

2:30	<p>Looking then at the Refutation beginning with the "Proof" at B 275:</p> <p><i>"I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time [a1]. All determination of time presupposes something permanent in perception. This permanent cannot, however, be something in me, since it is only through this permanent that my existence in time can itself be determined.[*] [a2] Thus perception of this permanent is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me; [a3] and consequently [a5] the determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of actual things which I perceive outside me. Now consciousness [of my existence] in time is necessarily bound up with consciousness of the [condition of the] possibility of this time-determination; and it is therefore necessarily bound up with the existence of things outside me, as the condition of the time-determination. In other words, the consciousness of my existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me.[a6]"</i></p> <p><i>[* As stated by Kant in the Preface to B (above p. 36 n.), this sentence should be altered as follows: 'But this permanent cannot be an intuition in me. For all grounds of determination of my existence which are to be met with in me are representations; and as representations themselves require a permanent distinct from them, in relation to which their change, and so my existence in time wherein they change, may be determined.' [a4]]</i></p>
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[al] This is the premise of the argument. And as we said last time, Kant is depending on a distinction here that Descartes fails to draw—namely that between the “I think”—which is formal, the logical subject of all judgments—and my empirical self.

So when he claims that “I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time,” he is at least thinking that I have concrete self-awareness of my own mental life, and necessarily here we have to imagine at least two moments of it, minimally. That is, I would need to be aware of having first seen this, and then that. Therefore seeing this *after* that.

So really we need some concrete sense of some real bit of my mental history. Therefore we are assuming that what I am aware of is datable states.

So to begin with, Kant is already driving a wedge into the Cartesian picture, where he is saying that Descartes failed to adequately distinguish between the ‘I think’ and the thought of a particular person at a particular time.

In order for their to be problematic idealism—the Cartesian one—[sorry for the buzz, my brother called my phone] this bit of empirical self-awareness is compatible with it being the case that I do not know whether or not there is an external world. I do not know whether my being in a state is connected to an outside world—that is fundamental Cartesian skepticism.

Back to [B275](#)

	<p>[a2] This obviously refers back to the First Analogy. But at the moment he is holding it as a thesis that is weaker than the first Analogy.</p> <p>Here he is simply stating that in order to be aware of temporal change, I have to see it against the background of something that is unchanging.</p> <p>Depending on that much of the First Analogy, the question he is going to be interrogating in the rest of the argument is the location or conditions of possibility of that permanent.</p> <p>So he is taking, at least that much of the First Analogy to be essential. If we had nothing but a stream of consciousness, and nothing else, then we couldn't even be aware of ourselves in that stream.</p> <p>To be aware of something as a datable state, we have to be aware of something that is unchanging—since change only makes sense against the unchanging. Hence time [in the Aristotelian way related to change ?] requires a background—the backdrop thesis—as a condition of possibility of awareness of that change.</p> <p>So I can know that this occurred and then that occurred because this and that are seen against what hasn't changed.</p> <p>Back to B275</p>
10:30	<p>[a3] Why would he say that?</p> <p>He is assuming a couple of different things. First of all he is assuming here that all inner intuitions are in a state of flux, as Hume stated. So that the very nature of mental life is of ephemeral and transient items. Time after all is the form of inner sense.</p> <p>So our inner life is a kind of indefinite restlessness. And the elements of it are themselves ephemeral and transient.</p> <p>If it is that case that all inner intuitions are in state of flux, then Kant also seems to be assuming that inner sense has no manifoldness of its own. And he seems to infer from that fact that inner sense has no capacity to generate data of outer sense.</p> <p>[]</p> <p>So he also says here that—and he misstates this, and he corrects this in the Preface to B which is included in a footnote at the bottom of the page. See above footnotePrefacetoB.</p>

<p>13:3 0</p>	<p>[a4] Here we see him being much clearer.</p> <p>But why did he add that clause? The thought that he is trying to get here is that there is something unchanging in me—namely the “I think”—but we have no <i>intuition</i> of this “I think”.</p> <p>So even though this is a permanent structure of thinking it cannot be the background against which I perceive change because it itself is not an intuition which could be used in that way.</p> <p>So the restated thought in the footnote is the deeper one: there is nothing within my inner life, within inner sense, that could conceivably play the role of the permanent.</p> <p>So he says that representations cannot do it because they are intrinsically ephemeral. The mind is just one thing after another. It goes so quick.</p> <p>So representations won't do. And the self won't do. So there is a kind of an argument by the process of elimination going on here.</p> <p>We've agreed that we need a permanent—as the backdrop thesis requires. We've eliminated representations themselves, then we've eliminated the “I”, so Kant goes on to argue... see B275 above</p>
<p>16:3 0</p>	<p>[a5] Because, again, representations are ephemeral.</p>
<p>17:3 0</p>	<p>[a6] That is of course a strong claim. How should we try to make sense of it?</p> <p>In part, Kant seems to think he is entitled to it simply by a process of elimination. If the permanent cannot be found within me, then it must be found outside me. That is, it must be mere represented outside me but actually so.</p>
<p>18:0 0</p>	<p>As stated, this appears open to a kind of obvious objection. Why is it not sufficient that I have a representation of something outside of me, conceive of it so, but that the actual experience of something, and not the actual experience of something outside of me. [<i>sic.</i>]</p> <p>What is the extra existential ‘umph’ in this argument? How does Kant avoid the obvious fact that the Cartesian skeptic is going to say as Kant was himself aware as stated in the footnote in the Preface at B xl, where he is worried about this.</p> <p>The Cartesian skeptic will happily think of this as compatible with the dream data, with the evil demon data. That is what that whole thing was about—that I have this strong sense of things outside of me and yet I was wrong.</p>

