

00:00	We were in the midst of paragraph 78 and I detoured into the preface, paragraphs 28, 29. And the two thoughts in paragraph 28, 29 I wanted to bring out, one on the bottom of page 16 when Hegel says, in this respective formative education regarded from the side of the individual consists in his acquiring what thus lies at hand, devouring his inorganic nature, and taking possession of it for himself. So process of the education which is going to be the reading of the book is going to be patching up with our own
1:00	inorganic nature, that is the history that is already sedimented in us. Is - if I could use a Husserlian phrase here - this would be a reactivating of the origin. Goes all the way to the Greeks. Similarly there's this idea that we are more being than consciousness. That's what he means by our inorganic nature. We are more being than consciousness. It's all that history sedimented in us comes out as our capacity to do the simplest sorts of things. For example, we simply know we don't have to automatically think about it
2:00	that the earth revolves around the sun. No one's actually seen that. We've actually seen the opposite. We always see the sun, right? So what took people centuries to discover, people went to jail for, was killed for, we have now as common sense knowledge. And the common sense knowledge is the tip of the iceberg - what is meant by we are more being than consciousness. And we have to take possession of that history. So Hegel says at the end of paragraph 29, turning these now into Hegelese jargon.
3:00	It is no longer existence in the form of being in itself, neither still in the original [of an abstract concept], nor submerged in existence - but is now the recollected in-itself, ready for conversion into the form of being-for-self. How this is done, we shall come to. So it's a recollected in-itself, it is to be made brought to consciousness. So he says in paragraph 78, going back to it, that the series of configuration which consciousness goes through along this ride as related in
4:00	history of the education of consciousness itself from the standpoint of science. It means we are not going to watch natural consciousness going through this educative process. An educative process that is manifest in us by its being our inorganic nature. Now part of what makes this education possible, Hegel says, toward the end of that paragraph, is that he is going to have a, as we've already entold, a
5:00	skeptical method. And he says, a skepticism that is directed against the whole range of phenomenal consciousness, on the other hand, renders the spirit for the first time, competent to examine what truth is. So he's going to be claiming that he's on skeptical method that's deeper, darker, more dangerous, more thorough than Descartes'. but he's referring to the skeptical method, to Descartes, and he is himself going to be employing a skeptical method. But he says, a skeptical method that is going to go against the whole range of phenomenal consciousness. And because he does so, and here he

6:00	Gets down and dirty, it brings about a state of despair about all the so-called natural ideas, thoughts, opinions regardless of whether they are called one's own or someone else's. Ideas with which the consciousness that sets about the examination of truth is hampered so it is, in fact, incapable of carrying out what it wants to undertake. He's here, going right back to the beginning of the introduction in which he had already showed himself skeptical about modern skeptical methods. And we discovered last time
7:00	that he was skeptical about modern skeptical methods because they were not serious enough. And the reason why they're not serious enough is because they always presume a point of safety and security. Namely, consciousness itself. Whether it is pre-cogito, the exemplar of the moment of absolute security and safety. Or the empiricists - 'I'm immediately aware of impression, I'm immediately of ideas in the mind.' And this goes right through... no one in the 17 th or 18 th century thought to question the transparency of ideas before the mind. That was a gimmick.
8:00	And Hegel says, if you help yourself to that then you can't be serious because what we need to question what it means, for example, an idea in the mind. So it's at this point where Hegel is thinking of the model of ancient skepticism as opposed to modern skepticism and again, just to remind you, ancient skepticism was the practice of trying to show that two opinions each was equally plausible and implausible. And that to show that no side of a serious debate about a problem of knowledge could be shown to be true
9:00	So a method of trying to find a balance of terror on each side of the debate and of course for them, but not for Hegel, was actually part of an ethical exercise. Because for them the idea was, if you could learn that you could not have the truth, that there was always reasons not to believe, then the right thing to do was to suspend belief. And if you could suspend belief, you could reach a point of equilibrium, what they call ataraxia - a state of calmness and acceptance of the world because there was no truth to be had about. Hegel wrote on this.
10:00	There's no doubt that he had this view of ancient skepticism so he wanted, and this is what lies behind his search here, to find a method of skepticism that would avoid the traps of modern skeptical methods of which the paradigms of the first meditations - I doubt, and give the reasons for doubt, the skeptical method. Trying to show you were assuming a presupposing nothing.
11:00	So what Hegel wants is a general skeptical method. And hence, he wants to have a method in which he draws doubt over everything and therefore nothing is taken for granted within this method. Having that thought is what leads people to think that Hegel has a pre-suppositionalist starting point, which I will refute in about 17 minutes. Nonetheless, it's a skeptical method. So how is his skeptical method going to differ from the first instance from the Cartesian empiricist skeptical method?

12:0 0	And the answer is given in the next paragraph when he wants to say that we're going to be doubting, we already know all the consciousness, whatever forms of consciousness means, we don't know that yet. Doubting natural consciousness, let's call it natural consciousness for the moment. And We're going to doubt all different forms natural consciousness as they arise. And he says that this series of skeptical doubts, each doubt will bring us to a moment of despair, if you hold any of these views you will find yourself in despair. That the series of this will be a progression, a narrative of a kind, an interconnection. And he says
13:0 0	And again this is very Cartesian, by following every falsity - this is false, this is false, this is false - we're coming to the truth. There's nothing left or when we can't negate anymore, then it will bring us to the moment of truth. So he does take, so this is a kind of the... but not quite, the reasons we will come to. And that will be the double-sidedness of it. Both a wholly negative process and a build up at the same time. And therefore there better be at least two points of view of the story if we're going to have nothing but skepticism all the time and education all the time. So you already know there are going to be at least two points of view. And the story will have to be double-voiced.
14:0 0	For reasons that every reader of the modern novel understands. So it's going to be a negative progression a series that will bring to past the completion of the series, that's the hope. And of course he expects us to have in mind either, and he doesn't care - you can think either Cartesianly we're going to get to something or you can think negative theology you're going to get to something - but he's thinking we're used to this idea that the negative can take us this way. Now he now gives it an extra twist by saying our forms are forms of pathology,
15:0 0	Mainly what makes us pathological creatures is our one-sidedness, remember my claim last week that pathologies in modernity are series in one-sidedness that could not be reconciled. So mind versus body, man versus nature, individual versus society, faith versus reason, right on down the line we have these series of dualisms and it's the irreconcilability of those dualisms that generates the crises... but because we are alive, and none of us are ancient skeptics, we are bound to one side or the other so we are either dogmatists or skeptics. That is,
16:0 0	We are either someone who feels no no, I'm going to go with the revolution and the terror. Or the problem of skepticism. Or the skepticism is going to be about the peculiar kind. It's going to have to show what's wrong with the forms of natural consciousness, is there one -sidedness. Which means that one-sidedness is always taking a partial truth for the whole. That is the mistake for Hegel, is the substitution of the part for the whole.

