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9:00	<p>Read Robert Stern before you read the text. It is lucid and good. The best commentaries that are best are Hyppolite which is staggeringly great, and Harris which is a paragraph by paragraph clever reading which also contextualizes it historically. This is deflationary and anti-metaphysical reading of Kant.</p> <p>Charles Taylor is completely wrong on Hegel.</p>
10:00	Pippin reads Hegel in context of Kant's transcendental idealism, though Pippin is too epistemological but a version of that will be done in this course.
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17:00	<p>Today is an introduction. This is mainly epistemological. Mainly, it is about the relationship between Kant and Hegel. Mainly about Hegel completes Kant.</p> <p>The "Spirit of Christianity and its Fate" forms the best early bit of Hegel.</p>
18:00	<p>Phenomenology is the most riveting text of philosophy ever written. It is unspeakably brilliant.</p> <p>It has no followers even by Hegel. It is unlike anything else. Even Hegel loses control of PS as it is richer than even his own system. What makes it so gripping?</p>

19:00	<p>What Hegel does (as great philosophers do) is not answer old questions or problems, or not directly, <i>but they change the topic. They change what we are talking about.</i> Hegel makes two moves which change the topic of what philosophy is all about or could be about. There is also a third move involved, which is significant to understanding how he achieved the other two moves.</p> <p>Let's begin with the obvious. Modern philosophy begins with the thought of self-consciousness, with the discovery of subjectivity. With the "I think, therefore I am." That idea, that self-consciousness is certain of itself, is the ground and foundation of possible other knowledge.</p>
20:00	
21:00	<p>Kant deepens the Cartesian thought with the notion of the transcendental i.e. the thought "I think" must accompany <i>all</i> my representations or otherwise something would be represented in me which could not BE thought at all. The old D131132 jiggle. (Look for this?)</p> <p>Hegel changes the subject. He contends that the minimal unit for there to be self-conscious agency is two. That you cannot be self-conscious agent by yourself. You are not in an immediate self relation with yourself.</p> <p>On the contrary your relationship to yourself, you being yourself, is mediated by the other. So you are absolutely dependent on the other, absolutely dependent on what is not you (we will discover this later in the semester).</p>
22:00	<p>One might suppose that this is enough of a break.</p> <p>But actually Hegel goes even further for he doesn't think that two is enough. Maybe the minimal unit is two. But as every lover has discovered, two is never enough, you always need a third. So Hegel's definition of self-consciousness is the "I" that is a "We" and the "We" that is an "I."</p>
23:00	<p>That is, his claim is going to be that instead of an "I think" we require a "We think" and it is the notion of "we think" is what is implied and involved in his notion of the "geist."</p> <p>The phenomenology of spirit is a phenomenology of the "geist." "Geist" or the spirit is the "we" that is an "I" and the "I" that is a "we." So the idea that we are always involved in a community of some sort; Hegel calls language the Daesin of spirit. (if I figured out what that meant I would write a book).</p>

24:00	<p>Language is the being there of spirit. It's the way in which, its the median through, which a community passes itself on, recognizes itself, talks to itself, so embeds itself.</p> <p>The problem, Bernstein thinks (having read too much Whitehead), with Freud is that he suffers the problem of misplaced concreteness;</p>
25:00	<p>he thinks that the mind is in our head. Bernstein thinks mind is not in the head and in between us.</p> <p>So Hegel has this notion of mindedness or "Geist" that is somehow the mind that is not in your head, not to be located there in the head, but somehow bound up in the practices and relations one has with one's others who they might be. And we will see who the others are.</p> <p>Because this is Hegel's second move. To get rid of the premise of modern philosophy namely metaphysical and methodological individualism. That is the move here.</p>
26:00	<p>That he destroys the fundamental unit with which we begin philosophy and with which we do philosophy is the stand alone individual that is the mind knowing itself; he says the minimal unit is going to be some broader object. Then in the middle of his book having already made that move he says what is this 'we think.' What we think is not flatly up to us, we cannot think anything we want. Rather we have history. This is the next new topic of conversation.</p>
27:00	<p>That our linguistic community is conditioned by the language, resources, relations we have to one another are all conditioned by history. And to say this is to say a bunch of things.</p> <p>Anyway, spirit is history. One of the things it means Hegel says is that we are here right now a community of the living and the dead. That the dead are always with us. And that we must find out in our community and practices a relation to the dead. This is famous chapter on Antigone.</p>
28:00	<p>And then the even more famous chapter on absolute knowledge are all about, how to live with the dead. So when Hegel says philosophy is its own historical epoch conceptualized in thought, he means unearthing the history that allows us to be speaking in the ways in which we do. That we are not only dependent on each other in our linguistic community and in our linguistic relations but we are dependent on the concrete history that got us here. What bits of concrete history? Well Hegel is going to give us a story on that concrete history,</p>

