

00:00	<p>We will spend more than a week on space because the problems of the transcendental ideality of space are going to become complicated.</p> <p>So today we will just jump right into space and get back to the issues of transcendental idealism via the problems of space.</p>
1:00	<p>Kant claims that we have no access to the way things are in themselves—all the intellect can know a priori are its own rules of activity.</p> <p>And it doesn't even know its own rules of activity absolutely. Rather what Kantian self-reflection is an internal self-description: i.e. within the bounds of our limitations.</p> <p>We have ourselves and ideal representation of our own capacities for self-understanding.</p>
2:00	<p>That is to say, the old Russel-Moore objection is that there is behind every necessity a kind of contingency.</p> <p>There is a resolute non-absoluteness; even Kantian necessity. Everything in Kant is conditional. The only unconditional in Kant is that everything is conditional.</p>
	<p>Content of our experience is known as a result of sensible affection. Hence the transcendental aesthetic—referring to sensibility, not to aesthetics as in art—is going to be a study of our powers of affection.</p> <p>Although that sounds oxymoronic, we do have powers of affection, they just happen to be passive powers.</p>

3:30	<p>The question is what can be known a priori about our capacities of affection.</p> <p>In speaking of affection and hence of sensation, we have to be aware that for Kant sensations on their own are not representations of any sort.</p> <p>They do not confusedly represent things—as Leibniz thought—nor can they clear and distinct perceptions in the mind—as Locke and Hume thought.</p>
	<p>Thus the having of a sensation for Kant is not a form of awareness—it is not a form of awareness, not a form of sapience, knowledge.</p> <p>We might say that the gap between sentience and sapience is rigorous and absolute.</p>
5:00	<p>Indeed for the sensory manifold—which is Kant's word for the sensory many that we start out with—on its own cannot be described at all.</p> <p>For any such work of description would equally be a work of discrimination—like the difference between a tickle and a slap—any discrimination is already a cognizing or conceptualizing; you are already deep in the business of knowledge and representing—even if what you are conceptualizing is your own states.</p> <p>Cognition is cognition whether it is of states within or outside of you.</p> <p>Knowledge requires the discursive element and hence all the apparatus of thinking and judging must be brought into play.</p>

6:30	<p>Insofar as we are aware of all the stuff that happens in us they are inner objects that have to be thought.</p> <p>From this we can infer three claims about the status of sensations:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Transcendentally-transcendental is a word for Kant that means the description of something in its necessary prior conditions. Therefore sensation transcendentally considered simply means that feature of our knowledge which is given or over which we have no control. There is nothing more to say—we have no control but are affected by. 2. B 350: 'for truth or illusion is not in the object insofar as it is intuited but in the judgment about it insofar as it is thought. It is therefore corrected to say that the senses do not err—not because they always judge rightly but because they do not judge at all'. What happens in the senses is just causal stuff, and thus no judging happens at all. Questions of right and wrong don't really arise in sensation; illusion or unillusion in respect to the sense is a <i>misdescription</i>—although not an innocent misdescription since empiricism spent all its efforts and time on. Descartes also had problems here. Sensibility is neither clear nor obscure, but it must be understood as 'the genetic origin' of certain states. 3. Since we are beginning with a primitive description between form and content—form always for Kant involves the notion of relations. Form always involves relations, sensations are non-relational. Therefore, since sensations are the content of knowledge, it follows for Kant all relations belong to the mind. <p>This is one way in which Kant accepts a kind of atomistic...there is a primitively atomistic background. That is the world in itself is non-relational. Relations are all creatures of the mind and insofar as we are aware of relations we are aware of mind dependent phenomena.</p>
11:00	<p>One way you could avoid Kant, is to begin with a different non-atomistic conception of the sensory manifold—e.g. beginning with Bergson or James—they really saw that if you wanted a different account than Kant you need different primitives...hence the Bergsonian <i>Duree</i>, which is intended to side-step the whole Kantian apparatus.</p>