17:0 0	He is bound to say, going backwards, that the form of pathology is the taking of the part for the whole. That's what every position you will find will be doing is reifying a partial truth so that it becomes the whole truth. Which is to say that every previous philosophical position is a caricature, it exaggerates a half-truth and makes it everything, which is why again, philosophy is inherently comical. That is, there's something laughable about philosophical thought. If you don't giggle when you read Mark Lee. You're not reading the same book I'm reading. Which isn't to say read the great great book on Berkeley.
18:0 0	That Berkeley isn't one of the darkest thinkers of the modern epoch. Berkeley's book is devastating, devastating about the notion of passivity. But it's also again comical. And this book is in part the reversals, as you will see one of the reasons I like Hegel, is for a German philosopher, he had a sense of humor. Okay so, the notion of skepticism is to overcome one-sidedness. So the skepticism is a skepticism of overcoming positions and positions of themselves is a reification of one-sided views until we overcome those and we are not tempted by those one-sidedness again.
19:0 0	That's the first thing. The second thing he now says is that the via negativa is not a via negativa because the issuing of a skeptical doubt, for example, just saying that a particular theory is false because it's contradictory. Now I want to be clear that in logic, a contradiction entails... Anyone? Anything follows! The problem with contradiction is by saying that the tree is green, it is not green, I'm entitled to say the frog is purple. It's bad news. Now the notion was is that
20:0 0	contradiction can't get us anywhere therefore we're discovering internal contradictions in positions, part of the skeptical method. So we're going to end up each time with nothing. Now that isn't truth of logic. Hegel now suggests that he has a different view in mind. He's no longer following the rules of former logic as how he inherited it from Aristotle because he says that the negation of a position, the discovery of a contradiction yields a determinate nothingness.
21:0 0	a determinate nothingness. In this, and a determinate nothingness which has a content, now he claims that this is a theory of determinate negation. But the intuitive form is n fact that Hegel is offering much much more like an ordinary scientist than like a magician. For a scientist, when they test out a theory and it gets refuted by the evidence - so it has a prediction, I predict X and it shows not X, so I've got a contradiction, it's not X - they don't think oh, I've got nothing. They say wait a minute, there must be a mistake in the theory,
22:0 0	why did we go wrong, let's cook up a new theory to explain why this one went wrong and that will account for the fact we missed. The first person to try to think of this - it can't be formalized, but the way in which pragmatism held the idea of adductive inference, which is a typical Peircian unreadable phrase, so everyone else uses a much nicer phraseology- inference to the best explanation.

23:00	Hegel's thought is, and this is why for years so many people if you wanted to beat up on Hegel the first place you went was go to the idea of negation, because it was clear he was a bad magician, because he would tolerate contradictions and he said they went somewhere. And this was the reason why. The notion of negation is actually part of a standard empirical method. Once we are no longer
24:00	Naïve about how science works, how theories work, and how as thinkers we try to develop explanatory accounts of experience. We're always going to be trying to fix things up and take that refutations are a stir to generate a new version of our theory. And a new version of our theory will always have the minimum capacities to explain what the former position could not explain and do so on the basis of pointing to what its weakness was.
25:00	So the debate here now would be the question of whether these acts of determinate negation, Hegel does talk a lot about necessity, and the question is - this is the necessity of transition, to move to one form of natural consciousness to another. And Hegel seems to claim at various moments that the movement for it is some form of necessity. If I'm right in thinking that its inference to the best explanation, it won't be necessary. Let me say a word about this. At least one plausible account, there are varieties in Foster's book on the ideas of PHEM, he gives a fairly detailed account
26:00	On page 186, I'm going to go for a shorter account on Pippin on page 108 - what we're asking, we have some theory A that failed and we want to understand the status of B, which is going to be the successor theory. This is said certainty, this is perception, what makes perception follow
27:00	from said certainty? At the very least, and here would be the strongest version, Pippin says is to argue that given the internal difficulties of A, B is the only possible resolution of those difficulties and so represents a necessary correction to A. So B is the only possible. Why may we not want to argue that?
28:00	How about the only possible? Of course it's not a logical inference. That's why we call it adductive. Why is it going to be, even on its own terms, impossible? It's proving an existential negative, which is really hard to do. Do you follow that? It's not that there is a counter-example. You have to prove there can't be a counter-example to it. You have to prove a negative existential. That's an impossibly strong criteria.
29:00	So that cannot be. So that's the only way - I want to be clear about this - than an adductive inference could be necessary. So whatever Hegel means by necessary, it better not be that. So a weaker version of the argument is to say that B does resolve the inadequacies of A in the appropriate way and issues a challenge to any potential objector to provide a better resolution. So not that B is the only possible,

