 | <p>So the schematism really simply sets up the background for the Analogies as setting up this problem of time determination.</p> <p>So let's say first a few words about the structural background to the Analogies.</p> <p>We've already suggested that we cannot directly inspect time itself. As a consequence no objects positioned in time is directly determinable.</p>   |
| 43:00 | <p>From the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant assumes that there can only be one time.</p> <p>Time persists in the sense that it does not pop in and out of existences as its moments do.</p>   |
|       | <p>Notice that neither simultaneity on its own nor succession on its own will guarantee the unity of time.</p> <p>Why?</p> <p>Let's say that we can generate simultaneity—then it would follow that we simply have as many worlds as we have moments. So simultaneity will just give us a kind of leaping from world to world.</p> <p>Succession on its own will generate simply multiple chains of time, but they can then exist parallel to one another and again many times would result.</p>   |

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| 45:00 | <p>So neither simultaneity by itself nor succession by itself gives us anything like a unity of time. So the possibility of experience, which is now going to mean for Kant – a new translation – the possibility of temporal experience – is going to have to involve the experience of objects – all of them in one and the same time, and this is going to be a necessary condition for the possibility of experience.</p>   |
|       | <p>So there has to be an in principle connectability of all experience.</p> <p>The idea then of the unity of experience – which we can see that we desperately need: if there is no unity of experience there is no knowledge – is going to be the case if and only if there is a unity of time. And a unity of time will generate what it means to have a unity of world or nature.</p>  |
| 47:00 | <p>So that there is such a thing as “the world” or “nature” is simply an artifact of the unity of time which is a necessary condition for the possibility of experience, or at least Kant says so at A 216: [Third Analogy: Principle of Coexistence, in accordance with the Law of Reciprocity or Community]:</p> <p><i>“By nature, in the empirical sense, we understand the connection of appearances as regards their existence according to necessary rules, that is, according to laws. There are certain laws which first make a nature possible, and these laws are a priori. Empirical laws can exist and be discovered only through experience, and indeed in consequence of those original laws through which experience itself first becomes possible. Our analogies therefore really portray [c1] the unity of nature in the connection of all appearances under certain exponents which express nothing save the relation of time (in so far as time comprehends all existence) to the unity of apperception – such unity being possible only in synthesis according to rules [c2]. Taken together, the analogies thus declare that all appearances lie, and must lie, in one nature, because without this a priori unity no unity of experience, and therefore no determination of objects in it, would be possible.” [c3]</i></p> |
|       | <p>[c1] That is, the rules themselves, there must be substance (1), every event must have a cause (2), objects exist in thoroughgoing interaction with one another (3)</p>  |
|       | <p>[c2] The “I think” portrays (?) the necessary conditions for the unity of experience now turns out to be the flip side of the unity of nature. They mutually define one another.</p> <p>“I think” and “the world” are internal transcendental correlatives.</p>  |
| 50:00 | <p>[c3] So in generating the three analogies, which we are now suggesting must be used together, all three of them, no one without all.</p> <p>In the Analytic literature there has been an obsessive look at the 2<sup>nd</sup> Analogy (every event must have a cause) – and that is a mistake because Kant thinks of them as jointly generating – hence our argument about simultaneity and succession – the unity of time and therefore the unity of nature.</p> <p>And that turns out to be the true correlative of the “I think”.</p>   |

