

00:00	<p>We are going to hunker down into the "Deduction" for 4-5 weeks.</p> <p>It is slow and painful work.</p>
1:00	<p>Last week we ended with a non-skeptical conception of Transcendental Idealism of which the simplest statement is that there cannot be any form of a conceptual scheme vs. world dualism.</p> <p>That we know appearances only and not things in themselves is just a way of stating, to quote Hillary Putnam's <i>Realism and Reason</i>,</p> <p><i>"Kant taught us that the whole idea of comparing our conceptual scheme with a world of things in themselves, which Kant did accept as a postulate of reason, Kant taught us to see that if the conceptual system copies the unconceptualized reality, it is incoherent."</i></p> <p>If we can only know the world as conceptualized, then we cannot even begin to ask the question whether it copies or corresponds to unconceptualized reality since we have no notion or access to such a reality. Therefore we have only to do with appearances.</p>
3:00	<p>Today we want to get at this issue by going through the "Metaphysical Deduction" as well as an introduction to the Deduction of A.</p>

3:30	<p>Looking at A 50, the very beginning of the Logic in general.</p> <p>To be clear, for those who are Kantians, Jay's account will be deflationary in two ways:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Jay has a modest conception of what a Transcendental Deduction involves ii. And he has an almost negligible conception of self-consciousness. <p>So that is to say that a lot of the things that people worry about in the CPR are just not there. They are later inventions, mostly of Fichte.</p> <p>Of course Fichte is interesting but they are his inventions.</p> <p>Jay claims to be an old-fashioned type meaning he begins with the Metaphysical Deduction because he thinks that really the whole of the Transcendental Deduction is really about what we mean by judgment and what we mean by our knowledge being discursive.</p> <p>Thus the Deduction is going to be an unpacking of those two ideas. If we can unpack them successfully, then all the heavy-duty Kantian problems should with good luck fall in tow.</p>
5:30	<p>A 50: <i>"Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind;"</i></p> <p>So at the very beginning of the Logic, Kant repeats what we have said is his great insight: that knowledge has two irreducible sources.</p> <p>We want to reiterate that this is the key to the whole CPR.</p>
6:00	<p><i>"Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (receptivity for impressions), the second is the power of knowing an object through these representations (<u>spontaneity</u> [in the <u>production</u>] of concepts."</i> (emphasis added)</p> <p>We should be feeling nervous here: spontaneity in production of concepts.</p> <p>This should strike us as a puzzling thought. Why?</p>
7:00	<p>Aloisia seemed to suggest that the "production" isn't in the German but is Kemp Smith's interpolation.</p>
	<p>Spontaneity seems like the very opposite of objectivity and of knowledge, of getting a hold of the world. Spontaneity is supposed to be what we do when we are unconstrained, when all the rules are being broken.</p> <p>So he is taking the very concept "spontaneity" and turning it the other way.</p>

	<p>Question:</p> <p>We mean spontaneity in the sense that these are concepts that are not abstracted from the world—this is the Copernican Turn in a way—we haven't learned these categories from the phenomena and we are not constrained by the phenomena in producing them.</p> <p>They seem to come alive of their own.</p> <p>Spontaneity shows the sense in which we are not trying to copy the world and they are not empirical and they are expressive of us and our activity.</p>
9:00	<p>A 50 cont.</p> <p><i>"Through the first an object is given to us, through the second the object is thought in relation to that [given] representation (which is a mere determination of the mind)."</i></p> <p>And then he reminds us that intuitions and concepts can be either empirical or a priori.</p> <p>A 51:</p> <p><i>"...the pure concept only the form of the thought of an object in general. Pure intuitions or pure concepts alone are possible a priori, empirical intuitions and empirical concepts only a posteriori."</i></p> <p><i>"...If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any wise affected, is to be entitled sensibility, then the mind's <u>power of producing</u> representations from itself, the <u>spontaneity of knowledge</u>, should be called the <u>understanding</u>."</i> (emphasis added)</p> <p>And this should almost strike us as oxymoronic.</p>
10:30	<p>A 51 cont.</p> <p><i>"Our nature is so constituted that our intuition can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding."</i></p> <p>So intuitions are that through which representations are given and the understanding is that through which representations are thought.</p> <p>And obviously those are going to be connected up.</p>

11:30	<p>Our first question is simply: Which concepts have their seat solely in the understanding?</p> <p>Or in other words what grounds are there for believing that some concepts have their seat in the understanding? Why should we think that we make this contribution to knowledge rather than merely receive it?</p>
12:30	<p>There is an easy negative answer to this.</p> <p>The concepts that are going to have their seats in the understanding are just those for which we lack an impression, just those that are not learned from experience.</p> <p>In short, those concepts that turn out to be located solely in the understanding will turn out to be just those very same ones that Hume in his desperate quest to find verification ended up failing to find.</p> <p>So Hume was right, there is no impression corresponding to cause, to substance, or to self.</p> <p>All those famous passages in Hume, he was right.</p>
13:30	<p>So Kant says at A 91, where he gives Hume his due.</p> <p><i>"If we thought to escape these toilsome enquiries by saying that experience continually presents examples of such regularity among appearances and so affords abundant opportunity of abstracting the concept of cause [1], and at the same time of verifying the objective validity of such a concept, we should be overlooking the fact that the concept of cause can never arise in this manner. It must either be grounded completely a priori in the understanding, or must be entirely given up as a mere phantom of the brain."</i></p> <p>[1] Now he is just repeating the argument of Hume's <i>Treatise</i> here.</p> <p>Hume took it that it was a mere phantom of the brain. He never denied that we needed the concept (e.g. of cause) but that doesn't mean there is any grounds for it, it is just a mere phantom of the brain, something we are drawn to.</p> <p>So Kant's move here is saying that it is either Kant or Hume here, take your pick. It is an important move that if we want to make use of a fundamental concept—one that Hume says is the "glue of the universe"—we have a choice, either it is a figment of our imagination, which is one concept of spontaneity, or it has an a priori validity which is the Kantian notion of what we can do with spontaneity.</p> <p>So cause, come what may, is derived from spontaneity. The only question is does this make cause a fantasy or can it in some sense be validated?</p>