30:0 0	but simply that B does do the work of accounting for it. And I'm actually going to add another counter, not that B does that, but in each and every case we will discover that B is an available historical position. So what Hegel's roughly claiming is that for every successor form of consciousness, he's looking for an account that does follow, does explain the failures of the earlier one and he actually already have in our repertoire in positions that people already held in these matters. It then follows of course,
31:0 0	so these are images of explanation under the conditions of historical provinciality. So going forward, I want to be clear there is no necessity. Just like going forward, there is no necessity in any narrative. The necessity when it arises will arise from the endpoint and lo and behold the next paragraph that's what Hegel says. That is, if you think of the narrative, the necessity will have to be retrospective narrative.
32:0 0	Going forward, the Phenomenology is a gamble, and retrospectively, a necessity. Why necessary? Because when we get to the endpoint and we have to know there can be an endpoint, if we can reach an end, then the path from A to B to C to D to the end, shows that those were the steps we needed to make in order to get here. So like any narrative story we have to show the steps by which we can get to the end. But what would be the end?
33:0 0	What would be the end minimally? A kind of naïve Proustian sense? How is the minimal conditions for this book ending? It has to make possible that it was written at all. So this is an education of consciousness, a portrait of the artist as a young consciousness. The end of book must be the conditions of it being written at all. So consciousness reaching a standpoint -
34:0 0	absolute knowing , the goal - the goal being now that you can see you got to the position whereby you can overview this whole process and see yourself as a result of it and see that going through this process is what allowed you to write this book. So in that sense, this book is nothing but a historical recapitulation of its own conditions and possibility. So it has to go back to the beginning in exactly that sense. It will turn out that although we are going to start with natural consciousness,
35:0 0	We are going to start with ego-ology, the view that there are individuals who face the world, we are going to discover that Christianity, that's not true. Individuals don't just face the world, individuals are part of historical communities, and therefore the story's going to have to run consciousness discovering that it is not the measure of all things, that Spirit is the measure of all things, and then Spirit has to go through a history to get to the point that the Spirit is the kind of Spirit that allows that people like Mister Hegel to write that kind of philosophy book. So this is going to be a spiraling story.

36:00	In this sense, more like a Virginia Woolf novel than Proust in the sense that it's a masquerade. You're going to start with someone that looks like a consciousness, looks like a man, and then it's going to become an 18 th century scientist, then a woman in Greece, the characters are going to change. The very meaning of what it means to be a character is going to change. So it's going to be rich in that way. That's not exactly what he says in paragraph 80. He says something much more modest, but the modesty for me is terribly important. Because what he gives is a formal and not substantive account of an ending.
37:00	But the goal is the necessary fix for knowledge as a serial progression. It's the point where knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself. Where knowledge finds itself where notion corresponds to object and object to notion. You don't know what that means yet. But at some point it's where whatever natural consciousness is supposing about the world at that point, it turns out it works out okay. And therefore there's no unfulfilled desires, no further negations to make. You can just relax. So not unlike ataraxia in that way, you've got your desires satisfied.
38:00	However, short of that moment, life is hell. That's what he goes on to say because - and this is something we don't have an understanding of and it'll be weeks before we understand it fully - but he says that no satisfaction is to be found in any of the stations on the way. So he's giving you a standard correspondence theory of truth
39:00	we can stop when object corresponds to notion and notion to object, whatever that means. And then he suddenly adds a wholly affective erotic dimension. Mainly that prior to that moment when that former criteria is satisfied, there'll be no satisfaction subjectively. There'll be a restless in consciousness so that consciousness will be tearing itself to pieces, forcing itself to go on, and then he says of course there are various ways in forms of self-deception that allow you to stop but eventually they'll collapse too and you'll be forced to go on. So he presumes that this forward motion now is both logical and erotic.
40:00	Where the notion of a quest would be one version of an erotic pursuit, the other one might be the ascent - the Republic as an erotic pursuit, the Symposium, those models. But he's certainly suggesting that knowledge has something to do with desire and what we're looking for is a certain kind of satisfaction and that's going to have to do something with the picture of subjectivity at stake here. That to get the right kind of account is going to be the kind of account that provides us, as modern subjects with the kind of self understanding that means we are no longer in crisis, no longer feeling alienated from our world,

41:0 0	no longer torn to pieces. And we'll see we strive towards this in various ways. Or to put it another way, we will not be compelled to participate in any further self-defeating performances. Because all previous forms of consciousness will be forms of self-defeating performances. Deep breath. Are there any questions there? Because where Hegel starts all over again in paragraph 81 is now done at the level of consciousness and in the level of self-consciousness.
42:0 0	Have some idea of how this is supposed to work itself out. The question B I already answered, B will be progress over A just in case it resolves the contradictions in A and does so on the basis of giving us insight into the mistakes in A. So getting from A to B
43:0 0	is easy. The question that arises, a question of progress, is whether it is a transitive. This is the big problem with historical theories of natural science. So you know that B is better than A and C is better than B but does it follow from that that C is better than A? Because unless C is better than A, you're not making progress, you're just going through bumps. And this was the great anxiety arose when historical accounts of physics
44:0 0	first arose. What do you suppose Hegel's answer is going to be given what I just said? How does Hegel fit transitivity into the story? To get to the end! You ain't gonna get there 'til the end. So your question is exactly right, which is why I said up until the end, it's a gamble. At any moment, failure is possible and the method has to allow for this. Transitivity is not built into the overall structure of the account,
45:0 0	although there are many compensations for the absence of transitivity,, namely you will feel at certain moments which is why people stop reading the book at various moments as if you've reached an end, and there's a way in which the parts sometimes feel bigger than the whole because they feel like real microcosm of the whole and in a way they are. And I want to say, the first 25 pages is pretty good, John Russen's reading of the Phenomenology. And Russen has the thought that you could read the book, in a way,
46:0 0	happily non-cumulatively by thinking about how each section has a microcosm/macrocosm structure. And that's not implausible. So that part of the satisfaction is that you feel like what the end of the book is going to be because it's so heavily adumbrated in various ways by the nature of the individual failures. But I want to say that that's a fool's paradise. It's true, the real notion of transitivity is because of the end. So if Hegel couldn't write the book, couldn't complete the book, think what an odd book remembrance would be, just with writer's block.
47:0 0	It would be very odd. So the structure of that book has about it a certain type of necessity given the very nature of the problem it's solving. We know from very early on it's a portrait of how Marcel becomes a writer. All the things are there, right away, Swann's Way. We already know what this is going to be about from that. We kind of know, although again,

