

1:00	<p>There is no sense of doing all of this and not solving the problem of freedom and necessity, which is really the reason to read Kant in the first place.</p> <p>Kant has a solution to the problem of freedom vs. determinism.</p>
1:30	<p>To summarize from last time. The strategy we were pursuing overall was that the Analogies attempt to show that there can be only one time.</p> <p>Also we wanted to show that time itself persists. And also that we have to have rules of asserting both simultaneity and succession.</p> <p>Simultaneity on its own would only give us distinct times—just leaps. And succession on its own would just give us multiple chains but nothing linking.</p> <p>So the very possibility of an experience at all is the idea of the possibility of a unified temporal experience. Therefore the possibility the experience of objects <i>in</i> one and the same time.</p>
3:30	<p>We have to be able to show that all objects come when with respect to one another. There can't be an object or an event that is not temporally locatable with respect to anything else. Hence the unity of experience requires the unity of time—and the unity of time therefore grounds or gives Kant's account of the unity of the world or the unity of nature.</p>
4:00	<p>And this claim cannot be merely analytic because causality is not analytically part of either our account or our experience of knowledge. Something about the role of causality has then got to be synthetic.</p> <p>Nor is the account merely epistemological— —since it holds for scientific as well as ordinary experience.</p>
5:00	<p>The indication then at A 218 in the long footnote he argues:</p> <p><i>"The unity of the world-whole, in which all appearances have to be connected, is evidently a mere consequence of the tacitly assumed principle of the community of all substances which are coexistent. For if they were isolated, they would not as parts constitute a whole...[a1]...We have, however, in the proper context, shown that community [a2] is really the ground of the possibility of an empirical knowledge of coexistence, and that the inference, rightly regarded, is simply from this empirical knowledge to community as its condition."</i></p>
	<p>[a1] This is really the crucial sentence of the footnote.</p> <p>[a2] "community" here is of objects or substances.</p>
6:00	<p>So the argument is going from knowledge to the metaphysical or ontological conditions of knowledge.</p> <p>Today we want to look at the extent to which this account of causality is going to be heavily metaphysical.</p>

6:30	<p>The only writer on these topics that gets close to what we are arguing is Eric Watkins in <i>Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality</i>.</p> <p>The book is surprising because it takes a strategy of trying to generate a metaphysical model from Kant's earliest writings. Jay on the other hand tries to do the same thing but by drawing from the later writings.</p>
7:30	<p>So where we ended last time we were just finishing the first Analogy. And the argument we were looking at is an argument that has the form that nothing can count as a direct perception of the absence of anything, including the absence of a state of affairs.</p> <p>Hence in order for us to have an idea of change, we have to have the idea that we have a different state of affairs than we had previously.</p> <p>And in order to have an account of things being different from a previous state of affairs but connected to it, we have to have the idea of state of affairs as such that the nature of the object concerned does not allow of it of being in the two states of affairs at the same time.</p> <p>They have to exclude one another.</p> <p>Hence the absence of one and the presence of the other is indicative of a change because they are mutually exclusive.</p>
10:00	<p>So for example the water cannot be both liquid and steam or ice at the same time – so we have an idea that the water has changed, because those two states of affairs exclude one another.</p> <p>So we postulate the states as being of something that endures – the water.</p> <p>It is the water that has changed its state from liquid to steam.</p>
	<p>So we see, we comprehend, we grasp the change against the background of the changing. And the intelligibility of the change requires that.</p>
11:00	<p>Kant pushes that argument one step further.</p> <p>Last week we looked at A 188. [see 12. Schematism, (Axioms, Anticipations), Analogies.doc#gobackA188] [Part 2 of week 12, about 28:00 and following]</p> <p>In the very next paragraph he pushes that argument further when he says.</p> <p><i>"Substances, in the [field of] appearance, are the substrata of all determinations of time. If some of these substances could come into being and others cease to be, the one condition of the empirical unity of time would be removed. The appearances would then relate to two different time, and existence would flow in two parallel streams – which is absurd."</i></p>