29:00	<p>a story that included the Greek and Roman world and absolute history,....FILL...Sophocles Antigone, FILL.....nature of guillotine and so forth and so on.</p> <p>Suddenly now philosophy is connected to non-philosophy. So what philosophy has no control over and what you cannot know a-priori and on reflection or the like, but philosophy finds itself conditioned by bits of concrete history, so a kind of history, but certainly concrete history.</p>
30:00	<p>Now in this Hegel has almost no successors. No other philosophers who Bernstein can think of who included in the core of their thought history as a condition for self-consciousness.</p> <p>Heidegger pretends to and the question is what the difference is? And the other side is that Marx will argue that Hegel was not historical enough. So this is a fraught area but the fraughtness is where the thrill is because if Hegel can convince us that you cannot talk about the self without the mediation of the other and if you cannot talk about the mediation of the other</p>
31:00	<p>the "we think" and we cannot talk about the "we think" without talking about history then those debates, lets call it the finessing of history, and Heidegger story, and the attempt to reduce philosophy to history, Marx notion, actually Marx might be more philosophical than Hegel and not historical enough.</p>
32:00	<p>One person who will challenge Hegel on this is Hyppolite.</p> <p>Foucault got the point. He too wanted to write a history of present and maybe in a different way but that is the stake.</p> <p>Now there is a third move. This move is novel in the context of modern philosophy and is fundamental to the Hegelian program.</p>
33:00	<p>Everyone wanted to answer the question of what to do with Kant and like all good nerds they just kept reading more Kant. And finally he helped them out by publishing CJ which contains a thought that had not been uttered philosophically since the time of Aristotle and that is the thought of organism.</p>
34:00	<p>Hegel early was impressed with Aristotle. And what he and his friends FILL Fill got out of CJ was how to avoid atomism and formalism which go together in the following way. Atomism is the thought that there are irreducible particulars and formalism is the thought that there are a-priori universals.</p> <p>So the problem with the tradition which goes back to Plato is the relation between universals and particulars. The thought is that if there are universals that have any weight whatsoever then they will</p>

35:00	<p>swallow up all the particulars--history, finitude, all the concrete stuff.</p> <p>The other side is that if you start with just particulars then you get nominalism, relativism, skepticism that is the debate between rationalism and empiricism.</p> <p>The people who followed him they read Kant as just a rationalist as we will see in a minute how he is seen as a formalist.</p> <p>Now the way to approach this is not through the relationship between universal and particular (though there is much in Hegel on universal and particular).</p>
36:00	<p>Rather we approach this as part/whole. I have already said that I am absolutely dependent on you, that means part of a whole, and I have already said two is not enough so we are both part of a wider linguistic communal community and I have already that is not self-sufficient which means it is part of...</p> <p>So as we see the logic of part/whole is a different way of thinking of the fundamental way of starting way of thinking of. And this will run throughout this.</p>
37:00	<p>And the issue will be what is the mechanism of thinking of all this. How do individuals not get mere parts of whole and get swallowed up by the whole like they used to get swallowed up by the universals.</p> <p>Nonetheless the movement to part to whole is a structural movement in Hegel.</p>
38:00	<p>Now let us put this in context i.e. movement from Kant to Hegel.</p> <p>As we should know Hegel is known as an absolute idealist and some notion of unity of thought and being.</p> <p>The question is what is the relation between absolute idealism (Hegel) and subjective or formalist idealism (Kant).</p>
39:00	<p>In the preface (which we will read last) §26:</p> <p>“”</p>
40:00	<p>By pure self-recognition he means pure self-perception so TUA. And by absolute otherness he might mean what Kant calls things in themselves. So he is saying that the Aether, goal, ground of his endeavour is to show the conditions for the possibility of self-consciousness are grounded in things in themselves. The very thing that Kant said we could not know.</p> <p>How does he manage to do that?</p>

