


so Quasi-linear w.r.t  $x_1$

Take  $x \sim y$

Define  $x + te_1, y + te_1$ ,  $e_1 = (1, 0)$   
then  $(x + te_1) \sim (y + te_1)$



parallel shift in  $\vec{e}_1$  direction

But for representation, assume  
that 11 shift is rightward.

So shift is along one axis only as Quasi-linear  
is w.r.t a commodity.

## Utility Functions

With every bundle, a satisfaction/utility is defined

utility function

$n \succsim y$ ,  $\text{def: } x \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$


Representation of preferences

$u, \succsim n \succsim y \iff u(n) \geq u(y)$

$\Theta \rightarrow$  Prof A takes 2 exams but couch only highly of 2.

B subject

$$U(n_1, n_2) = \max\{n_1, n_2\}$$




(upper contour set includes the indifference curve also)

Bunk Pages

\* MRS is defined as amount of  $y$  exchanged for  $x$ .

→ If both axis have bad goods



If  $n > y \Rightarrow u(n) > u(y)$   
or  $n = y \Rightarrow u(n) = u(y)$



→ Prove if  $n > y$   $u(n) = u(y)$  is not true

let it be true so  $u(n) = u(y) \rightarrow u(y) \geq u(z)$

(as utility def.)  $\rightarrow y \geq z$

If  $n > y$   
 $n \geq y$  and  $y \neq n$

~~utility  $\geq u(y)$~~   
 ~~$y \geq z$~~

contradiction

→ Preference relation must be complete and transitive ↑  
to be represented as utility function  $u(n)$   
(this is a softer claim)

• Should be complete as we need to compare 2  $u(n) & u(y)$  and we can always compare 2 real numbers  $u(n) & u(y)$

\* Suppose that  $n, y \in X$ ,

$n \succ y$  if (i)  $x_1 > y_1$ , (ii)  $x_1 = y_1$  &  $x_2 > y_2$

This preference is called lexicographic pref. ordering.

- Indiff. curve of ~~over~~ lexicographic ordering

~~Ex~~

$\begin{matrix} \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot \end{matrix}$

Single point is the answer.

As in this preference we cannot find any indifferent bundle to another bundle.

→ So, we can't find any utility function for lexicographic pref. ~~Ind.~~ even its complete & transitive

Suppose it can be represented by ()

$$x \geq y \Rightarrow u(x) \geq u(y)$$

$$x > y \Rightarrow u(x) > u(y)$$

→ Utility function for a preference is not unique.  
We can't always find a transformation.

Absolute values of utility function doesn't matter. But ranking matters.

→ Suppose  $u$  represents lexicographic preference.

Take 2 bundles  $(x_1, 1), (x_1, 2)$  • 2nd bundle is more preferred

$$u(x_1, 2) > u(x_1, 1)$$

Now, there will be a rational no. b/w  $u(x_1, 2), u(x_1, 1)$

Arbitrarily choose 1 such rational no.  $x_1$

Bunk Pages

Closed set is, any sequence in a set has its limit in the set itself.

Now, suppose some  $n_1'$  such that  $x_{n_1'} > n_1$

$$u(n_1', 2) > u(n_1, 1) \quad n \rightarrow x, \\ \downarrow g_1 \qquad \qquad \qquad n_1' \rightarrow g_1' \\ \text{so } u(n_1, 2) > u(n_1, 1) > u(n_1', 2) > u(n_1', 1)$$

So, each  $n$  (real no.) will be mapped to a rational no (unique) which is not possible.

→ Continuity is the ~~not~~ main thing / reason of utility functions to exist.

### \* Continuity of preference $\geq$

→ Take 2 sequences  $\{x_n\}$ ,  $\{y_n\}$  such that  $x_n - y_n \rightarrow 0$  are all bundles

if preference is continuous if  $x_n \geq y_n$ .  
where  $x$  is the limit of  $x_n$  sequence  
 $x \geq y$   $\leftarrow x_n \geq y_n \rightarrow$

Alternative def:

This pref. rel. is continuous. If for any  $x$  (bundle)  
the upper contour set & lower contour set  
is closed

(i) Suppose  $x \geq y$  is continuous & lower  
contour set is closed set.

Take a sequence  $x_n \geq y$  in  $x$  in upper  
contour set.

any sequence  $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_m$  in upper  
contour set.