20:0 0	<p>So, we'll cycle back to the passage at B x1 in the Preface shortly, but turning back to B 277, Kant says in the long footnote at the bottom of the page (Kemp-Smith 246):</p> <p><i>"It is clear, however, that in order even only to imagine [b1] something as outer, that is, to present it to sense in intuition, we must already have an outer sense, and must thereby immediately distinguish the mere receptivity of an outer intuition from the spontaneity which characterizes every act of imagination. For should we merely be imagining an outer sense, the faculty of intuition, which is to be determined by the faculty of the imagination, would itself be annulled.[b2]"</i></p>
	[b1] Now we see Kant worrying about this Cartesian problem.
20:3 0	<p>[b2] Well, that is right, it would be annulled, but that is what Descartes is worried about. So that can't be an answer.</p> <p>So we can take it that the footnote in the preface tries a simply more complicated move.</p>
	<p>So looking then at B x1:</p> <p><i>"But through inner experience I am conscious of my existence in time [c1] (consequently also of its determinability in time [c2]), and this is more than to be conscious merely of my representation [c3]. It is identical with the empirical consciousness of my existence [c4], which is determinable only through relation to something which, while bound up with my existence, is outside me. This consciousness of my existence in time is bound up in the way of identity with the consciousness of a relation to something outside me, and it is therefore experience not invention, sense not imagination, which inseparably connects this outside something with my inner sense. [c5]"</i></p>
	[c1] Now that is an interesting premise, because he is now claiming that [not only do ?] I have a bit of self-knowledge, but what my self knowledge is of is something existential—namely, I am aware of <i>myself</i> as having a temporal existence and therefore <i>myself</i> as being in temporally [displaced ?] states.
22:3 0	[c2] It is also the fact that my inner life is nothing but something that is to be temporally determined.
	[c3] Now he is trying to get out of what we might call the representational veil, the representational circle.

	<p>[c4] So he is now claiming that the question is now that I am not merely aware of a seeming state of first one thing and then another—but this is an awareness of my being a temporal being who is in these diverse states. And I am conscious of that. So that my consciousness of myself is a consciousness of my existence as temporal, and not simply my <i>knowledge</i> of my existence as temporal.</p> <p>Back to Bx1</p>
24:3 0	<p>[c5] So the argument runs something like the following: self-knowledge is knowledge of something existing and its temporal states. And at least with respect to me I am aware of me, which again is something that the Cartesian won't want to reject—but then a Cartesian would not want to doubt the reality of whatever can be shown to be a necessary condition of the possibility of this experience.</p> <p>But in the second step we already saw that the determination of time and therefore the determination of anything in time presupposes the perception of something permanent, and that permanent must be spatial.</p>
26:0 0	<p>What Kant is beginning to try to get to here...to just state what Kant's driving intuition seems to be here, then we'll say something about what he would need to follow through on it.</p> <p>Let's begin, and this is why this argument gets so [cluttered? Clobbered?], let's begin with what we have called Kant's holism.</p> <p>[holism was discussed in classes 5, 8, 9 , 10 and the Q&A for weeks 9 and 12.]</p> <p>Kant's holism, remember, is that we do not build-up our knowledge of outer things by first having private representations. Rather the claim of holism is that our original and immediate awareness is of things outside us and that our awareness of inner things is either a change of focus with respect to our awareness of the world—so rather than seeing the bright orange shirt, I think of my experience of seeing the shirt—so on our version of Kant's holism, it is that it is our experience of seeing the bright orange shirt is parasitic on seeing the object in space.</p> <p>So that inner states for Kant are only ever anyway shadows of external acts of awareness.</p>

28:3 0	<p>Now what he is trying to do here, is reconstruct that argument from the inside. And the trouble he is having is because of course the argument goes from the outside-in, to reconstruct it inside out, ends up always being weaker than he wants it to be.</p> <p>[]</p> <p>So he needs some sense of an extra sense of how he can show that the permanent must be really spatial.</p>
29:0 0	<p>And after he finished writing the CPR he began to think that the way to cash out this argument was through a fuller conceptualization of the role of the body in ordinary perception.</p> <p>We have said from the get-go to say that 'I see the bottle' is to make a judgment about an object 'out there' from a perspective, from a "here".</p> <p>So the argument is that an "I think" is not a separate awareness, it is the acknowledgement of the perspectival character of all judgments.</p>
30:3 0	<p>So what then is the cash value of the "here"? What is the "here" from which I see the bottle?</p> <p>I can only see the bottle from here if I am located in the same space as the bottle is. But a necessary condition for me to be located in the same space that the bottle is is to be of a kind with the bottle, namely to be of a body in space.</p> <p>So a necessary condition for the possibility of seeing an object from "here" is my being a body in space, and therefore of a kind with the bottle.</p>
32:0 0	<p>So Kant notes in his <i>Reflections</i> (as quoted in a book by Guyer, pp 313-314) in 1788, just at the very moment he finished writing the second edition, he drew the conclusion that:</p> <p><i>"Since time cannot be externally perceived in things in so far as it is only a determination of inner sense, so we can determine ourselves in time only in so far as we stand in relation to outer things and consider ourselves therein."</i></p> <p>That is, we have to consider ourselves to be in the same space as them.</p>