12:00	<p>Question:</p> <p>The Kantian assumption is that things apart from the mind do not have external relations. Real external relations are the work of the mind.</p> <p>Take the primitive account—think of all external relations of as the relation of "taller than".</p> <p>So, e.g., Barry is taller than Jay.</p>
	<p>Insofar as that is a comparative judgment, the Kantian thought would be that it is the mind that is doing the work of connecting the two. But there primitive ways of eliminating the comparison.</p> <p>e.g. Barry is 6ft and Jay is 5.10ft. So the Leibnizian view is you take all of these comparative judgments which are confused perceptions and you reduce them to their internal features.</p> <p>So their internal properties is in any possible world Barry = 6ft and Jay = 5.10. That is the Leibnizian truth. The comparison is just a confused way of representing internal relations.</p> <p>But Jay and Barry in themselves have no relation to one another of "taller than"—we can do all this work without two place predicates.</p> <p>Reductionism is always the reduction of two place predicates (X is taller than Y) to one place predicates (X is F, Y is G).</p>
16:00	<p>In Descartes second meditation, there is a treatment of a piece of wax which is intended to show that bodies are intrinsically things with qualitative features.</p> <p>Quantitative feature belongs intrinsically to extension.</p> <p>So we are talking about the intrinsic features of the thing, not in reference to an arbitrary standard.</p> <p>So the point here is the difference between external vs. internal relations and two place vs. one place relations.</p>

17:3 0	<p>There are three parts to the Transcendental Aesthetic:</p> <p><u>1. Metaphysical Exposition</u> <u>2. Transcendental Exposition</u> <u>3. Conclusions</u></p> <p>the Metaphysical Exposition means things undeniably true of the concept of space.</p> <p>Having established what these are, Kant will go on to show, in the "Transcendental Exposition" the ontological status of space, given that the claims of the Metaphysical Exposition are true. And this is cleared up in the Conclusion.</p>
18:3 0	<p>The Metaphysical Exposition of space has 4 arguments.</p> <p>The first two arguments try to show that space is apriori., The second two arguments try to show that space is an intuition.</p> <p>And then having shown that, in the Transcendental Exposition, he tries to infer from those claims, the conclusion—which is then elaborated into the conclusion—that space must be transcendently ideal. That is the strategy.</p>
19:3 0	<p>Looking then at the first two arguments, for the apriori character of space.</p> <p>Argument 1, B 38: "...xxx..."</p>
21:3 0	<p>The point of Kant's argument, and of the following one, which is hardly transparent...one of the bizarenesses of reading the CPR is that for being a long text it is far from overly-argued, almost everything is [?]-there is missing premises and clauses, etc.</p> <p>What Kant is trying to argue here is trying to think hard about the notion of "outer". Where "outer" means bodies external to one another. Kant is trying to think about what it means to claim something is outside my mind.</p> <p>How can I be in touch with something other than my own thoughts. If there is a kind of drive that epistemologists care about, we want to know that we are in touch with the world and not some hallucination. We want to get outside our heads. We have a drive to get outside our own head—and the whole history of philosophy turns out to tell us that this is very difficult.</p>

24:3 0	<p>Kant wants to begin with the thought that to say that something is outside of me or things are outside one another is not the same as, does not mean, "in space".</p> <p>Those two are not analytically the same. But why?</p> <p>This claim is false for Leibniz. Leibniz thinks that space is purely ideal—there is no space in itself. Just in the way that "taller than" to me being so big and you being so big, space is reducible for Leibniz to the internal predicates of the different monads.</p>
26:3 0	<p>If we were going to give a Leibnizian description to get rid of space—each of us looking at the blackboard...we can all look at the blackboard without a spatial description by saying that we each have our own state, and our perceptions of the blackboard will be variable in an angular way, but that is it. There is no space involved, just different perceptual states.</p>
29:0 0	<p>Leibniz would think that so that, taking two books, what keeps the two books in different places...well he couldn't think of anything. Leibniz was struck by the fact that we can't touch it, you can't feel it, so what then is space?</p> <p>I know what a book is, but I don't know what the space it is in is independently of what is in it—then we should get rid of it.</p> <p>If substance is what is real, then let's drop an account of anything in the middle and just talk about the things themselves.</p> <p>For him space is just an illusory way of talking about what is out there as "taller than" is illusory.</p>
31:0 0	<p>A lot of philosophers and scientists have thought that space is dependent on the things with in it and is not itself an independent existence.</p> <p>It is purely relational, and has no existence in itself.</p> <p>For the moment all we need to know that this is enough for us to realize that outer doesn't analytically mean "in space". It is not an analytic truth—that is all we are trying to say.</p>