41:00	<p>In a very simple way the goal of Hegel is to complete Kant. For Hegel Kant is a limited, subjective, or finite idealist.</p> <p>As I have already suggested he will replace the Kantian notion of TUA with his notion of the spirit which is a community with a history and language etc, something very thin but something very fat.</p>
42:00	<p>The reason for calling Kant a subjective idealist is just the very terms of transcendental idealism namely we know appearances and not things in themselves. Let us unpack what this means.</p> <p>One way Kant spells out this notion that we know appearances and not things in themselves is by contrasting our conceptual forms of understanding that is the idea that our awareness of objects is always mediated by categories and concepts.</p>
43:00	<p>That is we know objects because they fall under and are mediated by empirical concepts and certain basic items called categories.</p> <p>That notion of awareness is compared to God's awareness which Kant calls intellectual intuition. so for Kant intellectual intuition is that God does not have to wait for something to affect his sensibility and then come up with a concept and work it up and think about it. That is, God does not have to make judgments. God's act of thought is an act of creation. That no sooner does he think something that it exists.</p>
44:00	<p>That God, and this is the crucial, the crux of God is a modal issue, that for God there are no unrealized possibilities. That there is no difference between possibility and actuality and thus no difference between possibility and necessity.</p> <p>Thus the modal differentiations are only true of finite intellects. So Kant is saying that there is a difference between our finite intellects and God's intellectual intuition.</p> <p>That is our point of view on the world is limited. We do not have Gods eye point of view. This is what everyone knows from FILL that we do not have a view from nowhere.</p>
45:00	<p>We only have a subjective perspective. And therefore God or angels in Locke's essay, angels can know necessary connections. So God and angels can know and only we cannot know them. God and angels may know differently.</p> <p>Therefore our knowledge is restricted or primitive priritive? (FILL)with respect to an infinite standpoint.</p> <p>Hegel's question is simply this. What are the grounds for posing this other standpoint?</p>

46:00	<p>Imposing this other point of view, namely Gods eye point of view, makes that point of view constitutive of the meaning of the knowledge we do have and hence restricts the being of the world to what merely conforms to our subjective way of looking at it.</p> <p>So it is as if the story goes we are told that our knowledge is limited or finite because we cannot see things the way God can see them.</p> <p>So compared to God our position is restricted. And the question is with what right we can pose this other standpoint</p>
47:00	<p>as the condition of possibility and meaning of our stand point. So if our meaning were not restricted or limited in contrast to intellectual intuition it would not be finite in the restricted sense. It would be infinite.</p>
48:00	<p>So all you have to do is to say that there is no allowing for stuff that we cannot know and that would make your perspective on the world not finite but infinite.</p> <p>Let us face it. No one will say that there is no God talk in Hegel but the God or religion talk in Hegel is precisely there to discuss this very issue namely the issue of whether we can presume an externality, something that is unknowable, and outside of us as a condition of possibility for the intelligibility of what we do think and know.</p>
49:00	<p>So the move here is famously made by Donald Davidson in analytical philosophy when he says that people think that our knowledge is only limited to our conceptual scheme. And then he says if there can be different conceptual schemes and then he said that if we can understand one another then these conceptual schemes could not be that different. But if these conceptual schemes could not be really different then it does not make sense to say that knowledge is relative to a conceptual scheme because there is nothing to contrast it with. So the relativity disappears.</p> <p>This is not to say that knowledge is not conceptual, historical, all of that. But that there is no reason to think that all of that is a restriction. So this is to take Kant at his word.</p>
50:00	<p>Kant's great stupendous thought, the Copernican Turn, is that the limits of knowledge are its conditions of possibility and therefore not limits at all.</p> <p>Hegel wants to radicalize that thought. So that there are no limits at all cuts across all thoughts of Kantian skepticism.</p>

51:00	<p>So for Hegel the problem with traditional metaphysics is not that it tried to know the infinite (why do philosophy if not to interrogate the infinite) but rather that it has offered a false interpretation of the infinite as something transcending the world of ordinary experience.</p> <p>So the idea of Hegelian philosophizing is to make everything that was thought to be transcendent to human experience and makes it immanent to human experience and gets its role in the role it plays in the part whole logic. So it makes it wholly immanent.</p>
52:00	<p>So of course there is God and this is what the great chapter on Christianity does is that God becomes man. Not sort of, that is it. God becomes man, man becomes holy spirit, holy spirit becomes geist. That is the story and the argument. End of story.</p> <p>Now this move is definitive of continental philosophy. Continental philosophy is distinguished by the attempt to show that each item that traditional philosophers have thought to be transcendent is really an immanent connection.</p> <p>So all of continental philosophy is just doing Aristotle and Plato. Bring the universal down to earth and make them do some real work.</p>
53:00	<p>The question for continental philosophy, modern philosophy as Hegel started it, is that how far can you go without stopping doing philosophy at all, that is where you lose any possible grip on saying that the world has a structure, intelligibility, meaning, and get reduced to positivism.</p> <p>So philosophy is that ticklish, difficult, almost impossible endeavor of bringing God down to earth, without losing that it was God who came down to earth and not some other wise guy.</p>
54:00	<p>Second move.</p> <p>Lets think of other ways in which Kant thinks of totality. It is of course Kantian notions of totality that make the view on things subjective.</p> <p>And one of the ways in which Kant thinks of totality is the idea of infinite progress or infinite regress that is never completed.</p>
55:00	<p>So when he talks of causality and that each cause has a condition, and keep going back forever, he talks about his, in his moral philosophy he will talk about the highest good as an object of infinite striving, a regulative idea that we seek after, we realize our virtue, so that we may be deserving of the proportion of that highest good, happiness would be proportional to virtue.</p>
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56:00	<p>So in both cases Kant supposes that finitude means no knowledge of totality.</p> <p>So that there may be an infinite striving or an infinite thinking that moves back to the un-conditioned but we never have an image of the totality. But why? In a way Kant's thinking here is literal. He thinks that if there is a totality you have to be outside it to see it. You can approach it but cannot get there because if you get there then you would already be outside it and the thinking would not be finite.</p>
57:00	<p>Hegel will argue, and this will yield his notion of the unhappy consciousness, the consciousness that is continually striving to be one with what is beyond it and never achieved it.</p> <p>He thinks that once you know the limit you have already crossed the limit. That you cannot think the idea of limit without going beyond it. To make sense of the idea of limit....</p> <p>Think of how you used to think of where space ended...</p> <p>You cannot think of the notion of limit the way Kant wants to without it being self-defeating.</p>