	<p>As he got bolder about this in 1790 he writes:</p> <p><i>"We are first object of our outer sense to ourselves, for otherwise we could not perceive our place in the world..."</i> that line is really the crux here... <i>"and thus intuit ourselves in relation to outer things."</i></p> <p>So in order for me to have a relation to outer things, at all, the very premise that we are now thinking about, the determination of my existence in time, I must be aware of myself as outer, that is have an outer intuition of me. And that is the condition of my perceiving of them as outside me.</p> <p>Otherwise outside me has no...we know outside me has to be outside my own mind, but where is that exactly? It has to be in a different space than I am.</p>
34:30	<p>That is, unless the mind is synonymous in some way with the body, it could not have an awareness of spatial location.</p> <p>So, Kant getting this thought right now, and this is the question he has got to get a hold of—we can say the question is where is the mind or the soul. And the answer is going to be, wherever the body is, and nowhere else.</p>
	<p>So the soul as the object of inner sense—and this is where we started, it is the premise of refutation—cannot perceive its place within the body—where is my soul in my body? How do we figure this out? But rather my soul is in the place where the person, the <i>Mensch</i> is.</p> <p>So that Kant ends up defending the thesis, which as a teacher he had read over and over again in Baumgarten, and who knows what exactly Baumgarten meant.</p> <p>But Baumgarten says quite beautifully and eloquently: "The human soul is the faculty of representation which represents the world according to the situation of its body."</p>
37:00	<p>So the missing set of arguments in the Refutation is that to be in a spatial relationship to an object requires spatial location, and there can be no spatial location unless oneself is spatial and therefore embodies.</p> <p>Therefore, now the argument will run, awareness of my existence in time is dependent on my awareness of the permanent. Where is the permanent? Well it is at least wherever I am as an embodied self.</p>

38:0 0	<p>So that thought—put the body back in—and now the holism thesis is perfectly in order. Because now it really does make sense that we have no awareness of our inner sense except as shadows, limitations, and privations of our awareness of the world.</p> <p>That seems to be Kant's argument.</p>
39:0 0	<p>Questions:</p> <p>The question is the other way around, that is, give me an idea of where your soul could be other than where your body is.</p> <p>The point is that soul can only get hold of its self via space.</p> <p>So the argument that is really going on throughout the analogies is that 'no temporal awareness without spatial awareness'</p>
40:3 0	<p>'no temporal awareness without spatial awareness'.</p> <p>The inner is dependent on the outer. So all these are permutations on the derivativeness of inner life. And that inner life is something we develop and refine.</p>
41:0 0	<p>[I'll summarize Jay's following point—I take it that he is trying to respond to the earlier concern that the inner life is not all shadows and privations. So his point is to try to defuse or undermine the inner life as this robust realm of experience. He claims then he goes to museums because the outer experience is much more interesting and pleasant than inner experience.]</p>
41:0 0	<p>That is the thought. The inner life is a certain refinement of our encounter, learning to encounter and cope with the things of the world. It is not a building out.</p> <p>There is no inner life. Rather the inner life comes at a certain withdraw from and making use of the materials gathered from outer existence.</p>

42:0 0	<p>It is interesting that given where Kant started that he should end up with such a strong version of our dependency on the outer.</p> <p>And it should also give us the sense that by empirical realism Kant really does mean "realism". He really does mean things and not mere representations of things.</p>
	<p>So not only does Kant begin developing this elaborate structure of the dependency of the inner on the outer. Indeed the primacy of the outer over the inner—which is remarkable given where we started from...the nature of the Copernican Turn.</p> <p>But we also want to suggest that Kant has a strong sense of the idea as the knower as agent. Therefore it is essential to the whole of the Copernican Turn that there be a strong defense of human agency.</p>
43:3 0	<p>And indeed this was the original premise with which Kant's critical project began.</p> <p>Namely it began with the awareness that the unrestricted generality of Newtonian physics entailed two intolerable conclusions. []</p> <p>First, if Newtonian physics is unrestrictedly true, then there is no freedom in the world. Determinism prevails.</p> <p>Secondly, if Newtonian physics is unrestrictedly true, then it can not make any sense of truth, and therefore of science.</p>
	<p>Science after all is a human, rational practice. It is a representation of the world. And therefore to have an account of science, you need something more than the content of science.</p> <p>So let's say that the scientific worldview eliminates something fundamental—science itself, as a human and rational practice.</p>
45:0 0	<p>So Newtonian physics on its own made both morality and science, truth and empirical inquiry unintelligible.</p> <p>It is therefore not surprising that in the second half of the book, where he deals with the antimonies he also deals with scientific rationality as a project.</p>