16:00	<p>A 91 cont.</p> <p><i>"For this concept makes strict demand that something, A, should be such that something else, B, follows it necessarily and in accordance with an absolutely universal rule. Appearances do indeed present cases from which a rule can be obtained according to which something usually happens, but they never prove the sequence to be necessary."</i></p> <p>So what Kant needs to demonstrate is that the concepts Hume denies, these notions of self, substance, and cause, primarily, are somehow necessary or indispensable or presupposed for knowledge.</p> <p>But, we have to be careful here, because in a way Hume agrees with that too. Hume doesn't think that we can do without the notion of cause. He thinks that it is kind of necessary, it's just that it is a fantasy—that is why he is a skeptic.</p> <p>So Hume's naturalism is a way of saying that we must help ourselves to what we need, but <i>we are not entitled to do so.</i></p> <p>So it is not the necessity that is contended here—rather it is the rationality of that necessity.</p>
18:00	<p>So we are going to need to move somehow to a deeper level [than Hume agreeing that cause, substance, self are necessary but not rationally validated] and that deeper level Kant thinks is going to be had by thinking about what is necessary for the possibility of <u>judgment</u>.</p> <p>So he gives a hint here what he is thinking about at A 89/ B 122:</p> <p><i>"The categories of understanding, on the other hand, do not represent the conditions under which objects are given in intuition [1]. Objects may, therefore, appear to us without their being under the necessity of being related to the functions of understanding; and understanding need not, therefore, contain their a priori conditions. Thus a difficulty such as we did not meet in the field of sensibility is here presented, namely, how subjective conditions of thought, can have objective validity, that is, can furnish conditions of the possibility of all knowledge of objects."</i></p> <p>[1] Space and time are the conditions under which objects are given in time.</p>

20:30	<p>This is the question Kant is trying to answer.</p> <p>That is, how is it possible for the <i>subjective</i> conditions of thought—and we will need to show how the spontaneous concepts we need, the categories, are subjective conditions of <u>thought</u>—can have <i>objective</i> validity.</p> <p>So he is acknowledging that the necessity in the first instance is subjective—it is my way of encountering the world.</p> <p>But the puzzle is why should it be the case that what is necessary for my mere subjectivity should not be source of error but a condition of objectivity.</p>
21:30	<p>We typically think that when we say 'oh, that was a subjective comment' we mean that your subjectivity got in the way of seeing reality.</p> <p>Subjectivity or subjective reality is a term of abuse. And it was a term of abuse during Kant's time. He knew that calling something subjective means "not objective" or not of the world.</p> <p>So Kant is deliberately upping the ante. We have thought as spontaneous and now we know that the spontaneity has to do with our subjective conditions of thought, and these subjective conditions are what we are going to need to have objective validity.</p>
22:30	<p>And objectivity here has got to be something stronger than, to use a Rortyan phrase, that's the way we do things—we human beings do it this way.</p> <p>Kant wants something deeper than this kind of hyper-conventionalism. He wants something about our subjectivity to be deep so that at the very center of our subjectivity is our elimination from the world but our access to it.</p>
23:30	<p>Furthermore, he seems to suggest at A 85 that at the end of the day, the very idea of a transcendental deduction is going to be bound up with filling this gap, or "explaining" is the word Kant is going to use, explaining our subjectivity and spontaneity on the one hand and objectivity on the other can be filled.</p> <p>But to be clear, this is as weak a conception of what a transcendental deduction is that we might get. It is also the least mysterious. Because it turns out it is not an anti-skeptical argument, but we will return to this in about 5 weeks.</p>

25:30	<p>A 85</p> <p><i>"Now among the manifold concepts which form the highly complicated web of human knowledge, there are some which are marked out for pure a priori employment, in complete independence of all experience; and their right to be so employed always demands a deduction."</i></p> <p>The deduction now is the right for us to employ these spontaneous subjective concepts that have their seats in the understanding.</p> <p>The notion of "right" is the question of what entitlement do we have to make use of these things. We need some sort of account. And he is assuming that Hume's naturalistic account can't do this work.</p>
	<p>A 85 cont.</p> <p><i>"For since empirical proofs do not suffice to justify this kind of employment[1], we are faced by the problem how these concepts can relate to objects which they yet do not obtain from an experience."</i></p> <p>[1] which is roughly what Locke and Hume did.</p> <p>The next sentence then is for Jay the definition of the Transcendental Deduction, which we say not to be perverse but because Kant says this.</p> <p><i>"The <u>explanation</u> of the <u>manner</u> in which concepts can thus relate a priori to objects I entitle their transcendental deduction; ..."</i></p> <p>The crucial thing here is the "explanation" of the "manner"—so the explanation of how it is that concepts that have their seat in the understanding—in our spontaneity and subjectivity—the explanation of how they apply to objects a priori is their transcendental deduction.</p>
28:00	<p>So in a way a transcendental deduction is no more nor less than an analysis of what we mean by discursive cognition. Since discursive cognition is just what we mean by cognition by means of concepts.</p> <p>And we are going to show that we can't think without concepts—and particularly we can't think without the concepts that have their role in the understanding—then explaining the way they apply, the explanation of all that, is their deduction.</p>