48:0 0	the surprises are pretty stern. And Hegel's readers would not know where he's going to end up at all. They're in for big surprises. So transitivity - where it gets really progressive, not until the end. And only the end gives it that necessity.
49:0 0	Except that two things - he's actually saying as we know this book is a memory book, it's a remembrance of philosophy past. Given the story of inorganic nature, it's already here, so in some way he's going to claim the implicit and explicit, he's going to claim it's drawing things out, all those are right metaphors except they don't count for the logical character of the book. The logical character of the book still has to come up to this criteria or it fails. So even if I don't remember everything in the spiritual animal kingdom, that's not important, it's got to have a certain logical character and I've got to be able to consider it having a certain historical
50:0 0	so the criteria turn out to be, those are ways of trying to get you to think about the process as a seduction in the preface, but he needs this.
51:0 0	So that's the cost of dropping the necessity - only possible - and only going with not the necessary but sufficient explanation. What that does, however, that although it generates necessity, it doesn't give it character of logical in??#@\$ what it does, and what it must do -
52:0 0	it must account for all the standards, prejudices of all the members of its philosophical audience. And it must give all of them reasons to move from their partial perspective to a fuller perspective, so it has to address its audience. And if it can do that and if it can satisfy all these criterions, then again still not logically feasible, what it's done is simply issued a massive otus provante. That's all you can do. Speak louder. All you can do is show that now all the weight is on someone else who wants to argue differently. That you have nothing further you need to do for your position,
53:0 0	if someone wants to come with another position they have got to show your account fails their perspective. So that becomes then the standard and Kierkegaard says no, I'm not in there. And then says, yes you are! So you're right, it doesn't have the character of a rationalist system, and it cannot have the character of a rationalist system precisely because its acceptance of the inevitability of contingency. The necessity of contingency means it can never obtain the status of logical indefeasibility and therefore
54:0 0	can't undo transcendental deduction, why I don't even like the thought that he was attempting to do transcendental deduction because that makes no sense of the role of contingency in the argument. [Student: What's great about the end is that we're finally satisfied in some fundamental way, but you mean that there's no logical indefeasibility that there's no finality, that it's perfectly plausible someone else could come along and say 'look, the standards you just reconstructed makes no sense at all' and then you're back in the fray again. So I guess that's the worry.] But what I'm saying that part of the satisfaction will be learned to discover that

55:0 0	that's what is called the skeptical induction. And the skeptical induction is we know from the past that every theory is proven false so any future theory will be false. Even if that's logically true, which it is, I want to suggest that Hegel gives us reasons to think that that kind of objection should not disturb us. That that's the wrong level and the wrong kind of skeptical valley. So the capacity to feel satisfaction in the Hegelian sense is also learning about the disappointment of knowledge.
56:0 0	That knowledge doesn't provide all the forms of security or defense or certainty that many people thought that knowledge did. And knowing that is part of what absolute knowing is - that is, knowing about knowledge is knowing what knowledge can't do. Isn't that the story of 90,000 movies? I know exactly what it is to find the perfect wife and of course I fail miserably. Because knowledge in fact falls apart. We all know there are certain things what knowledge can do is illusory. And this book begins with certain framings of the limits of knowledge and it's going to turn out the framings are going to be very powerful because
57:0 0	it's going to turn out that we not essentially knowers. So absolute knowing is the knowledge of us as non-knowers, mainly as historical agents in complex social worlds who are in accordance with complicated, communal, so forth. It's knowledge of ourselves as essentially non-knowers. These are absolutely the right kinds of questions we should be feeling. [Student: Does this allow for the possibility that we could get to the end?]
58:0 0	But a fundamental moment is missing. Something wrong about science or nature or the history of politics. Or maybe you think you can't reach the end. Or maybe you think reaching the end doesn't lead in where you think it leads in. there's all sorts of possibilities. And those I really want to say has to do with the kinds of demonstration it is. One would insist upon that level of openness. We've already gone an hour and I've not yet begun. That's always dangerous and I do want to finish the introduction today so let's add a 10-minute break and then I'm going to go right through the method.
	BREAK
00:0 0	Daniel just reminded us quite rightly that we do have a bad version of ancient skepticism through the modern thought, no end to the causes, there's an end to the causes, and Hegel was very very infatuated with those indemnities. Those indemnities are a model for finding both views equally strong and equally false. And we know that Kant solves them by phenomena noumenon, which is the very thing that Hegel's going to doubt. Certainly, Kant's sentiments are certainly

1:00	part of the origins Hegel's idea of dialect. Paragraph 81 brings up the problem of criterion. And because we know that Hegel did write this early essay on ancient versus modern skepticism, then we know he knew about ancient skepticism, therefore when he raises the problem of criterion we can be near as damn certain that he's thinking of the problem of criterion as raised by Sextus as in his outlines of Pyrrhonism, and just to jog your memory, Sextus say, in order to
2:00	decide the dispute, which has arisen about the criterion of truth. So the problem is you're going to be examining natural consciousness, you have to have a criterion to know whether A is true or false. The problem of criterion, what's the criterion by which we judge each form of consciousness? The problem of criterion is very deep, say Sextus. He says we must possess, in order to judge of any claim whether it's true or not, an accepted criterion by which we shall be able to judge the dispute. And in order to possess an accepted criterion, the dispute about the criterion must first be decided.
3:00	So in order to judge a claim whether it's true or false, we need a criterion. But now we need a criterion to decide which is the right criterion for truth. And when the argument thus reduces itself to a form of circular reasoning, the discovery that the criterion becomes impracticable, since we do not allow those who make knowledge claims to adopt criterion by assumption - that is, we don't allow dogmatism, we can't just say "it's certainty, because I say so!" I don't think that's a kosher move. While they offer to judge the criterion by criterion, we force them to regress. So give me a criteria for your criterion while I judge certainty by faith and faith by God and God by infinite regress
4:00	and furthermore, since the demonstration... circular reasoning. That is, it looks to be an unsolvable problem about the criterion for truth. For will it not be the case that every criterion is either asserted dogmatically or since we don't see how dogmatism is going to work, we force you into a regress - the criterion for the validity for your criterion, and that can go on forever. Or you end up arguing in a circle - the criterion for A is B, the criterion for B is A and you just go round and round.
5:00	So it looks like every possible account of criterion is impossible. It's either dogmatism or infinite regress. It looks like this is a big problem. So he raises the question of criterion he's now raising the very problem he began the entire book - knowing before you know, how do we know knowledge. And now giving its pristine logical form. Criterion is the logical repetition of the problem of knowing before you can know. That is, having the criterion of knowledge. Hegel says, we can solve this problem.

