A theoretical model of language discrimination and identity, for multi agents more than two, in uni dimensional and multi dimensional space for both a discrete and continuous model.

The supposition is of the following lines that there are types and communication between various types and buyers and sellers based on that uni dimensional types and strategic considerations of the types.

The essages and communications assumed that decoded by expert and middleman and how they arise and the consumer type space continuous but further sub divided into te rational and naïve

There are binary interations amon the various typesand model follows from work of spence nd akerlof’s lemons model as there are moral hazard and adverse selection inherent.

On varying levels of consumer type better able to distinguish among the middlemen and experts probabilistically. But can fully know after the transaction only.

Cheap talk happens as communication is costless especially since for the middlemen or expert it is a rip off so but we sy all indulge in cheap talk is necessary it’s way more nuanced. Since all are certified experts and middlemen who might be certified but one important aspect becomes that how these middlemen arise in this model.

It is established that this is not a zero sum game since there are advantages to trade and the game is of information asymmetery and incomplete information. So how is supposedly a middleman’s gain an expert’s loss?

My example primarily draws from the health care market. Most exmples thereof which fulfils the assumption and stylized facts nicely. The main poits being that of rational ignorance, doesn’t know naïve consumer and only gans experience gets to know.

The inefficiencies In the system are clear to gauge say of going to the best doctor is inefficient is it necessarily better. Same for middlemen because of the lemons and moral hazrd problems which are involved. Trust credibility prices are important parametrs here especially quality is the most. Only verification post transaction since at the time once can’t do anything.

So the ext time the consumer may go to the best expert, learns more , goes to a better middleman. So learning and deception are also happening in this environment.

The strategies of the middleman become important.since he occupies the gulf between the consumer and expert.

This has also elements of a search and matching process. Also a signaling game of the Crawford and sobel kind.

Like language and health a capital stock approach. I am taking the phrase the language of the market.

I have taken the model where declining population, empirical facts need to be validated for that though.Entry and exit should be related to that as well also.

What is optimality then is it risk minimization cost minimization maximization of consumer surplus or what?

So in markets of expert skills where we assume hugh knoeldge asymmetery or information asymmetry between buyers and sellers. Say I define a language as a form of information.X is that composite index, so that information asymmetery is in the form of knowledge asymmetry of X. X’s distribution . So the single dimensional axis line X which has 2 breaks X’ and X’’, at which the agent type is determined.

Overtime this is supposed to take a dynamic game shift and that all agents have strategic interactions. It needs to be considered of what is to be taken as pvt information.

Do we need the population to grow at at a rate g. so that for each type rates add up to g? The sequence of play starts first without no assumptions and then build up towards middlemen existence., and also to be noted is the scope of preplay communication(especially between middleman and expert). The subtypes for easy purposes take to be two for every type.

An important factor is that should the existence of the middlemen be endogenous in the model? Also let entry be fixed as I’m not taking market access to be problematic but what about market exit? Is that exogenous or contingent on a fixed budget, That is the decision to drop out or stay.

Middlemen and consumers probabilistically find out the expert’s type, with an increasing function. Can the middlemen extract rent on the basis of better information. As the game proceeds, the consumers learn X,at each subsequent turns.

So in such markets where experts exist such as my adaptation of the healthcare market. This brings about a case of horizontal and vertical differentiation.

As the strating point of my analysis is that all economic transactions/trade involve communication between agents or in a platform. How I have moved from linguistic identity and economic behavior and introduced heterogeneity.

So in my long movement from term paper to thesis proposal I have expanded the scope .

Research problem

issue of communication itself. Now language is different from communication, and a medium through which communication takes place, where as communication as a broader superset encompasses the non verbal and hence applies everywhere( check this out).

the implications of communication has much more microeconomic relevance an indirectly assumes the role of affecting or having any political economy implications.

Though much more abstract, and hence much more amenable to economic theory(CITE HERE), the present analysis in my hope subsumes the original hypothesis(CHANGE WORD), since it has developed from such.

The basic facts established then which would be useful for my current analysis are as follows

1. Linguistic heterogeneity and interaction among various social groups in the same social plane.(I earlier said that this linguistic element entered into the economic plane as well, but now the 2 planes are 1, that is they are two sides of the same coin, one has in itself, the other).
2. Abstraction of the Language as the medium of communication in the market place. Earlier, language had in it been defined as done in the sociological sphere, now , language it moulded from the market and its definition as such.Note that this still retains the important elements of coordination and hence efficiency. This analysis is much more closer to Rubinstein’s approach than earlier.
3. Bilingualism and Multilingualism adopt hence different interpretations in the analysis. So Modelling on the basis of language gives one a tool to better understand certain facets without restricting itself to that domain, and hence market language absorbs this. Precise definition required of course. The effects of bilingualism and correlations are important elements of economic theory.

Closely related to my definition of market language will be its definition, and that language’s dictionary is of course, information. The point being that just as seeing the dictionary might confuse you more than learning, same applies to the market, that is, information access is there, but what does that really help with?

The first implication of the relevance of this study is not just of increasing importance now, but in the future as well. For example the health market and decision making, with advertisments, learning and generally advised that it might do mmore harm than good. The incorporation of information goods with the sellers as the seller of that processed information good makes it a very powerful analyisis. The allegory of the signals and noises and in fact that analogy would be used in my analysis, of extracting signals from ever increasing noise brings with it elements of strategic interaction.

The beauty of the analysis is that it starts out from very simple elements, but can incorporate increasing complexity. Intermediaries, trust, reputation and mediation. This is clearly an economic problem, proper. The analogy of the signal extractors and processors as the language speakers, and the imperfect speakers as the buyers can be plainly interpreted as someone ‘speaking’ the language or not. The analogy then automatically applies that when we say that people ‘pick’ up the language, that means in the market, repeated transactions ensure that buyers pick up the signals and make better decisions. But note that just by speaking a language in bits ad pieces doesn’t make one an English professor, similarly, picing up the language doesn’t make someone an expert or hence a seller. That requires training and investment, perhaps a degree, or in expert market context, some professional certification which costs years and time.(PROOF AND BACKING REQUIRED FOR ALL THIS SAID)

FROM THE QUALITY OF MEDICAL ADVICE IN LOW INCOME COUNTRIES – JISHNU DAS, JEFFERY HAMMER, KENNETH LEONARD

This paper has the elements which form the bases of my motivation. The paper starts at the point that many low income countries have witnessed a growth in health infrastructure. Basically means that access to the health market and doctors, but that’s not the problem, since the outcome one is interested in broadly is whether health outcomes have improved or not.

So quality of medical ‘advice’ and not care, because behaviors are observable, poor care can be made out but advice or anything intangible cannot be ascertained. There has been a documented evidence of access to medical

SECTION 3 – FRANK ROSE

The important dimension here becomes the definition of language, so what really is the language you talk about. The composition of language.

Information as language, what is the language then? Can this be integrated to a strategic spatial model.

The distinction between information and knowledge in the form of language provides a good representation. Information here is the good and language as an abstraction.

Matching of end user, expert knowledge to the consumer and in a particular form