


00:00	The goal today is get into the A Deduction. We'll eventually get to the B Deduction.
1:00	<p>We begin by picking up with the analogy of the smiley face on the board.</p> 
	<p>The idea is to get at the intentional structure of representations [and?] judgments.</p> <p>The analogy we were trying to draw was to distinguish between the representational medium on the one hand and the object on the other.</p> <p>The representational medium would be the chalk marks on the board and the object would be the face.</p>
2:00	<p>The suggestion was that face should be thought of as neither inferred from nor reducible to the representational medium.</p> <p>The chalk marks do not smile nor have eyes.</p>
3:00	<p>We see the object in or presented by the representation of it—where Kant's work for representing is "synthesis"—and we will come back to this.</p> <p>The work of synthesis as we will use it is the mind grasping representations as representations. That is, representations as representing things and not simply as its own modifications.</p> <p>And it does so in virtue of grasping an intuition of an object presented to me.</p>

4:30	<p>What we are trying to do here is draw a distinction between sensations and intuitions—which tend to get wildly conflated in Kant.</p> <p>A sensation is a modification of sensibility insofar as it is merely a subjective state.</p> <p>Intuition is a modification of sensibility insofar as it plays a role in presenting an object in cognition.</p>
6:00	<p>So the thought is that sensations are representational mediums alright, but they are not representations. And therefore what we have when we have an intuition, is truly an awareness of an object.</p>
7:00	<p>So thinking about the sorts of things Kant might have called “experience”:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Experience could be a sensation, a striving, feelings, etc. They are fully non-cognitive phenomena for Kant. ii. A second possibility would be having a sensation and being conscious of it. iii. A third possibility would be having an intuition. iv. A fourth thing would be having an intuition and conceptualizing it. v. we could add having an intuition and conceptualizing it through a physical object concept. <p>And then we could add further layers, such as having intuitions and being aware of them as mine, having intuitions and making judgments about them, having intuitions and knowing propositions about them.</p>
10:00	<p>So there is a whole gamut of possibilities but probably the simplest way of thinking about it is to put it into three levels: a bottom, a top, and a mixed level.</p> <p>The bottom level would be strivings, sensations, and feelings which are fully non-cognitive.</p> <p>The top level would be the object level of judgment, having awareness of an object.</p> <p>Mixed levels would be things like, it appears to me that the door is brown. Where there is still a subjective side but it is a qualification of the objective.</p>

11:00	<p>The claim we are trying to draw out here is that first of all one cognizes objects <i>not</i> by grasping sensations. That is why Kant is not an empiricist.</p> <p>We do not grasp objects, such as the wall, by grasping sensations. Rather we do it by grasping an intuition. Which is to say by grasping mental modifications as representing something.</p> <p>The idea is that the grasp of an intuition is the awareness of a representation as representing. An awareness of what is in that representation—e.g. 'the face' in our drawing.</p>
12:30	<p>Ordinarily I am aware that the bottle is blue. But that is my awareness of it. The question is, where is the awareness bit?</p> <p>The awareness has to be my responding to some modification of my sensory apparatus. I can only be aware of the bottle by having been affected by it—that is why Kant is a representationalist, he thinks that judging is a judging in the light of my being constrained, solicited, responding to... all that response language is necessary.</p> <p>But my mental modifications, the modifications to my sensory apparatus, to me, are not being used for me to say that I am in such and such a <i>state</i>—that would be like saying, 'I am having chalk marks'.</p> <p>Rather we need to see that the chalk marks are the medium through which I grasp the bottle.</p>
14:00	<p>So the bottle is the intentional object of my modified state.</p> <p>So what Kant does insist on, why he is a representationalist, is that he thinks that judgments have a subjective moment—which is why things can go wrong, we can make mistakes, which is why realism makes no sense—it is why I can shift from thinking that the bottle is blue to saying that really the bottle is green but the light threw me off.</p>

15:30	<p>But that shift would neither make no sense under direct realism but equally my judgment that the bottle is blue would make no sense as an inference from my subjective state.</p> <p>It is not that I am inferring. It is not as if that I am in this state, then we make some story, when I am states like this it is usually that I a seeing blue bottles...</p> <p>But I am not making an inference from my subjective state. That is why we have to understand the marks as a representational medium through which I capture the object—nor again am I reducing the object to my sensory states at all.</p> <p>The bottle is in space and time and you can drink the water in it. You can't drink a representational state.</p> <p>The point is that my representation is an awareness <i>of it</i>.</p>
16:30	<p>So judgment is an awareness of things as being thus and so. And not, this is the propositionalist stance, the proposition <i>that</i> they are thus and so.</p> <p>I am aware of the bottle as blue. It is not that I am aware <i>that</i> it is blue. This is too far away. The notion of synthesis as being something that occurs.</p>
17:30	<p>So the synthesis is the act of seeing the depicted object in the medium.</p> <p>We see the face in the chalk marks.</p> <p>But what is seen in the medium is not itself mental, not merely in me, but an object in space.</p>
	<p>So the idea is that representations—and this is to anticipate what we will mean as “apperception”—a representation is a point of view on an objective world.</p>
18:30	<p>Why put it this way?</p> <p>We are trying to get the sense that it is the objective world, but to have a representation is to see it <i>from here</i>. So the very notion of a representation is a representation <i>for me</i> of an <i>it</i> that is independent of me.</p> <p>Therefore the trick of an analysis of judgment is going to be how we can square those two sides—how we can make sense of the thought that mental modifications end up being representations of an objective world—that is what the theory has to do.</p>
20:00	Question:

	<p>We will see that for Kant there is absolutely nothing that is unfalsifiable. That is because it is a judgment. And once you have got a judgment then you have all the apparatus of a judgment. E.g. commitment about the terms, etc.</p> <p>So you might say that that bottle appears to me blue and you claim that nothing can falsify that subjective appearance. But then we can ask if it is the same color as this other thing you also call blue?</p> <p>That language is not going to give you certainty or indubitability for Kant—nothing will.</p>
	Follow-up question:
21:30	<p>It is a judgment about a subjective state. We acknowledge that there are subjective states. But these subjective states are not themselves cognitive, but we can have judgment about them.</p> <p>We can have a consciousness of a sensation. And we can have a judgment about a sensory state.</p>
	As will become clear in the paralogisms...
	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Outline of Critique Of Pure Reason:</u></p> <pre> graph TD Prefaces --> Intro["Introduction (§§I–VII)"] Intro --> PartI["Part I"] Intro --> PartII["Part II"] PartI --> TDE["Transcendental Doctrine of Element"] PartII --> TDM["Transcendental Doctrine of Method"] TDE --> FP["First Part"] TDE --> SP["Second Part"] FP --> TA["Transcendental Aesthetic"] SP --> TL["Transcendental Logic"] TA --> S1["§1. Space"] TA --> S2["§2. Time"] TL --> Intro2["Introduction"] Intro2 --> DI["Division I"] Intro2 --> DII["Division II"] DI --> TA2["Transcendental Analytic"] DII --> TD["Transcendental Dialectic"] TA2 --> Intro3["Introduction"] Intro3 --> BI1["Book I"] Intro3 --> BI2["Book II"] BI1 --> AC["Analytic of Concepts of Pure Reason"] BI2 --> APC["Analytic of Principles Concepts of Pure Reason"] TD --> Intro4["Introduction"] Intro4 --> BI3["Book I"] Intro4 --> BI4["Book II"] BI3 --> AC2["Analytic of Concepts of Pure Reason"] BI4 --> DI2["Dialectical Inferences of"] AC --> VA["version A"] AC --> VB["version B"] VA --> III["III"] VB --> Ideal["Ideal"] DI2 --> CI["Chapt. I"] DI2 --> CII["Chapt. II"] DI2 --> CIII["Chapt. Antimonies"] CI --> P["Paralogisms"] </pre>

	<p>As will become clear in the paralogisms, one of the ways that Kant wants to break from Descartes is that Kant thinks that that the subjective world is no more secure cognitively than the objective world.</p> <p>They are cognitively on a par. He is going to say that over and over again. A judgment is a judgment whether you are judging what is going on within you or whether you are judging what is going on outside.</p> <p>And that just follows from what we called above the three levels.</p>
23:00	Question
	<p>One of the things that Kant shares with Leibniz is that he is quite happy to allow unconscious thoughts—<i>petite perception</i>.</p> <p>The unconscious stuff is OK, but that is why we need apperception and not perception.</p> <p>That is what Kant borrows from Leibniz—but we will get to that eventually.</p>
24:30	<p>This [?] is non-cognitive, just as a desire is for a Kant in the moral realm not itself a ground for action independently of being judged whether it is...</p> <p>You still need to have a reason attached to it in order for it to become an action. Sensation doesn't become representational until it is...</p>
25:00	Question:
	<p>The sensory mode can be a bearer of intuitions, not only of sensations. That is why we gave a definition of sensation and intuition that showed that both had to do with sensibility.</p> <p>To show that sensibility can be cognitive or non-cognitive. And imagination too it turns out can be cognitive or non-cognitive.</p> <p>Thought can be epistemic-knowledge bearing—or just thinking.</p>
26:00	Question:
	<p>The Sellarsian point is the deep one here because the Sellarsian point is that the object is <i>priori</i> to the mixed, as we will come to.</p> <p>That is the deep Sellarsian point—before you can say 'it appears red' you have to be able to judge 'it is red'.</p> <p>"it appears red" is not the working up to being able to say "it is red"—rather it is what you do when someone says, 'hey, look again'.</p>
	Question:

	<p>Beatrice Longueness will use the word <i>conatus</i>. Kant will say it is the instinctive movement of the mind. There is no grounds for it. Just like there is no ground for any of our spontaneities—knowing, moralizing, judgments of tastes—are our ground level possibilities of response to the world for Kant.</p> <p>Of course, once we have the repertoire, we can take up different stances. And we have reasons within each stance for going to the others or not.</p>
28:30	<p>For example, if I judge that someone has been beaten-up I can question whether I am in the right cognitive stance. Maybe what I should think is what someone should do in the event that someone is beaten up. And then in that stance I can kick into the moral law and all that.</p>
	Question:
	It is a ground level mode of encountering, which is not further motivated by something else.
29:30	Question:
	<p>The Sellars point was that...</p> <p>Kant just thinks that at this level that we are in the world and encountering it. And we do these encountering in different modes. But we are passive. He thinks that is an ontological fact.</p> <p>It is a deep fact and it matters to our knowledge because discursive knowledge is just spontaneity and receptivity. Kant's whole program is to figure out how we as agents who are also finite and spatio-temporally provincial navigate ourselves epistemically, morally, and aesthetically.</p>
31:30	Question:

	<p>Many people think that the manifold is a manifold of sensation. It is not.</p> <p>The manifold in Kant is a manifold of intuition.</p> <p>So it is intuitions that have to be unified, not sensations worked up into intuitions—that is the red herring we are trying to get rid of by saying that sensations are not any kind of cognitive matter.</p> <p>So our suggestion is that despite the fact that Kant has a notion of sensation, he actually does operate at the level of the cognitive from the get-go. There is no non-cognitive stuff in the story. That is what we are trying to put behind us.</p> <p>Indeed one of the tempting (mis)readings is to say that what Kant means by intuition is what Hume meant by sensation or impression or idea, and why do they run those three concepts together...</p> <p>But we want to get out of all of that in order to see that an intuition is the complexity of an appearance—which is to say that it is already in the domain of representation.</p> <p>Kant is not mixing, as is tempting to think, a naturalistic account of the psychology of affection with a theory of judgment. That it is always already a theory of judgment.</p> <p>We can call this distinction the "de-naturalization of Kant". This is a radically idealist story.</p>
34:30	Question:
	<p>The work sensation is doing is giving a material substratum to intuitions themselves, which is what Kant says.</p> <p>It is not an aspect of intuitions. Sensations are natural occurrences. Intuitions are representational occurrences.</p> <p>We have sensations, we cognitively make judgments about them, but they are themselves not cognitive material.</p> <p>You do need them because we are passive—there is a causal background, but the causal background is a background and that finally it gets fully overtaken.</p>
36:00	<p>Now we will tell a certain story about the A Deduction.</p> <p>The way we want to read the A Deduction—there is a good essay written early by Allison that does this too—but the point is that A Deduction has the following plot.</p> <p>The idea of the Deduction in A is to provide a transcendental re-interpretation of the new way of ideas.</p>

37:00	<p>First of all, that the way in which Kant knew his Locke and his Leibniz was from his reading of the <i>Nouveaus Essai</i> [?].</p> <p>These are the new essays on the human understanding, it is a paragraph by paragraph commentary by Leibniz on Locke's <i>Essay on Human Understanding</i>.</p> <p>The Locke <i>Essay on Human Understanding</i> were written in 1690, and as far as we know the Leibniz <i>Nouveaus Essai</i> [?] was written around 1703-5. But they were not published until 1765, and it is where Kant got his Leibniz apart from the Wolffian Textbook stuff.</p> <p>It is a great way of getting into Leibniz and Locke. So the [way of ideas ?] was the way that people spoke about Locke. That the raw material of the A Deduction is Lockean realism and we will see how it is transcendently re-interpreted.</p>
39:00	<p>That this is Kant's strategy is deeply unfortunate. It makes his project very clear.</p> <p>We will give an absolutely transparent interpretation of "the object = x". This is often taken to be deep and dark, but Jay thinks that it is the easiest passage in the CPR.</p>
	<p>The difficulty is because he is giving a Lockean story and then there is a re-interpretation, there is a tension in the account between the process, the re-interpretation, and the product, the Copernican Turn.</p> <p>We can see the Copernican Turn happen literally. That is what we want to do now.</p> <p>The problem is that you do take this on literally, you end up in a bit of a mess because you end up conflating the empirical and transcendental levels, and he never quite recovers in the A Deduction.</p> <p>This is why Jay thinks that he wrote the B Deduction. So his account is a very simple view of the relation between A and B, but also he thinks that Kant's views do not change one single drop. He found tensions in presentation, not in the fundamental structure of argument, so Heidegger is just confused, although he has some nice things to say about the A Deduction.</p>
40:30	<p>We will see that all the material in the A Deduction reappears in the B Deduction in little bits of ¶26 and the like, but it is all there, as is all the material from the Metaphysical Deduction—it is in both places.</p> <p>Although we said that the Metaphysical Deduction is a red herring, it does come back.</p> <p>And the fundamental ideas recur.</p>


41:30	Let's start with a puzzling passage in Kant, then we will go to Locke, then we will go to Kant's response, and we will actually see the Copernican Turn before our eyes.
	<p>A104:</p> <p><i>"At this point we must make clear to ourselves what we mean by the expression 'an object of representations' [1]. We have stated above that appearances are themselves nothing but sensible representations, which, as such and in themselves, must not be taken as objects capable of existing outside our power of representation [2]. What, then, is to be understood when we speak of an object corresponding to, and consequently also distinct from, our knowledge? It is easy seen that this object must be thought only as something in general = x, since outside our knowledge we have nothing which we could set over against this knowledge as corresponding to it [3]."</i></p>
	<p>[1] that is what we have been trying to set up this idea in everything above.</p> <p>[2] That is, the most that can be said about the <i>objects</i> of our representations is because they are partially constituted by our categories, our modes of thinking, they make no sense outside of our representational context.</p>
44:30	<p>[3] If you put this back in a Lockean context, this makes much better sense. Because, of course, the <i>etwas überhaupt</i> = x is the "something I know not what".</p> <p>So in chapter 23, which is the chapter on "our complex idea of substances", first of all Locke gives the famous story about the substance as the what underlies and supports and he talks about the great elephant that was asked what it rested on and the tortoise and all that—he gives that famous passage.</p> <p>The New Essays are a wonderful reading. They are engaging and beautifully written.</p> <p>But we know that Locke was a scientific realist so he thought that really the underlying thing was the real essence of the object, that substance really referred to real essence.</p>