32:0 0	<p>Therefore, if I want to connect the notions of outer and in-space I am going to need an argument. That is what the first two arguments of the Metaphysical Exposition are.</p> <p>They argue that for us that in order for us to be able to count...notice how we are shifting the vocabulary, we are not talking here about the ontology of it all, we are saying that the necessary condition for us to be able to count something as outside my mind is for me to know that it is in a space outside me.</p> <p>'In space' and 'outside me' turn out to be what we need to hook up. In other words, this is going to be a synthetic a priori truth.</p>
33:0 0	<p>So the thought here is that the necessity of thinking about space as what gives me outsidedness is going to be transcendental, that is a necessary condition for the possibility of knowledge.</p> <p>I can only claim something as not merely a state of me but as other than me if and only if it is in space—otherwise I have to admit it is just a state of me.</p>
34:0 0	<p>If I am tripping and I see pink elephants, but a friend says they are not there. There is only one place for them to be, in my mind.</p> <p>The condition for them to be independent, for them to be real, would be for them to be in the corner, in space. If they are not there in space, then they are in my mind.</p> <p>So in showing that I am tripping, we are just appealing to the Metaphysical Exposition of space.</p>

35:0 0	<p>The argument here then is not an argument from abstraction—it is not as it often looks on a first reading that Kant is arguing that I can abstract the concept of space from the things I see; if that is what this passage intended, that would entail that all concepts cannot be abstracted which is to claim that all concepts are innate, which would make the passage absurd.</p> <p>Although Kant is claiming that the concept of space cannot be totally learned through abstraction and reflection.</p> <p>Rather Kant's argument is that a representation of space is necessary in order for me to be aware of things as distinct from me and as distinct from each other.</p> <p>Since a reference to space is analytically built into these distinctions—that is, separate from me, separate from one another—as a reference to red is built into the thought of red things, then the two cases are not analogous.</p>
36:3 0	<p>Space and outer are not logically-analytically connected is suggested by the argument—as much of the Transcendental Aesthetic is directed against Leibniz who did think that space was an imaginative projection that mirrored the real relation amongst objects.</p> <p>Leibniz's famous notion of the identity of indiscernibles...if all the qualitative features of one thing are the same as all the qualitative features of another thing, then they are the same thing.</p>
38:0 0	<p>So Leibniz thought that what made two things really two is that they had to be qualitatively different.</p> <p>Hence is said to have been telling this identity of indiscernibles to an incredulous King of Prussia, to which Leibniz told him to go examine the leaves on the tree and to try to find two similar ones. This qualitative difference is what makes them different.</p>



39:0 0	<p>The Kantian response is that we cannot even go looking for differences in these leaves until we know that they are numerically different.</p> <p>In order for us to even begin the business epistemically of trying to see whether two objects have the same qualitative features or not, we already have to know that they are numerically distinct, and that we presupposed spatial difference in order to individuate the qualitatively identity that Leibniz is speaking of.</p> <p>Think of the possibilities in the age of mass production...</p> <p>We know that two Styrofoam cups are different not by finding a slight molecular variation in one that we don't find in another, we know that they are different because one is here and one is there.</p> <p>So spatial difference is a condition of numerical differences—so we can individuation, although not necessarily identify things by spatial difference.</p>
41:0 0	<p>Stawson captures something of what is going on here when he says that an objective particular, a particular outside me, objective being here what is outside of us, an objective particular is just one that exists when unperceived.</p> <p>But in order for something to exist unperceived, say a pink elephant, it must be somewhere I am not.</p> <p>Hence spatiality is deep in our conception of objectivity.</p>
42:0 0	<p>This is where Jay dislikes Heidegger's conception of the phenomenality of space. He just ruins what is deep about space—its brute outsidedness, its indifference to me.</p> <p>Which is what interests both Kant and Husserl who have robust notions of space and outsidedness.</p>
43:0 0	<p>So that was the first of the Metaphysical Expositions.</p>
44:3 0	<p>So on to the second argument for the Metaphysical Exposition:</p> <p>"...xxx..."</p>

45:3 0	<p>We can represent space without objects, but we can't represent objects without space.</p> <p>The temptation is to say that here Kant is got it wrong, because when I try to close my eyes and think about space empty of objects, I just see nothing at all.</p> <p>You would think that we need at least one object, probably two.</p> <p>But Kant seems to be suggesting the opposite, as if he closed his eyes and saw what?</p> <p>Well, he didn't close his eyes at all. This is not a psychological thought experiment, this must be some kind of logical argument, and therefore, again with Kant we should always remember that the argument is meant to inscribe an <i>epistemic</i> not a psychological possibility.</p>
47:3 0	<p>So against Leibniz, skip logic because it takes us nowhere. Skip psychology because it is just psychology. He wants the argument to be epistemic.</p> <p>So how and when can we conceive of space with objects—do we ever conceive of space without objects?</p> <p>He thinks we can have knowledge of space that is independent and separate from any objects that might inhabit it.</p> <p>So the answer is 'geometry' in which we conceive of space without objects—the pure thinking of space itself independently of the constitution of any objects it has.</p>
49:3 0	<p>Hence we can conceive of space with out objects—geometry—but why can we not conceive of objects without space?</p> <p>Thinking way back to Metaphysical Exposition #1, if they are going to be particulars, they are going to be numerically distinct from one another, hence they must be in different spatial regions.</p> <p>Hence the second argument for a priori space is 'geometry + the first argument'.</p>