29:00	<p>So that is all a transcendental deduction is, a kind of explanation...that means that on the way we are doing it this is not structurally an argument against skepticism.</p> <p>The argument of the transcendental deduction is not meant to defeat skepticism. We will try to see that from the get-go the notion of skepticism is unintelligible for Kant. And it is unintelligible for Kant because subject-object dualism is unintelligible for him.</p> <p>So we are trying not to make things less complicated but to make it much more stream-lined than some accounts would have it.</p>
30:00	<p>How are we going to get all this going?</p> <p>We have seen the puzzle: there are two sources of knowledge and it looks as if there are concepts that we absolutely need that are not derived from experience, therefore it looks like the very notions of understanding and thinking involves us in the use of concepts that spring from our intellect, from the spontaneity, and that we therefore must figure out a way of showing why what is subjective and spontaneous is objective.</p>
31:00	Question
	<p>By discursive we mean the opposite of intuitive. Discursive cognition is going to be cognition by means of concepts—and then we have to ask what it is to use concepts. And that is the next step. But for now we haven't quite got what we need to answer what discursivity is.</p>
32:00	Question
	<p>The notion of 'that we have no choice' is not adequate because we saw that Hume agrees that we have no choice. So we need something stronger than 'we have no choice'. We have to show that it is necessary that they have objective validity because they cash out the very notion of what it is for something to be an object. So the notion of necessity has got to be deeper.</p> <p>The sense of weaker is the strategy of [Jay's] explanation. That is filling in the gap between spontaneity and objectivity we are trying to argue is <i>explanatory</i>. That is the deduction.</p> <p>That is the right. The explanation can be either a naturalistic explanation—that is how our imagination works or a logical one—and we will be giving a logical explanation.</p>

	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Transcendental Deduction:</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Spontaneity of Thought → ? ← Objective validity of concepts</p> <p style="text-align: center;">\ /</p> <p style="text-align: center;"> Explanation /</p> <p style="text-align: center;"> </p> <p style="text-align: center;"> logical explanation</p>
33:30	Follow-up question
	<p>The question is that we are agreeing with Hume on the Spontaneity. But the question for Kant is why is it <i>more</i> than merely subjective spontaneity.</p> <p>Why of all the concepts that pop-up into my head when I am examining regularity does the concept of <i>cause</i> pop-up?</p> <p>Hume of course agrees that it is cause that pops-up. And he agrees that it gives us a kind of self-assurance that when I see A I am going to see B.</p> <p>But for Hume this is only self-assurance, but there is nothing cognitive there.</p> <p>So we want to ground the use of those concepts.</p>
35:00	Question
	<p>Well McDowell is an anti-Transcendental-Idealist. Jay thinks that McDowell can be interpreted either as a super-conventionalist or a super-Platonist. And it may be impossible to determine which he is.</p> <p>Transcendental Idealism does take the thought that these concepts that do have their seat in the understand are not every concept but only some concept.</p> <p>For McDowell or Wittgenstein it wouldn't matter. Cavel says somewhere that every concept can require a transcendental deduction. We are saying that not every concept needs a transcendental deduction but only those that have their [seat purely in understanding ???]</p> <p>Our argument is that there are some concepts that are special, that is going to be part of the answer against McDowell, and we have to ground their specialness in a way that connects it with the very idea of knowledge.</p> <p>That is the right pressure. If Jay's account is vulnerable, it is going to be vulnerable from the McDowellian, naturalistic wing because Jay is softening the Transcendental in a certain way.</p>
	Question

37:00	<p>There is good reason to think that your fantasy that you are seeing a pink elephant is wrong.</p> <p>If you can't locate it in space with other people...Kant is going to give a standard account of that. But his account is going to have to make the standard, everyday explanation the right one. Namely, the elephant is not there, it is in your head.</p>
38:00	<p>The premise of everything that is going on here is that to know is to <i>judge</i>.</p> <p>Every act of knowing is a judging and Kant takes it that the notion of judging is a irreducible kind of cognitive activity.</p> <p>Judgments are not something that we explain—what we have to unpack is that judgments are ground level phenomenon.</p> <p>The business of judging is what we mean by what it means to know something. And Kant is then going to say that the catalogue of the forms of judgment will become the guides or the clues or hints to what the pure concepts of the understanding are.</p>
40:00	<p>So he says at A68 (and here we are just plodding on through the Metaphysical deduction)</p>
	<p>Kants says so far we have said that the understanding is not an intuition, it is not sensible, what else can we say about it?</p> <p>A68: <i>"Whereas all intuitions, as sensible rest on affections, concepts rest on functions. By 'function' I mean the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation. Concepts are based on the spontaneity of thought, sensible intuitions on the receptivity of impressions. [1]Now the only use which the understand can make of these concepts is to judge by means of them."</i></p> <p>[1] this is an incredible phrase.</p> <p>Those who do Frege and Wittgenstein, this should sound familiar because the claim now is that the minimal unit we are going to be talking about is a judgment, not a concept, but a judgment.</p>