12:30	<p>To imagine something either going clean out of existence or popping out of existence makes it temporally discontinuous with anything else – it is not a change of anything to anything – and therefore it is incapable of being placed.</p> <p>Therefore whatever it begets is unplaceable and hence you generate the idea of separate temporal streams.</p>
	<p>So Kant wants to argue that there is some sense in which the possibility of the intelligibility –and here we want to insist on “intelligibility” and not something like “verification” – the very intelligibility of changing presupposes the presumption of an unchanging background.</p> <p>We always have the sense of the enduring against which we perceive change.</p> <p>The business of science is to track down where exactly where everything has gone. To see what has changed into what, something must endure.</p>
14:00	<p>So already in this first analogy Kant shows that he is committed to some notion of substance by which he means at the very least enduring particulars, and maximally he might be committed to the permanence of substance – that which is unchanging.</p> <p>We will come back to how this rather large commitment plays itself out.</p>
15:30	<p>Obviously the real stakes are in the Second Analogy. Although we had already insisted last time that the second and third analogies cannot be done independently of one another.</p> <p>So it has been a mistake to separate the analogies and in particular to downplay the third analogy. We will also claim that the third analogy clarifies some of Kant's metaphysical commitments.</p>
16:00	<p>People have searched in the second analogy for a decisive refutation of Hume. And as close as it is – in the second half we will take a look at Louise White-Beckett's argument which is as close as there is to making this case convincing, still on the whole we want to think about the second analogy in a different way.</p> <p>[Jay passed around but didn't discuss a handout which I am duplicating below: Beckhandout]</p> <p>What Hume challenged was the idea that there could be logically necessary relations between distinct substances or events. That is what he denied – that there was a <i>logical</i> necessity of “if A then B”.</p>

17:30	<p>Roughly, the reason he didn't think that there was an impression of cause – but rather just regularity – he also thought that...</p> <p>After all, what is Hume's model of logical necessity? What is his example of logical necessity?</p> <p>For Hume something is logically necessary if it is analytically true, meaning that it is true by the meaning of the terms. "All bachelors are unmarried males".</p> <p>That claim is an example of an analytic truth, but if it is an analytic truth then of course the two (the unmarried male and the bachelor) cannot be logically distinct.</p> <p>So the very idea of <i>distinct</i> events and logical necessity can not be put together. ()</p>
19:00	<p>So Hume has two claims. One is that we do not perceive or do not have an impression of causality because all we actually perceive is regularity – one thing than another.</p> <p>Further more, one event then another cannot possibly be connected (because as two separate events they are distinguishable) because all logical truths are merely analytic truths.</p> <p>By the way, the rationalist agree that all logical truths are analytic.</p>
20:00	<p>Well this is the nature of the challenge. By 1764 Kant had already begun distinguishing between what we can call the 'logical grounds of an event' and its 'real grounds'.</p> <p>That is, he was already beginning to see that you could not go very far by staying with logic alone.</p> <p>That said, no one in Germany, including Kant, accepted Hume's view of causality. What everyone agreed was that Hume offered no account of objective necessity – he just gives you an account of regularity which is not necessity – and therefore he gives no intelligibility to the idea of causality.</p> <p>The debate in Germany didn't take Hume seriously for a second in a positive way. Only in England, in the world of empiricism, could that happen.</p> <p>The debate rather in Germany was that given Hume's challenge, could an account of causality be generated in Leibnizian terms – that is really what the debate was all about.</p> <p>And Kant was breaking from Leibniz in that he did not think that Hume's challenge can be met in Leibnizian terms because Leibniz accepts too much of the logical apparatus.</p>

22:00	<p>So Kant's position in the CPR begins to depart from Hume in all sorts of ways.</p> <p>We will mention here four such ways.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. He understands the problem of causality in a transcendental context. That is, he now thinks that the question of causality and mutual interaction are necessary for the possibility of experience. He has a new location for the very notion of causality. That is, causality now turns out to be a condition of knowledge of a single world so that causal rules and rules of mutual interaction are necessary for knowledge of successive and simultaneous states of affairs. So it is a transcendental setting that he is after – which is to say that it is neither empiricist nor rationalist. 2. Secondly he introduces quite distinctly from Hume but consistent with some Leibnizianism a different metaphysics of causality. That is, causality does not consist of events, but – what we are trying to see today – rather causal powers. And we will say a lot about this because it is one of those things that it is hard to see why analytic philosophers continue to reject the idea of causal powers. Why they remain despite all their scientism and naturalism in an essentially empiricist framework – which is itself we will see essentially anti-naturalistic. 3. Thirdly Kant is going to argue that one substance can cause an effect in another substance just in case one <i>acts</i> on the other. So suddenly the notion of activity or the exercise of a capacity, or the exercise of a causal power becomes fundamental to the account of what we think a causal event involves. 4. In the case of mutual interaction, the exercise of causal powers must be joint because they must be reciprocal. And reciprocity as we will come to is something Hume and even Schopenhauer found unintelligible.
26:00	<p>So Kant has a wholly different way of thinking about causality. So it isn't surprising that in the first edition of the CPR he only mentions Hume by name three times. You would think from reading the analytic literature that he was thinking about Hume all the time.</p> <p>The right way to think about this is that Kant does not answer Hume directly. That is to say that he does not show – and no one could show – that distinct events are logically connected. That is the obvious thing Hume asks for but that is not what Kant tries to demonstrate.</p> <p>By the time Kant is doing giving his account, his account of what a causal event is is just incommensurable with Hume – this is really the important thought. Kant introduces us to a wholly different framework of thinking. Therefore, he tries to give us a different understanding.</p>