50:3 0	<p>Hence the second argument shows, something new here above the first, is not just that space is necessary for outer experience, but it is necessary for the objects of outer experience.</p> <p>So the first step of the metaphysical exposition is that we need space in order to generate outsidedness for us.</p> <p>But I can also know about space independently of objects—geometry—but I can't know of objects independently of space, therefore, objects—and not just my knowledge of them—the possibility of the objects of outer experience is itself spatial.</p>
52:0	<p>Space as a content that is independent of its objects and a condition of possibility for its objects.</p> <p>And in fact, sly old Kant, he actually says this in the Introduction, B 35:</p> <p>"Thus if I take away from the representation of a body ..."</p> <p>of sensibility..."</p> <p>That is to say that extension and figure do not belong to the particulars but to our way of thinking about them and this we can know a priori.</p>

	Part 2
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00:00	<p>The first two arguments of the “Metaphysical Exposition” show that space is a priori. To say that space is a priori is to say that it is presupposed in our knowledge of objects. It is presupposed because it is a condition of possibility because in order to be aware at all of an object outside and independent of us we have to have it as somewhere in space outside of us.</p> <p>Further, we cannot gather up our notion of space from objects, in part because we can represent to ourselves space absent of objects, but we cannot represent objects absence of space.</p>
1:00	<p>We cannot represent to ourselves objects without space, hence space is both the condition of (i) our awareness of things outside us and (ii) a condition of those appearances themselves.</p>
1:30	<p>The second two argument then of the Metaphysical Exposition contend that space is an intuition. That is, a particular, a singular thing, or singular un-thing, as the case may be.</p> <p>In any event, it is an individual and not a concept.</p> <p>This is an argument again mainly directed against Leibniz. And if it is true we have to think a bit harder about how or in what way the Transcendental Aesthetic forms a critique of the Newtonian absolute view of space and time that views them as real existences.</p>

2:30	<p>The great debate in the 17th century, which will return to next time, which is the Leibniz-Clarke (Newton) Debate about space and time.</p> <p>The Newtonians said that space and time are real. They are big containers. Everything exists in space and time.</p> <p>While Leibniz thinks that space and time are ideal, that is to say un-real. They are simply mistaken representations or confused perceptions, which can be analyzed out into the predicates of independently existing monads.</p>
3:30	<p>Since both the argument about a priori and the argument about intuition are really targeted against Leibniz, then the question is, what is Kant's argument against Newton, since in many ways his position is analogous to Newton's?</p> <p>W.H. Walsh always said that the CPR was written with both eyes on Newton. In the background of everything Kant says lies Newtonian physics and that more or less that is the right account of the physical world.</p>
5:00	<p>So space as an intuition...</p> <p>The thesis Kant is now going to examine is that the one-many relationship with respect to space should be one of whole and part rather than of concepts and its instances.</p> <p>That is to say, there are two types of one-many relationships.</p> <p><On these differences, see Claudia Baracchi, Spring 2006, lectures 1 & 2></p> <p>(i). You can have a single concept of "apple" that then refers to an indefinite number of particular apple things.</p> <p>(ii). Or you can think of the one-many as a whole which then can be divided up to its parts that are within it.</p> <p><(i) Mimesis vs. (ii) participation ></p> <div style="display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center;"> <div style="text-align: center;">  </div> <div style="margin: 0 20px;">vs.</div> <div style="text-align: center;">  </div> </div>
6:00	<p>So the one-many relationship with respect to space is not (i) concepts to instances but (ii) parts-wholes.</p>