6:00	And we can solve this problem by all the solutions. That is, it's not that he's going to show you that there's a criterion that's not dogmatic or circular by infinite regress. He can't do any of that. So he really has to dodge it in some way. He's going to say, I'm going to solve the problem by not having a criterion. Well, hold it. How can he have a story about knowledge and truth, and not have a criterion? This is the story of his dialectical method. So he reminds us in paragraph 82,
7:00	that consciousness simultaneously distinguishes itself from something and at the same time relates itself to it, or as it is said, this something exists for consciousness and the determinate aspect of this relating or of the beam of something for consciousness is noble. This hardly sounds like a solution to anything. So what is Hegel doing here or beginning to do here? Well one of the things he's going to do here, or is beginning to do here,
8:00	is suggest that all consciousness is minimally a form of self-consciousness by which I mean that he's beginning to suggest that every form of knowing is an activity = and you should have large suspicious ears - he's saying something that is incompatible with where we are going to begin certainty. Because his first assumption is knowing is an activity. So he's picking up the rationalist Kantian thought, that knowing is an activity.
9:00	An activity of a certain kind, an activity in which I distinguish myself from the object, have an awareness of myself and relate myself back to that object in some respect. So every act of knowing assumes a distinguishing of the subject from the object and the form of interconnection. So every act of knowing or anything that we will count as ant of knowing is going to suggest
10:00	is a form in which the object, every act of knowing presupposes that the object is, that consciousness operates with a concept of its object. That when I know I have an idea about what knowing is and I have an idea about the objects of knowing are and I have an idea about how those two things get hooked up together, consciousness - we might say - has the power to define
11:00	or constitute itself in a particular way. And in doing so, if to find what truth is for it, and what the standard of truth will be. That is what we are talking should ring lots of bells of familiarity. Because the very description of consciousness operates on the assumption of construction.
12:00	So I'm going to suggest to you that the structure of Hegel's method is not presuppositionalist, it's not about some crazy idea, but rather a generalization of the result of Copernican, or as we might say, it takes as a starting point the agreed truths of Kantianism for all post-Kantian readers. That is, Hegel is assuming a readership in which everyone agrees that something spectacular happens in the critique of pure reason. And yet, as I said in the first lecture, can't stay. Knowing appearances as things not in itself is a form of skepticism.

13:00	Nonetheless, what Kant convinced his generation of, was the following: the best way to think about knowledge is to think about judgment and that all knowledge is a relationship therefore between a judgment and an object-judge and that therefore, this relationship is an internal relationship. And it's an internal relationship because
14:00	what Kant told that transcendental unity of perception, the unity of consciousness, is at the same time the idea of a concept of an object in general. That is what Kant thought is that what he called the categories - by which the categories by which the knower synthesized, gathered up information of the senses. Those categories were the outline for what it was for something to be an object. So that Kant's theory provided the
15:00	account for what judgment was, bringing an intuition into a concept, and gave an account of what the world was like - mainly made up of substances in relation to cause and effect in space and time. Now, my suggestion is that this idea, so Kant's fundamental solution here, how he got round rationalism and empiricism was to show that subject-object is not externally related, but internally related. That they're internally related because every judgment presupposes a series of categorial terms of what an object must be.
16:00	So if I see an event, a typical Kantian example, it must have a cause. Even if it's turning water to wine, I don't think - Oh! Mystery! I think 'hidden cause, let's search' and that's necessitated by my concept of an object. For what is something to be an object is for something to have a cause for Kant. So the Copernican term was to overcome, was to say that subject-object relationship was not ontologically different kinds.
17:00	What he thought was really the case that the relationship between self and world was an internal relationship. Now Hegel thinks he can help himself to this because that's who we are, the problems with our current categorial set are really the dualisms of Kantian philosophy. So if you go to the first week, and I gave you a list of problems, those are the list of problems that Kant failed to solve. The first Kantian philosophy hands over, gives to us
18:00	these dualisms. It's already inhabiting the Kantian world, but he also thinks something else. He thinks that it's easy for us to help ourselves to this because our object in our examination is not atoms or frogs, because his method would not work, his method would not work, would not work easily if the question was - what is it really really to be a frog? And the reason why he would have problems convincing us to adopt this for that is because

19:00	it would be very tempting for us to be realist about frogs. I don't know what the different theories of frog-ness are, but whatever they are, it's up to the frog. So about ordinary objects in the world, we are all intuitive realists. And I'll be very hard, help myself to Kantianism and think hard about frogs. But we're not thinking about frogs. He says we're thinking about knowledge. That our object is not about being in the world, it's about knowledge. And now he says knowledge is the relationship between the subject and object. That is, knowledge - if that's our object - is going to be something like this.
20:00	Knowledge has got to be something we examine. And now we're able to think with a clear conscience because whatever your account of knowledge is you're bound to say knowledge is a relationship between subject and object. And we want to account the relationship between subject and object that does not beg the question of what a subject is and what an object is. So what we want of a non-question begging account of any account of what knowledge may be is to claim that whatever knowledge is, it will be a categorial set of a certain kind namely it will be one that matches up a form of knowing
21:00	Kant starts getting a little Hegelian. A form of knowing with a concept of an object in general. So what he's doing is taking the idea of Kantianism, dropping all the details of the transunity of our perception and categories and just thinking about it as a general mapping of a kind of internal relationship so that every account of knowledge will have a form of knowing. Let's say, sense certainty.
22:00	And every form of knowing. So I mean a certain account of what you think knowing is like so sense certainty says knowing is like having a certain sensory episode - immediately. So that's it's description of what the act or state of knowing is and that account precipitates or goes along with an account of what is to be known, a concept of an object, that is the internal correlate of that form of knowing.
23:00	It's the <i>this</i> . Immediacy is the way it happens, what is known is the determinate this. This is. So lo and behold, Hegel's so-called pre-suppositionalist starting point turns out to be a little bit mediated. Namely, he's helping himself to the complete Kantian philosophy. That's his starting point. He's starting, in other words, in the middle, which is to say in his own historical location.
24:00	So he does not have a pre-suppositionalist starting point. He has a starting point that any of his readers can find methodologically acceptable above all because it's not bringing with it any of the baggage that anyone worries about, nor is it bringing with it any technical assumptions, no nothing. He's just giving you the Copernican turn itself - just the very idea that we can no longer imagine that our effort as knowers is to approximate ourselves that we know not what, but rather the activity involves legislating for nature in some way.