27:30	<p>There is a kind of fetishism in modern philosophy with this notion of refuting the skeptic. Sometimes it is like dealing with a bully in a pub where the best strategy is just to walk away.</p> <p>To say this is to remind ourselves what we've been up to all along with the regressive strategy. What we are trying to do is introduce a new framework rather than a direct refutation.</p> <p>So by distinguishing real from logical grounds, Kant is going to introduce a notion of natural necessity, in place of logical necessity.</p>
29:00	<p>So you can now begin to see some of the depth of this problem because obviously Hume thinks that there are only relations of ideas and matters of fact—things analytically related or contingently and synthetically related. And that for Hume exhausts the possibilities, therefore all necessity must be logical necessity.</p> <p>There could be nothing else for Hume. So if Kant is going to think about some notion of real grounds, <u>he is going to require a faculty of knowledge other than pure reason</u>—by pure reason we mean the kind faculty that analyzes ideas.</p> <p>And of course he is going to require principles beyond identity and contradiction. <u>This new faculty is the understanding</u>—this is what we have been examining all along.</p> <p>And the understanding is going to provide explanations of the principles of the analogies themselves. So it is this new faculty that introduces a new notion of necessity into the story via this transcendental strategy.</p>
30:30	<p>So Kant's response to Hume overall is not the direct refutation of skepticism—but even in those passages where he refers to Hume, mostly in the methodology and the dialectic—he talks about it in terms of an orientation that views skepticism as intrinsically unstable.</p> <p>On the one hand skepticism oversteps the marks when it infers from its ignorance of certain dogmatic truths ignorance of reason altogether—Hume's repudiation of reason in defense of the imagination which we might call his "logical defeatism"—simply because reason cannot answer questions it has no business answering.</p> <p>So to generate skepticism because you cannot answer dogmatic questions like freedom, God, the immortality of the soul, that is no reason to doubt reason, that is reason to doubt God.</p> <p>The other thing is that Kant thinks that skepticism is susceptible to self-referential problems, which Hume himself knew—it turns on itself.</p>

32:30	<p>So the general strategy against Hume is nothing other than a “Critique of Pure Reason” – an account of the powers and limits of reason. And in scoping out the powers and limits of reason, Kant on the one hand attempts to provide foundations for science and mathematics and knowledge – this is all that “synthetic a priori” stuff.</p> <p>On the other hand Kant accepts skepticism over certain dogmatic claims. He doesn't want to refute them, he wants to insist upon them.</p> <p>So we are not going to discover an irrefutable knock-down refutation of Hume. We are going to change the terrain. He will change it so that it is quite different from even the dominant trends within analytic analyses of causality.</p>
34:30	<p>So we should say a word about what these analytic accounts of causality are. The bottom line is that most analytic philosophers accept Hume's event ontology in some way or another.</p> <p>So the late David Lewis in the introduction to his collection of essays gives a perfect description of an event ontology.</p> <p>David Lewis was the great interrogator of possible worlds logic and his famous statement is that ‘all possible worlds are equal’ meaning there is no reason to prefer this world over any other possible world since this world is just one more possible world. He claims that he had no intuitions that would lead him to believe that this world was any different than any other possible world. He was a realist about possible worlds.</p> <p>“It is the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact. Just one little thing and then another. We have geometry, a system of external relations, of spatio-temporal distance between points. Maybe points of space time itself. Maybe point-sized bits of ether or fields, maybe both. And at those points we have local qualities, perfectly natural intrinsic properties which need nothing bigger than a point in which to be instantiated. For short, we have an arrangement of qualities and that is all. There is no difference without difference in the arrangement of qualities. All else [b1] supervenes on that.”</p>
	[b1] causality, laws of nature, counterfactuals, persistence through time

38:00	<p>What does it take to think of the world like that? We can see the temptation in its simplicity and elegance; it is not question begging.</p> <p>The point is that there is a tendency in the analytic tradition to provide accounts of causality in terms of regularity — a straight Humean line — and you can do a variety of things with regularity. You can choose regularities that are simplicity or informativeness or strength or some other criteria to figure out which regularities you are going to go with.</p> <p>So the first way to give an account of causality is just to go with some kind of regularity.</p> <p>The second is to go with counterfactual dependence. That is, something will count as a cause if and only if it supports a counterfactual. A counterfactual states that had the initial conditions been different, something else would have happened as a result.</p> <p>A third route for causality is statistical relations. Causal relations then would be the ones with high probabilities.</p> <p>Lastly we have nomological subsumption. This takes the distinction between particulars and universals seriously and the thought is that it belongs to the universal, e.g. “water”, that it boils at 212 degrees Fahrenheit. So then you can an event, an instance, and you put it under the universal. And somehow the universals are in that relation of necessity.</p> <p>The oddity of this last is that they want to argue that universals are not derived from particulars — because they think that would then be circular — so it really is about a subsumption of universals. So it is a kind of believe in universals.</p> <p>Yet this last nomological option is peculiar because universals don't cause anything. It is one event that causes another event. So discovering the heart of causality in the universal looks odd.</p>
42:30	<p>So we will have to leave analytic theories of causality at that. But we want to get a sense is that what Kant is doing is very distinct.</p>
43:00	<p>So turning back to the second analogy — what we will do first is start intuitively, look at some of the formal arguments, and then we are going to build up the metaphysical story.</p> <p>Kant sets up the problem, as we already know, by asking how it is possible to distinguish between objective succession from unchanging states of affairs.</p> <p>There is a problem here — simply all experience is successive. We always perceive one thing then another then another (even if we are perceiving what we take to be a stable object).</p>