46:0 0	<p>To say all this is certainly to say that Kant, against Locke, never thought of philosophy as a mere under-laborer to science.</p> <p>That simply is being in the wrong relationship to science. To think that philosophy ought to map its results on to the results of scientific inquiry, makes scientific inquiry itself all but unintelligible.</p> <p>Programs in natural epistemology show how baleful that idea is.</p>
46:3 0	<p>So Kant's general strategy, in the CPR, the idea of limiting knowledge in order to make room for faith—where faith means not faith in God but faith in freedom—his general strategy is to demonstrate non-skeptically that scientific rationality does not have an unrestricted scope.</p> <p>It is a mode of encounter. It is an anthropocentric, or anthropocentric mode of taking up the world.</p> <p>Hence the fundamentals of the scientific world view—causality, explanation, falsifiability, mathematics and the role of the reduction of the qualitative to the quantitative, the primacy of the system, all the things that make up scientific inquiry, are human contributions to the knowing situation.</p> <p>The goodness of science—this is what Kant saw that these other characters didn't see—the question is not how we can found science but rather how can we account for the goodness of science as a mode of our relating to the world.</p> <p>Of course Kant's view is that all the fundamental ingredients of science come from us.</p>
49:0 0	<p>Now we will see in a moment that this general strategy is more or less right, as we have been arguing all semester, but nonetheless slightly flawed and hence we are going to argue that Kant does require some corrections.</p>
	<p>We had said earlier that the problem with Newtonian physics is its "unrestricted generality". What do we mean by this "unrestricted generality"?</p> <p>What is the philosophical word for "unrestricted generality"? It is "Transcendental Realism".</p>
	<p>So the antimony between determinism and freedom derives from, not from Newtonian physics, but from a philosophical thesis, namely Transcendental Realism.</p> <p>"Scientism"—that's what Transcendental Realism is—and not "science" is going to be the problem.</p>

50:0 0	<p>In the context in which we have been using it all semester, Transcendental Realism involves two claims.</p> <p>What appears in space and time is what exists independently of us. And vice versa, namely what exists independently of us exists by itself in space and time.</p> <p>Or to say the same thing in another way—appearances and things in themselves are identical.</p> <p>Secondly, things in themselves exists if and only if the sufficient conditions for them to exist are satisfied.</p> <p>By this we mean that if you think that appearances are things in themselves—just what is there—then you have got to think that whatever is necessary for that things to be there in that state, with those characteristics, etc., then all those conditions are satisfied fully.</p> <p>There can be nothing “gappy” about things in themselves. There can be no indeterminacy.</p>
52:0 0	<p>So let's put this as a third point:</p> <p>Things in themselves must be fully determinate with respect to every possible pair of predicates, e.g. A and not-A.</p> <p>That is, for every possible pair of predicates, you have to be able to determinately say whether or not it holds of that object.</p>
	<p>And hence, it is absolutely fundamental for the argument of the Antimonies, appearances must be for the transcendental realist, fully determinate. Because appearances are identical with things in themselves.</p>
53:0 0	<p>So that is the background.</p> <p>We are taking it that this is the way to start because if Kant is going to solve the antimony by saying “Transcendental Idealism”—then it helps if the problem is “Transcendental Realism”.</p> <p>Now what we have to do is give an interpretation of both the thesis and the antithesis of the third antimony by which the contradiction between them arises if and only if both of them are interpreted in a transcendently realistic manner.</p> <p>The idea is that we are going to have the thesis and the antithesis and in order to generate the contradiction we are going to give them each a certain realist interpretation.</p> <p>And then we will solve the antimony by interpreting them from the point of view of transcendental idealism.</p>