BREAK

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2:00	In the antimonies, in the third antimony, Kant, this is the antimony on freedom, Kant contrasts the idea of the subject as known versus the subject as free or self-determining.
3:00	And the thought is, is that this is the moral agent. This is going to be his so called noumenal self. Kant says we don't know if we are free, rather we must believe we are free. That is not an arbitrary belief, its not like we can decide. It is a necessary belief, but none the less it is a belief. It is form of what he calls practical faith.
4:00	So there is a contrast between the empirical self that can be known in just the ordinary ways that people know about one another and how people who know about themselves and the free and self determining agent who is unknown, and this is equally the distinction between theoretical and practical reason. Now, Hegel's problem with this is that this subject, the practical subject, the subject of agency, of morality is not only unknown, it is equally in a certain way given, so it is unknown and unconditioned
5:00	Which to say that the very idea of a free or moral agent is equally the idea of a new immediacy. And the idea of immediacy you might say is the very thing that Kant should not allow. That the whole point of Kantianism is to say nothing is immediate, everything is mediated, and yet he struggles throughout his entire career the idea of the fact of reason, all these ideas to try to understand this practical self.

6:00	Hegel will avoid this problem in a multiplicity of ways. But the first and most profound way is to say that freedom and self consciousness come to be. That they are not given. That they emerge through practices and through history and that we can know them in all the way that we can know any historical item, that there is going to be nothing particularly obscure about agency or practical freedom, it is going to be another way in which we know ourselves as historical agents and hence in which we must affirm ourselves as beings of a certain kind.
7:00	Now What ties these critiques together of Kant is that he thinks that Kant did not complete his program, and he did not complete his program because in a certain way he remained an epistemologist. What does that mean? Epistemology is not just the theory of knowledge but we'll say epistemology arises at a certain moment as first philosophy. That is what Descartes' revolution was all about. Making epistemology first philosophy by which I mean the issue became my fundamental relationship to the world is by means of representations.
8:00	So to be in the world is to have fundamentally veridical representation of it, which is why for all the early epistemologists and early philosophers skepticism is so scary. Because if you believe that your being in the world is by virtue of representations of the world and you don't know you can trust those representations, then you don't even have any surety that you are a being in the world. Hence not only is it a moment of the first meditation, but radically that moment where Hume becomes afraid "I am a monster I must be mad"
9:00	Because he knows that the very idea of letting representations be our way of connecting us to the world is a way somehow disconnecting us from the world. Now, in a certain way Kant's Copernican turn was supposed to resolve that problem, to be a theory of representation. But without the problem of whether or not our representations were veridical because the idea of the Copernican turn was I don't even have to ask if my representations match the world, the very idea of representations is already the idea of being in the world. That the Copernican turn. It doesn't ask if my representations match the world, it rather suggests that to have judgmental representations of a certain kind is our way of being in the world.
10:00	And, you'll find the same thought for example in John McDowell. That's how I read McDowell. Hegel is going to argue that our mode of being in the world is not fundamentally as knowers but we might say as agents. We're getting there, that is overcoming epistemology, is the work of the opening 4 chapters of the phenomenology. The first three chapters are the repetition of the history of epistemology and the transition of chapter four and self consciousness is to show that self conscious agents are