6:30	<p>Looking then at the third item...</p> <p>B 39:</p> <p>"3. Space is not a discursive or, as we say, general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition. For, in the first place, we can represent to ourselves only one space; and if we speak of diverse spaces, we mean thereby only parts of one and the same unique space. Secondly, these parts cannot precede the one all-embracing space, as being, as it were, constituents out of which it can be composed; on the contrary, they can be thought only as <i>in</i> it. Space is essentially one; the manifold in it, and therefore the general concept of spaces, depends solely on [the introduction of] limitations. Hence it follows that an <i>a priori</i>, and not an empirical, intuition underlies all concepts of space. For kindred reasons, geometrical propositions, that, for instance, in a triangle two sides together are greater than the third, can never be derived from the general concepts of line and triangle, but only from intuition, and this indeed <i>a priori</i>, with apodeictic certainty."</p>
8:00	<p>Kant assumes, and this assumption underlies everything here, that the concept-intuition distinction is exhaustive. This is another aspect of his rigid form-matter distinction.</p> <p>We will worry about this rigidity as we go along. We will examine how committed he is to this distinction between concept and intuition we will have to see when we come to the schematizism—and that will be the pay off of our worrying about this.</p> <p>But we might say that everything in Adorno depends on denying the rigidity of the distinction between concept and intuition. Or as Adorno would put it, the rigid distinction between art and science.</p>

	<p>Prefaces Introduction (§§I–VII) / \ Part I Part II Transcendental Doctrine of Element Transcendental Doctrine of Method (see below) / \ First Part Second Part Transcendental Aesthetic Transcendental Logic / \ §1. <i>Space</i> §2. Time Introduction / \ Division I Division II Transcendental Analytic Transcendental Dialectic Introduction Introduction / \ / \ Book I Book II Book I Book II Analytic of Concepts Analytic of Principles Concepts of Pure Reason Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason / \ Schematism Principles</p>
9:30	<p>With this in mind, Kant's strategy is to show that the relation of space to spaces is unlike the relation of a concept to its instances—either extensionally or intentionally.</p> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; align-items: flex-start;"> <div style="text-align: center;"> <p>x</p> <p>/ \</p> <p>x x x</p> <p>Extension is all the particular instances that fall under a concept.</p> </div> <div style="text-align: center;"> <p>concept</p> <p>/ \</p> <p>instances</p> </div> </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; align-items: flex-start; margin-top: 20px;"> <div style="text-align: center;"> <p>x</p> <p>/ \</p> <p>forward slash, back slash, letter of the alphabet</p> <p>definition/ meaning</p> </div> <div style="text-align: center;"> <p>concept</p> <p> </p> </div> </div> <p>The intention of a concept...a concept is a rule or a mark, so the intention of a concept, say "apple" would be the marks that belong to the mark apple—such as 'red,' 'round,' 'fruit'—or in other words, its meaning. Each of these marks have smaller marks.</p>

11:30	<p>In any event, Kant wants to suggest that space is different from either the extension of the intention of a concept.</p> <p>And he wants to say this because he thinks that we can only represent to ourselves <i>one</i> space.</p> <p>But why does he think that?</p> <p>The thought is that to think of a space is to think of it...in order to individuate a spatial region (that is what we mean by thinking of space) we have to locate it—to the right of this one, to the left of that one, below that one.</p> <p>And this locating can go on indefinitely.</p>
13:00	<p>That is for something to count as a space that we can be aware of we have to locate it. But we have to locate it with respect any possible other spaces that I know—roughly starting from here, and therefore I always think of space as an indeterminate horizon in which to think of any point is equally to think of it as enclosed by further regions and those enclosed by further regions, and so on.</p> <p>And in this sense we have what we might call a “pre-intuition” of the totality of space as this one through which I can locate any other particular space.</p> <p>That is, to say where any space is, is simply to map it with respect to spaces that I know.</p> <div data-bbox="667 1276 773 1377" data-label="Diagram"> <pre> ^ / \ ^ ^ - - </pre> </div> <p>What is misleading about this concept of space as the relation between one and many as parts-whole is that this triangle gives the impression that space, on this analogy, is determinate. But with the triangle, we might always ask, what is <i>outside</i> the triangle. And this is what we cannot do with space.</p>