54:0 0	<p>So the thesis of the third antimony asserts: [A 444 B472] <i>"Causality in accordance with the laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of the world can one and all be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is also another causality, that of freedom."</i></p> <p>So the thesis asserts that appearances require freedom since causality in accordance with the laws of nature is insufficient to fully account for appearances.</p>
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56:0 0	<p>Strikingly, both thesis and antithesis deploy <i>reductio ad absurdum</i> forms of argumentation, in which you assume the opposite of what you want to claim and demonstrate its impossibility, its absurdity.</p> <p>You take the opposing view and show its absurdity thereby leaving your original thesis in place.</p> <p>As you can easily imagine just by looking at the thesis—natural causality is insufficient, we require freedom, this is going to take the form of a very standard infinite regress argument.</p> <p>So the argument runs—to look at it broadly—it starts with the idea (and here we are following Watkins outline [Eric Watkins in <i>Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality</i>. See class #13, 6:30 for some comments about the connection between Jay and Watkins' strategies])—assume the opposite.</p> <p>Assume that there is no freedom and that all causality occurs within the laws of nature.</p> <p>If all causality occurs in accordance with the laws of nature, then for every event that happens, there must be a previous event from which it follows, in accordance with the laws of nature. That's simple enough.</p> <p>Hence if the state from which an event follows in accordance with the laws of nature, if such an event had existed for ever, then it could not have brought forth the event that is supposed to follow, in accordance with the laws of nature.</p> <p>That is, there has got to be change...a condition requires a previous condition and not an unchanging state, because only some change can bring about a change. Something has to change in order to account for change, that is all he is arguing for there.</p> <p>Hence in any event that happens the state from which it follows in accordance with the laws of nature must itself be an event. Chance is only going to come from previous change. Conditions from previous conditions.</p> <p>Now we can get our infinite regress going pretty easily. If every event presupposes a preceding event, from which it follows in accordance with the laws of nature, then there is never an absolutely first causal event, and thus no completeness of the series of events on the side of the causes descending from one another.</p> <p>That is, simply if events only follow from events, and there is no first event, then we just have to keep going back and back forever. There is no completeness.</p> <p>Therefore there is no completeness of causes for any event, because every event is condition by the previous event. And we have got an infinite regress going on.</p> <p>So the conditions for any event never take place. Therefore</p>
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60:3 0	<p>That is, what Kant means now is that if you actually have an infinite regress then you are imagining that an event happens without the conditions for the event happening. That is why it is a regress argument.</p> <p>But since we know the opposite to be true, namely that every event happens...if you imagine that you imagine an impossible world. You are imagining a world in which every event happens without a cause sufficient to determine it. And we know that that is false.</p> <p>We know that no event occurs without a cause sufficient to determine a priori, therefore the original premise is false. Namely there now must be a kind of causality distinct from the causality in accordance with the laws of nature, that is, one that occurs without its cause being determined by another previous cause.</p>
62:0 0	<p>A 446</p> <p><i>"We must, then, assume a causality through which something takes place, the cause of which is not itself determined, in accordance with necessary laws, by another cause antecedent to it, that is to say, an absolute spontaneity of the cause, whereby a series of appearances, which proceeds in accordance with laws of nature, begins of itself."</i></p>
	<p>So the heavy-weight clauses in this argument concern the idea that there can be no completeness of causes and no event happening without a sufficient reason, those are the real working clauses.</p> <p>And those clauses simply are the principles or thesis of transcendental realism: that is simply the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of determinacy.</p> <p>That if an event happens all the conditions for it must be satisfied and in infinite regress they are unsatisfied.</p> <p>Hence what is involved here in getting this argument going are very strong readings of the principles of sufficient reason.</p> <p>By strong we mean the following, that appearances are fully real and completely determinate entities. That is really what the argument depends on.</p> <p>The background of this argument is if a cause is to be a sufficient for its effect, then there must be a sufficient reason for it as well.</p>
64:0 0	<p>Clearly, this form of transcendental realism assumes a rationalist version of realism in which the world is fully determinate a priori.</p>

	<p>Let's look then at the antithesis. The antithesis simply asserts that there is no freedom in the world since freedom is incompatible with the requirements of a natural world.</p> <p>And therefore freedom is only "therefore an empty thought-entity" [A 447].</p>
65:00	<p>So, how is he going to run the argument for the antithesis of no freedom, for causal determinacy? It begins reductio, "Assume that there is freedom".</p> <p>If there is freedom, there is a spontaneous uncaused event in the world, an absolute beginning in a series of events.</p> <p>Step two, if a series of events is caused by...</p>
	<p>[I apologize, the battery died on the recorder and I had to replace it. I would guess that about half a minute is missing, but not much more.]</p>
00:00	#2 of 3
	<p>This is a premise now. That means that for every event that happens there must be a previous state in which it follows in accordance with the laws of nature.</p> <p>If a spontaneous cause happens or begins then there must be a previous state from which it follows with the laws of nature. A spontaneous cause is caused by a previous state in accordance with the laws of nature. But that is a contradiction in terms. Therefore there can be no freedom in the world.</p>
1:00	<p>Now the crucial premise here is often misinterpreted and misinterpreted by nearly everyone.</p> <p>The crucial premise is that for everything that happens there must be a previous state from which it follows in accordance with the laws of nature.</p> <p>Nearly every single interpreter thinks that this refers back to the Second Analogy. But on our principle of interpretation this cannot be a restatement of the second analogy because the structure of the antimony is based on transcendental realism.</p> <p>Therefore we take it that this (transcendentally real) premise (here in the antithesis of the third analogy) should not be taken as a restatement of the second Analogy [the subject of class #13] but should be construed as a principle that belongs solely to transcendental realism.</p>