44:00	<p>Even though we always perceive, our perceptions are always successive, not all of our perceptions are <i>of</i> succession. On the contrary, most of what we perceive is not of succession but of simultaneous states of affairs.</p> <p>So when we see one wall then the next wall – we don't think the right wall causes the left wall – so the order of my perceptions is not a clue to things happening in the world. On the contrary we are pretty sure that nothing is happening.</p>
45:30	<p>When Kant gets his first shot at thinking about this – although it may be misleading how he is going to use it – he is going to think about reversible and non-reversible sequences.</p> <p>And the famous examples are the example of the boat and the house. It is rare thing in Kant that the argument really does build up around those two examples.</p> <p>And at least one of the illustrations is misleading.</p>
46:00	<p>We will turn to the passages in a moment, but the thought is quite simple.</p> <p>I see the boat moving downstream, and there is nothing I can do to change the order of the sequence of my perceptions.</p> <p>I first see it against the jetty and then against the yacht, and then against the shore. And I cannot see it in any other order. The order of my perceptions seems to be bound down to what is occurring.</p>
47:00	<p>On the other hand, when I am touring my way around the house – I first see the front door, then the window, then the roof. But I can easily reverse the order.</p> <p>That is, I can just as happily see the roof and then the window and then the door. So the order of my perceptions is fully reversible. Or my perceptions are in that case "order indifferent" temporally.</p> <p>And in that case it is indicative that despite the fact that I am having a succession of perceptual states, I am actually perceiving an enduring object.</p>
48:30	<p>While in the case of the boat, because the order of my perceptions is bound down, then there is subjective succession, to use the technical vocabulary, should be interpreted as objective succession – that is as really succession in the world.</p> <p>So some succession is to be interpreted as objective succession – and those are the ones that are irreversible and some subjective successions are not of changes in the world but simply of the movement of my eyes or body, which gives me a different take on the object, but the object itself stays the same.</p> <p>In the case of subjective succession, I am the one that is moving not the object.</p>

50:00	<p>So irreversibility is certainly playing a kind of fundamental role. Although it is not a “criteria”. Because if it was simply a criterion we wouldn’t then have a theory of causality, we would just have a theory of irreversibility.</p> <p>Rather what we are going to say is something more like a sequence cannot appear in a different order, only if there is a <i>rule</i> determining that order.</p> <p>And we are going to call that rule...a rule that determines order is what a causal law is.</p>
51:30	<p>So we will have a perception of objective succession only if we can frame our experience as being determined by rules of a causal nature – that is, if A occurs, B follows on it with necessity.</p> <p>Hence the very idea of being able to distinguish objective from subjective succession presupposes the principle of causality.</p> <p>That is the short version of the argument.</p>
52:30	<p>The first thing to add here is that given that a certain instance of objective succession, Kant wants to say that the order of our perceptions is necessary.</p> <p>It is because the order of our perceptions is necessary is why they are irreversible.</p> <p>So irreversibility follows objective succession rather than leading the way.</p>
	[sorry for all the ruffling]
53:30	<p>The cause of something – and here the boat example is massively unhelpful.</p> <p>So let’s look at the boat example for a moment and then try to see why it is unhelpful.</p> <p>The boat example is at A 192.</p>
	<p><i>“But, as I also note, in an appearance which contains a happening (the preceding state of the perception we may entitle A, and the succeeding B) B can be apprehended only as following upon A; the perception A cannot follow upon B but only precede it [c1]. For instance, I see a ship move down stream. My perception of its lower position follow upon the perception of its position higher up in the stream, and it is impossible that in the apprehension of this appearance the ship should first be perceived lower down in the stream and afterwards higher up. The order in which the perceptions succeed one another in apprehension is in this instance determined, and to this order apprehension is bound down. In the previous example of a house my perceptions could begin with the apprehension of the roof and end with the basement, or could begin from below and end above; and I could similarly apprehend the manifold of the empirical intuition either from right to left or from left to right. In the series of these perceptions there was thus no determinate order specifying at what point I must begin in order to connect the manifold empirically. But in the perception of an event there is always a rule that makes the order in which the perceptions (in the apprehension of this appearance) follow upon one another a necessary order.”</i></p>
	[c1] That is the irreversibility thesis.