25:0 0	And then testing that out. So now, if that looks to you intelligible, we are not in a position to dodge the criterion problem. And we're in a position to dodge the criterion problem because sense certainty itself has a criterion of knowledge, namely knowing this. So now, I don't have to ask what the criterion of knowledge is, every form of knowledge will propose its own criterion. Truth is knowledge of the immediate knowledge of this and now all
26:0 0	I have to do is look on and see if sense certainty really is in its own terms knowledge of this. So in this respect, we can stand back and observe sense certainty performing its own claim. So what Hegel says, what each form of knowledge is, show it. You have immediate knowledge of this, show it. So Phenomenology now, Hegel's notion of Phenomenology,
27:0 0	Means I am an observer. I can stand back and let sense certainty perform so that ever form of consciousness undergoes a performance. And the performance is going to do is try and demonstrate that indeed its knowing really is adequate to its criteria of knowledge. And if sense certainty can not know this, if the very idea of sense certainty and we use passivity
28:0 0	makes knowing this impossible, it dies. It goes under. Finis. Now we get determinate negation. And so the determinate negation will be - I now need something else here and it turns out, I won't go through the story this week, it turns out I'm going to need universals. And so my new concept of an object is going to be a thing with properties and the kind of knowing that knows things with properties is going to be called perception.
29:0 0	So the moment, so what happens here, what allows this reversal to happen, Hegel says, is we realize that what was taken to be the this is in itself. Now in Hegel's jargon - this is the in itself. And on goes this activity to know the in itself, and it discovers that the in itself was not an in itself, it was an in itself for us. That is learning a Kantian lesson. First of all, every form of consciousness is turned into
30:0 0	a form of idealism. As soon as I get rid of this, and realize that this was merely my projection of a concept of an object. Then we're ready for a new concept of an object to occur. And of course the new concept of an object must follow the criteria I laid out from before for determining a negation. Must make good the inadequacies of the previous standpoint and it turns out that all problems of sense certainty are problems about no knowledge of intuitions without concept, no knowledge of particulars without universals, so we're going to have to get our universals in there and have our new concept of an object. Hence, that will give us a new notion

31:0 0	of knowing. So it turns out that each of these is what Hegel calls a form of consciousness. Or what is a version of natural consciousness. Remember that natural consciousness is simply an espousal of any position without acknowledgement of its historical or logical conditioning. What makes it natural is that, we can always return to immediacy. We always take where we are to the immediate, which we do. It has that structure to it. We were like, like to be like Phenomenology all the time.
32:0 0	And Hegel understands that the notion of natural consciousness also has a value. There's a necessity to the notion of immediacy. Before I say something about experience... now we've gotten all that complicated stuff. Under a different account... Are there now any questions about this structure. This is the structure that we need to get going. This is the structure that solves the problem of criterion.
33:0 0	As I said, going forward, the Phenomenology is a gamble. We don't know it's going to end. Now we can understand what he meant the goal's already set. The goal's already set when a concept of knowing and a concept of an object no longer enter into contradiction with one another. That's it. So all this stuff, you know Heidegger says the absolute wills of suffer, just crack it. Take out a perfectly modest whole criterion, where everyone's happy internally. And it may never happen. Don't worry 'til you get there.
34:0 0	So this tells us something about the structure of the book of which you must be alert to when reading the book, which is the book operates from two perspectives. Namely, who is the we? And the best account of this in the literature is still I think Kenley Doves, wonderful essay from 1969 on Hegel's Phenomenology Method. Gives a wonderful account of all the different accounts of who people think the we is. I now say the we begins as, and this is observing consciousness, we post Kantian philosophers. That's who the we initially is.
35:0 0	It's we unhappy Kantian, we German idealists who can find no satisfaction. After 15 or 20 weeks of this, just get a life, don't worry about it. We who can find no satisfaction. So the structure of every chapter, this is going to be important to how the story goes. And moving forward onto paragraph 86 further on. There are two perspectives - the perspective of natural consciousness and the perspective of we or observing consciousness.
36:0 0	Which is to say what allows the Phenomenology to happen is because we stand back and watch the various forms of natural consciousness come up, do their little performance, defeat themselves, disappear and another form of natural consciousness arises. But that's not exactly all that happens because we are observing this and so we are keeping track of this story. So in every chapter there are moments of, so every chapter has at least two voices and when you read each chapter you must rigorously distinguish between the two voices. The voice

37:0 0	of the we, or philosophical consciousness, and then the bit where there is actually a phenomenological demonstration, that is the internal performance of a certain position carried out from the first person point-of-view. So there has to be observing consciousness, natural consciousness, and for example just to look at sense certainty for one second. So sense certainty begins paragraphs 90 through 94. That's all the voice of the philosophers. Hegel's saying what he thinks about it.
38:0 0	Then, paragraph 95. Change of voice. It is this then that itself should be asked, What is this? Now sense certainty is going to be pressed. There are complications of sense certainty, it's not going to want to talk, we'll have to make it talk, have our arguments about whether this is a form of epistemological terrorism whether this is coercion. So this question of voices is terribly important. In a sense, sense certainty has lots of problems. It looks to be very easy but you can get quite worked up about it.
39:0 0	All I want to say here is, notice the two voices. The shift in the philosophical voice to the Phenomenology voice of the natural consciousness. The only account I know of that gives a breakdown of the entire book in terms of the two voices is an index of Kojève's introduction to the reading of Hegel. It breaks down every part of the book and asks who's talking - is it the philosopher talking or is it a Phenomenology demonstration? So this is at least a two-voice book. At some point, observing consciousness
40:0 0	I better have a moment of recognition, that is, at some point the philosopher better say something like 'Oh! That's me!' so it has that moment of, like when someone in a movie sees his hometown in a movie - 'wait it exists? My hometown is in the movie.' So you who force yourself beyond this process must have a moment as in any narrative you identify with the hero or heroine and you too must go under. So that much of the structure is also about the relationship between these two
41:0 0	it's not just a hands-off now. Because it's natural consciousness that must get to the point of writing the book but already gotten to the point of writing the book. So the ending must involve necessarily a synthesis of the points of view of observing consciousness and natural consciousness or what is he saying. To say another way, there is no such thing as an omniscient narrator. There's no framed narrative. Or to say another way, the biographical form, the biography of the story, the life, the natural consciousness, for us moderns always precipitates an autobiographical form.
42:0 0	All biographies are already always autobiographies. Why? Because we can't get rid of the first person perspective. But something else is going on here between these two perspectives. Hegel talks about experience. He says on page 86m after laying out this structure of self-comparison, that's why it's a PHEM, he says, now notice I have said all of this and never once mentioned

