

The *Dhvanyaloka* of Anandavardhana with the *Locana* of Abhinavagupta

Translated by

DANIEL H. H. INGALLS,

JEFFREY MOUSSAIEFF MASSON,

AND M. V. PATWARDHAN

Edited with an introduction by

DANIEL H. H. INGALLS

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Foreword

This volume is the result of work by three men. The inception was an annotated translation by J. M. Masson of the First Chapter of the *Dhātanyāloka* and the *Locana*, a work carried out in the Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies at Harvard University. As Chairman of the Department at that time, I read it and approved it as Masson's doctoral thesis, Harvard, 1970. Later, Dr. Masson spent two years in India, much of it in study under Professor M. V. Patwardhan. With Patwardhan he completed a translation of the remaining chapters. Of that translation the brief Chapter Four was published in the *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 97 (1977), pp. 285–304, 423–440. The complete translation was offered for publication to the Harvard Oriental Series. As editor of the Series, I stated that two major alterations would first be necessary. The separate parts, Ānanda's and Abhinava's, must be integrated; and the quotations of poetry in both parts must be rendered into verse, not prose. I was asked if I would be willing to make these alterations myself and any others that I saw fit.

I accepted the request and have spent what my colleagues must have thought an unconscionable time in fulfilling it. I have altered the original considerably. What is wholly my responsibility is the Introduction, the verse translations, the indices, and large sections of the notes. In the notes when it seemed necessary, as in the expression of opinions, to make a distinction, the first personal pronoun singular is used to refer to Ingalls (for example, "I believe," "It seems to me"); the plural pronoun refers to a consensus. In the notes on Chapter Three several long passages are given verbatim from the written communications of Patwardhan. They are indicated by his name in parentheses. As for the prose translations of the texts, while I have altered the wording throughout, the substance remains basically that of Masson and Patwardhan.

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After these changes had been made, preliminary drafts of Chapter One and portions of Chapter Two, and later the finished version of the Introduction were sent to Patwardhan. Several alterations have been made in Chapters One and Two as a result of Patwardhan's comments. In the Introduction nothing has been changed, but I have added a long note (note 42) dealing with a matter which Patwardhan regarded as important. Shortly before going to press there came the sad news of Professor Patwardhan's death, which will be felt by all Sanskritists as a major loss to their field of study.

As the basis of our translation we have used the edition published as Volume 135 of the Kashi Sanskrit Series, *The Dhvanyāloka of Śrī Ānandavardhanācharya with the Lochana and Bālapriyā Commentaries* (Benares: Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series Office, 1940). The edition is not without faults, as may be seen from the Corrections of the Kashi Text at the end of this book, but its text of the *Locana* is better than that of the *NS* edition and it is the only edition which contains the invaluable *Bālapriyā* commentary on the *Locana*.

An effort has been made to explain technical terms the first time they occur. If we have delayed an explanation by inadvertence, or if the reader has forgotten it, he may consult the general index, where he will find a reference to the passage where the explanation occurs.

In the translation, verse quotations from scientific works (*sāstras*) are usually rendered in prose; so also always the *Kārikās* of the *Dhvanyāloka*. Verse quotations from literature (*kāvya*), on the other hand, are rendered, with very few exceptions, into unrhymed verse.

The breaking up of the commentarial matter on many *Kārikās* into sections (for example, 1.13 a, b, c,) is in order to keep the two commentaries (*Vṛtti* and *Locana*) close to each other and close to the footnotes for ease of cross-reference. Likewise for ease of cross-reference, quotations and *pratikās* of the *Dhvanyāloka* which occur in the *Locana* are printed in boldface.

The process of production was more complicated than I had at first envisaged. I began typing out the text on a Macintosh 512K computer. For about a third of the text Mrs. Ann Palmer, Secretary of the Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies, Harvard University, took over this onerous task. For her skillful and time-consuming assistance I express my sincere thanks. When my Macintosh printer did not give sufficiently fine resolution for press copy, Dr. Gary Tubb came to my aid. He transferred my files to IBM disks and typeset the volume using the Multilingual TeX program from Personal TeX, Inc. The text was

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then run off on a Linotronic 300 by Chiron Inc. of Cambridge, Mass. In developing the formatting packages Dr. Tubb was aided by technical advice from Dr. Dominik Wujastyk of the Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine, London. The output from the Linotronic 300 has been photographically reproduced by the Harvard University Press.

But my indebtedness to Dr. Tubb goes beyond this. In the course of transposing the text, he added his own proofreading to the three or four proofreadings I had given it. No volume containing so many different fonts of type and so much index material can hope to be absolutely free from error. But if this work approaches the ideal, it will be in large part owing to Dr. Tubb.

DANIEL H. H. INGALLS

HOT SPRINGS, VIRGINIA

August 1989

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Introduction

The pages which follow carry a translation and annotation of two Sanskrit texts. The first has been known for many centuries as the *Dhvanyāloka*, or "Light on [the Doctrine of] Suggestion," and has been ascribed to Rājñaka Ānandavardhana, a Kashmiri author of the ninth century A.D. The fact that this was not the original title of the work and the fact that many scholars have recently claimed, I think wrongly, that Ānanda wrote only the *Vṛtti* or prose portion of it, are matters of which I shall speak later. The second text is a commentary on the first, called the *Locana*, or "The Eye," composed in about A.D. 1000 by another Kashmiri, the critic, philosopher, and Śaiva mystic, Abhinavagupta. These two texts have proven over the centuries to be the most influential works of India on the theory and practice of literary criticism. For the last thousand years all Indian critics of Sanskrit, and many even of those who have written on the literatures of India's modern languages, have studied their doctrine, if not directly from the texts themselves, at least through the rendering of Mammata. Even when an author has disagreed with their pronouncements he has treated these works with honor and has taken pains to answer their point of view in establishing such other doctrines as he might favor.

How did Ānanda's view of literature arise? I use this general phrase because, as will soon be clear, the doctrine of *dhvani*, of suggestion or suggestiveness in literature, forms only a part of it. And what is there about his view and about Abhinava's commentary on it that placed these works in such a magisterial position? In this Introduction I shall try to answer these questions, steering a course between the generalities of brevity and a full-scale exposition, which would be nothing less than a history of Indian aesthetics.

As both Ānanda and Abhinava were Kashmiris and drew heavily on Kashmiri traditions of scholarship, it is to that northern province of India that we should look for the historical background of their works.

Kashmir in the narrow sense is a small valley ringed in by the immense ranges of the Himalaya and Karakoram mountains. The floor of the valley, some eighty by twenty miles in extent, lies a mile above sea level and is watered by the Jhelum River, which twists its way northwestward into the Wular Lake, issuing westward from which it breaks through the mountain barrier. The soil of the valley, helped by winter snows and spring rains, is fertile. In those brief periods when the valley was well governed and when measures were taken to prevent annual flooding, both produce and population rose to a high level, permitting the kings of Kashmir to extend their sway well beyond the narrow limits of their homeland.

The first of our two authors lived toward the end of the longest period of strong government that Kashmir ever enjoyed, a period in which for once this little valley played a major role in the political history of Asia. This strong Kashmir was the achievement of two long-reigning kings of the Karkota dynasty: Lalitāditya, "the World Conqueror" (reg. A.D. 725-761), and his grandson, Jayāpīda, the great patron of literature (reg. A.D. 776-807). Kalhana's *Rājatarangini* gives a delightful account of their reigns, mixing history with the romantic adventures of folk tales. As the reader may follow the account in Sir Aurel Stein's edition and translation of the *Rājatarangini*, I shall limit myself to selecting the few items which are strictly to my purpose.

In A.D. 732 or 733 King Lalitāditya borrowed from the Bhūtesa Temple ten million *dīnāras* to finance an expedition to the south. The goal of his expedition was King Yaśovarman of Kanauj, who controlled through feudatory rights the Punjab and most of the Ganges valley. In 733, the date perhaps being confirmed by a solar eclipse,¹ at the confluence of the Jumna and the Ganges, 700 miles as the crow flies from where he had set forth, Lalitāditya met with and defeated his

¹ The *Gāudavaho*, a Prakrit poem describing the victories of Yaśovarman, contains a passage (vss. 827-832) mentioning various portents, including a solar eclipse, which occurred just before Yaśovarman's "[royal] position became suddenly weakened" (*khāṇa-nivadā-niyaya-paya-bhārige* = *kṣāṇa-nirvṛtta-niṣṭha-/pada-bhārge*). Such is the reading of three of the four manuscripts of the poem as edited in the Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, No. 34, second ed., 1927; see Introduction, p. ccvii. Hermann Jacobi took this weakening of the royal position to refer to Yaśovarman's defeat at Prayāga by Lalitāditya (*Gött. Gel. Anz.* 1888, II, pp. 67-68). A total eclipse of the sun would have been visible from Prayāga (Allahabad) in A.D. 733. But the reading of the latest edition of the *Gāudavaho* (Prakrit Text Society, Ahmedabad, 1975), *khāṇa-nivadā-bhūlād-bhāṅga-bhāṅgurāpōrige*, eliminates the "weakening of the royal position."

enemy. A temporary peace seems to have been arranged, for in 736 we find that Lalitāditya's ambassador to the Chinese emperor apparently refers to Yaśovarman as Lalitāditya's ally.² Meanwhile Lalitāditya had advanced eastward to raid the former adherents of Yaśovarman in Magadha and Bengal. Before 740 the peace was broken, Yaśovarman was rooted out of his kingdom, and the revenues of his capital city of Kanauj were given to a temple of the Sun in Kashmir.³ Lalitāditya, who was now the paramount ruler of northern India, repaid the Bhūtesa Temple 110,000,000 *dīnārás* for the 10,000,000 that he had borrowed.

The World Conqueror spent the last twenty years of his reign founding cities and religious institutions in the valley of Kashmir and in expeditions against his northern neighbors, the Dards, Tibetans, and Turks. On the second day of Caitra (April/May) of an unspecified year he won a great victory over the Turks. Three centuries later the Arab traveler Alberuni reports that in Kashmir this victory was still the occasion of an annual celebration. The nationalist pride which Kashmiris felt in the victories of their king is reflected in the boast of Kalhana:⁴

The rulers of many lands to this very day wear symbols of their defeat, which the fierce king forced them to adopt. Clearly it is by his command that the Turks, to show that they had been enslaved, still walk with their hands held behind their backs and wear their heads half shaved, while he forced the rulers of the South, in token of their having been reduced to the state of beasts, to wear a tail to their *dhotis*, which reach to the ground.

The World Conqueror ended his days on an expedition across "the ocean of sand," that is to say, in what is now either Russian or Chinese Turkestan, in quest of further glory. After the brief reign of his two sons, he was succeeded by a grandson, Jayāpīṭa, whom his tutors, following the dying instructions of the World Conqueror, had constantly urged to "be like your grandfather."

Jayāpīṭa, as soon as he reached the throne, attempted to follow their advice. He too gathered a force for a great southern conquest. Fate turned against him at Benares, where most of his troops deserted. But by reckless bravery the young king retrieved his fortune. He allied himself with the king of Bengal, whose daughter he married. In the

² Stein, *Rāj. T.* I, p. 89, with reference to Chavannes and Lévy, *JA* 1895, p. 353. The ambassador had been sent to obtain Chinese aid against Lalitāditya's northern neighbors.

³ *Rāj. T.* 4.187. The temple was at Lalitapura, the modern Lātpōr.

⁴ *Rāj. T.* 4.178-180, my translation.

course of his return he once more subjected Kanauj to the rule of Kashmir. Then at the entrance to his homeland he defeated a usurper who had arisen in his absence.

We are told that after his return Jayapīda became a great patron of learning, attracting so many scholars to his court that there came to be a dearth of wise men in other kingdoms. Kalhaṇa lists many of the scholars and poets whom the king brought into his service. Among them was the grammarian Kṣīra, from whom the king himself took lessons (*Rāj. T.* 4.489). The person meant is doubtless Kṣīrasvāmin, the well-known commentator on the *Amarakośa* and the *Nirukta*. "The king engaged Bhāṭṭodbhaṭa as his *sabhbāti* at a salary of a lakh [of dīnārās] a day and made the poet Dāmodaragupta, the author of the *Kuttanīmata*, his chief minister" (*Rāj. T.* 4.495–6). I shall have more to say below of Bhāṭṭodbhaṭa, or Udbhaṭa as he is now generally known, for his influence on Ānanda and the *Dhvanyāloka* was great. The minister Dāmodara was perhaps the most original of classical Sanskrit poets. That may be why his work later fell out of fashion. Fortunately nearly the whole of it has now been recovered.⁵ Among other ministers is mentioned Vāmana, doubtless the poetician quoted in our texts, and among other poets is mentioned Manoratha (*Rāj. T.* 4.497), whom Abhinava identifies as the author of a verse opposed to the doctrine of *dhuviṇi*, quoted by Ānanda (1.1c A). Finally, we are told that the king, having dreamed that the sun was rising in the west, was happy to realize that the Buddhist scholar Dharmottara had entered his kingdom (4.498).⁶ This will explain how Ānanda came to write a commentary, as Abhinava tells us (3.47 L and see note 6), on Dharmottara's *Pramāṇaviniścayatikā*. The man had been the leading Buddhist scholar in the kingdom in the generation previous to Ānanda's.

⁵ The frame story, which gives the title to the work ("The Bawd's Advice"), can be likened to several other Sanskrit works, but the emboxed stories are *sui generis*. The combination of comic and tragic in the tale of Hāralatā and Sudarasena is against all the classical conventions of *rasa*. The tale is told by the bawd with an explicitly cynical purpose, but if the death of Hāralatā will break the reader's heart, Dāmodara's is the only example I know of in Sanskrit of this double attack on the reader's sensibilities.

⁶ The works of Dharmottara were not yet known to the West when Stein wrote his translation of the *Rāj. T.* (1900). Stcherbatsky's edition of the *Nyāyabinduśikā* was published only in 1909. This explains Stein's misunderstanding of the passage, where he failed to see that *dharmottara* was a proper name. As for the sun rising in the west, Dharmottara, like most visitors to Kashmir, would have entered the valley through one of the western passes of the Himalaya.

It was under King Jayāpīda that the school of literary criticism in Kashmir originated. The *sabha* to which Udbhaṭa was appointed as director (*pati*) was doubtless a *panditasabha* rather than a political body. One might therefore translate Udbhaṭa's title approximately as Director of the Royal Academy. His salary, by the way, was not so immense as it sounds. The *dīrināra* (the word derives ultimately from the Roman *denarius*) had become by this time a money of account, of less worth than the smallest coin. A lakh of *dīrināras* in Jayāpīda's reign would have equalled approximately twenty-five silver rupees of Akbar's mintage (Stein, Vol. II, p. 323), a princely but not a fabulous daily retainer.

It is pertinent to our understanding of Ānanda and Abhinava to inquire what materials were available for the teaching and research of such an academy, or to the individual scholars who might compose it. To judge from the quotations and references in the *Dhvanyāloka* and *Locana*, Kashmiri critics of their time had access to all the epic material and most of the early classical material that we now possess. A few works that are now standard in a library of classical authors are absent—those of Aśvaghoṣa, as one might expect, and more surprisingly the *Bhāṭṭikāṭya* and the plays of Bhavabhūti—but not many. On the other hand, they had much that we have now lost.⁷ In addition they were acquainted with a substantial literature in Prakrit, most of which is now lost. The only two works in this category quoted by Ānanda which have come down to us are the *Sattasai* and the *Gāudāvaho*. These account for only about a fourth of his quotations.⁸

While the Kashmiri critic thus had access to a substantial library of Sanskrit and Prakrit literature, his library of literary criticism, in the early years of its development in Kashmir, was extremely modest. It consisted of little more than the eighth-century works of Bhāmaha and Dandin. There existed also the ancient manual of the theater, the *Bhāratīyanāṭyaśāstra* (*BhNS*), but until Udbhaṭa turned his attention to it, this work had played almost no part in general literary criticism.

⁷ Of Ānanda's 131 Sanskrit literary quotations, we still possess the originals of 59, to which one may add 29 more that may still be found in anthologies of later date, in reworkings (the *Hanumannāṭaka*), or in the work of later literary critics. This leaves 41 for which our only source is Ānanda.

⁸ To be precise, 10 out of 39. Seven verses, not counted in the 10, may be found in the supplement to Weber's edition of the *Sattasai*, but they most probably found their way into the manuscript sources of the supplement from the *Dhvanyāloka*.

Bhāmaba and Dandin had spent most of their effort in defining and exemplifying the figures of speech, a science which they had developed to a point comparable to what the West has to offer in the Greek of Demetrius or the Latin of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. Beyond that, they had listed the faults and the good qualities (*gunas*) of poetry and had spoken of its different styles (*rītis*). But what they had to say on these subjects suffers from two serious weaknesses. The qualities are so general that they offer no operable criteria of what is great or beautiful in poetry and what is not. The three primary qualities were given as sweetness (*mādhurya*), clarity (*prasāda*), and strength (*ojas*). How is one to say when a stanza, much less a whole poem, is sweet and when it is not, or how judge whether it has strength? In an effort to render the qualities more precise, Bhāmaba and Dandin made the error of identifying them with measurable elements of phonetics and structure. Thus, a large number of retroflex consonants and consonant clusters and the use of many long compounds were said to exhibit strength. The modest use of compounds and the avoidance of harsh phonetic combinations gave sweetness. No better was the attempt to associate these qualities with regional differences. The sweet style was associated with Vidarbha in the Deccan, the harsh or strong style with Bengal. A third style, Pāncālī, fell aesthetically and geographically somewhere in between.

Such concepts and associations died hard. Not until Ānanda was it pointed out that long compounds are not really necessary for strength (*Dhu. 2.9*). In fact Vāmana, who belonged to the first generation of Kashmiri criticism, if anything exaggerated and worsened these early faults. He extended the number of qualities to ten and defined each as of two sorts, depending on whether it was viewed as a quality of sound or a quality of meaning. Unfortunately his new qualities, such as *samatā* (regularity), *saukumārya* (delicacy), and *kānti* (brilliance), are as vague and as difficult to define as the original three. It is these qualities, he said, which give beauty to a poem, a beauty which may then be enhanced by the use of figures of speech (Vāmana 3.1.1-2). He continued the old association of certain qualities with regional styles and so came to the dictum for which he is chiefly remembered, "Style is the soul of poetry" (*rītir ātmā kāvyasya*, Vāmana 1.2.6).

While Vāmana, who may well have come from some older center of literary studies outside Kashmir, looked backward for his inspiration, Udbhaṭa, whose name indicates that he was a native Kashmiri, may be said to have looked forward. We know that he wrote a commentary,

unfortunately now lost, on the *BhNS*. It was the first of a series of commentaries on that work that were to be written in Kashmir in the following two centuries, by Lollāja, by Śāṅkuka, and by Abhinavagupta. The importance of this new interest is inestimable, for as we shall see, it was by bringing Bharata's doctrine of the *rasas*, the flavors or moods of a theatrical piece, into a general theory of literature that Ānanda arrived at a critique which finally could furnish workable criteria of literary excellence.⁹

Fate has been unkind to the works of Udbhaṭa. His other great commentary, the *Bhāmahavivarana*, is also for all practical purposes lost to us. What appear to be minute fragments of it, written on birch-bark in a hand of the ninth to eleventh century, have been lovingly reconstructed by the Italian scholar Raniero Gnoli. But while Gnoli makes out a persuasive case for Udbhaṭa's authorship of these fragments, even if his case were fully proved none of them is of sufficient continuity to furnish evidence for the new ideas which Udbhaṭa must have propounded in that work. We know that it did contain new ideas. Ānanda and Abhinava ascribe to it, for example, the doctrine that the beauty of particular words depends on the *rasa* that the author wishes to achieve (see 3.16 m A and L). This would be a major step toward their critique. Jacobi goes so far as to say that "Udbhaṭa was the first to designate *rasa* as the soul of poetry" (ZDMG 56, p. 396). But this is saying too much. The verse on which Jacobi based his statement is not by Udbhaṭa at all, but by some unknown, and doubtless later, author quoted by Udbhaṭa's commentator Indurāja.¹⁰ What is true, rather, is that Udbhaṭa was the first of the literary critics to concern himself seriously with the concept of *rasa*. He was not prepared, however, to make it the chief goal of poetry, as Ānanda was to do.

The only book of Udbhaṭa's that we possess in readable form is the *Kāryālankārasārasaṇgraha*, "A Compendium of the Most Important

⁹ The older poeticians had been aware of *rasa*, but had not shown what I should call much interest in the subject. Both Bhāmaha and Dandin relegated examples of it to the *rasādī* figures of speech (*rasavadalanikāra*, *preyo'nikāra*, *śrūjasvin*), figures where they found the emotions (*bhūvas*) to be strongly or strikingly expressed.

¹⁰ The verse runs: *rasādyadhiṣṭhitam kāvyam jīvadrūpatayā yataḥ / kathyate tad rasādīnām kāvyaśāmatuam vyavasthitam* // It occurs in Indurāja's commentary on Udbhaṭa's definition of *kāvyahetu* (6.7; in the numeration of the *Viṁśi* 6.14). That it is not by Udbhaṭa is clearly indicated by the words with which Indurāja introduces it: *tad āhuḥ*. The error in identification originated with Col. Jacob, JAOS 1897, p. 847, and has been corrected by P. V. Kane, HSP, p. 128.

Figures of Speech in Poetry." This little work furnishes definitions of forty-one figures, which are then illustrated in verses narrating the story of the *Kumārasambhava* up to the point reached by Kālidāsa in the fifth canto of his poem on the same subject. Many of the definitions are the same as those of Bhāmaha. But we should not let that fact obscure Udbhaṭa's innovations. In the definition of the very first figure of sense, *rūpaka* (1.11 *Indurāja*, 1.21 *Virūti*), we meet with a distinction that was new to Sanskrit poetics and that was destined ultimately to transform the analysis of all the figures. This is the distinction between the furnishing of a meaning *śrutyā*, that is, explicitly, and furnishing it *arthena*, that is, by the power of the contextual facts, or implicitly. The same distinction appears in the analysis of simile (1.16 *Indurāja*, 1.33 *Virūti*). Thus *rūpaka* (metaphor)¹¹ differs from simile by the fact that the similarity between the superimposed object and its real base is always given *arthena*, is "understood" from context, whereas in simile it is given by *śruti*, that is, usually by an explicit word (e.g., *iva*, *yathā* = "like," "as") expressing the fact that the similarity is shared.

This concern with the implications of words appears in many of Udbhaṭa's definitions. In *dīpaka* (zeugma), for example, the paired properties are said to contain or imply a simile. Thus, where a poet writes that "the doom of autumn carried off the beauty of the kadamba flowers and all the joy of damsels separated from their lovers," he is suggesting an implicit similarity between the beauty of the flowers and the joy of the damsels. To follow the concern for the implied or suggested sense through the whole of Udbhaṭa's book would require a more detailed exposition than is justified in this Introduction. It appears in his definitions of *paryāyakta*, *aprastutapraśamsā*, *sandeha*, and elsewhere.

¹¹ *Rūpaka* is not what a Greek would have called metaphor, but that translation has come to be used by every Sanskritist. *Rūpaka* is actually a simile in which the particle of assimilation has been omitted, e.g., "her moon face, her cherry lip." In a Greek metaphor the object as well as the particle is missing: "her stars shone upon my face," meaning that her eyes looked at me. The distinction is noted by Gero Jenner, *Die poetische Figuren der Inden*, p. 68, Ludwig Apfel Verlag, Hamburg, 1968.

Pratibhārā Indurāja, who commented on Udbhaṭa's book some time after Ānanda's *Dhvanyāloka* had become popular,¹² concludes his commentary with a disquisition on why Udbhaṭa had nothing to say of *dhvani*, "which some connoisseurs [i.e., Ānanda and his followers] consider to be the very life of poetry." His answer, in brief, is that Udbhaṭa included *dhvani* in his treatment of the figures of speech. The answer is not strictly true but it points the way to an important truth. Udbhaṭa nowhere uses the word *dhvani*. He speaks of a meaning's being understood (*pratiyamāna*), or implied (*gamyate*), or of its being included (*antargata*) in another meaning, but he avoids using the more technical terms *vyajyate* or *dhvanyate* for "is suggested." His avoidance cannot have been because he did not know the use of the words in this sense, for his contemporary Manoratha laughs at critics of the time "who will tell you with delight that a poem is full of *dhvani* but cannot tell you just what this *dhvani* is" (*Dhv.* 1.1c A). Perhaps Udbhaṭa wished to distance himself from the new enthusiasts and to keep as far as possible to the old terminology of criticism. But Indurāja's remark is justified to this extent: Udbhaṭa was fully aware of that type of semantic operation that Ānanda was later to call suggestiveness (*vyanjakaṭva*, *dhvani*) and of the importance to poetry of the suggestions which it could bring about. One might fairly say that in Udbhaṭa's mind the two main building blocks of Ānanda's critique, *rasa* and *dhvani*, were present, the first consciously, the second perhaps only subconsciously. But the blocks had not yet been built into a system.

It is said that in his old age King Jayāpiḍa became ruthless in the exaction of taxes, oppressing both his peasants and the brahmins. He died after ruling for thirty-one years and was succeeded by a number of worthless descendants. For nearly fifty years Kashmir fell back into its habitual state of misrule. Then in A.D. 855/856 a strong-willed minister set up a young man of a collateral line, Avantivarman, who was to rule for nearly three decades. King Avantivarman was descended from Utpala, an uncle of Jayāpiḍa's daughter-in-law, whence the new dynasty has come to be known as the Utpala Dynasty. Avantivarman and his minister Śūra brought the treasury back to solvency. They installed major works of drainage and irrigation. Once more the king became resplendent through the poets who graced his court. Kalhaṇa gives us the names of four of them (*Rāj.T.* 5.34): Muktākāṇa, Śivasvāmin,

¹² P. V. Kane puts the date of Prati and 950 (HSP, p. 197).

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Ānandavardhana, and Ratnākara. The works of Muktākana are lost. Of Śivasvāmin we possess a Buddhist kāvya, the *Kapphinābhuyudaya*. Of Ratnākara we have the longest of all classical kāvyas, the *Haravijaya*, and a small collection of clever verses, the *Vakroktipañcāsika*. Of Ānandavardhana it is now time to speak.

Of Ānandavardhana's life, beyond the fact that he was patronized by King Avantivarman, we know nothing except what can be inferred from his two extant works and their colophons. From these it appears that he was the son of Nona (*Devisātaka* 101) and that he bore the title Rājānaka (*Dhv.* 4 Conclusion A and note 3). Nothing is known of Nona. The title denotes no political position and probably implies no more than that he was given a stipend by the king.

Ānanda was the author of many books. In the *Dhvanyāloka* he refers to two earlier works, which are now lost: the *Arjunacarita*, "The Adventures of Arjuna"; and the *Viṣamabāṇalilā*, "The Sports of the Bowman Love." The first of these was evidently a Sanskrit *mahākāvya*. Ānanda tells us (3.10–14 e A) that he altered the traditional account of Arjuna's life so as to include new material of his own invention on Arjuna's adventures in the underworld. Abhinava quotes one stanza (3.25 L) of the poem, written in an unpleasing meter of unrelieved iambs, but it would be unfair to judge the work as a whole from one accidental quotation.

Of the *Viṣamabāṇalilā* we can say somewhat more. We are given four quotations from it and several remarks about its subject matter. The quotations show that it was written in Māhārāṣṭri Prakrit. It may have been in the form of a play (or a narrative work would be possible), for 3.15 A refers to "the scene where the God of Love meets with his friends [Youth and Springtime] in my *Viṣamabāṇalilā*." The purpose of the work, however, was to give instruction in poetry. In speaking of the variety which may be achieved by handling an insentient object as if it were sentient, Ānanda remarks, "This is a well-known procedure of great poets and has been described in detail for the instruction of poets in the *Viṣamabāṇalilā*" (4.7 A). I believe we can be more specific. The quotations which we have from the work exhibit various types of suggestiveness. The stanza at 2.1 b A exemplifies *arthātarasākramitavācyadhvani*; that at 2.27 b A is of *alānikāradhvani*. Concerning the verse quoted by Abhinava there may be some question as to the precise type of *dhvani* intended (see 3.15 L and notes), but it is certainly *dhvani* that is being illustrated. I would say, then, that the *Viṣamabāṇalilā* was Ānanda's first work propounding the new doctrine of suggestiveness, in a play or narrative written quite appropriately in

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Prakrit, for Prakrit was the language in which this style of suggestiveness first became popular and it may well have been from Prakrit that Ānanda's interest in *dhvani* was first stimulated. The work was most certainly not an anthology, as Sten Konow once suggested.¹³

Ānanda also wrote on philosophy. Abhinava twice refers (1.4 b L and 4.5 L) to a work of Ānanda's called the *Tattvāloka*, which from the context of the references seems to have dealt with both metaphysics and literature. Again, Ānanda himself speaks of his intention to write a book which would examine the doctrines of the Buddhists (3.47 A). Commenting on this passage, Abhinava tells us that the book to which Ānanda refers was his *Dharmottaravivṛti*,¹⁴ an "explanation" of Dharmottara's commentary (*tikā*) on the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* of Dharmakīrti. Although the underlying texts here of Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara are preserved, at least in Tibetan translations (see 3.47 L, note 6), Ānanda's *Vivṛti*, like the *Tattvāloka*, seems to be irretrievably lost.¹⁵ It is perhaps natural that Ānanda should have chosen Dharmottara as representative of the Buddhist viewpoint, for Dharmottara had taught his doctrine in Kashmir under the recent reign of King Jayapīda. But it is unusual for a devout Hindu to have written on such abstruse points of Buddhist epistemology and metaphysics as Ānanda must have found in the *Pramāṇaviniścayadharmaṭṭari*.

Ānanda was indeed a devout Hindu, as appears from the stanza quoted at 3.43 b A and from the *Deviśataka*, a poem that has been published in the KM Series (ninth guchaka). The poem consists of 103 trick stanzas (*yamakas* and *citrabandhas*) in praise of the mother goddess. It culminates in a sort of crossword puzzle, a great wheel, the spokes of which are formed by sixteen stanzas, the outer rim by four other stanzas the syllables of which interlock with the spokes. The secret of the puzzle lies in an "inner rim" which gives the message: "The son of Nona has thus performed his worship of the Goddess under the

¹³ Rājaśekbara's *Korpūrāmañjari*, HOS Vol. 4, p. 193.

¹⁴ The statements of Kane (HSP, p. 194) and Jacobi (ZDMG 57, p. 328, note 9) are based on the incorrect reading of the KM edition of the *Locana*. The correct reading is *viniścayaṭikādīyām dharmaṭṭaryām*, not *dharmaṭṭamādīyām*.

¹⁵ Ānanda seems to have written still other books which are now lost. At least, that is what I infer from the scattered verses of his own which he quotes in the *Dhv*. Some of these verses, like the courtly stanza on his mistress's face (2.27 a A) and the stanza on discouragement (3.40 a A), may be occasional verses (*muktakas*) which never belonged to any larger collection. But others, such as the punning benedictions to Krishna and to the Sun God (2.21 f A), or to Rukmī (2.21 b A), would seem by their nature to have introduced major works.

title of 'The Goddess's Century,' as instructed in a dream, a worship unsurpassed by reason of her having been the instructress."

For suggestions as to why Ānanda chose to write this citrakāvya in praise of the Goddess when he casts such scorn on this type of composition in the Dhvanyāloka, I refer the reader to my forthcoming essay on the Devīśatāka in the Ernest Bender felicitation volume. I shall here remark only on the fact that the yamakas of the poem are musical and the citrabandhas extremely clever. If one may speak of better or worse citrakāvyas, the Devīśatāka must rank with the better.

In the Vṛtti of the Dhvanyāloka Ānanda proves himself one of the great prose stylists of Sanskrit literature. No matter how delicate or complex the subject, he is always clear. He varies his expression, so that no matter how often he comes back to the importance of rasa and dhvani he seems never to repeat himself or become tedious, while the rhythm of his sentences gives constant delight. In comparison with his prose, his verses for the most part are disappointing. They go against his own advice by being too consciously clever. But I make exception of the noble stanza which he gives us at 3.43 b A. I should like to think that it represents his view of his life and of his life's work.

I am weary from much painting of the world,
for although I used the new and wondrous sight of poets
which busies itself in giving taste to feeling
and used the insight of philosophers
which shows us objects as they really are.
I never found, O God recumbent on the Ocean,
a joy like that which comes from love of Thee.

It is for the content of the so-called Dhvanyāloka, however, rather than as a poet or a master of prose style, that Ānanda has become famous. As regards the original title of his great work, one should note that none of the manuscripts gives it the name of Dhvanyāloka.¹⁶ The colophons of the manuscripts refer to it usually as Saḥṛdayāloka, "A Light for Connoisseurs"; sometimes as Saḥṛdayaḥṛdayāloka, "A Light for the Hearts of Connoisseurs"; and rarely as Kāvyāloka, "A Light on Poetry." The oldest commentator on the text whose work has survived, Abhinavagupta, refers to his commentary as the Saḥṛdayālokalocana, "An Eye for the Saḥṛdayāloka,"¹⁷ and this is the title found in the colophons of the first three chapters of his commentary in the printed

¹⁶ See Kane, HSP, p. 181, and Krishnamoorthy's edition, p. 36, note 4.

¹⁷ The references are noted by Kane HSP, p. 170, note 1.

editions. The colophon of the fourth chapter, which derives from a separate manuscript tradition, gives the name of the work as *Kāvyāloka*.¹⁸ In the absence of a critical edition of Ānanda's great work¹⁹ the colophon readings may not be decisive, but the weight of Abhinava's testimony when added to their evidence seems to clinch the matter. The name which Ānanda gave to his work, I believe, was *Sahṛdayāloka*.

The *Sahṛdayāloka*, then, to give it that title, opens with a spirited defense of suggestion as an independent semantic power. As I have indicated, the subject of suggestion was not a new one. It had occupied the thoughts of Udbhaṭa. The term *dhuani* that Ānanda uses had been laughed at by Manoratha. An important stimulus to discussion, it seems to me, must have been the Prakrit literature which formed an important part of Kashmiri critical studies. The first five quotations in Ānanda's opening defense are all taken from Prakrit. The reason is not far to seek. If we look at the verses of the *Sattasai*, we see that it is suggestion upon which the effect of almost every stanza depends. The *gāthā* stanza, in which they are written, is so brief a poetic form that it could scarcely attain a powerful effect by any other means. Such verses lend themselves naturally to the thesis which Ānanda set out to defend.

To understand the argument we must cast a brief glance at the traditional Indian theories of meaning into which the new doctrine was introduced. These theories had been developed over a long period of time by the grammarians and the ritualists (*Mimāṃsakas*). The Buddhists too, in the writings of Dignāga and Dharmakirti, had had their say. It was generally agreed that words had two sorts of semantic power: the power of direct denotation (*abhidhā*) and a secondary power of indirect indication (*gunavṛtti, bhakti, upacāra, lakṣyāṇā*).²⁰ By denotation, a particular group of phonemes in a particular order, say *g-a-u-h* ("ox"), denotes an animal with horns, hump and tail. But when one says *gaur vāhikōḥ*, "the Punjabi is an ox," meaning that the man is stupid, it is the secondary power that is working in the word. The secondary power may be elicited by a common property of two objects, as in the example just quoted, or it may be elicited by some other relation, for example that of possessor with the thing possessed, as in

¹⁸ S. K. De, *The Text of the Kāvyālokaścana IV*, p. 265.

¹⁹ Krishnamoorthy's edition is helpful, for he gives the variants of a South Indian MS from Moodabidre as well as of the NSP MSS and occasionally of other MSS from the BORI. But there exist many manuscripts about which he is silent.

²⁰ For the distinctive uses of the Sanskrit terms see I. I. K. note 2.

nagaram pravisanti kundāḥ, "the spears enter the city," meant is spearmen.²¹

In addition to these two powers, the school of ritualists founded by Kumārila held that there existed a third power which furnished a "final meaning" to the sentence as a whole. They called this the *tātparyasakti*, and defended its reality against their opponents, the Prābhākara ritualists, who claimed that the denotative force in each word kept on operating until at the conclusion of the sentence it worked automatically in harmony with the other words.

These three powers left no room for what Ānanda considered to be of all semantic powers the most valuable for poetic expression, a power which in its most general aspect he calls *vyanjakatva*, the power of suggestion, or, more literally, the power of revelation (as of a lamp which reveals the objects upon which it casts its light). He calls this power *dhvani* when it is in its purest form, that is, when it predominates over the other semantic powers in the sentence. He begins the proof of its existence by a number of humorous examples. The suggestion may be of an act that is the very opposite of what is denoted. One of his examples is this (1.4 c A):

Mother-in-law sleeps here, I there;
look, traveler, while it is light.
For at night when you cannot see,
you must not fall into my bed.

What is denoted here is a prohibition. There is obviously no secondary operation of metaphor or the like in the stanza. The *tātparyasakti*, if such there be, merely conveys the syntax of the sentence. The syntax is still impeccable if we take the statement as a prohibition. And yet we know, as the traveler must have known, that the prohibition is unintended and that the woman speaking is inviting him to sleep with her.

By the use of examples Ānanda builds up a typology of suggestion. The type to which the example just given belongs he calls *avivakṣitavācya*, suggestion "where the denoted sense is unintended." The type has two varieties. In the variety just exemplified the denoted sense is *ātyantatiraskṛta*, "entirely set aside." The second variety is where the

²¹ In a rough way one may say that a secondary meaning in Sanskrit corresponds to the Greco-Latin "trope"; but only in a rough way, because several of the traditional Greco-Latin tropes (e.g., hyperbole, allegory) are treated by the Sanskrit poets as figures of speech.

denotation is not wholly abandoned but is "shifted to something else" (*arthāntarasarikramita*). When we say, "The spears enter the city," we are using the secondary power (we are using a trope). The literal meaning of "spears," its denoted object, namely, weapons of a specific shape, has been replaced by men carrying spears. But why do we speak in this way? Why do we use such secondary or tropical expressions? Usually, say Ānanda and Abhinava, in order to achieve some suggestion. In the case of the spears entering, one imagines a more compact and injurious force breaking into the city than would be expressed by the literal statement.

The "first of poets," Vālmīki, wrote of the winter:

The sun has stolen our affection for the moon,
whose circle now is dull with frost
and like a mirror blinded by one's breath
shines no more.

Ānanda quotes this verse (2.1c A) for its use of the word "blinded" and Abhinava comments both on the secondary usage and the suggestion. The word "blinded," he says, is used in a secondary sense here, because only sentient creatures can be literally blind. The purpose, though, of using this trope is to suggest "numberless properties [of the winter moon] such as uselessness, an exceptional loss of beauty, and so on." A point that is noticed often by both our authors is that suggestion vastly increases the scope of words. The denotation is extremely narrow; the secondary sense includes only things (objects, properties, acts) which are closely related. The suggestion opens up a new world.

So much for suggestion of the first type. In one of its varieties it is poetically useful, but in neither does it yet reveal the ultimate purpose of literature. That revelation lies within a second type of suggestion, which Ānanda calls *vivakṣitānyaparavācya*, "where the literal sense is intended but only as leading on to something further." This type also Ānanda divides into two varieties, depending on whether or not we are conscious of the succession from the literal to the "something further." Much the more important of the two varieties is that where we are not conscious of any interval between the two senses (*asamplaksitakrama*), for in this variety the "something other" is a *rasa* or something closely allied to a *rasa*; and *rasa* in the critique of Ānanda is the ultimate aim of literature.

The word *rasa* in its most literal sense means juice, taste, flavor. In a technical sense the *BhNS* uses it to express the flavor or mood which

characterizes a play if the author and actors are successful in their work. According to *BhNS* 6.15 there are eight possible flavors which a play may exhibit: the erotic (*śrigāra*), the comic (*hāsyā*), the tragic (*karuṇā*), the furious or cruel (*raudra*), the heroic (*vīra*), the fearsome or timorous (*bhayānaka*), the gruesome or loathsome (*bibhatsā*), and the wondrous (*adbhuta*). To these Ānanda adds a ninth, the rasa of peace (*sānta*). These flavors, as their names indicate, are based on various human emotions, the *sthāyibhāvas* or "abiding emotions," as they are called, which are listed in *BhNS* 6.17.²² Just how the rasas differ from the emotions was a question much argued in Ānanda's age and in the following two centuries. Curiously, Ānanda has never a word to say on the subject; and unfortunately most students of the *Dhvanyāloka* have inconsiderately filled the gap by superimposing Abhinava's explanation on the text of Ānanda. I propose to come at an answer more cautiously by recalling the words of *BhNS* and its oldest commentators and then examining Ānanda's use of the term.

BhNS 6.31 +3 (the famous *rasasūtra*) tells us that "A rasa is produced by the combining of the determinants (*vibhāvas*), the consequents (*anubhāvas*), and the temporary or transient states of mind (*vyabhicārināḥ* or *vyabhicāribhāvas*)."²³ These technical terms require explanation. By determinants are meant those factors which make the realization of the emotion and the rasa possible. They are of two sorts, objective (*ālambanavibhāva*) and stimulative (*uddiponavibhāva*). The objective determinants are the objects toward which the emotions are felt. In the erotic flavor they will be the lover and his beloved; in the tragic, the person or persons who suffer; in the loathsome, the object of disgust. The stimulative determinants in the erotic will be such factors as the springtime, gardens, or a bridal chamber; in tragedy, such factors as separation from dear ones, death, or capture. The consequents of the emotions may be regarded by the audience as its symptoms; in

²² They are: sexual desire (*rati*), laughter (*hāsa*), grief (*soka*), anger (*krodha*), heroic energy (*utsāha*), fear (*bhaya*), disgust (*yugupsā*), and wonder or amazement (*vismaya*).

²³ *Vibhāvānubhāvayabhibhārisamyoग्द rasanispatti*. The commentator Lollata supplied a genitive, *sthāyināḥ*, to go with the ablative compound. That is, he interpreted the sūtra to say, "A rasa is produced by the combining of the abiding emotion with the determinants, the consequents, and the transient states of mind." Later commentators found fault with this interpretation, for they restricted the rasa to the audience. In the case of the audience, the basic emotions cannot be observed without the previous presence of the determinants, etc. But as we shall see, Ānanda did not restrict the rasa in this way.

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the erotic flavor, for example, they will include the sidelong glances, smiles, the graceful movements of the limbs. The temporary or transient states of mind are listed as thirty-three in number. Among them are discouragement, apprehension, jealousy, embarrassment, intoxication. Some are appropriate to only one basic emotion, some to several. To them are added eight involuntary states (*sāttvikabhdas*), which a good actor, however, was trained to represent at will: perspiration, horripilation, trembling, fainting, and so on.

An example will make these technical terms clearer. Ānanda quotes (4.2 a A) the following stanza from the Amaru collection as an example of the erotic flavor (*śrigārūsa*):

Seeing that the attendant had left the bedroom,
the young wife rose half upright from the bed
and, gazing long upon her husband's face
as he lay there feigning sleep, at last took courage
and kissed him lightly, only to discover
his feint from the rising flesh upon his cheek.
When then she hung her head in shame, her dear one
seized her, laughing, and kissed her in good earnest.

Here the objective determinants are the husband and his bride. The stimulative determinant is the bedroom in which the lovers find themselves alone. The consequents of the bride's basic emotion are her gazing at her husband's face and kissing him; the consequents of his, the laughter and kisses with which the stanza ends. Meanwhile we have the bride's transient state of shame or embarrassment and the involuntary state evident in the rising flesh on the husband's cheek. It is by the combination of these factors that *śrigārūsa*, here of the type "love-in-enjoyment" (*sambhogasṛigāra*), is suggested.

Bhaṭṭa Lollāṭa, the oldest commentator of the *BhNS* whose views are known to us,²⁴ said that the *rasa* was simply an intensified form of the abiding emotion,²⁵ which it assumed after being strengthened by the determinants and similar factors; and this is clearly the sense in which Dandin had taken the term many years earlier.²⁶ Lollāṭa also stated that the *rasa* had its place both in the character being portrayed

²⁴ They are known from three sources: the *Locana* on 2.4, *ABh.* on 6.31 +3, and *Mammata* 4.28.

²⁵ *Tena sthāyy eva ubhduvnubhduddibhir upacita rasah.*

²⁶ Dandin 2.275: *yuktotkārṣam ca tāt trayam*, where *trayam* refers to the three rasas of figures of speech. Again, after giving an example of the figure *ūrjasvin*, he explains (2.283): *ity dravya pardm koṭīm kroḍho raudrātmālām gataḥ.*

and in the actor.²⁷ The most glaring fault of this interpretation, that it leaves out the audience, was partially addressed by Śaṅkuka, the next commentator, who may have lived about Ānanda's time. He stated that the basic emotion (*bhāva*), supposed to exist in the character being portrayed, was imitated by the actor for the delight of the audience and was given a different name, namely, *rasa*, because it was an imitation.²⁸ This theory too has its drawbacks, which led to still further theories by Bhṛṭṭāñyaka and Abbinava. But those lie beyond the time of Ānanda, and I have shown enough now to take up Ānanda's use of the word.

Ānanda uses the word *rasa* of a basic emotion that has been heightened,²⁹ sometimes from whatever reason, but most specifically from the combination prescribed by *BhNS*. An example of his use of the term in the most general sense is *Dhv.* 3.26 a A:

The peaceful is indeed apprehended as a *rasa*. It is characterized by the full development of the happiness that comes from the dying off of desire. As has been said, "The joy of pleasure in the world / and the greater joy of pleasures found in heaven / are not worth a sixteenth of the joy / that comes from the dying of desire" (*MBh.* 12.186.36).

Here *rasa* is simply a heightened form of peaceful happiness (*sukha*). Similarly, "For śrīgītarasa, as it is regularly the object of the experience of humans and is therefore dear to them, is the most important [of the rasas]" (3.29 A). Here one cannot argue that the regular object of human experience is the aesthetic pleasure of love poetry. What he means is a heightened emotion of sexual love.

Ānanda conceives this *rasa* to abide in the character invented by the poet or in the poet himself, as well as in the audience. As for the first: "The speaker may be the poet or a character invented by the poet. If the latter, he may be devoid of *rasa* and *bhāva*, or he may be possessed of *rasa* and *bhāva*" (3.6 g A). As for the poet himself, it is when he is under such a heightened state of emotion as *rasa* that he becomes capable of writing the suggestive poetry that will transfer this *rasa* to his hearers. The process is illustrated by the story of the first poet, Vālmiki,

²⁷ *Sa cobhayor apy anukārye 'nukartarye api.*

²⁸ *Sthāyi bhāvo mukhyardmddisthāyanukarana-rūpa 'nukaranorūpatvā eva ca nā-māntarena vyapadiṣṭo rasah;* *ABh* on *BhNS* 6.31 (Vol. I, p. 272, two lines from bottom of page; given also by Gnoli, *The Aesthetic Experience*, p. 4, lines 8-9).

²⁹ Even after the time of Ānanda, Indurāja considered a *rasa* to be simply the basic emotion which had undergone strengthening (Indurāja on *Udbbata* 4.3-4). The Candrikākāra seems to have held this same view; see 3.4 a L. note 4.

who was so saddened by the wailing of the curlew bird who had lost its mate that Vālmīki's grief (*soka*, the basic emotion) was transformed into the tragic *rasa* of the *Rāmāyaṇa* (*Dhv.* 1.5 *K* and *A*). The notion of Abhinava that Vālmīki ruminated on the determinants and consequents of the bird's bereavement and so developed his *rasa* in the scriptural way strikes me as an addition quite foreign to the view of Ānanda.

In most cases, of course, Ānanda's *rasa* is indeed produced in the scriptural way by the poetic use of determinants and consequents. The examples of this use, as in the verse of Amaru quoted above, are legion throughout the book. I wish to emphasize, however, that Ānanda's sense of *rasa* has none of the aesthetic removal, the impersonality and generalization, which we shall see Abhinava give to the term.

Ānanda was the first Indian critic to state that a *rasa* cannot be directly expressed. If we say, "A young man and his bride were very much in love," we give the hearer no flavor at all of what the love was like. This can be done only by suggestion. Accordingly, *rasa* is as important in poetry and literary prose as it is in plays, for there is no other way of enlisting the sympathy of the reader. By suggestion the *rasa* arises without any conscious realization that our experience has been preceded by a perception of the determinants, consequents, and transitory states of mind. These have been denoted literally and are not unintended by the author. They are intended, however, only as being productive of the *rasa*.

I shall not describe in this Introduction the second variety of *vivakṣitānyaparavācya*, the variety where we are forced to think about the literal sense for a moment before we perceive the suggestion and are therefore conscious of the interval between the literal and the suggested sense. The reader may examine that variety with all its subvarieties in the translation which follows (2.20ff.). Here I wish to speak of matters more strictly pertinent to my purpose.

Ānanda tells us that *dhvani*, that is, suggestion, or more specifically suggestion acting as the primary sense of a passage, is the soul of poetry (1.1 *K*). But that is only half the story, for his critique is one which explains the goal of poetry to be *rasa*, and *dhvani* to be its means. Now the concept of *rasa*, it seems to me, is more important than that of *dhvani* in furnishing a criterion of beauty. For not all *dhvani* leads to *rasa*, nor does all *dhvani* lead to beauty.³⁰ And it is as the discoverer

³⁰ Only the most ardent enthusiasts will find beauty in the punning suggestions of the verses quoted under 2.21f.

of a workable critique of beauty in literature that Ānanda merits the fame which has long been accorded him. The works of previous poets in India, although of interest for their analysis of language, are almost useless for this, the chief goal of literary criticism. One might write a poem embodying all the figures of speech listed by Bhāmaha and Dandin and compose it in a style calculated by its phonemic and word-joining form to produce sweetness or strength. With a modest amount of care in syntax one could add clarity. All this would not ensure the poem's being beautiful, delighting its hearers. Indeed, if one followed the definitions too closely, the composition would more likely bore them. One gets to the reader only through the flavors deriving from the basic emotions. To do that, suggestion is necessary, but the test lies in the flavor.

It might be thought that for purposes of furnishing a criterion of beauty or of literary excellence the achieving of a *rasa* suffers from a touch of the vagueness and lack of precision of which we complained in speaking of the "qualities" of poetry. On what basis is one to say that one verse achieves *rasa* and another does not? Of course the final test will be the judgment of the heart. But to help the reader and the composer—for Ānanda always writes with both types of student in mind—he speaks of several supplemental tests.

The literary piece must exhibit appropriateness (*aucitya*). To begin with, the plot must be appropriate to the emotions, the determinants, and the consequents which are to produce the intended *rasa*. In exhibiting the heroism of a human king, for example, one should not engage him in adventures that could be accomplished only by a god (3.10-14 A). If a plot as given in the epics and Purāṇas contains a trait that is inappropriate to the character of the hero or to the intended *rasa*, one must either omit it or add some element to the plot to achieve the needed appropriateness (3.10-14e A). In this regard Ānanda cites Kālidāsa as an example to be followed. His reference is in general terms only, but we might supply such a specific instance as the Śākuntala, where in the epic prototype the king abandons with needless cruelty the heroine whom he has seduced.¹ Such action would be inappropriate to

¹ In the Critical Edition of the *MBh.*, after being forced by a voice from heaven to recognize his son, the king says to Śākuntalā, "It was to purify you [i.e., to convince my people of your purity] that I did this" (*MBh.* 1.69.40). The Southern version, however (*MBh.* 1.627" S), says that he had simply forgotten her.

true love and to the noble character of King Duṣyanta as Kālidāsa conceives it. So Kālidāsa invented the story of the ring of recognition,² by losing which Śakuntalā unhappily brings upon the king his involuntary forgetfulness.

All the *sandhyarīgas*, the plot-components which are prescribed act by act for a play in the *BhNS*, are to be employed only insofar as they are consistent with the *rasa* which the author intends to display. In this regard Ānanda very justly praises the *Ratnāvalī* and reprimands the *Venīśamīhāra*. In the latter play Duryodhana suddenly exhibits amorousness (*vilāsa*) in the second act, which is otherwise filled with preparations for war and vengeance, simply because Bharata prescribed *vilāsa* as a *sandhyarīga* of second acts. As Abhinava puts it, the author should have taken the word *vilāsa* in a wider meaning and have depicted in Duryodhana a yearning not for sex but for some goal more appropriate to the spirit of the play.

The concept of appropriateness was further elaborated by later critics of the Kashmir school. Kṣemendra in the generation following Abhinava wrote an entire treatise on the subject. What is characteristic of Ānanda's treatment, and what I would emphasize in taking a view of his work as a whole, is that he always associates his appropriateness closely with *rasa*. In great literature the words must be appropriate to the plot, the characters, the immediate situation, but they become appropriate only through their enabling these factors to build up to the intended *rasa*.

Ānanda brings also other, older elements of the critical tradition: a subservience to the same final goal. He redefines the old qualities of sweetness and strength by treating them as ornaments of particular *rasas*. Sweetness is what ornaments śṛigāra, whereas strength ornaments the *rasa* of fury (2.6 A to 2.9 A). Style (*sarighātanā, rīti*) also is influenced by the *rasa*, as it is in intimate connection with the qualities, but a sparingness or frequency of compound word structure is no sure guide, in Ānanda's opinion, to the presence or absence of

² Winternitz and others supposed that Kālidāsa had taken the story of the ring from the *Sṛṣṭikhaṇḍa* of the *Padmapurāṇa*. The *Sṛṣṭikhaṇḍa* occurs only in the Bengali version of the *Pad.P.* and is a late Vaiśeṣika reworking of an earlier text. The reworking is later even than the Muslim conquest of Benares. The Śakuntalā story occurs in chapters 1–6, which are part of the Vaiśeṣika reworking. They are therefore likely to be a derivative of Kālidāsa's play and are certainly not its source. See Asoke Chatterjee, *Padma-Purāṇa: A Study*, Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series LVIII (1967), pp. 104 ff., especially p. 114.

sweetness or strength. Furthermore style is influenced by genre. The single stanza (*muktaka*) offers less scope for a heavy style than linked stanzas (e.g., the *kulaka*). The heavily ornamented compound style is especially appropriate to the prose romance (3.8).

Ānanda's critique with its emphasis on *rasa* offers for the first time a criterion for the figures of speech. A figure of speech is well constructed when it strengthens the *rasa*. To do this it must not be overworked. Ānanda quotes a verse (2.18-19e A) which begins, "In anger she has bound him tightly in the noose of her soft arms." Abhinava remarks that "were one to continue the metaphor furnished by the woman's creeper-like arms acting as a noose for binding, the woman would become a huntress, the bedroom would become a prison or cage, and so on, all of which would be most inappropriate." In general, figures should never be so elaborate as to take either the poet's mind or the reader's mind off the main goal, which is *rasa*. As Horace would say, there should be no purple patches.

In several passages (e.g., 2.3ff. and 3.34ff.) Ānanda distinguishes between *dhvani*, as a suggestion which furnishes the predominant meaning of a sentence, and a subordinated form of suggestion which he calls *gunibhūtavyanyigya*. Among his examples of the latter type is a stanza which he quotes twice (at 3.34 A and 1.13e A).

The sunset is flushed with red; the day goes ever before.
Ah, such is the way of fate that never the two shall meet.

As the Sanskrit word for sunset is feminine (*sandhyā*) and the word for day masculine (*divasah*), the suggestion arises of two lovers prevented by adverse fate from ever joining. But the stanza is obviously from a description of sunset. The literal sense remains predominant. The suggestion functions as a figure of speech.³

This distinction has often been misunderstood by modern Sanskrit scholars and among them by some of the best. Jacobi, in the introduction to his admirable translation of the *Dhvanyāloka* (ZDMG 56 [1902], p. 400), speaks of the poetry of subordinated suggestion as "eine Poesie zweiter Güte," a phrase repeated by Winternitz twenty years later.⁴ S. K. De, in his *History of Sanskrit Poetics* (II, p. 162), uses the same pejorative. "By the side of *dhvani kāvya*,"⁵ he writes, "in which the

³ There was argument over whether to call the figure *samāsakti* or *dksepa*. See notes on the passages where the stanza is quoted.

⁴ *Geschichte der indischen Literatur* III, p. 18.

⁵ A phrase, by the way, which Ānanda nowhere uses.

suggested sense is predominant, we have poetry of second-rate excellence, designated *gunī-bhūta-vyāngya kāvya*, in which the unexpressed plays a subordinate part."

This error should be corrected, for nowhere in the *Dhvanyāloka* does Ānanda characterize the poetry of *gunibhūtavyāngya* as second-rate. That characterization appears first in Mammaṭa (1.4-5), who speaks of *madhyamam kāvyaṁ* as opposed to *uttamam*. Mammaṭa threw all cases where the suggestion was obvious (*agūḍha*) or not beautiful (*asundara*) into the category of *gunibhūtavyāngya*. Ānanda, on the other hand, refers to subordinated suggestion (3.36 b '4) as having been used by the great poets and states that it can be extremely beautiful and should be studied by sensitive readers. The very examples which he gives of *gunibhūtavyāngya* (e.g., at 1.13d, e, 3.39, 3.40) should inform the reader of his evaluation, for they are among the most beautiful stanzas in the whole book. I shall not quote them here, as the reader, if curious, can look them up in the translation.

What prompted Ānanda to make this distinction between *dhvani* and subordinated suggestion was an historical fact, not an aesthetic judgment. Many cases of suggestion had been preempted by the older poeticians, especially Udbhaṭa, under their definitions of the figures of speech. Thus, according to Udbhaṭa, the figure *samāsokti* (compound statement) occurs where from a description of the object-in-hand (*prastutārtha*), that is, the primary object of the sentence, one understands some other object (Indurāja 2.10; Vivṛti 2.21). An example would be the little stanza which I have just quoted, "The sunset is flushed with red." The figure *aprastutapraśāmsā* (reference by means of the extraneous; in some instances equivalent to allegory) occurs where from an extraneous object (*aprastutārtha*) we understand the object that the poet really has in mind (Indurāja 5.8; Vivṛti 5.14). Now it was Ānanda's goal to break away from the tradition of figures of speech, to set up suggestion (*dhvani*) as an independent power of words, and to establish the suggested meaning as the soul of poetry. As the Sanskrit term for a figure of speech (*alaṅkāra*) means literally an ornament, Ānanda was also faced with the logical problem of how the soul could act as an ornament. One might conceive of the soul's being ornamented, say by its body or its virtues, but by what sort of logic could a primary element, the thing-to-be-ornamented (*alaṅkārya*), itself act as an ornament?

Ānanda's solution to the problem was to relegate all instances of suggestion which had been included in the figures of speech by the

older critics⁶ to a subordinate position. In that position they could very well serve as ornaments. An example will show the method which he followed and its success in achieving his goal.

There is a famous stanza, written perhaps by Bāna but included in the collection of Amaru, which likens the purifying power of God to the fire by which he destroyed the triple citadel of the demons.⁷

The women of the Triple City wept from lotus eyes
as Śambhu's arrow-flame embraced them;
but still, though shaken off, the fire caught their hands,
though struck, did pluck their garments' hem,
denied, it seized their hair, and, scorned
like lover who has lately loved another, lay before their f t.
May this same fire burn away your sins.

In this stanza, as Ānanda remarks, the description of the demon women suggests that unhappy variety of *sringāra* which is so close to tragedy, namely love-in-separation, here brought about by jealous anger. But this flavor (*īśyāviprnlambhaśringārasa*) is not the final aim or meaning of the stanza, which is rather the extraordinary power of God. As the suggested *rasa* of love is not the final aim, he characterizes it as subordinated suggestion, not *dhvani* in the strict sense. This subordinated element can logically act as an ornament. Bhāmaha's definition of *rasavadalaikāra* is thereby maintained without injury to Ānanda's new doctrine of *dhvani*. But there is nothing second-rate about such instances of subordinated suggestion. He calls such instances "derivative of *dhvani*" (*dhvaniniṣyanda*, 3.36 b A and 3.41-42 b A) and remarks under 3.40 that such instances "may again turn into *dhvani* when regarded from the viewpoint of [the final] *rasa*." In the stanza just quoted one may take the final meaning to be the *rasa* of God's heroism or the *rasa* of the worshiper's love of God. The historical reasons which prompted Ānanda to make the distinction between predominant and subordinated suggestion are no discovery of mine. They were noticed by both Jacobi and S. K. De.

One final question must be raised and answered concerning Ānanda before I move on to the period of his commentator Abhinava. This is the question whether he was the author of the whole of the *Dhvanyāloka* or of only a part of it.

The text of the *Dhvanyāloka* consists of 138 *Kārikās*,⁸ written in simple verses (almost all in *śloka* or *āryā* meter) and intended to be memorized. Expatiating on the verses is a prose commentary (*Vṛtti*), approximately twenty times their length. Within this prose commentary again are some twenty-nine simple verses, indistinguishable in style from the *Kārikās*, but usually introduced with some such remark as "This is a supportive (*parikara*) stanza," or "Herewith a summarizing (*samkṣepa*, *samgraha*) stanza." These supportive and summarizing stanzas can also be distinguished from the *Kārikās* by the fact that the prose *Vṛtti* never comments on them. In the case of two of them (3.41-42 a A), which are not introduced by the usual remark but by the simple phrase, "it is stated," Abhinava tells us specifically that the matter is stated by the author of the *Vṛtti*.

Until the mid-nineteenth century it was always supposed in India that all this material was the work of one man, Ānandavardhana. And this is quite in keeping with the form in which other Sanskrit treatises on literary criticism have been handed down. Kuntaka's *Vakroktijivita*, written in the age of Abhinava, comes to us in precisely the same combination of *Kārikās*, prose commentary, and supplemental stanzas. Except for the absence of supplemental verses the same is true of the text of Mammaṭa, Ruyyaka, Hemacandra, and Viśvanātha. Not only literary criticism but Sanskrit treatises on most scientific or philosophical subjects tended to be composed in this form. One may instance the works of Bharṭṛhari the grammarian, Kumārila the ritualist, Dharmakīrti the Buddhist.

Then in the mid-nineteenth century a remark of Georg Bühler⁹ suggested that the *Kārikās* of the *Dhvanyāloka* might be by an older author and only the *Vṛtti* by Ānanda. Thirty years later Hermann Jacobi took up the question in earnest.¹⁰ He pointed out that the question of *dhvani* must have been discussed for many years prior to the time of Ānanda. This follows from the variety of opinions on the subject of *dhvani* which *Kārikā* 1.1 ascribes to "others." So far so good. But

⁸ In the Kasbi Series text, upon which we have based our translation, the *Kārikās* come to a total of 142. But three of them (4.4, 4.9, and 4.10) are almost surely not intended as *Kārikās* but as summary or supportive stanzas, while 3.5 is a quotation from some other author. See notes to the translation of those passages.

⁹ "Detailed Report of a Tour in Search of Sanskrit MSS in Kashmir, Rajputana and Central India," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bombay*, extra number 1877, p. 69.

¹⁰ See especially the i

Jacobi went on to claim that Abhinava, the oldest commentator that we have on the text, furnishes evidence of a dual authorship.

With the adherence of other Sanskritists to the theory of dual authorship, a vast amount of ink has flowed on the question. It was pointed out that the *Abhidhārvttimātrikā*, written in about A.D. 900-925, attributed the doctrine of *dhvani* to *sahrdayāḥ* ("connoisseurs," or possibly "the honorable connoisseur"), whereupon one misguided scholar claimed that the name of the author of the *Kārikās* must have been *Sahrdaya*. On the other hand, it was established that *Rājaśekhara* about the same time attributed one of the supplemental *ślokas* of the *Dhvanyāloka* to *Ānanda* and, in a verse preserved in the *Sūktimuktāvalī* (4.78), attributed to *Ānanda* the whole introduction of *dhvani* into poetics.

The student who would examine all the arguments which can be adduced for dual authorship should consult Kane's *HSP*, pp. 153-190, where that great scholar, like the lawyer that he was, gives a full-dress argument in its favor. Almost all of Kane's arguments, like those of Jacobi, are based on the remarks of Abhinavagupta, who frequently supplements such a phrase of the *Vṛtti* as *idam pratipāditam* ("this has been stated") by some such addition as *vṛtikārena* ("by the author of the *Vṛtti*") or by *asmanmūlagranthakārena* ("by the author of the basic text [i.e., of the *Kārikās*]"). From such passages Kane argues that Abhinava regarded the two portions as written by different authors. Against his view, Dr. Satkari Mookerjee (*B. C. Law Volumes*, I, pp. 179-194), followed by Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy (*IHQ* 24, pp. 180-194 and 300-311), has argued that Abhinava is merely distinguishing the different functions of one man. To me the arguments on both sides are inconclusive because Abhinava is so inconsistent. There is no doubt that he regarded *Ānanda* as the author of the *Vṛtti*. There are passages in the *Locana*, I admit, where he seems to regard the author of the *Kārikās* as someone else. But then in his *Abhinavabhratī* (Vol. 2, pp. 299-300) he explicitly ascribes two of the *Kārikās* of the *Dhvanyāloka* to *Ānanda*.¹¹ I am not at all confident that Abhinava had any historical knowledge on the matter. A man who could speak of *Manoratha* as a contemporary of *Ānanda* (1.1c *L*) and who confuses

¹¹ Kane tries to explain away this inconsistency by saying that *Bhattatauta* was Abhinava's teacher in *BhNS*, whereas *Bhattendurāja* was his teacher in *Dhu.*, and that in both cases Abhinava merely followed his teacher's opinion. But that argument is destructive of Kane's goal. *Bhattatauta's* opinion would be more valuable than Abhinava's and no less valuable than *Bhattendurāja's*.

Abhinanda with his father Jayantabhaṭṭa (3.7 L, but cf. note 3) is not to be much trusted in matters of history.

Two considerations persuade me of the single authorship of the *Dhvanyāloka*. First, there is not a single instance in the *Vṛtti* of substantial disagreement with the *Kārikās*. There is not even a case where the *Vṛtti* interprets a *Kārikā* in a forced or unnatural manner. This is rarely the case where one Sanskrit critic comments on the work of another. There is much matter and long arguments in the *Vṛtti* which are not in the *Kārikās*, it is true. If there were not, there would have been no purpose in writing the *Vṛtti*. But these matters and arguments are auxiliary. They do not change the basic system.

Second, if some earlier genius had established the system of *dhvani* and the general critique of literature in terms of *dhvani* and *rasa* which is found in the *Kārikās*, I find it inconceivable that a later author should not have given some praise, some respect, to him. Indeed that he should not even have mentioned his name. Important texts are never treated by the Sanskrit tradition as anonymous. They always carry the name of an author, even if modern scholarship may prove that the name is mistaken or fictitious. If the *Kārikās* are not by Ānanda, his silence regarding their authorship would be an instance of disrespect to an intellectual master without parallel in Sanskrit literature.¹²

¹² Professor Patwardhan has called my attention to an article by Dr. Semarat Paranavitana, "The *Dhvanyāloka* in fifteenth century Ceylon," JAOS 94 (1971), pp. 131-133. The article contains the text and translation of a Sanskrit inscription giving a thesis (*sthāpona*) upheld in debate by a scholar at the court of King Parākramabābu VI (A.D. 1412-1467) to the effect that the *Dhvansikārikās* were written by a Buddhist named Dharmadāsa. The debater's evidence consists in his statement that a manuscript of the *Dhvansikārikās* in the library of the King of Suvarṇadvīpa (Sumatra) bore on its last page the statement "Dharmadāsa-pandita-virocitam." The debater seems not to have seen this manuscript himself, but to have heard of it from a Rādhākṛṣṇa-pandita, who gave the further information that the first twenty *Kārikās* of the manuscript were not to be found in copies of the *Dhvansikārikās* in India. In these verses the author divided semantic powers into *arthasakti* and *vyavajyanasakti*, from the latter of which springs *dhvani*. The debater argues that Ānandavardhana left out these verses because they were too obviously connected with the tradition by which the Buddha is said to have taught *sārthaḥ sayañjano dharmah*.

Professor Patwardhan, I think, gives more credence to this thesis than I do. If there was indeed such a manuscript in a royal library of Sumatra, I should think it must have been a Buddhist reworking of the *Dhv.* verses. The normal meaning of *arthato vyavajyanato dharmadeśanā* in Buddhist texts is "the teaching of the letter and spirit of the Law." I much doubt that these terms would have been applied

Soon after the death of King Avantivarman (A.D. 883) literature seems to have lost its royal patronage in Kashmir. We are told of one learned brahmin, Nāyaka,¹³ who was given charge of a newly erected temple (*Rāj. T.* 5.159), but the court poets, such as Bhallata (5.204), fared badly. The favorites of the new king Śāṅkaravarman (A.D. 883-902) were men of low birth. Kalhaṇa speaks with scorn of Śāṅkaravarman's ignorance of Sanskrit, claiming that he spoke "an Apabhramṣa dialect worthy of a drunkard" (5.206).

With the death of Śāṅkaravarman things went from bad to worse. The history of Kashmir in the tenth century falls roughly into two parts. The first half saw the breakdown of royal administration and power under the demands of the Tantrin footsoldiers who time and again sold the throne to the highest bidder. Then from about the middle of the century the guidance of political affairs passed into the hands of the terrible Diddā. Diddā was born a Khaśa princess. Her father held the fortress of Lohara on the main route from Kashmir to the Punjab. On her mother's side she was descended from the Shahi kings of Und and Kabul. Outliving her royal husband, Diddā governed for some years in the name of her child son, securing her own safety by fomenting discord among the military and political factions. When the son died not long after coming of age, she established a grandson in his place. There were three of these little grandsons whom the unnatural Diddā placed on the throne only to murder each child after his enjoying for a few years the titular sovereignty. Finally, from 980-1003 she assumed the royal title in her own right, governing with the aid of her paramour Tunga whom she had elevated from the peasantry. In the end she left a strong kingdom to a nephew whom she had chosen by carefully testing him against other candidates. And so began the Lohara Dynasty with a return of prosperity under two long-reigning kings.

Because of the withdrawal of court patronage, court literature virtually disappears from Kashmir during the tenth century. From this century in Kashmir we have no plays, no Sanskrit lyrics. The only

to the technical study of semantics without a stimulus from non-Buddhist sources. And the total silence of India about Dharmadāsa's authorship of the work strikes me as strong evidence against the thesis. Kashmiri brahmins of Ānanda's time, including Ānanda himself, showed no prejudice against Buddhist authors nor any desire to hide Buddhist ideas.

¹³ The name and the date suggest an identification with Bhāṭṭānāyaka, of whom I shall have more to say. But "Nāyaka" was not an uncommon name.

mahākāvya that we have from this period is Abbinanda's *Kādambarī-kathāsāra*, a work which retells in verse what Bāna in a former century had told better in prose.¹⁴ The traditions of Sanskrit scholarship, however, were not broken. The brahmins living in the capital or on their tax-free grants of land saw that their sons were taught Sanskrit grammar and the traditional Sanskrit sciences, in many cases teaching their sons themselves. The tradition was especially well maintained in Śaiva philosophy and literary criticism.