56:00	<p>So why do we want to say that the boat example is not felicitous here?</p> <p>How would we interpret the boat's movement causally?</p> <p>The example is infelicitous because it sounds as if the position upstream causes the position downstream. But of course the boat's simply being in one position doesn't cause it to be in another position.</p>
	[.]
	What causes the ship to be in one position and then in another position is the river and the wind or whatever is the causal mechanism.
57:00	<p>We're insisting on this point about the misleading nature of Kant's use of the boat example because we are trying to get away from thinking about events. It is not the event of the ship here and the ship there and the question being how are these two events causally connected.</p> <p>Rather we want to say that there is a causal rule, namely given the ship and that given that it has no motor and given that it is positioned in such a way in the stream, there is just no way given the causal laws...</p> <p>So the necessity, the relation of necessity does not hold between the successive states – that is the thought we want to get out of the infelicity of the boat example.</p>
58:00	<p>That is, the necessity does not hold between the successive states, but rather between the cause – say the river or the wind on the sails – and the effect, that is the successive state.</p> <p>The cause causes the boat to be first here and then there. It is the force of the river or the wind.</p>
	<p>So necessity is between cause and effect and the successive states of the effect rather than the successive states themselves.</p> <p>We are going to argue that there are necessary connections in nature. But no justification for a necessary connection between successive states. That is just the wrong kind of analogue.</p>
59:00	<p>But that entails that there are going to be ontological conditions for objective succession. And we will see then in the text that causality must be more than an inference ticket.</p> <p>Talking about causality cannot be mere 'if you say this you are allowed to say that' talk. That is just bad Bob Brandom idealism.</p>

60:00	<p>So – if our claim is right, just on the basis of the boat example – knowledge of objective temporal relations is going to require ontological principles.</p> <p>Or we might say that the necessary conditions – and this is just a restatement of the principle of the metaphysics of experience – namely the metaphysical conditions for the possibility of experience are also the necessary conditions for the possibility of the objects of experience.</p>
61:00	<p>And what Kant must mean by this thick sense of 'necessary for the objects of experience' is that we are determining in some thick or rich sense a metaphysics of experience, that is, a metaphysics of the world as determined by our transcendental orientation.</p>
	<p>So that is the set-up of our strategy, in the second half then we will begin an analysis and look at the actual arguments and go from there.</p>
	-end of part 1-
	BREAK
	-part 2-
00:00	[sorry I missed the first line]
	<p>And there are two possibilities, namely what is called the 'same cause-same event' formula or 'every event some cause' formula.</p> <p>And on the reading we are going to offer we take Kant as interested in the weaker of the two claims, namely every event must have some cause. He doesn't think that by itself the Second Analogy demonstrates 'same cause yields same effect'.</p> <p>That is the second Analogy doesn't answer the problem of induction. How Kant would answer the problem of induction – we may get around to this but it is a complicated story about the status of laws.</p>
1:30	<p>Nor given what we had set about the boat example, we now know that irreversibility is neither a criterion for nor does it entail causality.</p> <p>As Schopenhauer rightly pointed out, day does not cause night, even though they are in fact irreversible.</p>
2:00	<p>So the thought on our regressive reading is that causality is an immediate, necessary condition of objective succession.</p> <p>That is, the intention here is what it has been all along on the regressive reading – we begin with a piece of knowledge, in this case it is knowledge of objective succession and we unpack its presuppositions.</p> <p>And when we examine the intelligibility of the very idea of objective succession we are committed to the idea of cause and effect.</p>

3:00	<p>As Watkins argues [Eric Watkins in <i>Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality</i>] Kant runs two basic styles of argument throughout the text of the second analogy.</p> <p>The text of the analogy is difficult to map out—it feels like Kant is circling around a problem and repeating himself.</p> <p>One form of argument which he continually brings up, which is on the whole not successful, is on the following excerpt from Watkins.</p> <p>The following is a reconstruction of B 233-234. And here we see Kant tries the same strategy in the third analogy.</p>
5:00	<p>“Kant’s argument can be reconstructed as follows:</p> <p>P1 Objective succession is a connection between two appearances (i.e. between the states of an object that can appear to us).</p> <p>P2 Intuition does not provide knowledge of any connection.</p> <p>C1 Intuition does not provide knowledge of object succession. (from P1 and P2)</p> <p>P 3 The imagination’s synthesis can represent a connection.</p> <p>P4 Objective succession is not just any connection, but a <i>necessary</i> connection according to which one state of an object must precede a second state of the object.[d41]</p> <p>P5 The imagination’s synthesis cannot represent a necessary connection between appearances (i.e., the states of the object), since it can represent only a <i>contingent</i> relation between perceptions (or states of an object).</p> <p>C2 The imagination’s syntheses cannot represent objective succession. (from P4 and P5)</p> <p>P6 There is an exhaustive disjunction between sensibility’s intuitions, the imagination’s syntheses, and the understanding’s categories.</p> <p>C3 Only the categories can represent a necessary connection between states of an object (from C1, C2, ad P6)</p> <p>P7 The only category that can represent a necessary connection between successive states of an object is that of causality.</p> <p>C4 Causality is a necessary condition for representing and thus knowing objective succession. (from C3 and P7). [d42]”</p> <p>[d4-1] Though Kant does not explicitly mention the irreversibility of the order of our apprehension in this passage, it could be thought to be implicit in his emphasis on what an objective relation of succession would naturally entail.</p> <p>[d4-2] To be explicit about the conclusion of this argument, it is condition in nature. If we represent of have knowledge of objective succession, then the category of causality must be employed. Also, while the argument focuses on the conditions for <i>representing</i> succession, insofar as representation is necessary for knowledge, the argument can still be viewed as attempting to establish the category of causality as a necessary condition for knowledge of <u>objective cognition</u>.</p>