2:00	<p>Secondly, in interpreting this we take it that the claim that a spontaneous cause occurs in <i>natural time</i>, and therefore it must follow from a previous state in accordance with the laws of nature, is perfectly compatible with transcendental realism, which identifies appearances and things and themselves.</p> <p>So for transcendental realism—which assumes the identity of appearances and things in themselves—if there is a spontaneous state, it must occur in natural time, since there can be only one spatio-temporal whole for transcendental realism, all of which is to say on our reading that the antithesis depends on transcendental realism and again on the principle of sufficient reason and hence the crucial premise should not be read epistemologically.</p>
4:00	<p>So that the argument is that spontaneous causality is incompatible with natural causality in that it is something that we could never meet with in experience.</p> <p>Which is to say that even for the transcendental realist, the idea of a spontaneous cause cannot be determined to have a referent.</p>
5:00	<p>So the crucial passage that gets people in all sorts of trouble in the antithesis is in A445-447 reads:</p> <p><i>"Transcendental freedom thus stands opposed to the law of causality; and the kind of connection which it assumes as holding between the successive states of the active causes renders all unity of experience impossible. It is not to be met with in any experience, and is therefore an empty thought-entity."</i></p> <p>This is the passage that tends to be read as coming out of the Second Analogy. Our suggestion is that the reference to the unity of experience is not a premise of this argument but what follows from its conclusion.</p>
6:30	<p>It is because, again, spontaneous causality is incompatible with natural causality that we cannot meet with it in experience.</p> <p>So all the work is being done by the principle of natural causality, not by some complement premise.</p>
7:00	So we'll take a break before we try to tie this all together.
	Break
00:00	So on our interpretation of the third antimony, we want to say that the whole thing presupposes transcendental realism. And it is only thereby that Transcendental Idealism can come to the rescue.

	<p>Under transcendental realism, the thesis and the antithesis explicitly contradict one another. That is why it is an antimony. One asserts what the other denies.</p> <p>Both are premised on transcendental realism and hence transcendental realism must be rejected in order to solve the antimony.</p>
1:00	<p>Kant assumes that if there is a straightforward clash between freedom and causality then you have to renounce freedom.</p> <p>Because for Kant, a [A537] <i>"thoroughgoing connection of all appearances, in a context of nature, is an inexorable law, the inevitable consequence of obstinately insisting upon the reality of appearances is to destroy all freedom. Those who thus follow the common view have never been able to reconcile nature and freedom."</i></p> <p>This is the unity of nature thesis that we defended when we looked at the Analogies.</p> <p>Hence the only possible solution must involve showing how both natural causality and freedom each in a different relation could take place with respect to a given event.</p> <p>Each—freedom and causality—could be said of one and the same event.</p>
2:00	<p>Clearly if appearances are things in themselves, then freedom cannot be saved.</p> <p>So the solution is going to run like this: if things in themselves are not given, then they are not in space and time, and we can have no substantive knowledge of them.</p>
3:00	<p>Kant says at A497, the beginning of the entire story,</p> <p><i>"The whole antinomy of pure reason rests upon the dialectical argument: If the conditioned is given, the entire series of all its conditions is likewise give; objects of the senses are given as conditioned; therefore..."</i> all the conditions for it are also given.</p> <p>So it is the relation of condition to conditioned, and the totality of conditions is the premise of the whole argument. If the condition is given, then the whole series of conditions for that must also be given.</p>
4:30	<p>So Kant has a really simple claim here. Namely the meaning of this requirement—if the conditions are given then the series of conditions for it are also given—is in fact equivocal and subject to different interpretations.</p> <p>In other words, that simply thought means different things when applied to appearances and when applied to things in themselves.</p>

5:30	<p>He says at A498, which helpfully he tells us is the critical solution of cosmological conflict, so at the end this is where we need to look for the solution.</p> <p><i>"In the first place, it is evident beyond all possibility of doubt, that if the conditioned is given, a regress in the series of all its conditions is set us as a task [aufgegeben]."</i></p> <p>This is what that phrase means when applied to appearances.</p> <p>So he goes on to say on the following page, B527:</p> <p><i>"If, however, what we are dealing with are appearances—as mere representations appearances cannot be given save in so far as I attain knowledge of them, or rather attain them in themselves, for they are nothing but empirical modes of knoweldge—..."</i></p> <p>To have a condition is to have knowledge of something's conditions.</p> <p><i>"...—I cannot say, in he same sense of the terms, that if the conditioned is given, all its conditions (as appearances) are likewise given, and therefore cannot in any way infer the absolute totality of the series of its conditions. The appearances are..."</i></p> <p>And this is the sentence that is the crux.</p> <p><i>"The appearances are in their apprehension themselves nothing but an empirical synthesis in space and time, and are given only in this synthesis. It does not, therefore, follow, that if the conditioned, in the [field of] appearance, is given, the synthesis which constitutes its empirical condition is given therewith and is presupposed."</i></p>
	<p><i>"The synthesis first occurs in the regress, and never exists without it. What we can say is that a regress to the conditions, that is, a continued empirical synthesis, on the side of the conditions, is enjoined or set as a task, and that in this regress there can be no lack of given conditions."</i></p>
8:00	<p>In short, in the field of appearances, if I have an event, e.g. knocking over a bottle, we can seek its conditions.</p> <p>But in search for the conditions you can just keep going back and back, but you'll never reach, because our capacities for knowledge are finite and limited, you will never reach the full totality. It is only set to you "as a task".</p>