Śaiva philosophy owes its origin in Kashmir to two sages of the ninth century, Somānanda and Vasugupta. The views of the former were developed by his son Utpala into the doctrine of recognition (*praty-abhijnā*); those of the latter, with the help of his disciple Kallata, into the doctrine of cosmic vibration (*spanda*). These two branches of philosophy were preserved during the difficult years of the tenth century, the former by Utpala's son Lakṣmanagupta, who became one of Abhinava's teachers. The school of vibration had a more checkered career, for Kallata's son, Mukula, seems to have turned away from philosophy toward literary criticism. His one surviving work, the *Abhidhārvṛttimātrikā*, is concerned with the nature of denotation and the secondary use of words. His son, Pratihāra Indurāja, followed in his steps and wrote a commentary on *Udbhatta*. Meanwhile, the school of vibration was carried on in the family of a scholar named Bhūtirāja, who also taught the *Krama* *Tantras* and, as an old man one presumes, taught tantraism to Abhinava. Bhūtirāja's son, Bhattendurāja,¹⁵ also taught Abhinava in other subjects, notably in the *Bhagavadgītā* and the *Dhvanyāloka*.¹⁶

Among these brahmin scholars with their thoughts turned away from politics to mystic philosophy and literature the *Dhvanyāloka* was much studied. The first commentary on the *Dhvanyāloka*, now lost, was called the *Candrikā*. It was written by some member of Abhinava's family, to whom Abhinava often refers but never by name. Sometimes he calls him "the author of the *Candrika*" (3.26 b L), sometimes "a

¹⁴ At the end of the ninth century, Abbinanda's father, Jayantabhaṭṭa, had written an admirable work, the *Nyāyamārijā*. Jayanta not only gives a lucid account of the Nyāya system; he writes with style and with the true Kashmiri gift for satire.

¹⁵ Bhattendurāja, Bhūtirāja's son and the teacher of Abhinava, must not be confused with Pratibārendurāja, the son of Mukula and the oldest commentator on *Udbhatta*. See Kane, HSP.

¹⁶ A brother of this Bhattendurāja, it appears, was Hesarāja, the well-known grammarian. It was a learned family indeed.

commentator, an older member of my family" (3.24 a *L*, 3.40 *L*). Always his references carry a criticism: "The author of the *Candrikā* who could easily fail to see an elephant in front of his eyes" (3.33 b *L*): "A certain commentator now enough of arguing with persons who think themselves wise but whose references are wrong" (3.4 a *L*). If one glances through all such passages, one will find that the author of the *Candrikā* usually chose the simple or natural meaning whereas Abhinava gives a more subtle interpretation. In several cases I think the *Candrikā* came closer to what Ānanda actually meant (e.g., 3.33 b *L* and 1.1 b *L*).

Another scholar before Abhinava's time occupied himself with the *Dhvanyāloka* but for a different purpose. Bhaṭṭānāyaka's intention was to demolish the concept of *dhvani*. He seems to have gone through the book systematically, examining Ānanda's examples, showing how each one might be explained without reference to the new concept. Bhaṭṭānāyaka's work was called the *Hṛdayadarpana*, and it too is now lost. But Abhinava describes for us, largely in his opponent's own words, the theory which Bhaṭṭānāyaka hoped to substitute for that which he destroyed. I shall treat of it in dealing with Abhinava's doctrine of *rasa*, for Abhinava, although he vigorously opposed Bhaṭṭānāyaka, borrowed from him not a little.

Abhinavagupta was born about the middle of the tenth century into a learned family that descended from a brahmin named Atrigupta, who had been brought to Kashmir from Kanauj by King Lalitāditya after his conquest of that city.¹⁷ The king had given him a dwelling place in his capital of Pravarapura (the modern Srinagar) on the bank of the Jhelum river facing the Śaiva temple of Sitāṃśumaulin.¹⁸ From his loving description of its environs one infers that Abhinava had lived in that ancestral mansion at least as a child. His father, whose proper name was Narasimha, but who was popularly known as Cukhalaka, was an ardent devotee of Siva.¹⁹ Becoming a *vairāgin* by strenuous asceticism, he overcame the miseries of worldly existence. Before departing from the world, however, he introduced Abhinava, and presumably his younger brother also, to Sanskrit grammar. The brother, Manoratha, was to be the first of Abhinava's disciples.²⁰

The number of Abhinava's works is large. Even the preserved works very nearly fill a half shelf in my library. To these must be added a considerable number of lost works, of which we know the title or subject matter from references in the works which are preserved. As a complete bibliography is available in V. Raghavan's *Catalogus Catalogorum*, and as details on the subject matter of most of the works may be found in Pandey's *Abhinavagupta*, I shall give only an outline.

In general Abhinava's oeuvre falls into three parts. (1) Commentaries on the Tantras and surveys of their doctrines. The greatest of these works is the huge *Tantrāloka*, published in twelve volumes in the *Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies*, and the summary, *Tantrasāra*, published in the same series and now available in an Italian translation by Raniero Gnoli.²¹ (2) Works on literary criticism. The first of these was a commentary on the *Kāvyakautuka* of his teacher Bhāṭṭatauta. Both it and the work on which it commented are known only from references and quotations,²² chiefly from the *Locana* and the *Abhinavabhrāti*. The *Locana*²³ must have come second, for Abhinava refers to it in the *Abhinavabhrāti*. The latter work is Abhinava's commentary on the *BhNS*. An almost complete, though sadly corrupt, text of the *ABh*. is now available in the *GOS*.²⁴ (3) Commentaries of the Recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) School of philosophy. There are three of these. On Somānanda's *Parātrīṁśikāvivṛti* (the *Parātrīṁśikā*, or verses on the ultimate, form the final portion of the *Rudrayamalatantra*), Abhinava wrote the *Parātrīṁśikātattvavivarana*, or *Anuttaratrīṁśikā-vivṛti* (*KSTS* 7, 18). On Utpala's *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśini*, also called "the Small Commentary" (*Laghuvivṛti*), published as *KSTS* 22 and 32. On Utpala's *Īśvarapratyabhijñātikā* he wrote the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivirtivimarśini*, called also "the Great Commentary" (*bṛhati vimarśini*), *KSTS* 60 and 62.

²¹ "Essenza dei Tantra," *Encyclopædia de autori cl. sici*, No. 38, Boringhieri, Turin, 1960.

²² Gathered by P. V. Kane. *HSP*, pp. 209-212.

²³ The *Locana* has been printed several times. We have used the Kashi text as the basis for our translation. Although it is marred by numerous misprints it carries the valuable *Bālapriya* commentary, which supplements the still more valuable *Kaumudi*, available only on Chapter One. For particulars of these texts see Abbreviations and Works Cited.

²⁴ One should use the second edition of the first volume, as it contains numerous improvements in the text. Four chapters (6, 7, 18, 19) have also been edited by R. P. Kangle with a Marathi translation and commentary. His emendations of the text will be useful even to those who cannot read Marathi.

In addition to writings on these three subjects Abhinava was the author of numerous religious verses (*stotras*); of the *Paramārthasāra*,²⁵ a Śaiva reworking of a Vaiṣṇava text; of the *Bhagavadgītārtha-saṅgraha*,²⁶ a brief collection of notes on important passages of the *Bhagavadgītā*; and of a commentary on the *Ghaṭakarpara*.

The order in which Abhinava wrote these works is not quite certain. He gives the dates of completion of only three of them. The *Kṣemastotra* was completed in A.D. 990, the *Bhairavastotra* in 992, and the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛttivimarśini* in 1014. K. C. Pandey in his monograph on Abhinavagupta believed that a period of Tantric studies in Abhinava's youth was followed by his work on literary criticism and this in turn by a final period of concern with *Pratyabhijñā* philosophy. The lynchpin of his belief was a reference in the *Locana* which he believed was to the *Tantrāloka*. But this lynchpin has now broken. The reference exists only in the false reading of the *NS* edition (p. 19) of that work.²⁷ Furthermore, the hypothesis does not agree with the general order of Abhinava's intellectual interests which seems to be given in the biographical information at the end of the *Tantrāloka*:

[The author] was introduced into the forest of grammar by his father, had his mind clarified by a few drops of the sea of logic, and, when intent on enjoying the full rasa of literature, was seized with an intoxicating devotion to Siva. Being wholly filled with that, he no longer cared for any worldly pursuit, until, in order to increase his enjoyment of that devotion, he went to serve in the houses of [religious] masters. (*Tantrāloka* 37.58-59)

There follow the names of a great many of his teachers, among which is the name Bhūtirājatanaya, "the son of Bhūtirāja," that is to say, Bhāṭṭendurāja, Abhinava's master in the *Dhvanyāloka*, as also the name of Lakṣmaṇagupta,²⁸ his teacher in *Pratyabhijñā* philosophy. The

²⁵ *KSTS* 7. The work has been translated by L. D. Barnett, *JRAS* 1910, pp. 718-47, and by L. Silburn, Paris 1957.

²⁶ Translated by Arvind Sharma, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1983.

²⁷ The false reading is as follows: *taduttīrṇatve tu sarvam paramēśvarādvayam brahmety oṣmacchāstrāṇusārena viditam tantrāloka-grantham vicāraya*. The correct reading, given by the Kashi edition, p. 67, carries a very different meaning: *taduttīrṇatve tu sarvam brahmety oṣmacchāstrakārenā no na viditam tattvāloka-grantham virocayatā*. Thus the reference is to a work of Ānanda called the *Tattvāloka*, not to the *Tantrāloka* of Abhinava. The Kashi reading is substantiated by Abhinava's later reference to this *Tattvāloka* under Chapter 4, Kārikā 5 of the *Locana* (Kashi edition p. 533, line 5 of *Locana*): *etoc ca granthakārenā tattvāloke vitasyoktaṁ*.

²⁸ Lakṣmaṇagupta is also praised in *TA* 1.11.

Tantrāloka and *Tantrasāra* should therefore be placed among the last of his works. His initiation into Kaula tantraism by Śambhunātha and his dūtt Bhāgavatī (see *TA* 1.13 and commentary) seems to have given the final spiritual increment to his life. By it he became a *siddha* and there was nothing more to learn.

Whether the literary studies followed or, as I should think, preceded the works on the philosophy of recognition, is not certain. In the *Locana* he quotes one verse of Utpala's *Īśvarapratyabhijñā* (see 1.8 *L* and note 3), but this proves only that he was acquainted with the works of Utpala at that time, not that he had already commented on them. In the *Locana* he comments on a verse from the *Gītā* (*Bh.G.* 2.69), giving much the same interpretation as that given in his *Bhagavadgītārtha-saṅgraha* (see *Dhu.* 3.1b *L* and note 3). This likewise does not prove that he had already written that work.

It would take more space than I propose to allow myself and more knowledge than I possess to give an account of Abhinava's entire contribution to Indian thought. What I shall have to say in the following pages is limited to the contribution furnished by the *Locana*.

Abhinava chose the title *Locana* for his commentary on the *Sahrdayā-loka* (*Dhvanyāloka*) because he intended it to serve as an "eye" by which one could see the "light for connoisseurs" which Ānanda had furnished. If we are to be fair to him, it is by his achievement of that purpose that we must judge him, not by modern standards of historical or philological accuracy, nor even by the criterion of originality.

Like all Sanskrit commentators Abhinava had no interest in history. I have already noticed two of his historical errors. Just how uninterested he was in history appears still more clearly from his comment on the first *Kārikā*. In order to justify the perfect tense of the verbs there used (*tasyābhāvam jagadur apare*, etc.) Abhinava says, "The author had not actually heard the alternative views of those who deny the existence of suggestion. Rather, he will imagine such ideas and then refute them. Hence his use of the perfect tense," for Pāṇini prescribes the perfect to be used in the *Bhāṣā* only for that which occurred in the past outside the range of one's experience. Abhinava would rather allow his author to have been obtuse than to have committed a grammatical error. Frequently throughout the *Locana* Abhinava will depart from a natural interpretation of Ānanda's words in order to save him from some inconsistency (see, for example, 1.13*i* or 2.26 *A*, note 2). He will even exclude an example as being spurious if he believes it has been improperly adduced (see 2.27*a A*, note 2 and 2.27*a L*).

As against such instances which are faults by a standard foreign to the Sanskrit tradition of scholarship, Abhinava exhibits a high degree of skill in those abilities which his own tradition sought to develop. He is an impeccable grammarian, possesses a sound knowledge of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā, and has the works of the older poeticians by heart. He uses his formidable education not in order to show off but to give the reader an accurate understanding of Ānanda's critique. In example after example he points out just where the suggestion lies, the range of its meaning, and often just what it is that gives to it its *camatkṛti*, its sudden effect of delight. For examples see his comments on the stanza "White herons circle against dark clouds" (*snigdhaśyāmalakāntiliptaviyuti*, 2.1 a), "Why do you laugh" (*kim hāsyena*, 2.5 b), "Say, happy friend, if all is well" (*gopavadhūvīlāsasuhṛdām*, 2.5 f). Such careful aesthetic *explications de texte* had just come into vogue. We find the fashion also in Abhinava's contemporary Kuntaka. I know of no examples in the older literature. But, once established, it became characteristic of Sanskrit literary criticism and is what gives to that tradition of criticism its great strength. In our Western classical tradition there is nothing to compare with it except pseudo-Longinus.

This careful analysis of Ānanda's examples leads Abhinava at times to remarkable discoveries. I may here point out just one of these. In 2.9 Ānanda cites two examples of the *rasa* of fury (*raudrarasa*), the first composed in the style of long compounds traditionally associated with that *rasa*, the other in a non-compounded analytical style. The point that Ānanda would make in the passage is that either style may serve the purpose of suggesting fury. He adduces the two stanzas as examples and leaves it to the reader to savor the effect. Abhinava analyses the examples. Both examples are taken from that drama of vengeance, the *Venīsamṛhāra*. In the first it is the hero Bhīma who speaks. He vows to crush the thighs of Suyodhana, who had dragged Queen Draupadī through the Kuru assembly. Then he will deck Draupadī's hair with his "hands new-reddened in that fresh-congealing blood." The stanza begins with an immense compound: *cañcadbhujabhramitacandagadābhīghātasāñcūrṇitoruyugalasya suyodhanasya* (literally, "of the by-my-whirling-arm-held-brutal-war-club-stroke-crushed-thighed Suyodhana"). After commenting on the suggestions of the stanza, Abhinava remarks, "From the long compound, flowing in an uninterrupted stream and allowing the hearer no pause in all its course, there results an apprehension of the whole scene as a unity up to the representation of the broken-thighed Suyodhana.

This serves to intensify the impression of Bhîma's violence."²⁹ On the other hand, in the second, analytical, stanza adduced by Ānanda, Abhinava sees the effect to lie in a protracted climax. He says, "Here the anger of the speaker rises to the highest pitch by a progression from word to word through meanings which, being presented separately, are reflected upon by the bearer in succession. And so the very absence of compounds acts as a cause of rising excitement." When one reads such verses over after reading Abhinava's comments, one reads them with a new appreciation and with some degree of the excitement and delight that can be found in them himself. This is the highest gift that a literary critic can possess in any tradition.

In only one important respect did Abhinava change what he found in Ānanda's text. I refer to the new explanation he gave of *rasa* and of the psychological process by which it appears in the heart of the reader or the poet, for with Abhinava *rasa* is sharply excluded from the character invented by the poet or portrayed on the stage by an actor. The experience of Râma on losing Sîtâ is the emotion of grief (*sôka*). If the hearer of a poem or play were to experience the same emotion, he would close his book or leave the theater. There must be a qualitative difference between the *sthâyibhâva* and the *rasa* to explain how we can relish the tragic or the *rasa* of fear.

Most of the components of Abhinava's new theory are borrowed, strange to say, from Ānanda's chief critic. Bhaṭṭanâyaka had insisted that we do not perceive *rasa* as belonging to someone else, for in that case we would remain indifferent. Nor do we perceive it as belonging to ourselves—here Abhinava was to disagree—for the factors which Bharata says are productive of *rasa*, the determinants, as for example Sîtâ and the abduction of Sîtâ, work on Râma, not on us. Indeed, said Bhaṭṭanâyaka, *rasa* is not perceived at all, it is simply enjoyed. What happens is that in a great poem a second semantic operation comes into play by which denotation assumes a new dimension. Bhaṭṭanâyaka gave this operation the name of *bhâvanâ* (aesthetic efficacy). He borrowed the term from the technical vocabulary of Mîmâmsâ, where it is used of the efficacy residing in the verb of a Vedic sentence, which explains how that verb can bring an actor to pursue a given aim. By *bhâvanâ*

²⁹ Some years ago I made the following remarks on this stanza with reference to Abhinava's interpretation in a paper published in *The Harvard Advocate* (CXV, No. 4, summer 1982, p. 126). "The whole scene is before our eyes as soon as we understand the words at all. We are not allowed to dilute the effect by relishing it bit by bit. It hits the aesthetic sense not like pebbles but like a rock."

the ritualists meant the efficacy of a Vedic command. Bhaṭṭānāyaka then applied the term to poetry as the aesthetic efficacy of a particular combination of determinants and consequents. This aesthetic *bhāvanā*, he claimed, has the effect of universalizing the determinants and other factors, so that they may bring about or realize a *rasa*. Upon the realization of the *rasa*, a third stage of the aesthetic process begins, namely enjoyment (*bhoga*), which Bhaṭṭānāyaka regarded as springing from a third semantic power, *bhogakṛtva* (enjoyment-efficacy). We enjoy the *rasa* in a manner different from our enjoyment of direct experience or of apprehensions derived from memory. This enjoyment takes the form of melting, expansion, and radiance, and is like the bliss that comes from realizing one's identity with the highest Brahman. This is the purpose of poetry. Any instruction that poetry may furnish is incidental.

One should bear in mind that we know of Bhaṭṭānāyaka's theory only through the writings of his opponents, Abhinava and Abhinava's follower Mammata. The questions that arise in one's mind as to the exact nature of *bhāvanā* and why it should work to the effect claimed for it are ones for which he may have given answers of which we are not told. Abhinava's most telling criticisms are two. First, that the newly extended use of the word *bhāvanā* refers to nothing other than the suggestion of *rasa* (*rasadhvani*) described by Ānanda. Second, that it cannot be that *rasa* is never perceived. We must perceive it, or we should be unable to discuss it. And granted that this perception may be of a different sort from sense perception, we perceive a *rasa* as belonging to us.

Beyond these specific criticisms, however, the reader will be struck by how much of his rival's theory Abhinava incorporates into his own. He too excludes the actor and the portrayed character from enjoyment of *rasa*. What the character experiences is the basic emotion. As for the actor, if he experienced either the emotion or the *rasa*, he would forget his lines. Then too, although Abhinava holds to Ānanda's term of suggestion or *dhvani*, he sees in *rasadhvani* a transforming power that bears a close resemblance to Nāyaka's *bhāvanā*. The grief, for example, that the observer perceives in the poetic character or the actor, by the observer's ruminating on its determinants and consequents, meets with a response from his heart in which he identifies that grief with the griefs in his own memory. *Rasa* is not simply the apprehension of another person's mental state. It is rather a supernormal relishing based on

an involved sympathy.³⁰ By this sympathy, one might say, the reader or audience loses his own grief in the larger dimensions of compassion. Abhinava, like his opponent, sees *rasa* not as an object to be enjoyed but as the ongoing process of enjoyment itself. He too uses the word "melting" as one of its characteristics (see 1.5 *L*, note 3). He too is struck by the similarity of *rasa* to the relishing of the ultimate Brahman (2.4 *L*). One might say in sum that Abhinava has taken over most of the new ideas of Bhaṭṭāṇāyaka but trimmed them here and there so that they may fit into the terminology and the general view of Ānanda. He even agrees at one point with the statement that enjoyment (he calls it bliss) is the chief goal of poetry, in comparison with which instruction is a far lesser goal (1.1 e *L*). But later, in Chapter Three (3.10–14 f), he brings this admission into harmony with a more orthodox view by attempting to show that delight and instruction are not different in nature.

Abhinava adds much that is not in Ānanda. He adds arguments against all the opponents of *dhvani* not only against Bhaṭṭāṇāyaka but against both schools of Mīmāṃsā. He gives numerous examples of varieties of *dhvani* and of subordinated suggestion which Ānanda had passed over. Interesting are his remarks on *rasābhāṣa*, false or improper *rasa*. According to the tradition going back to *BhNS*, a love that is not mutual, a love implemented by violence such as Rāvana's love for Sītā, or an adulterous love, is productive only of *rasābhāṣa*. If one guides one's criticism strictly by the words of Bharata (*BhNS* I, p. 295) such false love should lead to comedy. In fact, says Abhinava, it may lead to comedy only at a time long after our experience. When we hear Rāvana's passionate words in the *Rāvaṇakāvya* (alas, now lost) there is no occasion for relishing comedy (2.3 *L*). This qualification opens up to favorable evaluation much that would have been rejected or reprobated by older standards.

Since Sanskrit criticism has been accused of concentrating too much on the individual verse or stanza, one will take a special interest in Abhinava's tracing of the predominant *rasa* throughout a whole play, as he does with the *Tāpasavatsarāja* (3.10–14 g *L*). His survey should impress the Western reader with the basic difference of movement in Sanskrit works of literature from that in European works. This difference, between a tortuous or cyclical movement, a periodic distancing from and return to the predominant theme, as against the climactic

inava's argument with the Mīmāṃsā at 1.18 *L*.

achievement of a final result,³¹ is found, I believe, in all the traditional Indian arts. The Indian style is found only rarely in the West, as in the music of César Franck or in Joyce's *Finnegans Wake*.

To continue with a listing of interesting or illuminating passages in Abhinava's commentary would be otiose. The translation is here for the reader to find them on his own. I would sum up my opinion of Abhinava's work in the *Locana* by saying that he accomplishes admirably what he set out to do. He expresses Ānanda's views more logically than Ānanda expressed them; he defends them against those who had opposed them. Under the provocation of Bhaṭṭānāyaka he develops the concept of *rasa* into something different from what I believe Ānanda envisaged, but the new concept is more consistent than Ānanda's and was to become, after Mammata's incorporation of it in his *Kāvya-prakāśa*, the leading view of *rasa* in Indian criticism. More than all this, Abhinava's analysis of Ānanda's examples will give the sensitive reader a hundred new insights into the beauty of Sanskrit poetry.

There is nothing in our Western classical (Greek and Latin) tradition of criticism that corresponds to *rasa* and nothing that corresponds to *dhvani* in the grand dimensions in which Ānanda and Abhinava conceived it. Our classical rhetoricians, all but one of them, chose the path that Bhāmaha and Dandin chose: they included such instances of suggestion as they recognized in the tropes and figures of speech.³² One man of this tradition, however, the author of the treatise *On the Sublime*, had an uncanny skill at recognizing passages of literature which excite the reader or, as he put it, drive him to ecstasy. I have noticed that almost every instance of what pseudo-Longinus³³ cites of what he calls "the sublime" in literature, is actually an instance of suggestion.

³¹ Sanskrit dramaturgy speaks of the achievement of a result (*phalayoga*), it is true. But the *phalayoga*, for example in the *Tāpasa-vatsarāja*, namely Udayana's retrieval of Vāsavadattā and acquisition of universal sovereignty, is aesthetically far less important than the recurring manifestations of śringārasa throughout the play.

³² In the Greek *εὐφασίς*, the significatio of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and of Quintilian, it is the figure itself that is usually striking. Only under irony and allegory does Greco-Latin rhetoric come to what would qualify with Ānanda as *dhvani*, and at that only as *vastudhvani*.

³³ Manuscript P of the *Περὶ οὐρανοῦ*, from which apparently all our texts descend, refers to him as "either Dionysios or Longinos." He appears to have been a Jew and perhaps for that reason had no following among the Greek and Roman rhetoricians. His fame began only with the rediscovery of his work in Renaissance times.

I translate here from just one of his instances, the famous φαίνεται μου κῆρυξ οὐος θέοισιν:

He seems to me the equal
of the gods who sits beside you,
listening to your sweet speech
closely

and to your lovely laughter.
which has quickened the heart in my breast.
When I see you, Brochea, my voice
leaves me,

my tongue is broken, a thin fire
runs over my flesh,
my eyes have no stren
my ears ring.

Longinus, if that was his name, says that the beauty of Sappho's poem comes from its arrangement and that the result is the sublime. Ānanda would have said that the beauty comes from dhvani and that the result is śringārārūpa. If only Longinus had had followers, they might have worked out a critique of literature not unlike that of Ānanda and Abbinava.

TRANSLATION AND NOTES

CHAPTER ONE

A Of Madhu's foe

incarnate as a lion by his will,
may the claws, which put the moon to shame
in purity and shape,
by cutting off his devotees' distress
grant you protection.¹

1. In this benedictory verse which introduces his work Ānandavardhana takes as subject an attribute of his chosen divinity (*iṣṭadevatā*) Nṛsimha, the man-lion incarnation of Viṣṇu (Madhu's foe). Viṣṇu became incarnate as a man-lion in order to destroy the demon Hiranyakāśipu and thereby remove the distress of the Vaiṣṇava devotee Prahrāda. For the story, see *Bhāg.Pur.* 7.2–8. Benedictory verses to Nṛsimha usually take his claws as their subject; see *SRK* 116, 128, 141. As is appropriate to a verse introducing a work on 'suggestion (*dhvani*), the present verse contains numerous instances of *dhvani*. Abhinava points out one occurrence of *rasadhvani*, five of *vastudhvani*, and three of *alaṅkārdhvani*.

L Victorious is the Muse's double heart,

the poet and the relisher of art:
which has created brave new worlds from naught
and even stones to flowing sap has brought,
imparting beauty to all within its reach
by successive flow of genius and of speech.¹

At Bhaṭṭendurāja's lotus feet I heard
all that I know and love of letters;
from that, echoing but a little portion,
I, Abhinavagupta, shall explain
with my own Eye the Light of Poetry.²

Although the author of the commentary (*vṛttikāra*)³ has himself accomplished his own aim in life by his continuous and perfect devotion to the highest God, in order to achieve a desired purpose, namely, that teachers of his work be unhindered in their explanation and students be unhindered in their audition, he enlists God's attention to this purpose by publishing an appropriate benediction. "May the claws of the foe of Madhu protect you," that is, may they protect you teachers and students of this work; for teachers and students are the only appropriate objects of address here and the word "you" implies direct address. To "protect" is to furnish help toward attainment of a desired goal and that help comes about by such means as the opposing of hindrances. Such is the protection that is here meant.

The heroic flavor (*vīrarasa*)⁴ is here suggested by our apprehension of energy (*utsāha*), an apprehension furnished by the association of God, who is constantly exerting himself [on behalf of mankind], with the characteristics of clarity of purpose and diligent resolve. Again, as claws are weapons and as protection requires a weapon for instrument, the extraordinary power of these claws, which are identical with instruments, is suggested by treating them as agents.⁵ Also suggested⁶ is the absence of dependence on extraneous instruments on the part of God. The word "Madhuripu" conveys the fact that he is always active in removing whatever is a menace to men.⁷

What sort of Madhuripu ("Madhu's foe")? "Incarnate as a lion by his own will," not because he is subject to his earlier deeds (*karma*), nor to the will of another; rather, he took the form of a lion in conformity with his entertaining a desire to do so, a desire⁸ which is appropriate to the killing of a particular demon.

What sort of claws? Those which "cut off his devotees' distress." The power to cut is appropriate to claws and while it is impossible for [ordinary] claws to cut away mental anguish, it becomes possible in the case of these claws because God's creations are conformable to his desires. Or [we may take it as follows]: Hiranyakasipu was the thorn of the three worlds, a torment to everyone, and so in reality he himself was pain in concrete form to those who come to God as their sole refuge. When these claws destroyed him, it was the very pain [of God's devotees] that was rooted out; so this shows how God, even in such a state⁹ [i.e., even while engaged in an act of destruction], is still exceptionally compassionate.

Furthermore, the claws by their *svaccha*, that is, their property of being pure, their purity—for words like *svaccha* and *mṛdu* in their

primary sense refer to abstract properties¹⁰—and by their shape, which is curved and lovely, have "shamed," that is, have distressed, the moon. It is here suggested by a suggestion based on the power of meaning¹¹ that the moon is new. By the moon's being afflicted, it is suggested that it appears pale and devoid of charm in the presence of the claws; and it is generally well known that claws can cause pain. But in the case of the man-lion this property of causing pain has been presented in superhuman form [viz., by saying that His claws are pure and lovely although causing pain]. And so, when the new moon looks at the purity and curved shape of these claws, he feels an inner pain [as follows]: "Although I may be equal so far as purity and my curved shape go, these claws are skillful in removing the distress of devotees, whereas I am not." In this manner the figure of speech known as contrast (*vyati-reka*)¹² is suggested. "Moreover, in the past I alone was desirable to all people because I was possessed of unequalled clarity and beautiful shape, but now all these ten claws have the same shape as the new moon and in addition to that they are skillful in removing both mental and physical pain and so now people regard them and not me with the respect due to the new moon." Thinking in this manner, the new moon experiences, as it were, continual torment and so the two figures of speech, fancy (*utpreksā*)¹³ and denial (*apahnuti*),¹⁴ have been suggested. Thus in this verse the three varieties of suggestion, namely *vastudhvani*, *alankāradhvani*, and *rasadhvani*, have been explained by my teacher.

1. The inner glory of literature is here derived from its three characteristic abilities: to create (*prathayitum*) new worlds; to impart a relish (*sāroyitum*) to even the dullest objects in the actual world, so that they may elicit aesthetic response (*rasa*); and to render both these areas bright (*ubbhāsayitum*) with a beauty constructed out of the poet's genius and the words with which he communicates. This much is a fine characterization. What is even finer in my opinion is Abhinava's realization that the beauty of poetry, or of art in general, depends upon the audience as much as on the artist. One may find echoes of this verse in the benedictions of later critics. Compare, in Mammata's benedictory verse to his *Kāvyaprakāśa*, *niyamarahitām* with *vind kāraṇakalām* of our verse, or *navarasarucirām* with *nijarasabharāt sārayati*.
2. Here the name of Ānandavardhana's work is given as "The Light of Poetry" (*Kāvyaśloka*). Elsewhere Abhinava refers to it as the *Sahṛdayaśloka*; see Introduction, p. 12. Abhinava gives to his own commentary the title "The Eye," (*locana*) and by his words here indicates, according to the *Kaumudi*, that he will comment on only parts of the text, the parts that are difficult or subj t

to doubt. In the fourth line of the verse, *janasya* is proleptic genitive: I shall explain "to the world." 3. Abhinava attributes the introductory stanza to the author of the *Vṛtti*, not the author of the *Kārikās*. That the two were the same man has been argued in the Introduction, pp. 25-27. 4. *BP* notes that as Ānandavardhana proposes to show that suggestion is the soul of poetry, his introductory verse might naturally be supposed to contain suggestions; accordingly, Abhinava points out the three types of suggestions which it contains, beginning with the most important type, *rasadhvani*. For the technical terms *rasa*, *sthāyibhāva*, *vibhāva*, *anubhāva*, and *vyabhicāribhāva*, see Introduction. Abhinava here discovers a suggestion of the heroic *rasa*. Of its components he points out the *sthāyibhāva* as the *utsāha* (energy) of Nṛsimha. For *utsāha* as the *sthāyibhāva* of *vīramāsa* see *BHNS* 6.67. The *ālambana-vibhāva* of course is Nṛsimha himself. The *vyabhicāribhāvas* are given by Abhinava as the god's *asammoha* (clarity of purpose) and *adhyavasdyā* (diligent resolve). According to *BP*, God's constantly exerting himself (*nityodyogitva*) is the *anubhāva*. 5. The point is this. Usually the *karana* (instrument) and the *kartṛ* (agent) are kept distinct and given different case endings. *Nakha* is usually a *karana*, the means of accomplishing something, and not a *kartṛ*. Now a *kartṛ* is the chief of all the *kārakas*; all other *kārakas* are dependent (*svatantrā kartṛ*). Therefore by presenting the *nakhas* themselves as the agent, that is, by placing *nakhāḥ* in the nominative instead of the instrumental case, the extraordinary power of these claws is suggested. This is an instance of *vastudhvani*. 6. *Dhvanīś ca* refers to a second *vastudhvani*. 7. *Tasya sadaiva jagatṛā*, etc., is the third *vastudhvani*. Abhinava has used the word *uktā* here to mean *sūcita*. *Kaumudī*, p. 19: *uyañjita iti uktavye sati uktā iti vacanam abhidhāvypāragocaraval prakatapratipattikatvam uyanigyoarthasya pradarsayitum*; that is, *uktā* has been used in order to show that the matter is as clear as if it were conveyed by *abhidhā* itself. 8. In the long compound *visiṣṭadānava-*... I have taken the word *uktā* to modify *icchā*; it might equally well modify *parigraha*. The point is that the form of a man-lion was required for the slaying of this particular demon, who could not be slain by a god, a man, or an animal. Had Viṣṇu wished to slay another demon, he would have wished for some other form. 9. *Tasyām apy avasthāyām* means that he is compassionate even when he is engaged in the act of killing. This is Abhinava's interesting explanation of the apparent contradiction in a verse like *kṣipto hastāvalagnoh* (2.5c A), where it would appear that Śiva is being cruel. Abhinava would argue that he is really acting out of compassion since he is acting for the sake of the world, not for the sake of killing.

10. It is a doctrine of the grammarians that adjectives (like *sukla* "white") denote primarily a quality (e.g., *śuklotā* "whiteness"). Only secondarily do they come to denote a substance qualified by a quality (as in "a white horse"). See *Patañjali* on *Pāṇ.* 2.1.30. Accordingly, Abhinava is here analysing the

compound as "pained by their pure-ness and by their own (curved and lovely) shape," rather than taking *svaccho* to modify *svacchāyā*. 11. This is another case of *vastudhvani*. The idea that the moon is new, i.e., at its most beautiful, on the first day of its appearance as a slender crescent, is not conveyed by *slesa* and so is not an example of suggestion based on the power of a word. It is conveyed by the meaning of the words and so is an instance of *arthasaktimūladhvani* (suggestion based on the power of meaning). See 2.20 K. 12. This is the first of the three cases of *alankāradhvani* discovered by Abhinava in the verse. For definitions of *vyatireka* see Bhāmaha 2.75, Dandin 2.180, Al.Saru. p. 101. In *vyatireka* the *upameya* (the thing itself) is usually shown to be superior in some respect to the *upamāna* (the thing to which it is likened); for example, "her face by being spotless puts to shame the moon with its spot." 13. For *utpreksā* see Bhāmaha 2.91, Dandin 2.221, Al.Saru. p. 69. In *utpreksā* the possibility which one fancies is usually in cold fact an impossibility. It is of course impossible that anything should pain or shame the moon, for the moon is an insentient obj. t. 14. For *apahnuti* see Bhāmaha 3.21, Dandin 2.304, Al.Saru. p. 63. Bhāmaha's example is: "The bee is not buzzing; this is the sound of Love's bow." In Ānanda's verse the suggested *apahnuti* would take the form: "People deny me the status of new moon and look only on these claws in that way." Note that all these figures in the present stanza are suggested, not directly conveyed. Thus they are examples of *alankāradhvani*.

K Some have said that the soul of poetry, which has been handed down from the past by wise men as "suggestion" (*dhvani*),¹ does not exist; others, that it is an associated meaning (*bhākta*);² while some have said that its nature lies outside the scope of speech: of this [suggestion] we shall here state the true nature in order to delight the hearts of sensitive readers.

1. The key word of the book, *dhvani*, is used in many different senses. Of the senses used by literary critics, as opposed to the grammarians (for whom see 1.131 A and L) Abhinava specifies the following (1.13 L): (a) *sabbah*: a word which gives rise to a suggestion; (b) *arthah*: a meaning which gives rise to a suggestion; (c) *vyāpārah*: the operation, the suggesting of the implicit meaning; (d) *vyāngyam*: the suggested meaning itself; (e) *samudāyah*: the

group; or a poem which embodies all the above factors. *K* and *A* restrict the senses of the word to (c), (d), and (e) and, wherever they would be precise, specify that the suggestion involved must be the primary suggestion of the sentence. It is not immediately clear in which sense *K* is here using the word. The *Vṛtti* in setting forth the first argument (1.1a *A*) seems to take it in sense (c) or (d). In the second argument (1.1b *A*) it clearly takes it in sense (e). 2. Ānanda uses the word *bhākta* to cover both types of secondary or associated meaning: the metaphorical (which Abhinava calls *gauṇa*), as in "The boy is a lion," where "lion" takes on secondary sense because of the boy's similarity in some respects to a lion, and the relational (which Abhinava calls *lakṣaṇika*), as in "Bring in the spears," where "spears" is used for "spearmen" because of some relation other than similarity between the two objects. Ānanda's general words for secondary usage or the secondary operation of a word are *bhakti* and *gunavṛtti*. In 3.33b Ānanda distinguishes the two types of *gunavṛtti* as *upacāra* (metaphorical) and *lakṣaṇa* (relational). For making this distinction Abhinava prefers the terms *gauṇī* and *lakṣaṇī*. He uses the words *lakṣaṇa* often and *gunavṛtti* occasionally in a very general sense for any sort of secondary operation.

A By wise men, that is, by those who know the essence of poetry named "suggestion" (*dhvani*), which has been handed down from the past through a succession [of wise men], that is to say, has been made fully known far and wide:¹ this [entity], in spite of its being clearly apparent to the hearts of sensitive readers, some have claimed to be non-existent.

The following alternative ideas are possible for those who deny the existence of suggestion.

1. In glossing *samāmnāta*, *A* takes *sam* to mean *samyak*, "fully, thoroughly"; and he takes *ā* to mean *samatāt*, "far and wide." One can harmonize this interpretation with the verse at the end of 3.33p *A* by supposing that it had been long held by some critics that suggestion was the finest part of poetry but that suggestion had nevertheless been *aviditasattvah*, "not precisely understood."

L [Commentary on the *Kārikā*:] Now the author states directly the nature of the subject matter [viz., suggestion, the soul of poetry], making it the predominant element of his sentence. Through a subordinate element of the sentence ["to delight the hearts of sensitive readers"] he states directly the purpose of the purpose of the book [the

purpose of the book is "knowledge of the nature of dhvani"; the purpose of attaining this purpose is "to delight the hearts of sensitive readers". By implication he shows us the purpose of the book, that purpose being connected [with the second purpose].¹ Thus he says, "[some have said that] the soul of poetry," etc.

[Commentary on the *Vṛtti*:] In view of the proximity of the term "soul of poetry," the term "wise men" in the verse must be taken in the sense of those who give instruction in the soul of poetry. With this in mind, he explains "wise men" by those who know the essence of poetry. Explaining the meaning of the word "soul" by the word "essence," he shows the prime importance of suggestion and the fact that what it produces lies far beyond the reach of other word-powers [namely, the literal and the secondary].

It may be objected that the word *iti* refers to the phonetic form of the word *dhvani*,² for the denotandum of the word cannot be the referent as this is still a matter of controversy and has not yet been decided. He explains away this difficulty by the word named. In truth the word *dhvani* has not been used [in the *Kārikā*] as a mere name; rather there is a thing called by the name of *dhvani* and it is the essence of all poetry, for otherwise the wise would not have taken pains to hand down a mere name. Thus he will go on to explain, "in spite of its being clearly apparent to the minds of sensitive readers." But the following is a better explanation. The word *iti* is used out of normal order. It must refer to the sense of the clause as a whole [and not to the word *dhvani* alone]. So we should construe the clause as follows: "The thing, namely *dhvani*, which has been traditionally called the soul of poetry." For if the word *iti* referred only to the word *dhvani*, how could we reconcile this with the commentary's speaking of a thing named *dhvani*? For if that were the case [i.e., if *iti* governed the word *dhvani* alone], we should have to understand that "the word *dhvani* is also the soul of poetry," as when we say, "He says 'ox'."³ That which has no reality [viz., a mere name] cannot be a matter of controversy. Only when a thing (*dharmin*) exists [distinct from its name], do its properties become a matter of controversy. But now enough elaborating on an irrelevant topic that will only annoy sensitive readers.

Should only one scholar have made such a statement [viz., that suggestion is the soul of poetry], it is possible that he could have been mistaken, but that is not likely where many have been involved. Accordingly, [the *Kārikā*] uses the plural: "wise men." [The commentator] expatiates on the matter: through a succession. That is, they have

said this in an unbroken succession, without, however, putting it down in specific books. This is what he means. For many scholars could not teach, with great respect, something that really did not merit such respect. And this they did teach with respect. Therefore [the *Kārikā*] says "which has been handed down from the past," for the phrase "from the past" shows that one should not imagine this to be the first mention of *dhvani*. And [the commentator] explains by saying: this [entity] has been made fully known far and wide.

How can one entertain the thought that an entity which one should strive to understand can be non-existent? What can one say? The sense is that those who deny its existence exhibit an extraordinary stupidity. Also [it is implied by the author of the *Kārikā* that] he has not actually heard the alternative ideas of those who deny the existence of suggestion; rather he will imagine such ideas and then refute them. Hence [his use of the perfect tense (*jagaduḥ*), which implies] absence of direct perception [by the subject of the verb].⁴ [He could not have used the future tense, as] it is not proper to refute something that is in the future, for the simple reason that it is not yet there. If it be argued that a hypothetical fact can be refuted, we say that its futurity would be abrogated by its being [already] hypothesized. Thus, because these views are imagined to be in the past, because they are beyond the range of direct perception, and because they have not been specifically characterized as belonging to present time, the perfect tense can be used. Accordingly, the alternative views will first be imagined and then refuted. But even in imagining something, it is improper to imagine an implausible thing; one should imagine only a plausible thing. Otherwise there would be no end to the products of imagination and their refutation. And so, in order to give substance to these hypotheses, to be stated presently, he has said in advance that they are possible. Had the term "are hypothesized" (*sambhāvyaṇte*) been used, there would be tautology [in the use of the optative of hypothesis in what follows]. And what is possible is not only hypothesized here but appears to him clearly as a present reality; hence his use of the present tense [in "they are possible"].

Fearing that someone might object that it is impossible to criticize that which has been predicated by a hypothesis based on something impossible, he says, "ideas" (*vikalpāḥ*). There is no real thing to which these hypotheses refer; they are merely ideas.⁵ Furthermore, they might have occurred through an ignorance of the true nature [of poetry]; and

so he uses optative forms like *ācakṣīrān* which refer to possibilities and here amount to a reference to past time [i.e., "they might have said"]. The same usage can be instanced in the following verse:

If what is within the body
had been outside,
people would need take sticks
to drive off dogs and crows.⁸

The meaning is that if the body had been visible in such a way, such [a result] would appear. The sense of past time is here implied. The same in the following [negative condition]:

[But] if it were not thus,
what would be the case?

The meaning is: what would be the case if there had been no hypothesis as above of [the body's] being [inside out]? Here we have the same [preterite] sense. But now enough of dilating upon an irrelevant topic.

Here in brief are the *vikalpas*, the alternative ideas, that might be put forward against the concept of *dhvani*. (1) Words transmit meanings because of the conventions (*samaya*) which we have assigned to them. Accordingly, there can be no suggested sense over and above the denoted senses [which we have assigned]. Or, (2) granted that there are extra senses, such a sense will be implied by the denotative operation and will be merely an associated sense (*bhākta*) since it has been drawn into our mind by force of the understood meaning of the word. Or, (3) the suggested sense is not implied in this way, but is impossible to describe, just as the happiness of having a husband cannot be described to virgins who have not experienced it. These are the three main varieties of disagreement [with our doctrine]. But of them, the argument that the suggested sense does not exist may be divided into three sub-arguments. The first of these may be put thus. (a) As it is the qualities (*gunas*)⁹ and figures of speech (*alaṅkāras*) that impart beauty to words and their senses, and as a poem consists of words and senses which are more beautiful than those used in conversation or in scientific works, there can be no source of beauty of which we have not already taken account [in our definitions of the qualities and the figures of speech]. The second is this. (b) Whatever we have not taken into account is not a cause of beauty. [Now the third:] (c) If suggestion is a source of beauty, it must fall under either the qualities or the figures of speech, in which case it shows no great scholarship to give it another name; while if it is not actually included in the qualities or figures,

still it will be only by reference to some minute differentiation that you give it another name, such differentiation being possible because of the endless varieties of loveliness in simile. The fact remains that suggestion is not really outside the area of the qualities and figures of speech. By giving it a new name what have you accomplished? It is always possible to imagine a new shade of beauty. For we see that the ancients, such as the sage Bharata, accepted only two figures of speech, the *yamaka*⁹ for sound and the simile for meaning. What later writers on poetics have done is only to show the direction in which these figures are to be multiplied [by giving independent names to the different forms of strikingness which they possess]. Suppose a man, familiar with the grammatical rule *karmany an* (Pāṇ. 3.2.1) and hearing such examples as *kumbhakāra* "pot-maker," were to invent such a word as *nagarakāra* "city-maker," would it not be foolish for him to feel proud on this account? The same principle applies to the topic under discussion. This then is the third subvariety. And so, the first view having three subvarieties and being joined to the other two [major views], we get five alternative views in all. Such is the overall meaning.

1. Abhinava here examines 1.1 K for information on the *anubandhas*, those "pertinent points" concerning a work which commentators on Sanskrit philosophical texts always try to make clear, for it is by them that an intelligent man will decide whether or not to study the text; see also 1.1 e L, p. 69. The traditional *anubandhas* are four: *abhidheya*, *prayojana*, *sambandha*, and *adhitāra*. Abhinava finds the *abhidheya* "the subject to be treated" clearly expressed in the subject of the sentence, viz., "the soul of poetry called 'suggestion'." The *prayojana* "purpose" of the work, he states, is given only by implication. It is of course "knowledge of the nature of suggestion," as implied by the statement, in a subordinate clause, of the purpose of the purpose, as this is "connected with the purpose." We take the reading of both Chowkhamba and Kashi editions *tatsambaddham prayojanam ca*. The Kaumudi, wishing to bring in a third *anubandha*, reads *tatsambandham prayojanam ca* and supposes that *sambandha* refers to the connection between the subject and the purpose. One may add to Abhinava's information that the *adhitāra* "the qualification required of the reader" is that he be a "sensitive reader."

2. The difficulty which Abhinava here discusses arises from the placement of the word *iti* in the verse and from the gloss *sañjīvita* in the *Vṛtti*. The word *iti* functions like quotation marks in English to shift the denotandum from thing to word. An ox (*gauh*) is an animal; "ox" (*gaur iti*) is a word, beginning with 'o' in English and with 'g' in Sanskrit. This shifting power (*uparyāsakarana*) of the word *iti* is often noticed by the grammarians; cf. Nyāsa on *Kāś*. 1.1.44 and on 1.1.66. Now if we take 1.1 K to mean that

wise men have called the soul of poetry "suggestion," but some have said that it does not exist, we are in danger of making the verse say that "some have said that the word 'suggestion' does not exist," which is nonsense. So Abhinava first claims that *dhvanir iti* means more than just the word. Next he gives a better explanation, namely that the word *iti* is out of place. It really goes with *kāvyasyātmā*, the sense being, "wise men have said, 'dhvani is the soul of poetry.'" A more radical solution of the difficulty would be to change the wording of the verse. Mahimabhaṭṭa suggests changing the first line to read: *kāvyasyātmety amalamatibhir yo dhvanir nāma gītāḥ* (*Vyaktiviveka*, p. 397). This would be in fact a considerable improvement. 3. See *Mahābhāṣya* 1.1.44, *Vārt.* 3. 4. The perfect tense is to be used for an act in past time which one has not directly perceived (*parokṣe iti*, *Pāṇ.* 3.2.115). The remarks which follow are occasioned by Abhinava's desire to reconcile the perfect tense (*jagaduḥ*) used by the *Kārikā* with the optative (*ācakṣitṛ*) about to be used by the author of the *Vṛtti* (beginning of 1.1 a 4). He claims that the perfect is used in strict accordance with Pāṇini's prescription to refer to past time which has not been directly experienced and he will claim of the optative that it here refers to past time rather than present ("might have said" rather than "might say"). Such an interpretation of the optative is grammatically justifiable, for Kāś. on *Pāṇ.* 3.3.154 states that in an hypothesis the optative shall take precedence over all other tenses and moods (*sarvalakrānām apovādoh*). If the author of the *Kārikā* actually had heard the criticisms of *dhvani*, he should have used the form *agadon* (imperfect) rather than *jagaduḥ*. Abhinava is so little interested in the historical data on which the *Kārikā* and the commentator based their criticism that he is willing for the sake of justifying a grammatical inflection to deny that such data ever existed. And yet later (1.1c L) he will speak of Manoratha, who ridiculed the concept of *dhvani* as having been a contemporary of Ānandavardhana. It seems to me that Abhinava's strict grammatical interpretation of the perfect tense is here quite misguided and that *Kārikā* and commentary are both referring to views which their author had actually read or heard expressed. 5. If someone says "the flowers that grow in the sky are red," an opponent cannot validly criticise him by saying that the flowers that grow in the sky are not red; but he can criticise the idea as a whole by saying that flowers do not grow in the sky. 6. The verse is a paraphrase of *Bṛh. Ar. Up.* 3.9.25. Sanskrit makes no formal distinction between past time and present in conditions expressed by the optative (see note 4 above). So Abhinava is grammatically justified in taking the optative inflection here to refer to past time. He has thus reconciled the tense used by the *Kārikā* with the mood used by the *Vṛttikāra*. 7. "*Yadi na syāt tataḥ kim syāt*" forms another quarter-verse that follows the half-verse just quoted. Abhinava forces the same preterite interpretation upon the condition. The moral of the three quarter-verses taken together, according to *BP*, is this. If one were to imagine the body's being constructed

inside out, one would be disgusted by the thought of dogs and crows rushing toward such filth. But even without such a repulsive hypothesis "the body remains a disgusting collection useful only for the pursuit of worthless sense enjoyments." 8. See below, 2.6. 9. See below, 2.15 K, note 1.

A Here some might contend¹ that poetry is nothing more than what is embodied in word and meaning.² The means of beautifying this pair that lie in sound, such as alliteration, and those that lie in meaning, such as simile, are well known. Also well known are [those qualities] such as sweetness, which possess certain properties of phoneme and arrangement.³ The *vṛttis*,⁴ which have been described by some writers under such names as *upanāgarikā*, and which are not different in function from these [figures and qualities]⁵ also have reached our ears. So also the styles (*rītis*) such as the Vaidarbhi.⁶ What is this thing called *dhvani* that it should differ from these?

1. Abhinava interprets as referring to past time: "some might have contended"; see 1.1 L, note 4. 2. See Bbāmaba 1.16, Dandin 1.10, Vāmana 1.1, and compare the opening of the *Raghuvamśa*: *udgarthdv iva samprktou*. 3. I follow the reading of the Kashi Sk. Ser. edition: *varṇasāṅghāṭanādharmaś ca*. Abhinava, the Kaumudi, and Krishnamoorthy's MS MB drop the word *varṇa*. My preference is based on the following consideration. The old view of the qualities *mādhurya*, *ojas*, etc., was that they were based solely on the choice of certain phonemes (*varṇa*) and certain degrees of compounding (*sāṅghatana*). Ānanda will insist later in this book (2.7) that factors of meaning must also be taken into account. Here, however, where he is giving the objection of an old-fashioned opponent of *dhvani*, it is likely that he would give it in the old-fashioned terms. But Abhinava, noticing the discrepancy with Ānanda's later pronouncement, would have been glad to drop the word *varṇa*. By doing so he could supply "*sabddārthayoh*," thus making the qualities depend on both sound and meaning. For the technical term *sāṅghatana* (arrangement, texture), see 3.5 K and 3.5 A, note 1. 4. The word *vṛtti*, literally manner of employment or place of employment, bears two different technical meanings in this book, the one derived from Udbhaṭa, the other from BHNS. The word is here used in Udbhaṭa's sense, who applies this term (Indurāja 1.7) to the three varieties of simple alliteration, that is, to what later writers call

vṛttiyanupr̥ṣṭa. He calls the three types *paruṣā* (harsh), *upanāgarikā* (polite), and *grāmyā* (rustic or vulgar). He calls the third type also *komalā* (soft). For further details see 1.1 a L and note 4. On the other hand, *BhNS* applies the term *vṛtti* to four modes of gesture and speech (*BhNS* 18.7 and 20.8ff.); see below, 3.6 g L, and note 1, as also 3.33 K and A. 5. As will be seen from L, the *vṛttis* are not different from the figure alliteration, while the styles (*rīti*) are not different from the qualities sweetness, etc. 6. Three styles (*rīti*), to which are given the geographical names *Vaidarbī*, *Gaudī*, and *Pāncālī*, are described by Dandin 1.40ff. Dandin assigns all the good qualities of poetry to *Vaidarbī*, which he further characterizes as employing few compounds and avoiding harsh sounds. In these last two respects the *Gaudī* style is its opposite, while the *Pāncālī* lies intermediate between the two. The differentia are similar to those used by Udbhaṭa in distinguishing the three *vṛttis*. But the evaluation was different. Udbhaṭa regarded the intermediate *vṛtti* as best, whereas Dandin chose as best the soft *rīti*. The concept of *rīti* was emphasized by Vāmana to the point of calling *rīti* the soul of poetry (1.2.6ff.). On *rīti* in general see P. C. Lahiri, *Concepts of Rīti and Guṇa in Sanskrit Poetics*.

L He now describes these views in sequence. Nothing more than what is embodied in sound and meaning: By saying "nothing more" he shows that no one will object [to this definition]. Now this sound and meaning themselves cannot be *dhvani*, for what advantage would arise merely from giving them an extra name? But perhaps you suppose that *dhvani* refers to some special beauty of the sound or meaning. Very well; we may speak of two sorts of beauty: the beauty of a thing in itself and the beauty that arises from its arrangement (*sāṅghātanā*). Of these sorts, the beauty that belongs to the sounds themselves derives from the figures of sound [such as alliteration], while that which arises from their arrangement derives from the qualities (*guṇas*) of words [when they are so juxtaposed as to produce sweetness, harshness, etc.]. So also of the meanings: the beauty in themselves derives from such figures as simile, while the beauty that arises from their arrangement derives from the qualities of meanings. So there is no such thing as *dhvani* distinct from the figures and qualities.

Which possesses certain properties of arrangement:¹ that is, arrangement of sound or meaning. The proof by negative probans will run thus: Whatever is other than the figures and qualities is not a cause of beauty, as for example the absolute faults such as solecism and the relative faults such as harshness;² and *dhvani* [you say] is a source of beauty; therefore, *dhvani* is not other than the figures and qualities.

To this argument it might be replied: Just as the *vṛttis* and the styles (*rīti*s) are distinct from the figures and qualities and at the same time are causes of beauty, so it may be that *dhvani* is distinct and is also a cause of beauty. It is with this reply in mind that he [who denies the existence of *dhvani*] continues: the *vṛttis* also . . . which are not different in function from these. It has not been proved that the *vṛttis* and styles are distinct from the figures and qualities. For it is merely three types of alliteration that are called by the name *vṛtti* in order to group these alliterations under three broad classes to be distinguished as harsh (*paruṣā*), graceful (*lalitā*), and intermediate, so called because of their utility in describing three types of subject matter, namely that which is fiery (*dipta*); smooth (*masrṇa*), or intermediate. [The literal sense of the word *vṛtti* is that] the alliterations occur (*vṛt*) in these forms. As has been said [by Udbhaṭa, *Indurāja* 1.7, *Vivṛtti* 1.12]: "The wise hold that alliteration (*anuprāśa*) is the placing of homogeneous consonants, separately for each separate class, in these three ways (*vṛtti*s)." "Separately for each separate class": thus, harsh alliteration is the *nāgarikā* (citizeñed) *vṛtti*; smooth alliteration is the *upanāgarikā* (polite), so called on the analogy of a sophisticated lady of the city (*nāgarikā*);³ the intermediate variety is between gentle and harsh; such is the sense: it is called *grāmyā* (rustic, vulgar) on the analogy of a country woman, who lacks sophistication and is neither gentle nor harsh by nature. The third of these varieties is also called *komalānuprāśa*.⁴ Thus the *vṛttis* are simply classes of alliteration. We are not using the word *vṛtti* here in the sense in which the Vaiśeṣika philosophers use it, for [by Vaiśeṣika rules] there could be no occurrence (*vartamānatva*) of a member in its class;⁵ all that is meant is that the alliteration functions by means of such and such a *vṛtti*. Just as it is said: "Kings function (*vartante*) on a plane of insight above that of common mortals."

So the *vṛttis* do not act as anything other than alliteration. They have no extra function; and as they have no separate function, they should not be counted separately. Thus we see that in the compound *anatirikta-vṛttayah* the meaning of the word *vṛtti* is function (*vyāpāra*). It is because the *vṛttis* are nothing other [than alliteration] that Bhāmaha and others made no mention of them. Although Udbhaṭa and others did mention them, they nevertheless convey no additional meaning [beyond that of alliteration] to our minds. It is with this thought that he says have reached our ears.⁶

So also the styles (*rīti*): One is to construe these words [with the preceding sentence] thus: So also the styles, which are not different in

function from these, have reached our ears. The word "these" [as here supplied?] refers to the qualities. Now in giving the appropriate *vṛtti* to a passage⁸ these *gunas* may be combined, through their capability of mixing with one another, in the form of a texture (*sāṅghaṭanā*), just as the tastes of sugar, pepper, and the like may be combined in a drink. Such a combination is called a *rīti*. It is of three sorts, as it applies to a subject matter that is fiery, or delicate, or something intermediate, in accordance with what we see to be most eagerly sought in the country of Gauda, or Vidarbha, or Pañcāla. The class is here not different from its members and the whole is not different from its components. So the *vṛttis* and styles are not different from the figures and qualities; and the negative probans [which we just gave] is valid.

So he says: what is this thing called *dhvani* that it should be different from these? It is not a substrate of beauty, as it is neither in the form of sound or meaning. Nor is it a cause of beauty, as it is other than a figure of speech or a quality. If we examine poetry analytically, despite the fact that it should be appreciated synthetically,⁹ even so we find no distinct thing which can be called *dhvani*. He says as much by using the phrase "this thing called" *dhvani*.

1. Abhinava omits the term *varṇa* (phoneme) in the compound *varṇa-sāṅghaṭanādharmāḥ*. 2. The faults (*doṣas*) have been treated by almost every Sanskrit literary critic. For accounts in English, see Raghavan, *Bhoja's SP.*, pp. 203–243, and Krishnamoorthy, "Doctrine of Doṣas," *IHQ* 20.217–232. The distinction of *nitya doṣāḥ*, usages which are always faulty, i.e., absolute faults, from *anitya doṣāḥ*, usages which are faulty only in certain contexts, i.e., relative faults, is known to Ānanda (see 2.11 below). An example of the latter type is harshness, which is reprehensible in a passage of love but may be praiseworthy in a passage of heroism or cruelty. 3. Abhinava takes the term (by Saunāga Vārttikā 7, see *Mahābhāṣya* 2.2.18) as *nāgarikayā vidagdhayā upamitā*: given its simile by, i.e., similar to, a *nāgarikā*, that is, a sophisticated lady. The same explanation was given by Indurāja on Udbhaṭa 1.5 and is grammatically unexceptionable. But it leaves us wondering why the harsh variety of *vṛtti* should be called *nāgarikā*, a term not found in Udbhaṭa and which seems to originate with Abhinava. To that the *Kaumudī* says that the harsh variety is like a city lady in brilliant costume. 4. It will be seen that Abhinava has changed the distribution as given by Udbhaṭa. Udbhaṭa gives three *vṛttis*: (1) harsh, which alliterates by means of *s*, *ś*, the retroflexes, and certain harsh conjuncts; (2) *upanāgarikā*, which alliterates by means of the stops other than the retroflexes and by conjuncts of which the first member is a nasal; and (3) vulgar (*grāmyā*) or soft (*komalā*), which alliterates by means of the remaining consonants, i.e., the semivowels and *h*. Obviously his *vṛttis* are

ordered according to a decreasing degree of harshness. What is reprehensible in the third type is its excessive softness or liquidity. But Abhinava wants to harmonize the three *vṛttis* with the three *ṛitis* given by Daṇḍin and Vāmana. Accordingly, he keeps the first *vṛtti* as harsh, makes the second *vṛtti* soft, and makes the third, mixed, *vṛtti* bears the traditional name of *komaldā* (soft). The commentators (*BP* and *Kaumudi*) are forced to say that the term *komaldā* is here *rūḍhā*, i.e., used without regard to its etymological meaning. Such was Abhinava's authority, however, that his scheme is followed by Mammata (9.80 and cf. 8.74-75) and other later authors. 5. Udbhata had said that alliteration occurs in three *vṛttis*, to which Abhinava has added the statement that these three *vṛttis* are classes (*varga*). Now in the *Vaiśeṣika* system a member cannot occur (*vartate*) in its class; the class occurs in, or inheres in, its members. So it is necessary to specify that "alliteration occurs in a given *vṛtti*" means simply that it functions in a certain way. 6. That is, these terms have reached our ears but not our minds. 7. When the compound *tadānatirikta-vṛttayāḥ* explicitly modifies the word *vṛttayāḥ*, one will take *tad* to refer to the figure *anuprāsa*. When the compound is supplied as a modifier of *ritayah*, the *tad* will refer to the gunas. 8. *samucitavṛttiyarpane*: Abhinava's conception seems to be that a combination of gunas, say of *mādhyura* and *prasāda*, transfers to a particular *vṛtti*, say the *upanāgarikā* *vṛtti*, its ability to express an appropriate *rasa*, say, *śringāra*. The word *yad* which follows in the sentence modifies *saṅghātarūpatāgamanam*. 9. The notion that the *āsvāda* of poetry is *akhaṇḍa* belongs really to the *siddhāntin*, to Abhinava himself. The idea might have been borrowed from Bhartṛhari, who says that we understand the sense of a phrase without analysing or dividing it, but as an indivisible whole. We achieve thus by means of *pratibhā*. See *Vākyapadiya*, ed. Abhyankar and Limaye, 2.143-147 and Filliozat, p. xviii.

A Others might say: There is no such thing as *dhuani*.¹ For a type of poetry that falls outside our well-known system would no longer be poetry. The correct definition of poetry is that which consists of sounds and meaning which delight the heart of a sensitive audience. To a method which differs from the system which has been laid down this [definition] is inapplicable. Moreover, if you were to confer the title of "sensitive audience" on some few persons who belong to your

persuasion and on that basis assign to *dhvani* the title of poetry, you would not thereby gain the assent of the general body of educated men.

1. Here used to mean a type of poetry; see 1.1 K. note 1.

L Now it might be granted that *dhvani* does not consist of sound or meaning; furthermore that it is not a cause of their beauty; and yet it exists and for the aforesaid reason is different from the figures of speech and the qualities. In order to combat such a position the author introduces a second type of persons who deny the existence of *dhvani*: others.

[Others might say:] It may well be [that such a thing as *dhvani* exists, distinct from the figures and qualities]. But this *dhvani* is not such as you would have it in your definition. For you were going to speak of something related to poetry; and this [*dhvani*] is no more related to poetry than are dancing and singing and instrumental music. Poetry must be spoken; therein lies its nature. One cannot claim that dancing and singing are spoken.

Well-known: The well-known system is one of sound and meaning and of the figures and qualities. "System" means the path which people follow in a continuous tradition. Type of poetry: this method of yours is intended by you to be a type of poetry, for you have called it "the soul of poetry." Why is it not poetry? Because of the definition "...of a sensitive audience." To a method: what he means is such a method as is used in dancing, singing, motion of the eyes, etc. This: supply "definition" [viz., that which consists of sounds and meanings which delight the heart] of a sensitive audience.

Now it might be argued that the only sensitive auditors are those who recognize this novel form of poetry; and as that which lies outside [the well-known system] is approved by them, it may well serve as a definition of poetry. With this in mind he says, moreover. The case is similar to a man's saying, "I will define a sword" and proceeding to do so as follows. "A sword has length and breadth, it can be worn, it covers the whole body, it is soft, it is woven of variegated threads, it can be spread out or rolled up, it cannot cut, but can itself be cut. This is the best kind of sword." Then when someone objects that he has described a cloth, not a sword, he says, "This is what I consider to be a sword." Just so is this [definition you are giving of *dhvani*]. What the author means is that what we define should be what it is known to

be, not a figment of the imagination. So he says, the general body of educated men. As a few educated men might hold this strange opinion, he rules them out by saying "the general body." For even should a few hold it, what difference does it make? It merely proclaims their insanity. This is his meaning.

Another commentator has taken this passage otherwise. He would have the denier of *dhvani* to argue thus. "What you recognize is a *dhvani* that is the very life of poetry. Now such a life of poetry lies outside our well-known system because it has not been mentioned by the experts on the figures of speech. Furthermore, this word *dhvani* is not an accepted term for poetry in common usage."¹ This interpretation runs counter to everything the text has said. For if *dhvani* as a vivifying principle of poetry is admitted by the denier of *dhvani*, the fact that it has not been mentioned by the ancients should rather be a reason for now defining it. Therefore, the meaning should be taken as we have taken it above.

1. This interpretation is simpler than Abhinava's. It amounts to this. The first argument of the *dhvani*-deniers was against *dhvani* as the content of poetry or as the cause of the beauty in poetry. This second argument is against *dhvani* as the highest type of poetry itself. *Dhvani* is not that, because the ancients made no mention of it as such and because people do not commonly use the word *dhvani* in that sense. Such an interpretation is too simple for Abhinava, for it would leave the proponent of *dhvani* with the reply: "That the ancients failed to notice this type of poetry is all the more reason why it should now be defined."

A Still others might argue for its non-existence in another way. *Dhvani* simply cannot be something entirely new because, being something that falls within the area of beauty, it must be included in the means of beautifying poetry that have been mentioned [in earlier works on poetics]. It is trivial to single out one of these means and merely give it a new name. Moreover, as the possibilities of speech are limitless, there may well be some small variety that has not been dealt with by the well-known compilers of definitions for poetry.¹ Even so,

we cannot see any justification here [for the proponents of *dhvani*] to close their eyes in the fond imagination that they are sensitive critics and to dance about chanting "dhvani, dhvani." Others, great men too, have shown in the past different varieties of beauty in poetry² by the thousand and continue to do so.³ But we do not find them acting in this indecorous fashion. As a matter of fact, *dhvani* is mere prattle. It is simply not possible to put forward anything as a definition of *dhvani* that can bear critical examination. In this vein someone⁴ has written a verse on the matter:

A fool will take a poem that has no content
 to make the heart rejoice, no ornament,
 no words to show the author's skill,
 no striking turn of speech:
 and tell you with delight
 that this same poem is full of *dhvani*.
 If you who are wise should ask him, I am sure
 he could not tell you what this *dhvani* is.

1. What are meant are those who have defined the figures of sound and meaning, the qualities and styles, e.g., Dandin, Bhāmaha, and Vāmana.
2. *Alarikāra* here does not mean specifically a figure of speech, but rather beauty of poetry in general. Cf. the opening of Vāmana's KA: kāvyam grāhyam alarikārāt, and the second sūtra: saundaryam alarikārūḥ and its vṛtti: kāraṇavṛtpattiyā punar alarikārasabdo 'yam upamādīsu vartate.
3. Cf. Dandin 2.1: te cādyāpi vikalpyante kas tān kārtṣṇya vakyātī.
4. According to Abhinava (see below) the author of the verse was Manoratha.

L But suppose that *dhvani* is a cause of beauty and that it can be included under the figures or qualities either of sound or sense; still, this entity has not been spoken of as "*dhvani*," nor has anyone heretofore spoken of it as the life [of poetry]. In order to combat such a position, the author now introduces a third variety of those who deny the existence of *dhvani*: still others.

"Beauty" (*kāmaniyaka*) is the passive abstract of "beautiful" (*kāmanīya*).¹ i.e., the source of our notion of cārūtva (dearness, beauty).

But now, as there is an endless number of charming things, [the proponents of *dhvani* might argue that] they have discovered a certain charming thing that cannot be included under such [figures] as alliteration, or under such [qualities] as sweetness, as defined by earlier

writers. The opponent refutes this after first accepting it for the sake of argument: the possibilities of speech (*vāc*). *Vāc* can have any of three meanings: (1) that which expresses, namely a word; (2) that which is expressed, namely a meaning; or (3) that by which a meaning is expressed, namely the denotative function.²

A small variety: for such a source of beauty will be either a quality or a figure of speech and so will be included under the general definition. As has been said: "The factors which make for beauty in poetry are the qualities. The figures are what add to this beauty."³ Also: "An unusual or striking turn of word or meaning (*vakrokti*) is considered an ornament of poetic utterances."⁴

Dhvani, dhvani: the repetition suggests the excitement [of the proponents of *dhvani*] and shows the awe [with which they regard their concept]. Dance about: one may supply as subject "those who define *dhvani*, those who compose poems that use it, and those who experience a thrill on hearing it."⁵ Why, he means, should there be such reverence for this word "*dhvani*"? *Dhvani* is mere prattle: a general view, summing up all [three] positions of those who deny the existence of *dhvani*. It is mere prattle (1) because if it is a cause of beauty, it is not different from the figures and qualities; (2) because if it is different, it is not a cause of beauty; and (3) because even if it is a cause of beauty, it is not worthy of our serious attention [as it has already been included under the general definition of the figures and qualities]. This is the meaning.