6:30	<p>The analysis there simply turns on the limits of intuition. Intuition cannot show this, imagination cannot show it—yet we know it. But if we know it, and intuition can't show it and the imagination can't show it then it must come from somewhere.</p> <p>It must come from understanding, the categories, therefore we are entitled simply because the understanding imposes it.</p>
	<p>But this argument just seems hopelessly thin. It works by <i>reductio ad absurdum</i> by eliminating what faculties can do.</p> <p>So it does point us to the source of causality—namely, the understanding—it doesn't really explain why that source is the necessary ground of that knowledge.</p>
7:30	<p>The core argument is that something will count as objective succession if and only if it is subject to a <i>rule</i>. And it must be a rule of a certain kind, namely a rule that relates the condition to the conditioned.</p> <p>That is, the causal dependence of successive states. Therefore the crux of the argument is really what Watkins next page calls "P4":</p>
	<p>"P1 Apprehension of Objects is always successive.</p> <p>P2 There is a distinction between the subjective order of perceptions and the successive states of an object such that no immediate inference from the former to the latter is possible.</p> <p>C1 One cannot immediately infer objective succession from the successive order of perceptions. (from P1 and P2)</p> <p>P3 To have knowledge of objective succession, the object's states must be subject to a rule that determines them as successive.</p> <p>P4 Any rule that determines objective succession must include a relation of condition to conditioned, i.e., that of the causal dependence of successive states on a cause.</p> <p>C2 To have knowledge of the successive states of an object, the object's successive states must be dependent on a cause, that is, must stand under a causal rule. (from P3, P4, C1)"</p>
9:00	<p>So the claim is that there are real grounds that are responsible for the positing of determinations.</p> <p>So Kant says, just to look at an example of this, at A191, B236.</p> <p>This is passage that sounds almost as if it from the Transcendental Deduction:</p> <p><i>"Since truth consists in the agreement of knowledge with the object, it will at once be seen that we can here enquire only regarding the formal conditions of empirical truth, and that appearance, in contradistinction to the representations of apprehension, can be represented as an object distinct from them only if it stands under a rule which distinguishes it from every other apprehension and necessitates some one particular mode of connection of the manifold. The object is that in the appearance which contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension."</i></p>

11:30	<p>Notice: "The object is that in the appearance which contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension"</p> <p>What does it mean that the "object" is that "which contains the rule"?</p>
13:00	<p>For example, say I drink some water and my thirst is slaken.</p> <p>The thought is that there is something in the nature of the <i>object</i> that under certain conditions, namely 'water' – such that water determines that when in contact with a dry throat that it will be slaken.</p> <p>So it is in the nature of the object that the rule is found. And the rule is the rule of that object determining successive states.</p>
14:00	<p>So that the idea is that what we are interested in is determinations of objects—objects changing their determinations from one state to another state.</p> <p>Kant's claim is that a change or an alternation of state must have a ground. But more than a ground, it must have a <i>real</i> ground, not merely a logical ground. That logical ground would just be a preceding representation. But that does us no good. We are not going from representation to representation.</p> <p>Rather what we are looking for in the representation is the "appearance" – appearance is just Kant's word for "empirical object" – and it is that rule in the appearance that will take us from one determination to another.</p>
16:00	<p>So temporal determinations in the second analogy are states of objects. That is, their being in one state and then in another state.</p> <p>So the ground of the determination of states of objects are therefore going to be the <i>causes</i> of those states.</p> <p>But if all that is right, then causality is necessary for the temporal determination of objective succession.</p>
17:00	<p>So the first thing we are doing is shifting away from the event ontology to an ontology in which alterations are changes in the state of an object.</p> <p>So all succession is alteration. And all alteration is a change in the determinations of an object.</p>
18:00	<p>So at A 198 Kant says:</p> <p><i>"But immediately I perceive or assume that in this succession there is a relation to the preceding state [e1], from which the representation follows in conformity with a rule, I represent something as an event, as something that happens; that is to say [e2], I apprehend an object to which I must ascribe a certain determinate position in time – a position which, in view of the preceding state, cannot be otherwise assigned. [e3]"</i></p>
	<p>[e1] That is, immediately I presume that I am perceiving a change or alteration</p>