11:00	not related to the world as knowers but by means of the strange Hegelian word that we'll suffer through out the entire semester, by means of recognition, by not knowing, but recognizing. As if that's going to make anything better. Anyway, but we're in the world not as knowers but as agents. Well the turning point, what motors this movement into fundamentally overcoming the theory practical reason distinction and generating a philosophy which truly has a primacy in practical reason, next week I am going to argue that Hegel's ontology is an ethical ontology, that the very structure of his thought is governed by the structures of practical reason, not theoretical reason.
12:00	So, Hegel's gripe, you might say this is another one of his revolutionary moves, called the movement into pragmatism is that we cannot understand our relation to ourselves, and our relation to one another and our relation to the world if we think of any of those relationships as fundamentally representational. That they are going to have a completely different status. This is not to deny that we are knowers, it's just that, to take a cheap shot, that knowing is a social practice, that knowing is something that is regulated by collective norms in which we validate certain truths and by means of certain practices and so on and so forth.
13:00	That is all the things that you are familiar with from post Popperian philosophy of science, Kuhn and all that kind of stuff. The turning point that gets us on the way to this for Hegel is in the second edition transcendental deduction. And the moment in the transcendental deduction where Hegel and indeed even Fichte think that Kant goes beyond himself is going to be in what is usually thought of as the turning point in the deduction which relates to our knowledge of things in space and time.
14:00	What Hegel and Fichte want to argue is that everything must be related to us as self conscious beings. If I can use one of Hegel's slogans: "Everything that is substance must become subject." Which is to say that nothing no substance ,no thing , no material, no item, no individual, no though, no nothing that doesn't get itself related to us as self conscious agents. So that the absolute is as much subject as substance.
15:00	In the Transcendental Deduction? Well, lets remember how the Tran de works and this is the moment of great success. The t d. fundamentally operates by trying to connect two claims. The first says that the "I think" provides the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience.
16:00	Kant thought here, it's a rather easy one. It is that in order for an object to be known, it must be judged. The only we can know thing is by judging them. If you are going got judge an object you must employ certain judgmental forms, that is judgment has a structure. So we use : the table is brown. Subject object. Well if that is the way we judge things, and the only we can know them, then that structure must itself, so subject, predicate form of knowing must relate itself to the structure of things in the world.

17:00	<p>Things , substances with properties or accidents so that the structure of the world Kant argues must be as it were a material mirror image of the forms that we use in our practices of judgment so if the "subject is predicate" is your syntax, then we might say the syntax entails semantics or transcendental syntax entails a transcendental semantics. Well that is an easy enough thought, but it is also a subjective thought because what Kant is saying that we think about the world how? Well, in just the way we think about the world.</p>
18:00	<p>By using these forms, and therefore we must impose those structures, they must accommodate themselves to our way of thinking. And that is the usual the conceptual scheme problem: that things must accommodate themselves to the forms of structures of our thought. So the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience, those forms I must use, turn out to be these categories. That's the first step. The second step is to argue that the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience are also the necessary conditions for the objects of experience</p>
19:00	<p>That is, nothing can appear in space and time, that does not conform to our structured ways of knowing. So the thought is here in the first step, this leaves, lets call it "things" temporarily outside our experience. Experience is just what gets shaped by our ways of knowing. In the second step the argument is that things now must conform to our ways of structured experience.</p>
20:00	<p>The thought then is, even appearing in space and time is subject to categories where the categories themselves derive from the structures of self consciousness. But how on earth does Kant get from 1 to 2? There has got to be a trick. How does he get from the thought that the categories are not just subjective conditions for representability but further that nothing is given in intuition can fail</p>
21:00	<p>to conform to those categories. It is remarkable that in this book of nearly 700 pages, the crux is in the footnote. The famous footnote at B 160. Kant says</p> <p><i>Space represented as object as we are required to do in geometry contains nothing more than the mere form of intuition.</i></p>
22:00	<p><i>It also contains combination of the manifold given according to the form of sensibility in an intuitive representation so that the form of intuition gives only a manifold the formal intuition gives unity a representation</i></p> <p>That must be nearly Greek. The shift is from space as a form of intuition, as a given empty container that is wholly independent of self consciousness, namely space as it is discussed in the transcendental aesthetic, to space as an actual object of cognitive awareness , but in so far as space is an actual object of cognitive awareness,</p>