Now this imagining of the position of those who deny *dhvani* cannot be charged with being [historically] baseless. Thus he says, in this vein someone. The reference is to a poet named Manoratha who lived at the same time as the author of this book.⁶

[To explain Manoratha's verse:] As it has "no ornament," therefore it does not "make the heart delight." This shows that the poem lacks the figures of meaning [simile, etc.]. "No words to show the author's skill": this refers to the figures of sound [alliteration, *yamaka*]. "Striking turn of speech": elevated style or arrangement (*saṅghatana*). That it lacks this implies that it lacks the qualities of sound and meaning. Some have taken this phrase [viz., "no striking turn of speech"] to mean that since the poem lacks this general characteristic of the figures of speech, it must lack every figure.⁷ But by this interpretation one could not avoid involving the author in tautology. I shall not argue the point further. "With delight": he means a passion for following by rote the example of others. "Who are wise": for if a fool asked him,

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he could reply with such [silly gestures] as rolling his eyes.⁶

1. By Pān. 5.1.132 the suffix *vunī* (*vrddhi* + -*aka*) is added to certain noun stems in the sense of *bhāva* or *karma*. Such formations are nouns. *Bhāva* refers to a nominal abstract, the state of being beautiful; *karma* to a passive nominalization, "that which has been beautified." In English we may render both concepts as "beauty." But note that in the phrase *kāvyasya kāmaniyakam* (the beauty of poetry) Abhinava takes *vunī* specifically in the sense *karmani*, the whole word *kāmaniyakam* denoting something that has been made beautiful. 2. *Vāc* is here etymologized as the verbal root *voc* plus the null suffix *kvip* with irregular *vrddhi* by *Unādisūtra* 225. Normally *kvip* is used actively, by Pān. 3.4.67: thus, *vaktīti vāk* or *ucyate 'nayeti vāk*. But by drawing down *karmani* from Pān. 3.2.1 it may be taken passively: *ucyata iti vāk*. 3. This is from Vāmana's *Kāvyaśārākārasūtra* 3.1.1-2. Under *guṇa* Vāmana includes the *sabdagunas* and the *arthagunas*, viz., ojas, prasāda etc.: *ye khalu sābdārthayor dharmāḥ kāvyasobhām kurvanti te gunāḥ*. Under *śārīra* he includes the *sabdāśārīras* and the *arthāśārīras*: *śārīrāś ca yamakopamādayāḥ*. 4. Bhāmaha 1.36. *Vakrokti* here has therefore a very general application, as it has in Dandin as well. See Dandin 2.363, Bhāmaha 1.30, 1.34, and especially 2.85: *saiṣā sarvātma vakroktir anyādṛtho vibhāvyate / yatno 'syām kavindā kāryaḥ ko 'lāñkāro 'nayā vīnā*. 5. It is not fully clear whether "it" (the *tat* in *tac-chravāṇa*) refers to the poems that make use of *dhvani* or to the word "dhvani" itself. 6. Abhinava uses the term *granthakṛt* (Kane, HSP, p. 156) as synonymous with *vr̥titākāra*. He uses the term *asmanmūlagranthakṛt* for the author of the *Kārikās* (ibid., p. 158). Thus, whether or not we suppose that he is following a tradition of dual authorship, we must charge him with here saying that Manoratha was a contemporary of Ānanda. For this error see Introduction, pp. 4, 9, 26-27. 7. This is certainly the more natural interpretation. 8. Cf. the similar passage in Abhinava's *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśī*, Vol. 2, 2.3, p. 91, where he refers to the Buddhist definition of *pramāṇa*: *anyathā mukhabhārigamūrdha-kampāngulimoṭandādimātratattvam tat*.

A "Others say that it is an associated meaning (*bhākta*)": others say that this soul of poetry which we call *dhvani* is [merely] secondary usage (*gunavṛtti*).¹ And although the authors of definitions for poetry have not given the specific name *dhvani* to secondary usage nor to any other sort of thing, still, in showing how secondary usage is employed in poetry, they have at least touched on the process of *dhvani* even if they have not actually defined it. It is with this in mind that [the *Kārikā*] states, "Others say that it is an associated meaning."

1. See 1.1 K. note 2.

L The [three] alternative views of the non-existence of *dhvani* were presented successively and not without connection of thought. That is why he used the phrase "still others" in introducing his description of the third alternative; and [with this close connection] the unitary conclusion [viz., "*dhvani* is mere prattle"] is in keeping. As the doctrine of the non-existence of *dhvani* is completely hypothetical, he used the perfect tense¹ in reporting it. On the other hand, the view that *dhvani* is no more than an associated meaning can be found in written texts; and so he now employs a present tense: [others] say that it is an associated meaning, using the present tense for the expression of that which takes place constantly.²

[Abhinava now gives four different etymologies to explain the meaning of the word *bhākta*.] (1) *Bhakti* ("association") is a property that is associated (*bhāyate*), or is in company with,³ or is regarded [by the speaker] as commonly recognized in, a word-object [let us say, river-bank]—e.g., a property such as proximity to the direct object of the word [here, river]. Now the relational secondary sense (*lāksaṇiko 'rthah*) that derives from [i.e., that is made possible by] this property is called the *bhākta* ("associated") meaning. [Thus, river-bank is an associated or relational meaning of "river," as may be seen in the phrase "a village on the river."] As has been said,

Lakṣaṇā (secondary usage) is held to be of five sorts, as it is based on the proximity of the secondary object to the direct object, on its similarity to it, its involvement in it, its opposition to it, or its being connected with the same tivity.⁴

(2) *Bhakti* ("portion") is a portion (*bhāga*) of the meaning of such a word as is used of a group of properties, e.g., the portion of the word "lion" that means fierceness. Now a metaphorical meaning (*gauno 'rthah*)⁵ that arises thus is called a *bhākta* ("partial") meaning. Such a meaning may be seen in the sentence "the boy is a lion," meaning that the boy is fierce. (3) *Bhakti* ("attachment, love, affect") is the intense desire one may have to express such a concept as proximity [to a holy river] or fierceness [in a young man]. The meaning that arises from such eagerness is called a *bhākta* ("affective") meaning and may be either a metaphorical (*gauna*) or a relational (*lāksaṇika*) meaning. (4) *Bhakti* is the breaking or blocking (*bhangā*, from *bhanju āmardane*) of the primary meaning. Hence a meaning that arises from blocking of the primary sense is a *bhākta* meaning.

These etymologies will show that the presence of three factors forms the seed from which secondary usage (*upacāra*) arises. They are: the blocking of the primary meaning;⁶ a cause [e.g., proximity to or similarity to the primary object]; and a purpose [e.g., one's eagerness to express forcefully this proximity or similarity].

What lies back of the apposition between soul of poetry and secondary usage is this.⁷ Although secondary usage is [sometimes] found in that variety of *dhvani* where the literal meaning is not intended, as in "like a mirror blinded by breath," nevertheless *dhvani* is not identical with it, for we find *dhvani* without secondary usage in such a variety of *dhvani* as that where the literal meaning is subordinated to a second meaning.⁸ And we shall show⁹ that even where the literal meaning is not intended there may be secondary usage without *dhvani*. So our author will say: "This *dhvani* is not identical with *bhakti* (secondary operation), because it differs from it in form; nor is it defined by that, because the definition would be both too wide and too narrow." (1.14 K) and "It might, however, be an adventitious mark (*upalakṣana*) of a certain type of *dhvani*".¹⁰ (1.19 K).

[Abhinava now takes the part of the opponent, etymologizing the word *gunavṛtti* to show that just like *dhvani* it may denote a word, a meaning, or an operation or usage].¹¹

Gunas are properties such as proximity or fierceness. *Gunavṛtti* (literally, "of which, or in which, there is an occurrence because of properties") may be either a word or a meaning [depending on whether we analyse the compound as a genitive or locative *bahuvrīhi*], viz., "that

(word) of which there is an occurrence in (or, application to) a meaning other than the primary meaning because of these properties," or "that (meaning) in which there is an occurrence of a word by these means." Or: *gunavṛtti* may be the occurrence, that is, the operation, of the secondary power of meaning through these properties. This is as much as to say: in whatever sense we understand the word *dhvani*, viz., as that which suggests, or that which is suggested, or the operation of suggesting, still it is nothing different from a word used in a secondary meaning, or the secondary meaning itself, or the secondary operation. For, as denotation is the only operation in conveying the primary sense, we are left with only one possibility: that *dhvani* is the secondary operation, as there is no third.

But who ever said that *dhvani* was *gunavṛtti*? With this objection in mind, [the denier of *dhvani*] says, and although, etc. Any other sort of thing: e.g., any sort of quality or figure of speech. In showing: he is referring to such authors as Bhāṭṭodbhaṭa and Vāmana. For where Bhāmaha says, "Words, meters, designations (*abhidhāna*), meanings."¹² Bhāṭṭodbhaṭa explains the difference between words and designations as follows: "Designation means the denotative function of words, which may be primary or secondary (*gunavṛtti*)."¹³ And Vāmana has said, "*Vakrokti* is secondary usage (*lakṣaṇā*) based on similarity."¹⁴

Have at least touched on: that is, they showed the direction in which *dhvani* lies, but being men who read literally, they gave no definition of its true nature, as they were unable to distinguish it. Indeed, they scorned it, merely taking up as they found them the words which contained it [without examining their precious inner meaning], as a man might take up a coconut [with no conception of the delicacy of its inner meat].¹⁵ Hence [the *Vṛtti*] says that it is with this in mind that the *Kārikā* states If one fails to interpret the passage as we have done, the statement of the *dhvani*-opponent that [former writers] have "at least touched on" the process of *dhvani* will be contradicted.

1. Viz., "jagaduh"; cf. 1.1. L, note 4. 2. The word *dhuh* "they say," although it carries a perfect suffix, is regarded by Pāṇini as a present (Pāṇ. 3.4.84). "The present tense for the expression of that which takes place constantly" (*nityapraवृत्तिवार्तमाने लो*) is an expression taken from Vārttika I on Pāṇ. 3.2.123. It is given by Bhoja (ŚP 5, Josyer's edition, p. 164) as one of the six uses of the present tense. 3. The wording *sevyate padārthena* ... *dharmaḥ* is awkward, as may be seen by the variant reading *prājñena* for *padārthena* noticed by the *Kaumudi* and accepted by Kane in his notes on

SD, p. 320. But the variant is surely wrong. Abhinava is forced to use *sevyate* in glossing *bhajyate* because that is its gloss in the *DhP* (1.1047 *bhaja sevāyām*). 4. The quotation is from a Mīmāṃsā author Bhartṛmitra whose works are I t. See Kane, *SD*, p. 320, footnote. Abhinava uses a different version of it in commenting on 1.18. The word *sārūpyat* is there replaced by *sāmyogat*, which would exclude the metaphorical variety of secondary usage from *lakṣaṇā*. The verse is quoted in the *Abhidhārvittimātrikā* on Kārikās 9–10 in still a different version, but one that does include the metaphorical variety (*abhidheyena sambandhāt sādṛsyat* *samaudiyataḥ*). The *Abhidhārvittimātrikā* is about a century older than the Locana. 5. For the distinction of *guna* and *lakṣaṇika* see 1.1. *K.*, note 2. 6. By blocking is meant that the context renders the primary meaning impossible. Boys, for example, are not really lions. 7. Abhinava is here speaking in *propria persona*, not in the role of the denier of *dhvani*. He admits that there can be *sāmānyādhikaranya* (apposition, syntopicity) between *dhvani* and *gunavṛtti*. This is very different from saying that they are identical. "An oak is a tree" is a sentence which exhibits syntopicity, but a tree is not an oak. For the distinction see *NVTT* 1.1.4 (Kashi ed., p. 110, lines 16ff.; Calc. ed., p. 96, lines 2ff.) 8. One must correct the punctuation of the other editions by the Kaumudi, thus: *tadvyatirekenāpi bhāvāt vivakṣitānyaparavācyaprabhedādau / avivakṣita* For the two varieties of *dhvani* here mentioned see below, 1.13 m A and 2.1 Introduction A. 9. Cf. 3.33.

10. An *upalaksana* is a characteristic that helps define a term only temporarily or under certain conditions. The *lakṣaṇa* (definition proper) of the washerman's house might be "the first house east of the lake." An *upalaksana* of this house might be "the house on the roof of which a crow is sitting." 11. *Gunavṛtti* is actually used almost exclusively in the third of these senses. But the point of the etymologies is to show correspondence between *gunavṛtti* and *dhvani* which might be thought to support the opponent's view. 12. Bhāmaha 1.9. 13. See J. Masson, "A Note on the Authenticity of the *Bhāmahavivaraṇa* Attributed to Udbhaṭa," *IJ* 13, pp. 250–254. 14. Vāmana 4.3.8. 15. Vidyanātha speaks of *drākṣāpāka* "grape-taste," where enjoyment is easy and immediate, and *nārikelapāka* "coconut-taste," which is more difficult to obtain, but finally gives unsurpassed pleasure. See De, *HSP*, II, p. 242. See also *Agnipurāṇa* 346.22–23.

A Finally some, whose minds have shied away from attempting a definition, have declared that the true nature of *dhvani* lies outside the

realm of speech, that it can only be felt and that only by a sensitive reader.¹ Therefore, in view of such disagreements, we shall state its true nature in order to delight the hearts of sensitive readers. For the nature of this *dhvani* which is the secret of all good poets' poetry, which despite its extraordinary beauty has not been opened to view by the subtle minds of the ancient makers of definitions of poetry, which, moreover, is clearly seen to be at work in such great poems as the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*, will here be revealed so that the bliss [which arises] in the hearts of sensitive readers on their noticing it in [the poems that form] the object of their attention, may take firm hold in their hearts.²

1. One may note that the *Kārikās*, while they refute both the *abhāvavāda* and the *bhāktavāda*, are silent about the *anākhyeyavāda*. This may be, as the *Vṛtti* claims at the end of the chapter, because the author felt that the very statement of his own theory was sufficient answer. 2. This is a difficult sentence to translate. If one breaks it up, one loses the tight connection that subsists between its parts. The *bahurūhi* compound *prasiddha-vyavahāram* is in a double construction (*kākākṣigolakanyādyena*). The nature of *dhvani*, which is clearly at work in all great poetry, will be revealed for the delight of those readers who notice that it is clearly at work in all great poetry. Their initial observation of *dhvani* has brought them bliss, but this bliss will take permanent hold on their hearts (or minds) only by the clear definitions of *dhvani* that the author is about to reveal. Abhinava gets carried away by the discovery of latent implications in the sentence. To him it suggests arguments against all the preceding wrong views of *dhvani*. In order to find an argument against the last of the wrong views, viz., that *dhvani* cannot be defined, he takes the word *lakṣayatām* here to mean "who are defining" rather than "who are noticing." This seems to me (D.I.) to mistake entirely the intention of the sentence. If sensitive readers are already defining the nature of *dhvani* in the poems of their reading, what need would there be to write the *Dhvanyāloka*? Abhinava's remark on the word *ānanda* should be accepted. The author is here playing on the proper name. The effect of his book will be to give firm footing in the hearts of sensitive readers not only to the bliss of understanding *dhvani* but to the fame of *Ānandavardhana*.

*L Whose minds have shied away: who were of timid intellect. The three [sets of critics, viz., those who deny the existence of *dhvani*, those who say that it is merely an associated meaning, and those who say that it cannot be defined.] are such that each one later mentioned is of sounder judgment than the preceding. Those of the first*

set are completely wrong; those of the second, while they recognize its nature, deny it [to be dhvani] because of indecision;¹ those of the last set do not deny it but know not how to define it. So what characterizes the three groups is in turn error, indecision, and insufficient knowledge.

Therefore (*tena*): He uses the singular (*tena*, lit., "because of this") since any one of these [three] statements of divergent view might serve as justification for the following description [of dhvani].

Such disagreements: locative of limitation; the sense is, because of any one type among these divergent opinions.²

We shall state its true nature: These words imply that the subject matter of the book is the true nature of dhvani, that the relation of dhvani to the book is a relation of subject matter to speech, that the relation of speaker to hearer is a relation of instructor to instructed, that the purpose of the book is [to give] a knowledge of the true nature of dhvani by refuting wrong opinions on the subject, and that the relation of the book to this purpose is a relation of means to goal.³

Now in order to explain the portion "to delight the hearts of sensitive readers," a portion which sets forth the purpose, resident within the hearer, of the purpose [of the book], he says: for the nature of this, etc. The meaning of "this" is "this dhvani which has become a matter of controversy." The structure of the sentence is as follows. The nature of dhvani will be revealed in order to effect a purpose, namely, so that bliss (*ānanda*), which is a sort of delight (*nirvṛtti*) also known as "rapture" (*camatkāra*), may assume a firm stance—firm enough not to be shaken by other critics who suffer from error, [indecision, and ignorance]—within the minds of those who define (*lakṣayatām*, see 1.1 e A, note 2 and remarks of L below) [this nature of dhvani]. As one understands the purpose [viz., the giving of delight to sensitive readers] to be that which ultimately prompts [the author to furnish] the matter [viz., the definition of dhvani] which achieves the purpose, this explanation takes the words [of the last line of the Kārikā, viz.,] *prītaye tatsvarūpam brūmāḥ* as part of a single complex sentence.⁴

In explaining the words "its true nature," the Vṛttikāra indicates briefly his rebuttal of the five divergent views which he has mentioned above.⁵ All: By the word "all," combined with good poets, he refutes [the view that dhvani might consist] "in some small variety" [that has not been dealt with previously; cf. 1.1 c A]. By its extraordinary beauty he shows its difference from associated usage [cf. 1.1 d A], for there is no particular beauty in such instances of associated meaning as "The boy is a lion," or "A village on the Ganges." By calling it the

secret [of all good poets' poetry], he refutes the view that it is merely a new name [for something already defined by earlier critics; cf 1.1 c A].⁶ By speaking of [dhvani as not having been opened to view] by the subtle minds [of the ancients], he shows that it cannot be included in the qualities or in the figures of speech [cf. 1.1 a A]. By the passage stating that moreover [dhvani is clearly seen to be at work in great poems], he refutes the suspicion of cliquishness that [was brought against proponents of dhvani when the objector] spoke of "some few persons of your persuasion" [cf. 1.1 b A]; and by mentioning the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* he shows that dhvani has been revered by every one from the time of the very first poet.⁷

By the participle *lakṣayatām* [which in translating A we have rendered as noticing it] he sets aside the objection that dhvani lies outside the realm of speech. The noun *lakṣa* means that by which something is recognized, that is, a definition (*lakṣana*). The denominative verb *lakṣayati* means to describe something by defining it. So the participle *lakṣayatām* means "describing it by means of definitions."

Of sensitive readers (*sahrdayāñām*): The word *sahrdaya* (lit., "having their hearts with it") denotes persons who are capable of identifying with the subject matter,⁸ as the mirror of their hearts has been polished⁹ by the constant study and practice of poetry, and who respond to it sympathetically in their own hearts. As has been said, "The realization (*bhāva*) of that object (e.g., *vibhāva*, etc.) which finds sympathy in the heart is the origin of rasa. The body is pervaded by it as dry wood by fire" (*BhNS* 7.7).¹⁰

The bliss: In showing the primary object to be bliss, which is nothing more than the relishing of rasa, he shows that [of the three types of dhvani] it is the suggestion of rasa that is the most important and is the real soul of poetry. Hereby the following verse [of Bhāṭṭānāyaka¹¹] is given a mortal blow: "Supposing that one could prove dhvani to be a separate verbal operation, whose nature is suggestion, it would still form only a part of poetry, not its very self."¹² For you [i.e., Bhāṭṭānāyaka] have admitted that while poetry consists of the three parts, designation (*abhidhā*), aesthetic efficacy (*bhāvanā*), and the relishing of rasa (*rasacarvanā*), it is the relishing of rasa that gives it its life. As you yourself have said, "It is the man who relishes [what he reads], not he who learns it nor he who obeys it, [who is eligible] for [reading] poetry."¹³

If your saying that dhvani is only a part of poetry is a statement made with reference to *vastudhvani* (the suggestion of a fact) or to

alankāradhvani (the suggestion of a figure of speech), you are merely confirming what we regard as already confirmed;¹⁴ but if it is made with reference to *rasadhvani*, your statement stands in contradiction to the experience proclaimed in your own admission.¹⁵

In this matter¹⁶ [of the primary goal's being bliss, one may make a distinction]: For the poet, delight is certainly his goal, but it may be achieved also by fame, as the verse proclaims: "for they say that fame has heavenly reward."¹⁷ For the auditors (or readers), it is true that both instruction and delight are goals, for it has been said, "The study of good poetry imparts skill in *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma*, *mokṣa*, and the arts; it gives both fame and joy" [Bhāmaha 1.2]. Nevertheless, of instruction and joy, joy is the chief goal. Otherwise, what basic difference would there be between one means of instruction, viz., poetry, which instructs after the fashion of a wife, and other means of instruction, such as the Vedas which instruct after the fashion of a master, or history which instructs after the fashion of a friend? That is why bliss is said to be the chief goal. In comparison with [poetry's] instruction even in all four aims of human life, the bliss which it renders is a far more important goal.

"Ānanda" ("bliss") is also the name of the author. Therefore [the concluding sentence of the *Vṛtti* on 1.1 e] also means: may the teacher Ānandavardhana attain by means of this book an imperishable place in the hearts of sympathetic readers, as [the statue of a god, properly consecrated, attains such] a place in a temple. As has been said:

The authors of great works,
even after death,
leave with us in their poems
a body of undiminishing beauty.

[Bhāmaha 1.6]

From the place he attains in their hearts, one may judge the heart of the author himself: the sense is that he is a prince of connoisseurs. The same use of "place" is found in the line of verse: "In battle the highest place was Arjuna's." The mention of his own name is simply to encourage his readers [to study the work] by arousing their respect and their trust, as we shall explain at the end of the book. Thus [the word "bliss" hints at] the primary goal of the author, of the poet, and of the reader.

1. *Sandeha* (indecision) is that type of doubt which cannot decide which of two identifications is correct, e.g., "Is it a man or a tree? Is it a cloud or smoke?" Here the *sandeha* would take the form "Is this an instance of *dhvani* or of associated meaning?" 2. Abhinava does not take the locative *evam-vidhāsu vimatigu* as a normal locative absolute (*lakṣonā-saptamī*), as we have taken it. He assigns it rather to the locative of limitation (Pāṇ. 2.3.41). So the literal sense by his interpretation would be: "because of this or that misunderstanding among [or, within the limit of] these divergent opinions, we [I] compelled to set the matter straight." One should place a *danda* after *tenaiva hetundā*. 3. This sentence elicits the *anubandhas* essentially as Abhinava has already given them; see 1.1 L and note 1 thereon. 4. The first Kārikā says in essence: "*Dhvani* has been understood in various ways; therefore, we shall state its true nature for the joy (*pritaye tatsvarūpam brūmāḥ*) of sensitive readers." Other things being equal, two methods of interpreting the Kārikā would be possible: (1) by *vākyabhedo*, as furnishing two parallel clauses, in which case the sense would be: "Because *dhvani* has been understood in various ways we shall state its true nature and we shall state its true nature for the joy of sensitive readers"; (2) by *ekavākyatā*, as furnishing a single complex sentence, in which one clause is subordinated to another, viz., "Since *dhvani* has been understood in various ways, we shall state its true nature for the joy of sensitive readers." Of these two possible interpretations, only the second is correct because the purpose of stating the nature of *dhvani* is to furnish delight to the readers; the need of refuting the various wrong opinions is subordinate to this purpose. We have followed the preference of BP in taking *vyākhyeyam* as *vyākhyā + iyam*. It could of course be understood as a single word, a gerundive modifying the *iti*-clause *pritaye tatsvarūpam brūmāḥ*. One would then translate: "The words *pritaye*, etc., are to be interpreted as part of a complex sentence." 5. What follows is an instance of Abhinava's passion for discovering hidden indications and suggestions in Ānanda's text. He not only finds suggestions to refute the five arguments against *dhvani*, he assigns special suggestions to no less than nine words or phrases in the brief passage comprised by 1.1 e A. His enthusiasm pushes him into a false interpretation of the word *lakṣayatām*, as it is only by this false interpretation that he can find in this passage a reference to the last anti-*dhvani* argument, viz., that *dhvani* cannot be described in words. Cf. 1.1 e A, note 2. 6. If *dhvani* is the secret of all good poets' poetry, it must be more important than any of the components of poetry mentioned by the older authors. We cannot call it merely a new name for one of those anciently defined components. 7. Vālmiki was the first poet. The Rāmāyaṇa according to Indian tradition is older than the Mahābhārata. 8. In ABh. Vol. 2, p. 339, Abhinava defines *saṃhrdayatva* (literary sensitivity) as the faculty of entering into identity with the heart of the poet (*kavihṛdayatādātmyāpattiyogyatā*). The passage has been pointed out by Gnoli, p. xliv. 9. The polished mirror is a favorite image

of Abhinava. Cf. *IPV*, beginning of Vol. 2: *vitatavिदादस्यद्माद्र्षे सुदक्ति-रासोज्जवलम्*, and *Tantrāloka*, Vol. 2, p. 4, vs. 4: *nirmले मुतुले यदुवद् भांति भूमिजलादयः / अमिरास तद्वद् एकाश्मिन् सिन्धेविश्वामित्रयः*. Mirrors, which were of metal, were polished with ashes; cf. *Vajjälalga* 33.

10. By this quotation Abhinava seems to indicate that it is only within the *sahṛdaya* that *rasa* can arise. Unfortunately the MSS of *ABh.* break off just before this passage of the *BhNS*. In its place one may use the *Kou-mudi*'s remarks, for its author had probably read an undefective MS of the *ABh.* and is most likely following it in commenting on this verse. "Whatever thing," he says, "that is, whatever form of विभावा, etc., occurs in a good poet's description. 'Finds sympathy in the heart,' that is, is such as to become the object of the heart's sympathy. 'The realization (*bhāva*) of that thing,' in other words, its blossoming within the frame of the spotless mirror of the heart: that is, the origin, or more strictly, the cause of the rise of, *rasa*. 'By it,' that is, by a विभावा, etc., of such a sort, the heart is pervaded. For this sudden and uniform pervasion he gives an example: 'as dry wood by fire.' It is dry wood that is so pervaded, not stone or some other substance. Accordingly, to speak of what is exemplified. Vedic scholars (*śrotriyāḥ*) and such like persons have no poetic sensitivity, for their hearts lack any proclivity (*vāsanā*) toward such emotions as love. By the wood's being 'dry' he indicates the purity of the heart achieved by its study of poetry, while by 'fire' he shows that the property of being a विभावा depends on the beauty of the poetic qualities and figures of speech by which it is expressed."

11. Abhinava later refers to the author of the verse by name (1.4 a L). 12. *Rūpatā* is here used, *metri causa*, for *svarūpatā*. *K* glosses it by *svarūpatvam*, *ātmavatvam*.

13. To explain the verse *Kau* supplies the words *सर्वा एव कार्ये धिक्रियाते*. As *Kau* elsewhere quotes *Bhaṭṭānāyaka* independently of Abhinava, its author must have known the text of the *Hṛdayadarpana* at first hand. He is therefore a reliable guide in such instances as the present. *Bhaṭṭānāyaka* is here envisaging three types of reader to fit the three types of literature, viz., that which delights (poetry), that which instructs (history), and that which commands (the *Veda*). 14. In Abhinava's system *vastudhvani* and *śārīkārdhvani* are merely parts of poetry, being superior to direct designation but not being the real soul of poetry, which is *rasadhvani*. 15. We have taken the reading *suḍbhupagama-prasiddha-samvedanā*, preferred by *Kau.*, rather than the reading with *prasiddhi*. The latter, given by both Chow. and Kashu, makes an awkward dvandva: "stands in contradiction to your admission, to what is well known, and to inner experience." Furthermore, the point is that *Bhaṭṭānāyaka* has admitted *rasacarṇvā* to be the essential delight of poetry, so how can he make *rasadhvani* a subordinate part?

16. Abhinava does not spell out the connection of his thoughts here. It seems to be this. Ānanda has chosen the word bliss to express the final goal of his work: it will give bliss to his readers. His choice of words is appropriate because it hints at the thesis

that the primary purpose of poetry itself is the bliss that it gives, rather than any instruction one may gain by it. For the relative importance of enjoyment and instruction in the reading of poetry, see also 3.10-14 f L and Introduction, p. 36. 17. One may take *svarga* either literally, understanding that fame leads one to heaven, or metaphorically, understanding that fame gives to its possessor a delight equal to heaven.

A At this point, although it is only *dhvani* that the author has undertaken to define, he states the following in order to lay a groundwork.

L Now the reader might ask what the train of thought can be, for after promising to "state the true nature of *dhvani*," the next *Kārikā* goes on to speak of the literal meaning, telling us that "there are two varieties of meaning, the literal and the implied." To show what the trend of thought is, [the *Vṛtti*] furnishes an introductory remark.

At this point: that is, the subject matter [of the book] and its goal being as stated.⁴ Groundwork: anything similar to a ground or basis. Just as when one wants to build something new, one first prepares the ground, so also when one is about to describe the true nature of *dhvani*, which is none other than implied meaning, one takes as groundwork the literal meaning, which is undeniable and known to everyone, because the implied meaning will be more clearly noticed when placed beside it. Its being placed here on the same level with the literal meaning is in order to convey the fact that it also is undeniable.

1. The subject matter is *dhvani* and the goal is to give delight. Both factors seem to be inconsistent with a mention of the literal meaning.

K Meaning, which has been praised by sensitive critics and determined to be the soul of poetry, is traditionally held to have two varieties, the literal and the implied.¹

1. This is a badly constructed verse, as many Sanskrit critics have noted. Taken literally, the relative clause is restrictive, for the anaphoric pronoun *tad* must take both subject and predicate of the relative clause into its reference (*tasyeti tatpadenoddeśyavidheyasamuditarthaśeṣasyaiā tatra parāmarśah*). Accordingly, a literal translation would be: "That meaning which has been called the soul of poetry is held to have two varieties." This cannot be what the author intended, for it flies in the face of later statements by both the *Kārikās* and the *Vṛtti*. The soul of poetry is limited to the implied or suggested sense alone. It is meaning in a general sense that has two varieties. The contradiction is pointed out by Mahimabhaṭṭa (p. 89 Benares ed.), Viśvāśātha (Book I, p. 29, just before the first half of verse 3), and others. In our translation we have given the sense that the author seems to have intended by marking the relative clause off with commas as if it were descriptive. Abhinava, by the use of considerable ingenuity, arrives at much the same conclusion.

A Meaning, which is praised by sensitive critics as being essential to a poem and therefore what the soul is to a body already charming by the configuration of graceful and appropriate parts, has two varieties, the literal and the implied.¹

1. This prose sentence suffers from the same fault as does the *Kārikā*: the relative clause is properly restrictive. "Charming by the configuration of graceful and appropriate parts" goes with the word "poetry" as well as with "body."

L [Comment on the *Kārikā*:] Is traditionally held to have: this reinforces the statement [of 1.1 *K*] that the concept of *dhvani* has been handed down from the past.

When it is said that "poetry is embodied in word and meaning" [see 1.1 a 4], we infer from the reference to a body that poetry must also have something as a soul to give it life. Of the two elements [word and meaning], word falls wholly within the category of body, for it has properties sensible to everyone, just as fatness and leanness [are sensible in the human body]. Meaning, on the other hand, is not sensible to everyone, for we do not call something a poem solely from its having meaning. Both everyday sentences and Vedic sentences have meaning without being poems. So he specifies: which has been praised by

sensitive critics. The one general concept "meaning" is distinguished in the mind of discriminating critics into two branches. Now, both of these being equally "meanings," why should sensitive critics praise just the one? There must be something special about it. This special something is the part of meaning that is implied and that is determined by discriminating critics to be the soul of poetry because it is a cause of the special property [of poetry]. Other persons, however, whose minds are confused by the close connection [of the implied] with the literal meaning, dispute its separate existence, just as the Carvākas dispute the separate existence of the soul. Accordingly, while he begins with the word "meaning" in the singular, he goes on to say that there are two varieties or sorts of this meaning, giving the reason for this by mentioning the distinction [enjoyed by the implied meaning] of being "praised by sensitive critics." He does not mean that there are two souls of poetry.

[Comment on the *Vṛtti*:] To explain the word "poetry" as used in the *Kārikā*, the *Vṛtti* says, to a poem, etc. By the word charming he indicates that the qualities and figures of speech impart this charm to it. By the word appropriate he hints at the fact that *rasadhvani* is the real life of a poem because he will show that propriety is always with respect to the *rasa*. For if the *rasa* is absent, with respect to what could one use this word "propriety" that has become so popular?

Meaning, which is ... By the pronoun "which" (*yad*)¹ he picks up as subject of the relative clause a fact already known. Thus he shows that this fact at least (viz., that *artha*, "meaning," is admired by connoisseurs) is accepted even by the opponent. By the main clause, viz., *tasya*, etc. ("of it there are two varieties," etc.), he shows that this acceptance is possible only if there are two varieties [of meaning]. [Furthermore] he hereby demonstrates that the argument that "dhvani is not different from the *guṇas* and *alankāras* because it is a cause of beauty" suffers from a falsely assigned reason, because dhvani [is not a cause of beauty but] is the soul itself of poetry. For we do not say that the soul is the cause of the body's beauty. Or, even if we grant that we might say so, the objector's reason becomes inconclusive when applied to the literal meaning, for at least that [portion of the literal meaning] which is to be ornamented cannot be itself an ornament (*alankāra*), nor can that [portion] which possesses a poetic quality be itself a quality. It is for this reason that the author has brought in the literal meaning.² And that is why he will go on to say, "the literal meaning is well known," etc.

1. *yadānuvadan*: *yadā* is the instrumental of the word-stem *yad*. 2. The cause of the difficulty in this passage is that Abhinava is trying to justify a statement of Ānanda's that is really not justifiable. We have noted Ānanda's fault (1.2 K, note 1, and A, note 1), viz., the bringing in of the literal meaning to share in the designation "soul of poetry." In the present passage, from *yo 'rtha iti* to *vācyāṇopakṣepah*, Abhinava seeks to justify what Ānanda has done. It is necessary, Abhinava says, to bring in the literal meaning in order to exhibit a logical fault in an argument of the *pūrvapakṣa*. The *pūrvapakṣa* has argued that *dhvani* must be the same as the qualities (*guna*) or ornaments (*alaṅkāra*, figures of speech). The parts of the syllogism may be identified as follows.

Pakṣa: *dhvaniḥ = pratiyamāno 'rthah* (the implied meaning)

Sādhyā: *gunālāṅkārānatiriktaḥ* (is not different from the *gunas* or *alaṅkāras*)

Hetu: *cārūpahetutvāt* (because it is a cause of beauty).

The first and most obvious fault of this syllogism is that it suffers from *asiddhahetutva*, that is, its *hetu* is not true of the *pakṣa*. *Dhvani* is not a cause of beauty; it is the beauty of poetry. Now the *pūrvapakṣin* might reply that while this is strictly true, one might, by metonymy, speak of *dhvani* as a cause of beauty in poetry. A result may be referred to as a cause; we might allow that the soul is a cause of the beauty that is found in the complex of body and soul called man. Very well, says Abhinava, in that case your syllogism suffers from another fault. If we substitute *vācyo 'rthah* (the literal meaning) for *pratiyamāno 'rthah* as the *pakṣa*, the *hetu* will be inconclusive (*anāikāntika*). The substitution is permissible because the *vācyo 'rthah* is inextricably bound up with the *pratiyamāno 'rthah*. But now the *hetu* will occur in the absence of the *siddhyo* as well as in its presence. Being a cause of beauty will occur in that portion of the *vācyo 'rthah* which is to be ornamented (*alaṅkārya*) as well as in that which is an ornament. And the *alaṅkārya* cannot be an *alaṅkāra*. Similarly that which is a *guṇa* cannot be a *guna*. Here is Abhinava's pièce de résistance. The *vācyo 'rthah* must be brought in in order to show the inconclusiveness of the proving an *artha* to be a *guna* or an *alaṅkāra* from the fact of its being a cause of beauty.

K Of these [two varieties] the literal meaning is well known and has been analysed by others into many figures such as *si* *ile*. We shall therefore not expatiate upon it here.

A By others, viz., those who have made definitions of poetry.¹ [Shall not expatiate: i.e.,] we merely mention it whenever there is need.

1. Many MSS here add the phrase *bhaṭṭodbhaṭaprabhṛtibhiḥ* "such as Bhaṭṭodbhaṭa." See Kaumudi and Krishnamoorthy *ad loc.*

L Of these: the sense is, "although there are two varieties." Well known: he means such things, well known in the world, as a lady's face, a garden, moonrise.¹ The construction is: "has been analysed in many ways into the figures simile, etc." The *Vṛtti* explains the word "others" of the *Kārikā* by "those who have made definitions," etc. We shall therefore not expatiate: the *Vṛtti* shows that by this particular negation the remainder remains unnegated; so it says "we merely mention it," etc.²

1. Abhinava here lists objects that might serve as *ālambana* or *uddipana-vibhūtas* for the production of *rasa*. 2. The negation is a particular one. It does not negate all mention of the literal meaning.

K On the other hand, the suggested is something different, found in the works of great poets. It is that which appears as [something] separate from the well-known elements [of poetry], just as charm in a woman [is something that appears different from the well-known individual parts of her body].

A The suggested, on the other hand, is something which is found in the speech of great poets, different from the literal meaning. It is that which is well-known to sensitive readers and is separate from the known, ornamented, elements [of poetry], after they have been examined, being thus like charm in women. For just as charm is a certain something in women, a feast to the eyes of the discriminating, distinct from all

the parts of the body after they have been examined, just so is this [suggested] meaning.

L Something different: The word *punar* ("on the other hand") reinforces the difference [of the implied meaning] from the literal. What he means is both "different from that" and at the same time "the very essence [of poetry]." The plural in great poets conveys the fact that this [suggested meaning] extends throughout their works. In fact, the title of "great poet" is used only of a poet who has the inspiration needed to produce poetry which is enlivened with suggested meanings such as we shall explain in this work. It is because [a suggested meaning] of this sort exists that it is apprehended. For it does not stand to reason that something completely non-existent should be apprehended. Even the silver [for which we mistake the mother-of-pearl] is not wholly unreal.¹ The apprehension of something is due to its actual existence; and so from apprehension we infer existence. This is as much as to say that what appears is such as it appears. For the purpose of syllogistic demonstration [one may say that] the well-known literal meaning is that which will be shown to have a property [i.e., is that which forms the *pakṣa* of the inference]. It has that property by its being accompanied by an implied meaning distinct [from the literal]. It is thus because it so appears, as do the limbs of a woman endowed with charm.

'Well-known: The word *prasiddha* has the two senses "well-known to all" and "ornamented."²

That which (*yad tad*): [By its indefiniteness]³ the double pronoun shows two characteristics of both the example [viz., charm in women] and that which the example illustrates [viz., the implied meaning]; namely, that neither can be precisely described—this serves to emphasize the aesthetic effect—and that each is readily mistaken for that with which it is intimately combined, [charm being confused with beauty of the limbs and the implied meaning being confused with the literal]. The *Vṛtti* renders this by a certain something. For charm is revealed by the configuration of the limbs, but is a special property different from [that of] any particular part. Charm does not consist in the mere faultlessness of the limbs or in their association with ornaments. For we find that discriminating critics will say of a woman, "She is not really beautiful," even though the parts of her body on being examined are found to exhibit no fault, such as dullness of the eye, and even though her

limbs be ornamented with jewels. On the other hand, of a woman who is not such, they may exclaim that she is the very paragon of ambrosial charm.⁴

1. Abhinava is here attributing to Ānanda the *onyathākhyāti* theory of error. In our errors we do not invent objects. The erroneously perceived object is not unreal, but is merely in a place or relation other than that in which it is perceived. This is the standard Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of error.
 2. For *prasiddha* in the sense of ornamented see *Kum.Sam.* 5.9 and 7.16, on which Mallinātha quotes *Amarakośa*: *prasiddhau khyātabhūṣitau*; so also *Ragh.* 18.41.
 3. The basic difference between the single pronoun *yod* and the compound *yat tad* is that the latter is indefinite whereas the former is definite. See Speyer 287c. Abhinava goes on to specify two ways in which the double pronoun is here indefinite.
 4. The distinction is admirably put by an ancient Roman: *non est formosa cuius crux laudatur aut bracchium sed illa cuius universa facies admirationem partibus singulis abstulit* (*Seneca, Epist.* 33.5): "She is not *formosa* [= Sanskrit *lāvanyavati*]; the word is opposed to *bella* or *puhra*] whose thigh or whose arm is praised, but she whose whole configuration steals our admiration from the individual parts."
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A For this meaning, implied by force of the literal sense, will be shown to be divisible into several categories: a simple thing (*vastumātra*), a figure of speech, a *rasa*, etc.¹ In each of these varieties what is suggested is different from the literal meaning. Thus, even the first variety [viz., *vastudhvani*] is totally different from the literal sense. For sometimes where the literal meaning is an injunction, the suggested meaning takes the form of a prohibition.

1. Throughout the book reference will be made to "rasa, etc." (*rasādi*). The term refers to all the elements that belong to *rasadhvani*: not only *rasa* but *bhāva*, *rasabhāsa*, *bhāvabhāsa*, *bhāvodaya*, *bhāvasandhi*, *bhāvasabala*, and *bhāvaprasama*. For definitions see 1.4 g L and for examples 2.3 L.

L Now it may be objected that charm is widely recognized to be different [from beauty of the limbs], but we do not know what a

suggested meaning is; much less is there any general recognition that it is different [from the literal]. So the *hetu* of the syllogism [viz., "because it so appears"] is untrue. Anticipating such an objection, [the *Vṛtti*] states the nature [of this suggested meaning] in the words for this meaning, etc.; and in the words in each of these varieties, etc., it will establish the fact that it is generally recognized as different.

Here we may begin by distinguishing two varieties of suggested meaning, a workaday variety and a variety that is found to operate only in poetry.¹ The workaday sort is that which may take the place of a literal form of expression;² and its types, such as injunction, prohibition, etc., are designated by the term *vastu* ("things"). This workaday *dhvani* is in turn twofold. One type, a sense which enjoyed the nature of an *alankāra*, being in the form of a simile, etc., as it was exhibited in some previous [literal], sentence-meaning, is now [in the suggestive mode of speech] no longer an *alankāra* because there is no other factor to which it can be subordinated.³ But because of our recognition of it from the past, it is still called *alankāradhvani*, much as a *śramaṇa* (Buddhist monk) who was once a brahmin is called a brahmin *śramaṇa*.⁴ On the other hand, what lacks this special form is called [suggestion of] a simple thing (*vastu-mātra*). By the word simple (*mātra*) the other form is excluded.

On the other hand, *rasa* is something that one cannot dream of expressing by the literal sense. It does not fall within workaday expression. It is, rather, of a form that must be tasted by an act of blissful relishing on the part of a delicate mind through the stimulation (*anurāga*) of previously deposited memory elements which are in keeping with the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas*, beautiful because of their appeal to the heart, which are transmitted by [suggestive] words [of the poet].⁵ The suggesting of such a sense is called *rasadhvani* and is found to operate only in poetry. This, in the strict sense of the word, is the soul of poetry.

When Bhāṭṭanāyaka says that *dhvani* could form "only a part of poetry, not the very self" (cf. 1.1 e L), if by any stretch of the imagination this could be considered a valid reproach, it would be so only in respect to *vastudhvani* and *alankāradhvani*. He himself has [in effect] admitted that *rasadhvani* is the soul of poetry by his setting the third mode of speech, which he identifies as the relishing of *rasa*, far beyond the mode of designation (*abhidhā*) and aesthetic efficacy (*bhāvanā*). That *vastudhvani* and *alankāradhvani* lead to *rasadhvani* alone is a matter

that we shall illustrate from time to time in what follows.⁶ So we let the matter rest for now.

Implied by force of the literal sense: this characterization holds for all three varieties of *dhvani*, for although suggestion is an operation of the word, the force of meaning never fails to act as an auxiliary cause; so we may speak of the suggestive operation as being implied by force of the literal sense. Even in that variety of *dhvani* called *sabdasakti-mūlānurājanayanyāgya* (that form of suggestion which is similar to a reverberation and which is dependent on the suggestive power of words; for this type see 2.20–21 below), we shall show that our understanding of the implied meaning comes from the force of the literal sense, the power of words being only a subordinate auxiliary.

Is totally different: no one will gainsay the fact that injunction and prohibition contradict one another. That is why he illustrates them first.

1. The following remarks of Abhinava will be more easily understood if the reader will keep in mind the three traditional types of suggestion: (a) *vastudhvani*: suggestion of a thing. What is covered by the term "thing" is extremely various: a prohibition may be suggested, or an injunction, or a fact, or a situation. (b) *alankāradhvani*: what is suggested seems to be a figure of speech. (c) *rasadhvani*: what is suggested is a *rasa*, *bhāva*, etc. Abhinava magnifies the value of the last type. To him it is vastly more beautiful than the other two and it alone forms the real soul of poetry. So he begins his analysis of suggested meaning by setting forth just two categories: poetic suggestion (= *rasadhvani*) and workaday suggestion (= all other forms of *dhvani*). All workaday suggestion, he says, is really the suggestion of things (*vastu*), but one particular type of thing occasions a special designation. When the thing suggested seems to be a figure of speech, we call it *alankāradhvani*. 2. This is the essential characteristic of workaday *dhvani*. The sense given by poetic *dhvani* (= *rasadhvani*) cannot be expressed by any other verbal means. On the other hand, prohibitions (cf. the suggested prohibition in the verse quoted under 1.4 b), injunctions (cf. 1.4 c), figures of speech—all these can be expressed by either a literal or a suggested mode of speech. 3. *Alankāradhvani* is discussed in Chapter Two of the present work, esp. 2.21 e, but some anticipation of what is there said is needed if the reader is to understand what Abhinava says here. Take the illustration of *rūpaka-dhvani*: *atrántare ajñimbhata grīṣmābhidhānōḥ phullamallikādhavalāṭṭahāsa mahākāloḥ*. Here the literal meaning, as demanded by the context (a description of the passage of time), is: "Then expanded the long season called Summer, in which there was a blossoming of the market stalls which were white with jasmine." But the power of words suggests a non-contextual meaning, viz., "Then yawned

the God of Destruction, whose terrible laughter is white as jasmine." The confrontation of the second meaning with the first suggests a figure of speech, viz., rūpaka: the long season of summer is a god of destruction. Now this figure of speech can perfectly well be furnished, and in another context might well have been furnished, by the literal sense of a sentence rather than by a suggestion. Note further that the suggestion is not, strictly speaking, an alankāra, for Ānanda will define an alankāra as something subordinate. Just as jewelry is subordinate to the limb or body on which it is worn, so a figure of speech is subordinate to a sentence meaning, a *rasa*, *bhāva*, etc. But in the rūpaka-dhvani just instanced there is nothing to which the dhvani is subordinated. It is itself the sentence meaning. Accordingly, it is only by a fashion of speech that this can be called alankāra-dhvani.

4. Strictly speaking, a śramaṇa cannot be a brahmin, for his initiation will have forced him to give up all marks and distinctions of caste.

5. The long compound would be easier to understand if we read *samudita* in place of *samucita*, as does the KM edition. The more careful editions, though, give only *samucita*.

6. At 1.5 L, etc.

A For example:

Go your rounds freely, gentle monk;
the little dog is gone.
Just today from the thickets by the Godā
came a fearsome lion and killed him.

[*Sattasai* 2.75]¹

1. The text of the verse is given with better readings in Weber's edition of the *Sattasai*:

bhama dhammia vīsaddho so sunaho ajja mārio tena /
golādāvīdakudānīgavāśinā dariesūhena //

In Sanskrit, if we disregard meter, this would be:

bhrama dhārmika vīrabdhah sa sunako 'dyā māritas tena /
godāveritaṭavikātakunījavāśinā daryasimhena //

The word *kudānīga* is given by Hemacandra in the *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi* (1115) in the sense of *kurīja*. For *daria* (Sk. *daryo*) "fearsome, causing fear," see

gana on Pāṇ. 5.1.2. The traditional rendering by *drpta* is incorrect: *drpta* would become *ditto* in Prakrit. As regards the meaning of the verse, one may correct Abhinava's comment by the remarks of Mammata p. 253 (5.139) and his commentators as well as those of Hemacandra (*KA* 1.19). A religious mendicant has hitherto been frightened away from a certain house by the family dog, but has wandered along the riverbank nearby, gathering flowers for *pūjā*. Now, the young wife of the house has been accustomed to steal out and meet her lover in a grove by the riverbank. She fears interruption by the mendicant and furthermore begrudges him the loss of flowers from her trysting spot. So she tells him that the dog has been killed by a lion who lives in the thickets by the river. As Mammata puts it, the invitation to the mendicant, through the death of the dog, to make his rounds at the house suggests that he will no longer make visits to the riverbank when he hears of the lion.

L [Abhinava begins by translating the Prakrit verse into Sanskrit. He renders the second half as *godāvarīnadikūlalatāghanavāśind drptasimhena*: "by a proud (or fierce) lion dwelling in the thicket of vines by the bank of the Godāvari River." He then explains the meaning of the verse.]

These are the words of a certain woman spoken in order to save a trysting place, close to her heart, from the intrusions of a mendicant and from his spoiling its beauty by plucking its leaves and flowers. His walking in that place¹ is a natural activity that has been inhibited by fear of a dog; so the injunction here is merely the absence of prevention that arises from lifting of a ban and is not an original command; for the imperative inflection here conveys the sense [not of command but] of permission (*atisarga*) or of "the proper time to do something" (*prāptakāla*) [Pāṇ. 3.3.163]. As there is contradiction between an activity [e.g., walking] and its absence, both cannot be directly expressed [by the same word] simultaneously. Nor can they be expressed by this word successively, for the dictum, "*Abhidhā* cannot express the individual," etc.,² states that after the denotative function has once ceased to operate, it cannot operate again.

[Objections from the *Abhihitānvaya-vāda* and their rebuttal.]

Now according to the view of the *abhihitānvaya-vāda*, the expressive power of the sentence (*tātparya-sakti*), without coming to rest [in a permission], produces a notion of prohibition as the sense of the sentence.³

It does this by the cooperation of the speaker's intention (*vivakṣā*) with the secondary assignment of reversed sense (*viparita-lakṣaṇā*) to the words, brought about by a contradiction, that is, by the blocking of the primary sense [here in the form of "you may wander fearlessly"] which is not construable with the sense of the words "fierce [lion]," "pious monk," and "that [dog]." Thus the final meaning is entirely based on the [denotative] power of the words. And this is what we find in actual communication. People say, "This is what he said" [not "This is what he suggested"]. So there is no other sort of meaning here than the literal [i.e., there is no *dhvani*].

But this is not true, for one can observe three semantic operations in this verse.⁴ The operation of denotation (*abhidhā*) conveys senses that are of a general nature, for denotation is a semantic power which depends on convention, and convention is tied to the general; it lacks reference to the specific individual, for otherwise there would be no end [to the conventions that would have to be made for each word] and there would be failure of a word connected with one [individual to refer to other individuals of the same class]. After *abhidhā*, the power of *tātparya* conveys the sentence sense, in which [the general and unconnected] word senses are particularized and mutually connected according to the maxim, "The general senses [of the words] lead to a particularized sense, for if that were not the case, no effect could ensue."⁵ Now in the example under discussion, in the second stage [i.e., in the moment when *tātparya* operates], nothing more is understood than the injunction "you may go," for this is what is furnished by the mere syntax of the words [i.e., by the syntax as opposed to the other semantic factors]. Such is not the case in the examples "There is a village on the Ganges," or "The boy is a lion." For in those examples, the syntax [i.e., the logical connection between the sense of the different words], while it is on the point of taking place, is thwarted because of the inherent absurdity.⁶ But in the case of the present stanza there is no such difficulty⁷ with regard to the logical connection between the senses of the different words: "That dog, which prevented you from going, has been killed by the lion and therefore, because of the absence of that which prevented your going, it is now proper for you to go." Therefore no blocking of the primary sense can be suspected and accordingly there is no occasion for *lakṣaṇā* (secondary usage, metonymy) to give a reversed sense. [What we have here is rather suggestion (*dhvani*).]

Or we may even admit [for the sake of argument] that there is *lakṣaṇā* here.⁸ Still, it cannot be said to occupy the second stage [i.e., to

operate simultaneously with the force of *tātparya*). For *lakṣaṇā* takes place when there is a blocking of the primary sense. This blocking takes the form of an apprehension of inconsistency. In the case of the present stanza, there is no inconsistency in the sense of the words themselves. Should you argue that they are inconsistent with each other, that must be understood as an inconsistency with regard to the syntax. Now there can be no apprehension of this inconsistency until the syntax is understood, and the understanding of the syntax does not come about through *abhidhā*, for *abhidhā* exhausts itself in conveying the [individual] word-meanings and has no power to function further. Our understanding of the syntax comes about only through *tātparya-sākṛti*.

It has been objected that if that were the case, there would be an apprehension of syntax even in the phrase, "There are a hundred elephants on the tip of my finger."⁹ Well, we reply, is there not an apprehension of syntax in that phrase, as there is not in the phrase, "Ten pomegranates, six pancakes," etc.?¹⁰ [Of course there is.] but this syntax, although it has been understood, is countered by other valid means of cognition, such as perception, as in the cognition "There is silver" in regard to mother-of-pearl. Hence, the sentence which conveys such a meaning is not valid. In the example "The boy is a lion," on the other hand, there arises a third power called *lakṣaṇā*, which is different from both the power of *abhidhā* and the power of *tātparya*. It arises immediately after the emergence of the factors repugnant to the syntactical connection conveyed by the power of *tātparya* belonging to the second stage and it is able to neutralize those repugnant factors.

Our opponent may object: "If this were so, such examples as 'The boy is a lion' would be poetry, because, as you will shortly say, the soul of poetry, which you define as suggestion, is found in such examples as well [as in poems which exhibit *rasa*]." To which we answer no; one might as readily say that a clay pot is alive, because, as the soul is omnipresent, it must be in the pot as well. Should you try to reply to this answer by saying that it is only when the soul is present in a body that serves as basis for particular [sense faculties and the like], and not when the soul is present in any other sort of locus, that we speak of life, very well, we will employ the title "poetry" only when *dhvani* is embodied in a composition containing *gunas*, figures of speech, propriety, and beautiful words and meanings. But in neither case does the soul [or *dhvani*] lose its precious nature.¹¹

One cannot say that *dhvani* is simply *bhakti* (associated usage),¹² for *bhakti* is the same as the operation called *lakṣaṇā* and it belongs

to the third stage [of verbal understanding], whereas the operation of suggestion belongs to the fourth stage. We may put the argument thus. You have agreed that *lakṣaṇā* comes into play on the concurrence of three conditions. Of these the first, which is the blocking of the primary sense, is based on other means of cognition, such as perception. [The second.] which is known as the cause, i.e., such relations [between the primary and secondary objects] as proximity, etc., can also be understood from other means of cognition. But the purpose [for which the secondary sense has been employed] are notions such as the extreme holiness, coolness, fitness to be visited, etc., in the case of the village, or the extreme courage in the case of the boy, notions which cannot be expressed in other words and for which there is no other valid means of cognition. In our cognizing of these [notions] the process cannot be other than verbal, [as we shall now demonstrate.]

[The process cannot be inferential.] To infer the existence of qualities [like holiness in the village] from its proximity [to a holy river] would be to draw an inference faulty because of an ambivalent *hetu*.¹³ In the case of the boy, the fact that he is referred to by the word "lion" will constitute only an illusory (*asiddha*) *hetu*.¹⁴ Or, if the inference appears in the following form: "Wherever there is use of a word (e.g., 'lion') in such a way [viz., as in 'the boy is a lion,' where the word 'lion' is not used as denotation but by *lakṣaṇā*], there is the existence of those qualities," it will be necessary to furnish another supporting means of cognition [such as perception] at the time of comprehending the *vyāpti*.¹⁵ And there is no valid supporting cognition.

' Nor is this [knowledge of the purpose, viz., to furnish a suggestion of holiness, etc.] a case of remembrance, because it is not possible to remember something we have not experienced. And there is no rule of association by which we could determine what the speaker intended [namely, just this property and not some other]; so there would be no way of determining the meaning. Therefore, the operation [of understanding] in these cases must be verbal.

The verbal operation cannot be the operation of direct designation (*abhidhā*) because there is no conventional association here.¹⁶ It cannot be the operation of sentence meaning (*tātparya*), because that operation exhausts itself in giving us our apprehension of the syntax. It cannot be the operation of secondary usage or metonymy (*lakṣaṇā*), because it lacks the stumbling gait (*skhaladgati*) that *lakṣaṇā* assumes due to [the blocking of the direct object], a reason already mentioned.¹⁷ For if this operation too ran a halting course, it could only be because its

primary goal was blocked, which could only be because of some further purpose or intended goal (*prayojana*), so that an infinite series of intended goals would ensue. Accordingly, the name *laksita-lakṣaṇā* (secondary operation arising from a secondary operation), given by a certain author to this type of operation, is a piece of stubborn perversity.¹⁸ We are thus forced to admit that this is a fourth type of operation, distinct from *abhidhā*, *tōtparya*, and *lakṣaṇā*, one which has been described by such closely related terms as suggesting (*dhvanana*), indicating (*dyotana*), hinting (*vyāñjana*), giving a notion (*pratyāyana*), and giving to understand (*avagama*).¹⁹ As will be said:

When a word abandons its primary operation and reveals an object by secondary usage, the purpose for which this is done is one to which the word moves without interruption (1.17 K).

So then: the power of denotation is the power, regulated by convention, to convey the literal sense [of the individual words]; the power of sentence-operation is the power to convey a sense [of the whole], a power which is aided by the impossibility of the literal sense without it;²⁰ the power of secondary usage is the power to reveal a sense as regulated by such cooperating factors as the blocking of the primary sense; the suggestive power is the power to suggest, a power which has its origin in one's understanding of objects revealed by the first three powers, and which is then assisted by the imagination of the listener which has been prepared by these revelations.

This suggestive power, this suggestive operation, overshadows the three operations which precede it and is the very soul of poetry. This is the author's intention; and although this power has for its object in this verse the purpose [for which the metonymy was used, viz., the saving of the trysting place and the adulterous intentions of the speaker], still, as these notions are introduced by the notion of a prohibition, the author has spoken simply of its having a prohibition for its object.

The preceding²¹ has been said merely for the sake of argument. In truth there is no secondary usage (*lakṣaṇā*) in the verse in question, for neither is the primary meaning entirely set aside here, nor is it shifted to another meaning.²² In fact there is never any operation of this [secondary power] in the type of suggestion which is based on the power of meaning.²³ And it is obvious that from a difference in cooperating causes one may have a difference of power. One and the same word may operate, when aided by the memory of a concomitance (*vyāpti*), as an inferential mark for the apprehension of the speaker's intention, and,

when aided by sense perception, as that which renders the perception determinate.²⁴ So much, then, is incontrovertible by those who hold to the *abhihitānvaya-vāda*.

[Objections of the *Anvitābhidhāna-vāda* and their rebuttal.]

Now the school of *anvitābhidhāna*²⁵ holds dearly to the doctrine that "the word's meaning is that to which the word [finally] leads," and would have it that the denotative operation continues longer and longer, like the course of an arrow.²⁶ We ask them: if the operation continues so long, how can it be one, for its objects will be various? And if it is more than one, it stands to reason that it consists in heterogeneous elements, because both its objects and its cooperating causes are various.²⁷ Furthermore, if its effects were homogeneous, it would have to pause at each object and then operate again. But such repeated operation of a word, an activity, or a cognition is ruled out by [all] metaphysicians,²⁸ while if you admit that its effects are heterogeneous, why, this is our very position.

But perhaps our opponent, in speaking of longer and longer operation, means only that the meaning found in the last stage of apprehension is expressed so rapidly by the sentence [that this final, suggested meaning appears to be furnished by the initial semantic operation]. But how can this meaning possibly be understood when there is no convention connecting it [with word or sentence]? Our opponent may answer that conventions subsist between the causal factors [namely, the individual words and their meanings] and are therefore unnecessary between the result and its meaning. Now, look at the skill of this Vedic scholar! Here he is saying that the later understanding of the individual words—for according to his theory it does come later—becomes a cause of the meaning which occupies the final stage, a meaning which [according to his theory of semantics] enters the apprehension first. Why, this *Mīmāṃsaka* might claim to be the descendant of his own great-grandson!

Our opponent might claim that such understanding [viz., of the final meaning] occurs only to one who has previously been initiated into the conventions [of the initial, denotative meanings]; and because the matter stands thus, the [initial] meanings do act as a cause. But by recourse to this argument he would not be saying anything of use.²⁹ Furthermore, in our opponent's theory there is no previous understanding of the individual word-meanings, for they are invariably used in sentences

[which are understood as wholes before the meaning of their components can be inferred]. If he says that such understanding does indeed come about by insertion and removal (*āvāpodvāpābhyaṁ*),³⁰ this is tantamount to saying that the convention applies to individual words [which are general] and that the understanding of the specific [sentence meaning] comes later.

Now [the *anvitābhidhānavādin*] may say, "The final sentence meaning occurs to us immediately; there is no way around it." This is a fact that we too are not unwilling to accept. Our author will go on to say:

Just so does the suggested sense flash forth in an instant in the minds of the intelligent auditors who are averse to the literal sense and in quest of the real meaning (1.12 K).

But this is because the auditor has considered the subject so often that the succession, which must be hypothesized,³¹ is not felt, because there is no overt manifestation of succession among notions that belong to the same category, just as we are unaware of succession in our memory of concomitance and verbal convention.³² A relation of cause and effect [between the initial meaning and the final meaning] must be accepted if we are to keep the secondary sense, of either metaphorical (*gaṇa*) or relational (*lakṣaṇika*) type,³³ distinct from the literal sense, or [if our opponent is] to avoid impugning the doctrine that "of the six exegetical criteria—direct statement (*śruti*), implication (*liṅga*), etc.—each that follows in the list is weaker than those which precede" (*Mimāṃsa S. 3.3.14*), for this can only be justified by the causal efficacy [of different sorts of meaning]. And if you accept a variety of causal efficacy, what point is there in your ill will toward us?

[Remarks on the *Sphoṭavāda*.]

Those too who claim that both sentence and sentence meaning are an indivisible entity called the *sphoṭa*, when they descend into the world of communication,³⁴ follow our system in all respects. Above that world, of course, everything is *brahma*, which is identical with God Supreme: a point of view not unknown to our author, who also wrote a work called *Tattvāloka*.³⁵ So now enough.

[Bhaṭṭācārya's interpretation refuted.]

Bhaṭṭācārya has said: "In this verse our understanding of the prohibition is brought about by the entrance of *bhayānaka-rasa* (the flavor

of the timorous) through the use of the words 'fierce lion,' etc., with the use of the word 'pious,' for there would be no understanding of the prohibition in any other way if we lacked an understanding of the two characters [portrayed] here as fierce and as timid respectively. So it is not simply the suggestive force of the situation that causes this understanding."³⁸

To this we reply [as follows]. Who ever said that without an understanding of the particular speaker and the particular person addressed, and without the operation of suggestion that belongs to the words, there could be an understanding of the prohibition? We have said that it is essential to suggestion that it be helped out by the imagination of the hearer. And we do not [even] rule out the entrance of the *bhayānaka-rasa*, for we admit that it may arise from a simple [emotion (*bhāva*) of] fear. And this *rasa* may enter the hearer³⁷ if the *rasa* is manifested [in the verse]. But the *rasa* must be suggested. Its being directly denoted is not admitted even by Bhāttanāyaka; so it must be suggested. Furthermore, this *rasa* does not necessarily enter the hearer, for the sensitive reader is not necessarily similar to the timid monk. Or, if Bhāttanāyaka supposes a special nature of the reader [viz., that he must be aesthetically sensitive to fear] to be a cooperating cause [in producing *rasa*], why should he be so opposed to an operation of suggestion enlivened by the imagination of both speaker and hearer? What is more, by trying to deny *vastudhvani* in the verse, he has made out a case for *rasadhvani*. What a powerful critic of *dhvani* he turns out to be! As has been said, "Even the anger of a god is like a gift."

If he should claim that all that has been shown [by this example] is the supremacy of *rasadhvani*, who would deny it? But then, he might say, it was not right to adduce this verse as an example of mere *vastudhvani*. To this we reply that as this example is of poetry, let it exemplify two types of *dhvani*; what harm is there?³⁸ But if he insists on the mixture with *rasa*, know that a mixture with the *bhayānakarasa* does not sit well in the mirror of a connoisseur's heart. Rather [the connoisseur will feel that] in this verse there is the erotic *rasa*, which arises in the manner we have described,³⁹ from a mixture of *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas*: we have the trysting place serving as a *vibhāva* (stimulating determinant) of the [basic emotion which is] the desire for intercourse; and we have such *anubhāvas* (symptoms) as a specific tone of voice appropriate [to the mention of a trysting place].

It is because *rasa* is unworldly and cannot be understood straight off that the author has begun with this example of *vastudhvani*, intending

thereby to exhibit [an instance of literal and suggested meanings that are] indisputably distinct, [viz.,] injunction and prohibition.

As for him who set himself up as an explainer of dhvani and said that it was nothing but the power of sentence-meaning (*tātparya-sakti*) or inference of intention (*vivakṣā-sūcakatva*),⁴⁰ he does not appeal to us. As they say, "Each to his own taste."⁴¹ As we shall deal with this later in the book as occasion arises, let the matter rest for the present.

[Glossing the words of the verse.]

Go your rounds: you are permitted; it is time for you to wander. Pious monk: it is appropriate for you to wander about gathering flowers for pūjā. Freely: because of the removal of the cause of your hesitation. The little dog: viz., he who caused your slender little body to tremble with fear. Just today: the sense is that you have had a stroke of luck. Killed: so he will not appear again. Lion: that lion whom you heard about from hearsay and who lives in the thickets along the Godāvarī. For, to protect [her trysting place] she had already seen to it that he was told [of such a rumor].⁴² But now, because of his fierceness, he has emerged from the thickets. So the monk's going anywhere near the bank of the Godāvarī is out of the question; how much more his entering the thickets.

1. The word *tatru* ("in that place") is misleading. If the dog had frightened the mendicant from the trysting place, there would be no reason for the woman to invent a lion by which to terrify him further. We prefer the interpretation given above (1.4 b A, note 1). 2. The quotation is said to be from Mandana Miśra (so Jhalikkar on *KP*, p. 44). The full line is: *vīśeyam nābhidhā gacchet kṣīṇasaktir vīśeṣane*, "as the power of direct designation is exhausted in [denoting] the classifying character, it cannot operate on the classified individual." Mandana followed the Mīmāṃsā theory that words denote class characters or universals. When we say *gām ānaya*, "bring ... cow" (Sanskrit lacks the definite article), the word *gām* refers directly to *gotvam* (bovinity). The sense of a particular cow, or the cow, characterized by bovinity, is given only by the sentence meaning, which depends on context. The verse here quoted is Mandana's refutation of an opponent who argues that the word *gām* might denote both the universal and the particular. It cannot do so, he says, because the *abhidhā* (power of direct designation) in a word dies after it has once operated. Abhinava in the present passage uses Mandana's dictum to show that we cannot let *bhama* ("go" or "walk") in the exemplar verse designate directly two different things ("go your round" and "do not go into the thickets"). It can mean directly only one of these; the other

meaning must be furnished by a different semantic power, viz., suggestion. 3. The abhihitānvaya doctrine, held by the Bhāṭṭa-Mimāṃsakas, or followers of Kumārila, holds that the final sentence meaning (*tātparya*) is furnished by the syntax (*onvaya*) of the directly expressed (*abhihitā*) meanings of the individual words. The meanings of the individual words are universals; the *tātparya* is specific. The doctrine is directly opposed to the *anvitābhidhāna* view of Prabhākara, which argues that there is no need for two semantic powers here. All meanings, according to Prabhākara, are specific, the signification (*abhidhāna*) of words being understood only with reference to the specific acts and situations in which they are involved (*anvaya*). 4. The three operations that Abhinava here points to are *abhidhā*, *tātparya*, and *vyañjana* (*dhuvanā*). But he will go on to allow, for the sake of argument, the possible presence of another operation, *lakṣanā*. 5. If you tell a boy "gām ānaya," he cannot direct his action to the class character bovinity. He can only act with regard to a particular cow. 6. Accordingly, we are forced to understand these sentences by the semantic power of *lakṣanā* (secondary usage or metonymy). They mean, respectively, "There is a village on the bank of the Ganges," and "The boy is brave as a lion." Note that the Sanskrit sentence *garigāyāṁ ghoṣāḥ*, unlike the English translation, "a village on the Ganges," is literally impossible. The locative case does not have as wide a span of meaning as the English preposition "on," which may mean "by the side of" as well as physically "on top of." The Sanskrit phrase means literally "a village situated in the Ganges," so if we take the phrase literally, we will suppose that the inhabitants are drowning. 7. The words *na hi* (Kashi ed. p. 57, line 2; Vidyābbhavaṇa ed. p. 55, line 2) construe with *kācīt kṣatīḥ* (Kashi 57.5; Vidy. 55.5). 8. If one admits that *lakṣanā* is at work in the verse "*bhama dharmīo*," the nature of the verse's suggestion (*dhvani*) will differ from what it was taken to be when the operation of *lakṣanā* was denied. Without *lakṣanā* the suggestion in the verse is a *vastudhvani* that takes the form of a prohibition, viz., "you must not wander into the thickets by the river." With *lakṣanā*, the prohibition is furnished by *lakṣanā* and the suggestion becomes a *rasadhvani*, viz., a suggestion of the love between the speaker of the verse and the man she hopes to meet at the tryst. 9. A standard example of absurdity; see Jacob's *Handfull of Maxims* III. p. 4. It can become reasonable under certain circumstances; see 3.331 L, note 9. But the point here is merely that an absurd sentence has syntax and is meaningful.

10. Literally, "Why should there be no apprehension of syntax here, as in 'ten pomegranates,' etc.?" BP says that Abhinava here furnishes an example by giving the opposite (*raidharmyena dṛṣṭāntam āha*). "Angulyagre," etc., does have syntax; "dasa dādimāni," etc., does not. The latter quotation is from *Mahābhāṣya* on 1.1.3, Vārt. 2 (repeated on 1.2.45). It became a standard example of word groups that are meaningless because of lack of syntax. The full quotation is: *dasa dādimāni sad apūpāḥ kundam ajājinam*

palapindah adhororukam etat kumāryāḥ sphāyakṛtasya pitā pratiśīnah, "ten pomegranates six pancakes basin goatskin sesamum seed-cake petticoat this of a girl of sword-maker's-son the father curdled." The individual words have meaning and one can even make sentence meanings out of some of the component parts by supplying the verb to be (e.g., "there are ten pomegranates"), but there is still no syntax of the whole. The whole is not absurd but meaningless.

11. The fact that suggestion is found in many utterances—it is found in connection with all tropes and metonymies unless they have become frozen—does not cheapen it. It remains the central and most essential element in poetry. If one seeks a more precise nomenclature, one may call the unpoetic uses of suggestion *vastudhvani*, saving the term *rasadhvani* for the type of suggestion that is poetically effective.

12. Abhinava here gives his clearest proof of the difference between *dhvoni* and *lakṣanā*; the matter is not treated by Ānanda until later on (1.14) and his distinction is not so clear.

13. The inference "That village possesses holiness because it is close to the Ganges" suffers from ambivalence because the *hetu* "proximity to the Ganges" occurs in *upakṣa* objects (e.g., unholy objects such as filth and dead bodies) as well as *sapakṣa* objects (holy objects such as temples or the village in question). For the fault of *anaikāntikatva* in inference, see *N.S.* 1.2.5 and the commentaries thereon.

14. An illusory probans (*asiddha-hetuḥ*) is one which does not really occur in the minor term (*pakṣa*). For example, if we argue *hrado vahnimān dhūmāt*, "the lake contains fire because it has smoke," the probans, smoke, is *asiddha*, for there really is no smoke on the lake. Now there may be mist or fog on the lake, but a probans in the specific form (*rūpa*) of smoke is absent. Hence the probans in such an example may be more precisely termed *svorūpāsiddha*: "not found in that specific form in the *pakṣa*." To come to the case at hand: the Mīmāṃsaka wishes to argue that we arrive at the notion of the boy's extraordinary courage by an inference: the boy has extraordinary courage because he is *simhasābdavācyā*, "denoted in a primary sense by the word 'lion'." But that is just the point. The boy is *not* so denoted; he is denoted, that is, spoken of in a primary sense, by the word "boy." So the Mīmāṃsaka must substitute a different inference.