14:30	<p>And for this, and this is Kant's second (or 4th) argument here, I have got to start with the pre-intuition of the one.</p> <p>The wrong analogy here is that the relation of space to spaces is like the relation of bricks to house. [Here what the house "is" is the relation of its parts]</p> <p>The reason that is wrong is that it is true that I build up my house from its parts—but I don't build up space that way. If I start with a pre-intuition of its wholeness, what I am ever doing is limiting it, drawing boundaries within this indefinite whole.</p> <p>[to push the house analogy—the problem would be that we only get the "bricks" in the first place—the 'pieces of space'—by dividing up the parts of the indeterminate whole.</p> <p>So while in the house example we can build up the whole from the parts that precede it, in the space example, we never get the parts in the first place except by dividing up the whole that must precede it.]</p>
15:30	<p>So in a wholly non-conceptual way, I am always presupposing this indefinite spatial totality—this one-of which particular spaces are a part.</p> <p>So that every part of space is simply considered as somewhere in relation to other spaces and space as a whole is a pre-given, pre-intuited.</p> <p>Why are we using the word "pre" here? For the simple reason that we do not have an awareness of this big "one"—it is not that I actually have a concrete awareness of this big one of which all the spaces I see are a part, but rather the intelligibility of the spaces I am aware of are always thought on the model of being parts of this whole which [these parts] I construct out of the process of limitations.</p> <p>So it's not like this whole is given to me like a representation, but it is given to me as the underlying logic of my spatial forms of awareness.</p> <p>[I think by extension this is why it is an a priori and not an empirical concept—because we never perceive or experience the whole of space]</p>

17:00	<p>In our awareness of space as one, we are not aware of it as one in the same way we are aware of a cup is one. The cup we can see it in its determinateness more or less all at once. But space is never given in this way because it just keeps going.</p> <p>So by "pre-aware" we simply suppose that if this is a space than outside of it there is a further space and so on.</p> <p>So I am always doing the extension-limitation business [?] as part of my natural way of thinking about what it is to be aware of a region of space at all.</p>
18:30	<p>We can think of space as a "pre-intuition" as an anticipation—which is a nice word for the a priori altogether—we anticipate space will operate in a certain way.</p>
	<p>At A 282:</p> <p>"The concept of a cubic foot of space, wherever and however often I think it, is in itself throughout one and the same. But two cubic feet are nevertheless distinguished in space by the mere difference of their locations (<i>numero diversa</i>); these locations are conditions of the intuition wherein the object of this concept is given; they do not, however, belong to the concept but entirely to sensibility."</p>
20:00	<p>Here we are thinking that it would be very disappointing if someone advertised a 2000 sq ft apartment, and it turned out to be just one square foot—the seller claiming that all 2000 sq can be found in the one square foot.</p> <p>[in which case, you should just offer to buy one of the 2000 feet]</p> <p>That misses something about the meaning of space.</p> <p>What makes them 2000 sq ft is that they are external to one another.</p>

21:00	<p>A famous counter example has been conjured up by Tony Quinton—</p> <p>Do we have to represent space as one?</p> <p>Pretend you fall asleep in New York and wake up on a Tropical island. When you fall asleep on the island you wake up in New York. But when you are in New York, no matter how far you travel you cannot find the island. And when on the island, no matter how far you look you cannot find New York. Does this not demonstrate that it is intelligible to think of two different spaces not reducible to the “one” overriding space?</p> <p>The point is that we can conceive of two spatial regions that are not spatially related to one another—therefore Kant is wrong.</p> <p>Each of them separately satisfies the Kantian requirements—it is just that there are two.</p>
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27:00	<p>Kant's argument is epistemic. The claim therefore is that all the evidence for "two-ness" would be incomplete. Since it would always remain a question where each space is with respect to the other one.</p> <p>That is, we presuppose that spatial questions have spatial answers. So the way in which the counter-example works is to make a spatial question—"where"—turn on a non-spatial mechanism—falling asleep.</p> <p>We would still want to know where the other is spatially even if we traveled indefinitely and could not find it.</p> <p>Kant would say—and this tells us about the unity of space—that it has as epistemic conditions do <i>normative</i> force.</p> <p>In order for it to be intelligible to us... Quinton's example is <i>logically</i> intelligible to us but not <i>epistemically</i> intelligible.</p> <p>And since the whole point of the Kantian exercise is to show that logic is not a sufficient constraint on possibility, then we do not care that it is logically possible that there are two different spaces—what we care about is whether we can <i>know</i> that there are two different spaces.</p> <p>And the only way that we can know that there are two different spaces is if they are spatially external to one another.</p> <p>For Kant, that is simply what it counts as knowing that there are two different spaces.</p>
29:30	<p>So this discussion underlines is how epistemic Kant's notions are.</p> <p>He is always showing—and this is the trick to all Kantian idealism, so we are going to beat this thought to death this semester—what makes any Kantian notion transcendentally ideal is that there is some feature of its intelligibility—that is, how we think about it—that is connected to the possibility of knowledge.</p> <p>So when we think about space, we are thinking about outside of us, independence from us, individuation, relation.</p>