	<p>[e2] And now he is going to interpret what he means by an event or something that happens</p>
	<p>[e3] So it is in the nature of the preceding state that the current state arises. And that we are going to have a real ground or a rule taking us from one to the other, and that rule has ground.</p> <p>But only in that way can I interpret objective a subjective succession as an objective succession.</p>
21:00	<p>So the idea is that there must be a determinability to the order of events in order for the idea of objective succession.</p> <p>The only way we can have orderability is to have rules. But the kind of rules that will take us from one state of affairs to another just are causal rules. Therefore causal rules are necessary for the determinability for the order of appearances as successive.</p> <p>Therefore causality is necessary for the very possibility of temporal order at all.</p>
23:00	<p>Clearly, what is at stake here is the discovery of an order that is not up to me.</p> <p>That is part of what we mean by objective succession. And the idea of it being not up to me—that is, there is nothing I can do about it, the order is bound down—are all interconnected.</p> <p>So the first thing to say here is that the very idea that we are interested in the first place in objective succession can only arise for beings that are agents.</p> <p>After all, we are trying to distinguish object from subjective succession. And we are contrasting objective succession with subjective successions which are in contrast reversible.</p> <p>But the very idea of reversibility presupposes agency. That is the very idea of reversibility presupposes beings who are aware of themselves and their relationship to objects and therefore are aware that they can reorder the order of their perceptions for certain ranges of objects.</p>

25:00	<p>Therefore the very idea of objective succession is part of the way in which we are becoming or indeed do become aware of the limits of our powers to order the natural world.</p> <p>That is, it is our epistemic form of acknowledgment that the order of the world is not up to us.</p> <p>So if that is right, then it makes sense that what we are seeking out or what we are doing when we are trying to interpret some subjective successions as objective successions, is that we are trying to seek out the very ways in which our powers are limited. Which is to say we are trying to establish the very ways in which the world determines its own order independently of us.</p> <p>Therefore the kind of rules that are going to carry us from one state of affairs to another states of affairs—in the case of objective succession are going to be rules that are object dependent.</p>
27:00	<p>Hence when we suggest that what Kant is interested in here is showing that determinations of an object has a real and not merely a logical ground—that is a ground in the world and not merely in our way of talking about the world—then what we are looking for is the kind of rules of interpretation that are going to allow or permit us to acknowledge that power of the world's capacity to determine the order of events.</p>
28:00	<p>The notion of causality is precisely that kind of rule. So even if the notion of rule is as anthropocentric as anything could be, the notion of causal rule is our way of sublating our own agency, so to speak, in order to articulate the limits of the agency with respect to the temporal order of events.</p>
29:00	--Question--
	<p>So much hangs on the third antimony, which is not an accidental feature of this story. At least we can say that in one emphatic sense the answer [to the previous question, which I could not hear] must be 'no'. And this is part of Kant's genius—because if our reading is right, only a being capable of self-movement can comprehend something as a causal sequence.</p>
30:00	<p>So to anticipate where we are going to start next week, the thought is something like only free self-determining agents, can there be such a thing as causality.</p> <p>But not only that, for self-determining agents, they can only be self-determining agents <i>if</i> there is causality—given what we have just said.</p>

31:00	<p>It is an interesting question why in a philosopher a certain set piece or problem is exemplary.</p> <p>For example, in Foucault why is the scene of torture on center stage.</p> <p>In Kant's case, everything in a way does hang on the boat/house structure. Because the idea sublimated within that analysis of reversible and non-reversible sequences is the relationship between freedom and causality.</p> <p>The house example is an example of our freedom. What is reversibility but an awareness—an awareness that has to be more than counter-factual, so it is not only that I <i>could</i> reversed the sequence, but that on occasion I do.</p> <p>So it is not as though we are stuck with merely logical stuff. We have the counterfactual in the first place because we have the actual.</p>
32:30	<p>So everything about the house example, which Schopenhauer took to be a mistake is rather on our reading Kant's deepest insight.</p> <p>Of course there is another kind of causal event going on between the house and my eyes, but that is dependent on myself and my changing, or as Schopenhauer puts it, 'on me moving my eyeball'.</p>
	[sorry for the scratching noise, I was doodling]
	<p>Conversely, we were suggesting that the notion of causality was trying to get at what we mean by objective succession, of which irreversibility is an element.</p> <p>And we are suggesting that the notion of a causal rule, which has its real ground in the object, that is, it is in the nature of the thing, e.g. in the water, that as steam when it hits the window pane it liquefies. It is about the causal capacities of those two objects.</p> <p>And the notion of the causal rule is the notion of it being beyond our power.</p>
34:00	<p>This week we are suggesting what we will argue literally next week—if it is beyond our power then the power has got to be somewhere else.</p>
35:00	<p>We want to suggest that Kant thinks of objects as having powers.</p> <p>And despite Moliere, the notion of power is not tautological. Kant is trying to get at features of objects.</p>