15. An inference must always be backed up by perception and memory. If someone says, "The boy is courageous (*parākramavān māṇavakah*)" we can infer courage to be a property of the boy, because we have perceived courage in a number of persons who were directly denoted to us as *parākramavān* and we have a memory of those perceptions. But in the case of a metaphor no such background exists. We will have observed "lion" used metaphorically of persons who are cruel, royal, proud, or courageous. Without any rule of association (*niyama*) we cannot determine by inference what the speaker's intended meaning (*vivakṣita*) may be. We can arrive at that knowledge not by inference, nor by the previously mentioned powers of the word and sentence, but only by a separate power, suggestion, as Abhinava proceeds to demonstrate.

16. The *samaya* is between

the word *garīgā* and a river, not between *garīgā* and purity, etc. 17. The operation of *abhidhā* that runs from the word *garīgā* to a river runs a direct course. The operation of *lakṣaṇā* starts out from *garīgā* for a river but then shifts course to a river bank or some such nearby object. Accordingly, it runs an interrupted course. The course that runs from *garīgā* to the suggested meaning of purity again runs a direct course, being in this respect like the denotative operation and unlike the operation of metonymy. 18. Abhinava means that the term has been used only in order to avoid using the correct term "suggestion." The term *lakṣaṇā* misrepresents the basic nature of the operation, which is not a *lakṣaṇā* at all because it lacks *skhalodgatitva*. 19. The substance and often the very words of the foregoing paragraph are repeated in Mammāta's *Śabdavyāpāravacāra*, pages 5-6.

20. The words *tadanyathānupapattyā* have given the commentators trouble. The Kaumudī's explanation, which takes *tad* to refer to *abhidhāsakti*, seems the simplest. The power to convey a sentence meaning, a meaning which is of a specific situation that exists in the external world, is helped out by the fact that the individual word-meanings cannot be found in the world without it. In *gām ḫnaya*, "bring the cow," the *vācyārtha*, bovinity, cannot be found except as characterizing an individual cow such as we find in the sentence meaning. Hence we are forced to go on from the literal sense of the individual words to the specific sense of the sentence. 21. "The preceding" (*etad*) refers to everything that has been said in the English translation from "Or, we may even admit," page 85, up to the present point; in the Sanskrit, from *bhavatu vāsou* (Kashi ed. 57.7 to 63.2; Vidyābhavana ed. 55.7 to 61.3).

22. The reference is to the two types of suggestion which are based on *lakṣaṇā*: *atyantatiraskṛtavācya* and *arthāntarasākramitavācya*. They are described and identified later on (2.1 a-c). 23. Having given up the "admission for the sake of argument," Abhinava comes to what he believes the nature of the suggestion truly to be in the verse in question. It belongs to the second great class of suggestion, called *vivakṣidnyaparavācya* (2.1 Introduction and 2.2 A, note 1). Within this class it belongs to the type *samlakṣyakramavayavīgya* (2.2 K) and within that type to the sub-group *arthāśaktimūla* (2.20 K). In other words, he has now given up the interpretation by which the object suggested was taken to be the saving of the trysting place and the adulterous intentions of the speaker. The object is now taken to be the prohibition of the monk from wandering into the thicket. This is *vivakṣidnyaparavācya* because the literal meaning (a permission) is subordinated to something else which is primarily intended. It is *samlakṣyakramavayavīgya* because we are aware of an interval between our understanding of the literal meaning and our understanding of the suggestion, as is not the case in *rasadhvani*. It is *arthāśaktimūla* because the suggestion is based on the force of the situation rather than on that of an ambiguous word. 24. A difficulty has arisen, which Abhinava seeks to solve by an analogy. The difficulty is this. How is it that the very

same words, "go your rounds freely, pious monk," may be said according to one theory to have the power and the operation of *lakṣaṇā* and according to another theory may be said to have the power and the operation of suggestion? This is possible, says Abhinava, by a change of cooperating causes. *BP* explains. If we suppose a blocking of the primary meaning to occur because that meaning is incompatible with "fearful lion," etc., a power of *lakṣaṇā* will arise in the words "go your rounds"; and the *lakṣita* meaning will be "do not go your rounds." On the other hand, if we are not aware—as we ought not to be, according to Abhinava—of this blockage and if, instead, we are aware of some special characteristic of the speaker (an adulteress) or of what she seeks to convey, a power of suggestion will arise in the words. An analogy is furnished by the word "Devadatta," let us say, in the sentence "This is Devadatta." The word may operate in the realm of inference, if we are seeking to infer that the speaker has an intention to convey certain information. It may operate within the realm of perception if we are seeking to form a determinate perception of the indeterminate thatness in front of our eyes. The powers that arise in words depend on the causes that cooperate with words in giving us our cognitions. 25. That is, the followers of Prabhākara; see note 3 above. 26. The Prabhākara doctrine of word-meaning is brought up again at 3.33 d L (the long operation). The *Kaumudī* here gives the following explanation of the simile of the arrow. Just as a swift-handed bowman might shoot an arrow that would pierce his enemy's armor, then take the man's life and finally enter the earth, just so a single denotative operation may run on to the final stage of our comprehension, leaping through the intermediate stages. As so much of what Abhinava says in this section, this too has been taken over by Mammata (*KP* 5, Jhal. ed. p. 225, and Anand. ed. with Govinda and Nāgojī, p. 213). 27. Its objects: the literal meaning, the secondary meaning, the suggested meaning. Its cooperating causes: the convention, the blocking of the literal meaning, the special properties of speaker or context. 28. Cf. Śabara 1.1.25: *paddni hi svam artham abhidhāya nirvittavyāpārānti* and cf. note 2 above. But the doctrine extends farther than to words. A given action carries only one result. If we do one good deed, we reap the benefit of that good deed only once; we do not continue to enjoy the benefit time after time. We make a valid cognition only once; it is valid only for the time at which we make it. We may perceive smoke on the mountain and infer that there is fire there now. We may not, after perceiving smoke today, infer tomorrow that there is fire there. 29. *BP*: "Because the person who has learned the conventions would understand the meaning that is conventionally associated with the denotative meaning (i.e., the meaning of the first stage). How would he come to understand the meaning of the final stage, for which there is no convention?"

30. Insertion and removal (*āvāpa-udvāpa*) is the method, according to the *anvitābhidhāna-vāda* and other schools, by which a child learns the meaning

[1.4 b L]

of words; see *KP* ed. Jhalkikar, p. 221; ed. Anand, with Govinda and Nāgojī, p. 210. A child hears an older man say, "Devadatta, bring the cow," and observes a younger man go and bring a cow. Later the child hears such sentences as "Caitra, bring the cow," "Devadatta, bring the horse." By the removal of words from, and the insertion of words in, the various slots of a sentence, the child gains a knowledge of the meaning of the individual words. 31. Because cause must precede result. 32. "The same category": verbal, inferential, etc. We jump from the notion of Ganges to purity and holiness without awareness of the succession of our ideas, just as on seeing smoke we almost instantly conceive of fire, without being conscious of the concomitance, "where there is smoke there is fire"; or just as, on hearing the word "cow," we understand the object cow without consciously remembering the convention, "the sound 'c-o-w' shall represent the class notion underlying an object with horns, hoofs, tail, etc." 33. Cf. 1.1 K, note 2. 34. Abhinava is not fair here to the *sphoṭavāda*. The grammarians conceived of *sphoṭa* in the world of ordinary communication (*vyavahāra, avidyā*) as well as in the rarified metaphysical world of *param brahma*. For *sphoṭa*, see John Brough, "Theories of General Linguistics in the Sanskrit Grammarians," *Transactions of the Philological Society*, 1951, and "Some Indian Theories of Meaning," *ibid.*, 1953; also K. A. Subrahmanya Iyer, "The Doctrine of *Sphoṭa*," *Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Inst.*, Vol. 5, Pt. 2. 35. Presumably, this lost work dealt with metaphysics. The only other reference to it, so far as we know, is again by Abhinava; see 4.5 L and note 9. 36. See Corrections of the Kashi Text. Here, as elsewhere, Bhāṭṭanāyaka's effort is to deny the need of positing *dhvani* in order to explain the verse. He supposes that a feeling of *rāsa* is brought about by the verse's *bhāvokatva*, its possession of *bhāvand* or aesthetic efficacy. See Introduction, pp. 35-36 and 2.4 L. It here consists of the poet's having so arranged the words as to impress on us the terror of the pious monk. Once we relish aesthetically the monk's emotion, we shall understand *ipso facto* that the words of the verse amount to a prohibition. The term *artha-sāmarthyā* ("suggestive force of the situation") is approximately equal to *vastudhvani*. 37. It is a cause of some confusion in this passage that the same word, *pratipatti*, is used for the hearer in the verse, i.e., the pious monk, and the bearer of the verse, i.e., the reader or connoisseur. In the phrase *vaktṛpratipatti-viśeṣāvagama* the former must be meant. In *pratipatti-pratibhā* and in *pratipattu ca rasāvesaḥ* the latter is meant. 38. The point is this. In a work of philosophy it would be considered a fault to give an example that illustrates two principles at once when you are concerned only with one. But in poetry to do so is inevitable, since so many verses contain more than one excellence. So Kau-mudi, p. 129: *bahuvisayatvād ekasyāpi kātyasya niyatagocaratvāt*. 39. By "the method we have mentioned" is meant the method of suggestion following upon the literal sense. The thirty-nine syllable compound beginning *sambhoga-* is curiously compressed. Abhinava means that the *śringārasa*

arises from a combination of *anubhāvas* appropriate to a *vibhāva* of the *sthāyi-bhāva*.

40. None of the commentators has identified the person to whom Abhinava is referring in this passage. *Tātparyasākti* for *dhvani* would be a likely substitution for a Mimāṃsaka. The *Kaumudi* finds the substitution of *vivakṣā-sūcakatva* to be characteristic of a Buddhist. 41. *Ragh.* 6.30. If this was not a proverb before Kālidāsa's time, it has become one since. 42. Abhinava's incorrect interpretation of the verse here leads him to a farfetched hypothesis.

A Sometimes when the literal meaning is a prohibition, this [suggested meaning] takes the form of an injunction (or invitation), as in:

Mother-in-law sleeps here, I there:
look, traveler, while it is light.
For at night when you cannot see
you must not fall into my bed.¹

1. The verse is a variant of *Sattasaf* 7.67, which has been imitated by the Sanskrit verse *SRK* 812. As in the case of the verse in 1.4 b above, one may analyse in either of two ways. If one finds no *lakṣaṇā* in the verse, the suggestion will be simply an invitation to the traveler to come to the woman's bed. Presumably this was Ānanda's understanding. If one takes the invitation to be conveyed by *lakṣaṇā*, the suggestion will be of the woman's love of the traveler. Viśvanātha gives this the title *rasabhbhāsa* rather than *rasa* because the underlying love is adulterous; see *SD*, p. 26, prose following the 9th verse quoted after 1.2.

L [After translating the Prakrit stanza into Sanskrit, Abhinava continues:] In the Prakrit, *maha* is an irregular form used in many senses. Here it has the sense of the genitive plural ("our"), not the genitive singular.¹ Had she referred specifically to herself, she would have aroused suspicion² and so have been unable [later] to receive him secretly.

[The situation is this.] The sprout of love has suddenly arisen in a traveler as he looks at a young woman whose husband is away from

home. By means of this prohibition she gives him permission. So, what we have here is an injunction that consists in the absence of prohibition. It is not a command, setting someone to do that which he has not set about, for such would be insulting to her opinion of her own charms. In keeping berewith is her hint in the word *rātryandha* ("blind at night") that he will be out of his senses with the desire that will come over him at that opportune time. As an action and its absence are self-contradictory, it is clear that the suggested sense is here different from the denoted sense.

Bhāttanāyaka has said: "In this verse too, as in the preceding verse, the meaning is furnished verbally,³ by the woman's conveying her state of desire by the use of the word 'I' (in 'I sleep there') accompanied by particular gestures." We reply that the word "I" does not directly denote this sense [of sexual eagerness]; while if, in conjunction with a tremor of the voice, it may hint at this sense, that may count as a help to the theory of *dhvani*, not a hindrance.

From the word "mother-in-law" it follows that he must make love quietly so that it may not be known. And in speaking of "this miserable day" (*divasaka*)⁴ she suggests, "I know that your heart is being shot in pieces by volleys of Love's arrows and that I should take heed of you, but what can I do? The contemptible daylight is still with us." It is [called] contemptible because it is unsuitable for love. In Prakrit the distinction of masculine and neuter does not hold.⁵ "Nor do I fail entirely to take heed of you, as I remain right here. So look at me. I am not leaving you. We can get through the day with the solace of looking at each other's face." Such is the meaning. And there is a suggestion that "you should not join me in bed, being blinded [by passion], the very minute it grows dark, but should be very secret and wait until you have discovered that sleep has overtaken this thorn in my flesh called a mother-in-law."

1. *Maha*, or, according to the *Kaumudi* reading, *maham*, is irregular and is used for various cases of the singular first person pronoun: accusative and genitive, the latter of which may also substitute for the dative. But it seems never to be used for the plural. The reason that prompts Abhinava to this interpretation is his overrefinement of the woman's character.
2. Abhinava supposes that the words are spoken in the presence of the mother-in-law.
3. Ānanda has quoted the verse as an example of *vastudhvani*, a suggestion which arises *ortha-sāmarthyāt* ("from the capability of the situation"). Bhāttanāyaka is saying that the suggestion here does not arise from the situation; it arises from a skilful use of the word "aham."
4. Abhinava is

interpreting the word *diasoam* of the Prakrit as though it formed an elliptical sentence, standing for *divasako 'yam*, "This is miserable daytime." He takes the suffix to be the -*ka* of contempt given in Pāṇ. 5.3.74. The interpretation is wrong on both counts and forces him to find a reason for the supposed neuter gender of the word. It is not neuter, of course, but accusative masculine: "during the daytime." 5. This is to explain how *diasoam* has been used in the neuter (see preceding note). Actually, the grammarians permit *divasa* to be used as a neuter even in Sanskrit (*Gaṇa* on Pāṇ. 2.4.31 and *AK* 1.1.3.5), but we do not remember ever having seen it so used.

A Sometimes the literal meaning is in the form of an injunction, while the suggested meaning takes a form that is neither [injunction nor prohibition]. Thus,

Go, and let the sighs and tears
be mine; nor let them rise
from you as well, tortured,
being without her, by your hateful courtesy.¹

1. Found in a non-Vulgate version of the *Sattasai* (Weber 944). The literal sense of *cd* is probably "May they not arise from you, being without her, destroyed by your courtesy." But *dakhinna-haassa* could (it is just possible) stand for *hata-dākṣinyasya*, "possessing hateful (damned) courtesy." Weber's suggestion that *haasa* may represent *hṛtasya* is improbable. The point of the verse lies in the lady's fury at her lover's affectionless politeness. Whether she says that the politeness is damned or that he is damned is not important. But it would ruin the verse to say that he is "carried away (*hṛta*) by politeness."

L Here the word "go" is an injunction. We understand from the verse the intention of a woman who has been slighted¹ and whose pride has been deeply wounded. Her intent is: "Your union with this other mistress was not a careless adventure, but arose from the deepest love, as may be seen from your change of color and from your having inadvertently called me by her name. You remain here only out of the

courtesy [of pretending] to maintain our former relationship. You are a complete hypocrite." There is no [suggested] prohibition here in the form of not letting him go, nor is there a non-prohibition in the form of some other injunction.

1. *Khanditā* ("slighted") has been defined by *BhNS* 22.217 as a woman whose lover fails to visit her at the accustomed time. What is there meant is probably a lady of the harem who misses out on her "turn." *SD* defines the word as one whose lover arrives bearing signs of having enjoyed another. In the present instance the sign of the lover's faithlessness seems to have been his calling the speaker by another woman's name (*gotraskhalana*).

A Sometimes the literal meaning is in the form of a prohibition, while the suggested meaning takes a form that is neither [prohibition nor injunction]. Thus,

Turn back, I beg you. You are making trouble
for other ladies stealing to their lovers.
The moonlight of your countenance destroys
their covering darkness, wretched woman.¹

1. Supplement to *Sattasai* (Weber, No. 968). Cf. also Hemacandra *AC* 1.22 (*K>Anu.* p. 55) and Mahimabhaṭṭa p. 747. The verse is addressed to an *abbisārikā*, a woman who steals forth at night to visit her lover. The simple explanation of the stanza is that it is merely complimentary. One may remark further that much of the charm of the verse comes from its having *hatāse* for the 1st word, using it only after the pretty compliment has shown that the lady in fact is far from being what that term implies. *Hatāse* has much the same double sense that "wretched woman" has in English. It can be a term of compassion, if used of a woman who is truly wretched, or a term of reproach, if used of a woman who is vicious or cruel. The lady of our verse is shown, on the other hand, to be both beautiful and loving. But the simple explanation meets with a difficulty. In 2.4 and 2.5 our author will distinguish true *dhvani*, where the predominant meaning is a suggested *rūpa*, from figures of speech like *preyo lankāra* ("a figure of complimentary address") which involve a subordinate use of *dhvani*. Now by the simple explanation the present

verse would exemplify *preyo'lankāra* rather than true *dhvani*. I doubt that this would have troubled Ānanda, who is not concerned at this point with whether *dhvani* is used for final meaning or as a subordinate element. But the difficulty did trouble Abhinava and is the cause of his whole comment.

L "De" is a particle used in making a request. "Ā" has the sense of "tāvat"; so the meaning is: "Just turn back please," etc. As we understand the stanza to say "turn back" from your intended going, the literal sense is a prohibition.

[One might explain the suggested sense as follows:] A lady had come to her lover's house, where he had slighted her in some such way as addressing her by another's name, whereupon she had started to go home. He now turns her back with this clever piece of flattery: "You are putting difficulties in the way not only of your own pleasure and mine, but of those other ladies. You will never attain a drop of happiness. So you are a most 'wretched woman.'" Here the suggested sense is a particular compliment that represents the true feeling of the lover [BP: viz., that no other woman is her equal].

Or, [we might say that] a lady has been warned by her female friend not to go, but scorns the warning. Now the friend tells her, "Not only are you making difficulties for yourself, cheapening yourself by this light conduct, and so are a 'wretched woman,' but you are making difficulties for other women, stealing out to visit their lovers, by your lighting up the street with the moonlight of your countenance." Here the suggested sense is a particular compliment representing the feeling of the friend.¹

But in both these explanations, [the suggestion] comes back to rest in the literal sense, namely, a request to desist: from the intention of going back home, or from her going to a lover's house. And so this verse would be an example of a subordinated use of suggestion, that is of an *alaṇikāra*, either *preyo'lankāra* or *rasavadalalikāra*, and not of [what our author calls] *dhvani*. So let us explain as follows. A certain lady is hurrying to her lover at night, who in turn is on his way to her and meets with her on the way. Pretending not to recognize her, he addresses her with this stanza. That is why he adds "wretched woman" as a joke at the end, to let her know who he is: "You are causing difficulty for other women too, so how can you hope to receive your own desire? So either come to my house, or let us go back to yours." So the suggested meaning is a clever compliment that represents an

intention on the part of the lover, an intention that is in the form of neither [injunction nor prohibition] because the final sentence meaning allows of both.

Others have explained the stanza as being the words of certain gentlemen of taste who happen to be present [as the lady passes by]. But I ask persons of taste whether it would be at all proper in such a case to use an expression like "wretched woman."

1. This is, essentially, the explanation that Mahi (p. 474).
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A Sometimes the suggested meaning is made to be directed to a person (or persons) different from that (or those) to whom the literal meaning is directed. Thus:

Who wouldn't be angry to see
his dear wife with her lower lip
bitten?
You scorned my warning to smell
the bee-holding lotus. Now you must
suffer.

[Non-Vulgate *Suttasai*; Weber No. 886]¹

1. The stanza is quoted by Abhinava in *Abh.* on *BhNS* 18.123; by Mammāta 5.135; by Hemacandra *K.Anu.* 1 vs. 25, who in his *AC* repeats the comments of the *Locona*; and by *SD* on 5.2.

L In the previous examples there has been shown to be a difference between the literal and the suggested meanings even when the two meanings were addressed to the same person, viz., the monk, the traveler, the lover, or the *abbisārikā*. Now he shows that the suggested meaning may differ by its being addressed to a different person (or

persons) [from the person addressed by the literal]: sometimes the suggested meaning, etc.

Who wouldn't: that is, even a man without jealousy would be angry if he even [thought that he] saw it, that is, if he noticed her lip as being wounded because it appeared different for some reason even if it had not been [wounded].¹

Is made to be directed: What he means is that although various persons lie in the direction of application, a sensitive reader can make out the correct direction. [Abhinava here gives a Sanskrit translation of the Prakrit verse, literally:] Who wouldn't be angry on seeing his dear wife's lower lip with a wound? O you whose habit it is to smell bee-concealing lotuses, you who are averse to being prevented, now you must suffer.

O you whose habit it is to smell bee-concealing lotuses: because a person's habit cannot in any way be prevented. **Averse:** unwilling to accept. **Being prevented:** prevention. **Now you must suffer:** viz., a long and severe scolding.

The meaning of the stanza is as follows. An unfaithful wife has had her lip bitten by a lover. To save her from her husband's reproaches she is here addressed by a clever female friend, who knows that the husband is nearby but pretends not to see him. Now you must suffer: the literal sense is directed to the adulterous wife. The suggested sense, on the other hand, is directed to the husband and informs him that she is not guilty of offense.² There is also a suggestion directed to the neighbors who, if they hear the wife being roundly abused by the husband, may suspect her of misconduct. The suggestion in this case is the assurance provided by this concealment of her adultery. There is a suggestion directed to her fellow wife, who would be delighted by the abuse of her rival and by [the news of] her adultery. The suggestion lies in the word *dear* ("dear wife"),³ which shows that the wife addressed is the more attractive. There is a suggestion to the adulterous friend of the speaker, informing her, "You should not take on humiliation at the thought of being accused of bad character in front of your fellow wife; rather, you should take to yourself high esteem and now shine forth (*sahasra*)."⁴ To the wife's secret lover there is a suggestion, telling him that "Today I have thus saved your heart's beloved who loves you in secret, but you must not bite her again in a place that is so obvious." To anyone clever who is standing nearby the speaker's cleverness is suggested, [as though she were to say,] "This is the way I have concealed things." All of this is indicated by the expression *is made to be directed*.

1. *atruā*, even if it had not been wounded: this appears to be the interpretation of the *Kaumudī* and of *BP*. The grammatical interpretation, "seeing her lip wounded even if he had not done it," makes no sense. Obviously the husband would not be angry if he had bitten his wife's lip himself. 2. Most printed texts insert here the brief sentence: *sahasvety api ca tad-viṣayam vyāṅgyam*, "There is also a suggestion that he must suffer." The sentence is missing, however, from the MS used by the *Nirṇayasāgar* edition. The trouble with it is that such a suggestion, if present, would be directed to the reader, not to the husband as portrayed by the poem. Pāṭhak omits the sentence in his Hindi translation. 3. What I have translated as "dear wife" is in Sanskrit a single word, *priyādā*, a word which has two meanings, "wife" and "beloved." The literal meaning here is simply wife, but a suggestion arises *sabda-bolāt*, from the verbal force, to the effect that this wife is also her husband's beloved, that is to say, the one of his wives that he finds most attractive. 4. In assigning the sense of *sahasva* as a second meaning to *sahasva*, Abhinava is probably following some Prakrit grammar. Hemacandra (8.)4.100 gives the root *sah* as a synonym of *rāj* (*rājati*). The *Kaumudī* prefers the ancient Vedic meaning of *sah*, to win or overcome: "sa-hanam is here used in the sense of overcoming her fellow wife." That any second meaning is intended in *sahasva* seems to me most unlikely.

A Other differences of the suggested meaning from the literal meaning are possible along these lines. We have merely indicated the general direction. How the second variety of suggested meaning, viz., *alaṅkāradhvani*, differs from the literal will be shown in detail in what follows. But the third variety, involving *rasa*, etc., which appears as something implied by the inherent capability of the literal sense but as an object on which no words can operate directly, must necessarily be different from the literal. This may be shown [more formally]. For if such states as *rasa* are to be denoted, it must be either by reporting them under their own names, or through conveying them by means of the *vibhāvas*, etc.¹ If the former were the case, it would follow that wherever the *rasas*, etc., were not reported by name there could be no apprehension of them. But it is not true that they are everywhere reported by name. Even where they are, our apprehension of them

is through their being conveyed by means of particular *vibhāvas*, etc. This apprehension, while it may later be referred to by name,² is not produced by the naming, because in other cases we do not find it. For in a poem which merely uses such words as "erotic," etc., but fails to convey the *vibhāvas*, there is not even the slightest apprehension that the poem contains any *rasa*. And since there is the apprehension of *rasas*, etc., from particular *vibhāvas* without any naming of these *rasas* and there is no apprehension of them from the mere naming of them, it follows by the application of positive and negative concomitance that the *rasas*, etc., are implied by the force of things that are literally denoted and are in no way denoted themselves. So it stands proven that the third variety [of suggested meaning] also is different from the literal meaning. That we apprehend it as though it were simultaneous with the literal meaning will be shown in what follows.

1. This sentence lacks Ānanda's usual clarity, for the conveying of *rasa* by means of the *vibhāvas* is not an instance of *vācyatva* ("being denoted") at all, but of *vyāngyatva* ("being suggested"). Abhinava tries to exculpate our author by supplying *tātparyasāktyā*. 2. This concession is worth remarking on, for it is generally overlooked by later *ālankārikas*. Later authors were generally of the opinion that to use a word denoting the actual emotion (*bhāva*) or *rasa* constituted a major fault, so much so that such cases could not be considered examples of *dhvani*. Ānanda's concession allows for such words if used as an *anuvāda* (mere reference). The concession allows many fine poems to pass muster which are lowered in value by the later critics.

L In what follows: viz., in Chapter Two, where suggestion in which the literal meaning is intended but is subordinated to a second meaning (*vivakṣitānyaparavācya*) is said to be of two types, "one where the suggestion is produced without apparent sequence [i.e., immediately, together with the primary meaning], the other where the sequence is apparent," (2.2). There, in describing the second of these types, [the variety here referred to, namely *ālankāra-dhvani*, is dealt with in detail; see 2.20-21 and 25-26]. While it is easy to summarize *vastu-dhvani* under the heads of injunction, prohibition, and neither injunction nor prohibition, it is not easy to summarize *ālankāra-dhvani*, because the figures of speech (*ālankāras*) are so numerous. And so he says: in detail.

But the third variety: the word "but" is used to point a contrast. In the first place, the property of being expressible by the denotative

force of words [as well as by suggestion] attaches to a situation (*vastu*) or to a figure of speech (*alarikāra*). On the other hand, a *rasa*, an emotion (*bhāva*), an improper *rasa* or emotion, or the cessation of a *rasa* or emotion, are never directly denoted. They appear rather as matters that come to life in the process of being relished (*āsvādymāna*), and for this there is no explanation other than the operation of suggestion. For we cannot suspect as being here at work any of the conditions of *lakṣyāṇā*, such as blocking of the primary meaning, because there is here no halting gait in the journey [from word to meaning; cf. 1.4 b L, note 17].

[Definitions of *rasa*, *rasābhāsa*, etc.]

Rasa appears when a stable state of mind (*cittavṛtti*), constantly directed toward a proper object,¹ is aesthetically relished. *Bhāva* appears when a transitory state is so relished. The improper variety (*ābhāsa*) of *rasa* or *bhāva* appears when either of them is directed toward an improper object, as when Rāvana's love is directed toward Sītā.² While that case really belongs to the comic flavor, in accordance with [Bharata's] dictum that "the erotic leads to the comic,"³ that stage of realization overtakes the audience only later. Since the relish one experiences in the stage where one is identifying [the portrayed emotion with one's own] is of love, the *rasa* will appear to be the erotic *rasa* as long as we overlook the broader context, as we do when hearing:

I merely heard her name
and it acted as a magnet or a maddening charm.⁴

This is therefore a case of the improper or spurious erotic, [not of the comic]. An emotion (*bhāva*) which goes to form an improper *rasa* is an "improper emotion" (*bhāvābhāsa*). As the cessation or checking of an advanced emotion is especially delightful to the heart, it is separately mentioned [in the list that we just gave], although it is actually included [in the term *bhāva*.]⁵ An example is:

They lay upon the bed each turned aside
and suffering in silence;
though love still dwelt within their hearts
each feared a loss of pride.
But then from out the corner of their eyes
the sidelong glances met
and the quarrel broke in laughter they turned
and clasped each other's neck.⁶

Here we have the cessation of a pride which has taken the form of jealous anger.⁷

Now this suggested entity, *rasa* or the like, is not generated within us after the fashion that joy is generated from [the direct force of] the words "A son is born to you."⁸ Nor does it come from the secondary power of the words. Rather, it makes itself felt (*parisphurati*) as something the whole life of which consists in the ongoing process of relishing and which thereby differs from something like joy or grief that is a finished or frozen state.⁹ This process of tasting arises in a sensitive person through his empathy upon apprehending the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas*, an empathy made possible by his heart's being in tune with [the poetic message]. Our author states this: which appears as [something, etc.]. And so¹⁰ in these [instances of *rasa*, etc.] suggestion is an operation of a word as helped out by [that word's literal] meaning. But this [literal] meaning, which will be a *vibhāva* or the like, does not generate an emotion like the joy generated by the birth of a son. So suggestion is said to be an operation different from generation (*janaṇa*), an operation which belongs to meaning as well [as to word].¹¹

Under their own names: reporting them by the operation of denotation by using the words *śrigāra* ("the erotic"), etc. By means of the *vibhāvas*, etc.: He means "through the sentence meaning." Here, by ruling out *rasa*, which consists essentially in the process of relishing, by the use of positive and negative concomitance, from the use of the very words which denote it, he shows that these concomitances belong to suggestion.

It is not true that they are everywhere [reported by name]: for example, in this stanza of Bhaṭṭendurāja,

A tremulousness of the eyes,
hesitating in mid-glance;
limbs daily growing thinner
like severed lotus stems
and cheeks so pale they seemed
to imitate white dūruḍ grass:
such was the costume put on by the gopis
as they and Krishna came of age.

Here, after we become aware of the *anubhāvas* and *vibhāvas* and have joined ourself to them by empathy, the meaning, in the form of a *rasa*, makes itself felt (*sphurati*) as that which is blissfully relished by the self-consciousness, which is colored by latent impressions (*vāsanā*, see 2.4 L, note 6) responsive to these *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas*; all of this without

the use of any such words as *abhilāṣa* (desire), *cintā* (worry), *autsukya* (eagerness), *nidrā* (sleep), *adhr̥ti* (frailty), *glāni* (drooping), *ālasya* (languor), *śrama* (weariness), *smṛti* (remembrance), *vitarka* (speculation), or the like.¹²

Having thus shown the failure of a negative concomitance,¹³ he goes on to show the failure of the positive concomitance:¹⁴ even where they are. "They" refers to words that directly name a *rasa*, etc. Through their being conveyed: by the conveying of *vibhāvas*, etc., through the use of words. It may be merely [referred to by its name]: as in the following stanza:

When Madhu's foe had left for Dvārakā
his Rādhā hugged the slender tree
on Kālīndī's bank from whose wealth of frondage
he had in time past given her gifts.
With high-pitched voice and heavy falling tears
she sang a song with longing,
to which the birds who swam upon the wave
gave back a yearning cry.¹⁵

In this stanza the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* are clearly apprehended¹⁶ and longing is [thereby] conveyed as the object of one's relish.¹⁷ The word *sotkanthā* ("with longing") gives us no more than has already been given. But although it is merely a reference to the *anubhāva* [which has been learned through non-direct means], the word is useful, as it is employed to draw together the stated *anubhāvas* [e.g., the sad song and tears of the heroine] with the word "yearning" [applied to the cry of the birds]. For if the poet had conveyed the whole set of *anubhāvas* all over again, the stanza would suffer from tautology and we should not empathize.

Is not produced by the meaning:¹⁸ he gives the reason for this with the words, because in other cases, etc.; for example, in the stanza, "A tremulousness of the eyes," [where there is no naming of the *rasa* or its components]. The sense is that A cannot be produced by B if A comes into existence in the absence of B. He strengthens [the statement of] our not finding *rasa* by the next sentence, beginning *na hi*. He clarifies the expression such mere words, etc., by [adding the condition that the same poem fail to convey] the *vibhāvas*, etc.

In a poem: whereas in your opinion [i.e., according to the opponent who claims that naming the *rasas* should give rise to aesthetic relish], it should become poetry. Not even the slightest: as in the following

stanza there is not the slightest aesthetic relish although it names all the *rasas*.

The erotic, comic, tragic, and heroic,
the flavors of fury, fear, disgust and wonder:
such are the *rasas*, which number eight,
in our tradition of the drama.

[*BhNS* 6.15]

Having thus shown by a persuasive argument employing negative and positive concomitance that the *rasas*, etc., are absent [from a verse] when they are directly named in it, he now sums up the matter in similar fashion¹⁹ in the passage beginning with and since there is and ending with and are in no way [denoted].

[Explanation of the phrase by the force of things which are literally denoted.]²⁰ When the suggestion of *rasa* is ascribed to a word, the force (*sāmarthyā*), that is, the cooperating force, viz., the *vibhāvas*, etc., is the directly denoted meaning. When the suggestion of *rasa* is ascribed to the directly denoted meaning—inasmuch as the suggestion of *rasa* is not a case of one thing's begetting another, because of the different nature (*yogakṣema*) of joy at the birth of a son; and not a case of one thing's being inferred from another, because of the distinct nature of the inference of a man's eating at night from the premise of his being fat compounded with his not eating in the daytime²¹—then the force (*sāmarthyā*, *sakti*) of this meaning is the totality of denotative words arranged in their particular way.²² Thus the suggesting is an operation of both word and meaning. And so, in addressing the alternatives [A, that *rasa*, etc., can be conveyed through the mere naming of a *rasa*, etc.; and B, that *rasa*, etc., are conveyed by one's furnishing the *vibhāvas*, etc.], the former has been refuted, while the latter has been partly refuted and partly accepted. If taken as meaning that the operation [by which the *vibhāvas* lead to *rasa*, etc.] is a begetting or inferring, that is refuted; if taken as meaning that the operation is a suggesting, that is accepted.

He who thinks that even here suggestion is nothing more than *tātparyāsakti* (the power of the sentence meaning) does not know the truth of the matter. For in a sentence that conveys the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas*, the *tātparyāsakti* exhausts itself in giving the syntax (*samsarga*) [of the sentence] or its difference [in meaning from that of other sentences];²³ it does not concern *rasa*, the essence of which consists in the process of relishing. Let us say no more.

The word *so* is used in the sense of cause. The connection is: and for this cause also, the third variety too [of suggested meaning] is different from the literal.

As though it were simultaneous: By saying "as though" he shows that although there is really a succession, the succession is not noticed. **In what follows:** in Chapter Two (2.20-21 and 25-26).

1. *cittavṛtteḥ sthānyināḥ*: the more usual term would be *sthānyabhāvasya*. The phrase *aucityena pravṛttaḥ* is taken from Udbhaṭa (Indurāja 4.5, Viṁśti 4.9). 2. The *rasa* is improper because Sītā is another's wife and because the emotion is not reciprocated. On the concept of *rasābhāṣa* see Sivaprasad Bhattacharya, *Calc. Or. Jl* 2, pp. 237-247, and J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan, *Aesthetic Rapture I*, p. 42 and II, pp. 57-58. The concept of *rasābhāṣa* is highly restrictive of literature. If we are to limit *rasa*, the sole aim of literature, to only such subjects as conform to propriety and even to the *s*" *tras*, as Udbhaṭa would have it, not a little of Sanskrit literature and surely the greater part of Western literature will be judged to be of little worth. Abhinava seems to have been the first Indian critic to face this problem and find an answer: the *ābhāṣatva*, the impropriety, of such experiences is something we realize only later; during the actual experience we are absorbed. 3. *BHNS* 6.39. The next verse specifies that it is when the erotic is parodied (*śrīgārānukrītī*) that it becomes comic. 4. A larger fragment of this stanza is introduced at 2.3 L by the identification "*Rāvaṇakāvye*" (see also *Abh.* 6.40), but whether this means "in a poem called the *Rāvaṇakāvya*," or merely "in a poem about *Rāvana*" is not clear. The full stanza is given in Hemacandra's *AC* on *K.Anu.* 2.55 as *dūrākarsaṇamohamantra iwa me tan-*
nāmnī yāte śrutiṁ, cetahkālakalām api prasahate nāvasthitim tām vīnā /
etair ākulitasya vikṣatarater arīgaīr anaṅgāturaīḥ sampadyeta kathām tadāp-
tisukham ity etan na vedmi sphuṭam. 5. One might regard all the conditions of *bhāva*, such as *bhāvodbhava*, *bhāvasandhi*, *bhāvasabdatā*, and *bhāvaprāṣama* (see 2.3 L) as being included in *bhāva*. 6. Amaru *Sat.* 23, quoted in nearly every anthology of Sanskrit. (a) *vītottaram*: probably, "without reply, in silence." *BP*'s interpretation "without any of the action that [normally] follows lying down in bed" seems to me farfetched. (b) The MS and anthologies vary between *kanṭhagraham*, adverb, and *kanṭhagrahāḥ*, bahuvrihi. The former makes for clearer syntax. 7. Whether one considers such verses as examples of *bhāvaprāṣama* or *bhāvodaya* depends on whether one finds more charm (*camatkāra*) in the description of the ceasing emotion or the originating one. Mammata (4.51) quotes Amaru 22, a verse similar to the present one, as an example of *bhāvodaya*. 8. Abhinava would here make another, radical distinction between suggestion and the other powers of words. The denotative and secondary powers (*abhidhā-sakti* and *lakṣaṇā-sakti*) are able to give us only cognitions or concepts. The joy that may follow from "You have a new

son," or the grief that may follow from "Your unmarried daughter is pregnant" (*KP* ed. Jhalkikar, p. 229) is a subsequent development growing out of the word-meanings or concepts. In the case of suggestion, on the other hand, the meaning itself is the *rasa*, the flavor that we relish. Aesthetic pleasure is not the result of a meaning; it is the meaning itself. 9. *Siddha-svabhāva*: the commentaries, I think, fail to understand this term. *BP*'s first explanation misunderstands the syntax, taking the whole compound as "different from *sukha*, etc., by being of a *siddhasvabhāva*," as if it were *sukha*, etc., that were *sādhya*. Its second explanation agrees with the *Kaumudi* and supposes that *sukhādi* stands for *rati* and the other *sthāyibhāvas*. The correct interpretation surely will connect *sukhādi* with the *put* *janmahaṛṣa* just referred to and shortly to be mentioned again. The contrast is between (a) the denotative force of words which produces a meaning, which in turn generates a fixed mental reaction, pleasure or grief, and (b) the suggestive force of words which produces an ongoing process of relishing or enjoyment.

10. The *Vṛtti* has stated that *rūśadhvani* is *vācyasāmarthyāksipta*. And so (*tena*) the suggestive power of the word must be helped out by a meaning, viz., the *vācya* meaning. 11. The literal meaning should not be said to help generate (*janayati*) the *rasa*; it should be said to help suggest (*dhuanayati*) the *rasa*. *Abhinava* is merely distinguishing the primary production of the *rasas* from the secondary production of pleasure and pain. Later, on 2.4, he will admit, even insist, that the *rasas* are produced (*utpādyante*). 12. Of the ten words on the list, *adhīrta* probably represents the *sthāyibhāva*, *rati*; the five words *glāni*, *śrama*, *cintā*, *autsukya*, and *nirdrā* are listed by *BhNS* 6.45 as denoting *anubhāvas* of *vipralambhaśrīgāra*; the three words *ālasya*, *smṛti*, and *vitarka* denote *vyabhicāribhāvas*, listed in *BhNS* 7.47, 53, 91. Only of *adhīrta* can I not furnish a technical assignment. 13. The negative concomitance would be: "Where there are no words directly naming the *rasa* or its components, there is no *rasa*-experience." 14. This would be in the form, "Wherever there are words directly naming the *rasa* or its components, there is a *rasa*-experience." 15. The author of the stanza is unknown and the text of the first line is in question. All the printed texts write *taddatayahampānatām*, "bent down by the leap which had been given by him." It is certainly odd to speak of "giving one's leap to a tree." *BP* tries to make out that this was the tree from which Krishna leaped into the Kālindi. But the tradition is unanimous that that tree was a *kodambo* (*Hariuomśa* 55.57, *Vignu P.* 5.7.10, *Bhāg.P.* 10.16.6), not a *vanjula*. Neither is it clear just what tree is here meant by *vanjula*, except that it cannot be a *kodambo*. The word is used for an *āśoka*, or a *syandana* (= *tiniśa*, the Anglo-Indian *sissoo*), or a reed. Whichever tree is meant, I prefer the reading of the Malayalam MS quoted by Kuppuswami Sastri in his edition of the *Kaumudi*, viz., *taddatāsampannatām*, and have translated accordingly. 16. The *ālembana-vibhāvas* are Krishna and Rādhā; the *uddipana-vibhāva* is the bank of the Kālindi; the *anubhāvas*

are embracing the *varṇula*, shedding tears, etc. 17. This is as much as to say that longing is thereby suggested. 18. One should place a *danda* after the words *atanmayibhāvō vā*. In the text the words *na tu* *tatkta* should be printed in boldface. 19. Viz., again by the use of positive and negative concomitance.

20. The complicated and highly improbable interpretation which follows is occasioned by Abhinava's desire to bring this statement, which ascribes the suggestion of *rasa*, etc., only to meanings (viz., to *bhāvas*, etc.), into line with the opinion elsewhere expressed by Ānanda that the suggestion of *rasa* derives from both meaning and word. To accomplish this aim, Abhinava takes *abhidheya-sāmarthyā* first as a *karmadhāraya* compound and next as a *gṛhi-tatpurusa*. The meaning assigned to *sāmarthyā* differs in the one case from the other. 21. The stock example of the *arthāpatti* of the *Mīmāṃsā*, here reduced, as it is by the *Nyāya*, to an inference. 22. *BP*: put together with such *guṇas* and *alankāras* as are conducive to *rasa*. 23. That relating and differentiating are the two functions of the sentence is a notion first found in *Mahābhāṣya* 2.1.1. *Vṛtti* 2 (Kielborn ed., I.364.24; S. D. Joshi, ed. and trans. of 2.1.1, para. 84). To explain: the sentence "Gām ānaya" not only relates the object cow to the action of the addressed person; it differentiates the command from one concerning horses or concerning some other action.

K It is just this meaning¹ that is the soul of poetry. And so it was that, long ago, grief, arising in the first poet from the separation of the pair of curlews, became verse.

1. In order to make sense of the *Kārikā*, we must take "this meaning" to refer not to the suggested meaning in general that was mentioned in 1.4 *K*, but specifically to *rasa*, etc., the third type of suggested meaning, which has been mentioned only by the *Vṛtti* on 1.4. It was this element arising in Vālmīki, whether one regard it with Ānanda as the *bhāva*, *soka*, or with Abhinava as the *karunarasā*, that produced the first poem, for it is *rasa*, etc., that gives life to poetry as the soul gives life to the body. Note that Ānanda's concept of *bhāva* and *rasa* is much simpler than Abhinava's. To Ānanda *rasa* is no more than the sharpening of Vālmīki's emotion of grief. See Introduction, pp. 15-19. The quarter stanza *ślokāḥ sokaṭuvaṁ ḍgataḥ* is quoted from *Rām.* 1.2.39.

A It is just this [inner] meaning that is the essence of a poem, which has [outward] beauty in its wealth of direct meaning, word, and structure.¹ And so it was that the grief (*soka*) of the first poet, Vālmīki, born of the wailing of the cock curlew desolated by loss of its slain mate,² turned into verse (*śloka*). For grief is the basic emotion of the flavor of compassion (*karuṇārasa*) [which, as has been said, appears only as suggested].³ Although other types of suggested meaning may be found, they can all be supplied from the mention of *rasa* and *bhāva* because those are the most important.

1. The phrase *vācyavācakaracanā* recurs at 1.8A. What is here meant is the choice of word, direct meaning, and structure (degree of compounding and degree of phonetic harshness) appropriate to the *rasa* that is to be suggested and that forms the inner or essential meaning. *Vācyā* is used in distinction from *vyanigra*. 2. Both the reading and the sense of the passage have been questioned, wrongly. The reading *nihatasahacari* is found in the Kerala MS, in Krishnamoorthy's MB MS (see p. 311 of his ed.), in the text of the *Locana*, and in the semi-quotations by Rajaśekhara's *Kāv.M.* p. 7 and by Cāṇḍidāsa's *Dīpikā* (see Krishnamoorthy loc. cit.). The reading *sannihitasahacari* occurs only in two of the Niraya Sagar MS (KM ed.). The difficulty with the sense is that in the form of the legend given in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, a form that every Indian schoolboy used to know, it is the male bird that was killed (*Rām.* 1.2.10). It was the grief of the female bird that Vālmīki transformed into verse. In order to reconcile these traditions the learned Kuppusvāmi Śāstri (*Upalocana* pp. 163-164) proposed an unnatural analysis of Ānanda's compound, taking *nihata* by a frog's leap with *krauṇica* instead of with *sahacari*. Pt. Badarī Nāth Śarmā in his *Dīdhīti* emended the text. All needlessly. Ānanda has altered the legend to suit his purposes. See J. L. Masson, "Who Killed Cock Krauṇca," *J.O.I. Baroda* 18 (3), March 1969. 3. The phrase *pratiyamānarūpa* even *pratipāditam*, translated above by the words placed in brackets, appears in most of the MSS, but Abhinava makes no mention of it. One cannot say with certainty whether it has crept into the text from a marginal annotation or whether it has dropped out of an early copy of the text by haplography, the eye of the scribe having jumped from the initial word of *pratiyamānarūpa* to the *pratiyamānasya* of the next sentence. It is missing from the Kashi and Vidyābhawan texts.

L [Comment on the *Kārikā*:] So far, by stating that the suggested, on the other hand, is something different (1.4 K),

the nature of suggestion has been explained. Now, by making use of a well-known legend, he will show that it is the soul of poetry: the soul of poetry.

It is just this: while the antecedent is suggested meaning in general, what we are here to think of is the third variety, namely suggested rasa (*rasadhvani*), for that follows from the use of the legend and from the immediately preceding passage of the *Vṛtti*. So it is rasa that is the real soul of poetry. *Vastudhvani* and *alankāradhvani*, however, regularly end up in [producing] rasa, and it was in order to mark their superiority to the literal sense that he said [in 1.1 K] that *dhvani* in general was the soul of poetry.

Grief: That grief which arose from the separation of the pair of curlews, that is, from the destruction of the mating arising from the killing of the bird's mate, a grief which was a basic emotion different, because of its hopelessness,¹ from the basic emotion of love found in love-in-separation: that grief, by the poet's ruminating upon its [*ālambana-*] *vibhāvas* [i.e., the birds] in their [unhappy] state and on the *anubhāvas* arising therefrom, such as the wailing [of the surviving bird], met with a response from his heart and with his identifying [of the bird's grief with the grief in his own memory] and so transformed itself into a process of relishing.² It thus became the flavor of compassion (*karunarasa*), which differs from ordinary grief by its being experienced primarily as a melting of one's thoughts.³ Then, like the spilling over of a jar filled with liquid, like the pouring forth of one's emotion into a cry of lament, this [grief now transformed into the rasa of compassion] found its final form in a verse cast into fixed form of meter and into appropriate words, for cries of lament and the like are suggestive of a state of mind without the need of semantic convention; appropriate also because Vālmiki was wholly engrossed and the words came from him naturally. His words were:

May you never find honor, Niśāda,
for everlasting years,
who have shot the loving mate
from this pair of curlew birds.⁴

But we must not suppose that the sage experienced grief, for if that were the case there would be no occasion for calling rasa the soul [of poetry], as the poet would actually be in pain, pained by that grief.⁵ Nor does such a state [BP: the exalted state of being able to pronounce a curse, or to write a *slōka*] belong to one who is afflicted with pain.

Thus, since it forms the nature of this overflow [viz., the verse just quoted] of the flavor of compassion, of which the abiding emotion is a grief amenable to relishing, this *rasa* is therefore the soul of poetry, that is, its essential nature, that which produces a result beyond the reach of any other word-powers [than suggestion]. It has been said [by Bhaṭṭānāyaka] in the *Hṛdayadarpaṇa*,

Until he is filled with this *rasa*
the poet does not spill it forth.

[In the quotation given above from the *Rāmāyaṇa*] the form *agamah* shows Vedic retention of the augment.⁶

It is just this: by the word "just" he would say that there is no other soul [of poetry]. Accordingly, Bhaṭṭānāyaka is wrong when he writes: "One may distinguish the *sāstras* by the prominence they give to the word. One knows that stories are wedded to meaning. One forms a just notion of a poem by subordinating these two, viz., word and meaning, and making the operation (*vyanjana*) paramount." For if the "operation" he speaks of is essentially suggestion and consists in relishing, he is saying nothing new, while if he means the operation to be denotation (*abhidhā*), we have already shown that it holds no prominence.⁷

[Comment on the *Vṛtti*]

The *Vṛtti* comments on the [Kārikā's] stanza. In its wealth of direct meaning, word, and structure: that is, because a poem is varied in accordance with whatever *rasa* is to be suggested. [Only such a composition is called a poem and] therefore, although suggestion occurs everywhere, we do not speak of [poetry being everywhere], just as we speak of life only in some places although the soul exists everywhere, as we have said before [1.4 b L]. So there is no occasion for what is objected in the *Hṛdayadarpaṇa*, that "we should have to use the term poetry everywhere."⁸

Its slain mate: here we have the [*ālambana-*] *vibhāva*; the wailing; with this word, the *anubhāva*. Born: one must supply, "through being the object of his relish."⁹

But if verse (*śloka*) arose from relished grief (*soka*), why is the thing that is suggested [i.e., the *raso*] said to be the soul of poetry [rather than grief]? It is with a view to this objection that he says: for grief is, etc. Grief is the basic emotion of the *rasa* of compassion, for compassion

consists of relishing (or aesthetically enjoying) grief. That is to say, where we have the basic emotion grief, a thought-trend that fits with the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* of this grief, if it is relished (literally, if it is chewed over and over), becomes a *rasa* and so from its aptitude [toward this end] one speaks of [any] basic emotion as becoming a *rasa*.¹⁰ For the basic emotion is put to use in the process of relishing: through a succession of memory-elements it adds together a thought-trend which one has already experienced in one's own life to one which one infers in another's life, and so establishes a correspondence in one's heart.¹¹

It may be objected that it is anything that takes the form of a suggested meaning that forms the soul [of poetry] and that three varieties of this [suggested meaning] have been stated, not simply that which takes the form of *rasa*, whereas the Vālmiki legend seems to say that only *rasa* is the soul. Our author foresees this objection and accepts it, saying although other types of suggested meaning: the other types are *vastudhvani* and *alankāradhvani*.

The inclusion of the word *bhāva* indicates that even a transitory state (*vyabhicāribhāvū*) may form the life of a verse although the relishing of it is not complete in itself [but will go on to a relishing of a *rasa*] and although it never achieves the position of a *rasa* belonging to the final state of relishing a basic emotion.¹² An example is the following:

Rubbing one nail with the tip of another,
turning about her loose bracelet,
slowly drawing a line on the earth,
her anklet softly jingling ...

Here we have [the transitory state of] shyness [forming the life of the [verse].

Furthermore, by the words *rasa* and *bhāva* there are included the improper varieties (*ābhāsa*) of these as well as the termination (*prasama*) of these, for although there are many sub-types, a single form runs through them all.

Because these are the most important: they are so because the other types end up in or lead to *rasa*. *Vastudhvani* and *alankāradhvani*, while they are not complete in themselves, can be called the soul of a verse from their aptitude, that is, because of their ability [also] to furnish [a delight] that lies beyond the reach of other word-powers.

1. Grief characterizes not only *karunārasa* (the flavor of compassion or tragedy), but also that variety of the erotic flavor that is based on the separation of lovers (*vipralambhaśringāra*). Between the two sorts of grief is this difference: the grief of tragedy, as in the present instance, expects no relief; the grief of separated lovers looks forward to reunion. The term *nirapeksabhāva* for the hopelessness of tragic grief is taken from *BHNS* 6.45, near end of prose. 2. The all-important transformation from the emotion, grief (*bhāva*, *soka*) of the character portrayed, to the relish (*dsuḍda*) or flavor of compassion (*karunārasa*) of the poet or of his audience is here passed over very rapidly. Abhinava furnishes more detail at the end of his comment on the present passage and in commenting on 1.18 and 2.4. The sympathetic response (*hrdayasamuāda*) to the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* is said to "transcend the experience of the workaday world" (2.4 L). Where the Westerner may think of empathy as rendering Hamlet's griefs and problems his own, Abhinava thinks of the process of empathy with, say, Rāma, or with the grieving bird, as liberating one's personal memory of grief into a universal, impersonal flavor. 3. This melting of the mind (*druti*) is one of the symptoms assigned to the relishing of *rasa* by Bhāṭṭanāyaka (2.4 L). The others are expansion (*vistara*) and radiance (*vikāsa*). At the end of 2.4 L, Abhinava somewhat grudgingly accepts these characterizations from his rival, but insists that they are not exhaustive. 4. *Rāmāyaṇa* 1.2.14. The pair of birds had been mating as the Niṣāda shot, a fact that doubtless would have brought a curse upon him even if Vālmīki had not been present to versify it; compare the curse of Pāṇḍu, *MBh* 1.109. The legend is built on a folk etymology deriving *sloka* from *soka*, and from the despised status of the Niṣāda caste. As the incident is told at the beginning of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, it has been taken as introducing the tragic flavor of that work. If we accept Ānanda's alteration of the story, one may take the hunter to foreshadow Rāvana; the slain hen-bird, the kidnapped Sītā; and the heart-broken survivor, Rāma. 5. One must remember that Abhinava regards *rasa* as a form of bliss. Naturally it must be different from grief, which is a painful emotion. Here Abhinava is writing of the poet. On 2.4 he brings out the same contrast in the case of the audience: if they felt pain at a representation of the *Rāmāyaṇa* story, for example, they would not return to the theater. Masson has written of the Indian recognition of the poet's need to distance himself from his emotions before writing of them (*Sāntarasa*, p. 84). Ingalls would add that if we follow Abhinava's account strictly, we must say that the poet in fact never writes of his griefs. He writes only of the griefs of others, which he has relished. By relishing them it is implied that he has lost his own griefs within them. This is a far more refined view than that of Ānanda, who writes quite unconcernedly of the "grief of the first poet." And Abhinava's view, as Masson points out in the passage just referred to, differs from that of the *Rāmāyaṇa* itself, which in narrating the incident speaks time after time of the poet's grief and pity. 6. According to the *Kāśikā*, such cases are covered by

the word *bahulam* in Pāṇ. 6.4.75. They are noticed by Whitney, para. 579e. 7. What Bhaṭṭānāyaka meant doubtless was neither. He must have meant the operations (*bhāvanā, bhoga*) of the word's powers of *bhāvokatva* and *bhogakṛt-tva*, these being the special terms by which he explained the nature of poetry; see Introduction, p. 36, and 2.4 L, near end. One may note that Vidyādhara in his *Ekāvalī* (pp. 13-15) combines this triple distinction of Bhaṭṭānāyaka's with Abhinava's doctrine of the three *vyutpattihetavāḥ* (means of instruction; see p. 71), but in doing so substitutes *dvividipradhāna* for Bhaṭṭānāyaka's *vyāpārnpradhāna*. 8. Bhaṭṭānāyaka must have singled out 1.5 for criticism, saying that if suggestion in general is to be called the soul of poet , the title of poetry will be assigned to almost every sentence, as suggestion is found in every metaphor and trope. There are two ways to silence this objection: by showing that it is only *rasadhvani* that really qualifies as the soul of poetry; or by specifying other properties that poetry must have. Abhinava used the first way in commenting on the *Kārikā*. He now uses the second in commenting on the *Vṛtti*. 9. See how subtly Abhinava alters the meaning of his text. We are not to think of the grief as belonging to Vālmīki. The grief is the bird's. It gives birth in Vālmīki not to grief but to a relishing of the bird's grief.

10. Note that this statement is metaphorical, not exact. It is one's own *cittavṛtti* (thought-trend, state of mind), not the basic emotion, that becomes the *rasa*. How it does so is indicated in the next sentence. 11. It is this *hrdayasamvāda* (response of the heart) which permits the expansion and depersonalization of one's own emotions. 12. It seems highly improbable that Ānanda meant any such thing. By *bhāva* he probably meant *sthāyibhāva* and he probably intended such a *sthāyibhāva*, grief (*soka*), to be the meaning suggested by Vālmīki's first verse.

K Sarasvatī, [working] within great poets, in pouring forth this sweet matter (*arthavastu*) [viz., the emotions and flavors] reveals a special, vibrant, genius (*pratibhā*), which is superhuman.

A The divine speech of great poets, in pouring forth this essential matter (*vastu-tattva*), reveals a special, vibrant, genius, which is superhuman. Thus it is in this world, where there has been a long

succession of poets of every possible kind, that only two or three, or maybe five or six, such as Kālidāsa, can be counted as great poets.

L Having thus shown by means of a legend that the suggested meaning is the soul of poetry, he now shows that this is also a matter of one's own experience. Sarasvatī: He means that goddess in the form of speech. For the components of the compound *arthavastu* in the Kārikā, the *Vṛtti* substitutes *vastu* for *artha* and *tattva* for *vastu*. Pouring forth: giving forth from her very self the divine *rasa* of bliss.¹ As Bhaṭṭanāyaka puts it:

Prompted by the thirst of these children,²
the cow of speech
gives forth this *rasa* as her milk;
to which the experience milked by yogis
bears no comparison.

For without the afflatus of this *rasa*,³ what the yogis milk they milk by force. [How different from the yogis are those who are found worthy to receive the gifts of a goddess will appear from the following lines:]

The mountains made Himālaya their calf;
then with Meru playing the skillful milkman
and Pr̥thu giving instruction to the mother,
they caused to flow for him from Mother Earth
her milk of mighty herbs and shining gems.⁴

So runs the stanza [of Kālidāsa] which shows the worthiness of Himālaya to receive the most precious things.

Reveals a vibrant [genius]: The poet's genius is not inferred by the audience, but shines forth with immediacy because of his inspiration with *rasa*. As my teacher Bhaṭṭatauta has said, "This is why the experience of hero, poet, and audience is the same."⁵

Genius is an intelligence capable of creating new things.⁶ The special genius here is one which is capable of composing pure and beautiful poetry because of the inspiration of *rasa*. As the sage [Bharata] has said: "[They transmit] the inner mental state of the poet."⁷

Thus it is: The sense is that the number of great poets is arrived at by counting those who reveal this special, vibrant genius.

1. ānandarasam: that *rasa* which is bliss. The association of the two words is ancient. Cf. *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 1.1.12, where Śaṅkara in explaining

ānandamaya quotes from *Tait. Up.* 2.7 *raso vā sah rasam hyerdyam labdhud-
nandī bhavati.* 2. By "these children" is meant men of taste, connoisseurs.
3. *tad-āvesena vinā:* without the afflatus, the divine inspiration, of this *rasa*. Sarasvatī gives freely to the *sahṛdaya* or *rasika*, as the earth gave her gifts freely to the calf Himālaya. Yogis, on the other hand, must withdraw their mind and senses from all objects in order to force their way to their goal. For passages from the *ABh* bearing on the comparison of aesthetic and mystic bliss see *Aesthetic Rapture* Vol. II, p. 45 (note 263). 4. *Kum.* 1.2. The stanza furnishes the mythic explanation, drawn from the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, of how the Himālaya came to be the possessor of jewels and of the herbs to cure all diseases. 5. An extraordinary statement for Abhinava to quote with approval in view of the careful distinction which he makes elsewhere between the emotions of the hero and the aesthetic relish of the poet and audience. Of course the only point of the quotation here is to show a similarity of experience between poet and audience because of Sarasvatī's gift of *rasa*. If only we could take *nāyakasya* as an objective genitive, all would be well; the poet's and the audience's experience of the hero is the same. 6. This definition is close to Bhāṭṭatauta's: "an intelligence which keeps blooming with ever new things is called genius" (*projñā navānavonmeśādālinī prutibhā matā*); see *Sāntarasa*, p. 18. 7. *BhNS* 7.2; it forms part of a verse explaining the etymology of *bhāva*. The *bhāvas* (the word is used in a very broad sense to include the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, and *vyabhicāribhāvas* as well as the *bhāvas* proper, all of which are to be described in *BhNS* 7) are so called because they transmit (*bhāvayat*) to the audience the inner state (*bhāva*) of the poet. Here Abhinava takes the words to substantiate the statement of 1.6 that the words of great poets reveal their genius. The phrase is quoted again 3.41-42 a L.

A Here is another proof of the existence of a suggested meaning:

L Here is: It is not only, as indicated in 1.4 K when it spoke of the suggested as something different, that literal and suggested sense may differ in nature and in the person to whom they are directed. There is proof that the suggested sense differs from the literal in that that it is understood through a wholly different set of causes.

K It is not understood by the mere knowledge of grammar and dictionaries.¹ It is understood only by those who know the true nature of poetic meaning.

1. *sabdārthaśāsana*: We take *sabdāśāsana* to equal *sabdānusāsana*, as in the beginning of the *Mahābhāṣya*; *arthaśāsana* will then be the teaching imparted by dictionaries.

A Because this [suggested] sense is understood only by those who know the nature of poetic meaning. If this meaning were denotative, one would get to it by a knowledge of literal, denotative meanings and the words that convey them. But this meaning is beyond the range of those who have taken pains only on the definitions of words and who have paid no attention to the study of poetic meaning, just as the character of the notes (*svaras*) and *śruti*s, etc., is beyond the range of those who know the definitions of music but are not good singers.¹

1. Text and meaning are doubtful. The reading *iva pragitāndm* ("just as ... of good singers") is found in the *KM* ed. and in the three MSS on which it is based. All other MSS seem to read *iudpragitāndm* ("just as ... of not good singers"). The *Locana* says nothing of the negative, although the commentaries on the *Locana* infer or supply its presence: Kuppusvāmī Śāstri ad *Keumudī* pp. 173–174, *BP* p. 95, and, most ingenious of all, Pāṭhbak (Vidyā-bhavana ed., foot of p. 95), who supposes that the *Locana*'s two explanations are furnished the one to fit *aprāgīta*, the other to fit *pragīta*. Despite all this ingenuity it is unparalleled for Abhinava to gloss the second half of a - negative compound without mentioning the negative. Jacobi, who had only the *KM* ed. to work with, translated the passage: "wie solchen, welche nur die Theorie der Musik kennen, die individuelle ganze und Zwischentöne guter Sänger unkennbar sind." This destroys the parallelism of the sentence. We have chosen the reading with the negative and a translation essentially the same as Krishnamoorthy's. If one accepts this reading of the text, one will explain the passage as follows. Most would-be poets know only the literal meanings of words; only a few, like Kālidāsa, are capable of using words in their full suggestive meanings. In this respect they are like singers. Those

who know merely the definitions of the books on music, if they are not good singers, are incapable of producing the notes and śruti-s of the various melodies (*grāmas*; cf. 1.7 L below). I owe this explanation to Dr. Gary Tubb.

L Is understood: it is not [to be left as] not understood, by which [one might suppose] it does not exist. That is his intention.

Who have paid no attention to the study, that is, to a repeated reflection on matters other than the literal, of the meaning which is the nature of poetry.

The notes: of these there are seven, beginning with the tonic (*sadja*). A śruti is a change [of pitch] of such size as to make any alteration of a note. There are twenty-two of these śruti-s, formed of the notes, note-intervals, or both.¹ By the word "etc." he would include the [*grāmas* or melody types] such as the *jātyamśaka*, *grāmarāga*, *bhāṣā*, *vibhāṣā*, *antarabhāṣā*, *désī*, and *mārga*.²

Good singers (*pragitāḥ*): Those of whom the singing is good are called *pragitāḥ*. Or, those who have begun to sing are *pragitāḥ*, the past passive participle suffix being used in the sense of beginning an action (Pāṇ. 3.4.71). By the beginning is here indicated everything up to the final result.

1. [Note furnished by Dr. Gary Tubb.] What Abhinava is referring to is the classical system of twenty-two śruti-s, described by Nijenhuis, p. 10, as "micro-intervals used to describe interval arrangements" and by Capwell, p. 780, as "modally diagnostic microtones." It is by the śruti-s, the minimum units of measure of pitch interval, that the basic notes (*svara*) of a melody type are defined. If any of the notes associated with the melody type is given a new assignment differing in pitch by a single śruti, the type will fall under a different designation.
2. [Dr. Tubb] *Jātyamśaka* is a term found frequently in *BHNS* (chapters 28-33 in the *GOS* edition), while the other terms are discussed in Matanga's *Brhaddesi*, from which Abhinava most likely took them. Part Three of the *Brhaddesi* discusses the *grāmarāgas*. *Bhāṣā*, *vibhāṣā*, and *antarabhāṣā* (so-called because these melodies were used in dialect songs) are discussed in Part Four. It is of interest to note that the *Brhaddesi* (p. 105 in Śāmbāsiva Śāstri's edition, near the beginning of Part Four) uses the term *pragita* exactly as Ānanda and Abhinava have used it: *prakāśam na ca laksyate yatnahinaiś tu gāyataiḥ / pragitāḥ tu prasiddhyanti susuvarāṇām viśeṣataḥ*. "[The melody type called *bhāṣā*] is not manifested clearly by singers who have not practised hard. Good singers, however, succeed, especially those of perfect pitch."

A Having thus proven the existence of a suggested meaning which differs from the direct meaning, he goes on to show the greater importance of the suggested:

L Thus: that is, he has proven it by the difference in the nature and person addressed of the suggested and by the fact that it is apprehended through a different complex of causes.

K This meaning and whatever particular word has the capability of conveying it are the meaning and the word which should be carefully scrutinized (or recognized, *pratyabhijñeyau*) by a great poet.¹

1. Jacobi has taken *mahākaveḥ* as possessive genitive. One will then supply some such word as *sahṛdayaḥ* with *pratyabhijñeyau*. But the *Vṛtti* by rearranging the word order seems to take *mahākaveḥ* as subjective genitive (Pāg. 2.3.71) and Abhinava takes it definitely in that sense.

A The suggested meaning and the particular word that has the capability of conveying it, not just any word: this word and meaning should be scrutinized (or recognized) by a great poet. It is by the proper use of the suggested sense and the word that suggests it that a great poet deserves his name, not by mere structuring of the denoting word and the denoting meaning.

L Should be scrutinized (or recognized): the gerundive *su* *x* is here used in the sense of "should,"¹ for the fact that everyone strives

in this way [viz., for the suggested word and meaning] in itself furnishes proof that they are well known to be more important [than the denotative word and sense]. And by the suffix's use in this mandatory sense he indicates that this [seeking out of the suggestive word and sense] forms part of [a poet's] education. By using the word *pratyabhijñeyau* he would indicate that although poetry may flash forth (*parishphurati*) of its own accord in the way described [by Bhāmaha 1.5], "Poetry comes to the man of genius, and at that only sometimes;" still, it increases in a thousand ways if that man will keep considering his poem carefully, thinking, "this should be like this," i.e., "I should say such and such, not such and such." in this way always seeking the suggestive word and sense.² The matter was put as follows by my teacher's teacher, the renowned Utpala:

As some lover brought by many prayers
to a lady's side, only to find
that she does not recognize him when he is come
and so all hope of making love to her is gone;
just so is God, although he be
our very soul, misprised within us
and cannot share with us his glory.
Therefore I have written this book
called "Recognition."³

One sees from this that *pratyabhijñā* (recognition, scrutiny) is a careful inspection of and continuous reflection upon an object although that object is already [in some sense] known. This is what is meant by *pratyabhijñā* and not the mere recognition that consists in noting that "this is the same thing I saw before."

A great poet: One hopes that one also may be a great poet.⁴

By his speaking thus of the importance of the suggestive word and the suggested meaning he has implied an importance also of the relation between the suggestor and the suggested. Thus he has shown that the three [senses of *dhvani*] will fit: that which suggests, that which is suggested, and the operation of suggesting.⁵

1. More literally, "in the sense of the worthiness or desert of the subject" Pān. 3.3.169. The suggested word and its meaning deserve to be scrutinized.
2. The contrast of effort and genius (inspiration, imagination) in the making of poetry is noticed in *Āriguttara Nikāya* 4.230 and Dandin, KA 1.103. See also J. L. Masson, "Imagination vs. Effort," JIP 1.
3. The book is Utpala's *īśvarapratyabhijñā*, "Recognition of God," where this stanza occurs at 4.1.17

(p. 313 of the *Bhāskarī* Vol. 2). It is also found in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñānavṛtti-vimarsini* 4.4.2 (Vol. 3, p. 403). The lady, presumably, has sent a go-between to the potential lover, whose reputation she had heard of. He then steals to her garden some night only to find that she mistakes him for a stranger and will not come forth or allow him to enter. This simile of God's lying unrecognized within us suggests to Abhinava another simile. Just as God, if unrecognized within us, cannot impart to us his glory, just so our poetic genius, if we do not recognize or scrutinize it—and he goes on to give a very special sense to this term—cannot produce the great poetry of which it is capable. 4. Thus the study of the suggestive word and its meaning will form part of the education of every poet. 5. These are the first three senses that we listed in 1.1 K, note 1.

A Now, although a correct choice of suggested meaning and suggestive word is more important, it is right that poets should first turn their attention to the correct choice of denoted meaning and denoted word.

L The author anticipates that an inference might be drawn of the greater importance of the denotative word, meaning, and operation from the fact of their being taken up first for consideration.¹ So he shows, with now, etc., that as a reason (or middle term) this [fact of being taken up first] is contradictory to what is here sought to be proved, viz., greater importance, for he takes the view that it is the means that are first taken up, [not the all important goal].

1. The inference would appear as: *pradhānā vācyavācakatadbhāvāḥ prathamopādiyamānatvāt*. But here *prathamopādiyamānatva* is a *viruddha hetuḥ* because *pradhānavastuṣu prathamopādiyamānatvābhava eva*.

§ 1.10 *K*]

K Just as a man who wishes to see will take pains with the flame of the lamp as a means thereto, just so will a man who cares for this [suggested meaning] take pains [first] with the denoted sense.