46:00	<p>In ¶3 of chapter 23 he goes on to say:</p> <p><i>"It is the ordinary qualities observable in iron or a diamond put together that make the true complex idea of those substances, which a smith or a jeweler commonly knows better than a philosopher."</i></p> <p>So the complex idea of an object, for Locke, is simply the totality of ideas that belong to our thinking about it—hard and this and that—which is the complex idea of iron or a diamond.</p> <p><i>"Who, whatever substantial forms he may talk of, he has..."</i></p> <p>So substantial forms is the error that Locke is arguing against. The whole point of the essays is to argue against scholastic terminology and replace it by regimenting discourse to the claims of the new science of Newton, Boyle, and [?].</p>
47:30	<p><i>"Who, whatever substantial forms he may talk of, has no other idea of the substances than what is framed by a collection of those simple ideas which are to be found in them."</i></p> <p>So he is saying forget the notion of substantial form. Aristotle didn't know what he was talking about. When you think about iron, don't think about substantial forms, but think about what any iron monger tells you iron has got—how much heat you have got to apply and all that which makes up or complex idea of iron.</p> <p><i>Only we must take notice that our complex idea of substances besides all these simple ideas—ideas of the mind—are made up of, have always the confused idea of something to which they belong.</i></p> <p>So not only do I have my idea that it is hard and this cold and melts at this temperature, but I have this confused idea, says Locke, that they all belong to a collection, they are not just a heap, they all belong to one thing.</p> <p><i>Therefore when we speak of any substance we may say it is a thing having such or such qualities, as a body is a thing that is extended, figured, capable of motion, a spirit, a thing capable of thinking and so hardness, friability, the ability to iron we say are qualities to be found in a loadstone. These and the like fashions of speaking intimate that the substance is supposed to be always something beside the extension, figure, solidity, motion, thinking or other observable ideas, though we know not what it is.</i></p> <p>That is the famous puzzle. That is, what is a substance other than the collection of ideas.</p>

50:30	<p>This is the raw material for Kant's reflection, because he is saying we have the representation of the thing, we think of the representations as of the object.</p> <p>So we are thinking that we know not what is out there. Is that what we are thinking? That the transcendental object = x is the substance that holds all these properties together and from which it derives? That is what Locke thought.</p>
51:00	<p>In the next two paragraphs, Kant is going to do the Copernican Turn.</p> <p><i>"Now we find that our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it an element of necessity [1]; [2] the object is viewed as that which prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary [3], and which determines them a priori in some definite fashion. For in so far as they are to relate to an object, they must necessarily agree with one another, that is, must possess that unity which constitutes the concept of an object [4].</i></p> <p><i>But it is clear that [5], since we have to deal only with the manifold of our representations [6], and since that x (the object) which corresponds to them is nothing to us [7]—being, as it is, something that has to be distinct from all our representations [8]—the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing [9] else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations [10]. It is only when we have thus produced synthetic unity [11] in the manifold of intuition [12] that we are in a position to say that we know the object. But this unity is impossible if the intuition cannot be generated in according with a rule by means of such a function of synthesis as makes the reproduction of the manifold a priori necessary, and renders possible a concept in which it is united."</i></p>
	<p>[1] We want to say here not just that these are the features of iron, e.g., but that there is some kind of necessity by which they belong to it.</p> <p>Something about the object must be controlling or playing a role in holding these things together. Let's say that the object acts as a constraint on these things. In a moment we'll have to ask where the necessity.</p> <p>[2] The next sentence is our intuited idea of an object, which turns out to be Lockean and false.</p>
53:00	<p>[3] So the substance, the object, what is independent of these congeries of ideas, is that intuitively from which they spring, and that which makes this collection of properties belong to this object not arbitrary. That is our intuitive thought.</p> <p>That it is the bottle, somehow it.</p>
	<p>[4] That is an obscure phrase, but we'll move on and come back to this later.</p>

54:00	<p>[5] The "But it is clear" is the Copernican Turn. That's it. You have got to turn around.</p> <p>[6] We have to deal <i>only</i> with this stuff [the properties] not this underlying substance. We only have our representations, we don't have an object independent of them that is holding them together.</p>
55:00	<p>[7] Why is it nothing to us? There is no affection there. We can only deal with our representations. We can't deal with what is wholly independent of our representations.</p> <p>So since the object, whatever that is, is nothing to us...</p>
	<p>[8] That's the definition of Lockean substance—what underlies all the ideas, independent of them, not reducible to them.</p> <p>[9] And this is the turn.</p>
56:00	<p>[10] So what is going to unify them ultimately is going to be the logical functions of judgment. That is, the unity that was sought by Locke in the object independent of our representations, that was the new way of ideas, ideas are representations of insensible particulars in the natural world.</p> <p>The transcendental interpretation is that the unit of ideas is derived from not an underlying substance but the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representation.</p>
	<p>[11] Notice that it is we who produce. It is spontaneity, not found.</p> <p>[12] Notice manifold of intuition, not ideas, not sensations, not impressions. It is only because we are dealing with stuff like iron is, or it is, friable.</p>
58:00	So the Copernican Turn, which again at A 109, he takes up the language of the transcendental object.
59:00	<p>A109:</p> <p><i>"Appearances are the sole objects which can be given to us immediately, and that in them which relates immediately to the object is called intuition. But these appearances are not things in themselves; they are only representations, which in turn have their object—an object which cannot itself be intuited by us, and which may, therefore, be named the non-empirical, that is, transcendental object = x [1].</i></p> <p><i>The pure concept of this transcendental object, which in reality throughout all our knowledge is always one and the same, is what can alone confer upon all our empirical concepts in general relation to an object, that is, objective reality. This concept cannot contain any determinate intuition, and therefore refers only to that unity which must be met with in any manifold of knowledge which stands in relation to an object."</i></p>