31:00	<p>Almost everything we have said about space is really not about space in the way that geometry is.</p> <p>What we have been thinking about is the role that space plays in our life.</p> <p>So what Kant means by transcendently ideal is that there are features of these notions—space, time, causality, self—that cannot be understood in purely empirical or metaphysical or ontological terms.</p> <p>In order to get a grasp of them at all, you have to think of the role they play in our representing the world to ourselves, and since what it is to have a world is to have a representation of a world, the role they play in us having a world which, since the role in which they play in us having a world is the “worldhood of the world”—then they are the existential determinations for the worldhood of the world.</p>
32:30	<p>Jay is using this Heideggerian jargon deliberately to suggest that in <i>Being and Time</i>, and only there, Heidegger is a textbook Kantian.</p> <p>All the rest of Heidegger seems to be something else. But <i>SZ</i> is a Kantian exercise.</p>
33:00	<p>So the argument for space being one is finally an argument, and the parts being parts of this one, is finally an argument about the role that space plays in our coming to awareness of these differences of things—which is, again, different places.</p>
	<p>The fourth argument, in the Metaphysical Exposition, covers much the same terrain as the third, with the addition of the notion of infinity.</p> <p>So he says space is represented as an infinite magnitude.</p>

34:00	<p>B 40:</p> <p>"Space is represented as an infinite <i>given</i> magnitude. Now every concept must be thought as a representation which is contained in an infinite number of different possible representations (as their common character), and which therefore contains these <i>under</i> itself;"</p> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; align-items: center;"> <div style="text-align: center;"> <p>X</p> <p>/ \ x x x x x x ...</p> </div> <div style="text-align: center;"> <p>concept</p> <p>/ \ infinite instances</p> </div> </div> <p>"...but no concept, as such, can be thought as containing an infinite number of representations <i>within</i> itself..."</p> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; align-items: center;"> <div style="text-align: center;"> <p>X</p> <p>/ \ forward slash, back slash, letter of alphabet</p> </div> <div style="text-align: center;"> <p>concept</p> <p> definition/meaning</p> </div> </div> <p>I can get "X" down to forward slash and letter, and I can get forward-slash down to line segment, but at a certain point we come to a halt. No intention of a concept is infinite. Otherwise meaning would be impossible. Meaning cannot be infinitely divisible.</p> <p>But space is infinitely divisible.</p> <p>It is in this latter way, however, that space is thought; for all the parts of space coexist <i>ad infinitum</i>. Consequently, the original representation of space is an <i>a priori</i> intuition, not a concept."</p>
35:30	<p>So space is infinite in that the very idea of space presupposes both the divisibility of itself downward and it presupposes space outside it which borders it and contains it.</p> <p>I don't have the idea of space...</p> <p>All kids ask where space ends, and then wants to know what is outside of that.</p> <p>But that is Kant's argument, there is always another side of that line.</p> <p>For every limitation, we can extend past it.</p> <p>[]</p>

37:00	So we have two sets of arguments: space is argument, presupposed in our awareness of objects, and it is an intuition, a pure intuition, presupposed in our awareness of any spatial region.
38:00	One last distinction...
	Next time we will talk about the Transcendental ideality of space, and geometry, and incongruent counter-parts.
	<p>Instead today we will start with incongruent counter-parts.</p> <p>These are not mentioned in the CPR but in the <i>Prolegomena</i>.</p>
	<p>In three different places, Kant discusses the problem of incongruent counter parts.</p> <p>And all three times he mentions them in order to proof different things.</p>
	<p>So what are incongruent counter-parts?</p> <p>Right vs. Left.</p> <p>The thought is that the difference between my right hand and my left hand is that internally they are absolutely identical.</p> <p>Their difference is that one is right and the other is left, and that seems to be irreducible.</p>

40:00	<p>So in a two-dimensional world:</p> <p>Let's look at p vs. q</p> <p>These two are absolutely <i>internally</i> identical. They are composed of a circle in touch with a tangent line, in which, let's say the line is twice the length of the diameter.</p> <p>In two-dimensions, I can never do anything to the q to make it overlap with the p. The only way I can make them overlap is if I lift it off the plane into another dimension and fold it back on.</p>
41:00	<p>Kant was struck by this phenomenon and kept coming back to it throughout his career. But what does this mean? Kant thinks there is something deep here.</p> <p>In 1768, when he first thought about it he thought it meant that space is absolute and independent of its matter. When he first thought about it, at this point he was a Newtonian, and thought that it shows that space cannot be reduced to the objects in it.</p> <p>So p and q considered as monads—here we have the identity of indiscernibles, two things internally the same, but still different, not different as a matter of perspective, because there is no perspective we can take on a q that makes it a p without adding a dimension. They thus break Leibniz's law because they are different. Not because they are in different places but because one is right and one is left.</p> <p>Kant thinks that this shows that spatial relation cannot be reduced to its content.</p>