A For just as a man, although the object of his wish is to see, ill take pains with the flame of the lamp as a means thereto, for it is impossible to see without the flame of the lamp, just so will a man who cares for the suggested meaning take pains with the denoted sense.

So far the author has described the communicating poet's engagement with the suggested meaning. In order to describe the engagement of the recipient audience he goes on to say:

L To see: seeing. The reference is to seeing such things as the lotus-like face of one's beloved, and for that the flame of the lamp is a means.

K Just as the sentence-meaning is apprehended through the meaning of the words, just so is the apprehending of this matter preceded by the denoted sense.'

1. This analogy is later qualified by Ānanda (3.33f A). It is intended merely to show that the denoted sense is a means, and occurs at a time previous, to the suggested sense. In other respects the relation of word meaning to sentence meaning differs from the relation of denoted sense to suggested sense.

A For just as the sentence meaning is understood through the meaning of the words, just so is the understanding of the suggested meaning preceded by an understanding of the denoted sense.

L [Comment on the Kārikā.]

The word *pratipat* (apprehending) contains the null-suffix *kṛip* used to form an action noun (*Vārt.* 9 on *Pāṇ.* 3.3.108). Of this matter: viz., of the essential, that is, the suggested meaning.

This verse shows¹ that the sequence [of meanings, as first denoted and then suggested,] is clearly noticed only by those who are not sensitive to poetry, just as the sequence word meaning, sentence meaning, is noticed only by one who is not knowledgeable in the use of words. On the other hand, to one whose sensitivity is at a maximum, just as to one who is really skilled in the use of words, the sequence, although it exists in fact, is not noticed any more than one is aware of one's memory of the concomitance in an inference that has been frequently repeated.²

1. The words *anena slokena* construe with *iti darsītam* at the end of the comment. 2. When we see smoke, we infer fire without being aware of remembering the rule "wherever there is smoke there is fire."

A Now the author shows that the greater importance of the suggested meaning is not impugned by the fact that it is apprehended after the apprehension of the denoted meaning.

L Is not impugned: Since persons [of training or sensitivity] hasten with eagerness toward the end [viz., the sentence meaning or suggested meaning] because of its importance, and do not pause with pleasure along the way, they fail to notice a succession of meanings although it actually exists. This failure is thus a proof of the importance [of the final meaning].

K Just as the meaning of an individual word, by force of its capability, acts toward conveying the sentence meaning, but is no longer distinguished after its activity is completed

A Just as the meaning of an individual word, by force of its capability, acts toward revealing the sentence meaning, but is no longer distinguished apart [from the sentence meaning] after its activity is completed ...

, **L** Capability: The capability of a word is its *ākārīkṣā* (the 'expectancy' of its meaning's being completed by other words in the sentence), *yogyatā* (its compatibility with those other words), and *sannidhi* (its contiguity to those other words). Distinguished (*vibhāvate*): The prefix of the word denotes separation; the sense is "is not noticed as being separate." This states that the succession [of sentence meaning to word meaning], although it exists, is not noticed. In contradiction with this statement is what the grammarians say, speaking according to the theory of *sphoṭa*, namely that the succession does not exist.¹

1. The view of Bhartṛhari is that the sentence as a semantic symbol (*sphoṭa*) has no parts; it is only the sentence which we hear that has parts. See *Vākyapadiya* 1.73 *vākyat padāndm atyantam praviveko na kaścana.*

K just so does the suggested sense flash forth in an instant in the minds of intelligent auditors who are averse to the literal sense and in quest of the real meaning.

L Who are averse to the literal sense: whose selves or hearts find in the literal sense no satisfaction that could arise from dwelling on it. This brings out the force of the word *sacetasām* ("intelligent," but literally, "possessing a mind or heart"). One might suppose that this [rapid appearance of the suggestion] lies in the brilliance of sensitive auditors and [reflects] no special excellence of the poem. So he says: flashes forth. Because of this [rapid scintillation] the literal sense does not appear as something separate, but this does not mean that it does not appear at all. So there is no contradiction of this passage with that in Chapter Three [3.33f A] where he will state that our apprehension of the literal does not disappear when we apprehend the suggested sense, any more than the lamp disappears when [by its light] we perceive the pot.

A Having thus shown the existence (*sadbhāva*) of the suggested meaning as distinct from the literal, he puts it to use in the matter at issue.

L Existence: the word *sadbhāva* has [also] the meanings of excellence and predominance, both of which he wishes to convey. Puts to use: gives one to understand its use.¹ In the matter at issue: viz., in the definition [of dhvani].

1. What *A* and *L* mean is that the use of proving the existence of dhvani is that only then can one proceed to define it.

K The type of poetry which the wise call *dhvani*¹ is that in which sense or word, subordinating their own meaning, suggest that [suggested] meaning.

1. See 1.1 *K*, note 1. *Dhvani* is here used in the fifth of the senses there listed, viz., of a type of poetry. But this sense is not sharply distinguished from the fourth sense, viz., the suggested meaning. The *Vṛtti* on this verse slides very easily from the one sense to the other.

A The type of poetry which the wise call *dhvani* is that in which sense, viz., a particular literal sense, or word, viz., a particular denotative word, suggests that meaning.

L [Abhinava here comments only on the *Kārikā*. The *Vṛtti* is so similar as to need no separate comment.] That meaning: here he puts [the proven existence of the suggested meaning] to use.¹ [The compound *upasaranikṛtasvārthau* ("subordinating their own meaning") is to be analysed as follows:²] *sva* = self; *svārthau* = self and meaning; *upasaranikṛtasvārthau* = subordinating itself and its meaning. Here we must pair off the terms in order, viz., the meaning subordinates itself and the word subordinates its meaning. That meaning: viz., the meaning that he has already referred to in speaking of "Sarasvatī, pouring forth this sweet matter" (1.6 *K*).

Suggest: i.e., indicate. Here he uses the dual form, [rather than the singular], for while it is true that in the *avirakṣitavācya* type of *dhvani* a word is the suggestor,³ the cooperation of its [literal] meaning cannot be wholly dispensed with; otherwise, a word of whose meaning we are ignorant might be a suggestor. And in the *viuakṣitānyāparavācya* type⁴ there must be the cooperation of words, because the meaning [which is there predominant] could not be suggested if the denoted sense were not furnished by a word or words. Accordingly, the operation of suggestion always belongs to both word and meaning. So when Bhaṭṭanāyaka

criticizes the dual here, he is overlooking the obvious facts.⁵ But [we must remember that] in stating the alternative "word or sense" our author means [to include the notion of] predominance.⁶

The type of poetry: One may analyse the compound (*kāvyausīṣeṣa*) as a *karmadhāraya* or as a genitive *tatpurusa*.⁷ By using the word "poetry" he shows that that soul which has been characterized as *dhvani* falls in the area of words and meanings embellished by the poetic qualities and figures of speech, so that there is no occasion for applying the word *dhvani* to the "material inference" (*arthāpatti*) [of the *Mimāṃsā*.⁸

As for what has been said that "then the apprehension of beauty (*cārūtvapratiti*) will be the soul of poetry," we are quite willing to accept it. The only dispute is about a name [viz., whether to call the soul of poetry *cārūtvapratiti* or *dhvani*]. But when it is said that "If the soul of poetry is [nothing more than] the apprehension of beauty, the soul of poetry could arise from any means of cognition, such as visual perception and the like," we reply that the statement is nonsense. The context is an effort to define the soul of poetry, which is an entity consisting of words and meanings. How would there be any occasion [for bringing in visual perception]?

[The five meanings of *dhvani*]

That in which: we may consider the reference to be to the sense, or the word, or to the operation [of word and sense]. And the sense may be either the literal sense, for it suggests (*dhvanati*), as does the word, or the suggested sense, for it is suggested (*dhvanyate*), [while] the operation is an alternative [because it is] the suggesting (*dhvanana*) of word and sense. But the *Kārikā* would convey by the word *dhvani* primarily the sum total of these elements in the form of poetry.⁹

1. The pronoun "that" (in "that meaning") can refer to the suggested meaning because he has already established the existence of such a meaning.
2. The reason for Abhinava's odd analysis of the compound is that if we take it naturally, the element *ortho* is meaningless: *upasṛjanikṛtasvā* would have been sufficient.
3. In that type of *dhvani* "where the literal meaning is *ūṇi*" intended," what is important is the word. For example, in *gangāydm ghoṣah*, "a village on the bank of the Ganges," if we were to substitute the name of another river, the suggestion of holiness, etc., would disappear.
4. Many examples of this type, "where the literal meaning is intended but is subordinated to a second meaning," will be given in what follows. It includes all cases of *rasadhvani*. This whole paragraph of the *Locana* is quoted and subjected

to criticism by Mahimabhaṭṭa in his *Vyaktiviveka*, p. 91. 5. *Gajanimilikā*: literally, blinking at an elephant. The expression is used in *Rāj.Tar.* 6.73, and frequently in modern Sanskrit (e.g., Abbyankar's commentary on *SDS*, pp. 52, 86). *BP* gives an incorrect explanation, confusing the term with *gajasnāna*. 6. By adding this sentence Abhinava justifies the use of the dual inflection. If the author had intended to speak of either word or sense acting as sole agent, he should have used the singular. But his intention was to speak of word and sense cooperating to suggest, with either word being predominant or sense being predominant. His intention therefore required the use of the dual. 7. *BP* explains the difference of meaning effected by these analyses as follows. In *kāvyam ca tad vīśeṣam cāsau* it takes *vīśeṣa* in its normal sense (*vi + sīg + ghanī*, Pāṇ. 3.3.19), where the suffix gives the root passive sense: it is poetry and it is that which is distinguished [from *sāstra*, etc.]. One should then translate from the *Kārikā*: "Poetry as a distinctive type of literature is called *dhvani* by the wise." In the *tatpuruṣa* analysis *BP* seems to take *vīśeṣa* as formed with the *upapada* suffix *an* (Pāṇ. 3.2.1), for it takes the verbal root in an active sense. One should then translate: "The distinguisher of poetry (namely, the soul, suggestion) is called *dhvani* by the wise." Neither of these analyses would permit a sentence lacking in *dhvani* to be called poetry. On the other hand, I prefer to take the compound as *tatpuruṣa* but to give *vīśeṣa* its normal sense, as formed by *ghanī*: "That type, as distinguished from other types, of poetry is called *dhvani*" This is because I suppose that Ānanda would have considered poetry even not of the best to be still poetry. 8. See 1.4g *L*, note 21. 9. It may be found useful to memorize *BP*'s convenient summary of the five meanings: *tathā ca tathāvidhah śabda-vācya-vyanigrahyā-vyanjana-samudāyātmakah kāvyavīśeso dhvanir iti kathitah*. For an English rendering, see 1.1 *K*, note 1.

A This shows that the habitat of *dhvani* is different from that of causes of beauty in the denotative sense and word, such as simile and alliteration.¹

The objection that "there is no such thing as *dhvani* because what falls outside our well known system would no longer be poetry" (1.1 b *A*) is unjust, for it is only to the makers of definitions [of poetry] that *dhvani* is not well known. When poetry itself is examined, one finds that *dhvani* is the poetic essence that delights the heart of the sensitive

ience. Whatever differs from it is mere *citra* (display),² as we shall in what follows.

1. "Such as simile" stands for all the figures of meaning; "such as alliteration" for all the figures of sound. 2. *Citra*: lit., a bright picture, but in the technical sense, a display of mastery in poetic figures and meters. *Citra* verses are discussed in 3.41-42.

L Is different: *dhvani* cannot be included in them because the life of poetic qualities and figures lies in the nature of word and literal sense, whereas the essence of *dhvani* lies in the nature of the suggestor and the suggested, which are different from that. The word habitat (*viṣaya*) shows that it exists in no other place. In this way the depreciation is silenced that took the form of "What is this thing called *dhvani* that it should differ from these?" (1.1 a A).

The makers of definitions: [In inferring the non-existence of *dhvani*] its being not well known to the makers of definitions is a reason contradictory to what is sought to be proved (*viruddho hetuh*).¹ In fact this is all the more reason for trying to frame a definition. On the other hand, its not being well known in the poetry itself would be a "falsely assigned reason" (*asiddho hetuh*).² And the suggestion that it might be something like dancing and singing (cf. 1.1 b *L*) [is nonsense because that] would have nothing to do with poetry.

Citra: it is called "display" because its use of meters and other [embellishments] causes admiration, while it lacks the exudation of that nectar of true beauty that is sought by the sensitive audience. Or it may be called *citra* in that word's sense of "picture," as an imitation of poetry, or because it is a mere written design,³ or because it is simply one of the arts.⁴

In what follows: .., in Chapter Three [verse 41, which Abhinava here quotes].

1. Cf. 1.9 Intro. *L* and note 1. 2. Cf. 1.2 *L*, note 2. 3. This would apply to the topiary verses, e.g., verses composed in the shape of a sword or lotus, with which the Indians, like the ancient Greeks, amused themselves. 4. The last suggestion is not quite clear to me. Perhaps Abhinava feels that any of the sixty-four arts may be called *citra* in the sense of bright, interesting, amusing.

A The objection is also wrong which said that "Dhvani cannot be something entirely new because, being something that falls within the area of beauty, it must be included in the types of figures of speech, etc., which have been recorded" (cf. 1.1c A). For how can dhvani, which is found to occur always in dependence on suggestive word and suggested meaning, be included in a system that depends on only the literal word and meaning? Furthermore, the causes of beauty in the literal word and meaning are subordinate to it whereas it is principal to them, as will be shown in what follows. The following couplet will give support (*parikara*) [to our position]: "As dhvani depends on the relation of the suggestor and the suggested, how can it be included in the causes of beauty belonging to the denoter and the denoted?"

L A supportive couplet is a verse (*sloka*) intended to supplement the *Kārikās* in order to fortify (*parikara*) their argument.

A Now an opponent of *dhvani* may allow that [a figure of speech] where a suggested meaning is not clearly apprehended falls outside the habitat of *dhvani*. But where it is perceived, as it is in such figures as *samāsokti*, *ākṣepa*, the type of *vīśeṣokti* where the reason is not given, *paryāyokta*, *apahnuti*, *dipaka*, *sankara*, and the like,⁴ he will say that *dhvani* must be included. It is in order to refute such a suggestion that it was specified [by the *Kārikā*] that "word and sense subordinate themselves." It is where a sense by subordinating itself, or a word by subordinating its literal sense, reveals another [suggested] meaning, that we have *dhvani*. That is to say, since *dhvani* is found only where the suggested meaning is predominant, which it is not in *samāsokti* and the like, how can it be included in them?

1. For these figures of speech see the Index.

L Where: viz., in a figure of speech. Clearly: he means both with beauty and clarity. Specified: The *Vṛtti* uses the past tense because it has already dealt with the word "suggest" [in 1.13 b].¹ Subordinating itself: the *Vṛtti* explains the sense of *sua* ("own") of the *Kārikā* by *ātman* ("itself"). Which it is not: this predominance of the suggested sense is not. That is to say, its predominance does not appear as we are understanding the verse, because we spend our enjoyment in an unbroken relishing [of both literal and suggested meanings] on the principle of [what was said in 1.12 K]: "in the minds of those in whom the real [meaning] appears."² But [in a second stage], when a man of discrimination seeks the enlivening element, since it is the suggested meaning that gives life to the literal, he will decide that he is presented with a figure of speech, because the suggested is helping out that [literal sense]. And so he will say that he received his delight from the literal meaning as helped out by that [suggestion]. Although in a final [third] stage, there is indeed *rasadhvani*, nevertheless this suggested meaning in the second stage does not point to *rasa*; for its own part it simply hastens to ornament the literal meaning. And so the *Vṛtti* speaks of the suggested meaning as being subordinated.³

1. The usual word for the *Vṛtti* to use in such references is *dha*, which the Pāṇinians take to be a present tense (Pāṇ. 3.4.84). Abhinava feels that he must give a reason why *abhibhātam*, a past tense, is here substituted. His reason is that the *Vṛttikāra* has already explained the word *vyaniktaḥ*, which occurs in the second half of the *Kārikā*. He now turns back to explain *upasarjanī-kṛtasudṛthau*, which occurred in the first half of the verse. So in referring back to it he uses a past tense. 2. Abhinava is quoting from memory. The *Kārikā* actually used the word *tattvārthadarsīnyām*, not *tattvudbhāsīnyām*. 3. The complication of Abhinava's thought in this passage is caused, it seems to me, by the fact that he is trying to reconcile matters that are irreconcilable. There is no doubt that the figure *samāsakti* involves suggestion, as the example about to be quoted in 1.13d A will show. The old poeticians were aware of this fact and defined this sort of suggestion within their system of figures of speech. Ānanda, seeking to make suggestion into a wholly new semantic category but unwilling to defy the definitions of the past, abandoned the group of suggestions that had already been categorized by the older writers under the figures of speech and tried to find an area where suggestion could form its own independent species. To do this he invented the distinction between predominant and subordinate suggestion. Where it was predominant it could form its

own species. All the cases of suggestion contained in the old, defined, figures of speech could be left out as instances of subordinate suggestion. See Introduction, pp. 22-24. There would still be room for an important new species: predominant suggestion. The only trouble with the innovation is that many of the old type, many instances of *samāsokti*, *ākṣepa*, etc., move us as deeply, both emotionally and aesthetically, as any new examples which he can adduce. How can one explain this fact, if true *dhvani* exists only where it is predominant? So Abhinava, like Ptolemy inventing new pericycles to rectify a system that is basically wrong, invents still another distinction: the three stages in our response to these long-recognized instances of *dhvani*. In the first stage we respond automatically without distinguishing what is predominant and what is subordinate. In the second stage we realize upon reflection that the suggestion is helping out a defined figure of speech. Finally in a third stage we relish the *rasadhvani* despite our intellectual decision that it does not belong in the same category as that which is produced by a predominant suggestion.

A Let us begin with the figure *samāsokti* (compound statement):

The reddening moon has so seized the face of night
 with her trembling stars,
 that all her cloak of darkness in the east
 falls thus unnoticed by her in confusion.¹

In this, as in similar verses, the literal meaning, although it is accompanied by a suggestion, is apprehended as the more important, for the main purport of the sentence concerns the moon and the night,² on which have been superimposed the behaviors of a lover and his lady.

1. In *pāda* d I have taken the reading of the oldest version, *mohād*, in place of *rāgād*, which avoids the awkward repetition of *rāga*. The words of the stanza have double meanings, which are immediately brought to our attention by the obvious pun in *rāga*: redness, or love, and by the masculine gender of the word for moon in contrast with the feminine gender of the word for night. Proceeding from these hints, the mind soon finds a suggested meaning for

each word (see Abhinava's comment below). The suggested meanings, when combined, furnish a sense as follows: "The lover, with aroused passion, kisses the face of his beloved, whose eyes (*tārakā* = 'pupil' as well as 'star') tremble, so that she drops her robe entirely before him (*puraḥ* = 'in front of' as well as 'in the east') without noticing what she has done in her confusion." The traditional interpretation of such verses insists on keeping the two versions distinct, allowing one message to suggest the other, but refusing to mix the images. Masson writes: "When I attempted to mix the two, speaking of the moon kissing the face of the night, which is after all rather poetic, Pandit Srinivasa Shastri of the Deccan College looked astonished: "Katham s' i ceta navastuvan nisām cumber nanu? Tathā nāsti, sarvathā asambhavam." The verse is quoted in most of the anthologies, usually without variant, and invariably attributed to the poet Pāṇini, for whom see Peterson, *JRAS* 1891, pp. 313-316. Thus it is in Śāṅgī 3634, SūktiM. 72.5, Sodukti. 412 (where we find the better reading *mohād* in d). The first word and last quarter of the stanza are preserved among the fragments edited by Gnoli of Udbhaṭa's Commentary on the Kāvyālankāra of Bhāmaha, fragment 37, pp. 34-35, where the reading of d appears as *puro 'pi mohād galitam na ratṣitam*. The word *mohād* has been changed in the later versions, presumably because of the difficulty of finding a pun in it. 2. It is context which tells us which of the two possible meanings is the main purport (*vākyārtha*). Even without other verses which may once have accompanied it, we may be sure that the context of the present stanza is a description of moonrise, that being one of the favorite topoi of Sanskrit poetry. The lover and his beloved are a secondary suggestion.

L Samāsokti:

Where in a statement a second meaning is understood because of epithets common [to both meanings]: the wise call that *samāsokti*, because the meaning is composite. (Bhāmaha 2.79)

In the four quarters of this verse the author has given successively the basic characterization of *samāsokti*, the reason for it, its name, and the explanation of the name.

Reddening (literally, possessing redness): [in the case of the moon this means] assuming the red color of twilight; and [in the case of a lover it means] assuming the feelings of love. With trembling *tārakā*: in which the lights of heaven are trembling and in which a portion of the eye is trembling. So: i.e., suddenly [of the moon] and with a rush of love [of the lover]. Seized: illuminated [of the moon with respect to the night] and seized in order to kiss [of the lover with respect to his beloved]. The face of night: the beginning [of the night] and the lotus

face [of the woman]. Thus: suddenly [of the night] and with a rush of love [of the woman]. Cloak of darkness: Of the night *timirāṁsukam* means *timirām* (darkness) and *sūkṣmāṁśavah* (feeble rays),¹ i.e., her mass of darkness spangled with a few rays [of the stars]; of the beloved *timirāṁsuka* means the dark veil appropriate to a newly wed bride who is shy.² [In place of *mohād* (in confusion) Abhinava reads *rāgād*, which he explains as follows:] *Rāgād* [in the case of the night] means "from redness," that is, immediately following the redness produced by twilight;³ and [in the case of the woman] it means "from love," that is, because of love. In the east [in connection with night] and [in connection with the woman] in front of her. Fallen: vanished in the one case and fallen in the other. By her: by the night as instrument (Pāṇ. 2.3.18) the mass of darkness is spangled [with starlight], or we may take the pronoun to be an instrumental of identification (Pāṇ. 2.3.21).⁴ Unnoticed: it was not realized that this was the beginning of night, for people recognize the face, or beginning, of night when they see a mass of darkness spangled with starlight, but not when a clear light [as of the moon] is present. In the case of the woman, on the other hand, "by her" will be an instrumental of agent ["unnoticed by her"]. In the case of the night the word *api* [in *puro 'pi* = even in front of her] must be transposed to follow *upalakṣitam* [i.e., "was not even noticed by people"]. And here [in the case of the woman] the veil falls, or drops, in front, as the lover coming from behind begins to kiss her. Or, we may take the syntax to be that the lover [standing] in front seizes her face.

So although we understand a suggested sense in this stanza, it is not predominant. That is to say, the [superimposed] behavior of lover and beloved in ornamenting the moon and night, which thus take the form of *vibhāvas* of the erotic flavor, acts as an ornament or figure of speech. But then from the literal sense [of moon and night] which has been turned into a *vibhāva*, there issues forth a steam of *rasa*.

Here someone has said, "The word 'by her,' viz., by the night, expresses agency, and since agency is impossible on the part of an insentient being, the behavior of lovers which we infer is given by the denotative force of 'night' and 'moon' and not by a suggestion. That is why the stanza forms a compound utterance (*samāsokti*)."⁵ This expicator has ignored the clear sense of the text with which we are concerned, [for the *Vṛtti* has clearly said] "accompanied by a suggestion."⁶ At that rate the figure would be *ekadeśavivarti rūpakam* (a partial metaphor) like the couplet:

The pond kings were fanned
by autumn with her wild geese.

(Udbhaṭa, 1.*12 Indurāja = 1.24 Viṁśti)⁷

It would not be a *samāsokti* because it would not contain epithets that apply [in each instance] equally to both [the denoted and the suggested sense]. Furthermore, the denotative function is ruled out [in Bhāmaha's definition of *samāsokti* just quoted] by the phrase "is understood" [rather than "is stated"]. But let us not run on at too great length on a subordinate matter.

[Here it might be thought that Ānanda should have written *samāropitanāyaka-vyavahārayoḥ* rather than *samāropitanāyikā-nāyakayoḥ*.⁸ However,] there is no need for an *ekosēṣa* compound [viz., *nāyakayor*] if we explain the meaning to be that the behavior of a lady toward her lover is superimposed on night and the behavior of a lover toward his lady is superimposed on the moon.

1. He is taking the compound as a *duandva* rather than as a *karmadhāraya*. In *amṛuka* he is taking the suffix as the diminutive *-ka* (Pāṇ. 5.3.85) appended to the stem *amṛu-*, "ray." 2. Abhinava's interpretation of the second meaning of *timirāmṛukam* seems to me as faulty as his explanation of the first. In his interpretation the word "all" (*somasita*) will have no force. Nor does the falling of a mere veil indicate much passion (*rāga*). What is in fact suggested is the falling of her entire garment. It is a commonplace of Classical Sanskrit poetry that the knot of the beloved's garment opens of itself and her dress falls as her lover embraces her; see *Meghadūta* 73, *Kumāra* 8.4, *Sīḍupūra* 10.45 and 50, *Kirāta* 9.47–48. 3. Abhinava takes the ablative inflection of *rāga* as denoting cause only in the suggested meaning, which concerns the woman. To explain the ablative in the first meaning concerning night, he supplies the word *anantaram*, "immediately after." This word governs an ablative on the analogy of Pāṇ. 2.3.29. 4. This is the usage found in such phrases as *api bhauṇ kamandalunā chātrot adrākṣit*. "Did you see the pupil with a water pitcher?" where "with a water pitcher" serves to identify the pupil who is intended. Here the mass of darkness spangled with stars that was "with the night," i.e., that characterized or identified the night, was not noticed. Both interpretations are wildly improbable. *Tayā* must be taken as instrumental of agent with *lakṣitam* in the case of the night as well as in the case of the woman. If it is objected that an insentient thing like night cannot "notice" anything (this difficulty doubtless led Abhinava to his interpretation), one may have recourse to the older reading *rakṣitam*.

5. The anonymous opponent holds that words have only one operation, *abhidhā* (denotation). When context forbids our taking the usual meaning of the word, we choose a second meaning. But the opponent refuses to call this second meaning *lakṣita*, any more than he will call it *vyavīgya*. As night cannot be supposed to "notice" anything, we are forced to take "night" to mean a woman, whereupon we shall take "moon" to mean a lover. These meanings are denotative, just as night and moon are denotative. It is because of the double denotations in the verse that the figure is called *samsaṅkti*. 6. This is a sure refutation if the explicator was commenting on the *Dhvanyāloka*. But if he was attacking it, the statement of the *Vṛtti* would carry no weight. 7. Chowrie-bearers fan kings and one can express ponds metaphorically as kings, but autumn does not perform the function of such intelligent beings as fan-bearers. The example is quoted again at 3.36 L. 8. If we take Ānanda's compound, as I have done, to mean "on which has been superimposed the behaviors of a lover and his lady," we make Ānanda guilty of disregarding Pāṇini 1.2.67, which states that in such cases the feminine component of the pair is dropped and the masculine component, as an *ekāśeṣa* compound, suffices for both. Abhinava exonerates Ānanda by giving the compound a meaning other than "the behaviors of a lover and his lady."

A In *ākṣepa* (a hint, often in the form of a denial) also, while it hints at a particular suggestion, the literal sense is charming. The literal sense¹ is known to be predominant from the very fact that [the figure] is called *ākṣepa*. Thus, it is the hint itself, in the form of a denial explicitly stated with a view to expressing some particular,² that forms the principal body of the poem, even though it hints at some particular suggestion. This is because the decision whether literal or suggested meaning is the more important depends on which is the more charming. An example is this couplet:

The sunset is flushed with red, the day goes ever before,
Ab, such is the way of fate that never the two shall meet.³

Although we apprehend a suggestion in this verse, it is this [literal sense] that holds the greater charm. So [we should take it that] the literal is intended to be predominant.

1. There is a problem of reading here. The *Kaumudi*, and presumably all but the two *KM* MSS which it mentions as being in disagreement, reads *vācyārtha* for *vākyārtha*. The *KM* edition, however, chose the reading *vākyārtha* from those two MSS and has been followed by all the printed editions. If one accepts that reading, one must understand the word as a locative and take the whole passage from *ākṣepa* 'pi to *jñāyate* as a single sentence: "In *ākṣepa* also, while it hints at a particular suggestion, the fact that the beauty of the literal sense is predominant is obvious from the force of the expression of the hint in the final or sentence meaning." This is awkward, to say the least. I prefer to read *vācyārtha*, which I take as a nominative, and to put a *danda* after *cārutvam*. The sense, as I have given it in the translation, is then clear and to the point. 2. In the phrase *vīśeṣābhidhānechchatā* one must not take *abhidhāna* too narrowly. *BP* glosses the word by *vyāngyabhūtavīśesapratipādayiṣayā*. 3. What is hinted at in this anonymous stanza is a pair of lovers who are prevented, by their parents or by social differences or by reasons of state, from ever uniting. Clearly Ānanda considered this couplet to be an example of *ākṣepa*. Other Ālaṅkārikas who quote the verse consider it to exemplify *samāsokti* or *vīśesokti* or *saṅkara*; see *KP* 9.382 (p. 526), *SD* 10.99 (Sanskrit p. 63 Kane), and the *Locana* in what follows. To explain this difference of judgment some historical remarks will be helpful. The word *ākṣepa* is post-epic. Whether its earliest meaning was "hint" or "denial" or "censure" I cannot say, for it bears all these senses in the later literature. As a technical name of a figure of speech it is defined by all the Ālaṅkārikas starting from Bhāmaha and Dandin. Usually it is defined as a denial (*prativedha*, *nivedha*) which hints at something unexpressed. The denial may be of a fact or of a word that has been spoken, or it may be mere reticence, the refusal to say something that would be painful. For examples, see Abhinava's comment below and 2.27 c A with note 2. Vāmana, however, has a definition of *ākṣepa* that differs from that of all other authors. The meaning of his laconic definition: *upamānākṣepas cākṣepah* is shown by his examples to be "Ākṣepa is the censure of, or hint of, a simile." His examples will be found quoted by Abhinava in his comment on this passage. It is the second half of the definition (hint of a simile) that Ānanda must have in mind here. Neither Vāmana nor Ānanda tells us how to distinguish this second type of *ākṣepa* from *samāsokti*, so we are left to speculate. Presumably *samāsokti* was allowed to be the more general figure, *ākṣepa* preempting to itself only those instances where the hint was specifically of a simile (*upamāna*).

L In *ākṣepa*: [The figure has been defined thus:]

The denial (or holding back) of an intended [statement] out of a wish to convey some special [suggestion] is *ākṣepa* (denial, hint, censure), which is of two types depending on whether the statement was about to be spoken or has been made. (The first half of this verse is Bhāmaha 2.68)¹

An example of the first type is this:

If in my longing
I should lose sight of you but for a moment
But I say no more.
Why say that which would pain you?

(Bhāmaha 2.69)

Here we have *ākṣepa* in the form of withholding the death that the lady was about to speak of. The words "But I say no more," while they suggest the statement "I will die," are themselves the cause of the beauty in the verse. So [we must say that] the *ākṣepa* (the hinting reticence) as embellished by what it hints at is the predominant element. An example of [the second type, where] a statement that has been made [is denied or censured] is a verse of mine:

"My dear traveler, what causes this sudden collapse?"
"What else can I do who have such thirst,
when the miserly road here hides its water?"
"Your thirst is mistimed, good sir, and misplaced.
Vent your anger on it. The glory and greatness
of the desert road are famous throughout the world."²

In this verse a servitor is present. His heart is torn by desire and he asks why he receives nothing from his lord. Some one puts him to a right way of thinking by this censure. Here it is the literal meaning, expressing distress at the lack of recompense from service with a bad master, being transformed by a censure in the form of a denial into the *vibhāva* indifference (*nirveda*) which is the basic emotion of the flavor of peace (*sāntarasa*), which gives beauty to the stanza.

Vāmana, in different fashion, defines *ākṣepa* as censure of the simile. It amounts to saying, "When this is present, of what account are you?" He gives an example:

When we have the fair clarity of her face,
who would care for the full-orbed moon;
or who would care for water-lily flowers
before the vast beauty of her eyes?
What price would you pay for the tender, lovely
opening of a leaf, when you see her lower lip?
Ah me! but God shows a stubborn zeal
for tautological creation.

(Vāmana 4.3.27.1)

In this stanza the simile, although it is suggested, merely serves the literal sense. The expressed censure, in its casting away [of the simile] with a "who would care for it?" is the source of all the charm.

Or again, *ākṣepa* [here simply hint, not censure] of the simile may be brought in by the inherent capability [of the literal sense], as in this example:

Lady Autumn beautifies the moon
although his face is made imperfect by its mark,
and bearing on her cloud a rainbow
like a wound left by a lover's nail,
has made the sun grow hot.

(*Vāmana*, ibid. vs. 2)³

In this stanza, although a simile is hinted at, namely a lover who is pained by jealousy, it serves only to beautify the literal meaning.

But the stanza [which Ānanda] here [quotes, viz., "The sunset is flushed with red," etc.] is really an instance of *samāsokti* [if one follows the normal definition, as of Bhāmaha].

So he says: "[depends on] which is the more charming," and apropos of this quotes a well-known example: The sunset is flushed with red. Note that he has not yet finished his consideration of *ākṣepa* and that it is as an example of *ākṣepa* that he quotes this *samāsokti* couplet.

Ah, but such is the way of fate: The [suggested] sense is that there is no union [of the lovers] because of some such obstacle as their subjection to their parents. This: i.e., the literal sense.

Realizing that the figure of speech here is *ākṣepa* according to Vāmana's definition and *samāsokti* according to Bhāmaha's, our author by joining the two figures has given this single example. Let it be an example of *samāsokti* or of *ākṣepa*, what does it matter to us? All that we are trying to demonstrate is that in figures of speech the suggested sense is always subordinate to the literal. This is how my teacher [Bhaṭṭatauta] explained the intention of the present passage.

1. This is the definition that most later authors have followed. It is unfortunate that several of the best Indian scholars have adopted the term "paraleipsis" as a translation, for that is quite a different figure both in form and intent. An example from the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* is: "I would speak of your vices, had I time. But I pass over them and over the fact that you often left the army without leave" (4.27). Here one neither denies a statement made nor suppresses a statement about to be made. Rather, one passes over a fact (this is the literal meaning of *paraleipsis*) lightly in order by minimizing

it to increase the effect of one's major charge. If one wants a Greek or Latin translation for Bhāmaha's first type of *ākṣepa*, the Greek would be *apostoiesis*, which the author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* calls *praecisio* (*ad Her.* 4.30) and Cicero calls *reticentia* (*de Or.* 3.538). 2. What the verse suggests is a conversation between courtiers in which the first complains that his service is not rewarded and the second censures his complaint. Accordingly, most Ālāṅkārikas would take the figure of speech here to be *aprastutaprasādīṣā*. But Abhinava is thinking of Bhāmaha's second type of *ākṣepa* and he is influenced by the sense of censure that Vāmana, whom he is about to quote, attributes to the name. We have here clearly a censure of what has been said. In general, when we can assign a figure of speech to either of two defined types, we should assign it to the narrower type; see 1.13e A, note 3, end. There is room for *aprastutaprasādīṣā* where an allegory suggests the matter in hand without a censure of what has been said. One may add that to a tenth-century Kashmiri the desert road was still famous as a road to wealth; compare the expeditions across the northern desert of King Lalitāditya recorded in *Rāj. Tar.* 4.172, 277 ff., and 337 ff. 3. The literal meaning describes the phenomena of autumn, when the moon appears at its loveliest (our "harvest moon") despite the dark birthmark (*kolaṇka*, our "man in the moon") on his face. In an Indian autumn, which comes directly after the cooling season of the monsoon, the sun again grows hot. Several of the words of the stanza are puns. *Prasādayanti*: making beautiful or granting favors to; *payodhara*: cloud or breast; *tapoh*: heat or pain. Hence the suggestion of a courtesan favoring a lover of bad character and so making her noble lover jealous.

A And as in *dīpaka*, *apahnuti*,¹ and the like, although we apprehend a simile as something suggested, we do not call these figures of speech by that name because the simile is not intended to be prominent, so the same applies here [viz., we do not call a figure of speech by the name of *dhvani* because the *dhvani* is not intended to be prominent].

1. These figures of speech are defined below in *L* and the notes thereon.

L Having thus provided an example of where [the literal] is intended to be predominant, he now gives an example, acceptable both to

his followers and his opponents, of how the name [of a figure of speech] derives from its predominant element: and as in, etc. [Although we apprehend] a simile: he means that we apprehend a relation of subject and image. By that name: viz., "simile." For example, in *dipaka*—of which the definition runs thus: "*Dipaka* is held to be three-fold, as it falls at the beginning, middle or end"¹ (*Bhāmaha* 2.25)—the beauty of the verse is occasioned by the operation of the *dipaka*, [not by the suggested simile,] as in this example:

A jewel placed against the whetstone,
 a victorious warrior wounded by the sword.
 the moon when left with its last digit
 a young woman thin from exercise of sex,
 an elephant in rut, a river
 drawn back from its lovely sandbanks in the autumn,
 and the rich who spend their wealth by giving to the poor:
 all these by lessening grow resplendent.

(*Bhartṛhari, Nītiś*. 11)

Apahnuti has been defined: "The denial of what one really accepts, if it contains to some extent a simile, is *apahnuti*" (*Bhāmaha* 3.21).² In this figure it is the denial itself that is charming, as in:

This is not the buzzing of a bee,
 busy in her drunken joy;
 it is the twanging of the string
 as Cupid pulls his bow.

(*Bhāmaha* 3.22)³

1. Bhāmaha's "definition" is in effect no definition at all. It merely divides the figure into three types. *Dipaka*, "the lamp," is so called because a single verb or property serves to illuminate more than one object. Among early authors *dipaka* is the same as the Graeco-Latin zeugma. *Mahābhārata* 2.52.21: *Dhṛitarāṣṭrena cāhūtaḥ kālaśya samayena ca*, "challenged by Dhṛitarāṣṭra and by the doom of fate." Ovid, *Met.* 7.133: *demisere metu vultumque animumque Pelasgi*, "the Greeks lowered their faces and spirits in fear." From the time of Udbhaṭa the definition was further particularized. Udbhaṭa (1.14 *Indurāja* = 1.28 *Viṁśi*) distinguished *dipaka* from *tulyayogitā* (originally quite a different figure, which had come to encroach on *dipaka*) by claiming that in *dipaka* the common verb or property must join the matter-in-hand (*pradhāna, prākaraṇita, prastuta*) with some extraneous matter (*gaṇa, aprākaraṇita, aprastuta*), whereas in *tulyayogitā* the combined items are all within the subject of discourse or all outside it. Thus, an example like the following, which *BhNS* 16.55 gives of *dipaka*, becomes an instance of *tulyayogitā*

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accordi to the new view: *sarāṁsi hamsaḥ kusumaiḥ ca vṛkṣaiḥ... tasmin na śūyāni sadā kriyante*, "In autumn lakes are ever filled with geese, the trees with flowers, etc." for all the objects joined by the verb are within the subject of discourse, autumn. Later authors usually follow Udbhaṭa's distinction. 2. The printed versions of Bhāmaha all have the reading *apahnutir abhiṣṭā ca*. If we take Abhinava's reading, we must use the technique of āvṛtti, that is, we must read *apahnutir* twice. One might best render *apahnuti* in English as "feigned denial." Its definition remains essentially the same in all Ālāṅkārikas except Dandin, whose view does not here concern us. 3. Note that there is an appropriateness to the simile based on sound. The bee is a sign of spring, when Cupid annually renews his archery.

A Also in that type of *vīśeṣokti* (here = cause without effect) where the reason is not expressed, as in such verses as

Although his friends have waked him,
although he answers, "yes,"
although his mind tells him to go, the traveler
does not uncurl his limbs.

(Bharśu)¹

we merely apprehend the suggestion from force of the context, but there arises no particular beauty from the apprehension; so the suggestion is not predominant.

1. The verse is by a once famous poet, whose odd name Bharśu appears also as Bharvu, Bhaśu, Bhatsu. A handful of his verses are preserved by the anthologists. What little is known of him may be found in V. Raghavan's *Bhoja's SP*, sec. ed., pp. 817-818. Bharśu served the Maukhari kings of Kanyakubja, was Bāna's teacher (see *Kādambarī*, Introductory verse 4), and accordingly belongs to the early seventh century. The verse here quoted is found in the anthologies (*Sārīg. 3932, Sūkti.M. 63.23, Subh. Ā. 1838*) under descriptions of winter, which shows that they followed the interpretation which Abhinava (see below) ascribes to Udbhaṭa, viz., that the unexpressed reason for the result not to occur is the fact that the traveler was cold. Abhinava's *Locana* is the earliest of our preserved texts to mention a more romantic interpretation.

L After considering *ākṣepa* in the above manner, he now speaks of the subject that immediately followed it in the order of his initial statement:¹ and in that type of *viseṣokti*. [The figure in general is thus defined:] "The praise of one quality in the absence of others, if made in order to reveal some excellence, is traditionally known as *viseṣokti*" (*Bhāmaha* 3.23).² An example is the following:

Alone the god of the flowered bow
conquers all three worlds,
whose body Śiva destroyed
but left him still his strength.

(*Bhāmaha* 3.24)

As the reason in this case [viz., the reason why incineration should not lead to impotence] is inconceivable, there is no suggestion [of a reason]. Even where the reason is explicitly stated, since the statement amounts to no more than giving the nature of the object, there is no question of a suggested sense. For example:

I give my praise to him
who like camphor grows stronger with burning,
against whom no man prevails,
the god of the flowered bow.

(*Bālarāmāyana* 3.11)³

Accordingly, our author passes over these two varieties and examines only a third type [as a possible case of a predominant suggested sense]: when the reason is not expressed.

[We merely apprehend] the suggestion: viz., according to Bhatṭodbhata,⁴ the discomfort caused by the cold, this being the reason [for the traveler's remaining curled up in his bedding]. Conformably with this interpretation, our author says, there arises no particular beauty here. Some men of taste have imagined a different reason here, namely that the traveler does not uncurl his limbs because he wishes to bring back sleep, thinking that a dream would be a quicker means of union with his beloved than setting forth [on his farther journey]. But the experts in figures of speech have not taken even that reason as a source of beauty here, but have taken the source of beauty to be the words "does not uncurl his limbs," which form part of the *viseṣokti* itself, as embellished by the suggested reason. Otherwise this would not be an example of *viseṣokti* at all.⁵ So our author here accommodates

both views by speaking generally [i.e., by not mentioning the precise nature of the suggested reason]. It should not be thought that the text is based exclusively on the view of Udbhaṭa.

1. In the initial list (1.13c A) *anuktanimittā viśeṣokti* followed directly on *ākṣepa*. The subject of *apahṇuts* and *dīpaka* has intervened merely for the sake of an example. Ānanda will come back to them again later in their proper sequence (1.13 h A). 2. The name *viśeṣokti* (statement of the excellence) finds its explanation in the old concept of the figure as seen here and in Dandin, where a *viśeṣokti* was a statement of deficiency in certain respects, made in order to give special prominence or praise to an excellence or efficiency in some other respect. Thus, Dandin's example (2.328): "He has a one-wheeled car, a crippled driver, an odd number of horses, and yet the sun in his glory travels the whole sky." But Udbhaṭa (5.4 *Indurāja* = 5.5 *Vivṛti*) changed the definition to "A statement that the result fails to arise when all the causal factors are present, if made from a desire to point out a [particular] excellence." He further divided the figure into two types, one where a reason is expressed for the failure of the result to occur, the other where it is not expressed. Later writers all follow Udbhaṭa. In Bhāmaha's definition, here quoted, *samsṛuti* has its natural meaning "praise," not the watered-down meaning of "mention" by which it is glossed by commentators seeking to broaden the definition. 3. The reason why Kāma remains strong despite his incineration is here stated: because he grew stronger with being burned, as does camphor. We remain with a literal description of Kāma's nature. Liquified camphor gains not only in scent but in refrigerating power, a fact that is again used as a simile in *Naisadhiya* 7.25. 4. Presumably Udbhaṭa quoted the verse in his commentary on Bhāmaha. It is not found in his *Kāvyālankārasaṅgraha*. 5. Obviously, if the suggestion were the chief cause of beauty, we should cease to have a figure of speech; we should have *dhvani* instead.

A In *paryāyokta* (statement of periphrasis),¹ if the suggestion is predominant we may well include it in *dhvani*. But by no means may we include *dhvani* in it, for as we shall demonstrate, *dhvani* is of much wider range and is always the predominant element. Furthermore, in examples such as that adduced by Bhāmaha, the suggestion is not

predominant, because there is no intention there of subordinating² the literal sense. In *apahnuti* and *dīpaka*, on the other hand, the literal is [always] predominant and the suggested [simile] merely follows along with it, as is well known.

1. See note 1 on the *Locana* on this passage. 2. Read *upasarjanībhāvena*.

L In *paryāyokta*: It has been defined thus: "Paryāyokta is when something is said in a different manner, namely through an understanding that lacks the operation of denoter and denoted" (Udbhaṭa, 4.6 Indurāja = 4.11 Viṁśti).¹ An example is this:

The sage Rāma, who had strayed i
in his rage to cut down his foes,
was instructed in the path of duty by this bow.

In this stanza, although we understand [the suggestion] that the might of Bhīṣma overcame the might of Paraśu Rāma, it is merely as helped out by this suggestion that the literally used phrase "was instructed in the path of duty" ornaments the final meaning of the verse.

When what is said is distinguished by a *paryāya* (periphrasis), that is, speaking in a different manner, which consists in a giving to understand, [that is, when it is distinguished] by a suggestion, then the literally used words themselves form a *paryāyokta* (statement of periphrasis). Here "when something is said" forms the definition, "statement of periphrasis" is the thing to be defined, and the general characteristic of this thing is as a figure of speech based on meaning (*arthālankāra*). And so everything is here in order. On the other hand, if one forces on the phrase "when something is said" the unnatural interpretation that it means "when something is apprehended as the chief element," and if one offers as an example such verses as "Go your rounds freely, pious monk" (cf. 1.4 b A), then the statement of periphrasis will cease to be a figure of speech at all, for it will end up as the soul [of poetry, namely *dhvani*]. In that case it should not be included in figures of speech. Furthermore, in that case we should have to list subvarieties of it [just as injunction, prohibition, etc., were listed as subvarieties in 1.4 b, c, d, e A]. Our author says this in the words if the suggestion is predominant. That is, by including it in *dhvani*, *paryāyokta* would be the soul of poetry, not one of the *alankāras* (ornaments, figures of speech). In it: *dhvani* cannot be included in that sort of statement

which is intended as a figure of speech. We have not defined dhvani as something [subordinate] of that sort. For dhvani has a wide range. As it exists in all [sorts of statements], it is widely spread (*vyāpaka*), being the principal element on which all the [guṇas and *alavikāras*] are placed. A figure of speech is not widely spread any more than any other ornament, [e.g., a bracelet is worn only on the wrist, an anklet on the ankle]. And it is not the principal, as it is subordinate to the object which it ornaments. Or, if you assume that the suggestion here is both of widely spread type and principal, and that there is no figure of speech here, why then you would be accepting our own position but out of mere spite continuing to call it a *paryāyokta*.

Our author now shows that even this much [viz., that the suggestion can sometimes be predominant] was not understood by the ancients but was first revealed by himself: furthermore. Bhāmaha furnished his illustration of *paryāyokta* in accordance with the nature he conceived the figure to have. Now in his illustration the suggested element is not predominant because it is not the source of any special beauty. Accordingly, we may agree that in such other illustrations as may be composed along the same lines, there is likewise no predominance of the suggested sense. If you disregard the illustration just given and give as an illustration some such verse as "Go your rounds freely, gentle monk," you will have become our author's pupil [for you will be talking about *dhvani*]. But one must say that you have behaved in an unmannerly fashion by educating yourself in his doctrine with disregard of the rules and by an illicit hearing of it. The experts in sacred history say:

He who shows no respect to the teacher
but listens in hiding to his teaching
goes straight to hell.²

The illustration which Bhāmaha gives is this:

Neither at home nor when abroad
do we eat food that is not eaten
by learned brahmans.

(Bhāmaha 3.9)³

This statement of the blessed Krishna by a periphrasis averts his being given poison. As Bhāmaha says himself, "This is to avoid his being given poison." Now there is nothing charming in this suggestion of the averting of poison by which we might suppose it to be predominant. Rather, the statement of periphrasis itself, viz., that he does not eat without the prior eating of brahmans, as embellished by this suggestion,

ornaments the matter under discussion, namely his eating of food. The intention of the statement is not to say "Give me unpoisoned food." And so *paryāyokta* is simply a figure of speech according to the opinion of the ancients. This is what it all comes down to.

In *apahnuti* and *dīpaka*: These are figures which he has already discussed; so he says, as is well known. He means the matter has already been proved with valid means of proof. Previously he brought up these figures to serve as illustration of how⁴ a figure does not take its name from the [subordinate] simile, etc., [which it might contain,] whereas now he mentions them in a different way to show that they are not *dhvani* because their suggestions are not prominent. This mentioning of them a second time is to keep the order of his original list⁵ so that he may make his text all of one piece.⁶ But the matter on both occasions is basically the same, for one might suspect them of being *dhvani* from the fact that they suggest a simile.

As for the statement of the author of the *Vivarana*,⁷ based on an examination of many instances, that a [suggestion of] simile does not always accompany a *dīpaka*, it is unhelpful, without merit, and can easily be refuted. In the stanza:

Infatuation creates desire;
and that, love with its loss of pride;
that, a yearning to gain the beloved;
and that, unbearable pain of heart.

(Bhāmaha 2.27)⁸

one can easily imagine a relation of subject and simile between the terms even though the terms are produced successively. One cannot say that such a relation of similarity is impossible among successive objects, for we have the verse:

Daśaratha was like Rāma,
Raghu like Daśaratha and Aja like Raghu
and the whole race of Diṅpa like Aja:
marvellous is the glory of Rāma.⁹

where one cannot say that it does not exist. So why worry whether sequentiality or contemporaneity binds the [suggestion of] simile? Enough of trying to milk a mule.

1. In defining *paryāyokta* Bhāmaha merely says: "*Paryāyokta* is when something is said in a different way." (*paryāyoktam yad anyena prakārenādhīdhfyate*, 3.8.) Udbhaṭa here repeats the words of Bhāmaha but adds a second

half verse, which for the first time introduces into the figure the notion of suggestion. His definition is followed by Mammata (10.175, p. 680) and Ruyyaka (p. 141). Only late in the history of *ālankārasāstra* does the restriction appear by which most present-day students recognize the figure. "In a different way" is then taken to mean "by stating the result." So *SD* 10.61. Thus *paryāyakta* in the modern view is the suggestion of a cause by stating the result. 2. The quotation is presumably from some *Purāna*. It is not found in *MBh.* or *Rām.* One is supposed, of course, to bow down and touch the teacher's feet before hearing his words; and the punishments of śūdras who overhear Vedic teaching are famous. But the quotation is here intended humorously. 3. The English reader may need more explanation than Abhinava furnishes. The words are supposed to be spoken by Krishna on his visit to Śiśupāla, where he stands in danger of assassination. Without the hint of that possibility the words, taken literally, express the highly pious protocol that Krishna might be expected to follow. Out of respect he always has his priests fed before himself. The expression is enlivened, is given a twist of wry humor, by the suggestion, but it is the expression itself that delights us. 4. *omuyā cchāyayā*: the same as *omundā prakārena*, "of this sort, [namely, that a figure, etc.]." 5. Viz., in 1.13c A. See also 1.13g L, note 1. 6. *granthasayyā*: a smooth text, an orderly presentation. *Koumudi*: *sayyā nāma ekarūpah sannivesavisesāḥ*, "*sayyā* is a particular way of arranging matters so that they are all of one and the same form." See *PW*'s third definition under *sayyā*, which gives as synonyms *gumphana*, *sabdagumphana*, *granthasya nirmishī*. The term has an interesting development in later writers, where *padaśayyā*, like *pāka*, comes to mean the perfect choice of words; see *Pratāparudriya* 2.34 (p. 49) and Tarolō on *Ekāvalī* 1.13 (p. 22). 7. Kane (*HSP* p. 126) supposed that this was a reference to Udbhaṭa as the author of the *Bhāmaḥavivāraṇa*, a work specifically referred to by Abhinava at 3.16 m L. But Kane was forced to rely on the incorrect text of the *KM* edition, where the negative is omitted from *upamānvayo nāstīti*. The supposition seems to me impossible. In Udbhaṭa's *Kāvyaśāṅgrahā* there is no mention of such a theory as is here attributed to the Vivaraṇakṛt. In fact he there defines *dipaka* as containing a simile (1.14 Indurāja = 1.28 *Vivṛti*). Furthermore, I cannot imagine Abhinava referring to Udbhaṭa as a mule (see end of section) even if he disagreed with him. 8. The verse is given by Bhāmaḥa as an example of *ādīdipaka*, as the common verb ("creates") is given in the first quarter. It is really a sorites (*kāraṇamādā*) sharing the peculiarity of *dipaka* that the common verb is bracketed after its first occurrence. Presumably in order to make it more clearly illustrate *dipaka*, the Jayamānigala commentary on *Bhāṭṭikāvya* 10.22 alters it drastically: *mado janayati pṛitim ānandam mānabhanguram / yat priyāśāṅgamotkanṭhām asahyām mānasāḥ śucam.* 9. The figure here is *rāśanopamā* (chain simile); see *KP* 10.413, p. 580, *SD* 10.25.

A In *sankara* (fusion, see *Locana*, note 1) also, when one figure assists another with its color or charm, the suggested figure cannot be intended to be predominant and so falls outside the area of *dhvani*. Where either of two figures is possible, there is equal prominence of the literal and the suggested. But if the suggested figure subordinates to itself the literal figure, then we may assign it to the area of *dhvani*. We cannot say, however, that *dhvani* is just that, because of the same reasons that we gave in speaking of *paryāyokta* (cf. 1.13 b A). Furthermore, in all cases¹ of *sankara* the very name "sankara" will prevent us from thinking of *dhvani*.²

1. We have followed Abhinava's interpretation of *api ca sankarālankāre* '*pi ca kvacit... nirākaroti*' to mean *sankarālankāre ca kvacid api... nirākaroti*. The natural meaning of Ānanda's sentence would be, "And sometimes in *sankara* the very name 'sankara' will prevent us from thinking of *dhvani*." But the natural interpretation gives a less logical train of thought. 2. The name "sankara" denotes a figure of speech. A figure of speech cannot be an instance of *dhvani*.

L In the figure *sankara*.¹ One type of *sankara* is defined thus:

When contradictory figures appear,
when they cannot function together,
and when there is neither right nor wrong
in accepting just the one, we have *sankara*.
(Udbhaṭa, 5.11 Indurāja = 5.20 Viṣṇu)²

An example is a verse of mine:

Moon-faced she is,
dark water-lily-eyed
and with teeth of white jasmine:
God has given her forms of beauty
from sky, river and earth.

Either metaphor or simile may appear here, depending on whether we analyse "moon-faced" as "having a moon for her face" [by Pāṇi

2.1.72], or as "having a face like the moon" [by Pāṇini 2.1.56]. As both figures cannot be entertained at the same time and as there is no compelling reason to accept or reject one of the other, we have here the figure *sankara*. As there is no evidence that one of the components is denoted and the other suggested, what possibility is there here of *dhvani*?

And what chance is there in the second type, where a figure of sound and a figure of sense occur in one [sentence]? As in:

Remember as Kāma your lover,
in whose embrace you have found delight;³

where we have the figure of sound *yamaka*⁴ and the figure of sense simile.

In the third type too, where more than one figure of sense is found in a single portion of a sentence, inasmuch as both are equal[ly presented literally], how can either be suggested? As in:

They rise and sink together.
so when the bright sun has set,
the weary day for rest
enters as it were the cave of night.

(Bbāmaha 3.48)⁵

For in this stanza the partial metaphor [viz., "the cave of night"] implies a full metaphor of a well-bred man eager to perform the appropriate duty [of self-immolation] on the fall of his master. [The partial metaphor is directly expressed] and poetic fancy is also directly expressed, viz., by the term, "as it were."⁶ These two types are embodied in the following definition: "When figures of sound and sense occur in one sentence or one portion of a sentence, we have the figure *sankara*" (Udbhaṭa, 5.12 Indurāja = 5.22 Viṣṭi).

The fourth type is where there is a relation of assistance between the figures. As in this:

These glances of the long-eyed maid
that tremble like water-lilies in the wind:
did she borrow them from the does of the wood.
or did the does borrow them from her?

(Kumdrasambhava 1.46)

Although a likening of Pārvatī's glances to the glances of female deer is here suggested, the simile becomes subordinate from its role as assistant in giving rise to the figure *sandeha* (poetic doubt),⁷ for by its

assistance we end up with the figure *sandeha*. This [fourth type of *sankara*] is defined: "Where figures are placed in mutual assistance and lack independent being, that too is the figure *sankara*" (Udbhaṭa, 5.13 Indurāja = 5.25 *Vivṛti*).

This is what our author refers to in the words when a figure, etc. And so the existence of *dhvani* in the fourth type is ruled out. We have already stated that there is no possibility of *dhvani* in the second and third types. But in regard to the first type, exemplified in "Moon-faced she is," etc., one might suspect the possibility. This he now rules out: where either of two figures. Equal: because our mind sways between the two.

But now, when the suggested sense appears to be predominant, what are we to do? Take the example:

The masses have no care of quality
but easily fall for reputation.

The moonstone sweats at sight of the moon
but not at my true love's face.⁹

Here the figure *arthāntaranyāsa* (substantiation) appears, literally expressed, but *vyatireka* (contrast) and *apahnumi* (feigned denial) appear by suggestion and are predominant. Having this in mind, he says, but if, etc. He answers the problem with then we may assign it. That is to say, this is not *sankara* at all, but is the second type of *dhvani* called *alankāradhvani* (suggestion of a figure of speech).⁹ What was said under the subject of *paryāyakta* {viz., that *dhvani* is of wider range than the figure and is always predominant} may be equally applied here.

Now he gives a general means of denying the possibility of a [predominant] suggested sense in any form of *sankara*: furthermore. One must construe by changing the position of the particle *api*. The sense is, "everywhere in the figure *sankara*," as distinguished from any particular variety. For fusion means a mingling, a complete commixture.¹⁰ How would one element predominate any more than in the mixture of milk and water?

1. Frequently more than one figure of speech is found in a sentence or stanza. Such cases are assigned to *samsṛṣṭi* (association) or to *sankara* (fusion). In *samsṛṣṭi* the figures are associated "like sesamum grains and rice grains"; that is, they can be distinguished and separated. In *sankara* the mixture, "like milk and water," is irresolvable. By Abhinava's time *sankara* was divided into four types, which he will here define and illustrate. (a) *alankāra-sandigdhatva*, where there is doubt to which of two *alankāras* the case should

be assigned; (b) alarikāraikavākyānupravesa (also called alarikāraikavācakānupravesa), where two or more figures, with no doubt as to their identification, are combined in a single sentence; (c) alarikāraikavākyāmīśānupravesa, the same as type two except that here the figures are combined in a single portion of a sentence; (d) alarikārdigādigita (or alarikārdnugrahāhyānugrahākabhāva), where the two figures assist each other, where the charm of each depends on its involvement with the other. The whole scheme is often simplified by combining types two and three. Ānanda shows a clear awareness of types one and four. Abhinava, in interpreting Ānanda's remarks to cover all four types, quotes ancient authors whose verses, as the footnotes will show, do not always fit exactly the later scheme which he has in mind.

2. The text of Udbhaṭa reads onekālākriyā, "more than one figure," rather than "contradictory figures."

3. The better attested reading is priyam sma rūmase (Kaumudi). If one takes priyam ramayase, the sense will be "whom you delight with your embrace." The line is in *prthvi* meter.

4. Yamaka is the repetition of two or more syllables of the same sound but in different meaning, e.g., smaram and sma rom(ase).

5. Abhinava is taking this verse as an example of the third type of sāṅkora called *ekavākyāmīśānupravesa*. Bhāmaha furnished it as an example of a figure which he called *utprekṣānyaya*, a figure of far more restricted application than the type of sāṅkora which Abhinava wishes to exemplify. Bhāmaha requires for his figure an ambiguous expression (*sīṣṭa*), here instanced in *udayāvasāna*, which may mean the rising and setting of heavenly bodies, or the success and failure of humans. In addition there must be *utprekṣā* (poetic fancy), here evidenced by the particle *iva*, "as it were," and also "a sense of metaphor" (*rūpakārtha*). By the last stipulation I suppose he refers to the partial metaphor (*ekadesāvivartirūpaka*) that is directly expressed in the stanza. It is partial because it encompasses only one element of the sentence, the darkness to which the day goes. The much larger, suggested metaphor, which involves all elements of the sentence, is another matter, which Abhinava will speak of and which we shall remark on in the following note.

6. We are left with the difficult problem of the implied metaphor. It is difficult to see how it can be regarded as other than suggested. Presumably Abhinava takes the suggestion as subordinate to, and merely embellishing, the literally expressed partial metaphor. By such a view he could claim that as none of the figures is predominant, there is no *dhvani* in the verse. But surely this is a perverse reading of the poem. The suggested metaphor, or *aprasutaprasāmsā*, forms its heart and its whole beauty. What we relish and remember is the suggestion of a faithful servant who begins to die a little when his beloved master dies. Abhinava's rejection of *dhvani* in this case can be explained only by his wish to exclude all cases of suggestion that were involved in the old system of alarikārs. This is an old verse by an author who did not recognize *dhvani*.

7. Our reading *sandeḥa* here and in the next line is preferable to the Kaumudi's reading *sosandeḥa*. Udbhaṭa, whose

remarks on this figure are referred to by Ānanda later on (2.26 A), makes a distinction between *sasandeha* (embodiment of doubt) and *sandeha* ('poetic doubt). The first figure he finds in those verses where the doubt is expressly corrected, e.g., "People wonder on seeing the conch in Viṣṇu's hand, 'Is this a wild goose that has come to the lotus growing from his navel?' But no, it does not move." In *sandeha*, on the other hand, the doubt is not removed. Rather, it gives rise to a suggestion of some other figure of speech. The example here quoted from Kālidāsa is clearly of the latter type. Whether we regard the *sandeha* as giving rise to *upamā* or the suggested *upamā* as giving rise to *sandeha* is unimportant. The doubt is not resolved and there are two figures here assisting each other. In later authors the terminology is changed. Both of Udbhatta's figures are known by the same name (by Mammata as *sasandeha*, by most others as *sandeha*), but the former type is distinguished as "containing a resolution" (*niscayagarbha* or *niscayānta*) while the latter type is called "pure" (*suddha*). 8. We have taken the readings of the *Kaumudi*, *pahnauī* (for the senseless *pahinusai*) and *na* before *piāmuhe*. The point of the verse is that the poet would portray the face of his beloved as more beautiful than the moon. He arranges the stanza in such fashion that the suggestion of her beauty is expressed by an *arthāntaranyāsa* (substantiation) apparently intended for quite a different purpose. For definitions of substantiation see Dandin 2.169, Mammata 10.109. A general statement may be substantiated by a particular (as here), or a particular by a general. Moon-stones give off moisture (they are said to sweat or to weep) when exposed to the light of the moon. But, ignorant creatures that they are, they fail to sweat at the lady's face, which is more beautiful. This instance substantiates the general rule that common people respect reputation rather than true quality. The figure substantiation is explicit. The *vyatireka* (see 1.1 Intro. L, note 12), in the form "My true love's face is more beautiful than the moon," is merely suggested, as is also the *apahnumi* in the form "This is not the moon; the true moon is my beloved's face." 9. Ānanda will treat *alaṅkāradhvani* under 2.21.

10. We take this sense for *lalibhāva* from the comment not found in PW.

A So also in *aprasutoprasamsā* (reference by means of the extraneous, allegory).¹ When, by a relation of general and particular, or cause and effect, there is a connection of a literally stated extraneous

matter with the suggested subject in hand, then the literally stated and the suggested meanings are equally important. To begin with the case where there is a connection of a literally stated extraneous generality with a suggested germane particular: although we apprehend the particular as important [for that is the final intention of the sentence], we must admit that the general statement is equally important because the particular cannot exist without the general. Again, when a [literally stated] particular ends up in a general suggestion, [although the general suggestion is important as being the final intention] the particular is also important because all particulars are included in the general. The same principle holds where the relation is one of cause and effect [viz., cause cannot exist without effect, nor effect without cause; so both are equally important]. But in an *aprstutaprasāmsā* where the connection of extraneous and germane is based solely on similarity, there, if the literally stated extraneous [member of the] similar [pairs] is not intended to be predominant, the case falls in the area of *dhvani*. Otherwise, it will just be one of the figures.

1. The literal meaning of the term *aprstutaprasāmsā* is ‘praise by means of the extraneous.’ The extraneous is the matter not in hand. Bhāmaha (3.29–30) and Dandin (2.340) take the name quite literally. To them *aprstutaprasāmsā* was simply a special type of *samskṛti* where the matter in hand (the *prastuta* or real subject intended) is praised by a statement of something extraneous (*aprstuta*). Thus in Bhāmaha’s example we find praise of the magnanimity of trees, by which one understands the intended praise of good and generous men. Dandin’s example praises the simple life of deer in the forest, from which one is to understand his praise of a life away from court where one need not fawn upon kings. It is Udbhaṭa (5.8 Indurāja = 5.14 Viurti) who dispenses with the notion of praise. Any mention of an extraneous matter, if it is so connected with the subject in hand as to suggest it, is called *aprstutaprasāmsā*. Ānanda accepted Udbhaṭa’s definition and then divided the figure into three or five types. The five types are: where something general suggests the particular, where a particular suggests the general, where a cause suggests the result, where a result suggests the cause, and where like suggests like. The first and second, as also the third and fourth, may be taken together, giving only three types. The last type of all (also called *anyokti*) is essentially the Graeco-Latin allegory. Later writers went on to subdivide the last type also.

L The praise of something different,
that is, other than the matter in hand,
is called *aprastutaprasamsā*.
It is threefold.¹

What is meant is a description of extraneous matter which hints at the matter in hand. This hint is threefold, as it is based on a relation of general and particular, on a relation of cause and effect, or on similarity. In the sentence beginning *When* by a relation and ending with *equally important* our author sets forth the thesis that in the first two of these types the extraneous matter and the matter in hand are equally important.

In the type based on a relation of general and particular there are two methods of procedure. One method is where a general statement which is extraneous is literally expressed and the particular, which is the matter in hand, is suggested; as in the following:

Ah, the cruelty of worldly life,
the malignity of misfortune!
Ah, the tragic ways of fate
deceptive in its very nature.

Here the power of fate in its general form, which is extraneous to the poet's real intention, and which is stated throughout the verse, ends up in [a suggestion of] the matter in hand, which is a particular disaster that has befallen someone. Here the general statement, which is literally expressed, is as important as the particular, which is suggested, because the species is logically included in its genus; for there is no contradiction in the simultaneous importance of general and particular.

When a particular which is extraneous suggests a general statement which is germane, we have the second type; as in the following:

It is not so much that at first the fool imagined
a drop of water upon a lotus leaf
to be a pearl; but hear what happened next:
as he tried to take it slowly on his finger tip
with gentle motion, it melted at his touch.
At this he cried, "Alas, it has blown away!"
and now he cannot sleep from inner grief.

(Bhallaṭasatka 94)²

§ 1.13j L]

In this stanza the matter intended by the poet is the general principle that people imagine greatness in what is really nothing, while the extraneous subject is particular, that of imagining a pearl in a drop of water. Here too there is no contradiction in the simultaneous importance of the general and the particular, as has been said. In this way our author has dealt with the first type in its two varieties in the passage from "to begin with" to "all particulars are included in the general."

Extending the same principle to the type based on a relation of cause and effect, our author shows that it too has two varieties: where the relation is one of cause and effect. Sometimes a cause, which is extraneous, is presented literally in order to suggest an effect, which is the matter in hand. For example:

They who take joy in your success
and stay with you in adversity
are your true relatives and friends;
other seek only their own benefit.

Here the speaker states explicitly a cause which is extraneous to his real intent. The cause is that good men by their faithful attachment are friends and relatives to us. He states this in order to suggest what he really intends, namely that his own words should be trusted.³ Although we apprehend the effect here, our apprehension of the cause becomes important from its giving life to the effect; so both cause and effect are important.

Sometimes an effect, which is extraneous, being literally presented suggests a cause which is the matter in hand. An example will be found in the *Setubandha*:

I remember before the churning of the sea
heaven without its pārijāta trees,
Viṣṇu without his Lakṣmī by his side
or the kaustubha jewel upon his breast, and Śiva
without the lovely moon within his locks.

(Setubandha 4.20)⁴

Here Jāmbavān describes his memory of Viṣṇu's breast without the kaustubha jewel or Lakṣmī, and so on, which are matters extraneous to, and at the same time a cause of, what is his real intention. He does this in order to suggest the result, namely that his service of the elder gods, his longevity, and his skill in negotiations fit him to be accepted as an advisor. Here the suggested and the literal senses are equally

important, for although we apprehend the cause to be important, the effect, which is literally presented, raises itself [into importance] by its giving life to that cause.

After dealing with these two types, each of which is twofold, he examines the third type, which is based on similarity. Here too there are two varieties. Sometimes the charm [and therefore the importance] comes from the extraneous matter which is literally presented, while the suggested matter is subservient. An example is this verse by my teacher Bhātṭendurāja:

He who brought you back to life
and by his strength supported,
who carried you upon his back
and even gave you worship:
that man you kill with but a smile.
O brother zombie, you show yourself
to be the prince of gratitude.⁵

Here, although some other ingrate is suggested by the power of similarity, the charm and interest of the stanza lie in the anecdote of the zombie (*vetāla*), which is extraneous. The sense is not impossible as would be a reproach against an insentient being, and the anecdote is not without attraction. So the predominance here lies in the literal sense.

But if the matter in hand is charming and is suggested by a literal description of an extraneous subject possessing properties such as insentience which render it impossible for the described purpose, then we have a case of *vastudhvani*. An example is a verse of my own:

Troop of delights, who storm the hearts of men
and make them dance in many an antic step;
concealing your own intention as you play;
men call you brute and stupid, in their ignorance
thinking themselves intelligent thereby.
That title of stupidity, I think,
if given to them would be honorific,
for it would seem to liken them to you.

Here the germane matter, which is revealed by suggestion, is the extraordinary way of life of a man while he is being despised by the world as a fool. What is meant is a great man, who has rolled back the curtains of darkness by an eye of deep penetration and who lives a worldly life on the principle of "unimpassioned yet as though with

passion," concealing his real self and accepting the reproaches of men as he causes their tongues to wag.