23:00	it is a formal intuition and therefore subject to the categories. But that means if space which is the condition for any object appearing to us, must conform to the categories, then lo and behold, everything that appears must conform to the categories, therefore the necessary conditions for the objects of experience are also necessary conditions for the objects of experience. In short even the intuited manifold is determined by conceptual conditions. That is the crux of the matter. Everything, even the intuited manifold of space and time are determined by conceptual conditions.
24:00	And hence everything is determined by the spontaneity of the subject. Now, Fichte first this is what his entire v era is exactly what Fichte was trying to do and certainly what Hegel learned from Fichte was the recognition that the spontaneity of the subject, subjective agency, our powers, our ways of thinking, mediate anything that might appear to us.
25:00	Now what this does if this is right, if this is the right thought, is it makes problematic the distinction, which is structural for Kant, between original spontaneity and original passivity. That is the fundamental structure of Kant's system right? That it is structure by to know is to have intuitions that you receive, original passivity, and concepts through which you think and that intuitions are synthesized by concepts
26:00	. That presumes that there is an unsurpassable passivity and the depth of that passivity is express in the idea of space and time as forms of intuitions. That is as abstract containers, if the argument of the transcendental deduction is right, passivity cannot be absolute or unconditioned. Passivity as always contextual. This points to the deep failure in Kant.
27:00	Kant presupposes the availability of space and time as forms of intuition in order to work from the categories, to say the schematism, to things. So he goes from spontaneity mediated by the imagination which then allows the categories to get themselves into the world by working up space and time. So for Hegel, Kant's notions of space and time are empty forms.
28:00	And the form that he thinks is most empty, therefore the one he will struggle with most is time. We think of events as happening in time, at least Kant does. Hegel argues that time is not a container. He is going to replace Kantian time as a form of intuition with time as a contentful process. Let's give that process a name: history. Lets give history a name: Gost.
29:00	So, what is for Kant, the emptiest thing of all, time as a container in which events occur, becomes for Hegel the actual movement of history itself. This by the way is going to be the crux of that chapter the phenomenology called 26 weeks from now, absolute knowing. The chapter on absolute knowing is about the relationship as time the container and time as content. So it is a movement from time to temporality from history to historicity. Once Hegel makes that move, that is

30:00	Once he allows the thought that nothing can be given, that nothing is a substance by itself even space and time cannot be empty forms that fill up with content, that everything has to be related to self conscious agency then the entire notion of our inquiry will be an inquiry into... What does Kant say about self-conscious agency? He says us moderns as self conscious agents are self-determined. So, the Hegelian notion of the investigation of the conditions under the conditions in which we inhabit the world
31:00	Are as equally an inquiry into the conditions which we determine ourselves as we determine ourselves as agents in the world or to use Hegel's technical phrase an inquiry into "thought's self-determination", so now you are getting that great Hegelian thought that the Absolute is self-determining. Well, this sounds offensive I know. If nothing is given, then there is nothing but the self-determinations of thought. This is another way of saying that there is no given.
32:00	There is no object that is given that we are adjusting ourselves to that we are trying as it were to think of it as absolutely outside us. If we are always thinking within the movements of thought, then we are thinking of the self determinations of thought. So we are thinking that Hegel's philosophy is actually, what he says it is, a philosophy of freedom. That the nature of history is the discovery of the nature of the self-determining movement of reason and therefore a unity of theoretical and practical reason. So what Hegel does
33:00	By introducing this critique of the given, is deny what can be argued to be the ultimate structure of all platonic thought. And I take Kant to be a standard Platonist. Namely, the distinction between form and matter. By dropping the form/matter distinction one equally loses a sharp distinction between the transcendental and the empirical, between the a priori the a posteriori , if there are any a priori's in Hegel, then they will be, all of them material a priori's, whatever the hell that means.
34:00	This does not mean, or at least Hegel does not think it means, that there are not any categorical conditions for knowledge, that there are no categories. Remember, he did write a whole thing called the Logic. Rather the claim will be that categories are uncovered or generated, they are not absolutely a priori, and what is uncovered, shows how the world must be. Well, how can I put that into a cheap takeaway slogan?

35:00	<p>Well, Hegel puts it in this cheap takeaway slogan in paragraph 20. He says</p> <p><i>The true is the whole.</i></p> <p>That is pretty cheap. That just sounds like a tautology. He has to say a little bit more. Here is the more:</p> <p><i>But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through development.</i></p> <p>So the whole is what becomes so philosophy is bound up with its becoming and its becoming is ultimately the discovery of a self-determining movement.</p>
36:00	<p><i>Of the absolute, it must be said, it is essentially result.</i></p> <p>Now that sentence all by itself should tell you that whatever Hegel thinks the Absolute is, you know it ain't the Christian God. The Absolute is a result, a historical result, that only in the end, is it what it truly is and that precisely in this consists its nature to be actual subject spontaneous becoming of itself.</p>
37:00	<p>Someone, a philosopher once said, I forget which said, "Become what you are." Of course, what else could you become? Something you're not. In all of this Hegel nowhere denies the premise of Transcendental Id, that is to be is to be an object for a subject. I've already said substance must become subject. An object is always constituted by a certain categorical sect. I will argue in two weeks time, this is the premise of the phenomenology.</p>
38:00	<p>It is not even argued for. Hegel takes this as a given. Of course, what is to be, is to be conceived. What could you be, not conceived? Hegel doesn't see any way around that. What the phenomenology does is examine all of the different concepts of an object that philosophy and culture to now, have proposed. That is the history of philosophy is a series of what is for something to be an object, concepts of objects.</p>
39:00	<p>Which is crucial thought, categories are concepts of an object. So all philosophy is a series of concepts of an object. Each concept of an object entails thinking of a fundamental way in which we are related to reality. So every philosophy proposes a different concept of an object. Object is form, object is matter, object is life, object is self consciousness, object is work, object is freedom. Each of these have their moment in the history of philosophy, in the history of culture.</p>
40:00	<p>What Hegel does is show that each of these are forms of self-relatedness that they are ways in which we mediate ourselves and the world. And therefore puts them into order. The order is complicated. The order of the phenomenology which is both phenomenological and historical. How does he manage to do that? There are two simple premises for his entire project.</p>