42:00	<p>We can only figure out what a concepts are, what they do, what the mean, how they function, by analyzing the role they play in judgments.</p> <p>Concepts are not the primitive phenomena—judgments are primitive phenomena.</p> <p>And the meaning of conceptualization—and this is why we couldn't fully answer the question about discursivity before because we could say it means 'thinking by means of concepts' but it turns out that concepts are not primitive.</p> <p>We don't know what it is to think by concepts, we have a different unit of the "minimum" of thought: namely the notion of a judgment.</p> <p>It is the role that concepts have in judgments that tell us what concepts can do and how they do it.</p> <p>So we already know that concepts are a generality and all that...</p>
43:00	<p>Before we go on to the rest of the passage in A68, notice that this is a turning point in the argument.</p> <p>Remember that one of the first things we said last time is that one of the things that is different in Kant as opposed to empiricists and rationalists, is that they have the idea of cognition as a kind of "seeing"—seeing a simple idea. An immediate act of awareness.</p> <p>We contrasted this with Kant who says that we think through concepts where concepts are the general items that sort out, apply to many different particulars. And we think of conceptualization or recognizing or using concepts or possessing a concept as having a capacity, a recognitional ability and all that kind of stuff.</p> <p>That was our original line about conceptuality versus the "seeing" model of knowledge. Now we are pushing that thought one step further.</p> <p>[...??] it is judgment. In order to be able to make a knowledge claim is an act of judgment. And that concepts get their meaning from their role, their functional role they play in judgment.</p>

44:30	<p>One of the best works of Neo-Kantianism is Ernst Cassirer's wonderful book <i>Substance and Function</i>.</p> <p>The whole book is saying that before Kant, everyone thought about substance, about Being. Kant said give up the notion of being, think about the function of concepts, the role they play.</p> <p>Don't ask after the meaning of a concept, ask after its use.</p> <p>Which is why he and Heidegger were like boxers slugging it out.</p>
45:00	<p>To continue on with the quote then, A68: <i>"Since no representation, save when it is an intuition, is in immediate relation to an object, no concept is ever related to an object immediately, but to some other representation of it, be that other representation an intuition, or itself a concept. Judgment is therefore the mediate knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of a representation of it."</i></p> <p>So discursivity is mediation all the way down. That's why it is the opposite of intuition. Our cognition is discursive in that it is fully mediated.</p>
46:30	<p>So looking at B94 to drive the point home:</p> <p><i>"Now we can <u>reduce</u> all acts of the understanding to judgments, and the understanding may therefore be represented as a faculty of judgment."</i> (emphasis added)</p>
	<p>It is all about judgment—but how is that going to help us?</p> <p>It is going to help us because why judgments are is functions of unity among concepts.</p> <p>That is, what judgments are, what the logical functions of judgments are, are the various ways that or more concepts can be unified.</p>
	<p>So we have two concepts "S is P"—a subject concept and a predicate concept.</p> <p>And the thought is that the <i>minimal unit</i> in which we can do anything with either of these two things is the subject-predicate categorical form of judgment.</p> <p>There is nothing we can do with the notion of a subject idea or a predicate idea except use it in a judgment.</p>

48:30	<p>So this form "S is P" is a unity of concepts.</p> <p>So forms of judgments are the various ways in which unity is possible among concepts irrespective of [content ???].</p> <p>To put it another way, the forms of judgment are functions in accordance with which we unify concepts and thereby our representations, and concepts are just of representations.</p> <p>Indeed, you might even say that the thought is deeper. It is only in the light, it is only in so far as we do unity concepts in a judgment that representations represent.</p>
50:30	<p>To be clear, the opposite of this is the association of ideas. The empiricists said ya, I've got this idea red and this other idea round and whenever I get this one and I also get this other one, and then I get the apple idea.</p> <p>Kant thinks that the issue is learning how to put together our...</p> <p>So by itself, having awareness of something like this:</p> <p>I can have an intuition of this thing but it only becomes anything when I articulate it, namely, when I say 'the circle is red'.</p> <p>That is what takes it from the realm of being mere experience into a judgment about an object in the world—not what I experience but what is out there.</p>
52:30	<p>So the unifying—and Kant's word for unifying is "synthesizing," and we will come back to this—so by synthesizing my intuition with this in accordance with the logical function "S is P" I can make the judgment "the circle is red"</p> <p>And in making the judgment "the circle is red" my judgment is a representation of this thing:</p>