[The literal meaning.] A delight, such as a garden or moonrise, is despised by men as being a brute thing, but it can make the heart of an absent lover grieve with yearning, or make the heart of another overflow with joy. Of what sort its own heart may be no one knows. In fact it is vastly deep and intelligent, utterly void of pride and skilful at play. Now if people for that reason call it brute and stupid when it stands rather in honor because of its implied intelligence, and for the same reason honor themselves as intelligent when they are, rather, worthy of being considered stupid, then the expression "you are brute and stupid," being established as an epithet of the troop of delights, which we have seen are really intelligent, will, rather, be an honorific. What is hinted at is that men are worse than stupid.⁶ He indicates all this in the sentence but — if.

Otherwise: otherwise it will just be another figure of speech, that is, the particular figure of speech [*aprastutapraśamsā*], but never when the suggested element is predominant.

1. The definition is, basically, the one given by Bhāmaha (3.29), but Abhinava has changed the last pāda. The original says nothing of the figure's being threefold. The second half reads *aprastutapraśamsēti sā caiva kathyate yathā*. The division into types is first found in Ānanda. 2. I have followed the interpretation of both Kaumudi and BP. The point of the stanza is that it is not so egregious a folly to mistake a drop of water for a pearl; after all, they look alike. But to be so convinced of one's error that one will attribute volitional flight to a pearl shows the overwhelming power of vain hope in humanity. Abhinava's readings are superior to those of the printed text of Bhallata, which has śrīvann akasmād api in b and tatas in place of sonas in c. The alteration in b seems to have arisen from a reader who misunderstood *tasya mukhdī* to mean "from his mouth," presumably from the mouth of someone playing a joke on the fool. The verse is quoted again by Mammata 10.441, p. 621. Bhallata's Śataka comprises the work of various authors; see 1.14 A, note 6. 3. One could scarcely elicit this meaning without knowing the context in which the words were spoken. But Abhinava doubtless knew the context, as did Hemacandra who also quotes the verse (AC 559, p. 365), where he says that the words are spoken by Jarāsandha (the enemy of Krishna, soon to be slain by Bhīma). Presumably the quotation is taken from some lost play. 4. The stanza forms the opening lines in Jāmbavān's speech of advice to the leaders of the army about to attempt an assault on Laṅkā. Jāmbavān is the Methuselah of Indian legend. The trees, Laksmī, the kaustubha jewel, and the moon were all acquired from the

gods' churning of the sea many thousand years ago. 5. The verse is ironic and is used allegorically. In the *Vetālapānicavimśati* the belief is found that a corpse can be brought to life as a *vetāla* (zombie). As first revived, the *vetāla* cannot walk but must be carried. If worshipped with Tantric rites he may give the practitioner magic powers. Perhaps one may infer from this stanza that if the *vetāla* smiles the practitioner will die. The translation of *vetāla* by "vampire," though sanctioned by long usage, is misleading. The *vetāla* does not suck blood; he is a revived corpse, a zombie. 6. What is one to make of Abhinava's account of his own verse? The literal meaning of the stanza is not difficult. "Men who decry, as do the non-Tantric philosophers, the delights of love and of the senses, calling them brute pleasures, are really stupider than the pleasure they run down. So I will not copy them by calling names. To call them stupid would be to compliment them." Now it is true that the literal sense is impossible from the realistic point of view in which the words "possible" (*sambhāvyā*) and "impossible" are used by the Ālāñkārikas. Neither garden nor moonrise, being insentient, actually makes the heart dance, nor do they conceal their own heart, for they have none. So one is forced to look for a second meaning. To pass to that second meaning is more difficult. Abhinava has thrown what seems to me a needless stumbling block in our way by the discrepancy between the plurality of delights (or stimulants, *bhāvavṛtu*) and the singularity of the great man (*mahāpurusa*). But the great man does conceal his thoughts. His causing the tongues of men to wag, in the case of the Pāśupatas and I dare say of many Tantrics, was a premeditated instigation of reproach; see D. H. H. Ingalls, "Cynics and Pāśupatas: The Seeking of Dis-honor," *Harvard Theological Review* 55.4 (1962). There is also an underlying compatibility of the Tantric adept, seeking *mokṣa* by the path of *bhoga*, and the worldly stimulants amidst which he lives.

A Here then is a summary of the matter:

Where the suggested meaning does not predominate
but merely accompanies the literal sense,
there we clearly have ornaments of the literal
[i.e., figures of speech]
such as *samāsokti* and the rest.

Where the suggested appears only faintly,
or merely follows along with the literal,
or is not felt to be the more important:
in such places there is no *dhvani*.

§ 1.13 k L]

Only where word and sense are subordi
and directed toward the suggestion,
and where there is no fusion (*savikara*),
are we in the area of *dhvani*.

Accordingly, *dhvani* cannot be included in any other category. And for this reason too it cannot be included: because it is a particular poetic whole (*avaghaṇī*) that has been called *dhvani*. Its parts will be shown in the sequel to be the figures of speech, the qualities (*gunas*) and the alliterations (*vṛttis*).¹ A part, if taken by itself, is never known as a whole, while if taken together with the whole, it is recognized as a part of it, not as the whole itself. Even where one of the elements [which are normally parts] does constitute a case of *dhvani*,² *dhvani* because of its vast range is not limited to it.

1. For the *gunas* and *vṛttis* see 1.1 a A, notes 4 and 5. 2. As in certain cases of *paryādyokta* (see 1.13 h A) or *sankara* (see 1.13 i A).

L In the list [of seven figures of speech] with which our author began [his discussion (1.13 c A)], the words "and the like" refer to any other figure where a suggestion may be imagined, that is, to *vyājastuti* (trick praise),¹ etc. Our author proceeds to give a general answer to all cases of that sort: Here then, etc. His feeling is that it is useless to write on each particular figure.

Among such figures [we may give] an example of *vyājastuti*:

What good is done by telling on other wives?
And yet, being a chatterbox by nature
and a southerner as well,
I can't keep still.
She's in everybody's house,
in the market, at the crossroads and at drinking bouts;
she runs about like a drunkard, does your mistress.
Oho, but her name
is Fame.

(Vidyā?)²

Here it is the literal meaning that is embellished by the suggestion in the form of praise. Another critic has offered the following as an example of the figure:

The great earth, lord, engirdled by the sea,
 was wedded to your grandsire;
 she next became your mother, while today
 to raise a family you keep her as your wife.
 After a full century, without reproach,
 she will be married to your son.
 Say is this decent in a line of kings
 who know the rules of proper conduct?

This stanza strikes me as obscene, because it causes one to think of highly indecent things. And what does the praise amount to? That you are king by hereditary succession. What is so great about that? Trick praise of this sort will be reproved in any company of sensitive critics and deserves to be ignored.

[To explain the term "etc." in his remark "*vyājastuti*, etc.", Abhinava takes up another figure of speech, *bhāva* (expression of inner feeling):]

If an alteration [of a given state of mind], arising from an [apparently] unconnected cause, gives us to understand the intention and its connection with that cause, we have the figure *bhāva*. (*Rudraṇa* 7.38)³

Here too if the literal sense is predominant, the case is one of a figure of speech, *bhāva*. That is to say, if an alteration of a state of mind appears, such as the speaking of certain words not normally connected [with their apparent cause], and gives us to understand for what reason the intention embodied in that state of mind [has arisen];—here the reason may be such as the aim of enjoying the pleasures of love without stint—we have the figure of speech, *bhāva*. For example:

As I am a weak woman,
 young and left in the house
 while my husband has gone abroad,
 with no one here but my blind and deaf mother-i
 how can you be so foolish, traveler,
 as to ask to spend the night?

(*Rudraṇa* 7.41)⁴

Here a suggestion embellishes the literal sense of each word and so the literal sense is predominant. On the other hand, if the suggested sense were predominant, we should not have a figure of speech at all, as we have shown before.³ So enough of many words.

Where: i.e., in a poem. Ornaments: it is because they are ornaments that they act only to embellish the literal sense.

Appears only faintly: that is, where there is a vague impression, as in the simile, etc. [suggested by the figure *dipaka*, etc.]. Follows along with the literal: the meaning of following along with the literal is the having of equal importance with it, as in *aprasutaprasamsā*. Not felt to be: where its predominance does not appear clearly, but must be forced on it and so does not really enter the heart, as in the verse, "Turn back, I beg you," as explained by other commentators.⁶ By these two verses he shows that in four cases we are not justified in speaking of *dhvani*: where the suggested sense, although it is present, is not predominant [being a mere ornament], where it is faintly perceived, where it is equally important with the literal, and where its predominance is not clear. Where then are we justified? He tells us, only where word and sense are subordinate. He adds, where there is no fusion. By "fusion" he means the possibility of inserting any figure of speech. It is wrong to interpret as "without the figure called *sankara* (fusion)," for then it would be difficult to take the proviso as prohibiting other figures.

And for this reason too: not only by reference to the contradiction of denoter-denoted to suggestor-suggested can it be shown that the figures of speech and *dhvani* are not identical, but because there is a contradiction between the nature of a whole and of a part, as there is between that of master and servant. Its parts: that is, taken singly, as he goes on to say: if taken by itself. Very well, then, let us not take [a figure of speech] by itself but regard it in the context of the whole. In defense against this proposal he says, if taken together with the whole. It is then not the whole itself because other constituents are included in the whole; and among its constituents is the suggested sense which is not a figure of speech because of its predominance. He makes this point with the words: not the whole itself.

Now it may be objected against our author that he has consecrated an occasional instance [of what appears to be a figure of speech] with predominance and has recognized it as the soul of poetry, *dhvani*.⁷ With this in mind, he now says, even where one of these, etc. He has not consecrated any one of the figures, such as *samāsokti*, as *dhvani* itself, because each figure may exist separately from *dhvani* and because *dhvani* is found in the absence of all figures of speech, *samāsokti* and the rest, as in the stanzas "Mother-in-law sleeps here" (1.4 c A) and "Who would not be angry" (1.4 f A). He makes this point with the words, is not limited to it.

1. *Vyājastuti* = *vyājena stut'*, "praise by means of a trick." The immediate impression is one of reproach, but as one thinks of the implications one sees

that praise has been expressed. This is the old sense of the term, as defined and illustrated by Bhāmaha (3.31), Dandin (2.343), Vāmana (4.3.24) and Udbhāta (Indurāja 5.9 = Viṛti 5.16–17). There is no evidence that Abhinava recognized the extended definition which Mammata (10.112, p. 670) picked up from Rudrāṭa's *vyājasleṣa* (Rudrāṭa 10.11) and which has been followed by all later Ālankārikas. In the later view, *vijastuti* may be either trick praise or false praise (*vyājorūpā stutih*), i.e., a sentence apparently offering praise, but as one thinks of the implications, expressing reproach.

2. The stanza is ascribed to Vidyā by the oldest of our preserved anthologies, *SRK* 996. The ascription has this in its favor, that Vidyā was a southerner and an admirable poetess. But other anthologies ascribe it to Mātanga-divākara (Śāṅg. 1227, SubhĀ. 2544). The verse has given rise to much discussion; see Ruyyaka, p. 144, and *Rasagangādhara*, p. 418.

3. Abhinava here quotes Rudrāṭa's definition of the first type of *bhāva*. He goes on to interpret the definition so that it may fit Rudrāṭa's illustration of the second type of *bhāva*, which he quotes, omitting the illustration of the first type and the definition of the second type. I cannot say whether Abhinava does this advisedly, with the intention of reducing Rudrāṭa's two types to one, or by mistake. He may have read from a defective copy of Rudrāṭa, where the verses were omitted, or his memory may have played him false. At any rate, the original, as it stands in Rudrāṭa, runs as follows:

7.38 (naturally interpreted): When an emotional alteration (*vikāra*) of a person, arising from a cause which is not [normally] connected with it [i.e., productive of it], gives us to understand what that [cause] means to that person and that [in this case] it really is so connected, we have the figure *bhāva*.

7.39 (illustration): On seeing the village youth / with a *varīcūla* flower in his hand / the face of the young girl / changes color. The commentator Namisādhu explains. The girl would not normally be affected at sight of a *varīcūla* flower, so we seek for an explanation. It lies in the suggestion that she has made a rendezvous with the youth in a *varīcūla* grove, which she was prevented from keeping. When she sees the youth with a *varīcūla* flower in his hand, she realizes that he kept the tryst and that she has missed the opportunity of love-making.

7.40: When a sentence, in denoting just this, gives us to understand something that differs from this in regard to good and bad, we have another type of *bhāva*.

7.41 (illustration): As I am a weak woman, etc., as quoted by Abhinava.

4. The verse has been a favorite and is quoted in virtually all the great anthologies: Śāṅg. 3773, SubhĀ. 2234, SūktiM. 87.11, Saduktī. 547. It portrays by innuendo an unchaste wife (*asatī*) and has just as good a claim to be considered a case of *vastudhvani* as the verse "Go your rounds freely, pious monk" (1.4 b A). But see the following footnote.

5. Viz., 1.13 h L, commenting on the remark of A: "if the suggestion is predominant." It is of course a matter of taste whether one regards the literal sense or the suggested sense as more important. But Abhinava takes the fact that the verse was quoted by Rudrāṭa as illustrating a figure of speech to show that the literal sense must

predominate. On the other hand, the verse "Go your rounds freely, pious monk" was quoted by Ānanda as an illustration of *dhvani*. A Sanskrit commentator, without strong provocation, will not argue with ancient authorities. The irreverent Westerner of course is free to do so. 6. See the interpretation given in 1.4 e L of this verse, where it is shown that some critics took the verse to exemplify *preyo'lañkdra* or *rasyavadañkdra*. 7. See 1.13 j A, end of passage, and the illustrative stanza "Troop of delights," etc., in 1.13 j L.

A When [Kārikā 1.13] says "which the wise call *dhvani*," this means that the term was invented by men of knowledge and that it has not been put into use inadvisedly. The preeminent men of knowledge are the grammarians, for all the sciences rest upon grammar; and they gave the name *dhvani* to the sounds of speech that are heard. In the same manner other wise men, who knew the true essence of poetry, have followed the example of the grammarians by giving the title *dhvani* to that verbal entity which contains a mixture of denotative and denoted elements and which is designated as "a poem." They did so because of the similarity [to acoustical *dhvani*] in its being a manifester [of suggested meanings just as the heard sounds manifest words]. Now this being the nature of *dhvani*, the range of which is immense when one counts up all the types and subtypes which we shall soon describe, its illumination bears no comparison to a report on some mere individual figure of speech that has hitherto remained unknown [cf. 1.1 c A]. So the excitement of those whose minds are saturated with *dhvani* is quite within reason, nor should others exhibit toward them an intellect stained by jealousy. And so by this, those at least who deny the existence of *dhvani* stand refuted.

L Was invented by men of knowledge. The compound *vidvad-upajñā* is a *bahuvrīhi* modifying *uktih*, literally, "a term of which the *upajñā* or first use was by men of knowledge." Accordingly, the neuter gender demanded by Pāṇ. 2.4.21 when *upajñā* is used in a *tatpuruṣa* is here inapplicable.

The sounds of speech which are heard: According to the process [described in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika] it is the last sound of a chain of sounds that enters the orifice of the ear, so the heard sounds are sounds born of sounds, [not the original sounds produced by the organs of

speech].¹ These sounds in form are like the reverberations of a bell,² and it is these sounds that are called *dhvani*. As the master Bhartṛhari has said:

Others have expressed the view that the *sphoṭa* is born from conjunction and disjunction with the organs of articulation; the *dhvaniyāḥ* (plural) are the sound-born sounds. (*Vākyapadiya* 1.102)³

In the same way, the suggested meaning has been called *dhvani*,⁴ as it too is often characterized⁵ by a reverberation analogous to the pulsations of a bell. Again, the phonemes as heard, technically called *nāda-sabdas*, manifest the semantic unit,⁶ which we comprehend as soon as we cognize the final phoneme. These phoneme-manifestors are called *dhvanis*. As the same master says:

The true form [i.e., the semantic content] in the word that is manifested by the *dhvani* is determined by a series of cognitions [viz., the cognitions of the successive phonemes], which are unnameable [that is to say, each phoneme-cognition in itself is unassignable to this word or that], but favorable to the final [word-identifying] cognition. (*Vākyapadiya* 1.83)

So we too use the term *dhvani* for the word and the [literal] sense which manifest [the suggested meaning].⁷

Furthermore, it is in the *varṇas* (the phonemes produced by the conjunction and disjunction of the vocal organs) that the differences of prosodical length (e.g., a and ā, i and ī) reside, as has been said:

Either the mind does not perceive a sound if it is pronounced too softly, or it perceives clearly the whole phoneme. [e.g., we never hear half an ī]. (*Kumārila, Ślokavārttika, Sphoṭavāda*, vs. 10)

As these same differences are heard in the secondary sound, [or *dhvani*, that reaches the ear], it is only such other elements of the speaker's speech, such as its slow or rapid delivery, elements over and above the well-defined operations of articulation (e.g., prosodical length, aspiration, closure, etc.) that are more particularly called *dhvani*. As Bhartṛhari⁸ has said:

The derivative *dhvanis* (i.e., the sounds which reach the ear) after they have manifested the word continue to carry in themselves the variations in speed of utterance, but the nature of the phonemes⁹ is not altered by them. (*Vākyapadiya* 1.77)

In like manner we [poeticians] apply the word *dhvani* to an operation over and above the well known operations of denotation, sentence-meaning and secondary usage.¹⁰ Thus we have four senses of *dhvani*;

and by combining them we may speak of a whole poem as *dhvani*.¹¹ It is for this reason that statements both of its difference [from poetry, as in "dhvani is the soul of poetry," 1.1 K] and of its identity [as in 1.13 K, which Abhinava interprets as speaking of "poetry, as a distinctive type of literature, which the wise call *dhvani*"] are not improper.

[Abhinava now gives a highly artificial analysis of the compounds *vācyā-vācaka-sammiśra* and *sābdātmā*, which we translated as a mixture of denotative and denoted entities and as verbal entity respectively.] *Vācyā-vācaka-sammiśra* is a compound from which the penultimate member has been dropped.¹² It stands for *vācyā-vācaka-sahita-sammiśra*, "possessing mixtures as well as denotative and denoted elements." The sense of addition is given without the use of "and," as in "ox, horse, man, beast." By this analysis one can see that the denoted sense can be called *dhvani* and the denoted word can be called *dhvani*, for both of them are suggestive inasmuch as both hint at (*dhvanati*) the suggested sense. As they form a mixture when they are combined with the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas*, the suggested sense also, [which consists of such a mixture,] can be called *dhvani*, for it is what is hinted at (*dhvanyate*). The word *sābda* in the compound *sābdātmā* means *sābdana*, "a putting into words," or verbal operation, and that not in the form of the denotative operation but in the form of the *ātman*, "the soul," of poetry. This [suggestive operation] can also be called *dhvani*, for it is a hinting. Finally the object "which is designated as a 'poem'" can also be called *dhvani* because it is composed of the four other types of *dhvani* in the manner just described.

And so he states the reason common [to both the grammatical and the poetical traditions for the use of the same term *dhvani*]: because of the similarity in its being a manifestor. The relation of manifestor and manifested,¹³ present in general in all four senses [of poetic *dhvani*], is common [to the term as used by the grammarians]. This is the meaning.

It was objected [in 1.1 c A] that because the possibilities of speech are endless, [there may well be some small variety which has hitherto remained unknown and which might be called *dhvani*]. He answers that objection with now this being the nature of *dhvani*, etc. The types which we shall soon describe: there are two main types. The subtypes: for example, the subtype "where the literal is shifted to another sense" (*arthāntarasaṇkramitavācyā*) and that "where the literal is entirely set aside" (*atyantatiraskṛtvācyā*), both of these belonging to the main type "where the literal meaning is not intended"

(*avivakṣitavācya*);¹⁴ and the subtypes "where the suggested meaning is produced without apparent sequence" (*asamīlakṣyakramavyāyāgya*) and that "where the sequence is apparent" (*samlakṣyakramavyāyāgya*), these belonging to the type "where the literal is intended but is subordinated to a second meaning" (*vivakṣitānyaparavācya*).¹⁵ And even among these subtypes there are further divisions. The range of which is immense: the sense is that it covers the whole of poetry. By the word individual he indicates the restricted nature [of a figure of speech]; by the word mere, its being subordinate. Saturated (*bhāvita*): that is, whose minds are intent on the nature of *dhvani*, or, it may mean, whose minds, by being perfumed with its charm, cause them to show such symptoms of emotions as closing their eyes (cf. 1.1 c A). Those who deny the existence of *dhvani*: that is, those divided into all three categories [described in 1.1 a, b, c A].

1. The Nyāya-Vaiśeśikas regard sound as a quality set up in the ether by the conjunction and disjunction of matter. This quality spreads from its place of origin through ether in all directions, as waves spread out from a stone dropped in a pond. Just as the wave which reaches the shore is wave-produced, not stone-produced, so the sounds of speech which reach the ear are sound-produced.
2. The basis for comparison is the succession of replicas through a span of time.
3. The view, although here ascribed to others, is close to Bhartṛhari's own. Note that the word *sphoṭa* as used here is close to its etymological origin, "explosion." But Bhartṛhari regards the *sphoṭa* not simply as an inferrable physical fact, viz., the sound-explosion that is the ultimate source of the derivative sound that one hears, but as the accompanying metaphysical explosion of a phonemic pattern, a pattern that is devoid of the speed or slurring or variations in pitch and volume of the heard sound (*dhvani*). Bhartṛhari never took the further step, taken by his commentators, of identifying the *sphoṭa* with the semantic content of the sounds. See S. D. Joshi, *The Sphoṭanirnaya*, pp. 33 and 54.
4. Here Abhinava justifies the use of "dhvani" in sense d of 1.1 K, note 1, viz., as the *vyāyāga*.
5. Note that Abhinava is careful to use the word *upalakṣita*, not *lakṣita*. As will be shown in Chapter 2 (see 2.2 and 2.20), it is only the varieties of *dhvani* other than *rasadhvani* that give this impression of bell-like reverberation, for in them a sequence is perceived by the auditor between the literal and the suggested sense. In *rasadhvani* no such sequence appears. Accordingly, it would have been wrong, by using the word *lakṣita*, to characterize *dhvani* as a whole by an impression of reverberation. The word *upalakṣita* is more modest and may be used of a partial or temporary characteristic. A house may be *upalakṣita* by a crow perched on its roof.
6. *Sphoṭa* is here used in its final, post-Bhartṛhari sense as the sememe or

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meaningful unit of speech. 7. Here Abhinava justifies the use of "dhvani" in senses *a* and *b* of 1.1 *K*, note 1, viz., as *sabdartha vyanjikau*. 8. *So eva* does not here refer to the author of the previous verse. It is used in the manner of Irish dialect: "Himself told me," referring to the master of the house, or the most important man in the speaker's frame of reference. 9. *Sphoṭa* is here used in Bhārtrhari's sense, not the later semantic sense.

10. Abhinava here justifies the use of "dhvani" in sense *c* of 1.1 *K*, note 1, as the *vyāpāra*, *vyanjana*. 11. Here, finally, sense *e*. One can only marvel at Abhinava's skill in justifying all the poetic uses of "dhvani" by grammatical precedent. 12. Such *madhyamapadalopin* compounds are legitimized by Pāṇ. 2.1.69, Vārt. 8. The anointed example is *sāka-pārthiva* "the vegetable-(eating) king." 13. Abhinava is forcing the text here; *vyanjikatva* does not mean *vyanigya-vyanjaka-bhāva*. 14. See 2.1 *K*. 15. See 2.2 *K* and note 1.

1.13 m

A There is such as thing as *dhvani*. And it is in general of two sorts: where the literal sense is not intended (*avivakṣitavacya*) and where the literal is intended but is subordinated to a second meaning (*vivakṣitānyaparavacya*). An example of the first is this:

Three men reap the earth
of its flower of gold:
the warrior, the man of learning,
and he who knows how to serve.

(*Mahābhārata* 5.35.64)¹

And of the second, this:

On what mountain,
for how long,
and what was the name of his austerity?
I mean this little parrot's
that he should bite into a cherry
as pink as your lip?

(*Dharmakīrti*)²

1. The verse is also found in late versions of the *Pañcatantra*: Bombay 1.45, Kosegarten 1.51. One may argue over the syntax of *suvarṇapuṣpām*. My strong feeling is that it is a *karmadhāraya*, used *karmaṇy akathite* (Pāṇ. 1.4.51; the verb *ci* is listed in the *parigrahanā*). The learned Kuppusvāmī Śāstri was of the same opinion (*Upalocana*, p. 254). The gender of *puspā* may have been influenced by that of *loṭā* or by its proximity to *prthivi*. Those who would make the *Mahābhārata* agree with Classical syntax will of course take the compound as a *bahuṛihi*. Abhinava has a more improbable explanation. The "flower of gold" here does not mean what it says. It means success, worldly advancement. 2. Quoted also in *SRK* 439. Poetical use is often made of the belief that sensual pleasures are a reward for merit gained by asceticism in past lives. See *SRK*, translation, note on vs. 408. According to Abhinava's first explanation, the stanza is an instance of *rasadhvani*.

L He states the result of refuting [the position of those who deny the existence of *dhvani*]: there is such a thing. Now, that *dhvani* should be no more than secondary usage (*lakṣanā*) [which was the fourth objection to the *dhvaniśāda* set forth under 1.1 d A] can be easily explained and answered only after giving examples. So despite the fact that one would expect straightforwardly a refutation of the view that *dhvani* is secondary usage [the fourth objection], or that it is indescribable [the fifth objection, cf. 1.1 e A], the author of the *Vṛtti* here sets forth the two main varieties of *dhvani* in order to be able to give examples. In doing so he follows [the system set forth by the *Kārikās* in] the next chapter:¹ and it is

To fit the five meanings of "dhvani," the grammatical agreement [of the compound *avivakṣita-vācyā* with *dhvani*] can be achieved by taking it as a *bahuṛihi* which has simultaneous instrumental, locative, ablative, dative, and genitive relations [to its exocentric member].² When "dhvani" has the sense of *vācyā* (the literal meaning), *dhvani* itself will be referred to by the element *vācyā* in the compound. The *avivakṣita-vācyā* [*dhvaniḥ*] will be that type of *dhvani* (i.e., *vācyā*, literal meaning) by which that literal meaning itself is not intended, that is, is not intended to predominate [in the final meaning]. Such a *dhvani* will be a suggestor.³ The same sort of analysis can be made of *vivakṣitānyaparavācyā*. Or, in the one option [of the five] where "dhvani" means *artha* (the literal meaning), we can analyse the compounds as *karmadhārayas* (simple adjective compounds). *Avivakṣitavācyāḥ* will then be an unintended literal meaning. *Vivakṣitānyaparavācyāḥ* will be "a meaning which is literal and which is subordinated to something else which is

intended [to predominate]." In these two types, sometimes [viz., in *avivakṣitāvācya*] the literal sense is not intended for such reasons as that it makes no sense in the context; sometimes [viz., in *vivakṣitānyaparavācya*] it is intended insofar as it does make sense in the context, but by the power of its beauty it extends our apprehension to a suggested sense. It is on this account that in the second type a meaning is primarily the suggestor, in the first type a word. But is it not a contradiction to say that a meaning is intended and then say that it is subordinated to something else? No, because what is meant is that it is intended only insofar as it is subordinated to a second meaning.

In general of two sorts: His view is that although there are three kinds of *dhvani*—*vastudhvani*, *alaṅkāradhvani*, and *rasadhvani*—they are included in these two sorts. But we may ask what benefit accrues, after giving the name *dhvani*, from adding these [particular] names [for its two main varieties]. The benefit is this. The first name indicates the cooperation in the operation called *dhvana* (suggestion) of the apprehension on the part of the auditor of meanings implied by the three other operations of denotation, sentence-meaning, and secondary usage, while the second name indicates the cooperation of what is wished to be said, that is, of the intention on the part of the poet. In this way the true nature of *dhvani* is rendered more apparent.

Flower of gold: the compound *suvarṇapuspām* [is an upapada compound agreeing with *prthivi*; it]⁴ means "which flowers forth in gold pieces." As the sentence thus embodies an impossible meaning, the literal sense must be unintended. Accordingly, after setting forth the literal sense of the words by denotative power (*abhidhā*) and giving us the syntax by the power of sentence-meaning (*tātparyasakti*), the stanza, abandoning this sense because of the obstacle [of impossibility], gives us by the power of secondary usage (*lakṣaṇā*) a meaning which is related by similarity, namely that the three men easily partake of great wealth. The purpose of this secondary usage is that the praise of the warrior, man of knowledge and servant, which bides because of its not being expressed literally, should rise to the highest value by being suggested, just as the breasts of a beautiful woman [are the more beautiful from being half hidden].⁵ The primary manifestor of the suggestion here is the word [*suvarṇapuspām*], but the literal meaning cooperates. All four semantic operations are in use.

On what mountain: for not even such mountains as Śriparvata,⁶ which give unobstructed success of the highest order, furnish such success as this. The time spent there must have been measured in millenia

of divine aeons. And no form of austerity, such as sitting amid five fires,⁷ has been recorded as being productive of such reward. The word *tava* has been given separately lest it be understood with weakened force, as it would be if placed in compound. His intention is to bring the action of biting into close relation with "you." Accordingly, those who say that the author failed to use the expression *tuad-adhara-pāṭalam*⁸ simply because it would not fit into the meter are mistaken.

Bite: [the suggestion is that] he tastes it in an unbroken continuity; [that] he does not eat it like a glutton, but rather acts like a connoisseur. Hence [it is suggested that] he has gained his refined taste, just like the other reward, from his austerity. Little parrot: From this indication of his youth, we see that he has gained his reward at the proper time. This also must derive from his austerity. We have in this stanza a suggestion made by a lover, which stimulates the [ālambana]-vibhāva [i.e., the lady who is the object of his love]. It takes the form of a clever compliment which transmits his own hidden desire [viz., to kiss the lady's lip].

In this stanza there are only three semantic operations, viz., denotation, sentence-meaning, and suggestion, [as opposed to the four operations contained in the preceding stanza], for here the third, or middle-stage, operation of metonymy (*lakṣaṇā*) is missing as there is no blocking of the primary meaning, etc. Or, by a different interpretation, we may say that the third operation, *lakṣaṇā*, does intervene.⁹ We may suppose that the primary meaning is blocked by the impossibility of taking literally these improbable questions [directed to a parrot] and that a secondary meaning [of the lover as obtaining the chance to taste his lady's lip], based on similarity, ensues. But the purpose of the *lakṣaṇā* is still that which is being suggested, which enters in the fourth stage. There is this difference, however, that in the former verse ("Three men reap the earth") *lakṣaṇā* was the chief semantic power to cooperate with suggestion, while here the chief powers are denotation and the power of sentence-meaning, for it is because of the beauty of the literal sense that we apprehend the suggestion. This shows that the operation of *lakṣaṇā* is helpful only to a very small extent. In that variety of suggestion where the sequence is not noticed at all (*asamlakṣyakramavayāṅga*) [= *rasadhvani*] there is no apprehension of *lakṣaṇā* at all, for the sequence [from the literal to suggested meaning] is not apparent, as we shall show. So we may take it that in the second type of *dhvani* also [at least as here exemplified] all forms of semantic operation are present.

1. It has been argued that the present passage, taken in connection with 2.1 *K* and 2.2 *K*, shows that the author of the *Vṛtti* and of the *Kārikās* was one person. The argument takes the form of a question: "Why would the author of the *Kārikās* define the subtypes of *dhvani* under 2.1 and 2.2 if he had not already described the major types to which they belong?" But the argument is not conclusive, and I would base my belief in a single authorship on other grounds (see Introduction, pp. 25-27). 2. An English example may put the reader who is innocent of Sanskrit grammar on the right track. The phrase "cut-rate competition" can be glossed as "competition by which rates are cut." Sanskrit grammar would regard "cut-rate" as a bahuvrīhi compound. It agrees grammatically with the word "competition." Its exocentric (unexpressed) member is "which." Its relation to that member is instrumental. 3. *Vyanjaka* here = *vyanjaka* 'tthāh. Abhinava does not trouble to give analyses of the other relations. The locative will apply when "*dhvani*" has the sense of *kārya*; the ablative ("because of which"), when "*dhvani*" has the sense of *vyañjya* (the suggested meaning); the dative ("for the purpose of"), when "*dhvani*" has the sense of *vyañjana* (the suggestive operation); the genitive, when "*dhvani*" has the sense of *vācaka* (the denotative word). 4. Apparently Abhinava takes *suvarṇapuspādīm* as *suvarṇa* plus the root *pusp* (*DhP* 4.15, *pusp-yati*) plus suffix *an* (*Pāṇ* 3.2.1). 5. The same simile, spelled out in full, is used by the Pāla poet Vallana (9th or 10th century), *SRK* 1705. 6. A peak of the Western Ghats. For an interesting description of it some centuries later, see the account of the 15th-century Russian traveler Athanasius Nikitin, *India in the 15th Century*, Hakluyt Society, 1857. 7. Sitting with a fire on each side and the sun above. 8. It is normally considered incorrect to use an expression in which a member outside a compound (here *tava*) must be construed with the subordinate member of the compound (here *adhara* in *adhara-pāṭalam*). Abhinava's remarks are designed to clear the author of the verse from the charge of incorrect usage. The meaning that Abhinava reads into the sentence would be rendered in English by emphasis: "that he bites a cherry as pink as your lip." Accordingly, the commentaries *Kaumudi* and *BP* say that if the word for you were here placed in compound, the author would be guilty of *avimṛṣṭavidheya*, "not giving sufficient prominence to a predicative element." 9. Abhinava's reason for offering the second interpretation lies in his general view of the pertinence of both stanzas quoted in this section by Ānanda. He views them as introduced before the discussion of *bhakti* (= *lakṣaṇā*) in 1.14 in order to give examples where *lakṣaṇā* occurs but where it can be shown to be distinct from *dhvani*. It is true that *avivakṣitavācya* will always furnish such examples. But Abhinava wishes to show that there are cases even of *vivakṣitānyaparavācya* where a small degree of *lakṣaṇā* is possible. Otherwise there would be no point in Ānanda's mentioning or illustrating that type of *dhvani* at this point.

K This *dhvani* is not identical with *bhakti* (secondary operation), because it differs from it in form; nor is it defined by that, because the definition would be both too wide and too narrow.

A Here he refutes the objection that *dhvani* is nothing more than secondary operation (cf. 1.1 K, 1.1 d A). This *dhvani*, that is, *dhvani* of the sorts just mentioned, is not identical with *bhakti*, because it differs from it in form. *Dhvani* is where a meaning other than the literal is revealed by the literal word and meaning to be the final sense and in that sense a suggested meaning is predominant. A secondary operation is merely a subordinate one. The second half of the couplet shows that *bhakti* cannot define *dhvani*. Why cannot *dhvani* be defined by *bhakti*? Because the definition would be both too wide and too narrow. Too wide, because *bhakti* occurs in areas outside those of *dhvani*. Poets are often found to use words in an associated sense, being prompted by idiom or conformity [to convention],¹ without any great beauty being generated by the suggestion. An example is:

Wilting at either end
from touch of heavy breasts and loins,
green in between
from a waist that bears no weight,
and here all disordered
from tossing about of loosened arms:
this lotus-petal couch
speaks the fever of a slender maid.

(Harṣa, *Ratnāvalī* 2.12)²

Or again

You kiss a hundred times,
embrace each other a thousand
and rest only to unite again.
But when this happens with a lover,
it is not tautology.³

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And again,

Whether angry or pleased,
in tears or in smiles,
however you catch them, wanton girls
carry away your heart.⁴

With a newly flowered vine
the husband gives his young wife a tap
on her breast.
Such a gentle tap;
but the pain went straight to the heart
of her fellow wives.⁵

It suffers pressure for others' sake, is sweet when broken,
even in altered state it is prized by all.

What if it fails to grow if cast on barren land:
is this the fault of the sugar cane or of the hostile desert?

(*Bhallaṭasatata* 56)⁶

In this last stanza the word "suffers" [is to be taken in a secondary sense]. Instances like those quoted above are never the domain of dhvani, because ... [sentence completed by 1.15 K].

1. Idiom and conformity to convention: this distinction between *prasidhi* and *anurodha* is made clear by Abhinava in 3.33 i L (Text, p. 426), where Ānanda uses these words in the dual. 2. Here it is the verb "speaks" that is used in a secondary or associated sense for "makes it clear that." Couches do not actually speak. In the play, the lotus-couch furnishes the king with evidence of the heroine's love fever. The stanza is quoted in SRK 709 and in most of the great anthologies. 3. "Tautology" is a trope for "tedious repetition." The action here is repetitive but not tedious. The verse is badly misprinted in the Kashi ed.; see Corrections of Text. The verbs *cumbijjai*, *avarundhijjai*, and *ramijjai* are passives used statically (*bhāve yok*): lit., "there is kissing," etc.
4. Here "carry away" is a trope for to charm or fascinate. I am not sure of the sense of *ucchinta*. Prakrit *uccchitta* means "crazy" according to *Pāīa-saddamahānavo*. Abhinava renders it together with *mahilö* as *suciṇyāḥ*, lit., women who disregard in the pursuit of their own inclinations the constraints of husbands or parents. The term is used as a synonym for *abhisarikāḥ*; see SRK 233.
5. According to Abhinava, "gives to" is here used in the sense of "rewards with."
6. The verse is an *oprastutapraśāṁśā* (see 1.13 j A, note 1), an allegory of a virtuous courtier who cannot live under a vicious king. The

whole verse makes this suggestion, which is embodied in the figure of speech, as it is the literal meaning that is charming. But the verse is here quoted simply for the secondary usage of "suffer." Sugar cane cannot suffer, so "suffers pressure" means no more than "is squeezed." The stanza is certainly not by Bhallata, who lived under Śāṅkaravarman (A.D. 883-902), that is, after the time of Ananda; see *Rājtar. 5.204* and Jacobi, *ZDMG* 56, p. 405. Bhallata's *Sātaka* is an anthology drawn from many authors. This stanza is ascribed to Indurāja in *Sārīg. 1052* and *Sūktim. 35.5*, to Yasas in *Subhā. 947*.

L And so it is only after giving examples of both [major types of dhvani] that he comments on and refutes the view expressed [in 1.1 K] by "some say it is bhākta (secondary operation)." What he has in mind is this. Are bhakti and dhvani identical, the two words being merely synonyms? Or does bhakti define dhvani, marking it off from what is other than dhvani as *prthivītva* (earthness) marks off from earth what is other than earth?¹ Or is it an *upalakṣana* (occasional characteristic), as a crow may be of Devadatta's house because a crow may be perched on it? [The *Kārikā*] begins by denying the first possibility: not identical with bhakti. The [*Vṛtti*'s] phrase, of the sort just mentioned, should be referred to the five meanings of dhvani: word, literal meaning, operation, suggested meaning, and poem.² To show the difference [of the two concepts] he begins by stating the nature of dhvani: [where a meaning other than] the literal, etc. To be the final sense: i.e., the sense that permits our apprehension to come to rest, the sense which is the purpose [of the poet's employing just those particular words]. Is revealed: he means, is suggested. Merely a subordinate operation (*upacāra*): that is, secondary usage (*gunavṛtti*), metonymy (*lakṣanā*). To use an associated sense is to speak in transgression [of the literal sense]. By the word "merely" he is referring to cases where a fourth semantic operation, of the nature of suggestion, may be inferred as possible from the mere fact that the third operation has been employed,³ but where this fourth operation, being neither useful nor important, is as good as absent. For the definition of a [primary] purpose is "that with a view to [the acquiring or avoiding of] which one starts about an action."⁴ Inasmuch as secondary usage is found even in such cases, how can one say that the suggestive operation and the operation of dhvani are one and the same thing?

[The *Kārikā*] then rules out the second possibility: because the definition would be too wide, etc. Nor is it, viz., dhvani, defined by that, viz., by secondary operation. It may be objected that the

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suggestive operation must take place [wherever a secondary operation is employed], so how can one distinguish the area [of dhvani from that of laksana]? To provide against this, [the *Vrtti*] says: without any great beauty. He means, for the reason that the purpose in question is of no importance and nothing is therefore accomplished by the suggestion of it. By the use of the word "great" [he admits that there is some beauty in such cases but that] there is only enough to qualify as a *guna* (poetic quality), as shown by the definition [of the quality, aptness (*samādhī*)]: "the imposition of the property [of one thing] on some [other] thing should be called aptness."⁵

But if there is no real purpose in using such expressions, how is it that an author uses them? He answers this objection: "because of *prasiddhy-anurodha*,"⁶ for such has been the usage through a long succession [of writers]. But I would say that *prasiddhi* implies [not that there is no purpose but] that the purpose is too obvious. Although the purpose appears in clear form, it stands in need of something hidden,⁷ like buried treasure [in order to be in the domain of dhvani]. For in the case of the secondary usage (*upacāra*) illustrated by "speaks" [in the first of Ānanda's illustrative verses] the purpose is the apprehension by the auditor of "making something quite clear." If the author had used the obvious literal expression, would the verse lose an element of beauty? Or by his using this covert expression is any element of beauty added? With this in mind our author will say [that dhvani reveals] "a beauty which cannot be conveyed by any other form of expression" (1.15 K).

[In the second verse quoted by Ānanda] the Prakrit word *avarundhijjai* means altrigate (there is embracing). "Tautology" is used in its secondary sense of something to be avoided, because the literal meaning [viz., repetition of words] is impossible in the context.

[For the third of the quoted verses Abhinava furnishes a Sanskrit translation of the Prakrit and then adds:] In this verse "catch" is used in the secondary sense of receive, "carry away" in the sense of subjecting to their power.

[The fourth verse:] Here a husband in the course of normal love-play gives a light stroke of a fresh vine to the breast of his youngest wife. As this indicates the favor she has attained with him, it proves from its very softness hard to bear in the heart of her fellow wives, who no longer share in his love-play. That a light stroke given to one person should have its effect on another and be hard to bear "even although so soft," is startling. In this stanza giving is used in the secondary sense of rewarding.

[The fifth verse:] Although the word "suffers" is used in its primary sense with respect to the virtuous man, who is the subject really intended, still, with respect to the extraneous subject, sugar cane, which is being praised, as the "suffering" of pressure is impossible, the word is used in a secondary sense of undergoing pressure, so that the whole expression ends up meaning nothing more than "is squeezed."

Now in such cases of course there is some purpose, so how can we avoid saying that there is *dhvani*? It is in response to such an objection that our author says: Instances like those, etc.

1. *prthītī prthivitvasambandhāt*, Prajastapāda, Benares ed., p. 41. This so-called definition of earth is justified by Udayana in his *Kironāvalī*. He points out that it is not intended to be definitive. We shall still require a definition of *prthivitva*, which he gives. But such definitions, he insists, do not lead to an infinite regress, in logic any more than in medicine or grammar. One goes on defining until the uneducated man is educated. Then one stops. 2. This interpretation is historically impossible. Ānanda never distinguishes the five senses in this way. Ānanda's phrase actually refers to the two major types of *dhvani* that he has just mentioned: *avivakṣitāvacya* and *vivakṣitānyaparavācyā*. 3. Every use of *lakṣaṇā* implies some purpose, for otherwise the speaker would not have departed from literal usage. Thus even in the first of Ānanda's quotations (the verse from the *Ratnāvalī*) one may say that the word *vadati* is used instead of *gamyati* in order to give the notion that the couch shows very clearly the lady's suffering. But this is a secondary sort of purpose, not the main purpose of the sentence. It is not really useful to that purpose nor poetically important. 4. *Nyāya S.* 1.1.24. Harṣa did not set about writing his verse with the view to expressing only a little more vividly the action of the couch on the king's inferential judgment. 5. The source of this definition of *samādhi* appears to be lost. For other, and better, definitions of the term, see *BhNS* 16.102 and Dandin 1.93. Dandin's example is: *kumudāni nimūlānti kamalāñy umiśānti ca*, "the water-lilies close their eyes and the lotuses open theirs." The imposition must be within the range of everyday speech, or we would have a figure such as hyperbole or fancy. It must be apt and should impart vividness. 6. Abhinava seems to take the compound *prasiddhyanurodhā* here as a *totpuruṣa*. Kuppuswami Śastri in his *Upalocana* on the *Kaumudi* remarks that Abhinava's explanation here does not fit with the use of *prasiddhyanurodhā* in 3.33 i A. 7. *Kaumudi* and *BP* explain the hidden something as the transmission of an element of beauty that does not appear in cases of non-suggestive use.

§ 1.15 L]

K A word can justly be termed *dhvani* only if in its being suggestive it lights up a beauty which could be achieved by no other [i.e., non-suggestive manner of] expression.¹

1. In the bracketed words of our translation we are following Abhinava's interpretation. Without them the sentence might seem to be limiting *dhvani* to the Flaubertian *mot juste*, which is surely not the case.

A In the area of the examples just given there was no word that caused the manifestation of a beauty which could not have been achieved by some other [manner of] expression.

L By no other expression: that is, by the use of literal word and meaning, and so other than *dhvani*. "Word" is to be understood in all its five senses.¹ Can be justly termed *dhvani*: i.e., can be denoted by the word "*dhvani*" The examples just given: e.g., "speaks" [in the first verse quoted under 1.14 A].

1. Such is certainly not Ānanda's intention, but the interpretation makes for a more systematic presentation. The *Kaumudi*, followed by *BP*, shows that *sabda* may be analysed so as to give the same five senses given by Abhinava in his analysis of *dhvani* (1.13 L). Thus: *sabdyata iti* *sabdaḥ* = *vācyah*; *sabdyate* 'neneti' *sabdaḥ* = *vācakah*; *sabdyate vyajyata iti* = *vyarigyam* (here I suppose one must employ the principle *anekārthā dhātavah*); *sabdanam* = *vyāprāḥ*; while the combination of these four senses will give the *samuddayah* = *kāvyam*.

A Furthermore,

K Words such as *lāvanya*, which are used idiomatically in a sense other than their proper (etymological) sense, are never instances of *dhvani*.

A In these words there is indeed a secondary semantic operation. And in the context where they occur we may speak of *dhvani*, if it happens to arise, but that will be only because of some other consideration. *Dhvani* never occurs primarily because of such words.

L Our author has already said that there is no operation of *dhvani* where the purpose [of choosing to employ a secondary sense] is unimportant. Where there is secondary usage without any basic purpose at all, there too there will naturally be no operation of *dhvani*. He states this by saying, furthermore, etc.

Words like *lāvanya*, which means properly "possessing a salty taste," but which is idiomatically used in such other senses as "charm, beauty," by the very fact that they are used idiomatically lack that separation [from their proper meaning] which is occasioned by the presence of the triad¹ [and so cannot give rise to *dhvani*]. As has been said, "Some cases of secondary usage, being idiomatic, so far as their force is concerned are just like direct denotation" (*Tantravārttika*, p. 683). Such words, although used in a sense different from their etymological sense, do not carry any *dhvani* and we cannot speak of *dhvani* in such cases. By speaking of secondary semantic operation he refers to secondary usage of both the *gaunī* and *lākṣanikī* varieties.² By saying "such as" *lāvanya*, [the *Kārikā*] would include words like *ānulomya*, *pratikūlya*, *sabrahma-cārin*. *Ānulomya* (smoothness, orderliness) means literally rubbing in the direction in which the hair grows. *Pratikūla* (antagonistic) is used properly of a current that fights against the bank of the stream. The

primary meaning of *sabrahmacārin* (companion) is one who has had the same teacher. In each case the other meaning is secondary. As one does not adopt the secondary use of these words with any purpose in mind, we cannot speak of a suggestive operation in their case. But now in such verses as:

de vaditi lunāhi paludisi gasittha
lāvannujjala-gughariḍhollavapattā (?)³

a suggestion is indeed apprehended in the presence of the word *lāvanya*. True, but it does not derive from the word *lāvanya*. It derives rather from the operation of *dhvani* that follows after we have understood the meaning of the whole sentence, for in the sentence it is suggested that his beloved's face has illuminated the whole sky. But enough of many words. Our author says the same thing: because of some other consideration. He means, because of the suggestive power [of the sentence], not because of the use of such a word as *lāvanya* in a secondary sense.

1. The triad is: blocking of the literal sense, connection of the literal object with the secondary object, and a purpose (*prayojana*) for shifting from the use of one sense to the other. Actually it is only the third of these conditions that the word *lāvanya*, as used idiomatically, lacks. 2. *Gauṇī* is based on the similarity of the primary and secondary object, *lākṣaṇī* is based on some other relation subsisting between them; see 1.1 K, note 1. 3. No one to our knowledge has been able to make sense of any of the versions of the Prakrit verse. Each manuscript shows a different reading, all of them being mostly jibberish. After the first two syllables I have transcribed the readings of Kaumudi's MS ca, in which at least the words *lāvannujjala*, "resplendent with beauty," make sense.

A And again

K When a word abandons its primary operation and reveals an object by secondary usage, the purpose for which this is done is one to which the word moves without stumbling.

A Because when a purpose is to be achieved of revealing a meaning of special beauty, if the word accomplished that purpose only through a non-primary sense, the author would be at fault in using it.¹ But that is not the case.

1. That is, he should have used some other word. What is meant becomes clearer by the help of an example. "A village on the Ganges" suggests the beauty, peacefulness, and holiness of the village. These suggestions spring from the primary sense of the word "Ganges," not from the secondary, or shifted, sense of "bank," which we need in order to make sense of the expression. It is logic that demands the secondary sense (see 1.4 b *L*, note 6). The suggestion, the poetry, springs directly from the primary.

L The foregoing argument has shown it wrong to say that wherever there is *bhakti* (associated usage) there is *dhvani*. And so, if we use *bhakti* to define *dhvani*, the definition will be too wide. But even if we were to grant, for the sake of argument, that *bhakti* occurs wherever there is *dhvani*, the object on which the *bhakti* operates will be different from the object on which *dhvani* operates. There can be no relation of substance and attribute between entities that occupy different areas; and a definition must be an attribute.¹ *Lakṣanā* (*bhakti*) operates on a secondary object. The operation of *dhvani* takes place in the area of the purpose. The second semantic operation, *lakṣanā*, does not take place in that area, because that area lacks the set of conditions (blockage, similarity, etc.) for secondary usage. It is with this in mind that our author says, and again, etc.

[Comment on the *Kārikā*:] When a word abandons its primary operation, that is, after completing its denotative operation, and reveals, that is, brings to our apprehension, a secondary object by secondary use (*gunavṛtti*)—here *gunavṛtti* is a synonym of *lakṣanā*—the purpose, or goal, at which—accusative case—this illumination is aimed, is one where another operation comes into play. And this operation is not *lakṣanā*, because the *lakṣanā* of a word is an operation which moves haltingly, that is, the word's power of giving information is disturbed by the working of some hindrance, whereas that word in giving us to understand the purpose does not meet with any hindrance. For if it did, we should have to discover a reason for it, [which could only be] some further purpose, which we should have

to discover; and so we should be forced into an infinite regress. Accordingly, there is no place here for *lakṣita-lakṣaṇā* (secondary usage growing out of secondary usage).² To reveal: the word *darsanam* is a form that includes the causative suffix [i.e., the meaning is "revelation," not "sight"].

[Comment on the *Vṛtti*:] Accomplish here means "suggest." Through a non-primary sense: i.e., as disturbed by some hindrance. In using it, viz., the word. Would be at fault: It is so that the purpose may be easily apprehended that a word is used in its secondary sense. In the expression "the boy is a lion," where the notion of the boy's unusual bravery is to be conveyed, if the word were to operate haltingly, it would not convey to us this notion; so why should it have been used? If you reply that it will convey that notion by a [further] secondary operation, then we shall have to discover a subsequent purpose and still another secondary operation to go with it. So we shall be led to an infinite regress. On the other hand, if you admit that there is no halting motion here, then there can be no secondary operation prompted by the purpose to be conveyed, for the set of conditions for a secondary operation [hindrance, etc.,] will be absent. You cannot say that there is no operation [for conveying the purpose]; and that operation cannot be denotation, for the conventional agreement [between denoter and denoted] is absent. This operation, over and above the operations of denotation and secondary usage, can only be the operation of *dhvani*.

' But that is not the case: The author is not at fault, because the purpose is readily apprehended. So we see that the denotative power, wishing to pass to its primary meaning but being blocked by some hindrance, continues on because it has not fulfilled its aim. That is why, in speaking [of the associated sense which it does reach], we say, "This is the non-primary sense of the word." As there is an acceptance of convention even in the non-primary sense, [one may say that] secondary usage (*lakṣaṇā*) is simply an appendage to denotation (*abhidhā*).³

1. To define a substance is to furnish its peculiar attribute, that is, the attribute which rules out all other substances. If the attribute occurs in a different area from that of the substance, it obviously cannot serve as a definition.
2. Such is the correct reading furnished by the *Kaumudi*. The other printed texts read *lakṣaṇā* for *lakṣita*. See 1.4 b L and note 18. *BP* gives an example to which the term *lakṣita-lakṣaṇā* may be properly applied: "How is this, slender maid! The month of Śrāvana is in your eyes, autumn in your cheeks, summer in your limbs and winter in your lotus face." Here the month

of Śrāvana' is used in the sense of the rainy season, which in turn gives rise to the second secondary sense of tears. See also 2.9 L and note 2. 3. These rather odd remarks are occasioned by Abhinava's effort to clarify the following Kārikā. Kārikā 1.18 will say that secondary usage (*gunavṛtti*) depends on no more than vācakatva (the denotative power of words), a statement that seems at variance with the semantic system that has been described, where *lakṣaṇā* (as likewise *gunavṛtti*) is an independent semantic power which depends on a triad of conditions. Abhinava furnishes us here with two considerations which may explain the apparent change of viewpoint. *Lakṣaṇā* arrives at its object, the secondary sense, only at the end of a journey which set out toward the denoted object. In that sense it occurs as an appendage to *abhidhā*. Then also, it shares in the peculiar property of *abhidhā*, the convention (*samaya, sanketa*) between word and meaning. *Lakṣaṇā* does not veer aside from the primary sense to any meaning, but only to a secondary meaning that also attaches to the word by convention. One may find many of the secondary senses of a word in a dictionary. In this sense too *lakṣaṇā* is closely related to *abhidhā*. *Dhvani*, on the other hand, although it requires denotative word and meaning as its trigger, is not dependent on, or closely related to, *abhidhā* in the two respects here brought to our notice.

K Secondary usage (*gunavṛtti*) depends on no more than the denotative power of words. How can it be used to define *dhvani*, which is based wholly on suggestive power?¹

1. The distinction is expressed here unclearly. Both *gunavṛtti* and *dhvani* depend to a greater or lesser extent on vācakatva. The distinction lies in the manner in which they depend on it. Abhinava does much to clarify the passage. See 1.17 L, last paragraph and note 3, and his comment below.

A Therefore *dhvani* is one thing and secondary usage another. As a definition it would be too narrow too, because the type of *dhvani* where the literal is intended but is subordinated to a second meaning,

and many other varieties, do not fall in the same area with associated meaning (*bhakti*). Therefore associated meaning furnishes no definition.

L He sums up: therefore. Since secondary usage (*lakṣaṇā*) forms simply an appendage to denotation, for that reason; that is to say, since secondary usage (*gunavṛtti*)—he means both its varieties, *gaṇī* and *lakṣaṇī*—depends on denotative operation inasmuch as it arises from an obstruction to that operation and forms an appendage to it, how can secondary usage form a definition of *dhvani*, which is a suggestive operation? The two processes occur in different areas.

[The *Vṛtti*] sums up the matter: therefore. The author means, because he has shown its forming too broad a definition and apropos of that discussion [has noted] that it occupies a different area. So, having explained the overextension referred to in the *Kārikā* which stated "it is not defined by that, because the definition would be both too wide and too narrow (1.14 K)," he now explains the underextension: it would be too narrow.

It would be: that is, secondary usage would be. The definition would be of sufficient extension only if *bhakti* (associated usage) occurred wherever *dhvani* occurs. And that is not the case, for while *bhakti* occurs in the presence of that type of *dhvani* where the literal sense is not intended, as in such verses as "Three men reap the earth" (1.13 m A), how shall we find it in such verses as "On what mountain" (*ibid.*)?

[Objection from the Mīmāṃsā point of view:] But now, [let us examine the concept of] *lakṣaṇā* (secondary usage); it extends throughout the qualitative (*gaṇī*) as well [as the relational (*lakṣaṇī*)]. The only difference¹ between the qualitative and relational varieties is that in the qualitative the word which indicates an object by *lakṣaṇā* enjoys grammatical agreement with the word [which denotes that object], as in "The boy is a lion."² Or, we may say that one object [e.g., a lion], by indicating a second object [e.g., a boy who shares in the qualities of a lion], makes the word that denotes the second object agree with the word that denotes itself [i.e., makes the word "boy" agree grammatically with the word "lion"]. Or, we may say that the word "lion" and the object lion cooperate in indicating; and so both of them fuse with the word denoting that thing and with the thing itself. It has

been said that "the [denotative] word is used in the qualitative variety, but is not used in the relational variety (*lakṣaṇā*). But secondary usage (*lakṣaṇā*)³ is present there too and so extends to all varieties. And this relational variety is of five sorts,⁴ as it is based on (a) a conjunction [of the secondary object] with the direct object: for example, a direct object of the word "dvirepha" ("possessing two r's") is the word "bhramara"—now the word "bhramara" is connected [by the conventions of language] with the six-legged creature, a bee; that object may be indicated by the word "dvirepha" because of the bee's connection with a direct object [of the word "dvirepha"]; (b) the proximity (*sāmipyā*) of the secondary object [to the direct object], as in "a village on the Ganges" [where the bank of the river is close to the direct object, river]; (c) *samaṇvaya*, that is, a connection:⁵ for example, "Bring in the spears," meaning bring in the spearmen, [who are connected with the spears]; (d) opposition, as when one says with reference to an enemy, "In what has he not benefitted me?";⁶ (e) its being connected with the same activity, that is, when it is based on a relation of cause and effect: for example, "he takes away my life," when the expression is used of one who takes away one's food [here the direct object, life, is the effect of the secondary object, food]. In this way, *lakṣaṇā* occurs in all varieties.

And thus, in your verse "On what mountain," since an obstruction to the literal sense is introduced by the improbable questions [addressed to a parrot], *lakṣaṇā*, based on similarity, comes into play.

[Abhinava:] But we admitted this, saying that *lakṣaṇā* occurred in the middle stage [between denotation and suggestion].

[Mimāṃsaka:] Then how can your author say that "the type of *dhvani* where the literal is intended but is subordinated to a second meaning, [and many other varieties, do not fall in the area of *lakṣaṇā*]?"

[Abhinava:] He was referring to the chief subtype [of this type of *dhvani*], viz., where a succession from literal to suggested meaning is not noticed. And by its many varieties he meant the suggestion of *rasa*, of *bhāva*, of improper *rasa*, of improper *bhāva*, or of the incipience or cessation of any of these;⁷ all this, as well as the subvarieties of each.⁸ And in every one of these, *lakṣaṇā* is impossible.⁹ The reason is that in a poem that sets forth the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* there can be no hindrance to the primary meaning; so what chance is there for *lakṣaṇā* to arise?

[M:] Let us forget about hindrance. The true definition of *lakṣaṇā* is this: "That is called *lakṣaṇā* where we have an apprehension of an

object invariably connected with the primary meaning."¹⁰ In the type of poetry here of which you are speaking, when the *vibhāvas*, the *anubhāvas*, etc., are the primary meanings [of the words], the *rasas*, etc., being invariably connected with them, will be indicated by *lakṣaṇā*, for the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* stand in a cause-effect relation to the *rasas*, while the *vyābhicāribhāvas* stand in a relation of accompaniment.¹¹

[A:] By no means. At this rate, whenever we apprehend the object smoke from the word "smoke," we would be reminded by *lakṣaṇā* of fire, and from that we would be reminded of the repelling of cold, and so on, until there would be no end to a word's meanings.

[M:] The word "smoke" finds a point of rest in its own literal so it will not go on operating any further.

[A:] Here you have come around to our view, that it is a hindrance to the literal meaning that brings *lakṣaṇā* to life, for when such a hindrance occurs, the word does not rest in its literal meaning. And in the setting forth of the *vibhāvas*, etc., there is no hindrance.

[M:] Very well then, we may say that just as the memory of fire arises after one has understood the presence of smoke, so the apprehension of such mental states as sexual desire arises after the apprehension of the *vibhāvas*, etc. There is no verbal operation here at all.¹²

[A:] This Mīmāṃsaka who knows so much about our apprehension¹³ should be asked this question. Do you suppose that the apprehension of *rasa* is nothing more than the apprehension of another person's mental state? You should not make such an error. What aesthetic relish (*rasatā*) would there be in the mere inference of emotional states that are found in the everyday world? The relishing of *rasa* is a super-normal (*alaukika*) delight. It consists in savoring the *vibhāvas*, etc., which are found in poetry, and it must not be degraded to the level of memory and inference, or the like. Rather, the connoisseur, whose mind has been trained by everyday inferences from effect to cause, when he apprehends the *vibhāvas*, etc., does so not in an uninvolved manner (*tātasthya*) [in which everyday inferences are achieved], but by bringing them into the power of his sensibility, or in other words, confronting them with sympathy, a process that forms the seedling for the full relishing of *rasa* about to ensue. The nature of his apprehension consists in a savoring of the *vibhāvas* that springs from his identifying with them, a process that is entirely removed from the path of memory and inference. This savoring has not been produced by some other means of knowledge in the past so that it might qualify as memory.¹⁴ Nor is it produced now from any other means of knowledge, because

perception and the other means do not operate in a super-normal experience. That is why the terms *vibhāva*, [anubhāva], etc., are used, which are terms for the super-normal.¹⁵ As [Bharata] says: "It is called a *vibhāva* because its purpose is to give understanding (*vijñā*)."¹⁶ In dealing with normal experience we speak of a cause, not a *vibhāva*.¹⁷ *Anubhāva* also is a term for the super-normal. "The dramatic representation of voice, body, and emotional expression, since it permits us to experience (*anubhāvayati*) [the represented mental states], is called *anubhāva*."¹⁸ By experiencing (*anubhavana*) is meant one's identification with the mental states [so represented]. In dealing with normal experience we speak of an effect, not an *anubhāva*.¹⁹ And so, lest one suppose that [in the enjoyment of *rasa*] the mental state of another person is being inferred, Bharata omitted the word "basic emotion" (*sthāyibhāva*) from his definition: "*Rasa* is born from the combination of *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, and *vyabhicāribhāvas*."²⁰ Had it been included it would have proved a stumbling block.

The statement that a basic emotion turns into a *rasa*²¹ is based on suitability, that is, because the relishing of beauty arises in us from our memory bank (*samskāra*) of mental states which are suitable to the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* of those basic emotions [that are being portrayed in the characters of a literary work]; and because, while we are in the stage of understanding the mental state of another person, which may prove helpful to our sympathetic response, we understand such basic emotions as sexual desire from such [*vibhāvas*] as a garden and such [*anubhāvas*] as horripilation of the actor's skin. The transient emotion (*vyabhicāribhāva*) is also a mental state [resident in the portrayed character], but since it is relished only as dependent on a principal mental state, [there is no danger in its being mentioned in the *sūtra* and so] it is listed along with the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas*.

So what is born here is a *rasyamānatā* (a being tasted, a gustation, of beauty),²² that is, a savoring that eclipses such worldly mental states as the joy that might be produced by reunion with a constant stream of old friends. And for this reason, [viz., because of its super-normal character,] the savoring serves to manifest something, not to inform one of something, as might be done by an established means of knowledge (*pramāna*). It is not a production such as results from the working of a cause.

[M:] But if it is not a cognition and is not produced, what is it?

[A:] We have told you. It is the super-normal *rasa*.

[M:] But the *vibhāvas*, etc.—are they what inform us of it, or are they productive of it?

[A:] Neither informative nor productive; ing.

[M:] Where else is such a thing found?

[A:] The fact that there exists nothing else of this sort is why we have called it super-normal.

[M:] But then *rasa* will not be a valid means of knowledge.

[A:] So be it. Since we receive pleasure and instruction from savoring it, what else do you want?

[M:] But still, there will be no way of knowing that it exists.

[A:] Wrong. It is proved by our own self-awareness, because savoring is a form of knowledge.

Enough arguing now. But one more reason why *rasa* is super-normal: namely, that soft and harsh alliterations, while they have no effect on meaning, can be suggestive of *rasa*.²³ What possibility of *lakṣaṇā* can there be in such a case? One finds too that there can be relishing of the words of a poem by mulling them over, for we see a connoisseur reading the same poem over and over and savoring it. That the words of such a poem are unlike other words, which become useless after we have understood them according to the dictum, "One takes them up [as means] only to abandon them [after they have served their purpose],"²⁴ shows that such words must have a suggestive operation. And that is why the succession [of the suggestion to the primary meaning] passes unnoticed.

It has been objected by a certain person that this theory of suggestion would result in *vākyabhedā* (giving two different meanings to one sentence),²⁵ but his objection is based on a misconception because [of the following consideration].

A ritual text (*sāstra*),²⁶ uttered once, conveys a meaning by means of semantic convention. As it is impossible for us to remember simultaneously numerous contradictory conventions, the text cannot convey two meanings, while if the conventions are not contradictory, then obviously there will be just one sentence meaning. The sentence cannot convey contradictory meanings successively, because a semantic operation cannot begin again after it has once ceased. If the sentence is uttered a second time, the meaning will be the same, because there has been no change in the semantic conventions or the context. If it could convey a second meaning, obliterating the meaning obtained by context and convention, there would be no semantic rules at all. At this

rate when we hear the words, "A man desirous of heaven must perform the fire oblation," what assurance should we have that the meaning is not that a man must eat dog meat?²⁷ Nor would matters stop there. Language would become wholly unreliable. Accordingly, *vākyabheda* is there counted as a fault.

But in poetry, the *vibhāvas*, etc., as they are being conveyed to us, tend to become objects of our relish. There is no need then for semantic convention.²⁸ There is nothing here comparable to the apprehensions we receive from a ritual text: "I am enjoined to do this; I will do it; I have accomplished my purpose," since such a text, being on a normal plane,²⁹ tends toward what one should do in the future. But in poetry, the savoring of the *vibhāvas*, etc., is essentially a matter of the present, arising like a magic flower, without reference to past or future. In this sense the relishing of *rasa* is different from normal relishing, as it is also different from a yogi's meditation.

And so it is that in the stanza "On what mountain?" connoisseurs will sense the clever compliment which is the speaker's intention without noticing the succession to a blocking of the primary meaning. That is the [true] reason why our author has stated as a general principle that there is no *bhakti* in that type of *dhvani* where the literal meaning is intended but is subordinated to a second meaning. It was we, seeking to persuade you when you were being obstinate,³⁰ who granted that *lakṣanā* might be found in the stanza, for it was our thought that no matter how angry you might be, you could say nothing against cases where no succession could be noticed. But if you will not be angry, we will point out that even in the stanza "Three men reap the earth," where the literal sense is not intended, regardless of the fact that all the conditions for *lakṣanā*, such as blocking of the primary meaning, are present, the sentence comes to rest in the suggested meaning. And so enough of this long discussion.

Our author sums up: therefore associated meaning [furnishes no definition].

1. In the text, *kevalam* construes with the words *ity evam lākṣanikād* *guṇasya bhedah* four lines below.
2. "Lion" is here used by secondary usage to mean a boy with the qualities of a lion. It is accompanied by the denotative word "boy," with which it stands in grammatical agreement. In the relational variety, on the other hand, this accompanying use of the denotative word is not found. "A village on the Ganges" indicates a village on the river bank, but the denotative word "bank" is not used.
3. It is confusing to have the same word (*lakṣanā*) used in two different senses in the same sentence. To

make matters worse for the reader, the pronoun (*saj*) with which the next sentence begins must refer to the first, not the second sense. 4. Abhinava now specifies the five sorts, following the verse of Bhartr̄mitra which he quoted under 1.1 d L. But he here follows a different reading from that which he there gave: *abhidheyena samyogāt sāmipyāt samavāyatāḥ* in place of *abhidheyena sāmipyāt sārūpyāt samavāyatāḥ*. See 1.1 d L, note 4. In effect the version given under 1.1 d L includes the *gaunī* variety, that being the variety based on *sārūpya*, whereas the present version excludes it. The sense here given to *samyoga* is peculiar; in Nyāya a *vācyavācakasambandha* is never referred to as *samyoga*. Furthermore, the illustration of the type based on *samavāya* implies a non-Nyāya sense of *samavāya*. But these facts cannot be used as arguments against the present version, for Bhartr̄mitra may have defined the words in other than their Nyāya-Vaiśiaka senses. 5. Note that *samavāya* and *samyoga* are here glossed by the same general word. In its normal sense *samavāya* cannot be used of the relation between spears and the men who hold them. 6. This is a case of irony. The direct sense of the word "benefitted" is the opposite of the secondary sense which the speaker intends. 7. For these varieties see 2.3 K and for examples, 2.3 L. 8. *Rasadhvani* may be divided into the eight, or according to some, nine, *rasas*. Even single *rasas* have their subvarieties; thus, *sambhoga-sṛigāra* and *tipralambha-sṛigāra*. So also with the *bhāvas* and *rasabhāsas*, etc. 9. The text from this point, Kashi ed., p. 154, line 4. to p. 158, line 7, has been translated by Gnoli. *Aesthetic Experience*, pp. 102-106.

10. The quotation, given inexactly, is from the *Tantravārttika*, p. 354. The original reads *abhidheyavinābhūte pravṛttir lakṣaṇeṣyate*, "the operation of a word on an object invariably connected with its direct meaning should be called *lakṣaṇā*". It is not a good definition, because the connection need not be invariable. 11. The *vibhāvas* are the determinants of the *rasas*; they cause them to arise. The *anubhāvas* result from the *rasas* (at least as *rasa* is understood by the Mīmāṃsaka here speaking, viz., as a sharpened emotion). The *vyābhicāribhāvas* accompany the *rasas*. 12. Here the Mīmāṃsaka would reduce the achievement of *rasa* to an inference, the third valid means of knowledge. The fourth means, verbal apprehension, would play no part. 13. The words are ironic. Among poeticians the Vedic ritualists are stigmatized as the most insensitive of all men to poetic beauty and to the understanding of literature. 14. This is another distinction between *rasa-pratīti* and inference (*anumāna*). In inference the sight of smoke gives rise to a memory of fire which has been perceived in the past as accompanying smoke. 15. *alautika eva vyavahāra*: that is, they refer to a super-normal means of apprehension. Abhinava returns to this idea in commenting on 2.4. The apprehension (*pratīti*) of *rasa*, he says there, is *lokottararūpā*; it transcends the experience of the workday world. The term *alautika* had already been used by Nyāya and Buddhist epistemologists for types of perception that

could not be explained by normal physical causes. 16. *BhNS* 7.3 (Vol. I, p. 346): *atha vibhāva iti kasmāt / ucycate, vibhāva vijñānārthah.* 17. Here Abhinava is adding to the words of Bharata, who does not make this distinction. He merely says, *vibhāvah kārenom nimittam hetur iti paryāyāh* (*ibid.*). 18. *BhNS* 7.4 (Vol. I, p. 347). Abhinava is following a Northern version of the text, closer to that given by MS *ba* of the Gaekwad edition than to the text as it has been printed. 19. One may say that the determinant (*vibhāva*) is the cause of the mental state and the dramatic portrayal (*anubhāva*) is the result, so long as one remembers that these words are used not of an everyday mental state produced in the actor, but of the super-normal state produced in the audience.