41:00	Premise one: there is a difference between modern skepticism and ancient skepticism. Modern skepticism cheats. What does Hegel say that? What is curious about modern skepticism?
42:00	What is it that Descartes, Hume, Locke, Leibniz do not doubt? Their mindedness. What they are sure about is they have experience but what they want to know is does their experience represent the world. They keep the mind safe. Ancient skepticism does not keep the mind safe.
43:00	Ancient skepticism seeks reasons to doubt everything. In short we may say Ancient skepticism treats nothing as given and takes nothing as immediate. That everything is subject to doubt. Step two. What is another word for doubt? Lets assume that our fundamental way of relating to things is doubting it. It's a good way to start. We are philosophers after all. We all know philosophers are mad Lets just doubt. What does it mean to doubt?
44:00	Hegel thinks is crucial is the idea of the negative. To doubt something is to negate it. To say "no"
45:00	<p>Paragraph 32 of the preface. I am just using famous little bits from the preface because they are irresistible</p> <p><i>But, that an accident as such, detached from what circumstances, what is bound only in its actual only context with others should obtain an existence of its own in its separate freedom. This is the tremendous power of the negative. It is the energy of the thought of the pure "I".</i></p>
46:00	<p><i>The pure "I" in its spontaneity is the negation of the world, is the saying "no" to it.</i></p> <p>Well maybe there is another word for negation. Hegel suggests it: death</p> <p><i>If that is what we want to call this non-actuality is of all things most dreadful and to hold fast what is dead requires greatest strength. Lacking strength, beauty hates the understanding for asking of her what it cannot do. But the life of spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather the light that endures it and maintains itself in it.</i></p>
47:00	<p><i>It lives its truth only when in utter dismemberment it finds itself.</i></p> <p>What moves the entire phenomenology is the force of the negative and the negative is Hegel's first definition of freedom. The first way in which we are free is our power to say no, to negate. The power of negation is how we relate to the other?</p>
48:00	We relate to the other in the first instance by killing it. What is the simplest way to kill the thing if you are a philosopher? What did Adam do to get reality going? Named the apple Naming it! How do kill something?

49:00	Give it a name because you take away its reality. You interpose something between it and you, right? So the simplest gesture, there is a whole story in Hegel about Adam killing and all that. The simplest act of naming is a form of killing. You replace the actuality of that object with the name of the object. Then you have to work with that actuality, that name, because then that becomes the concept. The first thing you do in coming to an object is to kill it.
50:00	Take those two thoughts, that nothing is going to be safe from doubt, the privileging of ancient over modern skepticism. The second thought that consciousness or the understanding is defined by its negativity, which is another way of saying there is no such thing as intellectual intuition. The opposite of the idea of the primacy of negation would be a belief that we could immediately intuit something without any mediating gesture.
51:00	So the claim for the primacy of the negative is simply a way of stating the thesis that all thought is mediated that all relations to objects are mediated. And now we know what they are mediated by, by death. So this is going to be fun right? Now those two thoughts together are all you need from transcendental idealism because once you have those two thoughts, you must claim that every relationship to an object is mediated by a concept of an object. That is the Copernican turn.
52:00	Every relationship to an object is mediated by a concept of an object in general. Taking the idea of a concept of an object in general, Hegel can then do what? Let's take a look, as I said we want to defend idealism. What is the opposite of idealism? Realism. What is realism?
53:00	Something can either match or not match the world and that there are no definitive criteria of that. So that the thought of a realist is that if you believe that truth is representation, that it is correspondence to reality, then you must equally believe that it could be the case that we could have all the possible evidence we could have that the world is fine and it be the case that the world is not fine.
	That evidence and truth, there is always a gap. And, of course the whole idea of the entire tradition was to try to find some way of closing that gap. In Descartes, it's God's benevolence. As if God has nothing better to do than to make sure our representations match the world. What a devious God he must be. Kant, as you see, tried to change the story. Let's not get over our things, let's say that things must match our categorical representation. Well, that has all the problems that we have discovered.