	[1] But after almost sounding like he is Lockean, he goes on...
59:30	<p>So what do we mean by relation to an object?</p> <p>What we mean by relation to an object is the unification of the intuited manifold in accordance with a priori rules.</p> <p>Those a priori rules give us our concept of an object, and now we can see why they give us our concept of an object because it is only by relating intuitions one to another, that is...and by manifold we mean nothing more than the complexity of a single object by which we can say something like 'the circle is red'.</p> <p>To say that the circle and red, you have got manifold and complexity, the relevant kind of complexity is going to here be that of substance of property.</p>
1:01:30	<p>The thought here is that the ground of world order lie in the subject and not the object.</p> <p>The very idea of world is the correlate of the transcendental unity of apperception.</p>
	<p>So while Locke that the story was Newtonian. There are real essences and necessity came from these scientific processes, and ultimately if you are serious Lockean you end up a serious Quinian—meaning that you end up naturalizing your epistemology.</p> <p>Kant says, wait a minute, that causal story won't give you one judgment nor will it tell you how your ideas, your representations, relate to the world.</p> <p>Relationship to the world is something that occurs by virtue of our activities, our spontaneous activity, of synthesis and judgment.</p>
1:03:00	<p>In particular he wants to say that takes a certain kind of work of unification.</p> <p>But as we know from the Metaphysical Deduction, the kind of unification that is going to be relevant, is going to be the kinds of unity that we find in the forms of judgment.</p> <p>That is literally the Copernican Turn. From the grounds of world order in the object, to the grounds world order and therefore the meaning of the world as world in mental activity and practices.</p>
1:04:00	<p>Class Break.</p> <p>We'll return to a more general discussion of the A Deduction in the second half.</p>

	<p>Class begins with the following illustration:</p> 
00:00	<p>One way to help the present discussion is to note that what Kant is doing when he is doing when he describes the transcendental object = x, he describes it as having a function.</p> <p>That is the crux of the entire argument. He says: <i>the object is viewed as that which prevents [our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary].</i></p> <p>So notice, it has a job, it performs a logical task.</p>
1:00	<p><i>"the object is viewed as that which prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them a priori in some definite fashion. For in so far as they are to relate to an object, they must necessarily agree with one another, that is, must possess that unity which constitutes the concept of an object."</i></p> <p>So in Locke, the x is real essence, or substance, but also we should say that Kant misread, which we won't really get into. But he read Locke as most people did as an empiricist; Locke is not an empiricist but a scientific realist. But that is a long, complicated story.</p>
2:00	<p>So the substance is the underlying support, the invisible support which for Locke confers unity on the object.</p> <p>But notice that it has a <i>function</i>.</p> <p>And Kant says, if the idea of the "transcendental object = x" is now given a functional description, namely it is that which prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and introduces unity into the object—then his first question is 'what kind of unity does it introduce?'</p> <p>Well, the only kind of unity that we can be interested in is the unity of something that for us counts as an object of a judgment.</p> <p>That is, the only kind of unity that matters is the unity of a judgmental object.</p>

3:30	<p>So in saying that he can then say that if the function is introducing unity, but since this X is already outside representation, that is the famous Lockean veil of perception, which for Locke we cannot get behind so we cannot know what underlies our ideas, then Locke [?] says that it doesn't do anything for us so how can it play its role of unification if it means nothing to us, if it is outside our whole epistemic experience.</p>
	<p>So what we want is the function, and the function—providing unity—is provided by synthesis, that introduces into our representational manifold the order of the concept of an object.</p> <p>For example, it allows us to say that the vase is tall.</p>
5:00	<p>The Lockean notion of "transcendental object = x" is literally a notion of substance.</p> <p>Kant re-interprets substance as <i>function</i>, as what introduces unity into the manifold of intuition, and then says that function is carried on by unity of synthesis—that is, our manner of ordering and grasping the intuited manifold.</p> <p>That is what provides the requisite form of unity.</p>
6:00	<p>We haven't gotten necessity out of this yet, that is to come, but Kant is going to argue that this is a <i>necessary</i> unity of apperception.</p>
7:00	<p>Famously, the question of the transcendental deduction is what is it and how does it work—and there is a huge debate about this.</p> <p>We will be brief, however.</p>
	<p>We know that Kant's account is that the transcendental deduction is going to be the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience.</p> <p>The question is what does Kant mean by experience. And debates about the transcendental deduction are really debates about he means by experience in that phrase?</p> <p>And he can be thought to mean one of two things. He can either mean:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -i- mere consciousness -ii- ordinary knowledge.
8:30	<p>How you interpret what it is Kant means by experience will depend on how you interpret the ambition of the transcendental deduction as a whole.</p> <p>If you see that what Kant wants to begin with is something very minimal—e.g., I am conscious—</p>