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| 51:00  | <p>One may ask, since there are only two modes of time – succession and simultaneity – how come there are then three analogies?</p> <p>And the answer to that question can be traced back to the structure of the Analogies as a whole as a form of argumentation.</p> <p>Namely, it always begins with the premise that representations are always successive. We see one thing after another.</p> <p>That fact, that inner sense and consciousness is temporal, I always see one thing after another, successiveness is always even before James Joyce and Faulkner and Proust we knew that this is how things go.</p> |
| 53:00  | <p>But the question that then arises – should my representations which are always successive be taken <i>as</i> representing successive or coexistent states of affairs?</p> <p>Should my representations be taken as showing change or no change?</p> <p>For me from the inside it is all succession. Yet that isn't how I quite experience the world. I do not experience the world as mere succession.</p> <p>I experience it sometimes as no change and sometimes I experience change.</p>   |
| 54:00  | <p>Kant is going to claim that in order to make either judgment – either of successiveness, which is to say there really has been an event, or a judgment of enduringness in which there are just different perceptual takes of an unchanging object – this ultimately requires the presupposition of enduring and indeed ultimately permanent objects governed by laws of causation or interaction.</p> <p>That is, it is going to commit us to the idea that there is substance and that the determinations of substance are governed by thoroughgoing laws of causation and interaction.</p>                          |
| 55:30  | <p>Therefore, there is again an interdependence of all three analogies. Therefore in constructing their relations to one another, we construct the very idea of nature and world.</p>  |
| Part 1 |  |
|        | ***Break***  |
| Part 2 |  |

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| 00:00 | <p>We'll take a look now at the first analogy.</p> <p>In a perplexing way, Kant offers two apparently incompatible statements about what is to be the principle here.</p> <p>So in the B edition he states (p 212):</p> <p><i>"In all change of appearances substance is permanent; its quantum in nature is neither increased nor diminished."</i></p> <p>That sounds a lot like the principle of the preservation of matter.</p>  |
| 1:30  | <p>In A he states the principle as:</p> <p><i>"All appearances contain the permanent (substance) as the object itself, and the transitory as its mere determination that is, as a way in which the object exists."</i></p> <p>This sounds more like something we might actually think about.</p>  |
| 2:00  | <p>To state up front at the beginning, one of the major themes that we are going to be underlining here—and it really only becomes fully clear in the third analogy, although it is kicking around in the second analogy.</p> <p>One of the major distinctions between Kant and Hume is a <i>shift in ontology</i>.</p> <p>Hume operates with a pure event ontology. That is, for Hume, one "event" causes another "event". And since events must be, by definition, distinct from one another it follows that he is going to have all sorts of trouble with the necessary connections between them.</p>  |
|       | <p>That is, the amount of work that goes into separating "events" prohibits connecting them back up.</p>  |
| 3:30  | <p>Lots of philosophers, not just Hume, believe in event ontology. By event ontology we mean that events are the ultimate things that exists. Then objects are constructions out of events.</p> <p>So the young Bertrand Russell believed in an event ontology, which he was explicit about. Events are the ultimately real. He was asked at a lecture once about the 'white cliffs of Dover' he responded that they too were events, just really boring ones.</p> <p>Russell and Whitehead connected on this issue. Whitehead's <i>Process and Reality</i> is the most elaborate form of a true event ontology. Objects are "concrescences".</p> |
| 5:30  | <p>But Kant does not believe in an event ontology. As this statement of the first analogy already begins to indicate, that events are changes of states of objects.</p> <p>So that the notion of event becomes that of alteration, and not a distinct existence.</p>  |