55:00	<p>Hegel's strategy is to show the realist is false, not directly, but indirectly. Pippin pg 98</p> <p><i>That is, the only strategy Hegel can use consistent with his own idealism will be to undercut the presuppositions in standard realist assumptions about being as it is in itself. That is Hegel will try to undermine and exclude the relevance of such doubts progressively and systematically rather than answer them directly.</i></p> <p>So he is not going to refute realism. He is going to tease us out of our realist intuitions.</p>
56:00	<p>He is going to piecemeal by piecemeal. This gives us another thought about what philosophy does. It's a kind of therapy, an argumentative therapy in which we show that, well, what do we show? Lets see what Pippin says:</p> <p>He will try to show determinately why given some putative notional determination of objects.</p> <p>Notional determination of objects means concepts of objects in general. Some broad categorical account of what objects are.</p> <p>He will show that doubts about whether objects can be must or can be so notionally specified are the relevant determinate doubts. They are only as a consequence of that notion's own incompleteness.</p>
57:00	<p>That is, the reason you can raise a doubt is because your idea of a condition for knowledge has further conditions. All philosophy imagines that it knows what the conditions of knowledge are, that there be ideas, universals, and it turns out anytime anyone specifies conditions for knowledge, what Hegel shows is that there are further conditions for knowledge. And it is those further conditions that are the ground for doubt.</p>
58:00	<p>So that the doubts are perfectly sensibly motivated in that respect, not general. This in turn means for Hegel, summarizing everything all at once:</p> <p><i>That such an opposition between subject and object is itself a determination of the notion.</i></p> <p>That is the very thing that gets the whole problem going, there are subjects and there are objects, is one more categorical determination of concept and object in general. Even realism in its basic presupposition itself is one more way of setting up the world.</p>

59:00	<p>So such an incompleteness can be made out only on the assumption of a developing notion of objectivity.</p> <p><i>There is no point in abstractly asking whether the world really is as we take it to be. Whether for all we know this or that bizarre scenario might actually be occurring. Doubts about the adequacy of our conceptual scheme must have some basis for them to be serious doubts.</i></p> <p>And Hegel thinks he can show that the only legitimate basis for such doubts is what he calls spirit experience of itself.</p>
60:00	<p>An experience itself determined by the developing notion. So what he is going to do is show that all the reasons one would have for doubting, we go back to where I started the lecture, the infinite, turn out to be part of the process in which we come to understand ourselves as spiritual beings. And once we understand ourselves those doubts will not become unanswered, but irrelevant. Hence, and this is all Hegel means by absolute knowing is that knowing is unconditioned.</p>
61:00	<p>That is to say there is nothing outside knowing. Things in themselves, God, monads, all those creepy crawly things people keep making up, forms.</p>
62:00	<p>So Hegel means by absolutely means not that we know everything, that would be an absurd claim, but that knowing itself is not realistically constrained, that there is no exteriority, no God, no reason for faith, none of these crummy notions. In that respect, Hegel's philosophy completes Kant.</p>
63:00	<p>Now what might be thought to be more puzzling here is why in order to think that thought, we have to talk about Greek tragedy, Roman law, the absolute state, capital, the French Revolution, romantic poetry, get an account of Indian religion, Egyptian religion, Judaism, and Christianity.</p>
64:00	<p>Hegel will try to convince you that those too involve fundamental concepts of an object and that they too are part of mediations of our thought, so that they too are part of our education. It's a book whose conditions of possibility lie only in its end, therefore it is like a novel that is writing out the conditions of how the novel could be begun. So it is a reversion of remembrance of things past.</p>
65:00	<p>Three quick things. The ways in even which this deflationary reading is different from standard readings of Hegel. I do not believe that the Phenomenology has no presupposition. Since everything is mediated, then so is phenomenology therefore there is no possible way of philosophy ever beginning. That is how the phenomenology begins. It begins in the middle. I will have to convince you of that.</p>

66:00	Secondly, that the fundamental structure of the movement of spirit turns out to be a structure of ethical relations so lets say that the ontology of spirit is an ethical ontology. And thirdly, there is often the question of whether the phenomenology is a comedy or a tragedy. It is clearly a narrative. What kind of narrative? In part, I want to suggest at least some aspect of a tragic reading is appropriate.
67:00	For at least on the reading I am going to offer you, part of the core of what Hegel thinks absolute knowing involves is the discovery of the disappointment in knowing. That in knowing, we do not get all the things we hoped we might get. Philosophy does not tell us who we should sleep with, who we should make war with, or how to live a good life. Philosophy is intrinsically a disappointment.
68:00	To discover that is also, so that what philosophy cannot do and what has often been hoped for from philosophy is that it should offer us a kind of transcendental security that we are, what is a typical misreading of Hegel, that we are at home in the world. I think Hegel is suggesting just the opposite. That nothing, nothing, can makes us at home in the world. That's what people wanted from philosophy and that was the mistake that drove philosophy to be a series of hyperboles rather than be what philosophy must be which is a recovery of the ordinary.
69:00	That would lead me to say it, but I won't say it, that Hegel's dialectic is a negative dialectic.