9:00	<p>So Kant's thought here is that things in themselves, if such things exist, are completely determinate.</p> <p>Appearances are never completely determinate. This is something we tried to argue when looking at the Second Analogy. There we said—and not accidentally—that a cause is an indeterminate condition for any determinate event. Therefore all causality within a Kantian world presupposes an indeterminate background.</p> <p>Now we are stating this thought in another way, namely, there is an intrinsic indeterminacy in our knowledge of all events, because we never have their full conditions. We only ever have partial knowledge or reasonable sense of what is going on.</p>
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10:00	<p>Because appearances are not completely determinate we can go the other way and say that appearance can be—in a way that things in themselves in transcendental realism cannot be—appearances can be indeterminate.</p> <p>And if that is true, then the conditions that ground the determination of an appearance can be indeterminate, and therefore we are never faced in the world of appearances with complete determinacy.</p>
11:00	<p>Hence for Kant, transcendental idealism resolves the contradiction by holding that the thesis's assertion of freedom is <i>possible</i> for things in themselves, but not appearances. While the antithesis's assertion of determinism is true for appearances but may be false for things in themselves.</p> <p>So the log jam is broken by showing that the principle of sufficient reason, applies to appearances and things in themselves differently.</p>
12:30	<p>Of course, what that does is it essentially restates transcendental idealism. It restates the problem of appearances and things in themselves.</p> <p>Therefore one wants to know can using that distinction reconcile freedom and determinism.</p> <p>So the freedom and determinism is roughly that the world of appearances is determined, but only as a task, and is therefore not complete in itself, while that allows the thought that there is an outside to the world of appearance, and it will be in that world where freedom lives.</p>

14:0 0	<p>The question again is how do we interpret the appearance-things in themselves distinction.</p> <p>At least throughout these lectures we have been defending the weak, two standpoints thesis, and there is no doubt, for instance at...</p> <p>[Jay has misplaced the quote]</p> <p>...for the moment, we can simply say that there are lots of places where Kant states the two-standpoints thesis. And there are plenty of others, just as many in fact, where he states the two-worlds thesis.</p> <p>So our operating hypothesis in dealing with this is to say that this fundamental debate in Kantian scholarship was not a debate for Kant. Kant did not feel a big difference between what we call an epistemological and an ontological interpretation of the difference between appearances and things in themselves was a big conflict.</p> <p>They have become a conflict from our reading of Kant.</p>
16:0 0	<p>What considerations might push us in the direction of one or the other of the interpretations?</p> <p>Because we take it that they are incompatible in some way.</p> <p>And we have been defending an epistemological version of the two standpoints in which, to state it simply, the first person, practical standpoint of agency and freedom, on the one hand, and the third person cognitive point of view of the knower on the other hand, are ultimate categorial frames.</p> <p>You can either know something, or do something, but you can't as it were take up those standpoints of an agent and a spectator at the same time.</p> <p>The first person, third person, to decide what to do vs. prediction...I can't predict my own actions, I decide them—that is taking up the first person point of view. Someone else looking at my actions can predicate what I'll do, that is the standpoint of the knower.</p>

17:3 0	<p>So these are ultimate categorial frames, the former is governed by what Kant calls "reason" or the moral law, the latter is governed by the notions of space, time, and the categories.</p> <p>And we have been claiming that they are finite modes of encounter that are constitutive of the human standpoint. Which is to say that because there are two standpoints, at least, there is no synoptic overview which can unite them.</p> <p>Therefore the idea of the two standpoints is to disallow a god's eye point of view. Therefore the two standpoints cannot be adopted simultaneously.</p> <p>Therefore there is no standpoint in which they directly contradict one another.</p>
19:0 0	<p>So, pace even someone like Watkins, we can say that the whole point of the Copernican Turn is to urge that the question, I did this and someone else predicted I would do it—but then if you want to ask which one is true—the point of the Copernican Turn is to say that that question is transcendently incoherent.</p> <p>There is no such question, was I free to do it or was I determined?</p> <p>To imagine that there is an answer to this question is transcendental realism. Transcendental Realism is to imagine that there is a truth beyond the standpoints through which we encounter.</p>
20:0 0	<p>Some key essays here are Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment" and J.L. Austin's "Excuses".</p> <p>We can think of it this way: imagine a headline in the NY Times tomorrow that runs, "MIT Professor Discovers Determinism is True"</p> <p>What are we supposed to do with that thought?</p> <p>The claim here is that there is nothing that we can do for the following simple reason. We have internal to our everyday practices all sorts of ways of distinguishing between those things we do, and those things which happen to us.</p>

21:00	<p>If we kick somebody, we might apologize, or the victim might expect us to apologize. But why apologize?</p> <p>Because the kicked did not move her own foot, but it was moved by the kicker. So the kicker apologizes.</p> <p>So we might apologize if we insult somebody when we are drunk. We might lock somebody up if we think that they are crazy. So there are ways in which I as a person can discriminate which of your actions I take to be free and those I take to be determined.</p> <p>And I resent things like people kicking me for no reason.</p>
22:00	<p>So what is it that MIT Professor imagines we might do.</p> <p>The claim, "all action is determined," is trying to have a standpoint that drops all of our internal and complicated ways of distinguishing between free and determined.</p> <p>And there is no standpoint which would coherently determine all human actions from a single description given all human practices.</p>
22:30	<p>Of course it could lead to the elimination of all human practices.</p> <p>But people are capable of doing crazy things.</p>
	<p>There is a lot to say about all of this. But something about Kant's way of trying to get at all of this, seems to be fundamentally right.</p> <p>However, there also seems to be something unintelligible in the way that Kant goes about it.</p>
23:00	<p>What seems unintelligible then is what Kant calls the idea that my intelligible character, my choice of why I shall be, my choosing and my being tempted, my feeling of being obligated, Kant is committed to claiming that none of these are temporal matters.</p> <p>His argument of course is that appearances are in space and time while freedom and the space of freedom are not in space and time.</p> <p>And we know that it is part of the analytic version—what Allison says over and over again—that things in themselves cannot be in space and time, because if they were they would be governed by the categories and the like.</p>