20. *BhNS* 6.31 (Vol. I, p. 272). 21. *sthāyino dhāvā rasatvam āpnuvanti*, *BhNS* Vol. I, p. 288. 22. That is to say, the birth spoken of by Bharata is not of a physical thing called *rasa*, produced by everyday causes, but the birth of a super-normal enjoyment engendered by poetic means. Abhinava insists on the same distinction in his comment on 2.4. 23. Abhinava's view is more complex than this sentence seems to imply. See 3.33 b L, note 3. 24. *Vākyapadiya* 2.38. The dictum of course applies only to words that are denotative. That the words of poetry are different shows that they must have a different sort of power and operation. 25. The anonymous opponent (*Bhattāṇayaka?*) must have held *Mimāṃsā* views, for it is only in the *Mimāṃsā* that much is made of this fault. To the ritualists it was important to harmonize the many apparently discrepant statements in the Vedic texts. They did this by subordinating certain passages to others and so producing *ekavākyatā*, "the state of a single sentence," or, if many grammatically distinct sentences were involved, by forming a single *mahāvākyā*, "great sentence," i.e., a single consistent logical presentation. The grammarians, on the other hand, eager to make the text of *Pāṇini* apply to as many linguistic situations as possible, often instruct us to make two statements out of his one (*yogaibhāga* or *vākyabheda*). One feels that Abhinava would have answered the present charge more simply and more truthfully by pointing out that in cases of *dhvani* the primary sense is always subordinate to the suggested sense, whereas in the *alankāras*, if there is a suggested sense, it is subordinated to the literal. In either case there is *ekavākyatā*. Instead of this, he makes an elaborate distinction between *sāstra* and poetry, which leads up to the claim that *vākyabheda* is a fault in the former but not in the latter. 26. The *Kaumudi* advises us to take *sāstra* in a broad sense, as referring to any text that is not literary. But the argument that follows, it seems to me, implies a very narrow sense. It is only a ritual or *Mimāṃsā* text that is "directed to what one should do in the future," or that gives rise to such notions as "I am enjoined to do this," etc. 27. The words *tenagnihotrām kā prīmā* form a *śloka*. Gnoli (*Udbhaṭa's Vivarana*, p. xxci, note 1) has pointed out that it is a quotation from Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavartika*, 1.318

(Manoratha ed. 3.318). 28. *Kaumudi* and *BP* make clear that the need for semantic convention occurs in the stage of conveying the *rībhāvas*, etc. In the next stage, where they suggest *rasa*, semantic convention plays no part.

29. As opposed to the supernormal plane of *rasāsvāda*.

30. *Durdurūṭam*: the word appears also in other forms in the MSS—*dvandvarūḍham*, *dadurūṭam*, *durdurabham*. As I see no satisfactory etymology, I translate simply from context.

K It might, however, be an adventitious mark (*upalaksana*) of a certain type of *dhvani*. And if *dhvani* has been defined by others, our view would stand confirmed.

A While *bhakti* might be considered an adventitious mark of one type out of the various types of *dhvani* that we shall describe, if one were to say that *dhvani* is fully characterized by secondary usage, one might say that all the figures of speech which differ from *dhvani* are characterized by the operation of denotation, a statement that would imply the futility of constructing definitions of the individual figures of speech.

' Even if *dhvani* had been defined by others previously, this would simply confirm our view, for our view is that there is such a thing as *dhvani*. If this has already been proved, we have gained our wish without effort.

Those too who have said that the nature of *dhvani* is something sensed in the hearts of connoisseurs but incapable of being expressed, have spoken without reflection. For when the general definition has been given in the manner stated and the particular definitions in the manner about to be stated, if it were still held to be inexpressible, the same charge would apply to all things. On the other hand, if they mean this as a hyperbolical way of saying that its nature is superior to all other types of poetry, then they are speaking the truth.

L Now our opponents may admit that *dhvani* and *bhakti* are not identical and also that *bhakti* does not fully define *dhvani*. But it

does sometimes characterize it. As *bhakti* occurs in [some] areas where *dhvani* occurs, it serves as an *upalakṣana* (adventitious characteristic) of *dhvani*. True enough, but it does not occur everywhere that *dhvani* occurs, so what do our opponents gain by this fact, or what do we lose? And so [the *Kārikā*] says, it might be of a certain type.

And *bhakti* has been described by the ancient authors. Using it simply as an adventitious characteristic, we might be able to mark out *dhvani* and know it in all its varieties. What use is a [specific] definition? To dispel such a view, [the *Vṛtti*] argues, if one were to say, etc. The relation of denoter and denoted is found in all areas where figures of speech are found. So, since the working of denotation has been described by the grammarians and the ritualists, where is there any need of work by definers of figures of speech? In the same way, by adopting the dictum of the logicians that the effect is born of the cause, we might ask what useful new accomplishment has ever been made by any creator or discoverer, beginning with God.¹ At this rate no one would ever undertake anything. Our author states this, saying [it] would imply the futility of constructing definitions.

Let us suppose that we have not revealed anything new, that [the nature of *dhvani*] has already been revealed and we have merely described it correctly [by following precedent]. What harm would this do? With this in mind, our author says, even if, etc. Previously, that is, previous to our work.

By thus refuting the three varieties of the view that *dhvani* does not exist, as also the view that it is included in *bhakti*, it follows that among false views the view that it is inexpressible has also been refuted.² Accordingly, there is no *Kārikā* directly aimed at refuting this view. The author of the *Vṛtti*, however, in order to make a neat presentation of the whole subject, brings up this implicitly refuted view and gives an explicit refutation: those too who have said, etc.

Its general definition has been given in the manner stated, viz., "That [type of poetry] in which sense or word," etc. (1.13 K). The particular definitions will be given in the manner about to be stated, viz., "It may be shifted to a different meaning," etc. (2.1 K). In regard to these [we may note that] in Chapter One the general definition of *dhvani* has been given by the author of the *Kārikās*. In Chapter Two, the author of the *Kārikās* gives definitions of the subtypes of *dhvani* and refers to the two main types as though they had already been given. In conformity with this, the author of the *Vṛtti* had stated the basic divisions already in this chapter, by saying, "and it is in general of two sorts" (1.13 m A).³

To all things: both everyday matters and scientific matters. A hyperbolical way of saying: by this he shows that the inexpressibility may have been used as a hyperbolical expression, as in the verse "those syllables keep on sounding their ineffable message in my heart,"⁴ in order to show its supreme excellence.

[May my words prove] auspicious.

[There follows a colophon verse made up of puns, so that one is forced to render it by two separate translations.]

Will the world be clear even by moonlight,
if there is no eye to see?
So Abhinavagupta has opened an eye.
I praise the goddess Śivā.
. God's blessed *sakti* of understanding,
who resides within her own self and who,
by the power which awakens within her
wakes instantly the universe.⁵

Will the [Sahṛday]-Āloka be clear, even with the
help of the *Candrīkā*,⁶ if it lacks the *Locana*?
So I have made a beginning of the *Locana*.
I praise the blessed inspiration [of poetry],
which resides within [the poet] himself
and which by its power of revelation
reveals instantly the universe.

Herewith the First Chapter of the *Sahṛdayāloka-locana*, an exposition of *dhvani*, revealed by the great Saiva master, the revered teacher, Abhinavagupta.

1. The argument of the *Kārikā*, explained in the preceding paragraph, was that *bhakti* cannot serve to define *dhvani*, that is, to rule out the application of the term "dhvani" from all instances of non-dhvani, because *bhakti* is present only in some instances of *dhvani*. The argument of the *Vṛtti*, explained in this paragraph, is more general. Even if a characteristic occurs throughout the area of the thing to be defined, it is of no use as a definition if it is too general.
2. The references are to the five false views set forth or implied in 1.1 K.
3. I suppose the reason for Abhinava's again (see 1.13 m L) bringing up this distinction between the exposition of the *Kārikās* and the *Vṛtti* at this point is to justify the curious discrepancy between the future tense of

vakṣyamānayā ("in the manner about to be stated") and the past tense of *pratipādīte* ("has been given") in the present passage of the *Vṛtti*. 4. The quotation forms the last line of the following stanza: *nindrārdhanimūltadrśo* (or in some versions *nindrānimūltadrśo*) *madamantharāyā nāpy arthavanti na ca yāni nirarthakāni / adyāpi me varatanor madhurāni tasyā tāny akṣarāni hrdaye kim api dhvani*.

With half closed eyes, lazy with wine,
my lady spoke sweet syllables.
They were neither meaningful
nor yet unmeaning, but were such
that even now they keep on sounding
their ineffable message in my heart.

Abhinava may well have taken the quotation from Kuntaka, who uses it in his *Vakroktijivita* (1.19, vs. 51) and says that the indefinite pronoun *kim api* conveys the fact that the excitement of the heart cannot be expressed but can only be experienced. The stanza is found as number 36 in the Kashmiri recension of Bilhana's *Cauropoñcāśikā* (ed. W. Solf, Kiel, 1886) and is variously ascribed in anthologies to Bilhana (*Sārīg. 3468*), Kalaśa (*SūktiM. 43.26*), or Kalaśaka (*SubhĀ. 1280*). As Bilhana was a contemporary of King Kalaśa(ka) (regn. A.D. 1080–1088), the ascriptions must be wrong. Kuntaka lived a century or more earlier. 5. In the final ślokas to the chapters of his *Locana* Abhinava renders homage to the powers or stages of *Vāc*: at the end of the First Chapter, to the *parā sakti*; of the Second, to the *pasyantī sakti*; of the Third, to the *madhyamā sakti*; and of the Fourth, to the *vaikhari sakti*. That speech exists in four stages is a concept as old as *Rigveda* 1.164.45. We first meet with the traditional names of these stages in Bhartrhari; they are missing in the *Mahābhāṣya*, although that work quotes the famous Rigvedic verse (Kielhorn ed. I, p. 3, lines 24–25). To Tantric authors like Abhinava the four *saktis* represent a double process of evolution: on the metaphysical plane, from undifferentiated unity through two intermediate stages to the sensible everyday world of diversity; on a linguistic plane, from the undifferentiated *sādabrahman*, again through two intermediate stages, to the physically manifested speech by which worldly communication is carried on. For Abhinava's description of these stages, see his *Paryantarīcāśikā*, verses 41–48, or Jayaratha's commentary on *Tantrāloka* 1.18. *Pratibhā* (imagination, inspiration) is used, as well as *cit* (the self-conscious), as a name of Śiva's highest *sakti* in *T4* 1.2. It is a serviceable term in the present stanza, because the *pratibhā* of a poet is the power which enables him to make use of *dhvani* for the achievement of *rasa*. Compare the verses with which Abhinava concludes the later chapters of the book. 6. *Candrikā*: name of a commentary on the *Dhvanyāloka* that preceded Abhinava's *Locana*.

CHAPTER TWO

A Thus it has been shown that *dhvani* is of two kinds:¹ one where the literal meaning is not intended (*avivakṣitatavācya*), the other where the literal meaning is subordinated to a second meaning (*vivakṣitatānyaparavācya*). In this regard, the *Kārikā* makes a statement in order to show the subdivisions of the first kind.

1. The word "dhvani" may be taken here in any of the last three senses listed in 1.1 *K*, note 1, viz., as suggestion, suggested meaning, or a suggestive type of poetry. Note that it is the *Vṛtti* that has shown the distinction between the two main types of *dhvani*, not the *Kārikās*. See 1.13m *A* and 1.13m *L*, note 1.

L I praise the magic branch that bears
the wished-for fruit,
Śivā the generous;
who, as we think of her, gives blessing
and removes our grief.

The author of the *Vṛtti*, providing the logical connection between this [and the preceding] chapter, begins by saying thus, etc. Shown means: "by me, in my capacity as the author of the *Vṛtti*. Nor in saying this¹ did I depart from the intention² of the basic text; rather, I followed the intention of the author of the *Kārikās*." That is why he says what follows.³

In this regard: that is, in regard to the statement of two kinds of suggestion made by the author of the *Vṛtti*, this [*Kārikā* which now follows] is the seed [from which that statement sprang]. Or we may take *tatra* to mean "at that previous time." The sense will then be: the author of the *Vṛtti* showed previously, in the First Chapter, the

kind of suggestion where the literal sense is not intended.⁴ To show a difference (*prabheda*), that is, a sub-type within that, the *Kārikā* now makes a statement. And by showing these sub-types it will be possible, by reference to them, to show [in the second *Kārikā*] the difference (*prabheda*) of [the first kind of suggestion] *avivakṣitavācyā*, that is, the difference of its nature (*prabhinnatva*) from [the second type] *vivakṣitānyaparavācyā*.⁵ Basically, the sense is that the author of the *Kārikās* is in full agreement with the view that there are two kinds of suggestion.

1. "This" refers to the naming of the two varieties of *dhvani* in 1.13 m A.
 2. *Utsūtram* means "beyond the scope or intention of the basic text," viz., the *Kārikās*. The word is used in *Sisupāla* 2.112.
 3. The meaning of Ānanda's second sentence, on which Abhinava now comments, is perfectly clear. But Abhinava is not satisfied with the apparent sense, because the distinction of the two main types of suggestion has nowhere been stated in the *Kārikās*, but only in the *Vṛtti*. Accordingly, Abhinava tortures the sense in order to turn it into a statement by which the *Vṛttikāra* may justify himself.
 4. We have emended the word *prakāśitah* to *pra-kāśitasya*. As the text stands, one can make sense of it only by the expedient of taking *avivakṣitavācyasya yah prabhedaḥ* to mean *avivakṣitavācyarūpo yah prabhedaḥ*, on the analogy of such phrases as *rāhoh śiroḥ*.
 5. Thus Abhinava takes *prabheda* in two different senses. He thereby increases the implications of Ānanda's statement.
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K In that type of suggestion where the literal meaning is not intended, it may be shifted (*sāṅkramita*) to a different [associated] sense, or it may be entirely set aside (*tiraskṛta*).

A The suggested meaning likewise is distinguished (i.e., differentiated into two kinds) by virtue of the two mentioned varieties.¹

1. The point of this sentence is that one might question the propriety of the term *vācyā* (literal sense) in a definition that should deal with the suggested sense (*dhvani*). The response is that the suggestion is also distinguished by the very distinction that has been made in the *vācyā*. The *KM* edition adds after the word *vīśeṣa* the following: *iti vyanigyaprakāśanaparasya dhvaneṇ prakārah*, apparently only in order to make clear what we have stated in this note. The extra words are not found in the recorded MSS and seem to have been missing from Abhinava's text.

L The causative suffix in the past passive participle *sankramita*¹ denotes a group of conditions (*sahakārivara*)² and it is by their power that the sense is caused to shift in the suggestive operation. The word *tiraskṛta* refers to the same agents. The connection is this: that literal meaning which, being unintended, gives to the form of suggestion called "where the literal meaning is unintended" (*avivakṣitavācyā*) its name, is twofold. [In the first variety.] that meaning which, although possible, is not as such of any use; which seems to have become something else because of its involvement with various properties; and which remains as an unnoticed³ property-possessor like the thread of a necklace, is said to be [shifted, i.e.,] developed into a different shape. That meaning, on the other hand, which is not possible in the context and which serves merely as a means to perceiving some other [suggested] sense, after which it runs away as it were, is said to be "set aside."

Now it may be objected that we are supposed to be describing sub-varieties of *dhvani*, that is to say, the suggested sense. So surely it is inappropriate to speak of varieties of the literal sense. With this doubt in mind, our author says: the suggested meaning likewise. The word *ca* (likewise) is used in the sense of "because." He means: Because of variety in the suggestor [i.e., the *vācyārtha*, the literal sense], we can appropriately speak of variety in the suggested sense [i.e., the distinctions of the suggested meaning depend on distinctions of the literal meaning]. Or if we take the word *dhvani* to be used in the sense of suggestor [i.e., the literal sense, as explained in 1.1 K, note 1],⁴ there will be no difficulty.

Feeling that there is no need to give a definition since the definition of this variety is furnished by its very name, the author [of the commentary] proceeds to give an example.

1. *sankramita* is the past passive particle of the causative verb: *sam + kram + nic + if + kta*. The suffix *nic* drops by Pāṇ. 6.4.52, but not without denoting the causative agent. Abhinava identifies the agent, i.e., that which causes the shifting of the sense, as "the group of conditions" (*sahakārivara*). 2. The *sahakārivara* is composed of the three conditions of *lakṣaṇā*, namely *mukhyārthaśabdādhā*, *nimitta* (i.e., *sambandha*), and *prayojanavallva*. Both forms of *avivakṣitavācyā* depend on *lakṣaṇā* and thus on the conditions that bring *lakṣaṇā* into play. Another name for *avivakṣitavācyā* is *lakṣaṇāmūḍhvani*. 3. Against the interpretation of *BP*, I have taken *lakṣyamāṇah* to include a negative, i.e., as *lakṣyamāṇah*. Only thus does the passage make sense. Both the *sankramitavācyā* and the thread of a necklace are unnoticed property-possessors. What are noticed are the meanings suggested by the *vācya* and the flowers or gems strung on the necklace. 4. Abhinava has already explained several times in the first chapter, e.g., Text p. 31 (Translation 66), 99 (Tr. 125), 105 (Tr. 132), 135 (Tr. 171), that one of the meanings of *dhvani* is *vyanjaka*, i.e., the *vācyārtha*. The alternate interpretation strikes me as impossible, for what is obviously at issue is the *vyanigṛ̥tha*. Moreover, the full name is *avivakṣitavācyadhvani*.

A An example where the literal meaning is shifted (*arthāntara-sankramitavācyā*) is the following:

White herons circle against dark clouds
that paint the sky with their wet lustre.
Winds carry the small rain.
The peacocks, friends of the clouds, cry out with joy.
Let all this be: my heart is hard;
I am Rāma and can bear it all.
But Vaidehi, how will she live?
Alas, my queen, alas, be brave!¹

In this verse the [suggestive] word [whose sense is shifted] is "Rāma." By this word we understand Rāma as developed into various suggested qualities, not simply as the possessor of the name.

1. The stanza is quoted anonymously by *Mammata* 4, vs. 112 (p. 188), *Hemacandra AC*, vs. 68, and *SūktiM.* 90.6. Jacobi pointed out (*JRAS*, 1898, p. 296) that it occurs as *Mahāñātaka* 5.7 (the Eastern version of the *Hanumanñātaka*). The Western version lacks it. The quotation begins with a description of the rainy season, a time when lovers long to be together. The point in quoting the verse here is that the word Rāma qualified by "hard-hearted" reminds one of, or rather suggests, many other qualities that are associated with Rāma, namely his having undergone so many other hardships, such as the loss of his kingdom, his exile in the forest, etc. The beauties of the verse are explained by *L* below. One may point in addition, however, to the skill with which the stimulants of sight, touch, and hearing are combined in the first two lines (the first four lines of the translation).

L Taking it for granted that the definitions are sufficiently indicated by the names of the types and their subtypes, our author proceeds to give an example. An example where the literal meaning is shifted: this phrase is syntactically joined with "As in this verse, the suggestive word is Rāma." *Snigdha* means "moist" because of its connection with water. *Syāmala* is the dark color commonly found among Southern women. *Kānti* means brilliance. *Lipta* means covered; that is, the sky is covered by clouds of just such a brilliance. "Clouds that are *vellad-balākāḥ*," that is, in which the herons, a species of white bird, are *vellat*: the word means "conspicuous" (*vijṛmbhamāna*), sc., because of the contrast¹ [of their white bodies with the black clouds], and "flying about" (*calat*), sc., because of their joy [at being with their friends, the clouds]. And so the sky is painful to look at [since it reminds one of days of love]. All the directions are also hard to bear. The use of the plural in "winds" shows that they blow from all directions; and by their releasing small drops of water it is suggested that they are blowing very gently [and thus linger over one's body and make one all the more love-sick]. Well then, perhaps Rāma should enter a cave somewhere and stay there for the duration of the rainy season. With this in mind, the poet says that the clouds have friends (or helpers) among whom are the peacocks² who produce out of joy sweet sounds that resemble the *ṣadja*³ note and become reminders of that whole unbearable scene of the clouds. On their own as well, these sounds are quite unbearable. This is what is meant. In this way Rāma, whose feeling of love in separation has been aroused by stimulating factors (*uddīpanavibhāvas*), knowing that these determinants of emotion (*vibhāvas*)⁴ will be shared [by Sītā], since love is based on

mutual feeling, from here on in the poem conjures up his beloved in his heart. First he reports on himself: "Let this be." *Dṛḍham* means "exceedingly." The word "hard-hearted" (*kaṭhara-hrdaya*) gives scope to the particular suggestion that is achieved through the word Rāma and its literal sense,⁵ just as the word *natabhitti* in the verse that begins *tad geham natabhitti* ("That house with crumbling walls," cf. 3.161 A). Otherwise how would the word Rāma not suggest other meanings connected with other qualities, e.g., the fact that he was born in the family of Daśaratha, that he was the object of Kausalyā's love, the deeds of his childhood, and the acquisition of Sītā? *Asmi* means: "I am the self-same person [who has undergone all these sorrows]." *Bhavīṣyati* expresses action in general, so the meaning is: What will she do? It can also be taken in the sense that "her very being is impossible" [i.e., she will kill herself, or die of a broken heart]. In this way by a succession of memory, name [sc., "Vaiṣeṭhi"], and speculation [sc., "what will happen to her?"]], he has conjured up his beloved from his heart into being present before him. To her, as her heart is about to break, he says with agitation, "Alas, my queen, alas, be brave!" The word "queen" suggests that fortitude will be the proper response.

By this: that is, by the word Rāma, the literal sense of which is not strictly useful here [to the idea intended]. The suggestions of other properties, which suggestions form the purpose [for shifting from the literal to the secondary meaning] are endless; for example, his banishment from the kingdom, etc. And since these suggestions are countless, they cannot be conveyed [simultaneously] by means of the denotative function of words. Even if these innumerable suggested properties were to be conveyed [by denotation] one by one, since they will not be had in one single act of cognition, they will not be the source of a wondrous aesthetic experience and hence they will not give rise to great beauty. But if these properties are suggested, they will assume countless forms (*kim kim rūpam na sahate*) because in the suggestion their separateness will not be clearly perceived. In this way they will become the source of a strikingly beautiful aesthetic pleasure that is analogous to the flavor of a wonderful drink, or cake, or sweet confection [where the individual ingredients cannot be separately tasted but yet add to the flavor of the final product]. For it has been said already that a word which is suggestive reveals a beauty "which cannot be conveyed by another form of expression" (1.15 K). In all cases where the purpose [in a secondary usage] is to achieve a suggestion, this (viz., the simultaneity

of a number of suggestions] should be considered the cause of excellence. The word simply shows that the literal sense of the denoted object (*sañjñin*) is not wholly set aside.

1. *parabhāga*: from the sense of emphasis, work done in relief, etc., *parabhāga* often comes to mean contrast, though that sense is not given by *PW*; cf. *Ragh.* 5.70, *KirArj.* 8.42. 2. *Sobhanahṛdaya* is merely a literal gloss of *suhṛd*. 3. This is a poetic convention (cf. *Ragh.* 1.39 with *Mallinātha* thereon), just as the cuckoo is said to imitate the *pañcama*. 4. Note that *Abhinava* mentions elements from *rasadhvani*, whereas *Ānanda* has given the verse as an example of *avivakṣitavācyā*. *Abhinava* mentions the terms *vibhāva* and *vipralambha* (*śringāra*). This is not, however, a departure from the view of the basic text. There is textual justification, but it will not come until Chapter Three. There, under 3.43, mention is made of all the possible combinations of *dhvani*, *guṇibhūtavyonyigya*, and *vācyālānikāras*. In fact *Ānanda* there mentions this verse as an example of the combination of different types of *dhvani*. 5. The idea is that "Rāma" by itself might conjure up suggestions that are not meant. But the fact that the adjective *kāthorahṛdaya* is used lets us know that it is Rāma's character in the face of sufferings that is meant.

A Another example is found in my *Viśamabāṇalilā*:

Virtues blossom
when admired by men of taste.
When graced by the sun's rays
a lotus becomes a lotus.

In this example the suggestive word is "lotus" in its second occurrence.¹

1. By "virtues" the verse no doubt refers to poetic beauties. They shine forth only under the eye of the connoisseur, just as the lotus opens its petals only in the sunlight. We have here a case of pure *vastudhvani* as opposed to the combination of *vastudhvani* and *rasadhvani* in the previous example.

L Another example: *tālā* in Prakrit means "then," and *jālā* "when."¹ *Gheppanti* means "are taken [i.e., admired]."² He gives a corroborative statement in the line beginning with *ravikirana*.

The suggestive word is "lotus": he is speaking of the bearer of the name "lotus" as transformed into a hundred varieties by such properties as being the abode of the goddess of beauty, etc. [In both this and the previous example] there is blocking of the pure, literal sense [of the words "Rāma" and "lotus"]. The cause [of adopting the secondary sense] is the inherence of those [secondary] qualities in the literal or primary sense. It is through this cause (viz., this connection or inherence) that the word "Rāma" conveys by means of secondary usage (*lakṣayati*) a meaning that is transformed by other qualities. The sense that is suggested [and that forms the purpose of employing the secondary usage] consists of still other qualities which are extraordinary and which are beyond the scope of words [i.e., beyond the scope of denotation]. The same holds true of the word "lotus."³ On the other hand, the word "virtues" (*guna*) denotes merely the bearer of its primary sense. The forced view taken by some that what we have here [sc., in "Rāma" and "lotus"] is [simply] a metaphorical (or secondary) sense (*āropita*) is unconvincing, because wherever a primary sense is blocked by its uselessness we are in the area of suggestion and the secondary sense is only that from which the suggestion arises.⁴

As for what the *Hṛdayadarpana* says, that the aesthetic delight of the verse [of 2.1 a] is occasioned by the distress (*samrambha*) that comes from the particles "alas, alas," we must point out that even in this interpretation the suggestion of an aesthetic experience (*rasadhvani*) is admitted, because distress or agitation (*āvega*) is a transient emotion (*vyabhicāribhāva*) of the aesthetic experience of love in separation (*vipralambhaśringāra*). Furthermore, without the help of the meaning suggested by the word "Rāma," this distress would not blossom forth. For the emotion takes the form of "I can bear it, but what will happen to her?" Moreover, in the case of the word "lotus" what agitation can there be? Enough arguing then.⁵

As there is failure of the literal sense, that sense being useless,⁶ we have in these verses examples of something that is based on the secondary meaning (*lakṣaṇāmūla*) and that may rightly be called suggestion of the type where the literal sense is not intended (*avivaksitavācya*), for in it there is no intention to express its direct meaning. But the literal sense in the form of property-possessor is not totally set aside, since it is carried along [in the sense of Rāma, who is qualified by the loss of his kingdom, etc.]. Hence I have used the expression *parinata* (developed or transformed).

1. See Hemacandra, *Prākṛtavyākaraṇa* 8.3.65. 2. Ibid., 8.4.256.
 3. According to *BP* the *lakṣyārtha* of "Rāma" is Rāma transformed by exile from his kingdom, etc. (*rājyabhramśādiparinatarāma*) and the *vyanigṛthas* are discouragement, weariness, etc. (*nirvedaglānimohādi*); of "lotus" the *lakṣyārtha* is *lakṣmīpātravādiparinatakamala*, the *vyanigṛthas* are *manorathavādi*. Abhinava is not so precise. 4. What Abhinava is objecting to is an interpretation that would rest satisfied with finding some single property of Rāma or of the lotus as the final intention of the verses, this property being arrived at by *lakṣaṇā* or *āropa*. Such an interpretation is far from being unreasonable and can be dismissed only by appeal to the general theory of suggestion. The theory demands that everywhere that we find *mukhyārtha-bādhā* together with a *lakṣya* sense that does not rest merely on *rūḍhi*, there must be a suggestion. In the present examples the suggested sense, except that it is said to be multiple, does not differ very noticeably from the *lakṣya* sense. 5. Abhinava's point is that the *sāmrombha* does not actually consist of the words *he hā hā*. It consists in the fact that Rāma thinks, "I can bear it, but she cannot." Now this knowledge we cannot have without the use of the word "Rāma" as a *vyanjakaśabda*. He is not fair, however, in saying that Bhāṭṭānāyaka's interpretation must admit *rāsadhvani* in the stanza. Bhāṭṭānāyaka admits that there is *rāsa* in the stanza, but not *dhvani*. As though aware that he has pressed his criticism too far, Abhinava turns to an example where there is no *rāsa*. And yet the process of our understanding "lotus" is the same as the process of our understanding "Rāma." 6. In the case of the first example "Rāma" in its literal sense is useless to the idea of the capacity to endure those stimulating emotions (*uddīpanavibhāvus*) that are described in the stanza. In the case of the second example the second occurrence of the word "lotus" is useless in its literal sense, which would merely be a repetition of the prior occurrence.

A An example of the second variety, where the primary meaning is entirely set aside (*atyantatiraskṛta*) is a verse by the first of poets, Vālmīki:

The sun has stolen our affection for the moon.
 whose circle now is dull with frost
 and like a mirror blinded by breath
 shines no more.'

In this example the suggestive word is "blinded."

1. The verse is *Rāmāyana* 3.15.13, from Lakṣmaṇa's description of wintertime. *L* is incorrect in assigning the words to Rāma. *Sauḍhāgya* means literally success in love. The moon, which is loved for its coolness in summer, loses its hold on our affection in winter, when we turn to the sun for warmth. Compare *Rāmāyana* 3.15.5 from the same description: *subhago havyavāhanoh*, "and fire has won our affection." The point of quoting the verse is for its phrase "a blinded mirror," which *L* will discuss in detail.

L By the first of poets shows that [this kind of] suggestion is well known in literature.¹

The sun has stolen: these are the words of Rāma describing the winter when he was at Pañcavati. "Blind" (*andha*) means one whose sight is destroyed, for even a person born blind has had his sight destroyed in the womb. [When we say of someone:] "He is blind; he cannot see in front of him," the meaning of the word "blind" is only partly set aside, not entirely. But to a mirror, such as we have here, blindness cannot be applied even by an imaginary superimposition of this literal sense [for a mirror, being insentient, has no sight which could be destroyed]. The word "blind" can apply to a mirror only in the secondary sense of "being incapable of making a clear representation," a sense occasioned by the presence of that incapability in a man who is literally blind. The purpose of using this word here is that it suggests numberless properties such as an exceptional loss of beauty, uselessness, etc.

As for what Bhāṭṭanāyaka has said, that because of the use of the word "like" (*iva*) there is no secondary usage at all in this stanza,² he said this without really thinking about the meaning of the stanza. For the word *iva* conveys the similarity between the moon and the mirror. The words "blinded by breath" qualify "mirror." If, however, the word *iva* is connected with the literal sense of the word "blind" (*andha*), then we shall be left with the presentation [of an identity] "the moon a mirror." This construction of the word *iva* is harsh.³ To say that the word *iva* should be connected both with "blinded by breath" and with "mirror"⁴ is not proper. This procedure might be valid in the *Mīmāṃsā* system; it has no place in poetry. So enough.

1. The line is mispunctuated in both the Kashi and the Vidyābhavan editions. In Kashi, p. 172, *Locana*, line 2, delete both *dandas* and put *dandas* in place of the dashes. 2. Bhāṭṭanāyaka would join the word *iva* with *andha*: "a mirror blinded as it were." Here "blinded" is used in its literal sense, the

fancy being expressed by the word *iva* and therefore not being suggested. 3. Abhinava's argument is that we need the word *iva* to connect moon and mirror: *candrumā ādarśa iva*. If you borrow the word *iva* to express the fancy *andha iva*, you will be left with an awkward *rūpaka*: *ādarśasā candrumā*. The only solution would be to take the word *iva* twice (*dvṛtyā*), as the grammarians and the Mīmāṃsakas sometimes do; the exegetical technique is known as *tantra*; see 2.4 L, note 12. Abhinava then repels such a solution. 4. In *nīḥsvāsāndha iva*, *iva* would serve as *utprekṣavācaka* (a word expressing the fancy). In *ādarśa iva* it would serve as *dūpamyavācaka* (a word expressing the simile).

A In the following verse the suggestive words are "drunken" (*matta*) and "pride" (*aharikāra*).

Though the sky is filled with drunken clouds
and the woods with arjunas thrashing in the downpour,
these black nights too when the moon has lost its pride
carry off my heart.¹

1. This Prakrit verse is *Gaudavaho* 406. It describes a monsoon night, dear because of its associations of marital intimacy. The *arjuna* is a grey-barked tree with leaves of immense size. It is probably on their account that it is singled out for thrashing in the monsoon storm.

L "Though the sky," etc. [L follows this by a Sanskrit translation of the Prakrit verse; then continues:] The word *ca* should be understood in the sense of *api* (even).¹ Even when the sky is full of drunken clouds [it carries off my heart], not only when it is full of stars. So also the woods when their *arjuna* trees are thrashing in torrents of rain, not only when they are filled with mango blossoms shaken by the breeze from the Malaya moutains. Even these black nights when the moon has lost all pride carry off [my heart], not only nights that are whitened by the rays of the moon. "Carry off" means that they produce longing. The word "drunken" in its primary sense is impossible in

the context. As its sense of "a person who has become intoxicated by the use of wine" is blocked, it applies to the clouds through a metaphorical extension to other properties common [to an intoxicated man] and so suggests thousands of properties, such as irrational conduct, unruly behavior, etc. The phrase "without pride" is also applied by secondary usage. In applying to the moon it suggests the subservience, the lack of luster, the lack of will to rise up and overcome, etc., of one who has literally lost his pride.²

1. The literal rendering of the verse is: "And it be filled with drunken clouds," etc. This use of "and" for "although" is found in Latin and Shakespearean English as well as Sanskrit. 2. The literal sense of "pride" can apply only to a sentient being. In the compound *tatpāratantrya*, *tat* refers to *nirahāṅkāra*.

K The soul of *dhvani*,¹ where the literal meaning is intended (*vivakṣitābhidheya*), has two varieties: one where the suggested meaning is produced without apparent sequence (*alakṣyakrama*) [i.e., immediately, together with the primary meaning], the other where the sequence is apparent.

1. *Dhvaneśātma* is a somewhat ambiguous phrase. One might translate the present *Kārikā* as "The nature of *dhvani* has two varieties," and this is the way Abhinava takes it. But in 2.3 *K*, *A* and in 2.11 *A*, 2.17 *K*, *A*, and 3.16 *A*, the term seems to mean *dhvani* par excellence, the very soul of *dhvani*. In all these passages the term refers to the suggested sense in *vivakṣitānyaparavācyadhvani*. For this eleven-syllable title, which will not fit into *śloka* meter, the *Kārikā* substitutes the abbreviation *vivakṣitābhidheya*. As *L* will point out, the portion *anyapara* (subordinate to another sense) can be supplied from the context.

A The nature (or very self, *ātman*) of *dhvani* is a suggested sense which takes precedence over the literal sense.¹ It has been divided into two varieties: one where the suggestion appears without a perceived sequence between the literal and the suggested meanings, the other where a sequence is apparent.²

1. That is to say, when the literal sense is subordinate to the suggested sense (*anyapara* = *vyāñgyapara*). 2. First we perceive the literal sense; then, after a momentary interval, the suggested sense dawns on us. There is of course a *krama* even in *asamlaksyakrama*, but it is so swift that we no more notice it than we notice the succession of punctures when a needle pierces a pile of lotus petals.

L When the "different nature" (*prabhinnatva*; see 2.1 Intro. *L*) was mentioned of that type of suggestion where the literal meaning is unintended, from what was it meant to be different? For a thing cannot be different from itself. With this point in mind, he says that that type is different from the type where the literal sense is intended; for "intended" and "not intended" contradict one another. So the *Kārikā* says "imperceptible, etc." The word *asamlaksyakramoddyota* is a *bahuvrīhi* compound and means "that of which the revelation, i.e., the process of revelation, is such that its sequence in time cannot be well perceived." The fact that the literal sense is subordinated to something else (*anyapara*), although not expressly stated [in the *Kārikā*], is implied by the expression *vivakṣitābhidheya* ("where the literal meaning is intended") because of the proximity of this expression to the word *dhvani*.¹

Of *dhvani*: i.e., of the suggested sense. The nature (*ātman*): In the previous *Kārikā* the varieties of suggested sense were distinguished on the basis of the literal sense. Now the present varieties are distinguished solely within the suggested sense itself, the distinction being based on the process by which the suggestion operates.² But what sequence can there be within the process of suggestion itself? He tells us: a sequence with respect to the literal sense. The literal sense will here be the *vibhāvas*, etc.

1. The word *dhvani* used in the *Kārikā* implies that the *vācyārtha* leads up to the suggested sense; in other words, that it is *anyapara*. 2. The division in *vivakṣitānyaparavācyadhvani* is based on the *vyāñjanavāyāpāra*, whereas in *avivakṣitavācyadhvani* the basis of division was the *vācyārtha*.

K A *rasa*, *bhāva*, *rasābhāsa*, *bhāvābhāsa*, *bhāvapraśānti*,¹ etc., appearing as a predominant element and [so] constituting the soul of *dhvani*, are assigned to the non-sequential type.²

1. For these technical terms see Introduction, pp. 17-20, 37, and Abhinava's remarks on this section and on 2.4 and its various subdivisions. For *bhāvadhvani* Abhinava invents a wholly new meaning. 2. This is the natural interpretation, with *ātman* having its full value and *vyavasthita* having its normal meaning of "assigned, distributed." *L*'s interpretation is slightly different.

A For the suggested sense, such as a *rasa*, etc., is apprehended nearly at the same time as we apprehend the literal meaning. When it predominates, that is the soul of suggestion.

L Of these: among the two. Only that meaning which is of the form of *rasa*, etc., constitutes the variety of suggestion that is non-sequential. But this is not to say that such a meaning is always non-sequential. For sometimes we find that *rasa* does involve a sequence. When it does, we have a variety of *arthasāktyudbhavānusvānarūpadhvani* (suggestion similar to the resonance of a bell, a suggestion based on the power of meaning), as will be stated later in the text. The word *ātmā*, which means literally one's own nature (*svabhāvacacana*), here conveys the idea of "variety" (*prakāra*). Hence a [suggested] sense such as *rasa*, etc., is called the nonsequential variety of *dhvani*. What is meant is that if the sequence [from the literal to the suggested sense] is not perceived.

Are *rasa*, etc., invariably a variety of *dhvani*? He says no, only when they are revealed as the predominant element, that is, as of major importance [in the poem]. Although at the time of giving the general definition [of *dhvani* in Chapter One, Kārikā 13], this was explained by using the phrase "to which all other elements are subordinated" (*gunikṛitasvārthau*), it is here repeated in order to give occasion for the

discussion of *rasavat* (that which contains *rasa* in a subordinated position) and other figures of speech [in *Kārikā* 2.5]. And these elements such as *rasa* are distributed (*vyavasthita*, i.e., are everywhere present in poetry), for without them there is no such thing as poetry.¹

Although it is through *rasa* that all poetry lives and despite the fact that *rasa* is essentially an undifferentiated mass of aesthetic delight, it may still give rise to an extra degree of aesthetic pleasure through the agency of some particular element which acts as its cause. In such cases, when some particular transient state of mind (*vyabhicārin*) reaches a high pitch and gives rise to exceptional aesthetic delight, we have what is called *bhāvadhvani*.² An example is [*Vikramorvasiya* 4.9]:

Can she be angry
and using her magic to remain invis
But she was never angry for long.
Has she flown off to heaven?
But she loves me deeply in her heart.
Even the demons could not steal her from me
when I was with her.
Yet now she has utterly disappeared.
What turn of fate is this?

Although the *rasa* of love in separation is present throughout this example, the exceptional pleasure is occasioned by the striking effect of the transient state of mind known as "speculation" (*vitarka*).

Transient emotions have three states: inception, stasis, and cessation. As has been said,³ "Vyabhicārins are so called because in bringing [the rasas] before us they act in diverse ways."

Sometimes the emotion is presented in the stage of inception. For example:

The slender damsel heard him when in bed
address her by another woman's name.
She thought of turning away—
decided to try to do so—
had almost done it, loosening one graceful arm—
but could not lift her bosom
from her lover's breast.⁴

In this stanza the words "could not" show that the state of jealous anger is arrested in incipience, since they deny its full emergence; and on this depends the aesthetic enjoyment of the verse.

The stasis [of a *vyabhicāribhāva*, in this case speculation or doubt] has been illustrated just above in the verse "Can she be angry?"

Sometimes it is the cessation of a transient state that occasions the aesthetic delight. This was illustrated earlier in the verse "They lay upon the bed"⁵ and is called *bhāvaprasāma* (the cessation of an emotion). In the verse in question we might also speak of the cessation of a *rasa*, viz., of love in separation due to jealous anger.⁶

Sometimes, again, the cause of aesthetic relish is the coming together of two transient emotions.⁷ For example:

He who has kissed a face
beautified by jealousy
has known the bliss
of drinking nectar.⁸

In this example, in which anger is directly expressed, the man who kisses the face of his beloved as she weeps softly, sobbing with anger, is said to have known the satisfaction of swallowing successive drafts of nectar.⁹ The cause of the aesthetic delight is thus a mixture [of the directly expressed] anger and [the suggested] reconciliation.

Sometimes it is the mixture of different *vyabhicārins* that is the object of [aesthetic] satisfaction. For example:

How can a king of the Lunar Dynasty do a forbidden deed?
May I see her once again!
I have learned the scriptures in order to abstain from sin.
Even in anger her face was lovely.
What will the wise and sinless say?
One could not find her even in a dream.
My heart, come to your senses!
But what blessed man will drink her lower lip?¹⁰

In this stanza the states of mind arranged in pairs are mutually contradictory: compunction and longing, intellectual thought and memory, doubt and despair, firmness and anxiety. Yet since the last state is anxiety, the preceding states confer importance on anxiety alone and thus [by being mixed together] they give rise to the highest aesthetic pleasure. In like manner other [examples] may be supplied. All of these: incipience, conjuncture, mixture, etc., are intended by the use of the term *etcetera* (*ādi*) in the *Kārikā*.

It might be objected that in like manner great aesthetic delight is conveyed through the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas*, and so we should speak also of *vibhāvadhvani* and *anubhāvadhvani*. But no. For both *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* are conveyed directly by denotation [and not by suggestion]. And the aesthetic delight arising from them terminates in

[certain] states of mind (*cittavrtti*, namely the *sthāyibhāvas*) alone; so there is nothing to be aesthetically enjoyed in them apart from *rasa* and *bhāva* [to whose aesthetic enjoyment they lead]. But there is nothing wrong with saying that when the *vibhāva* and *anubhāva* are suggested, they are cases of *vasudhvani*.¹¹

Now when false love (*rasyābhāsa*, literally "the appearance of love") arises out of a false *vibhāva*, the enjoyment is false because of the falsity of the *vibhāva* and hence is known as *rasābhāsa*, "false or improper aesthetic enjoyment." An example is the *śringārābhāsa* (the false aesthetic feeling of love) that arises when we listen to the poem of Rāvana.¹² Although Bharata has said that "the imitation of the erotic (*śringāra*) is comic (*hāsyā*),"¹³ the feeling of its being comic arises only at a later time. In the verse

I merely heard her name
and it acted as a magnet or a maddening charm.
Since that day my heart has known
no moment's rest without her.

there is no occasion for relishing comedy. Now someone will object, "In this verse love is not the basic emotion (*sthāyibhāva*), for it lacks the bond of mutual affection." But who ever said that there was love here? Rather, we have here a case of false love (*rasyābhāsa*, the appearance of love). And it is false precisely because it never occurs to the heart [of Rāvana] that Sītā might be indifferent to him or even hostile. For if this were to occur to him, his desire would disappear. And even if he thinks that she is in love with him, that thought gives no assurance,¹⁴ for he is infatuated with passion. Accordingly, the love is established to be in reality spurious, just as the silver which one cognizes in a piece of mother-of-pearl is spurious. But Bharata himself indicated as much when he used the term *śringārānukṛti* (imitation of the erotic), for *anukṛti*, *amukhyatā*, and *ābhāsa* are all synonyms. Therefore when writers use the word *śringāra* in situations where the love is one-sided, it should be understood in the sense of an imitation (*ābhāsa*) of real *śringāra*. The word *śringāra* [in Bharata's phrase *śringārānukṛtir yas tu so hāsyāḥ*] implies further the possibility of imitation (or falsity, *ābhāsa*) of the heroic and other *rasas*.

Thus, *bhāvadhvani*, etc., are the outflow of *rasadhvani*. [In setting up these categories] we merely single out one major cause of aesthetic delight and consider it separately, just as connoisseurs of scent, even when they enjoy the unified flavor of a perfume, are able to say that the

sweetness comes from the nard,¹⁵ or some other element, alone. But *rasadhvani* is par excellence the intense relish occasioned by the audience's (*pratipattuḥ*) tasting of the basic emotional element when their understanding of this basic emotion has arisen from the combination of the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, and *vyabhicāribhāvas*. For example:

My eyes with difficulty pass her thighs
to wander long in the land about her hips;
then at her waist, uneven with the triple fold,
become quite powerless to move.
But now at last, like travelers parched by thirst
they've climbed the mountains of her breasts
and see at last what they had hoped,
their counterparts, her eyes, that flow with tears.¹⁶

In this example, from the King of Vatsa's looking at the painting [of two figures] which is honored by his own portrait and which he is describing [to his friend] because of the portrait of the heroine, [we know that] the *sthāyibhāva* of love is in that state where it is mutually shared. This *sthāyibhāva*, by means of the combination of *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas*, has reached a point where it can be aesthetically enjoyed. So enough of this long discussion. It is now established that a meaning in the form of *rūpa*, etc., when it appears as the major element [in a work of literature] is a variety of that kind of *dhvani* known as *asamlakṣyakramavyāṇigya*.

Nearly at the same time: the word "nearly" (*iva*) shows that although there is a sequence, it is not perceptible. As we apprehend the literal sense: viz., the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, etc.

1. Abhinava's literal interpretation of the *Kārikā* is: *rasa*, *bhāva*, etc., when appearing as predominant, constitute the variety of suggestion that can appear without perceived sequence, a variety that is widely distributed [in poetry].
2. Presumably Abhinava understands this term as an elliptical compound meaning "suggestion of [a *rasa* brought about by] a striking *vyabhicāribhāva*."
3. The quotation is from *BhNS* Book 7 (Vol. 1, p. 355), where the MSS disagree on the text. The editors have chosen the reading *vividham abhimukhyena rasesu carantī vyabhicārinah*. Abhinava's commentary on Book 7 is lost. Presumably he interpreted *vividham* (in various ways) to mean "by their inception, stasis, and cessation."
4. This verse is found also in Pratihārendrāja's commentary on *Udbhaṭa*, p. 88, and as No. 151 in the *pariśiṣṭa* to the *Amarasātaka*.
5. Quoted above in 1.4g L.
6. Love in separation (*vipralambhasaṅgāra*) is a *rasa*, not a *bhāva*. In the verse in question the separation is caused by jealousy. The *rasa* disappears into its contrary *rasa*, love in union.
7. Read *vyabhicārinoh*.
8. This verse is

found also in Hemacandra's *Desināmamālā*, 1.142. We do not know its origin. For *sumthiāim* read *sumhiāde*. By *osuru* Abhinava presumably understood *īrṣyā*, or possibly *īrṣyāśru* (*BP*), as he says that the anger (i.e., *īrṣyā*) is directly expressed. 9. Literally, "the satisfaction of successive pleasures of swallowing nectar."

10. This stanza is found also in the *Kāvyaoprakāśa*, 4, quotation 53; and 7, quotation 331. It is not from the *Vikramorvāsiya* as many commentators on *Mammata* have said. *BP* says that it represents the words of King Yayāti, who has fallen in love with the brahmin girl Devayāñi despite the restrictions of the laws of caste. The verse is later quoted by Ānanda (3.20 a A below) as an example of the introduction of elements from an obstructive *rasa* (*bere sānta*) in order by stopping short to magnify the *rasa* intended (*bere śringāra*). Compunction, intelligence, doubt, and firmness are *vyabhicāribhāvas* of *sāntarasa*. Longing, memory, despair, and anxiety are *vyabhicārinis* of love in separation. 11. *Vastudhvani* (the suggestion of an object or situation) belongs to the sequential variety of suggestion and will be described later. 12. It is not clear whether the reference is simply to a poem about Rāvana or to a work called the *Rāvanakārya*. See 1.4 g L, note 4, where one may add that the complete stanza is also quoted in *AbhBh.*, Vol. 1, p. 295. 13. *BHNS* 1, p. 295. 14. "Gives no assurance" (*no niscayena kṛtam*): One MS reads *kṛtyam*. The parallel passage in *AbhBh.*, Vol. 1, 295, has *niscayo hy anupayogi*, "Such an assurance proves nothing." 15. Māṇsi is a kind of nard, *Nardostachys jatamansi* (*PW*). 16. *Ratnāvalī* 2.10. The king is looking at a portrait of Sāgarikā and himself.

A Now it will be shown that this type of *dhvani* where the suggestion is without apparent sequence [from literal meaning to suggested meaning] is different from the figure of speech known as *rasavat*.¹

1. The figure of speech *rasavat* was known to the older poets. Dandin says merely that it was a figure charming with *rasa* (2.275). Bhāmaha says little more: "The figure *rasavat* is such that the *rasas* śringāra, etc., are clearly exhibited therein" (3.6). Udbhatta brings into his definition the formative factors of *rasa* as given in *BHNS*: "The figure *rasavat* is where the rise of a *rasa* such as śringāra is clearly exhibited. It is a locus of *rasa*, *sthāyiśubhāva*, *sānicārin* (= *vyabhicārin*), *vibhāva*, and dramatic portrayal" (4.3 Indurāja =

4.4 *Vṛtti*). For Ānanda to establish his system, in which the aim of poetry is *rasa* achieved by means of *dhvani*, it was necessary to distinguish this *rasadhvani* from the old figure of speech. See Introduction, pp. 23–24. He proceeds to do so here by assigning *rasadhvani* to cases where the *rasa* is predominant and limiting the figure of speech to cases where the *rasa* is subordinate or ornamental.

K Wherever the varied word, meaning, and their causes of beauty are subordinated to *rasa*, etc., this is considered the domain of *dhvani*.

A Wherever the words together with the *alankāras* (ornaments, figures) of sound, the meanings together with the figures of meaning, and the qualities (*gunas*), all variously arranged so as to be kept distinct from suggestion, subordinate themselves to the main suggested sense which consists of *rasa*, *bhāva*, *rasābhāsa*, *bhāvābhāsa*, or *bhāvaprasānti*, one may apply the term *dhvani* to that poem.

L Kārikā 2.3 spoke of *rasa*, etc., "appearing as predominant elements." It may therefore be asked if *rasa*, etc., can ever appear as subordinate elements so that it should be necessary to qualify them [as predominant] in order to rule out [their subordination in *dhvani*]. By way of answer the [the *Vṛtti*] proceeds to say, Now, etc. His thought is that there is subordination of *rasa*, etc., when they assume the form of the figures of speech known as *rasavat*, *preyas*,¹ *ūrjasvin*,² and *samāhita*.³ His turn of phrase indicates that *rasadhvani*, *bhāvadhvani*, etc., are not included within the figures of speech *rasavat*, etc. [i.e., the provinces of the two are different], for [in the same way,] it was earlier shown that *vastudhvani* is not subsumed under the figures of speech *samāsokti*, etc. [cf. 1.13 c].

The expression used in Kārikā 2.4, *vācyavācakacārutiuhetu* (words, meanings, and their causes of beauty), is a *dvandva* compound meaning "the literal sense, the denoting word, and their causes of beauty." In the *Vṛtti* [the expression *sābdārthālankārā*] is also a *dvandva* compound meaning "words together with figures of speech based on sound;

and meanings together with figures of speech based on meanings." Is considered: i.e., has already been said [by us in 1.13].

But now,⁴ Bhaṭṭāṇyaka has said: "If *rasa* were perceived (*pratiyate*) as belonging to someone else, the spectator would remain indifferent. Nor can *rasa*, which stems from a poem dealing with a subject like the life and deeds of Rāma, be perceived as belonging to oneself. For if it were perceived as belonging to oneself, we should have to admit that there was a physical production (*utpatti*) of *rasa* within oneself. And such a physical production would be inappropriate coming from Sītā, for she cannot serve as an [objective] determinant (*ālambana-vibhāva*) to the spectator.⁵ Should it be argued that a certain universal "belovedness" (*kāntatva*) causes her to become such a determinant [to the spectator] in the sense of causing a flowering of his latent impressions (*vāsanā*),⁶ we may ask how such a process could be possible in the case of the description of gods, etc. Nor can it be said that during a dramatic performance there is [on the part of the spectator] a recollection of his own beloved. And how can a [stimulative] determinant (*uddipana-vibhāva*) such as building a bridge over the ocean by an extraordinary hero like Rāma ever become generalized [since nobody else could ever do it]? Nor can it be said that Rāma, as full of heroic energy (*utsdha*), is remembered,⁷ for he has never formed part of our past experience. Again, to perceive Rāma's energy through a verbal source of knowledge is not to experience *rasa*,⁸ just as when we watch a couple making love there is no experience of *rasa*.⁹ And if we accept that *rasas* have a physical origin (*utpatti*), the spectator would be so pained by his [physical] sorrow (*karuna*, i.e., *soka*) that he would never return to watch a tragic (*karuṇa*) performance. Therefore there is no physical production. Neither is there a manifestation,¹⁰ for if the erotic *rasa* were a power [located within him] that is manifested, the spectator would make ever greater efforts to obtain those objects [which bring about the manifestation].¹¹ And if you hold that *rasa* is manifested [we must ask the same question as before]: Is *rasa* in the spectator himself, or in someone else? The same difficulties arise now as arose before. Therefore *rasa* is not perceived (*pratiyate*), nor physically produced (*utpadyate*), nor manifested (*abhisvajyate*) by a poem. Rather, poetic words are of an altogether different nature from ordinary words, thanks to their threefold operation. Their denotative power (*abhidhāyakatva*) operates within the limits of the literal meaning; their aesthetic efficacy (*bhāvakatva*) operates in the area of the *rasas*, etc. [i.e., it transforms the *vibhāvas*, etc., into *rasa*]; and their efficacy of aesthetic enjoyment

(*bhogakṛtva*) operates within the sensitive audience. The working of a poem consists of these three operations. If one were to claim that in poetry denotation alone held sway, then what would differentiate *sleṣā* (artistic double meaning) and other figures of speech from such devices as the forcible taking of a word in two senses (*tantra*),¹² etc., in scientific works? Moreover, the varieties of alliteration would be virtually useless. And what purpose would be served by the avoidance of such faults as indelicacy of sound (*śrutiduṣṭa*)?¹³ Therefore there is a second operation known as the efficacy (*bhāvanā*) of *rasa* (i.e., the ability to create *rasa*), thanks to which denotation assumes a new dimension. A poem's having the efficacy (*bhāvakaṭuva*) to create *rasas* is nothing more than a poem's power of making the *vibhāvas*, etc., universal. Once a *rasa* has been thus realized,¹⁴ its enjoyment (*bhoga*) [is possible], an enjoyment which is different from the apprehensions derived from memory or direct experience and which takes the form of melting, expansion, and radiance.¹⁵ This enjoyment is like the bliss that comes from realizing [one's identity] with the highest Brahman,¹⁶ for it consists of repose in the bliss which is the true nature of one's own self, a nature which is basically *sattva* but is intermingled with the diversity of *rajas* and *tamas*.¹⁷ It is this aesthetic pleasure (*bhoga*) alone that is the major element [i.e., the purpose of poetry] and it is something already [eternally] accomplished (*siddharūpa*).¹⁸ Any instruction that poetry may furnish is incidental."¹⁹

On this subject we may make the following remarks. To begin with, there are different opinions among the critics on the very nature of *rasa*. Some, for example [Lollāṭa], say that what is a stable emotion (*sthāyibhāva*) in a former state, being nourished by the addition of the transient states of mind (*vyabhicārins*), etc., just that much, as belonging to the character portrayed (*anukārya*), is *rasa*. The *rasas* [are not located in the actor or audience of a drama. However, they] are called "dramatic" *rasas* (*nātyarasādh*) because they are used in drama.

[Against this view it may be said²⁰ that] a state of mind (*cittavṛtti*) is something that underlies a series of properties [i.e., is really a trend of mind],²¹ so what can it mean to say that one state of mind is nourished by another state of mind? Wonder, grief, anger, etc., are not gradually augmented; [on the contrary, they diminish with time].²² Therefore there is no *rasa* in the character being portrayed. [On the other hand] if *rasa* were to lie in the actor, he would be unable to follow the tempo (*laya*),²³ etc. Again, if one were to say that *rasa* lies in the spectator, how could there be delight? On the contrary, in tragic (*karuna*)

performances the spectator would experience only pain. Therefore the above theory will not do. What will do? As states of mind are endless [chains], it is impossible to imitate them exactly. Moreover it would be useless to do so because if we did perceive the exact state, we should derive nothing from it, because we should be indifferent [as the state would belong to someone else].

Therefore²⁴ *rasa* is an apprehension (*pratipatti*) of a stable emotion whose nature is not exactly fixed. It results from the addition of the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, and *vyabhicārins* and takes the form a of relishing (*āsvāda*) different from memory because there is a direct object (*gocara*) of its perception of the *sthāyin*, e.g., "This Rāma [standing before me as represented by the actor] is happy."²⁵ This apprehension of *rasa* depends on the actor and is found only in plays. It requires no other basis. But the actor must be thought to be²⁶ the character portrayed in order for the audience to enjoy the experience. Only this much²⁷ and nothing more is required for the aesthetic experience of the *rasa*. Therefore, *rasa* exists only in the drama and not in the characters to be portrayed, etc. This is the view of some.

Others²⁸ say: The appearance (or semblance, *avabhāsa*) of a stable emotion in the actor, which has been brought about by a set of causes such as dramatic representation, etc., is like the semblance of a horse drawn on a wall by means of yellow and other pigments. When it is relished by an act of perception, known otherwise as a relishing (*āsvāda*) because it is beyond ordinary experience, it is called *rasa*. And so the expression *nātyarasāḥ* is to be explained as *nātyād rasāḥ*, i.e., *rasas* arising from drama.

Others, however, say: The *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* are presented to the spectator with the help of particular dramatic equipment (*vīśiṣṭā-sāmagrī* = acting, music, dialogue) so as to engage the latent impressions of the spectator that underlie that mental state which forms the stable emotion that is sought to be produced by these *vibhāvas* and that is brought within view by these *anubhāvas*.²⁹ The *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* when accompanied by this relishing of bliss within the self are the *rasa*. [That is to say,] these *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* themselves are the *rasa* and the term *nātyarasāḥ* means the *rasas* which are the drama.

Still others say³⁰ that *rasa* is the *vibhāva* alone, others that it is the *anubhāva* alone, and some that it is the *sthāyibhāva* alone, some that it is the *vyabhicāribhāva*, still others that the combination of these four is *rasa*. Some say that *rasa* is the character being portrayed. Others

say that *rasa* is the conglomeration of these five elements. But enough on this score.

Another point is that the occurrence of *rasa* in poetry is wholly analogous to its occurrence in drama.³¹ Where drama makes use of realistic style (*lokadharmī*) and theatrical style (*nātyadharmī*),³² poetry uses the styles of direct expression (*svabhāvokti*) and artificial expression (*vakrokti*).³³ In both cases *rasa* is produced in these styles by the combination of extraordinary³⁴ *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, and *vyābhicārins* presented in language that is clear, sweet, and forceful.³⁵ Granted that the perception of the *rasas* in poetry is distinct in nature from that experienced in drama, because the means differ whereby it is brought about, still, the same scheme (*sarṇi*) holds for both forms of art.³⁶

Having arrived at this point, [we can see that Bhaṭṭānāyaka's] criticism, pointing to the impossibility of a *rasa*'s residing in the spectator or in someone else, applies only to the first view [that we described after Bhaṭṭānāyaka's].³⁷ But in all the views [that followed Bhaṭṭānāyaka's] the unavoidable fact remains that *rasa* is perceived. For if it were not perceived, we could have no dealings with it, just as we can have no dealings with a goblin.³⁸ However, just as we have sensory, inferential, verbal, intuitional, and yogic perception, all of which are undifferentiated so far as being perceptions, but each of which is distinct because of differences in its means of production, just so may we have this other type of perception that is called tasting (*carvāṇā*), relish (*āsvāda*), enjoyment (*bhoga*), [which is distinct from other types of perception,] because its basic components, namely the *vibhāvas*, etc., helped by sympathetic response (*hrdayasamvāda*), etc., transcend [the experience of] the workaday world. To say that "rasas are perceived" is a turn of phrase as when we say "he is cooking the rice pudding," for the *rasa* consists in the being perceived [of the *vibhāvas*, etc.].³⁹ Relishing (*rasanā*) is a special kind of perception. This perception [of *rasa*] in drama is distinct from every-day cases of inference, although it depends on inference in the initial stages [since one first infers, from the *vibhāvas*, etc., the stable emotion that is being portrayed]. Similarly, in poetry the perception of *rasa* is different from other kinds of verbal cognition (*abhidhā*, *lakṣaṇā*, *tātparya*), but in the initial stages it depends on direct denotation (*abhidhā*) as a means [of reaching the suggested sense].

Accordingly, the case [of Bhaṭṭānāyaka] against us is destroyed because it never really had occasion to arise.⁴⁰ Again, it is a rash statement indeed to say that the extraordinary deeds of Rāma do not win a

sympathetic response from everybody. For minds are characterized by a great variety of latent impressions (*vāsanā*). As has been said: "Latent impressions are endless because desire is eternal." and "Though separated by birth, place and time, the latent impressions are uninterrupted because of the correspondence of impressions and memory" [i.e., though several lives intervene, impressions still give rise to the old reactions].⁴¹

Therefore it is now established that there is perception of *rasa*. Moreover, this perception in the form of aesthetic relishing is physically produced (*utpadyate*). And the verbal operation in bringing about this perception is the hinting (*dhvanana*), the suggesting (*vyanjana*), of the literal sense and denotative words, which is an operation different from *abhidhā* and *lakṣanā*. [What Bhāṭṭācārya calls] the poem's operation of causing aesthetic enjoyment (*bhogikarāṇa*) of the *rasas* is nothing other than the operation of suggestiveness. As for aesthetic efficacy (*bhāvavatva*), this too is nothing more than what is included in the use of appropriate qualities (*guṇas*) and figures of speech, a subject of which we shall speak in some detail [later in this chapter]. What is new about all this? And when you say that poetry is effective (*bhāvaka*) of *rasas*, you have revived through your aesthetic efficacy the theory of physical production (*utpatti*) [which you had hoped to destroy].⁴² Again, one cannot say that in poetry the words alone are effective of *rasa*,⁴³ for if their meaning is unknown, no *rasa* can arise. Nor can one say that it is the meaning alone, for if the same meaning is expressed in other words, *rasa* does not arise.⁴⁴ We explained that both word and meaning were effective when we said, "In which a sense or word suggest that suggested meaning, etc." [1.13 K]. Accordingly, with the operation known as suggestiveness serving as means and with the qualities, figures of speech, and propriety, etc., serving as procedure (*itskārtavyatā*), poetry, which is effective (*bhāvaka*) [of *rasas*], effects (*bhāvayati*) the *rasas*; and in this three-term scheme of efficacy (*bhāvanā* as understood by the Mīmāṃsakas) suggestiveness fits in as the means.⁴⁵

Again, aesthetic enjoyment (*bhoga*) is not produced by the words of poetry [i.e., the power of aesthetic enjoyment (*bhogakṛtvā*) is not a third function of poetic words, as BN would have it]. Aesthetic enjoyment, which is a melting, expansion and radiance,⁴⁶ otherwise known as relishing (*dsuvāda*), comes about rather from the cessation of that obscuration [of the true nature of the self] which is caused by the thick darkness of ignorance. In bringing this cessation to its

superlative degree it is suggestiveness that should be given the place of honor. When *rasa* has been achieved by means of suggestion, this power of aesthetic enjoyment inevitably follows. For enjoyment is nothing other than the incomparable thrill of delight that arises from tasting the *rasa*. But it is wrong to think that the varieties of relishing are fully enumerated by melting, expansion, and radiance, because there are innumerable possible variations on account of the endless variety [of human character] created by the varying degrees of predominance among the components of character, *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. We admit [with Bhaṭṭācārya] that the relishing of *rasa* bears a family resemblance to the relishing of the ultimate brahman. [We further admit that] the educative effect (*vyutpādaka*) [of poetry] is different from that which comes from scripture through its mandates and from history through its narrations.⁴⁷ For in addition to the analogy which it furnishes that we should behave like Rāma [and not like Rāvaṇa], it produces in the final result an expansion of one's imagination which serves as the means of tasting the *rasas*. With this view we find no fault.

Accordingly, it is established that *rasas* are suggested and that they are enjoyed by their very perception. Now this suggestion can be either primary [i.e., the *rasa* that is suggested can be the primary sense of the sentence or stanza] or secondary. If it is primary, it is a case of *dhvani*. If not [i.e., if the suggested *rasa* is only secondary], it is a case of a figure of speech such as *rasavat*, etc. This is what he now says in: the main suggested sense, etc. Kept distinct: viz., because of their having been determined to be distinct by the reasoning already employed [in 1.13a and following passages].

1. *Preyas*: name of a figure of speech also known as *preyasvin* (3.34 L) and *preyolankāra* (1.4 a A, et passim). Dandin and Bhāmaha give no definition, but their common example (Dandin 2.276, Bhāmaha 3.5) seems to show that they understood the figure to be a form of complimentary address. L on 2.5 ascribes to Bhāmaha the view that "preyolankāra is a loving description addressed to a god, a king, or a son." See 2.5 a L, and note 2. 2. *ūrjasvin*: an expression of pride or egoism, Dandin 2.275, Bhāmaha 3.7. *Udbhata*: "the description of bhāvas and rasas that exceed the bounds of propriety owing to love, anger, etc." (4.5 Indurāja = 4.9 Viṛti). 3. In Dandin (2.298) and Bhāmaha (3.10) *somāhita* is the description of a happy coincidence. *Udbhata* completely changed the definition and brought it into connection with *rasa*: "A passage concerned with the cessation of *rasa*, *bhāva*, or their improper

varieties, in such a way that there is no trace of a new *anubhāva* is called *samāhito*" (4.7 *Indurāja* = 4.14 *Vivṛti*). 4. Abhinava now takes up the question of the nature and genesis of *rasa*. The question involves him in a long criticism of the views of his predecessors. For the views of Bhāṭṭānāyaka and for the meaning of his technical terms *bhāvanā*, *bhāvavatwa*, and *bhāvita*, see the remarks in the Introduction, pp. 35–36. The passage 2.4 L from this point on has been translated in an appendix by Raniero Gnoli, *The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta*, 2nd. ed., Chowkhamba, 1968. In the same book Gnoli also translates the longer version of the same argument found in the *Abh.*, Vol. 1, 2nd. ed., pp. 272ff. 5. BN means that *Sitā* is a *vibhāva* only with respect to *Rāma*, not to the spectator. This holds, of course, only so long as *rasa* is regarded as a physically produced, perceptible, emotion. If *rasa* is admitted to be imaginatively achieved (*bhāvita* rather than *utpādita*), BN presumably would admit what Abhinava and all later critics hold, that *Sitā* is a *vibhāva* with respect to the spectator's *rasa*. 6. *vāsanā*: literally, the perfuming of the self by its former experiences, including those of previous lives; hence, the latent impressions of the mind, which give it a proclivity to particular tastes and sympathies. 7. Energy (*utsāha*) is the *sthāyi�hāva* that underlies the *rasa* of heroism (*vīrya*). But how can *Rāma*'s energy produce any such *rasa* in us? We cannot remember it, for the definition of memory in Indian philosophy involves direct experience (*anubhava*). 8. The expanded version of this passage in *ABh.*, Vol. 1, p. 278 (Gnoli p. 10) reads: *na ca śabdānumānādibhyas tatpratītāu* (where *tat* refers to *utsāhādi-sthāyi�hāva*) *lokasya sarasatā yukta pratyakṣād iva*. The point is that these various forms of perception lead only to information (*jñāna*), not to *rasa*, which must be experienced through some other *pramāṇa*, viz., through the *bhāvanā* of poetry. 9. Abhinava in *ABh.*, Vol. 1, p. 278 (Gnoli p. 10) expands the analogy of watching a couple making love by adding: *pratyuta lajjājugupsāsprhādisvocitacittavṛttiyantarodayavyagrata�ā kā sarasatvakathāpi syat*, "On the contrary, because one becomes preoccupied with one's own respective emotional reactions such as embarrassment, disgust, or even sexual desire, we cannot say that this is an aesthetic experience at all." Abhinava makes the same point in *ABh.*, Vol. 1, p. 35. See also *DR* 4.39 and *Avaloka* thereon.