Then each  $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_m \in x$  as it is in the  
upper contour set

and as preference is continuous we know that limit of the sequence  $x_1, x_n = x^*$  i.e.  $x^*$  will be weakly preferred to  $x^*$ . So, limit of the sequence lies inside upper contour set itself so it's closed.

\* To prove  $\rightarrow$  Lexicographic sequence is not continuous.

$$\text{Let } x^n = (2, 1)$$

$$y^n = \left(2 - \frac{1}{n}, 2\right)$$

$$\text{So } \forall n \quad x^n \succsim y^n \quad \text{as } 2 > 2 - \frac{1}{n}$$

$$\text{but in the limit } \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} y^n = (2, 2) = y^*$$


$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} x^n = (2, 1) = x^*$$

so  $y^* \succ x^*$  so lexicographic relation is not continuous.

\* Representation Theorem  $\rightarrow$  (Proved by Afriat)

Suppose that  $\succeq$  is well-behaved i.e. it is monotonic & convex. Additionally  $\succeq$  is also continuous then (i)  $\exists u$  s.t.  $u$  represents  $\succeq$  (ii)  $u$  is continuous.

(Although convexity is not reqd. in this theorem but we assumed it in stating it).



$\alpha$  represents a pt. on  $I$  (where  $\alpha$  is a constant)  
then if  $n^{\alpha}$  is a bundle on  $I$  s.t. it is  
indifferent to  $n$ , then  $\alpha e = n^{\alpha} \rightarrow$  this  
 $\alpha$  is just the utility function for  $n^{\alpha}$ .

→ Step 1) → existence of  $n^{\alpha}$

→ Step 2) → continuity of  $\alpha$

Upper contour set of  $n$   $n \geq = \{ \alpha | \alpha \in \mathbb{R} \}$   
Upper " " " "  
is whole  $I$ :  $(\alpha | \alpha \in \mathbb{R}) (\alpha | \alpha \leq n)$

→ Can't have multiple  $\alpha$ 's indifferent as by weakly preferred (coordinates are different so not indifferent)

⇒ Now, if  $x \not\simeq n \geq y$  prove  $\alpha(n) \geq \alpha(y)$

Given  $\alpha(n) \geq n \geq y$ ,  $x \geq \alpha(n)$

→ Perfect substitutes  $\rightarrow a x_1 + b x_2$

→ Complement  $\rightarrow \min_{x_1, x_2} \alpha x_1 + \beta x_2 \rightarrow \min \{ \alpha x_1, \beta x_2 \}$

→ Homothetic  $\rightarrow U(tn) = tU(n)$

→ Quasilinear  $\rightarrow n_2 = \kappa - f(n_1) \rightarrow U(n) = f(n_1) + n_2$

→ Equilibrium is attained in man. guaranteed by continuity.


→ man. utility pt. lies on budget line guaranteed by continuity



Bunk Pages



\* Utility Function  $\rightarrow u(n_1, n_2) = \bar{u}$  (constant)



MRS

Total differential

$$d\bar{u} = 0 = \text{RHS}$$

$$\frac{\partial u}{\partial n_1} + \frac{\partial u}{\partial n_2}$$

Budget line

MRS

$$\Rightarrow \frac{dn_2}{dn_1} = -\left(\frac{\partial u}{\partial n_1}\right)$$

$$(\frac{\partial u}{\partial n_2})$$



$\frac{\partial u}{\partial n_i}$  → Change in utility level with changing

Slope of indifference curve

Consumption of  $i$ th commodity while other commodity consumption is constant

↳ Marginal utility of  $n_i$

↳ Change in utility with marginal change in  $n_i$ ; keeping other  $n_j$ 's constant



→ Utility Man. Problem (UMP)

Man  $(u(n_1, n_2)) \rightarrow \max$

$$\vec{p}x \leq m \quad \vec{p} = \text{price vector}$$

$\vec{n}$  = quantity vector

$$p > 0, p \neq 0, m > 0, n \geq 0$$

Existence of solution  $\rightarrow$  Budget set is closed and bounded.

And man. exists as any closed, bounded set has man-min.

To solve  $\vec{p}x \leq m$ ,

\* The Lagrangean Multiplier technique  $\rightarrow$

Introduce a variable  $\lambda$  into system ( $\lambda \geq 0$ )

So, we converted constrained optimisation into unconstrained optimisation problem.

$$L(x_1, x_2, \lambda) = u(x) + \lambda [m - p \cdot x]$$

More the only constraint  
Bunk pages  
 $x_i \geq 0$ .