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|      | <p>I would like to point out that it seems that the true Kantian would be indifferent to ontologies one way of the other.</p> <p>That is Kant is not concerned with what objects “really are”. Rather, he is trying to lay the ground conditions for what sense we can make of them. What meaning does it have to speak of objects. In that way, when we speak of objects we do not mean an event – regardless of whether we can cock our heads and things of pencils and cliffs as concrescences.</p> <p>Kant it seems is not looking at how things are but is laying the ground work for any possible epistemology.</p> <p>To have an event ontology is to put the world back in flux – which may in fact <i>be</i> the case. However, it would then never make sense to speak of anything without qualifying it – as in, this is my dog Sam, that is until he dissolves and becomes a pear tree and soil.</p> <p>That is to say, to <i>use</i> nouns at all is to assume that there are objects without having to always remind ourselves that objects are finite.</p>  |
|      | <p>Borges, “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis, Tertius” (p 8):</p> <p>“Hume noted for all time that Berkeley’s arguments did not admit the slightest refutation nor did they cause the slightest conviction. This dictum is entirely correct in its application to the earth, but entirely false in Tlön. The nations of this planet are congenitally idealist. Their language and the derivations of their language – religion, letters, metaphysics – all presuppose idealism. The world for them is not a concourse of objects in space; it is a heterogeneous series of independent acts. It is successive and temporal, not spatial. There are no nouns in Tlön’s conjectural <i>Ursprache</i>, from which the ‘present’ languages and the dialects are derived: there are impresional verbs, modified by monosyllabic suffixes (or prefixes) with an adverbial value. For example: there is no word corresponding to the word ‘moon,’ but there is a verb which in English would be ‘to moon’ or ‘to moonate.’ ‘The moon rose above the river’ is <i>hlör u fang axaxaxas mlö</i>, or literally: ‘upward behind the onstreaming it mooned.’ “</p> <p>(p 9)</p> <p>“This monism or complete idealism invalidates all science. If we explain (or judge) a fact, we connect it with another; such linking, in Tlön, is a later state of the subject which cannot affect or illuminate the previous state. Every mental state is irreducible: the mere fact of naming it – i.e., of classifying it – implies a falsification. From which it can be deduced that there are no sciences on Tlön, not even reasoning.”</p> <p>But this is just Kant’s project – science, reasoning, and hence naming. Kant is not saying that event ontology does not in fact describe being, but he is not interested in this, because we could not say anything about it at all. To speak, the conditions of speech and meaning, are nouns/subjects/things. It is on things that science is built.</p> |
| 6:00 | <p>So Kant is changing, as part of his critique of Hume, the very fabric of the universe.</p>  |

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|      | See, I don't think Kant is making that claim, I think he is putting that claim out of bounds. What he is saying rather that for the purposes of knowledge and action we need to think of events, if such they are, as objects.  |
|      | It turns out that this is a complicated story. And the reason we mention this here is that we run into some of these complications already here in the first analogy even before we get the ontology laid out.  |
| 6:30 | <p>Like all of the analogies—and for reasons it is sort of hard to make sense of...there are too many arguments going on, and it is not clear that they are compatible, some are better than others.</p> <p>But we will suggest that there are two patterns of argument in the second and third analogies.</p> <p>In the first analogy there seem to be three arguments—each are worth mentioning. It is worth going through this because here we see Kant working something over, trying to get it right, clarifying an argument.</p> <p>His notes books are full of these attempts. He was always trying to refine these arguments and refine them.</p>   |
| 8:00 | <p>The second analogy is almost unreadable. But at least we see him puzzling through something.</p> <p>But to turn to the first analogy. The first version of the argument here is simply the first paragraph. (p 213)</p> <p><i>"All appearances are in time; and in it alone, as substratum (as permanent form of inner intuition), can either coexistence or succession be represented [d1]. Thus the time in which all change of appearances has to be thought, remains and does not change [d2]. For it is that in which, and as determinations of which, succession or coexistence can alone be represented [d3]. Now time cannot by itself be perceived [d4]. Consequently there must be found in the objects of perception, that is, in the appearances, the substratum which represents time in general; and all change or coexistence must, in being apprehended, be perceived in this substratum, and through relation of the appearances to it [d5]. But the substratum of all that is real, that is, of all that belongs to the existence of things, is substance; and all that belongs to existence can be thought only as a determination of substance [d6]. Consequently the permanent, in relation to which alone all time-relations of appearances can be determined, is substance in the [field of] appearance, that is, the real in appearance, and as the substrate of all change remains ever the same. And as it is thus unchangeable in its existence, its quantity in nature can be neither increased nor diminished.[d7]"</i></p> |