53:30	<p>If this is right, then it entails that the form of judgment are a transcendental syntax—or a transcendental grammar.</p> <p>By this we mean the thought that clearly "S is P" belongs to grammar and syntax, <i>not the world</i>. This is part of my language or in Kant's vocabulary, the faculty of thought, not about how the world is, but structures experience.</p> <p>And Kant is saying that our only access, the only thing we can do with the stuff that comes at us and affects us is to make judgments about it.</p> <p>Therefore he thinks of the variety of logical forms as the themselves providing a grammar, a transcendental grammar or transcendental syntax.</p> <p>We insist that this is a grammar because judgment are not about how the world is, but how we think about the world.</p>
55:30	<p>But of course the trick of all of this is how to get from grammar to the world.</p> <p>For the moment it seems obvious at a certain level that Kant feels compelled by the fact that if we are the kinds of beings that can think about anything only by making judgments about them, then the forms of judgment are the ultimate constraint upon how we go about this.</p>
56:00	<p>But this is not quite enough—because the naturalistic problem arises: "this is the way we talk" or something like that.</p> <p>So Kant has a further thought that runs something like the following: This grammar works, I can make use of this grammar to make judgments about the world if and only if I presuppose that the object of the judgment has a shape that is hospitable to being judgment in that way.</p> <p>So that I can use the judgment form "S is P", "the circle is red," if and only if the world contains substances which have properties.</p>

58:30	<p>So to be clear, "S is P"—this is about subjects and predicates and subjects and predicates belong to grammar and not the world.</p> <p>In the world there are not subjects of sentences and predicates of those subjects. Rather there are substances and there are properties.</p> <p>So Kant thinks that because we are constrained by this transcendental grammar then that use of that grammar [suggests?] a transcendental semantics.</p> <p>That is, a concept of an object. That is our forms of judging project on to the world the kind of things that are going to count for us as objects of representations including the fact that there are [events?], that they change, etc.</p>
1:00:00	<p>So the trick of this story—and this is the Metaphysical Deduction—is that the requirement that there be a transcendental grammar or transcendental syntax requires the necessity of their being a transcendental semantics.</p> <p>Well, why 'if and only if'?</p> <p>We'll look for at why this 'if and only if' and then go back to look at the text.</p>
1:01:00	<p>To retire for the time being subjects and predicates, and to look at the other form of logical judgments—hypotheticals, of the form "if...then".</p> <p>Clearly "if...then" belongs to grammar and not to the world. With subjects and predicates we might get confused, but "if X then Y" that is clearly just a logical form.</p> <p>Under that form we judge causality: cause and effect. "If X happens, then Y happens". And that is our semantics.</p>
1:02:00	<p>Now here is Kant's genius.</p> <p>He wants to say the following: This couple, the transcendental grammar and the transcendental semantics are indeed a married couple that cannot live without one another. In fact, not only can they not live without one another, they are unintelligible without one another.</p> <p>Why is that? Because in order to make use of the grammar "if...then" to talk about the world, the only use you can make of it is cause and effect.</p> <p>Conversely, if you lack the grammar of the hypothetical then you cannot make use of the notion of cause and effect.</p> <p>That is, only for a being who possesses the capacity to employ hypotheticals can make use of the notions of cause and effect.</p>

1:03:30	<p>Therefore the way things cash out in the world—these are our world ontologies, these are our 'categories'...the reason they are the categories, our concept of an object, is because the only way we can make sense of how things go in the world is by judging in accord with our logical forms of judgment.</p> <p>But our logical forms of judgment only gain a grip on the world if the world is articulated in terms of cause and effect, substance and property, etc.</p> <p>So that our grammar, our epistemic grammar, and our transcendental grammar hang together.</p>
	<p>And now if there is no cause and effect without the hypothetical form of judgment then the notions of cause and effect cannot be derived from the world.</p> <p>That is because they have an irreducible connection to the a priori grammar of our forms of judgment. That is that there is about the notion of cause and effect an irreducible sense in which they get their sense by the role they play in making hypothetical judgments.</p> <p>So if that is the case, if our notion of cause and effect doesn't belong to the world, they belong to our way of thinking about the world—that is they belong to our transcendental semantics, that is, something that is coordinated with our syntax rather than an independent role in the world.</p>
	Section Break
	Part 2

00:00	<p>Part 2 begins with a reference to the following scheme taken from A.B. Dickerson, <i>Kant on Representation and Objectivity</i>, p 63.</p> <p>Dickerson's reading is a late-Wittgensteinian reading of Kant, which Jay doesn't think is entirely unpersuasive.</p> <p>He suggests that the following argument for the necessity of the categories, which is an argument for why do we think that the categories are necessary—how do we unpack this?</p> <p>We have already got something like a minimal transcendental deduction, and we will explain by the end why we don't yet have a real one. That is, by the end of the class we will see that today's argument was all a bit of a red herring.</p> <p>But for the next 40 minutes we will try to believe this line, in order to see ultimately why we won't be able to believe it.</p> <p>So Dickerson lays out the argument we have been trying to lay out:</p> <p>"...In summary form, the argument that I have suggested Kant has for the second premise is as follows.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Necessarily, a spontaneous act of synthesis can result in a judgment with a claim to objectivity (i.e., a cognition) only if that synthesis is governed solely by what is essential to the cognizing mind. [i] 2. The cognizing mind is essentially a judging mind. 3. The essential structures of the act of judgment are the logical functions listed in the 'table of judgments'. [From the Metaphysical Deduction.] [ii] <p>(therefore) Necessarily, a spontaneous act of synthesis can result in cognition only if that synthesis is governed solely by the logical functions.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. The logical functions, insofar as they govern the synthesis involved in cognition, are the categories. <p>(therefore) Necessarily a spontaneous act of synthesis can result in a cognition only if that synthesis is governed by the categories.</p> <p>(therefore) (β) If our cognition involves a spontaneous synthesis then this synthesis must be governed by the categories. QED.</p>
	<p>[i] So that is the answer about how we are going to get around Hume. It has to be essential for the cognizing mind qua cognizing.</p> <p>Well the argument that we are faced with in the metaphysical deduction is (2. The cognizing mind is essentially a judging mind).</p>