Now, we minimize this

Constraint Qualification  $\rightarrow$  Constraint for Lagrangian Multiplier technique

$\rightarrow$  Kuhn-Tucker.

$\rightarrow$  Utility man  $\rightarrow$  At  $x^*$ :  $MRS = \frac{P_1}{P_2}$

Case 1) Slope of the BL is flatter than slope of  $I-G$

$\rightarrow$  Lagrange  $L(x, \lambda) = u(x) + \lambda [m - P \cdot x] \quad (x \geq 0)$

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Kuhn} \\ \text{Tucker} \\ \text{condition} \end{array} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \frac{\partial L}{\partial x_i} \leq 0 \quad i=1, 2 \\ \frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda} \geq 0 \end{array} \right. = \frac{\partial u}{\partial x_i} + \lambda P_i \leq 0$$

$m \geq P \cdot x$

These conditions are

satisfied at some optimal point  $x^*, \lambda^*$  only.


Interior solution  $\rightarrow \frac{\partial u}{\partial x_i} = \lambda P_i$  (opt of man. lying within interior)

Theory

function that we need to minimize is Quasi-concave  $\Leftrightarrow$  which comes from convexity.

Convexity  $\rightarrow$  for any  $x \in X$ , the upper contour set is convex.

Ruled out in this way



$u(n_1, n_2) = \text{Maximand}$

Bunk Pages

Quasiconcave ( $U(\cdot)$  is quasiconcave function)  
 ↳ Take 2 values  $n, n' \in X$ , take a convex combination of  $n$  &  $n'$ ,  $n'' = \alpha n + (1-\alpha)n'$   
 $U(n'') \geq \min \{ U(n), U(n') \}$

$$\text{At } n^* \rightarrow \frac{\partial u}{\partial x_1} \leq \lambda p_1, \quad \frac{\partial u}{\partial x_2} \leq \lambda p_2$$

$$M \geq p_1 x_1 + p_2 x_2$$

Assume it a Jeferson Solution  $\rightarrow \frac{\partial u}{\partial x_1} = \lambda p_1, \quad \frac{\partial u}{\partial x_2} = \lambda p_2$

$$M = p_n$$

$$\frac{\frac{\partial u}{\partial x_1}}{\frac{\partial u}{\partial x_2}} = \frac{p_1}{p_2} \text{ and } M \geq p_n$$

↳ MRS


Budget slope

Gradient at a point on level curve =  $\left( \frac{\partial u}{\partial x_1} \uparrow + \frac{\partial u}{\partial x_2} \uparrow \right)$   
 (Pupto tangent at that pt.)

Sufficient Condition for optimisation function is concavity of preferences or quasiconcavity of utility function.

$U(\cdot)$  is negative semidefinite  $\rightarrow$  we get this by a matrix of double partial

(Borden-Hayman)



Find Taylor expansion about  $x^*$

$$f(x^*) + (x-x^*) f'(x^*) + \frac{(x-x^*)^2}{2!} f''(x^*)$$

We see that as we increase no. of term we further dip in value so each  $f'$ ,  $f''$  etc are -ve this is ~~because~~ negative semidefinite

### Cobb-Douglas Utility function

$$U(n_1, n_2) = n_1^\alpha \cdot n_2^\beta$$

$\alpha + \beta = 1$ 
 $\alpha + \beta < 1$ 
 $\alpha + \beta > 1$

$n_1^*$   
 $n_2^*$

$$\text{or } n_1^\alpha n_2^\beta + \lambda (P_m - M) = L(n)$$

$$\frac{\partial L(n)}{\partial n_1} = \alpha n_1^{\alpha-1} n_2^\beta - \lambda P_1 \leq 0$$

$\frac{\partial L(n)}{\partial n_1}$

$$\beta n_1^{\alpha-1} n_2^\beta - \lambda P_2 \leq 0$$

$$M \geq P_1 n_1 + P_2 n_2$$

(Marginal Utility)  $MU_1 = \frac{P_1}{P_2} \cdot \frac{n_2^\beta}{n_1^\alpha} \geq \frac{\alpha}{\beta} \rightarrow n_2 \leq \frac{P_1 n_1^\alpha}{P_2 \beta}$

$$M \geq P_1 n_1 + \frac{P_1 n_1^\alpha \beta}{\alpha}$$

$$\left[ \begin{array}{l} M \geq n_1^* \\ P_1 \left( 1 + \frac{\beta}{\alpha} \right) \end{array} \right], \quad \left[ \begin{array}{l} M - \frac{P_1 n_1^\alpha}{\alpha} \geq n_2^* \\ P_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\beta}{\alpha} \right) \end{array} \right]$$