9:00	<p>If you see that what Kant wants to begin with is something very minimal—e.g., I am conscious, then you are going to think that the ambition of the deduction is anti-skeptical. That is, you are going to think that what Kant wants to do is produce an argument so that the necessary conditions for the possibility of self-consciousness are that experience must be of a realm of items which are objective in the sense that they can be distinguished from myself and my inner states.</p>
10:00	<p>So one reading of the Transcendental Deduction is that it is this wildly ambitious project of deducing from the mere fact of let's call it the Cartesian starting point—I am self-aware—to the conclusion that as a necessary condition for this the case I must be aware of myself as having objective knowledge of things that can be distinguished from me and my inner states, of which my inner states are but one path through an objective realm.</p> <p>This is the strong, "progressive" interpretation of the Deduction. And it is what most of the literature on the Deduction really thinks Kant is up to here.</p>
11:30	<p>The alternative interpretation begins from the fact of empirical knowledge—i.e. I have common sense knowledge—the table is gray, the bottle is blue, etc.</p>
	<p>And from this, I deduce the necessary conditions for the possibility of this, is the objective validity of the categories.</p>
	<p>And this account is called the "regressive" interpretation of transcendental deductions.</p>
12:30	<p>JMB considers the attempt to read Kant as providing the progressive reading, as a deeply anti-skeptical argument, to be completely mistaken.</p> <p>It is mistaken textually—which we will see. But JMB thinks it is mistaken more for the reason that anti-skeptical arguments in general are mistaken.</p> <p>That is, if you begin with a skeptical premise, you are just going to end up with a skeptical conclusion. So to speak, you cannot demonstrate from a weak premise the possibility of the necessity of knowledge and the world.</p>

13:30	<p>As far as JMB can see, Kant never has anything like an anti-skeptical argument. The closest he comes is in a passage called the "Refutation of Idealism"—which he says is not an anti-skeptical argument but a refutation of a certain version of idealism in which the inner is primary over the outer, and he tries to defeat that claim.</p>
	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Outline of Critique Of Pure Reason:</u></p> <pre> graph TD Prefaces --> Intro["Introduction (§§I –VII)"] Intro --> PartI["Part I Transcendental Doctrine of Elements"] Intro --> PartII["Part II Transcendental Doctrine of Method"] PartI --> FirstPart["First Part Transcendental Aesthetic"] PartI --> SecondPart["Second Part Transcendental Logic"] FirstPart --> S1["§1. Space"] FirstPart --> S2["§2. Time"] SecondPart --> DivI["Division I Transcendental Analytic"] SecondPart --> DivII["Division II Transcendental Dialectic"] DivI --> IntroI["Introduction"] DivI --> BookI1["Book I Analytic of Concepts"] DivI --> BookI2["Book II Analytic of Principles"] IntroI --> versionA["version A"] IntroI --> versionB["version B"] BookI1 --> versionA BookI1 --> versionB BookI2 --> ChptI["Chpt I Schematism"] BookI2 --> ChptII["Chpt II System of all Principle of Pure Understanding"] ChptII --> S1_2["§1 §2"] DivII --> IntroII["Introduction"] IntroII --> BookI3["Book I Concepts of Pure Reason"] IntroII --> BookI4["Book II Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason"] BookI4 --> S3["§3 Systematic Representation of all the Synthetic Principles"] S3 --> Axioms["1. Axioms"] S3 --> Anticipations["2. Anticipations"] S3 --> Analogies["3. Analogies"] S3 --> Postulates["4. Postulates"] Postulates --> Refutation["Refutation of Idealism"] </pre>
	<p>Almost all the literature, including all the commentaries on the syllabus, read Kant has having a progressive anti-skeptical argument, but that is not how we will look at it.</p> <p>Rather, we will suggest that all we want is to show that from the premise—itself a non-skeptical premise: we have knowledge of the world</p>

15:00	<p>Rather, we will suggest that all we want is to show that from the premise—itsself a non-skeptical premise: we have knowledge of the world.</p> <p>The suggestion here is to show that the categories are objectively valid.</p>
	<p>This is itself an immensely ambitious project, but in the literature this problem is dismissed as if saying 'if you are going to help yourself to knowledge of the world, why bother?'</p> <p>As if the only thing worthwhile doing in philosophy is defeating skepticism.</p> <p>And this is a debate within philosophy. There are philosophers who withdraw from that game or sport think that there are other types of theories.</p>
16:00	<p>But in any event, we will be following not the usual "progressive" anti-skeptical interpretation of the Transcendental Deduction but rather the "regressive" line.</p> <p>The fullest defenses of the regressive strategy can be found in Karl Amerik's books <i>Interpreting Kant's Critiques</i>. It is Amerik's who has a hegemonic control over this little domain of argumentation and owns the regressive argument.</p> <p>But there are also other good accounts of regressive strategies, e.g. Andrew Brooks in <i>Kant and Mind</i> and Dickerson's <i>Kant on Representation and Objectivity</i>.</p>
	<p>We will see that as we go along that JMB's version is even weaker argument than the standard regressive line—and he confesses that he hates strong arguments.</p>
17:00	<p>So the A Deduction, especially the first half, is often said to be a subjective deduction, as opposed to an objective deduction.</p> <p>And a subjective deduction has three elements:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> i. It is a doctrine of synthesis, that is, a doctrine of how concepts get applied. That is one of the things Kant means by synthesis—the application of concepts to intuitions. ii. Secondly, it is a doctrine of what a synthesizer—let's call it a mind—must be like. What is it like to be a synthesizer? And here the central notion is going to be one of unity. iii. Thirdly, it is going to be a doctrine of the relation of the mind's awareness of itself to unity, or to synthesis, and to the application of concepts to objects. It is going to gather those various elements together.