	<p>[ii] The Table of Judgments occurs at §9 at A70/B95, and we will say in a minute something about the number of categories.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">TABLE OF JUDGMENTS</p> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; align-items: center;"> <div style="text-align: center;"> <p>II</p> <p><i>Quality</i></p> <p>Affirmative</p> <p>Negative</p> <p>Infinite</p> </div> <div style="text-align: center;"> <p>I</p> <p><i>Quantity of Judgments</i></p> <p>Universal</p> <p>Particular</p> <p>Singular</p> </div> <div style="text-align: center;"> <p>III</p> <p><i>Relation</i></p> <p>Categorical</p> <p>Hypothetical</p> <p>Disjunctive</p> </div> </div> <div style="text-align: center; margin-top: 20px;"> <p>IV</p> <p><i>Modality</i></p> <p>Problematic</p> <p>Assertoric</p> <p>Apodeictic</p> </div> <p>But to first give a brief accounting of what these things mean.</p>
	<p>Judgments have <u>quantity</u>, which are Universal-Particular-Singular. That is, Universal means "All S is P". Particular is "Some S are P". And Singular is "X is P".</p>
	<p>There is <u>relation</u>, which it turns out later that we don't really need relation. But anyway, relation can be Categorical-Hypothetical-Disjunctive.</p> <p>Categorical is relation between two concepts "[?] S is P".</p> <p>Hypothetical is a relation, in a sense a judgment, a judgment that X happens, but if X happens, then Y happens.</p> <p>So the hypothetical is a really a way of relating two judgments themselves "X happens" and "Y happens" which are connected by the formula "if...then".</p> <p>Then there is Disjunctive, which is a relation of several judgments, 'either X happens or Y happens or Z happens.</p>
	<p>There is <u>modality</u>, which is terribly messy.</p> <p>What he means is the value of the copula—and the value of the copula can either be Problematic-Assertoric-Apodeictic.</p> <p>Problematic: it is possible that S is P. Assertoric: S is P Apodeictic: Certainly/Necessarily S is P.</p>

	<p>There is <u>Quality</u>. Judgments can be Affirmative-Negative-Infinite.</p> <p>Affirmative: Bernstein is moral. Negative: Bernstein is not moral. Infinite: Bernstein is non-moral.</p>
5:30	<p>So now on to step 3 of Dickerson's argument:</p> <p>"...In summary form, the argument that I have suggested Kant has for the second premise is as follows.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Necessarily, a spontaneous act of synthesis can result in a judgment with a claim to objectivity (i.e., a cognition) only if that synthesis is governed solely by what is essential to the cognizing mind. [i] 2. The cognizing mind is essentially a judging mind. 3. The essential structures of the act of judgment are the logical functions listed in the 'table of judgments'. [From the Metaphysical Deduction.] [ii] <p>(therefore) Necessarily, a spontaneous act of synthesis can result in cognition only if that synthesis is governed solely by the logical functions. [iii]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. The logical functions, insofar as they govern the synthesis involved in cognition, are the categories. <p>(therefore) Necessarily a spontaneous act of synthesis can result in a cognition only if that synthesis is governed by the categories. (therefore) (β) If our cognition involves a spontaneous synthesis then this synthesis must be governed by the categories. QED.</p>
	<p>[iii] That is, we have no other ways of putting concepts together, to talk about the world, to get knowledge of the world, other than via these logical forms.</p>
7:00	<p>So what is this little argument trying to do?</p> <p>It is trying to bridge the gap between spontaneity and objectivity. And the bridging of the gap is via the essential features of the mind, in terms of judgment. And then the categories as what are the non-arbitrary concepts we must make use of in order to judge in accordance with the logical functions of judgment.</p>

	<p>Kant's own way of doing this is the Metaphysical Deduction proper, as found at B105:</p> <p>It is vintage Kant to give a whole lot of blather before and after, but the actual argument is contained in ten almost incomprehensible sentences.</p> <p><i>"The same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgment [1] also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition [2]; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding[3]. The same understanding [5], through the same operations by which in concepts [6], by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a judgment, also introduces a transcendental content into its representations[4], by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general [7]. On this account we are entitled to call these representations pure concepts of the understanding, and to regard them as applying a priori to objects—a conclusion which general logic is not in a position to establish [8]."</i></p>
9:00	[1] So the same functions that I use to connect circle and red in a judgment "S is P" give unity...
	[2] Namely, the features of my intuition of the circle.
	[3] So we are getting the idea that unity is a big deal.
	[4] This is the maneuver...the movement here from the logical form of judgment to transcendental content is what we are calling the movement from transcendental grammar to transcendental semantics.
	[5] It is deeply important that this is the same understanding. Syntax and semantics hang together through the same understanding.
	[6] The same operation by which I cobble together judgments is equally the way in which I introduce into the intuition a transcendental content—by transcendental content he means an a priori form...substance, property.
	[7] So any old intuition is going to have this character.
	[8] General logic just studies judgments. Read Aristotle on judgments and all that. But this is not an argument that belongs to Aristotle but to Transcendental Philosophy and it claims that from the transcendental grammar we introduce a transcendental content.