Under its mentioned assumption

interior soln.

so  $\lambda$  will be replaced by =

$$\left[ \begin{array}{l} M \left( \frac{\beta}{\alpha} \right) \geq n_2^* \\ P_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\beta}{\alpha} \right) \end{array} \right]$$

$n_1^*$ ,  $n_2^*$  are called ordinary demand function  
(function of money & Price)

maybe it's also called ~~marginally~~ demand functions  
or

Mathian

Kuhn Tucker sol<sup>n</sup> occurs at boundary  $\rightarrow$  check

Sticky variable  $\rightarrow$  Preference doesn't change over time  
loose  $\sim \sim \sim \sim \sim$  " " " change in Bunk Pages

$x^*$  is a function of  $P_1, P_2$  &  $M$

Homogeneous function of deg.  $\kappa$   $\rightarrow f(\lambda n) = \lambda^\kappa f(n)$

This function is Homogeneous of deg. (0) in  $P_1, P_2, M$   
as  $f(\lambda P_1, \lambda P_2, \lambda M) = \lambda^\kappa f(P_1, P_2, M)$

\* We assume weak monotonicity & convexity unless mentioned to consider strict one

\* Interior sol.<sup>n</sup> we also get by  $\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_1} = \frac{\partial U}{\partial x_2} = \frac{P_1}{P_2}$   
& then Budget constraint

\*  $x_i^* = x_i^*(P_1, P_2, M)$ ,  $i=1, 2$

$\hookrightarrow$  Ordinary demand function

$\rightarrow$  Minimised level of utility,

~~\* When the prices/income are given by  $P_1, P_2, M$ ,~~

$$U(x_1^*, x_2^*) = U(x_1^*(P, M), x_2^*(P, M)) = v(P, M)$$

$v$  is a function which takes in  $P_1, P_2$  &  $M$ , keeping up ~~constant~~

function same and output max utility.

$\hookrightarrow$  also called Indirect utility function.

$\hookrightarrow$  also " " value function.

$\rightarrow$  Finding economic significance of  $\lambda$ .

$$v(P, M) = U(x_1^*(P, M), x_2^*(P, M))$$

$$\frac{\partial v}{\partial M} = \frac{\partial U}{\partial x_1} \Big|_{x_1^*(P, M)} + \frac{\partial U}{\partial x_2} \Big|_{x_2^*(P, M)} = \lambda$$

$\hookrightarrow$  Marginal change in minimised utility with  
change in income keeping other  $P_1, P_2$  constant

$\hookrightarrow$  Marginal utility of Money

$$\Rightarrow \lambda P_1 \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial M} + \lambda P_2 \frac{\partial x_2}{\partial M} = \lambda \quad \left[ \begin{array}{l} \frac{\partial M}{\partial M} = 1 \text{ by budget} \\ \frac{\partial M}{\partial P_1} = -\frac{1}{P_1} \text{ constant} \end{array} \right]$$

→ So,  $\lambda$  computes change in maximized utility with  $x_1$

\* Properties of ordinary demand function

1)  $x_i^*(P, m)$  is homogenous of degree 0 in prices & income

2)  $P_{x_i^*} = M \rightarrow$  Walras' law (Market clear)

3)  $x^*(P, m)$  is a convex set.

Proof → Suppose  $x'' \in x^*(P, m)$ ,  $x'' = \lambda x_1 + (1-\lambda)x_1'$ ,  $\lambda \in [0, 1]$

To show  $x'' \in x^*(P, m)$

- $x''$  lies in the upper contour set of  $x_1' \& x_1$  where  $x_1' \& x_1$  lie on same indifference line, by def. of convexity of preferences.


• Also  $x_1$  &  $x_1'$  both lie in budget line (clear the market) so its convex combination  $x''$  also lies on some budget line so under same budget constraint.

• As  $x_1, x_1'$  are minimized in this constraint &  $x''$  is of higher preference so  $x''$  is also minimized.