18:17	[You may notice quite a bit of burping in the residual background noise of this recording, both here and throughout this second half—for the record, it was not mine]
18:30	<p>On Jay's reading, both the A Deduction and the B Deduction have a similar structure in that they both occur in two parts.</p> <p>In the first part Kant focuses on providing an account of the synthesis of given individual objects—like, 'I've got this bottle in front of me.'</p> <p>And then both in the A and B Deduction, after this account of the synthesis of this given object, he moves from a talking about awareness of individual objects and their perceptual manifold to talking about groups of objects, and finally one global representation of one global object. So moving ultimately to talk about the world as a whole.</p>
	<p>Basic Architectonic of Transcendental Deduction (both A and B)</p> <p>Synthesis as awareness of...</p> <p>Individual objects → Groups of objects → World as a whole</p>
20:00	<p>So the underlying thought of the "subjective deduction" part of the Transcendental Deduction which comes a bit later in the B Deduction, is that for our experience to have organized, unified objects, we need a rich ability to structure and organize our sensible stimuli.</p> <p>We are so to speak, the kinds of beings who do things with our input and that furthermore, we must synthesize things if we are going to be able to recognize them as synthesized.</p> <p>That is, we must put things together if we are to recognize them as unified.</p> <p>So the motto would be: no unity without unification.</p>
21:00	<p>This thought is the opposite of association, e.g., 'I see red, I see round, I've seen this before, it is an apple'.</p> <p>On the empiricist story we get the influx and we have a recognition of the various bits and we associate some bits with others, and we have regularities, but there is no activity of putting all this together.</p>

22:00	<p>Kant says there are three minimal cognitive abilities that are required to represent objects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> --apprehending --reproducing --recognizing (in a concept) <p>Therefore this is going to be the three steps of this process.</p>		
	<p>So he begins at A77, where we will first look at a few comments about synthesis, then we will turn to apprehension, reproduction, and recognition.</p>		
	<p><i>"By synthesis, in its most general sense, I understand the act of putting different representations together [1], and of grasping what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge [2]."</i></p>		
	<p>[1] Again, not sensations, not feelings, not raw anythings. It is putting different <i>representations</i> together.</p> <p>[2] If it is not already, it will become painfully obvious that Kant is in this respect a kind of Platonic philosopher in that for him the big question is always the "One and the Many", over and over again.</p> <p>Manifold is just his word for the many, and he is always asking how the many is collected up into the one, and the one can be one mind, one act, one object, and all of these have to be interconnected.</p> <p>The goal is to show how the complexity—the maniness of the world gets ordered and articulated into a certain type of unity.</p>		
25:00	<p>So we are looking at how the underlying acts of synthesis, which are apprehension-reproduction-recognition.</p> <p>Kant will argue that apprehension and reproduction must be had together, as we will see, but that they can occur without recognition.</p>		
	<table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="text-align: center; vertical-align: top;"> Apprehension ← → Reproduction Can't have one without the other </td> <td style="text-align: center; vertical-align: top;"> Recognition but need not have recognition </td> </tr> </table>	Apprehension ← → Reproduction Can't have one without the other	Recognition but need not have recognition
Apprehension ← → Reproduction Can't have one without the other	Recognition but need not have recognition		

25:30	<p>So onto the threefold synthesis.</p> <p>First the synthesis of apprehension and intuition, that's at A 99.</p> <p>The synthesis of apprehension is a recognition of a manifold as a manifold. That is, in broad terms what this means is something like noting the brute spatial relatedness and temporal ordering and hence the fact that each item as it affects our sensibility appears in a spatial relation to other items and its part in relation to one another and in a temporal order, before and after with respect to other objects.</p>
27:30	<p>So the thought here is...</p> <p>Consider the experience of coming out of the subway station at a stop that we are familiar with, but we don't know which corner we have come up on, we get a feeling of vertigo. We temporarily can't figure out where we are.</p> <p>In one sense we <i>know</i> exactly where we are. We got off the train at 14th Street. I am at 14th Street. But coming out onto the 14th street I can't figure out which corner I am on, which way I am facing.</p> <p>But the point is that even in that vertigo, I can see that these objects are spatially related to one another, and I can see the taxis coming after one another. But I can't figure out how anything fits together.</p>
28:30	<p>The point of this example is to try to show what it would be like to have a manifold which has spatial diversity to it and a temporal complexity—but our vertigo in that moment of disorientation, roughly, our other syntheses have collapses, and we are back at the level of the synthesis of apprehension.</p> <p>Here the manifold appears as manifold, but without any sense of firm recognitional order.</p>