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|       | <p>[d1] That is just a restatement of the Schematism. It really restates the Transcendental Aesthetic. That is, all appearances appear in time – whether as coexistence or succession.</p> <p>And the notion of substratum here is just the idea of time as a form of intuition in which things appear.</p> <p>This substratum language is going to get squirrely on us very quickly.</p> <p>Almost every sentence in this paragraph is a step in the argument, more or less.</p>   |
|       | <p>[d2] Kant is now trying to elaborate the meaning of time as form of intuition. Time as form of intuition remains – it doesn't change. Rather it is things in time that change.</p> <p>Go back to <a href="#">firstanalogy</a></p>  |
|       | <p>[d3] So these are all statements about the meaning of time as the form of inner intuition as the medium in which all this happens.</p>   |
|       | <p>[d4] This is the statement of what we can call the “omnipresent premise”. This is our third premise.</p> <p>Go back to <a href="#">firstanalogy</a></p>  |
|       | <p>[d5] This is our first inference.</p> <p>So now the thought is going to be that if everything occurs in time, and that [time] is unchanging, and we get [in apprehension] is just all these appearances, then time cannot be represented – then we need some standing for that permanence of time which is the container.</p> <p>That is, something in the appearances has got to represent the permanence of time, time's unchangingness to us. If time itself cannot be perceived, how are we going to get the unchangingness of time? Somehow we have got to get it from the appearances.</p> |
| 13:00 | <p>[d6] So we see here what the counter-part to the permanence of time would be.</p> <p>This is the kind of rationalistic premise – whatever it is that exists and that remains in existence we are going to call 'substance' and we are just going to think of whatever happens as determinations of it.</p> <p>So in other words 'substance' is the material analogue of the permanence of time. It is not time itself, but its unchangingness at least is an analogue of the permanence of time. Anything that happens happens to it.</p>  |

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|       | <p>There are two things I want to point out here.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Apparently what I had argued above about Kant's indifference to ontology and his focus on grounding knowledge is called by Jay the "rationalistic premise" – so it must be a well enough known strategy.</li> <li>ii. Why do we need "substance" – or any material analogue – to represent time? As I understood Sorjabi's reading of Augustine, as well as Husserl's whole idea of "inner time consciousness" – we are aware of the passing of time, 'even with our eyes shut' so to speak.</li> </ul> <p>When the universe stands still as Moses holds his arms out, still time itself goes on.</p> <p>Go back to <a href="#">firstanalogy</a></p> |
| 15:00 | <p>[d7] For Jay this is almost incoherent.</p> <p>The crucial premise is that something must represent time's permanence. And whatever represents time's permanence must itself be permanent. And this can only be the substratum of all that is real, namely 'substance'.</p>   |
|       | <p>The obvious flaw, on Jay's reading, is that it is simply nuts to predicate permanence of time itself.</p> <p>For Jay, time neither changes nor is permanent. He doesn't see how we are going to get access to those notions in talking about time itself.</p> <p>It is possible that what Kant means here by 'time is permanent and unchanging' is just 'the unity of time'.</p> <p>It's just that this is not what he says. He does say something like this but in a later separate argument.</p>  |
| 17:00 | <p>So this argument seems to have something to do with literally finding a material analogue for time as form of intuition. And that just seems curious and it doesn't really help much in thinking through the problem.</p> <p>Because the next flaw in the argument is that it is not clear why permanence in something unperceivable must be represented something by something that is itself perceivable and permanent.</p>   |
|       | <p>This later concern I think articulates my worry (#ii) from above.</p>   |
| 18:00 | <p>To use a vulgar analogy, we are quite happy for God who is unperceivable and permanent, to be represented by all sorts of impermanent things: lambs, crosses, light, birds</p>  |
|       | <p>Also it is not clear to me <i>why</i> wants a representation of time. Isn't the whole point of "discursive" rationality to replace thought as images with thoughts as judgments?</p> <p>This is what I think of as Kant's "iconoclasm". The Iconoclasts did not think that God could be represented in images.</p>  |