Q3) Change Cobb-Douglas utility fn to have a set of  $x_1^*$  not singleton.

Q3) If strictly convex preference then prove  $x^*$  is singleton.

→ To minimize expenditure when your utility level doesn't fall below a utility level  $u^*$ .



Call this line as Expenditure line  
It is also called Hicksian

$\rightarrow \text{Min } (P \cdot n) \text{ s.t. } u(n) \geq u^*$

Lagrangian  $\rightarrow \mathcal{L}(x_1, x_2, \lambda) = P \cdot n + \mu(u(n) - u^*)$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_1} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial x_1} = \mu p_1, \quad \frac{\partial u}{\partial x_2} = \mu p_2 \quad (\text{Intuition set})$$

$$u(n) = u^*$$

$\rightarrow$  Connection in UMP & BMP

$(V(p, m) = u^*)$  in a special case.

$P_1 x_1^* + P_2 x_2^* = C(p_1, p_2, u^*) \rightarrow$  Expenditure function.  
 L minimized level of expenditure when prices are  
 $p_1, p_2$  & utility is  $u^*$

$\rightarrow$  Given indirect utility function, can we find out  
 ordinary demand function?

$\rightarrow$  From  $C$  can you derive compensated demand function?

But  $\rightarrow x_i^* = \begin{cases} m_i / p_i, & \alpha / \beta > p_i / p_j \\ 0, & \alpha / \beta < p_i / p_j \\ \left[0, \frac{m}{P}\right], & \alpha / \beta = p_i / p_j \end{cases}$

where  $u(x_1, x_2) = \alpha x_1 + \beta x_2$ ,  $P_1 x_1 + P_2 x_2 = m$

$\rightarrow$  Perfect complements  $\rightarrow u(x_1, x_2) = \min\{x_1, x_2\}$ , 1:1

$$x_1^* = x_2^* = m / (P_1 + P_2)$$

$V(p, m)$  is also homogeneous in  $\deg(0)$  as  $x^*$  is homogeneous in  $\deg(0)$

$$t^n(p, m) = x(tP_1, tm)$$

$$u(x_1, x_2) = V(tP_1, tm) = t^0 V(p, m)$$

strict inequality holds both in  
UMP & EMP.

Bunk Pages

$\{p \in V(p, m) \leq k\}$  is convex.

Take  $p, p'$  s.t.

$$V(p, m) \leq k$$

$$V(p', m) \leq k$$

$$p'' = (1-t)p' + tp$$

$$p''_n \leq m$$

$$B = \{x : p_n \leq m\}$$

$$B' = \{x : p'_n \leq m\}$$

Assume  $p''_n \geq m$ ,  $p''_n \geq m$

$$\text{then } tpx''_n \geq mt, (1-t)p''_n \geq m(1-t)$$

then sum also lie outside but

$$p''_n = tpn + (1-t)p'_n \leq m.$$

### UMP

Max  $U(x)$

$$\text{s.t. } p_n \leq m$$

$$\begin{aligned} i) \quad & \underline{MU}_1 = MRS = \frac{p_1}{p_2} \\ & \underline{MU}_2 \end{aligned}$$

$$ii) \quad P \cdot X = M$$

$$x_i^* = x_i^*(P, m), i=1, 2$$

Ordinary / Marshallian / Vulneration

Demand function

$$U(x^*) = \vartheta(P, m)$$

Indirect utility function

value function

$$\lambda = \frac{\partial \vartheta}{\partial m}$$

$\vartheta(P_1, P_2, m)$  is homogeneous  
with degree 1 in  $P_1, P_2, m$ .

$\vartheta$  is quasi-convex in  
 $P_1, P_2, m$  (lower contour  
set is convex)

### EMP

Min  $P \cdot x$

$$\text{s.t. } U(x) \geq U^*$$

$$i) \quad \frac{\underline{MU}_1}{\underline{MU}_2} = MRS = \frac{P_1}{P_2}$$

$$ii) \quad U(x^*) = U^*$$

$$h_i^* = h_i^*(P, U^*) \quad i=1, 2$$

Hicksian / Compensated

Demand function

$$e(P, u^*) = P \cdot h^*$$

This is homogeneous  
with degree 1 in  $P_1, P_2$   
only:

Lower contour

$\rightarrow v$  is quasiconcave  $\rightarrow \exists$  set  $\{(\bar{P}, \bar{m}) \mid v(\bar{P}, \bar{m}) \leq v^*\}$  is convex.