42:30	<p>In the 1770 "Inaugural Dissertation" he used the same argument to show—and this seems to be true—that our knowledge of space is intuitive and not conceptual.</p> <p>So what is the difference between right and left? How do we know the difference between them?</p> <p>Kant will eventually use the word "orientation" for this. There is no way of discursively telling someone what the difference between right and left is. It is your orientation in space.</p> <p>Right and Left is irreducible to any conceptual knowledge, it is just a spatial orientation. And therefore in the appropriate sense it is intuitive—I am perfectly aware of the difference between right and left although no discursive conceptual thinking can ever capture the difference.</p>
44:00	<p>So the thought now is—and this argument seems to work—that our understanding of space cannot be gathered up into concepts.</p> <p>Space is thus "pre-given" and "orientational"—both of which are orientations rather than conceptual graspings and cannot be cashed out in any conceptual terms.</p>
46:00	<p>So it is compelling that the difference between right and left is primitive. There is no possible world in which we can know in which glove makers would only need to make one glove.</p>
	<p>In 1783, in the critical period, Kant thought that the argument for incongruent counter-parts could be used to show that space is ideal.</p> <p>And this seems to be his worst argument. But it is worth going over because it shows us something about Kant's thought and how his mind works, and this will be relevant to cash out what is deep and what is shallow in him.</p>
47:30	<p>But the argument runs that things that are qualitatively identical, internally alike, must be interchangeable. Some spatial figures which are internally alike are not interchangeable. Therefore if we assume that the identity of indiscernibles holds for things in themselves, then it follows that we know appearances only and not things in themselves.</p>

48:30	<p>Jill Burkauer wrote a book dealing with a lot of this stuff runs the argument this way:</p> <p>--incongruent counter-parts are different in virtue of their differing relations to space as a whole (that is the difference between right and left).</p> <p>--all relations among things in themselves are reducible to non-relational characters of the relata.</p> <p>So let's define things in themselves as things that have only monadic predicates.</p> <p>--therefore if space and figures within it are things in themselves then p and q must be identical.</p> <p>--but in fact p and q are not identical.</p> <p>--therefore space and the things within it are not things in themselves, and therefore they are ideal.</p> <p>This is the argument of the <i>Prolegomena</i>.</p>
50:00	<p>We have to realize that Kant is presupposing here a definition of "things in themselves"—namely a thing in itself is a thing independent of all external relations. That is to say that a thing in itself is, or would be if there are such things, a Leibnizian monad.</p> <p>This is a bad way of thinking about things in themselves, a and a bad way of thinking about the ideality of space and time.</p> <p>But we need to be aware that it is one of Kant's constant temptations.</p>

51:31	<p>We will see next week that Kant meant three or four different things by "Transcendentally Ideal".</p> <p>There isn't one thing in his mind but three or four. And he was pretty uninterested in the differences—which are very important to us.</p> <p>But one of the things in his heart of hearts, when he went to bed at night and thought about what he really believed, he seemed to be secretly a Leibnizian. He might well have secretly loved the thought that the world is composed of nothing but little spirits.</p> <p>It just that he thought that even if that is in fact the truth about the world, we can't know it, we can't even hypothesize about it. We have to think about the world in a much different way.</p>
52:30	<p>But he may well have conceded that if there were a God's eye view, if there is a God, what he would see is not your and my fallen human way of looking at the world, but he would see an infinite number of monads.</p>
	<p>There is an interesting but equally false metaphysical thought behind this. We mentioned it earlier. Objects have in themselves only monadic predicates and all relational predicates are mind dependent.</p> <p>That will get you pretty much the same result.</p> <p>But even that would be a sorry way to think about what is deep about transcendental idealism.</p> <p>So for the moment we will pretend that Kant never made these moves.</p>
54:00	<p>Next week we will see what deeper thoughts about Transcendental Ideality can be gotten from the Metaphysical Exposition and the argument from geometry, etc.</p>