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|       | <p>And then why have as a corollary – as we get in the last sentence – the conservation of matter?</p> <p>Something seems to be misfiring here. Which of course is to be maximally ungenerous. But we are being ungenerous on purpose because there are phenomenological issues are related to this such as we can only perceive change against the background of non-change – this is classically called the “backdrop thesis”.</p> <p>But the “backdrop thesis” doesn’t require permanence. I can perceive changes against things that are only relatively unchanging.</p> <p>So the phenomenological correlate is a kind of interesting idea but it does do what Kant wants to do.</p>  |
| 20:00 | <p>So let’s try again. At A 187 he begins to think about alteration. So he says:</p> <p><i>“The correct understanding of the concept of alteration is also grounded upon [recognition of] this permanence. Coming to be and ceasing to be are not alterations of that which comes to be or ceases to be. Alteration is a way f existing which follows upon another way of existing of the same object [e1]. All that alters persists, and only its state changes. Since this change thus concerns only the determinations, which can cease to be or begin to be, we can say, using what may seem a somewhat paradoxical expression, that only the permanent (substance) is altered, and that the transitory suffers no alteration but only a change, inasmuch as certain determinations cease to be and others begins to be [e2].”</i></p> |
| 21:30 | <p>[e1] So alteration is a change of state in something and a change of state must be one in which that object cannot bear those two states without being in contradiction with itself.</p> <p>For example, changing from hot to cold.</p> <p>It is something that changes from hot to cold, and something that endures that was hot and now is cold.</p> <p>Therefore the exclusivity of alteration – which we will come back to – gets its force by the same thing not being capable of being hot and cold at the same time.</p> <p>Hence we require...</p>  |
|       | <p>This seems to have been Socrates point at the center of the <i>Republic</i> when he talks about the ring finger being both large and small in comparison to the middle and pinky fingers.</p>   |
| 23:00 | <p>...Kant is trying to think that the idea of alteration gets its grip because the two predicates have to be incompatible.</p> <p>Again, an event ontology can’t do this. You have the event of hotness, you have the event of coldness, and that is just what happens. But that won’t give you <i>anything</i> that happens. You don’t have alterations, you just have pure change, unmappable.</p>  |

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| 24:00 | <p>So the thought is that alteration has got to be alteration <i>to</i> something.<br/> <a href="#">gobackalteration</a></p>   |
|       | <p>[e2] That all seems right, but in his <i>Reflections</i>, Kant came to realize that this principle was only a <i>logical</i> principle.</p> <p>Quoting from Guyer p. 223:</p> <p><i>"In every alteration the substance endures. For alteration is the succession of the determinations of one and the same thing. This is a merely logical proposition according to the law of identity. But it does not say in general that substance doesn't come to be or cease to be, rather only that it remains during the alteration."</i></p>   |
| 26:30 | <p>So it doesn't give us any notion of permanence. It just makes a logical point about what we mean by substance.</p> <p>That is, if we have the notion of substance we have the notion of alteration. And we haven't yet justified why alterations should be to substances—that only really happens in the third analogy.</p> <p>All we have here is a logical proposition. So that can't be an [ontological] argument for the permanent—it just states what our commitments [in using words and expecting knowledge] are in this regard.</p>   |
|       | <p>However, the next paragraph does give us something much more like an argument. Now he is trying to think about <i>knowledge</i> of alteration. How do we come to have <i>knowledge</i> of state change? How do we come to have knowledge of an event.</p> <p>Remember that in the end we are going to need three conditions, that is all three analogies, but here at least we do get the first condition.</p> <p>[referring to the <a href="#">threecriteria</a> above?].</p> <p>We are going to need substance. We will have to see why.</p>  |
| 27:30 | <p>A 188:</p> <p><i>"Alteration can therefore be perceived only in substances [f1]. A coming to be or ceasing to be that is not simply a determination of the permanent but is absolute, can never be a possible perception [f2]. For this permanent is what alone makes possible the representation of the transition from one state to another, and from not-being to being. These transitions can be empirically known only as changing determinations of that which is permanent. If we assume that something absolutely begins to be, we must have a point of time in which it was not [f3]. But to what are we to attach this point, if not to that which already exists? For a preceding empty time is not an object of perception. But if we connect the coming to be with things which previously existed, and which persist in existence up to the moment of this coming to be, this latter must be simply a determination of what is permanent in that which precedes it. Similarly also with ceasing to be; it presupposes the empirical representation of a time in which an appearance no longer exists."</i> [f4]</p> |