To show:  $(\bar{P}_1, \bar{P}_2, \bar{m})$ ,  $(\bar{P}'_1, \bar{P}'_2, \bar{m}')$

$$(\bar{P}''_1, \bar{P}''_2, \bar{m}'') = (\alpha \bar{P}_1 + (1-\alpha) \bar{P}'_1), (\alpha \bar{P}_2 + (1-\alpha) \bar{P}'_2), (\alpha \bar{m} + (1-\alpha) \bar{m}')$$

$$\alpha \in [0, 1]$$

$$v(\bar{P}'', \bar{m}'') \leq v^* \quad (\text{To show})$$

$\rightarrow$  For any

$$x \in B_{\bar{P}'', \bar{m}''}$$

$$\text{We show } u(x) \leq v^*$$

$$\bar{P}''x \leq \bar{m}''$$

$$\alpha \bar{P}''x + (1-\alpha) \bar{P}'''x \leq \alpha \bar{m}'' + (1-\alpha) \bar{m}''$$

$$\text{with } \bar{P}''x \leq \bar{m}''$$

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \bar{P}'''x \leq \bar{m}'' \\ \text{as Both} \end{array} \right\}$$

Now if  $x$  is in  $\{(\bar{P}, \bar{m}) \mid v(\bar{P}, \bar{m}) \leq v^*\}$  then maximized utility is  $v^*$  so this  $x$  is finally less than  $v^*$

How prove this diagrammatically.

$\rightarrow e(P, u^*)$  is concave in  $P$

$$e(\alpha \bar{P} + (1-\alpha) \bar{P}', u^*) \geq \alpha e(\bar{P}, u^*) + (1-\alpha) e(\bar{P}', u^*)$$

$$\alpha e(\bar{P}, u^*) \leq \alpha \bar{P} \cdot x$$

$$u(x) \geq u^*$$

$$(1-\alpha) e(\bar{P}', u^*) \leq (1-\alpha) \bar{P}' \cdot x$$

$$\alpha e(\bar{P}, u^*) + (1-\alpha) e(\bar{P}', u^*) \leq \alpha \bar{P} \cdot x + (1-\alpha) \bar{P}' \cdot x$$

\* Recoverability  $\rightarrow UMP \Rightarrow V(P, M) \rightarrow$  Indirect utility function

$\rightarrow$  We need to find ' $x_i^*$ ' from  $V(P, M)$   
 $\downarrow$   
 demand function.

$$\frac{\partial V(P_1, P_2, M)}{\partial P_i} = \frac{\partial U}{\partial P_i}(x_1^*(P_1, P_2, M), x_2^*(P_1, P_2, M))$$

$$= \frac{\partial U}{\partial x_1} \Big|_{x_1^*} \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial P_i} + \frac{\partial U}{\partial x_2} \Big|_{x_2^*} \frac{\partial x_2}{\partial P_i}$$

$\hookrightarrow \lambda P_1$        $\hookrightarrow \lambda P_2$

$$= \lambda \left[ P_1 \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial P_1} + P_2 \frac{\partial x_2}{\partial P_2} \right] \quad \begin{cases} P_1 x_1 + P_2 x_2 = M \\ x_1 + P_1 \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial P_1} + P_2 \frac{\partial x_2}{\partial P_2} = \frac{\partial M}{\partial P_1} \end{cases}$$

$$= -\lambda x_i$$

\*  $\therefore \left( \frac{\partial V / \partial P_i}{\partial V / \partial M} \right) = -x_i^* \quad (\text{Demand function})$

There is an identity

Roy's identity (as true for all  
 prices & income)

$$\rightarrow e(P_1, P_2, u^*) \rightarrow h_1(P_1, P_2, u^*)$$

$$e(P, u^*) = P_1 h_1(P, u^*) + P_2 h_2(P, u^*)$$

$$\frac{\partial e(P, u^*)}{\partial P_1} = h_1(P, u^*) + P_1 \frac{\partial h_1(P, u^*)}{\partial P_1} + P_2 \frac{\partial h_2(P, u^*)}{\partial P_1}$$

$$= h_1(P, u^*) \neq \cancel{\frac{\partial h_1}{\partial P_1}}$$

$\frac{\partial e}{\partial P_1}(P, u^*) = h_1(P, u^*)$

← Shephard's  
 Lemma