24:3 0	<p>It simply sounds incoherent, and Kant knows better than this, that the moral life occurs in a timeless realm.</p> <p>That my choosings are not temporal events. That the life of the sinner and the saint are not essential temporal experiences.</p> <p>So there is a huge question here of why on earth Kant supposed that our intelligible, noumenal free self, was not in space and time.</p> <p>That view derived from a simply but crude error.</p>
25:3 0	<p>The way to get at that simple and crude error is to think of an example, not from the moral world, but from Kant's account of biology.</p> <p>Kant says, surprisingly, that of course living things as we encounter them cannot be understood in mechanistic terms. We require teleological explanations in order to understand the functional interconnection of living things.</p> <p>But, Kant says, that way of regarding them is only "as if".</p>
26:3 0	<p>Kant says that we cannot unrestrictedly use teleological forms of explanantion because in the empirical world all phenomena must be accounted for by mechanical explanation.</p> <p>But why does he say that? Why does he disallow that living organisms are not living? Since he is essentially saying that they cannot be accounted for mechanically.</p>
27:0 0	<p>The simple flaw is that Kant construed the necessary minimum conditions for the possibility of experience as the complete constitutive conditions for the possibility of experience.</p> <p>So we are agreeing with Kant that he has identified the are minimum necessary conditions for the possibility of experience, and he ratcheted up that claim so that the minimum necessary conditions became the exclusive and exhaustive conditions of the possibility of experience.</p>
28:0 0	<p>Again think about biology. Nothing in a living organism breaks the laws of physics. But the laws of physics cannot account for living organisms.</p> <p>So what we say is that the laws of biology "supervene" on the laws of physics. That is, the laws of biology have as a subset the laws of physics.</p>

<p>29:0 0</p>	<p>It just so happens that if we are doing biology then biology requires at least two times that are different than the times of mechanical causality.</p> <p>First the long duree of evolutionary theory—evolution happening over eons is one temporal framework necessary for doing biology.</p> <p>But biology also requires another framework—the time of ecological habitats, which is much shorter but necessary to explain change within an environment and how a habitat itself either collapses or is continued.</p> <p>The argument that biological theory requires two theories can be found in John [?] Duprey's [?] fabulous book called <i>The Disorder of Things</i>.</p>
<p>30:0 0</p>	<p>The point we are trying to make here is that even without human beings there are at least three structures of time in the world.</p> <p>The point about this is that instead of thinking that there is time and no time, what Kant should have done is figured out the other forms of time, beyond the minimal times of the causal world.</p> <p>Of course we can remain absolutely committed that Kant is right that there is a unity of time, a unity of cause and effect.</p> <p>But that is not the totality of the forms of temporality available in the universe. There is biological times, at least two of them, there is psychological time. There is the time of history.</p>
<p>31:0 0</p>	<p>So at minimum we might suggest that there are at least 5 forms of temporality necessary for the intelligibility of human affairs.</p> <p>Kant, in a way, knew this. Because after all he write about moral learning. And he writes about signs of history. He writes about culture and development.</p> <p>So he actually in various places actually writes about other forms of temporal organization other than sheer mechanical temporality.</p> <p>But what he didn't realize is that his version of transcendental idealism—and this is not to make a claim for all of transcendental idealism itself but only Kant's version of it—made that impossible.</p> <p>So it seems, the suggestion is, not to back off from transcendental idealism...</p>

32:0 0	<p>So the crux is to get the right account of transcendental idealism, and what we have been suggesting all along is that the right kind of transcendental idealism means having the right empirical ontology and metaphysics.</p> <p>That is what we argued about Kant's theory of causality. And we now want to argue that every form of ideality has as its flipside a corresponding set of thick metaphysical commitments.</p>
33:0 0	<p>So we will end the course with two poems:</p> <p>O. O'Neill</p> <p>"I met a Ding an sich one night It gave me quite a nasty fright. I cannot tell you how it looks, For, as you know from all the books, Things in themselves are not in space. I thought, "I am the first of all my race To have an intellectual intuition. I'll synthesize my apprehension And then describe it blow by blow." But then the Ding began to go. I said, "The knower petrifies the known; This Ding an sich <u>must</u> turn to stone!" Immediately I made acquaintance With the thing—as an appearance."</p> <p>D.H. Monro</p> <p>"When Kant, aroused from his dogmatic dozes And conscious of the very little room For anti-scepticism left by Hume, Decided that the intellect discloses Not what's out there, as everyone supposes, But only what it find it can subsume Beneath the Categories (I assume That they're like spectacles upon our noses) He added that this blinkered human'll Catch still some glimpses of the Noumenal And that God, Freedom, Immorality Are hall-marked: Guaranteed Reality. This simply shows what tangled webs we weave When we are quite determined to believe."</p>