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|       | <p>[f1] Now he is going to give an argument for this.</p> <p>So now we get something like an epistemic argument. Everything up to this point has seemed to Jay like an analogical or logical argument, but here we seem to get an epistemological argument.</p>  |
| 28:00 | <p>[f2] Now we are beginning to get an interesting thought. You can never <i>perceive</i> something going clean out of existence or something appearing literally out of nowhere.</p> <p>Rather we must think of these events and absence as something changing – say Pierre leaving the room if you are a Sartrean. We can perceive an absence but only against the background of existence and of a previous state.</p> <p>And we can conceive of something coming to be, but as an alteration, as in ‘now the room has Pierre’.</p> <p><a href="#">gobackA188</a></p> |
| 30:00 | <p>[f3] Now we’re getting a further claim about the impossibility of a raw disappearance or a raw ceasing to be.</p> <p>Roughly, in order for something to absolutely begin, we have to have a point of time in which it was not. But to what are to attach this point if not to what already exists?</p> <p>That is, whatever we think of as coming into being, we see it as coming to be, if and only if – to employ the backdrop thesis now – that which already exists of which it is an alteration, like the number of the people of the room.</p>                  |
| 31:00 | <p>A preceding empty time is not an object of perception. You can’t have an empty time that then gets filled up with something coming to be. But you can have a different time. But a different time means you have a determination of what exists and now you are getting a new or different determination of what exists.</p> <p>So the very idea of ceasing to be or coming to be, necessarily is a determination of what exists.</p>   |

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| 32:00 | <p>[f4] The claim now is – and this is what Jay thinks he has been trying to say all along, thus the way he stated the other two [formulations] tried to hint that this is the argument where he was going –</p> <p>The claim now is that knowledge of alteration in an enduring substance is a necessary condition for knowledge of any change at all.</p> <p>Only by treating a change <i>as</i> an alteration – notice the work that is going on here...</p> <p>Let's say that changes our indeterminate dummy term and we are now saying that only by treating change <i>as an alteration</i> – and that is our beginning now of categorial determination – alteration of what? Of what exists, of what endures, of what is permanent, of substance.</p> <p>...can we have or make intelligible to ourselves that there has been an occurrence of change at all.</p> |
| 34:00 | <p>Both Guyer and Melnick misread this move in verificationist terms.</p> <p>We are not claiming, nor is Kant, that we are looking for empirical verification of change here, rather we are looking for its conditions of intelligibility.</p> <p>So we take Kant to be asking the question 'how can I empirically verify that change is happening?' Rather Kant's question is how do we shape, frame, or make intelligible the change does happen.</p> <p>The argument is that it is only intelligible as an alteration of the unchanging. So that for every change there must be something underlying it that is unchanging, and that eventually of course – and now you can see why he thought that this implied the conservation of matter because the...</p>  |
| 35:30 | <p>The unchanging in the example of a building burning down, there is something remaining for Kant which is the actual constituents of the building which is ash and smoke and – to be modern we would add – the release of energy.</p> <p>But that is fine because then you say that there is something ultimate that does not change.</p>  |
|       | <p>So every change has its own background of relative change and endurance of what is altering, and ultimately there must be the permanent itself, which an Aristotelian might call 'prime matter'.</p> <p>Kant would say that it is the forces of attraction and repulsion that underlie all change.</p>  |
|       | <p>Next time will continue with the second and third analogies.</p>  |