43:0 0	thesis, anti-thesis, synthesis or mentioned the phrase 'dialectical method.' If you say that in the paper or in the class, you fail. We're done with that. There's no such thing. There is a logic of experience. So whatever you thought Hegel is about, that's what you came here for, you're in the wrong class, go take physics. We don't do that here. Inasmuch as the neutral objects issues from it, this dialectical movement. And the dialectical movement now is discovering now again that what was
44:0 0	in itself is in itself for us, hence the changing of our understanding of ourselves, because what we thought was in the world was not in the world, hence we have to re-describe ourselves as knowers and as soon as we re-describe ourselves as knowers we have precipitated a new concept of an object in general. That's the movement. Inasmuch as the new true object issues from it, that is the comparison and the defeat, this dialectical movement which consciousness exercises on itself, sense certainty does it to itself, I don't do it to it, it does it to itself. It cannot be
45:0 0	satisfied, there's no internal correlation. And which effect both its knowledge and its object, it cannot be sense certainty and its object cannot be this. Is precisely what is called experience. Experience is first the loss of the world. The primary experience is learning from suffering, that's what he means by experience. Suffering here is, why lose the world? Because for all the world, if I believe in sense certainty, I think I am a sense certain individual and I'm connected to the world by my immediate relation to this is.
46:0 0	And if that breaks down, I have nothing. I have nothing. I've lost it all. That is, I've lost the categorial set that constituted my relationship to the world. That's what this is supposed to be, not just a little bit of knowledge. The sense certain person thinks this is how human beings are in the first instinct, in their deepest stratum, connected to the world. If we're not connected to the world then everything is nothing. Each form of consciousness has that deep hyperbolic structure. Hence, the breakdown is the first instance this loss of the world.
47:0 0	But it is also the emergence, Hegel says, of the new object. Now the problem here is that the way things go for natural consciousness is in fact not very tidy. And what I mean by that is the following. Think about paradigms. Paradigms go on happily and then anomalies start to accumulate. They accumulate and he says well, there's a crisis.
48:0 0	That crisis can last forever. Nothing needs to end the crisis. In fact for some people, the crisis never ends. But for some others, say those who suddenly discover Newton, they wake up one morning and the world's just fine. They're Newtonians. Now for them, for the Newtonians, what their sense of themselves is the world's Newtonian whole, they're confident of this and then they carry on. What they don't see is the relationship between their Newtonianism and the pre-Newtonian

49:0 0	whatever is going to be your pre-Newtonian position. That is, they don't see their position as arising out of a reversal of the growing anomalies in the previous position. They just think woof! We're Newtonians and we can see what's wrong with those pre-Newtonians. Only us historical observers understand that position B emerges out of the reversal of position A. So Hegel says, paragraph 87,
50:0 0	this is terribly important. Natural consciousness undergoes a series of conversion experiences. An experience is a conversion. You wake up one morning and you're a Newtonian. You woke up one morning.. you don't wrestle no, that's not the way change happens. Change happens by conversion, by turning around. Why? Because what typically Hegel says, what allows us to move on, what allows us to move on is being in possession of a new truth.
51:0 0	So before the new truth arose, we couldn't do anything, we were in crisis. Once we had the new truth, the crisis is gone. So somehow we are never in the position of seeing the connection between crisis and resolution. We might say that seeing it as a pattern of crisis and resolution is to see it as an education and that is what Hegel says observing consciousness adds to the story. That is, we have these blocks of natural consciousness going through these
52:0 0	terrible experiences and what we add is an understanding of them as a movement from A to B to C and so on. We see them as a progress and an education. That is, we see them as a learning sequence or a developmental sequence, which is to say that for the most part, learning and developing happened behind our backs. Think about your own wrestling with the hard philosophical text. You struggle and struggle and struggle, you give up. Then you come back and say wait I understand this. How come? Why did I find it so difficult?
53:0 0	Very rarely so that learning happens in quantum leaps for the most part. And only therefore, only retrospectively do we see learning. Do we understand that learning has happened, part of developmental sequence. Another experience is practicing a skill. We don't feel it day to day. So the experience for Hegel is learning through suffering. That the forward movement is always the movement of conversion, that it is an adductive inference only for the observer and for the observer,
54:0 0	it is a developmental sequence. Once you have that, then it's fair to say that what the Phenomenology is is an account of the experience of consciousness. It was the original title of the book - the science of the experience of consciousness. But now we know that the experience of consciousness means the whole history of all those experiences by which modern self-consciousness has been constituted in a certain way. And what it means to grasp that.