29:30	<p>This occur cannot without reproduction—we'll come back to this.</p> <p>But the thought that lies behind this at an independent level is this: why if this cannot happen without reproduction does Kant insist on it as an analytically distinct moment?</p> <p>He makes a big deal out of suggesting that...</p> <p><i>"Whatever the origin of our representations, whether they are due to the influence of outer things, or are produce through inner causes, whether they arise a priori, or being appearances have an empirical origin, they must all, as modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense. All our knowledge is thus finally subject to time, the formal condition of inner sense. In it they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relation. This is the general observation which, throughout what follows, must be borne in mind as being quite fundamental.</i></p> <p><i>Every intuition contains in itself a manifold which can be represented as a manifold only in so far as the mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of one impression upon another; for each representation, in so far as it is contained in a single moment, can never be anything but absolute unity. ..."</i></p>
	<p>So that I know in this moment of vertigo, and what allows me to try to get my bearing, that I know that there is a temporal order, that I am looking from left to right, that is an ordered movement.</p> <p>But why insist on this moment of apprehension?</p>
31:30	<p>And here we can go back to some of the questions that were raised in the first half about sensation.</p> <p>Only here, we are at a cognitive level. Without apprehension, our synthesizing activities would lack a content. This is the moment that deals with the givenness of the manifold.</p> <p>The reason we brought up vertigo is that it is precisely my experience of not being in control of it. I am not manipulating where I am. In vertigo, not only do I not have control over it [be the source of it], I cannot even piece it together.</p> <p>In that sense, this is my raw awareness of not me already—the manifold as manifold, as spatio and temporally distributed in ways outside of my power.</p> <p>So that the synthesis of apprehension, which is a synthesis and an activity is what Husserl will later call "passive synthesis".</p>

33:00	<p>So we are registering this as a power and an activity—but it is a passive power. It is a power of responsiveness, and responding.</p> <p>So this is the moment in which we, as it were, take it that we are responding and that therefore there is something that is given to which we are responding.</p> <p>So the notion of apprehension has about it the claim of the world on our attention. That sensory sense that we are not just making this up whole cloth but under constraint.</p>
34:00	<p>But it is very hard to get a hold of this moment because it almost never appears on its own, and it is why nominalist—it is what nominalist forget—that we are responding to what is there.</p>
	<p>The notion of reproduction, and this gets articulated in sections of it that people never talk about, namely the Axioms of Intuition and the Anticipation of Perception. And they correspond to what we are calling here the synthesis of apperception</p>

	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Outline of Critique Of Pure Reason:</u></p> <pre> graph TD Prefaces --> Introduction["Introduction (§§I –VII)"] Introduction --> PartI["Part I Transcendental Doctrine of Elements"] Introduction --> PartII["Part II Transcendental Doctrine of Method"] PartI --> FirstPart["First Part Transcendental Aesthetic"] PartI --> SecondPart["Second Part Transcendental Logic"] FirstPart --> S1["§1. Space"] FirstPart --> S2["§2. Time"] SecondPart --> Intro2["Introduction"] Intro2 --> DivI["Division I Transcendental Analytic"] Intro2 --> DivII["Division II Transcendental Dialectic"] DivI --> Intro3["Introduction"] Intro3 --> BookI1["Book I Analytic of Concepts version A / version B"] Intro3 --> BookII1["Book II Analytic of Principles Chpt I Schematism / Chpt II System of all Principle of Pure Understanding §1 / §2"] DivII --> Intro4["Introduction"] Intro4 --> BookI2["Book I Concepts of Pure Reason"] Intro4 --> BookII2["Book II Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason"] BookII2 --> List["1. Axioms 2. Anticipations 3. Analogies 4. Postulates Refutation of Idealism"] BookII2 --> S3["§3 Systematic Representation of all the Synthetic Principles"] </pre>
35:00	<p>Step two, I have not only got this awareness of the moment and of spatial diversity but, Kant says... and this idea has become so familiar with Derrida and Heidegger that it is hard to see that Kant there first</p>

	<p>Kant's thought is this, the argument is that theoretically there can be no first, without a second.</p> <p>That is, there can be no first moment of consciousness that would be were be begin. And the reason why there can be no first moment of consciousness where we begin, is because unless that moment were connected to a second moment, it would not count as first.</p> <p>Our awareness of something as first... as in the example of a clock tower bells chiming, as you often wonder as you are counting whether you had heard the first one.</p>
36:30	<p>The point here is, and this is Kant's thought, is that in order for me to be counting the towns of the bell's chiming, I have to hold in mind the first as I hear the second, and it is the holding in mind of the first, reproduction in imagination, that let's me hear the second [as second]and finally that let's me go back to the first and hear it as the first.</p>
	<p>So the idea here is that there cannot be a punctual present.</p> <p>The present is a relational term of what came before or after something else, because unless we connected, unless we held in mind the past, then each present would simply be a solitary thing.</p> <p>That would be our vertigo gone wildly—like a scene out of Hitchcock—because I can't connect one moment with another.</p>
38:30	<p>Playing with this idea, Jay notices that listening to lectures can be like this sometimes because we are waiting for the end of the sentence, which we start and which includes a complex series of logical clauses in which we are being asked to recognized the connect between the original premise, the conclusion, and how the inference got there.</p>
	<p>In this example we can see how when we are listening to the sentence, we are at each moment picking up each word and carrying it along and in anticipation of where it is going. The anticipation of where it is going is recognition in a concept.</p>

39:30	<p>So the thought of reproduction as a strategy—and we will return to this next week—is that we have a possibility of being aware of our experience as occurring through time like listening to a sentence of a piece of music, where this becomes explicit.</p> <p>Think of listening to a complex piece of classical music—what are we holding in mind in the final movement when the theme comes back from the final movement. Imagine what we are collecting up in a unity simply to hear that final note.</p> <p>The identity of that note is dependent up, that note as our now, is not now at all.</p>
41:00	<p>We will start there next week and carry on with the Deductions.</p>