36:00	<p>And Kant's commitment to this occurs in two remarkable passages at A 204-205.</p> <p><i>"Causality leads to the concept of action, this in turn to the concept of force, and thereby to the concept of substance."</i></p> <p>He then says something like he shouldn't be talking about this but proceeds to anyways.</p> <p><i>"But I must not leave unconsidered the empirical criterion of a substance, insofar as substance appears to manifest itself no through permanence of appearance, but more adequately and easily through action."</i></p> <p>That is, what is a substance? He is not going to answer what a substance is, but he is going to tell us how we know about substances. We know about substances from what they <i>do</i>, that they bring about, what they effectuate.</p> <p>So what is it you want to know about water? You want to know that it is that which slakens the thirst, puts out the fire, makes the tree grow.</p>
38:00	<p>So he may be unclear about what the substance is. But he says that we understand and comprehend substances from their actions.</p> <p>So: <i>"Wherever there is an action – and therefore activity and force – there is also substance, and it is in substance alone that the seat of this fruitful source of appearances must be sought."</i></p> <p>Jumping down then to 205 – and notice he is using the language of "action" here.</p> <p><i>"For this reason action is a sufficient empirical criterion to establish the substantiality of a subject, without my requiring first to go in quest of its permanence through the comparison of perceptions."</i></p>
39:00	<p>So Kant has the thought – and this is what we are claiming is the metaphysics of causality – we are claiming that there is this whole analysis of the idea of their being a causal rule, is not free floating, you don't get causal rules for nothing – you have got to have certain ontological commitments.</p> <p>And we are suggesting that the nature of those ontological commitments in Kant are a commitment to the idea that determinations are determinations <i>of</i> something, hence no free floating events. And that every change of a determination is something that is brought about and that nothing can be brought about unless there is a real ground bringing it about. A real ground that is, we want to suggest, not reducible to any of the determinate states of affairs that is brought about.</p> <p>We will come back to this idea next week.</p>
41:00	<p>It is absolutely crucial to this whole argument that determinate states of affairs have indeterminate grounds.</p> <p>Determinate states of affairs necessarily have temporally indeterminate grounds.</p>

	<p>Why this recurrence to action and force?</p> <p>Because 'there must be that in the object which provides the rule that will determine the order of succession of particular determinations.'.</p> <p>So he was awkward about talking about action and substance and force, but clearly he does so because he acknowledges that those are the ontological or metaphysical presuppositions for that notion of rule.</p> <p>So causal rules are rules of the powers of determinations of substances and they are rules again that precisely escape our power. Let's call that the 'world's power'.</p>
43:00	<p>And this is Kant is the idealist. And we want to insist that only idealism can do this.</p>

[go back to lecture [Beck](#)]

Kant on Causality

How does Kant answer Hume? According to L.W. Beck, Kant showed that conditions sufficient to establish the truth of propositions Hume doubted are necessary to establish the truth of propositions he accepted.

Let K represent a set of propositions accepted by Kant and doubted by Hume; let H represent a set of propositions Hume (& Kant) accepted; let P stand for propositions sufficient to support K (thus P implies K). Kant's answer to Hume is to show that P is necessary to H (thus H implies P).

K. "Everything that happens, that is, begins to be, presupposes something upon which it follows by a rule."

P. Events can be distinguished from objective enduring states of affairs, even though our apprehension of each is serial.

H. Among events, we find empirically some pairs of similar ones which tend to be repeated, and we then make the inductive judgment: events like the first members of the pairs are causes of events like the second.

P implies K. by the arguments of the Second Analogy, which give a sufficient reason for K. H implies P, since if events cannot be distinguished, pairs of events cannot be found, and thus P is a necessary condition of H. Hence: H implies P and P implies K, therefore H implies K. That is Kant's answer to Hume.

Well, what is Kant's argument to show that we must use causal concepts (i.e. those involved in K) in order to distinguish an order of events as successive from ones which are coexistent? Arthur Melnick has outline Kant's argument as follows:

- 1) The determinability of the order of events as non-coexistent must be grounded on features of appearances.
- 2) The determinability of the order of events requires that we be able to infer from features of appearances the relative order of events.
- 3) Thus, we must have rules that enable us to conclude, on the basis of features of appearances, that events are ordered in a certain way (rules that enable us to make