12:30	<p>Well what that content generates is what we mean by "world".</p> <p>Kant's way of saying this is at B128:</p> <p><i>"But first I shall introduce a word of explanation in regard to the categories [1]. They are concepts of an object in general [2], by means of which the intuition of an object is regarded as determined in respect of one of the logical functions of judgment [3]."</i></p>
	<p>[1] We have been slogging away for 128 pages and now Kant gets around to telling us what categories are.</p>
	<p>[2] That is, they give us the very idea of what we mean by what it is for something to be an object.</p> <p>An object is something we get through judging the world and an object is the sort of thing that is a substance with properties that exists in causal relations with other objects in space and in time.</p>
	<p>[3] So categories refer to transcendental semantics. They are our concepts of an object in general. What can we do with that? They are what allows us to make use of the logical functions of judgment.</p> <p>So once we regard the world categorially then we are able to make use of "S" and "P" or "if...then" or "either this or that"</p>
16:00	<p>So there are a couple of puzzles here about how this is all going to work out.</p> <p>The first puzzle is...first, let's make sure we are following the shape of the argument...</p>
	Question
	<p>The reason why this argument is a bit of a red herring is Kant simply borrows the Table of Judgments from Aristotle and he makes no effort to justify that these are either unique or complete.</p> <p>So it turns out that all of this 'Transcendental Syntax-Transcendental Semantics' argument is nothing but, as he says, a "clue".</p> <p>That's why this is the "Metaphysical Deduction" and not the actual Deduction. The actual Transcendental Deduction is going to have a different basis, which we will return to.</p>

17:30	<p>But this is the basic shape of his thought. But it lacks a convincing premise.</p> <p>So what he is going to do, to quickly project ahead, he has obviously got a problem...you can try to deduce the number of judgments and in his "Reflections" Kant has various attempts, and various accounts of how many categories there are.</p> <p>This Table of Judgments in the CPR is the maximal account with 12 categories and there is minimal account with only 3.</p> <p>And there is a nice account of this in Guyer in the Cambridge Companion. There is equally a book by Claus Reich that is an account of trying to deduce the categories from the principle of unity.</p>
19:30	<p>Kant speculates on various possibilities. Sometimes (as in the "Reflections") he says that the titles of thought are just magnitude, reality, subject, ground, and whole.</p> <p>Sometimes we can really get it down to just 3 categories: substance, causality, and composition-wholeness. That is, on this account the relation categories are the only categories. And what they all share is that they are categories of different kinds of world unity.</p> <p>That is the unity of properties in a substance, the unity of substances at a given time, and the unity of the world through time by cause and effect.</p> <p>So it is a matter of how the world hangs together or is connected with its various parts.</p>
21:00	<p>He sometimes thinks that maybe these three are not enough because we probably need some idea of reality and some idea of magnitude as well.</p> <p>Those who care about this, tend to think that 5 is a good number.</p> <p>However, and this is why all of this is almost irrelevant, the structure of Kant's argument is much more elegant and beautiful than that.</p> <p>Roughly, he is going to have an argument, we are going to call it the Transcendental Deduction that is simply going to show, not depending on the notion of logical forms of judgment that there must be categories.</p> <p>So the Transcendental Deduction is simply going to be an argument of a form like on the handout [see above] but only with different premises—namely the premises of unity.</p>

22:00	<p>So the A and B Deductions are going to be simply arguing to connect spontaneity and objectivity by showing that we must have some categories.</p> <p>And then in the "Analogies of Experience"</p>
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The Analogies of Experience are in the "Analytic of Principles" [see outline below]

Outline of Critique Of Pure Reason:




	<p>And then in the "Analogies of Experience" he is actually going to make independent arguments for the categories that we need. That is, he is going to defend the ideas of substance, causality, and reciprocity or commonality, as well as some of the other categories in the "Anticipation and the like.</p>
23:00	<p>So Deduction, there must be categories, that's all that happens in that long, turbulent thing, but without the question begging premise that we know the logical functions of judgment.</p> <p>[...?]</p> <p>Part of the mystery of the Transcendental Deduction is what are the premises? But roughly the argument is going to be that in order to get from subjectivity to objectivity there has got to be categories.</p> <p>So that is the basic shape of the argument.</p> <p>And then there are separate arguments for the categories we actually need, and therefore obviating the necessity of saying anything about the original table of judgments.</p>
24:00	<p>We will examine one further issue and add at the end one further twizzle.</p>
25:00	<p>We have set up today to argue that the movement goes from transcendental syntax to transcendental semantics, however there are at least suggestions that Kant has a slightly different way of thinking about the logical functions of judgments and the categories.</p> <p>Namely the categories are extra-logical constraints that enable the logical functions of judgment to operate.</p> <p>So the thought here is simply that rather than reading the transcendental semantics off from the logical functions of judgment—which is what we have been doing—the argument is something like that the world can be judged only if it is conceived under the categories.</p> <p>So that the requirement of extra-logical categories is that places a constraint on the logical functions of judgment rather than the logical functions of judgment determining the categories.</p> <p>One is extra-logical constraint on the use of the categories which allows for a slight separation of the two structures. In the other we read the categories off from the functions of judgment.</p>
27:30	<p>But what we want to underline here is that either way you do this, all the work is being done by the way in which forms of judgment unite representations.</p>