55:0 0	That's the introduction. And that's going to be the way that the book works, the phenomenological method. The theory through experience. I've given you an account of the we. A claim that it's not a presuppositionalist starting point, so that you don't feel yourself anyway tempted by Kantianism. You will find this book un-readable. And you will. A lot of people find this book unreadable. And it's perfectly clear why. It is heavily conditioned by its own history.
56:0 0	So it starts in the middle, which means it must at some point catch up with its own starting point, so this structure = let's call it fundamental structure of self-consciousness - must emerge somewhere in the story as an object. And I will suggest it actually emerges very early on. The transition between chapters 3 and 4. Okay, questions?
57:0 0	One of the things that's going to happen is, as it's already clear, I am assuming that Copernican's position is fundamental view about knowledge. As I'll explain more next week, my reading of the text, the first 3 chapters are a genealogy of self-consciousness. And for the sake of discovering that self-consciousness is not a theoretical mode of consciousness at all. That self-consciousness is always already practical. So the first transition is going to be discovered, we'll start with identifying certain ways with this. So there will be moments of identification, but also moments of dis-identification.
58:0 0	But suddenly we're talking about having a consciousness, crazy people being themselves, other people looking for... all kinds of behavior all over the place. We're going to have a hard time identifying with all these characters. And yet all these characters are going to be insipient versions of us and therefore, that's going to be the difficulty of the reading.
59:0 0	Which is to say like, Hallmayer has the greatness to portray truly unattractive people. People who are intensely dislikable and she knows we will like her anyway. There's something about that, that it goes through these forms that we are both repulsed by and yet must somehow identify with. And that's going to be part of the tension of the book, part of the difficulty of my teaching the book, is this what. We must feel and this is the tricky part of reading the book. You should feel that each form of consciousness a moment when you just say even for one second,
60:0 0	Yes. Okay I can just about say that could be your world. You have to have that much identification and the book makes that question of self-identification difficult. And that difficulty is doubled by the fact these two are held apart in a way throughout certain moments to undergo certain indications.
61:0 0	[Student's question: What is it about natural consciousness that makes it capable of it being the motor of historical progress in that way?] What gives natural consciousness the oomph to go forward?

62:0 0	My answer is unhappiness. That Hegel takes seriously the thought that as human beings, we require some sort of satisfactory categorial articulation of our being in the world. That is we have to have... Kant understands and Hegel's going to follow, is to be human beings is to have a picture of yourself and a picture of the world and have an account of the relationship between you and the world. And to have that account of the relationship between you and the world is to have a philosophical position.
63:0 0	That gives you what it means to be a human being, what it means to have a world, and therefore they you have to, if you have to be in any way intelligible to yourself as a human being, you have to be in harmony with one another. Because unless they aren't in harmony with themselves, they I don't have direction, I don't have a path. I don't know how to do anything. So this categorial set articulates how I am to navigate the world in general. Now therefore, by what Hegel does is take these structure and condenses them to their categorial essentials. Takes them out of the messy business of the light world,
64:0 0	condenses them to their categorial essentials, and then forces, in a certain sense, their inhabitance to an act their meaning. And therefore, natural consciousness is going to have to make sense of itself in relation to its own account of the world. The failure of that is really a loss of self and loss of world. So the stakes here are immensely high. So when I say unhappiness is the motor, I mean that I might say nihilism is the motor anxiety is the motor, all these sort of things are the general way that we have to make sense of the world. And of course the difference between this and every day life is here, it's all stripped of ideology, of practical necessities, all the things that
65:0 0	protect us from the fragility of our categorial sets. Mostly, our categorial sets aren't under the kind of intense pressure that they're under here. And only in certain moments of history, or certain moments of our lives do our categorial sets come under intense pressure. So you know, you thought that that love was going to save you and be the meaning of your life, fall in love and get married, you're madly in love with your husband or wife, and you're not satisfied. And that means that love cannot be what you thought it was as a form of being in the world and you require some other access to the world. And so at certain moments of our lives, those things we most value, those things we most anchor for us, most orient us, they do so
66:0 0	historically... are an illusion. So it's unhappiness that's the motor. The job of observing consciousness is to acknowledge that this process of going under and new forms arising, itself is not arbitrary and it has a meaning and structure. So natural consciousness didn't have the thought of history and history is buried in category for human beings. So this notion of what constituted historic reason is a new thought.

67:0 0	That our lives can be various frameworks, all these are new thoughts. And Hegel's the first one to try and make sense of all that. Hamlet may be the first one to suffer it. He suffers the loss of frameworks, the story that frameworks are just frameworks is Hamlet's terrible discovery. And he has to make sense of live without a framework. That's what subjectivity means. And that's what Hamlet means as a play. And it turns out he can't do it. So Hegel wants to set this structure up. And Hegel really does think this is really the structure of not just knowing, as it turns out, but what it means to be a human being in the world of which knowing turns out to be one of the worst, most uninteresting, most stupid ways of thinking what a human being is in the world. I'm a knower, I represent the world.
68:0 0	What error makes someone think. There's a long story here and the answer here is the discovery of natural science. It's a good answer to why we for certain moments we thought of ourselves as pure and holy. I don't have an answer for Plato or Aristotle, but that's what us modernists think. Hegel's convinced it's a bad bad chapter and he gets rid of it in the first three chapters. Epistemology's first philosopher, gone in 100 pages. Does that kind of help?
69:0 0	That's the job of observing consciousness. That's why I said natural consciousness can be happy in thinking that it's immediate. But it doesn't need that extra. We can allow it, it's natural. We add to it, that it is historically conditioned and to see it as historically conditioned, therefore now for each form of consciousness there are minimally two descriptions - it's self-description and its description as seen by observing consciousness as historically conditioned. And there'll be a third description,
70:0 0	namely as seen by us at the end of the story. So just to remind you the idea of what makes sentences historical sentences. Historical sentences are that have two descriptions of which cannot be both had at all times. So in 1619, no knew that it was the beginning of the 30 years war. No one knew at the fall there was going to be America getting involved in Vietnam and ending up in a disaster. you can describe beginnings in one way as they're seen by protagonists and another way as seen by us at the end,
71:0 0	and Hegel's saying there's actually another way, as seen as us in the middle as moving towards the end. So each form of natural consciousness will have 3 descriptions - it's own self-description - this is who I am and this is how I see myself, our description of it - so we see perception as the successor state of sense certainty, trying to make sense of sense certainty, and then we'll see what this looks like at the end and it'll turn out that other forms of consciousness will look a lot like perception. Of course the problem of perception is that it's a form of many and it turns out that there are a lot of forms of consciousness that get caught up in the problem of the many. And that of course is what a lot of philosophers think about. Okay, so For those of you who have to capture trains to far away places..