	<p>That is why we said that we are maybe making too little of what we can call Kant's wholism.</p> <p>To say that there is nothing we can do with concepts except use them in judgments is to say that the whole precedes its parts. And therefore the notion of unity is a sense is what is going to be driving this story. And eventually that notion of unity is going to be the unity of the self.</p> <p>Exactly what that is, is going to be a mystery.</p>
28:30	<p>But at this point he is simply claiming that certain types of unity are essential to both judging and to what is judged.</p> <p>And that the model of that unity, that forms of unity, logical unity, semantic unity, provide a model or a clue of the relationship between syntax and semantics, which are mutually determining.</p>
29:30	<p>On the other hand, so far, the notion of unity is here simply borrowed from the table of judgments. "S is P" "if... then" are models of unity but those things are operating as primitives.</p> <p>And if that is all there is to say then this would be just a conventionalist argument.</p> <p>So Kant hasn't yet got anything that would move to a real <i>quid juris</i> beyond the <i>quid factus</i>.</p>
30:30	<p>So the reason today's argument is a red herring is that what is missing here is that Kant hasn't justified the word "Transcendental" here.</p> <p>For all we know these are just conventional ways of talking, conventional ways of thinking, but are not necessary for a cognizing mind.</p>
	<p>That said, we want to add one further argument, which will tie up this week with last week.</p> <p>If our conception here of 'transcendental syntax and transcendental semantics' is meaningful at all, it already indicates an overcoming of subject-object dualism.</p> <p>And that would be interesting if that was the result already. And this would be already a displacement of all of epistemology. And the demonstration would be that Kant is not an epistemologist.</p>

32:00	<p>How would all of this play out?</p> <p>Well if judging is the minimal action by which we get a hold of the world, and now we have no account of objects independently of them, then Kant is denying that there are subjects and that there are objects and that there is a puzzle about how they get connected.</p> <p>In the world of Kant there are no subjects and there are no objects. There are rather judges and objects of judgment.</p> <p>So to be a subject in this instance is simply to be a judge.</p> <p>This is to give a functional account of the subject and not an ontological one.</p>
33:00	<p>For all intents and purposes what it is to be a subject is to be a judge, and therefore what it is to be an object is to be an object of judgment.</p> <p>And that given what we have said about 'transcendental semantics and transcendental syntax' we may say that these two notions, judge and object of judgment, are internal correlates, meaning that they mutually define one another, and not mere external relations.</p>
34:00	<p>So for Kant there is no question of how do I as a subject in the world get a hold of objects in the world.</p> <p>Rather the notion of world is going to be defined by objects of judgments. Namely our concept of an object in general.</p>
	<p>So the reason a lot of the readings of the CPR are wrong is because if it is right that Kant thinks that this relation is internal, then what we want to do in the Deduction is indicate the nature of this relation.</p> <p>The strategy is not to explain how two independent things are connected because they are not two independent things.</p>

35:00	<p>We can think of it like this: In accordance of traditional epistemology, what kind of account of representation does Kant have? He can either be a direct realist, an indirect realist, or an idealist.</p> <p>But he is none of these three.</p> <p>He is not a direct realist (as Collins in <i>Possible Experience</i> thinks Kant is) because he is a representationalist. So that one just drops out automatically.</p> <p>But the claim that he is an indirect realist—indirect realists believe that I infer from my being in a representational state that the world is in a particular state of affairs.</p> <p>But Kant does not think that I have to infer from my judgment anything about the world. So it isn't an inference from my judgment that the world is such and such.</p> <p>So is Kant an idealist? An Idealist says that my awareness of an idea gets its reality by the constructive act through which it is coordinated with other ideas. But that just cuts us off from the world. So Kant can't be that kind of idealist either.</p>
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37:00	<p>So let's draw an analogy, using the following sketch drawn on the chalk board:</p>  <p>If you are a representationalist you have to begin with the fact that I am affected by the world, and therefore there are modifications of my mind. Those modifications of my mind are the representational medium.</p> <p>So the representations medium here, and this is an analogy, are 'chalk marks on a board'—that is the stuff, the marks.</p> <p>But what I actually see is a face. I see the face through the marks. And we need to get that phrasing right. That is to say, we do not <i>infer</i> the face from the marks on the board. We do not construct the face from the marks on the board. And we are not aware of the face independently of the marks on the board.</p> <p>The marks on the board are our representational medium. But what we see through those marks or in the representation is an object.</p> <p>So a face is not made up of marks, but a face is made up of eyes, nose, and mouth.</p> <p>So the parts of a face are not the parts of the representational medium, they are parts of an object.</p>
39:30	<p>And good Husserlians should like this because we are arguing that essentially the object of judgment is an intentional object.</p> <p>So representationalism is the thought that I have representations. Representations are modifications of my sensibility (Kant never doubts that), through the logical forms of judgment I spontaneously see them as a face.</p> <p>A face is the object.</p> <p>So roughly the categories are the mechanism through which we go from marks to face. That's the analogy, and that is why Kant is a representationalist and that is why we are immediately aware of objects in the world, because what we are aware of is what we see through our representations.</p> <p>The face is something in the world, not something in my mind. The 'in my mind' would be the marks on the board. That is the analogy. The face is an object in the world...</p>
	Class ends there.