10. BN's distinction of *utpatti* and *abhivyakti* is presumably the common distinction in Indian philosophy. *Utpatti* is the origin of an entity that was previously non-existent. Thus the Naiyāyika says that when a jar is made, there is *utpatti* of the jar. *Abhivyakti* is the transformation into sensible form of what was formerly imperceptible although existent. When a jar is in a dark room, it is manifested by the light of a lamp. It seems unlikely in view of what follows that BN is using *abhivyakti* in Abhinava's more restricted sense, namely, the manifestation of a suggestion by verbal means. 11. The basic argument against *abhivyakti* is omitted, presumably as being obvious. BP supplies it:

there can be no manifestation of *rasa* in the spectator because he had no *rasa* in the first place, that is, prior to his experience of the play or the poem. The argument against *abhivyakti* that is expressed is an argument against someone who supposes that the *rasa* might indeed be present in the form of the spectator's latent emotions. These might be roused into manifested, sensible, form by the *vibhāvas*. But then, the hypothesiser should push his analogy further. When we are looking for a treasure in a dark room, we want more than to be told about a lamp. We want to take the lamp in hand. Spectators would rise from their seats and try to carry Sītā away with them. See *DR* 4.39 and *Avaloka* thereon: *itareṣām asūyānurḍgāpahārecchādayah prasayyeran.* 12. This meaning of *tantra* is not found in *PW*. It occurs in *Vāmana*, *KAS* 4.3.7, in Padmapāda's *Pañcapaddikā*, Madras ed., p. 37, line 4, and elsewhere. *BP* exemplifies the technique of *tantra* by an old interpretation of *Pāṇ.* 1.3.3. The sūtra reads *hal antyam*, apparently meaning "the final consonant [of a technical term of grammar is an exponential marker]." But we cannot know that the expression "*hal*" means a consonant until we are told that its "l" is an exponential marker. So Kātyāyana (*Vart.* 5) recommended taking the word *hal* in two ways, that is, by *tantra*, as (1) the l of "*hal*" [here *hal* is a *tatpuruṣa* compound] and as (2) *hal* (= all the consonants from h to the exponential marker l). The sūtra then means: "The l of *hal* is an exponential marker and all the consonants from h to the exponential marker l are used as exponential markers when final in a technical term of grammar." This is how to make a computer bank, not poetry. 13. *śrutiḍuṣṭa*: see 2.11 below. The term goes back to *Bhāmaha* 1.47. 14. *bhāvite ca rase*: the notion of universalization is not present in the term *bhāvita* itself but derives from *BN*'s explanation of how the realization or creation (*bhāvanā*) comes about. 15. *Druti*, *vi-* storm, and *vikāsa*. We can point to no technical use of these terms earlier than *BN*, but they occur frequently in later texts. Dhanika on *DR* 4.43 assigns expansion (*vistara*) to the enjoyment of the heroic, and radiance (*vikāsa*) to the enjoyment of the erotic. Melting (*druti*) would naturally be connected with the *rasa* of compassion and with love in separation; see 2.8 *K* below. But *BP*, on the authority of the *Kāvyaprakāśasārikā* of Rājānaka Ruuyaka, identifies the three forms of enjoyment with the three respective components of the enjoyer: *rajas*, *tamas*, and *sattva*. On those terms as connected with the *rasas*, see Gnoli, p. 46, and Raghavan, *Bhoja*, pp. 467ff. 16. *BN* seems to have thought that aesthetic bliss was actually superior to yogic bliss; cf. the quotation of *BN* in 1.6 *L*. Abhinava in 3.43 b *L* seems to reverse this value judgment. 17. Abhinava's summary is so condensed that it almost misses the point. From *Māmṛata* 4.28, prose following verse quotation 26 (page 90), it appears that *BN* conceived of the bliss of poetic enjoyment as bringing about a predominance (*udreka*) of the basic goodness (*sattva*) of the soul over its adscititious elements of passion (*rajas*) and brutishness (*tamas*). For an account of the relation of *BN*'s views to the Sāṃkhyas, see M. Hiriyanna's

article "Indian Aesthetics" in *Proceedings and Transactions of the First Oriental Conference*, Poona, 1922, pp. 246-247 and Raghavan, *Bhoja*, pp. 466ff.

18. *Siddharūpa*: The term and its implications are taken from Vedānta philosophy. Śaṅkara argues that knowledge of Brahman cannot be learned or produced or manifested or developed in any way, for knowledge of Brahman is Brahman, which is not a *sādhya* (that which is to be produced) but a *siddha*. Brahman and Brahman-knowledge are eternally present, the appearances to the contrary being due to illusion. Just so Bhāṭṭānāyaka would take aesthetic enjoyment to be an eternal mode of being, which is not produced or manifested. In the last analysis he puts the relation between the aesthetic efficacy of the poem and the self-realization of the audience outside the relation of cause-effect which applies to the phenomenal world. It would be the same relation as that between the Upanishads and knowledge of Brahman. Abhinava in what follows will object to this high-flying mysticism.

19. Abhinava himself adopts this view at 1.1 e L. But cf. 3.10-14 f L. The view is not held by earlier authors of known date, but may be found in the *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa* 15.2.

20. *BP*, followed by Jagannāth Pāṭhak in the Chowkhambā edition, assigns the following criticism to Śrīśaṅkuka. 21. The point seems to be that a pure *sthāyibhāva* such as grief or anger is never found so that we could speak of its being nourished by the transient emotions (*vyabhicārins*). What we find is a complex mental state (*cittavṛtti*), composed at any one time of a *sthāyibhāva* and *vyabhicārins*, this complex flowing forth like a river until it loses itself with the passage of time. 22. This passage has been expanded in *Abh.*, Vol. I, p. 272: *sokasya prathamam tūrnatvam kālāt tu māndyadarśanam*. A mental state becomes intensified or weakened because of external objective stimulants and not because of other mental states like the *vyabhicāribhāvas*. 23. *BP* takes *loya* differently: *loyo nāma nṛtagitavādyānām ekatānārūpam sāmyam*. But we feel that the normal sense which the word *loya* has in music fits the context better. 24. *BP* identifies the following view as *svamata*: "his own view," meaning thereby the view of Śaṅkuka, whose objections have just been recorded. Jagannāth Pāṭhak also supposes that Śrīśaṅkuka's remarks are here continued. The identification seems to me probable but not quite certain. The seeing of the actor as "ayam Rāmāḥ sukhī" occurs in the account of Śaṅkuka's view given in *Abh.*, Vol. I, p. 273, and if nothing is here said about inference (see note 26 below), the same is the case with the account in *Abh.* The only occasion of doubt is that the analogy of the painted horse, which Mammāta attributes to Śrīśaṅkuka, occurs not in this view but in the view which follows. 25. *ayam rāmāḥ sukhī* is explained by *BP*, p. 185, as *rāmo 'yam sitāviṣayakaratimān*. 26. Nothing is here said about inference. Apparently Śrīśaṅkuka claimed that the spectator infers the identity of character and actor. It is this hypothesis of inference that brings the sharpest criticism on Śaṅkuka in other texts. 27. *adah* means *idem*, as often in *L*.

See Text, p. 160, line 5; p. 239, line 3; p. 258, line 9. 28. It is difficult to identify the person who held this opinion. According to Mammāta, line 8 of prose following 4.28 (page 88), the painted horse analogy (*citraturaganyāya*) belongs to Śāṅkuka. 29. This is a difficult passage. *Tadubhāvanīya* means *vibhāvavibhāvanīya*: "the *sthāyīdhāva* that is sought to be produced by those *vibhāvas*." *Tadanubhāvanīya* means *anubhāvānubhāvanīya*: "the *sthāyīdhāva* which is intended to be brought within the purview of the spectators by means of those *anubhāvas*." *Visīṣṭasāmagryā samarpayamānam* means *abhinayādisāmagryā sāmājikānām purastād upasthāpyamānam*.

30. For the theories mentioned in this paragraph see Raghavan, *Bhoja*, p. 437. As he points out, Jagannātha Pandita also refers to such theories. 31. The preceding views, except for Bhaṭṭānāyaka's and perhaps those mentioned in the last paragraph, were developed by commentators on the *Nātyasāstro* and apply strictly only to the theater. Abhinava now makes it clear that a theory of *rasa* must apply to poetry as well as drama. 32. On *lokadharmī* and *nātyadharmī* see the long article by V. Raghavan, *JOR* 7 (1933), pp. 359-375 and *JOR* 8 (1934), pp. 57-74. *Lokadharmī* refers to everything in the drama that is realistic, *nātyadharmī* to those artificial conventions that are peculiar to the theater, such as asides that nobody else can hear, monologues, talking animals, gods on the stage. In the thirteenth chapter of the *Nātyasāstro* (Vol. 2, beginning p. 214) Bharata gives a long list of the characteristics of each type. One may note an interesting verse that Abhinava quotes from his teacher on this passage. The verse reads as follows: *yad atrāsti na tatrasya kaver varṇanam arhati / yan nāsambhavi tatra syāt sambhavy atra tu dharmataḥ //* "Not everything that is in the world deserves to be described by the poet in his plays. And what is not possible in the world may occur in plays quite properly." In *ABh.*, Vol. 1, p. 269, Abhinava again voices his opposition to strict realism. 33. These are parallel terms, *svabhāvokti* corresponding to *lokadharmī* and *vakrokti* to *nātyadharmī*. Thus Abhinava is using the terms in their widest sense. The basic distinction is made by Bhāmaha 1.30 and by Dandin 2.363; see also Udbhatta 3.8-9 (*Vīṛti*). The most valuable discussion of *svabhāvokti* is found in the first chapter of Kuntaka's *Vakroktijivita*, but his use of terms is peculiar. For Kuntaka *vakrokti* is almost what *dhvani* is for Ānanda. See the valuable article of V. Raghavan, "History of *Svabhāvokti*" in *Some Concepts*. See also 4.7 A, note 1. 34. *BP* takes the word-stem *alaukika* to modify *sābda*: "presented in a language that is more than normally clear, sweet, and forceful." But the *vibhāvas* are called *lokottararūpa* on the very next page (Text, p. 187, line 5), so they are probably the recipients of the synonymous epithet here. The intention, I suppose, is that the characters and emotional situations of a work of art are in themselves more striking than those that we know from the workaday world. 35. *prasanna, madhura, ojasvin*: these are the *sābdaguṇas* mentioned by Bhāmaha, Dandin, and Vāmana. Ānandavardhana completely altered the older teaching

by bringing them under the system of *rasas*. For him the *gunas* are the properties of the *rasas*; see 2.7 below. Instead of the ten *gunas* mentioned by the older writers, Ānanda accepts only the three mentioned here. 36. The difference in perception (*pratīti*) results from the difference in presentation (*upasthāpana*), the play being presented to the sight and the poem to the ear. But the constituents of *rasa* in the form of the *vibhāvas*, etc., are the same in both. Furthermore, the same scheme of natural and artificial is found in both. 37. I.e., Lollāṭa's view, because Lollāṭa belongs to the *utpattipak্ষa*. He held that the *rasas* are physically produced. Others held that they were manifested or relished. 38. The insistence that *rasa* is perceived is directed against Bhaṭṭānāyaka, who said, just above, that it was not. But Bhaṭṭānāyaka would not on that account have admitted that *rasa* was nonexistent like a goblin. Obviously he meant that perception (*pratīti*) is too physical a concept to express the manner in which *rasa* is experienced. So Abhinava goes on to give "perception" a wider area of application. 39. Although we say *odanam pacati*: "he is cooking the rice pudding," a more accurate description would be *tandulān pacati*, "he is cooking the rice grains," because the pudding is the result of the activity while the grains are the object on which the activity works. Similarly, instead of the phrase *rasāḥ pratīyante* "the *rasas* are perceived," we would be more accurate to say *vibhāvādī pratīyante* "the *vibhāvas*, etc., are perceived," for the *vibhāvas*, etc., form the object of our perception; the *rasa* is the result. Or one may even say that the *rasa* is the process of perceiving itself. This qualification of his term perception leaves very little distance between Abhinava's view and that of Bhaṭṭānāyaka.

40. There is a similar passage in *ABh.*, Vol. 1, p. 277, which Gnoli misunderstood: *tatra pūrvapakṣo 'yam bhaṭṭalollāṭapakṣānabhyupagamād eva nābhypagata iti taddūṣanam anulthānopahatam eva*. "This *pūrvapakṣa* [viz., the view of Bhaṭṭānāyaka that has just been set forth] is unacceptable because we do not accept the view of Bhaṭṭalollāṭa. [If we did accept Lollāṭa's view of the physical production of *rasa*, the view called *utpattipakṣa*, then Bhaṭṭānāyaka would have a good argument against us; but we do not.] So the criticisms made by the *pūrvapakṣa* are destroyed, never having had a chance to arise. 41. *Yogasūtra* 4.10 and 4.9. In *ABh.*, Vol 1, p 282, Abhinava has an interesting passage where he claims that the nine *sthāyibhāvas* are present in all human beings, although some predominate in certain people and others in others. He ends by saying: *na hy etac cittavṛttivāsonāśūnyah prātmī bhavati*. In the course of our beginningless journey through this universe we have experienced all emotions. Thus nobody fully aware of his own humanity can fail to be moved by another person's experiences. Again, on p. 283 Abhinava quotes a line from the *Yogabhāṣya* of Vyāsa (2.4): *na hi castra ekasyāṁ striyāṁ rakaṭa ity anyāsu viraktah*, "the fact that Caitra is in love with one woman does not mean that he is out of love with others." This is not meant humorously, but is intended to show that beneath the particular emotions

which we manifest there lies a latent capability of many others. 42. This is a practical man's argument against a mystic. What else than cause and effect can Bhāṭṭāṇāyaka be speaking of when he says *bhāvile ca rasa* "once a *rasa* has been realized"? The identical argument is used against Śaṅkara by the ritualists and by Bhāskara: we are not in *mokṣa* now; if we get there, something must produce the change. See note 18 above. 43. Abhinava's point is that BN said that there are three functions of words; he made no mention of the part played by meanings in producing *rasa*. This seems to be unfair of Abhinava, as he too says over and over that *vyanjanā* is a *sābdavyāpāra*. Why criticise Bhāṭṭāṇāyaka for an imprecision of terminology of which Abhinava is equally guilty? 44. Cf. what Ānanda says on 3.16 m. 45. Abhinava here reduces Bhāṭṭāṇāyaka's term *bhāvanā* to the technical sense given it by the Mīmāṃsā. In the Mīmāṃsā *bhāvanā* is an efficacy residing within the verb of a Vedic sentence which explains how that verb can bring an actor to pursue a given aim by certain means and procedures. For example, we are given the sentence *jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta* "one who is desirous of heaven should sacrifice with a *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice." In the verb *yajeta* "one should sacrifice" there is said to reside *bhāvanā* (we may here overlook the refinement of Kumārila who speaks of two sorts of *bhāvanā*). This *bhāvanā* is connected with three terms or factors: (1) a *sādhyā*, an objective aimed at by the action, (2) a *sādhana* or *karaṇa*, the means leading to that objective, and (3) an *itikartavyatā*, a procedure to be followed in reaching the objective. These terms answer the questions: "What does it effect (*kim bhāvayet*)? With what does it effect it (*kena bhāvayet*)? How does it effect it (*katham bhāvayet*)?" In the case of the sentence "one who is desirous of heaven should sacrifice with a *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice," heaven is the *sādhyā*, the *jyotiṣṭoma* is the *sādhana*, and the performance of the minor sacrifices *prāyāja*, *anuyāja*, etc., is the *itikartavyatā*. Abhinava now argues that in poetry or drama *rasa* (or *rasāsvāda*) is the *sādhyā*, *dhvani* or *vyanjanavāyāpāra* is the *sādhana*, and *guṇālankāra* etc. is the *itikartavyatā*. By reducing Bhāṭṭāṇāyaka's term *bhāvanā* to its position in the Mīmāṃsā paradigm, Abhinava claims that it implies nothing more than is already furnished by his own theory. It is Abhinava's "suggestion" (*dhvani*) which is the *sādhana* by which *rasāsvāda* is achieved. 46. A few lines farther on Abhinava will refuse to limit aesthetic enjoyment to this threefold description (melting, expansion, radiance). He is here simply using Bhāṭṭāṇāyaka's description to show that even under Bhāṭṭāṇāyaka's definition aesthetic enjoyment should not be regarded as a power of words. It is rather a state of the audience that comes about after the words and meanings have produced *rasa*. 47. This admission falls a good bit short of BN's view. BN had said, "Any instruction that poetry may furnish is incidental." Abhinava admits that enjoyment is the main goal and that the instruction of poetry is different from the instruction of other types of literature. But the instruction given by poetry is not without importance.

to him. It has a moral value. Furthermore, inasmuch as it trains us to experience aesthetic bliss, it may even be said to be spiritually instructive. In this way Abhinava is able to make enjoyment and instruction come to much the same thing. In commenting on 3.14 he will say: *na caite prītiyutpatti bhinnarūpe eva, dvaṣṭor apy ekavिषयatvāt*.

K But where a *rasa*, or the like, is subordinate and the main purport of the sentence lies elsewhere, then it is my opinion that in that poem the *rasa*, or the like, is only a figure of speech.

A Although others have defined the domain of the figure of speech known as *rasavat*, nonetheless my own position is this: if in a poem some other sense is principally conveyed and is the main purport of the sentence, to which purport a *rasa*, or the like [e.g., *bhāva*, *rasābhāsa*, etc.] is subordinated, then the *rasa*, or the like, comes under the domain of a figure of speech.

L [Commentary on K:] Lies elsewhere: that is, in a *rasa* or something like a *rasa*, or in a mere fact, or in something peculiarly fit to form a figure of speech. My opinion: This shows that the author holds back other views as being faulty and is first giving his own view as being worthy of acceptance.

[Commentary on A:] Nonetheless: for the province [of the figures of *rasavat*, etc.] as propounded by others is not reasonable, as will be shown later [in Ānanda's comment on this *Kārikā*]. If in a poem: to clarify this loosely constructed sentence, it should be interpreted as follows: In that poem in which a *rasa*, or the like, as already mentioned, is subordinated, and some other sense is the main purport of the sentence—understanding the word "and" in the sense of "but"—that *rasa*, or the like, which though subordinated is yet connected with the poem,¹ should be considered as falling within the province of the *rasādi* figures of speech, called by the terms *rasavat*, etc.² The upshot of this is that a *rasa*, or the like, deserves the name of a figure of speech only when it is subordinate, not when it is otherwise.

1. Thus Abhinava takes the word *tasya* in *tasya cāṇigabhuṭa* (Text p. 191, line 4) as construing with *yasmin kāvye* rather than with *vākyārthibhūtasya*.
 2. The *rasādi* figures of speech are *preyas*, *rasavat*, *ūṛjasvin*, and *samāhita*.
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A As an example of this, in passages of flattery, even though a figure of complimentary address (*preyolāñkāra*) is the main purport of the sentence, a *rasa*, or the like, may be found as subordinate.¹

1. This sentence presents a difficulty. It seems to speak of an *alaṅkāra* as forming the *vākyārtha* (the main purport of a sentence), which is an impossibility, for an ornament (*alaṅkāra*) must ornament the purport; it cannot be that purport. Abhinava will offer three solutions of the difficulty.

L He gives an example for this statement: As an example of this. "This" refers to subordination. His meaning is: as in the example about to be given, so in other places also.

If we follow the doctrine of Bhāmaha,¹ we will take the passage *cātuṣu drsyate* all as one sentence, meaning: "even though *preyolāñkāra* is the main purport, [as it is] in passages of flattery, a *rasa* or the like may be found to form a part"; for Bhāmaha has said, "*preyolāñkāra* is a loving description addressed to an elder, a god, a king, or a son."² In this interpretation, the word *preyolāñkāra* [in A] will be a *bahuvihi* compound and so] will mean: "that [passage] in which a very dear person (*preyān*) is an ornament."³ Such a *preyolāñkāra* can be ornamented. It will not do to take the main purport itself to be an ornament (*alaṅkāra*).

Or, we may take "the main purport" to mean simply the most important element of the sentence, that is to say, the element that is most strikingly beautiful.

Or, we may follow the doctrine of Udbhaṭa and split the sentence in two. [First we will read] *cātuṣu vākyārthave preyolāñkārasyāpi viśayah*, taking *cātuṣu vākyārthave* as locative absolute (*viśayasaptami*), [transposing the word *api*,] and supplying the word *viśaya* from the previous sentence. This will mean: "where flattery is the main purport of

the sentence, there is scope also for *preyolankāra*." For according to Udbhaṭa any *bhāva*⁴ can be called a *preyas*, for affection (*preman*) is used to cover all the *bhāvas*. The sense of the word *api* is that not only is there scope for the figure *rasavadalarikāra*, but for the figures *preyas*, etc., too. By the word *rasavat* and the word *preyas* all the (four) *alaṅkāras* beginning with *rasavat* are included. This is just what he says in that (portion of the split sentence) which now follows: *rasādayo 'nigabūtā drsyante*, to which we must supply *uktaviṣaye*: "the *rasas*, etc., when subordinate, are found to have the same scope."

1. So also, just below, "or if we follow the doctrine of Udbhaṭa." One must not translate, "According to the opinion of Bhāmaha ... the sentence is to be taken as one," for it is out of the question that such early authors could have seen and commented on the words of Ānanda. 2. The text of Bhāmaha as we now have it says no such thing, although the example of *preyolankāra* that Bhāmaha furnishes at 3.5 does not disagree with such a definition. The absence of the quotation in Bhāmaha has already been noticed by Kane, *HSP*, p. 82. But we cannot explain the absence, as Kane was inclined to do, by impugning our present MS of Bhāmaha's verses, for the quotation is not in verse but prose. Possibly Bhāmaha wrote a *vṛtti* on his verses which is now lost, but if so one would expect other quotations from it to survive. Nearly the same words as in the present quotation occur in Rājānaka Tilaka's *Vīṭi* on Udbhaṭa 4.2: *ratir iha devagurunṛpādīviṣayā grhyote, kāntāviṣayāyāś ta ratere sūcane rasavadalarikāre vakyate*. 3. Just such a meaning is given to *preyas* by Indurāja in his comment on Udbhaṭa 4.2 (p. 51, line 27): *preyah-sabdaवाच्येना priyatareṇa ratyālambanena vibhāvena*. 4. For *bhāvālakāra*, we must read *bhāvā* and omit *alaṅkāra*. See Udbhaṭa 4.2.

A This use of *rasa*, or the like, as a figure of speech can be either pure or mixed. An example of the first is:

—

Why do you laugh? You will not get away again
now that I have finally caught you.
Pitiless man, what is this strange love of travel
that drove you from me?
So speak your enemies' wives

clinging to the necks of their husbands in their dreams,
only to weep aloud
when they wake to the empty circle of their arms.¹

Clearly this is an example of the figure of speech known as *rasavat*, for pure *karunarasa* (the aesthetic experience of compassion) is subordinated [to the predominating eulogy]. And thus in similar cases it is clear that other sentiments can be subordinated.

1. The verse occurs also in *SubhA.*, 2570. Its author is unknown. I have followed Abhinava in the interpretation of *r̥iktabāhuvalaya*. Another possible interpretation would be to take *valaya* not as a metaphor but simply in the sense of bracelet. The women's arms would be devoid of bracelets, as they are now widows. *A* and *L* speak of only two instances of *dhvani* in the verse: the suggestion of *karunarasa*, which is subordinate and which is therefore a case of the *rasavat* figure, and a *vastudhvani*, viz., the glory of the victorious king (*nṛpatiprabhāva*), which is predominant. In commenting on similar stanzas commentators sometimes speak of the *vastudhvani* as leading to a third type of suggestion, namely the poet's love of the glorious king (*nṛpativisayaratibhāva*); cf. 2.5 d *L*, note 1.

L Pure means that there is no mixture with another subordinated *rasa*, or with any other figure of speech. Mixed means that there is a mixture.

As a dream comes into being in the likeness of what one has experienced, a wife [here] sees her husband laughing in her dream.¹ "You will not get away again," that is, now that I know your unfaithful nature, I will not free you from the noose of my arms. This explains the "empty circle of their arms" later in the verse. It is only natural to scold a lover who is received back; so she says, "Pitiless man, what is this ... that drove you." She means that she never nagged him even when he called her by another woman's name. "In their dreams" refers to their talking in their sleep.² "Dreams": the plural shows that this happens again and again. This is what the wives of your enemies say, that is, the wives of the kings hostile to you,³ while their arms encircle the necks, that is, are tightly entwined about the necks of their beloveds. Just as they are in that condition, they awake to find the noose of their arms turned into a vacant circle, at which they cry aloud, with full throat. In the stanza the greatness of the king [which is the main purport of the sentence] is beautified by our relishing the flavor of compassion

(or, tragedy, *karunārasa*), whose *sthāyibhāva* is sorrow that is stimulated by the vision of the dream. Here compassion unmixed [with any other *rasa* or *alankāra*] forms the figure of speech. The main purport of this sentence is not baldly stated, without any embellishment, as for example, "You have killed your enemies." Rather, the purport of the sentence is beautified and the beauty is due to the experience of compassion [used as a subordinate element].⁴ Just as⁵ an object, such as a face, can be embellished by another object, such as the moon, for it appears with greater beauty by having the moon as its simile, so also a fact [such as the king's greatness], or another *rasa*, if embellished by a *rasa* used as a subordinate element, will appear with added beauty. So what objection can there be to our using a *rasa*, like any other object, as an ornament (*alankāra*)?⁶ But tell us, an objector may say, in precisely what manner the matter in hand (*prakṛtārtha*)⁷ is beautified by *rasa*. Well; [we might ask him the same sort of question:] just how would it be beautified by a simile? If he says that the matter in hand would be compared to something else by the simile, we can say the same of *rasa*: the matter is made more tasteful (*sarasikriyate*) by the *rasa*. This is obvious. Therefore, what some have asked in the form of an objection, namely, "Just what among the *vibhāvas*, etc., can be beautified by a *rasa*?" is answered by our not accepting the premise.⁸ For it has already been stated that it is the matter in hand that is beautified:

He now shows that this [subordination of *rasa* to the main purport] is often found in literature: and thus. In similar cases means in such cases as those where the greatness of a king, etc., is being described.

1. Perhaps she remembers a scene such as that depicted in the verse quoted at 2.18-19c A.
2. *svapnāyita*: talking in one's sleep; the more usual verb is *utsvapnāyate*, cf. *Mālavikāgnimitra* 4.15.30.
3. Abhinava is explaining the use of *te* in the verse; it is *saṅthi sambandhe*.
4. It is a pity that Abhinava does not really explain here, or at 3.20c, d L, which deals with the same subject, how the relish of compassion makes the main purport of such verses more beautiful. To judge from what follows, the problem troubled him. Most readers will agree that the stanza is beautiful. In *HOS* 44, pp. 372-373, I have spoken of the cruelty of such verses, but also of "their strong poetic effect." But it is hard to explain the effect without admitting that the compassion is really more important in such verses than the glory of their nameless kings.
5. Read *yathā vastrantaram* for *tathā vastvantaram* and remove the *danda* after *cārulayāvahāsanāt*.
6. In this respect a *rasa* is not different from an *upamā* or other figure of speech.
7. *prakṛtārthah*, like *prastuto*

'rthah just below, is used as a synonym of the pradhāno vākyārthah of 2.5 K. 8. We do not accept the fact that the vibhāvas, etc., are beautified by rasa. The vibhāvas, etc., are the means for achieving rasa. What is beautified by the rasa in the figure rasavat is the matter in hand or the main purport of the sentence.

A An example of mixed rasa, or the like, when it is subordi

The women of the Triple City wept from lotus eyes
as Śambhu's arrow-flame embraced them;
but still, though shaken off, the fire caught their hands,
though struck, did pluck their garments' hem,
denied, it seized their hair, and, scorned
like lover who has lately loved another, lay before their feet.
May this same fire burn away your sins.¹

Here the [flavor of love in] separation due to jealous anger (*īryā-vipralambhaśrigāra*) together with the ambiguities (*slesas*)² is subordinate to the main purport of the verse, which is the extraordinary power of the enemy of the Triple City [i.e., Śiva]. It is in such an area that the figures of speech like rasavat, etc. properly belong. That is why there is nothing wrong in including two [usually contradictory] rasas, namely, compassion (*karuna*) and love in separation, in one stanza, precisely because they are both subordinate. For when rasa is the main purport of the sentence, how can it be a figure of speech? Everyone knows that a figure of speech is meant to add beauty to a poem. Surely a thing's own self cannot act as its own beautifier.

1. This famous verse is usually attributed to Amaru, in whose collection it occurs as the second benedictory stanza. But Amaru is likely to have borrowed it, perhaps from Bāna (so SRK 49). It describes the destruction of the demon city Tripura by the god Śiva, an act that the demons themselves had long before prayed for. The act, although painful in immediate effect, is regarded as one of purification and mercy. It is here likened by suggestion to a lover's insistent embrace of a jealous mistress. The verse is quoted again and again in the critical literature; cf. Kosambi's apparatus, SRK ad loc. I

have discussed the meaning of the verse, *HOS*, Vol. 44, pp. 21-22. Ānanda will have more to say of it under 3.20c. 2. The *slegas* in the verse are not *sobdaslegas* (puns), but *arthaslegas*, that is, adj-tives (participles) that can apply to two sorts of object, fire or a lover.

L [Commentary on the verse:] "Shaken off" (*ksipta*) in the case of the lover means rejected; in the case of fire, physically shaken. When it is said that the lover was scorned (*avadhūta*), it means that he was not greeted with an embrace in return. In the case of the fire the same word means that the fire was fragmented (*vīśarārūkṛta*) through the shaking of the entire body. Their eyes were filled with tears in the one case because of jealousy and in the other because of despair.

[Commentary on A's comment:] The love in separation because of jealousy that is suggested by the simile "like a lover," which simile is in turn supported by ambiguities (viz., *kyipta* and *avadhūta*), is subordinated together with the simile and ambiguities and not by itself alone. It is subordinated to the main purport, namely the greatness of Śiva. Although the relish of compassion (*karuṇārasa*) is in fact also present in the stanza, inasmuch as it is not involved in our perception of the beauty of this [love in separation], Ānanda has said that this [relish of love in separation] is combined only with ambiguities and has not said that it is combined with *karuṇārasa*.¹ As this matter [namely the subordination of the figures *rasavat*, etc.] was not thought of by previous writers, he emphasizes it, saying: only such. That is why: sc., because [the relish of love in] separation is only an ornament in this verse and not the main purport of the stanza. Nothing wrong: If either of the two *rasas* [*vipralambhaśrigāra* or *karuṇā*] had been predominant in the verse, the second *rasa* could not have been combined with the first. For love in separation, whose primary emotion is love (*rati*) and which consists in a hope for reunion, is in contradiction to tragedy (*karuṇā*), whose primary emotion is sorrow and which consists in the despair of reunion.

Having thus demonstrated the [possible] co-presence [of two opposed *rasas*] in the course of treating the expression *alārikāra* [used in 2.5 K "alārikāra rasādir iti me matih"], he now explains the intention behind his use of [the emphatic word] "only" (*eva*) [in his comment] by saying: for when, etc.

1. The word *tat* in the compound *tat-cárutva* refers, as *BP* correctly states, to the *iryávápralambha* mentioned in the preceding sentence. Abhinava is not denying tragedy or the aesthetic relish of compassion (*karunarasa*) in the stanza. How could he, when Ānanda admits it in his next sentence? He is simply making it clear that the *karunarasa* does not beautify the *śringārārasa*. The two are held distinct and both are in subordinate positions. Hence they can both be contained in one stanza; cf. 3.20 *K* together with *A*'s comment. The reason that they cannot be combined in *rasadhvani* is that in *rasadhvani* one would have to be subordinated to the other, in which case their contradictory natures would clash.

A Here is a summary of the matter:

What makes any figure of speech a figure of speech is the fact that it is introduced in dependence on a *rasa*, *bhāva*, or the like, which serves as the purport of the sentence.

Therefore, wherever a *rasa* or the like forms the main purport of a sentence, that is not to be included under the domain of the figure of speech *rasavat* or any other, but must be considered to fall under the domain of suggestion (*dhvani*) itself. Of this [suggestion], simile and the like act as the ornaments. On the other hand, wherever anything else predominates as the meaning of the sentence, and where *rasa* or the like contributes to its beauty, that is where *rasa* or the like acts as a figure of speech. Thus the domains of suggestion and of such figures as simile and *rasavat* are distinct.

L Any figure of speech: e.g., simile, etc. The sense is this: the function [viz., ornamentation] that makes a simile a figure of speech works equally with the *rasas*, etc., [making them figures of speech when they serve in the same function]. There must always be something else to be ornamented. Now this something else, even if it be only a fact (*vastumátra*), if it develops into a *vibhāva*, etc., may furnish a *rasa* or

the like as the purport of the sentence.¹ And so everywhere it is *rāsa-dhvani* that is the soul or essence. This is what has been said in the words a *rāsa*, *bhāva*, or the like, which serve as the purport of the sentence.

Of this: viz., of that which is in a dominant position and is the soul [of the poem]. That is to say, although it is the literal meaning [of a sentence] that is ornamented by simile, nonetheless, the oramenting of this literal sense consists in its being endowed with the capacity to convey a suggested sense, and so in reality it is the soul of *dhvani*² that is ornamented and not the literal sense. For it is the soul that is ornamented by bracelets, armbands, etc., which are worn on the body, for these ornaments indicate what is likely to be in the thoughts [of the wearers].³ Thus, an insentient corpse, even if provided with earrings, etc., is not beautiful, for there is nothing [sc., no soul] to be ornamented. And the body of an ascetic adorned with bangles, etc., would look ridiculous because of their inappropriateness to that which is to be ornamented. Nor is anything inappropriate to a body; so it must really be the soul that is ornamented. This agrees with what people feel. They say "I am adorned" [and not "My body is adorned."]. Where *rāsa* or the like acts as a figure of speech: [the Sanskrit phrase] exhibits two genitives that are not in apposition. The meaning is: that alone is the province of the functioning as a figure of speech of *rāsa* and the like. In consonance with this, one should explain in similar manner the earlier passage in the *Vṛtti* [Text, p. 198, line 1, *na rasāder alankārasya visayah*], understanding it to mean: "that is not 'the area of an act of beautifying, of which act *rāsa* or the like is the agent.'⁴

Thus: that is, by distinguishing their spheres as we have done. Such figures of speech as simile: In cases where *rāsa* is that which is ornamented [i.e., where *rāsa* is predominant], and where there is no other *rāsa* subordinated, i.e., no *rasavadalankāra*, there such figures of speech as simile are pure [i.e., are not mixed with any second figure of speech]. Therefore the domain of simile, etc., is not eliminated by the figure *samsṛṣṭi*.⁵

And *rasavat*: the term here includes the figures based on *bhāva* and the like [viz., *rasābhāsa*, *bhāvābhāsa*, and *bhāvapraśama* when used as an ornament], that is, the figures called *preyasvin*, *ūrjasvin*, and *samāhito* [as well as *rasavat*.]⁶

Here is an example of a *bhāva* used as an ornament without any other figure of speech or *rāsa* mixed therewith:

Your foot, O Mother,
 with its sole as soft and red as a lotus petal
 sings with the jingling of its anklets
 like the gabbling of walking geese.
 How did this foot,
 stamping on the head of the buffalo demon,
 grow as ponderous as the Golden Mountain?

In this example the main purport of the verse is praise of the Goddess, but the emotions (*vyabhicāribhāva*) wonder and speculation act as sources of beauty. As they are subordinated to the main purport, this is a case of *bhāvālānikāra*.⁷

An example of *rasābhāsa* used as an ornament is a prayer of my own composition:

If all poetic qualities
 and every ornament of speech
 were to embellish you, my Muse,
 you would not show so fair
 as by taking your words whichever way they come,
 if thus they may delight your heart's love, Siva.
 So only will you be beyond compare.

In this example the main purport of the sentence is that the highest task of speech is to praise God. This fact is made to appear more beautiful by an appearance of the relish of love (*śrīgārābhāsa*) together with the figure of ambiguity (*sleṣa*). It is not the normal relish of love because the beloved is without qualities and without ornaments. For Bharata has said that *śrīgāra* "deals with beautiful clothes and with young and noble people" (*BhNS* 1, p. 300).⁸

An example of *bhāvābhāsa* as subordinated to the main sense of a poem is the following:

May he protect you,
 upon whose killing of their kinsmen
 the surviving demons tremble
 to see the dark color
 even in the collyrium used by their women
 to paint their lovely waterlily eyes.⁹

In this verse we have an example of *bhāvābhāsa* because the accompanying emotion (*vyabhicāribhāva*) of dread (*trāsa*) [which is subor-

are terrifying by nature.¹⁰ Similarly, an example of *bhāvaprasāma* [as subordinated to the main purport] may be supplied.

1. Abhinava here has in mind the third sort of suggestion that we mentioned in the footnote to 2.5 b A. The *BP* gives an example. In the verse "Why do you laugh?" the fact that is ornamented is the power of the victorious king. But this fact itself may assume the form of a stimulant to the emotion (*bhāva*) of love for that king in the heart of the poet. One might better choose as an example "The women of the Triple City." The power of God is a *vasumātā*, but one will readily grant that for many persons this fact stimulates their love of God. 2. *dhvanyātmā*: for the ambiguity of the term see 2.2 K, note 1. *BP* glosses the present occurrence as *dhvanirūpa* *ātmā*. What is meant is the suggested sense in the form of a *rasa*, etc.; but by calling it *dhvanyātmā* Abhinava is able to give the analogy which follows. 3. *BP*. Thus, the necklace and bracelets worn on the body of a young person indicate the likeliness of affairs of the heart, while the staff and orange robe of the ascetic indicate his distaste for worldly pleasures. 4. Abhinava wishes to make the two passages parallel. But surely in *rasādār alankārasya* Ānanda intended to use the words in apposition: "of the figures of speech called *rasādi* (i.e., of *rasavadalankāra*, etc.)." 5. The reason for this comment of Abhinava's on *upamādinām* is that, strictly speaking, there is no figure *upamā* in the verse "The women of the Triple City" that has been under discussion. The *upamā* in that verse is associated with *rasavadalankāra*, so the figure should be known technically as *samsṛṣṭi* (association); see 1.13 i L, note 1. At this rate it might be thought that *samsṛṣṭi* will preempt the whole habitat of *upamā* and of *rasavadalankāra*, and that Ānanda should have written *dhvaneḥ samsṛṣṭeś ca vibhaktavisayatā bhavati*. But no, says Abhinava. There are other instances where *upamā* in a pure form may ornament the predominant meaning. So Ānanda is justified. 6. Abhinava here constructs a more logical system of the *rasādār alankāras* than we find in the older critics. Originally the four figures *rasavat*, *preyasyin*, *ūrjasvin*, and *samāhita* formed a very disparate collection. In Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin they represent, respectively, an emotional passage, a complimentary address, a passage of boasting or pride, and a happy coincidence. Udbhaṭa was the first to bring some sort of logical order to the group, defining *rasavat* as a passage with strong *śringāra*-*rasa*, *preyas* or *preyasyin* as a passage where some other *rasa* was involved, *ūrjasvin* as a passage showing *rasābhāsa* or *bhāvābhāsa*, and *samāhita* as a description of *bhāvaprasāma*. Abhinava now takes the five concepts listed in Kārikā 2.3, viz., *rasa*, *bhāva*, *rasābhāsa*, *bhāvābhāsa*, and *bhāvaprasānti*, and in effect sets up five *alankāras* to cover the five cases where one or the other of these concepts plays a subordinate role in a sentence. 7. According to the older scheme of *alankāras* the figure here will be called *preyasyin*. 8. Abhinava's point is that *śringāra*, suggested through *sleṣa*, here serves an ulterior

purpose. *Hṛdayavallabha* means "one's heart's love" and Śiva will suggest the nāyaka because of the masculine gender, whereas vāṇī (speech, which we have translated as "Muse") will suggest the nāyikā because of the feminine gender. *Ranijayēḥ* in the case of the lover will mean not to delight but to make love to. The śringāra that is here suggested by ambiguities and that in turn ornaments the religious statement of the verse is not śringāra precisely as defined by Bharata. Accordingly, Abhinava calls it śringārābhāsa. The translation "false love" here would misrepresent Abhinava's intent and one should not press his remarks on 1.4 g L (*anaucityena tadābhāsaḥ*) too far. There is nothing inappropriate here in the relation of the poet's muse to God. The ābhāsatva comes simply from the fact that the relish of this love falls outside the strict definition of śringārasa. God, as conceived in Abhinava's Saiva-Vedānta theology, is essentially without qualities. 9. The black collyrium reminds them of the black-complexioned Krishna. The metaphor in "waterlily eyes" (*nayanotpala*) derives from the color of the dark blue waterlily, to which the color of the pupil is likened. The verse is quoted also in *ABh.* I, p. 297. It appears in *SubhA.* as No. 32, ascribed to Candaka.

10. The figure will therefore be ūṛjasvin according to the definition of Udbhaṭa; see note 6 above.

A Should one urge that figures like *rasavat* occur only when the purport of the sentence deals with sentient creatures, this would amount to saying that such figures of speech as *sī* *ile* have a very small domain, or have no domain at all. The reason is that when the situation of something that is not a sentient creature forms the purport of the sentence, we shall find that in some way or other there is some connection with the activity of a sentient creature. If you argue that, regardless of this connection, wherever the literal sense of the sentence concerns that which is not a sentient creature, this is not an instance of *rasavat*, your argument will amount to saying that great works of poetry, the very mainstay of *rasa*, are devoid of *rasa*.¹

1. The Sanskrit passage rendered in this paragraph is puzzling enough to have made Jacobi suggest that a portion of it (from *tarhi*, Text, p. 200, line 1, through *satydm̄ api tasydm̄*, line 3) is an insertion. But it is clear that Abhinava read the passage as we have it and the passage as a whole becomes

clear if one bears in mind that the objector belongs to an old-fashioned school of critics whose view of *rasa* is radically different from Ānanda's. To the objector there is no such thing as *dhvani*. Accordingly, he makes no distinction between *rasa* and *rasavadalankāra*. If the sentence meaning contains *rasa*, *bhāva*, etc., we have a case of *rasavadalankāra*. If it does not, we have the domain of the other *alankāras* such as simile. Now as the criterion by which to distinguish these domains, the objector first proposes *cetanauttānta*. If the purport of the sentence concerns a sentient creature, we have *rasavadalankāra*; if it concerns anything else, we have simile, etc. Ānanda replies that this will leave no domain for simile, etc., for we can always show some connection between the purport of the sentence and sentient creatures. The objector then refines his criterion. He will disregard these possible connections: if the sentence meaning is *prima facie* concerned with what is not a sentient creature, the domain belongs to simile, etc., not to *rasavat*. The answer to this argument is that great passages of poetry, which everyone recognizes as the paradigms of *rasa*—for example, the description of the oncoming season of rain in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, or Purūravas' apostrophes to nature in the mad scene of the *Vikramoruṣiṇī*—will lack *rasa* by the objector's criterion. This is because the objector's theory can admit *rasa* into a poem only in the form of *rasavadalankāra* and by his last refinement he is excluding the descriptive passages of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, etc., from that figure.

L Should one: with these words he introduces the refutation of the opponent's view that was hinted at by the words "my opinion" [in Kārikā 2.5]. The opponent's view is this: as a *rasa* is a mental state, it cannot belong to non-sentient objects.¹ So there is no possibility of *rasavadalankāra* or the like in descriptions of such objects. Accordingly, the sphere of simile, etc., is different from the sphere of *rasavad*, etc. Our author refutes this. This would amount: that is, because of the preceding statement. But the opponent may reply, "It has [already] been said [by us] that the descriptions of non-sentient objects is the sphere [of simile and the like]." Anticipating such a reply, he gives the reason for his statement [that simile and the like would have little or no sphere at all]: the reason is. In some way or other: that is, by taking the form of a *vibhāva* etc. Regardless of this: i.e., even though there may be some connection with a sentient creature. Devoid of *rasa*: the position of the opponent is that wherever there is *rasa* there must necessarily be *rasavadalankāra*. So if there is no *rasavadalankāra*, there will surely be no *rasa*. Hence, according to this view of the opponent, there would be no *rasa* in cases where a living creature is not described. But [our position is different]: we do not say

that there will be no *rasa* if there is no *rasavaddalanikāra*, but only if there is no *rasa* in its form of *dhvani*. And this kind of *rasa* is present in such cases [as the description of the rainy season in the *Rāmāyaṇa*].

1. As the objector belongs to an old-fashioned school (see note on 2.5 e A), he presumably follows Bhāmaha and Dandin in supposing that *rasa* is simply an intense form of *bhāva* that occurs in the character portrayed. It was the *Dhvanyāloka* that changed Indian views on this matter.

A For example:

Its waves are her frowns,
its startled birds the strings of her jeweled belt.
In her anger she trails an opening robe of foam
and twists and turns as her heart strikes upon
my many faults.
Surely her grievance has transformed my love
into this river.¹

[*Vikramorvasiya* 4.52]

This slender vine with its rain-wet leav
shows me her tear-washed lip;
its flowers fallen with the passing of spr'
show her without her jewels.
The loss of its bees
is the silence of anxiety,
as though my angry lady, having spurned me
at her feet,
now feels remorse.

[*Vikramorvasiya* 4.66]

Say, happy friend, if all is well still with the bowers
that grow upon the Jumna bank,
companions to the dalliance of cowherd girls
and witnesses of Rādhā's love.

Now that there is no use to cut their fronds
to make them into beds of love,
I know their greenness will have faded
and they grown old and hard.

[SRK 808, attributed to Vidyā]

1. This and the following quotation are from the mad scene, where Purūravas, distracted by the disappearance of his beloved Urvasī, fancies that he sees her transformed into the various natural beauties of the forest. The commentators differ as to whether *yathā-viddham* in the third line of the first stanza is to be taken as two words or one. In the first alternative: "since [the river exhibits these properties, it must be Urvasī]." In the second, *yathā-viddham* will mean "struck from side to side, with irregular motion." In the second stanza, line 3, read *cintā-maunam* together as a compound.

L Its waves, etc. *Tarangabhrūbhārigā* is a *bahuvrīhi* compound, literally, "whose frowns are [or, have become] waves." "She trails": literally, "forcibly pulling away the trailing [foam]." "Robe": garment. The idea is [that she pulls away her dress] to prevent her lover from holding it. Collecting together in her heart my "many faults," that is, offenses, she is unable to bear them.¹ What is meant is a proud, angry woman (*mānini*). And then, unable to bear the remorse caused by my absence, in order to calm her suffering, she has transformed herself into a river.

, This slender vine, etc. A woman who has grown thin from separation and is stricken with remorse abandons her ornaments. "[With the passing of] its season [of flowering]": this is usually spring or summer. She is silent because she is considering a means [to effect reconciliation] and also because she is thinking, "Why did I reject my beloved who had fallen at my feet [in supplication]?" "Angry": wrathful. Although the sentence-purport in these two stanzas is the description of a river and a vine, in fact they are the utterances of Purūravas who is overcome by madness [and thus they are clearly connected with an emotional situation].

Say, happy friend, etc. "Those bowers" means those that are firmly entrenched in my heart. They are the friends in pleasure, the gay companions of the *gopis*, the wives of the cowherds. For none else [but bowers and vines] can really be the friends of women who are engaged in secret love affairs [since only they can be trusted to keep a secret and to provide shelter for love-making]. He shows that these bowers

were much loved by Rādhā: they were direct witnesses of Rādhā's love-making. Are those arbors on the bank of the daughter of the Kālinda mountain, i.e., the Jumna, well? The question is conveyed by interrogative intonation. The blessed Krishna, residing now in Dvārakā, his memories awakened at seeing the cowherd, asks him this question, and then soliloquizes in a manner full of longing and with feelings of love awakend by memory of the *ālambanavibhāvas* [viz., Rādhā and the *gopis*] and *uddiponavibhāvas* [viz., the bowers].² The purpose of these bowers lay in their being cut, because they were soft, that is, delicate, for making beds of love, that is, love-couches; and that purpose is now fulfilled. Or, we can interpret the line to mean that the preparation, that is, the finished arrangement, into a love-couch, was gentle, that is, delicate; that this was the result of the cutting, which result has now come to an end. The idea is: now that I no longer recline there, what use is there in making love-couches? And so, with assurance that his love for the *gopis* is mutual [i.e., that they will never make love-couches for anyone else], he says, "I know, etc." The grammatical object of the verb "I know" is the sense of the whole sentence which follows. "Will have grown old and hard": If I were present, the leaves would be constantly used, as described above, and would never [have time to] reach such an old, faded, left-over condition. The remark that the leaves have lost their dark lustre suggests that Krishna has been away [from Gokula] for some time, but is still filled with constant longing for it. Thus, the second half of the stanza can be taken to be what Krishna says to himself. Or, we can take it as addressed to the cowherd to ascertain [the fate of the bowers]. The many examples here cited bear out what he has said, [that this applies to] "great works," that is, to many works, of poetry.

1. Abhinava brings out only half the meaning, the half that applies to a sentient being. In reference to the physical river, the line will mean: "aiming frequently at rough or stony ground, its course is irregular." 2. We have followed *BP* in taking the three compounds beginning with *prabuddharati-bhāvam* as adverbs, but it is not impossible to take the second and third as adj. tives qualifying *ratibhāvam*, the object of *āha*.

A In these and other similar examples, although the main purport of the sentences is a portrayal of inanimate objects, we find that a portrayal of human beings is connected therewith. Now, if you should say that whenever such portrayals are given, we may regard them as examples of *rasa*, etc., used as figures of speech, you would leave simile, etc., with a reduced domain or with no domain at all. Because there is really no case of a portrayal of something insentient which is not connected with a portrayal of living creatures, at least in so far as it furnishes an emotional determinant (*vibhāvatva*). Therefore *rasa* and the like are ornaments (figures of speech) when they are subordinate. But when a *rasa* or a *bhāva* predominates, then, by all means, it is that which is ornamented, that is, the soul of suggestion (*dhvani*).

L Now: one may here supply "with a view to prevent a lack of *rasa* from obtaining in such cases." But it might be objected that simile and the like will have their domain in those cases where there is absolutely no question of that which concerns a living being. With this in mind, he says: Because, etc. At least: When insentient reactions are described, for example paralysis, horripilation, etc., because of the fact that such reactions are *anubhāvas* (the physical consequences of an emotional situation), they necessarily bring into consideration living beings [as their basis]. Why say more?¹ Even a totally insentient object such as the moon, a garden, etc., though it is described [apparently] as an end in itself, will necessarily have no part in poetry at all, or even in historical or learned literature, except in so far as it may be a determinant (*vibhāva*) of some state of mind (*cittavṛtti*)². Having thus refuted the opponent's position, he ends the discussion by repeating his own view: Therefore. He means; since the distinction in the domains proposed by the opponent is not correct. Or a *bhāva*: The word "or" shows that *bhāvabhāsa*, *bhāvapraśama*, etc., are to be included. By all means (*sarvākānam*): to be taken adverbially, "in any way." That which is ornamented: and not an ornament (figure of speech).

1. Replace the comma after *tāvat* with a *danda* and replace the *danda* after *kim atrocyate* with a comma. 2. *BP*: What is implied is that it could not otherwise be written about. There is no such thing as does not provoke some sort of mental state or thought.

A Furthermore,

K Whatever depends on the predominant sense should be regarded as qualities (*gunas*). On the other hand, whatever resides in the non-predominant sense should be considered as ornaments (figures of speech), just like bracelets, etc.

A Whatever matters depend on the predominant sense [of a poem], which [sense] will be a *rasa* or the like, are called qualities, just as courage, etc. [are called qualities of the human soul]. On the other hand, whatever matters reside in the constituent elements [of the poem], namely, the words and their literal meanings, are to be considered ornaments (i.e., figures of speech), just as bracelets, etc. [are considered ornaments of the body].

L An ornament must be admitted to be different from that which is ornamented, for this is what we find in the ordinary world, just as a quality is different from [the substance] which possesses the quality. Furthermore, the use of the words quality and ornament is possible only where there is something that may be qualified and something that may be adorned. Now it is only by our theory that this usage can be seen to be logical. With these two propositions in mind,¹ he says: Furthermore. The word has the sense of addition, i.e., it is not only the

arguments already given² that show that *rasa* must be predominant, for there are others as well. The *Kārikā* too can be brought into accord with these two propositions. However, in regard to the first, the first half of the *Kārikā* should be explained as an illustration.³ The text of the *Vṛtti* should also be explained in this way.

1. The two propositions are: (a) An *alaṅkāra* (figure of speech) must be different from the *alaṅkārya* (the body of poetry); (b) One can only speak of an *alaṅkāra* and a *guṇa* (poetic quality) where an *alaṅkārya* and a *guṇin* (viz., *rasa* or the like) are present. 2. It is not clear just what arguments (*yuktijātām*) Abhinava is referring to. But *yukti* refers to something less than formal proof (*sādhana*), e.g., to circumstantial proof and analogy, and one can find arguments of this sort for the predominance of *rasa* in the comments on 2.5. Even when the main purport of a sentence is a mere thing, it will lead eventually to *rasa* if the sentence deserves the name of poetry. The two new propositions are more in the nature of formal proof. 3. The first half of the *Kārikā* does not state the proposition that an *alaṅkāra* must be different from an *alaṅkārya*, but illustrates it by the analogy: a *guṇa* is that which depends on a *guṇin*.

A So also

K It is just śrīgāra (the flavor of love) that is the sweetest and most delightful flavor (*rasa*). Sweetness (*mādhurya*) has its seat in poetry that is full of this flavor.¹

1. The old vocabulary of poetic criticism is here preserved, but it is made to express new relations. From the time of Bharata the critics spoke of the qualities or virtues (*guna*) of poetry. The early critics emphasized the qualities of sound. Later, qualities of meaning came in for their share of attention. But in all these critics the qualities were considered virtues in themselves. Now the *Dhvanyāloka* reduces the ten qualities of Bharata to three: sweetness (*mādhurya*), force (*ojas*), and clarity (*prasāda*); and it regards them as virtues only insofar as they lead the audience to *rasa*. This is Ānanda's position: the qualities reside in the sound and sense but depend on, exist only for the production of, the *rasa*. Abhinava goes even further, saying that the qualities are ultimately qualities of the *rasa*, of the experience itself. Their names are then applied metonymously to the sound and the sense that bring about such an experience.

A The *rasa* of love is sweet in comparison with the other *rasas*, because it gives delight. The quality known as sweetness is attributed to a poem if the poem consists of words and meanings which reveal this flavor. As for being pleasing to the ear, this characteristic belongs to [the poetic quality] force (*ojas*) also.

L Now it might be claimed that the qualities sweetness and the like belong to word and meaning. One may therefore ask how these qualities were said to depend on the predominant element, namely a *rasa* or the like [see 2.6]. Anticipating this question, he says: so also. He means that this [dependency] is perfectly reasonable because of the particular refutation [of the old-fashioned view] that our author has in mind and that he is about to announce.

[Commentary on *K*] "It is just *sāngāra*, etc." He gives the reason why it is called sweet with the words "most delightful." For in all creatures: gods, animals, men, and the like, there is an unbroken proclivity (*vāsanā*) towards the emotion of love (*rati*).¹ Accordingly, there is no one who is not inclined to respond sympathetically to it. Even an ascetic can be struck by its charm. And so it is said to be sweet. For a sweet substance, such as sugar or the like, when it comes in contact with the tongue, will immediately prove desirable to everyone, wise or foolish, healthy or sick. "Full of this": viz., that poem in which *sāngāra* is the main concern of the poet and is conveyed through suggestion as the essence of the poem.² "Poetry," i.e., both word and sense. "Has its seat": takes its seat. This is as much as to say that in reality what is

called sweetness is a quality only of the *rasa*, such as *sringāra*, etc. This [quality] has been metaphorically transferred to the word and meaning which are suggestive of this sweet relish. For the definition of sweetness is the capacity of words and meanings to suggest the sweet relish of love [etc.]. Therefore it was correct to say, "whatever depends on," etc. [2.6 K].

[Commentary on A] The *Vṛtti* gives the meaning of the *Kārikā*: The *rasa* of love, [etc.]. Now sweetness has been defined [by Bhāmaha 2.3, where he says]: "That [poem] which is pleasing to the ear and which does not contain many compound words and compound ideas is what is called sweet." Our author rejects this with the words pleasing to the ear, etc. He uses "pleasing to the ear" as an abbreviation of the whole definition of Bhāmaha. Belongs to force also: for in the verse "Whatever man proud of his strong arm,"³ [which is an example of force,] there is both pleasingness to the ear and absence of long compounds.

1. All creatures have had some previous experience, if not in this life at least in some previous life, of *rati*. This has left them with a latent proclivity toward this emotion, a predisposition to be affected by the stimulants of this emotion. 2. To speak in simple terms, Abhinava is rejecting the sense "poetry which is full of this relish" and substituting the sense "poetry in which this relish forms the essence." To speak in technical terms, Abhinava is rejecting the *Kāśikā*'s interpretation of Pāṇ. 5.4.21: *satprakṛitavacane mayat*. Here the *Kāśikā* says that *prakṛita* means *prācuryena prastutam*. Thus the *sūtra* means, according to the *Kāśikā*, "the suffix *maya* [may be added to a word designating a substance when we wish] to express that there is an abundance [of that substance]." Abhinava, on the other hand, wishes to take *prakṛita* to mean *ātmatuena prakṛita* and would understand the *sūtra* to mean "... when we wish to express that the substance forms the essence [of something]." 3. The verse will be given in full in 2.9 A.

K In the *rasa* of love in separation and that of compassion (*kaṇṭa*) sweetness is intense. This is because in these cases the heart is softened to a greater degree.

A In both these rasas, sweetness alone [of the qualities] is at its most intense, because the heart of the sensitive audience is overcome [by these rasas] to a greater degree.

L As the relish of love in separation is sweeter than that of love in union, and the relish of compassion is sweeter still, it follows that the higher degrees of sweetness of word and meaning are in reality their ability to suggest these [two forms of aesthetic experience]. It is with this in mind that he says, In the rasa of love, etc. And in that of compassion: the word "and" shows the sequence. Intense: what is meant is an intensity that progresses [in step with the sequence]. Softened: the meaning is that the heart of the sensitive audience hereby abandons its natural hardness, its imperviousness, its liability to the flame of anger and its passion (*rāga*) for the marvelous and for laughter. To a greater degree: to a progressively greater degree. This is as much as to say that in the relish of compassion the heart completely melts. Now an objector will question us: "If there is sweetness in the relish of compassion as well, how do you explain the fact that in the previous *Kārikā* the word "just" (eva) was used ["It is just *sringāra*," etc.]? Our reply is that this was not meant to exclude other rasas, but only to show that in strict fact poetic qualities such as sweetness and the like belong only to a rasa, the very soul [of poetry], and that only by extension are they attributed to words and meanings. This is what the use of "just" was meant to indicate.¹

The *Vṛtti* gives the sense of the *Kārikā*: in both these rasas, etc.

1. Abhinava is quick to notice discrepancies of statement. But he does not rest content with noticing them, as a Western critic might do. He is a partisan of his author, so he hastens to defend him. He does so in the present case by suggesting that we understand the first half of 2.7 *K* to say "It is just the flavor (*rasa*) in *sringāra* that is sweet, not the words, etc."

K The *rasas* of fury (*raudra*) and the like in poetry are characterized by excitement (*dipti*). Strength (*ojas*) has its proper place in words and meanings that manifest this excitement.

A The *rasas* of fury and the like give rise to a high state of excitement, of inner flaring up, and so by metonymy (*lakṣaṇā*) it is said that these *rasas* themselves are "excitement" (*dipti*).¹ A word group capable of producing this excitement is a sentence adorned by the use of lengthy compounds, as for example:

The brutal war-club whirling in my arm
will crush both thighs of this Suyodhana,
so that he whose name is truly Bhīma
may deck your hair, my lady, with his hands
new-reddened in that fresh-congealing blood.

[*Venisamhāra* 1.23]

Equally capable of producing this excitement, [however,] is a meaning which is expressed in lucid words,² without recourse to a style of length; compounds, as for example:

Whatever man proud of his strong arm
bears weapons in the Pāñcāla clan: dotards,
children, down to babes in the very womb;
and whoever saw that deed:
I will slay them all when I come upon the field,
every man who fights me, though he be Death himself:
in blind fury will I be the death of Death!

[*Venisamhāra* 3.32]

In both these and other similar examples there is strength.

1. All printed editions except Krishnamoorthy's read *ucyote* (singular); Krishnamoorthy takes the reading *ucyante* from his Moodabidre MS. Either reading may be justified, the former by taking the whole *iti* clause as the subject, the latter by taking *ta eva* as the subject. 2. The translation does not attempt to imitate the long compounds of the Sanskrit verse. For th

mise-en-scène see Editor's Introduction, pp. 34-35, where the effect of heavy compounding in Sanskrit is also discussed. 3. That is, words which have the poetical quality *prasāda* (clarity). 4. In this verse Aśvatthāman is vowing vengeance for the treacherous killing of his father, Drona.

L Fury and the like: the word *ādi* is used in the sense of "similar cases." Thus the *rasa* of the heroic and that of the marvelous are included as well.¹ Excitement is an apprehension characterized by radiance, expansion, and a blazing forth in the heart of the sensitive audience. It is what is primarily denoted by the word strength (*ojas*). *Raudra* and other similar *rasas* consist in the relishing of this excitement. They are characterized as effects, that is, they are distinguished from other *rasas*, by this excitement, this particular kind of relishing. Hence, by a metonymy which applies the name of the effect to its cause, *raudra* and similar *rasas* are called by the name "strength" (*ojas*). Then by resorting to a second metonymy,² even a word-group which reveals excitement, namely a sentence with long compounds, is called "an excitement" (*dipti*).³ for example, the verse "The brutal war-club whirling." In addition to this, a meaning which produces excitement, being expressed by lucid, quickly intelligible words⁴ without recourse to compounds, is also called "an excitement" (*dipti*), for example, the verse "Whatever man proud of his strong arm."

[The brutal war club, etc.:] With this "brutal," that is, cruel, war-club which will be wielded by my "whirling" arms, that is, arms circling with great speed; with the full attack of this war-club the "two thighs" will be simultaneously "*samecūrṇita*," that is, completely crushed so that the man cannot stand up again. I shall so despise⁵ Suyodhana [= Duryodhana] of whom the thighs are in this condition that I will become one of whom the hands are "red," crimson, with the blood that is "thick," that is, does not run off because it comes from a deep [wound] and is not the thin liquid [of a superficial cut], and which will stick to my hands because it is "congealing," that is, in the process of coagulating, there not having been time enough for it fully to dry. It is for just this reason that I shall be "Bhīma," that is, one who strikes terror into the hearts of cowards. "Your" hair: of you, to whom so many insults were given—"my lady" shows how little deserving she was—I shall deck the hair, that is, I shall change it from its braided state and give it as it were a coronet of red flowers with the bits of blood falling from my hands. Thus we have an implied figure

of *utprekṣā* (poetic fancy).⁶ By using the vocative "my lady," which reminds us that a noble woman was humiliated [by the Kauravas], the author has applied a stimulus (*uddīpanavibhāva*) to the relish of anger. Accordingly, [in spite of the reference to a normally amorous act, the decking of a beloved's hair] one cannot suspect any suggestion of the relish of love. There is both despite of Suyodhana and an absence of any effort to strike him again with the war-club because his thighs will have been completely crushed [with the one blow]. The use of the word "congealing" suggests Bhīma's impatience to wash away the grievance of Draupadī [before the blood even dries]. From the long compound flowing in an uninterrupted stream and allowing [the hearer] no pause in all its course, there results an apprehension of the whole scene as unity up to the scorn of the broken-thighed Suyodhana. This serves to intensify the impression of [Bhīma's] violence. Other commentators, we may note, take *suyodhanasya* as a possessive genitive and explain that Bhīma's hands will be reddened by the thick blood "of" Suyodhana that will cling, congealing, to them.

Whatever man proud of the strength of his own arm and [fighting] among the [Pāṇḍava] regiments: this refers to such warriors as Arjuna. Because Drona was killed by Drṣṭadyumna, the son of the Pāñcāla king, Aśvatthāman is especially incensed against that clan. "Whoever saw that deed" refers to such as Karna. [Now we may understand *caroti mayi rūpe* in either of two ways:] (1) when battle is to be engaged, whoever comes against me, that is, interferes with my fighting; or (2) when I am moving in battle, whoever opposes or resists me. Such a man [will I kill] even if he were the death of all creatures, how much more if he were a mere mortal or a god. Here the anger [of the speaker] rises to the highest pitch [by a progression] from word to word, through meanings which, being presented separately, are reflected upon by the hearer in succession. And so the very absence of compounds acts as cause of *dīpti*.

By showing that sweetness (*mādhurya*) and excitement (*dīpti* = *ojā*; strength) are opposed to each other in love and fury, our author would indicate that in comedy (*hāsyā*), the fearsome (*bhayānaka*), the loathsome (*bibhatsa*), and peace (*sānta*), these qualities exist together in varying proportions. So far as comedy is subordinate to love, sweetness will predominate; and so far as it partakes of the nature of expansion (*vikāsa*), strength will predominate; so the two qualities come to equal in that genre. In the fearsome, although that *rūpa* consists in broken (*bhagna*)⁷ state of mind, the stimulant (*vibhāva*) is excitement.

and so strength is greater and sweetness less [in that *rasa*]. The same applies to the loathsome. But for the *rasa* of peace there is a great variety of determinants, so that sometimes strength will predominate and sometimes sweetness.⁸ Such are the distinctions [among the *rasas*].

1. *BP* and *Mahādevaśāstri* (see Text, p. 208, footnote) are worried by this statement because the relish of the marvelous should produce *rāga* rather than *dīpti* according to what Abhinava has just said (2.8 L; Text, p. 208, line 1 of *Locana*). But we need not suppose the characteristics of the separate *rasas* to be so rigidly departmentalized. 2. A *lakṣitolokṣanā* is a second *lakṣanā* which comes into effect after a first *lakṣanā* has already operated. 3. Observe how elaborately Abhinava has complicated the natural sense of these words. To take the words naturally, *ojas* (strength) is a property of words and meanings which enables them to produce a *rasa* of fury or of the heroic. This *rasa* is characterized by *dīpti* (excitement, or, literally, "inflammation"). But in Abhinava's explanation, *dīpti* and *ojas* become synonyms. *Dīpti* is what *ojas* primarily means and *ojas* denotes primarily the result of an experience. The word *ojas* (or *dīpti*) is then transferred by metonymy to the experience, the relishing, itself. Then by a second metonymy *dīpti* (or *ojas*) is transferred to the words and meanings that produce the experience. 4. Abhinava uses the word *gamaka* to paraphrase the word *prasanna* used in the *Vṛtti* [Text, p. 211, line 1]; so it means *jhaṭiyarthabodhata* (*BP*) "instantaneously conveying the intended sense." *Abhidhiyamāna* paraphrases the *abhidheya* of the *Vṛtti*. 5. As will appear from his further comments, Abhinava is taking the genitive *suyodhanasya* as *anādare sasthī* (Pān. 2.3.38) and eliciting some such meaning as "I shall so despise Suyodhana in his weakness that I will wash my hands in his blood." This is of course an unwarrantable extension of what Pāṇini means by the genitive absolute of despite. Furthermore, this genitive in actual use almost always contains a participle, e.g., *rudato vrājīt*, "despite his (father's) weeping he became a monk." The *Kāśikā* actually insists on the presence of a verb form. The interpretation probably appealed to Abhinava on two grounds. It avoids construing *suyodhanasya* with the subordinate member of a compound, *sōṣṇi*; and it intensifies the *raudrārasa*. Abhinava uses a similar interpretation for the locative, 3.10–14c L and note 1, 3.24 L and note 2. 6. No *iwa* is used, so it is not a direct *utprekṣā*. But the red blood reminds the bearer of red flowers, so that a fancy is suggested. 7. The reading *bhagna* of Pāthak's edition seems better than the *magna* of our text or the *bhaya* of Tripathi's. The point would be that in relishing fear, our mind, it is true, is reduced to weakness: but as it is strong stimulation that has so weakened it, strength plays a predominant part in literature of that genre. 8. Under 4.5 Ānanda will assign the *Mahābhārata* to the genre of *rasa* because its varied scenes lead our minds by a sort of cathartic to

an attitude of peace. Of the *Mahābhārata* one may well say that strength sometimes predominates and sometimes sweetness.

K A poem's ability to communicate [to the reader] any *rasa*, an ability which is found operative in all *rasas* and styles, is called clarity (*prasāda*).

A Clarity is clearness both of word and meaning. And while it is a quality common to all *rasas* and common to all structures (*racanā*) we should restrict it primarily to its connection with the suggested sense.¹

1. Here again the vocabulary is traditional but the idea is new; cf. 2.7 F note. Clarity is generally taken by the older criti to be a quality of meaning; only Vāmana added a "clarity" of sound. This clarity was regarded as a virtue in itself without regard to what was being clarified. The *Dhvanyāloka* now defines it primarily in terms of *rasa*. Clarity belongs only to that word and meaning which clearly reveal a *rasa*. It is common to all *rasas*, that is, it is found in the words and meanings which produce all *rasas*. In this respect it differs from sweetness and force, which have more restricted domains. It is saying that it is common to all structures. Ānanda may be making a criticism of Vāmana (3.1.6), who believed the *sabdaguna prasāda* to consist in an uncompounded structure.

L Ability to communicate, literally an ability to communicate (*arpakatva*) that is complete (*samyak*), is the ability to fill (*vyāpakatva*)¹ the hearer quickly with a sympathetic response by entering into him, as fire quickly pervades dry wood, or water pervades a clean cloth. This lack of impurity, this lucidity, is a quality of all the *rasas*. By metaphorical extension the word clarity is also used of the power, possessed by both words and meaning, to communicate suggested meanings of that sort (viz., *rasas*).

The *Vṛtti* explains: Clarity, etc. Anticipating an objector who might ask how this purity that belongs to the *rasas* can be attributed to words and meanings, he says, And it is, etc. The word "and" is here restrictive [i.e., is used in the sense of *eva*].³ [In its primary sense] clarity is a quality only of all the *rasas* and only this quality is such [sc., common to all the *rasas*].⁴ [In a secondary sense] clarity is common to all structures both of word and sense, whether they make use of many compounds or none. Primarily: This ability to communicate can be intended only with reference to the suggested meaning, not others, for what is so wonderful in a word's communicating its literal sense that one should use the word "quality" or "virtue" of such a word? This is what our author has in mind.

Thus according to Bhāmbara [2.1-3] only three qualities were accepted: sweetness, strength, and clarity. And these three qualities refer primarily to the relishing of the audience. By metaphor their names are extended to that which is enjoyed, namely the *rasa* [in that word's sense of object rather than process], and even further to the words and meanings which suggest this *rasa*. This is the essence of what he means to say.

1. We follow *BP* in reading *vyāpakatvam* in place of *vyāprakatvam*; cf. the use of *vyāpyate* in the verse from which the analogy of fire and dry wood is taken (*BhNS* 7.7, quoted *Dhu*. 1.1 e *L*, Text, p. 39, lines 2-3). 2. Remove the *danda* after *drṣṭāntena* and place it after *ca*. For the first analogy see previous footnote. The second is used by Mammata 8.70 (Jhalkikar p. 476), who has doubtless taken it from Abhinava, as is clear from the commentary of Śrīdhara, p. 277. The sense is that if a clean cloth is put into water, it will quickly absorb the water, whereas if the cloth is greasy the water will not easily be absorbed. Cf. Jhalkikar, p. 476: *svacchajalavat—jalam yathā svaccham patam sahasiva vyāpnoti molinapate jalasyāprasārat tadvat*. 3. This sense of *ca* has the authority of Patañjali, *Mahābhāṣya* on *Pāṇ*. 2.1.16. Kaiyata justifies it by the fact that "particles have many meanings" (*anekārthatuṁ nipātānām*). Abhinava not only takes the word here in this unnatural sense, but he reads it twice (by *āvṛtti* or *tantra*) so that it may restrict both *rasasādhāraṇa* and *sa gunah*. 4. *BP*: the first restriction rules out its being a property of word and meaning; the second restriction rules out sweetness and strength.

K And¹ those faults such as indelicacy of sound,² which have been shown [by earlier writers] to be relative, are found in [their] illustrations to be shunned only in the essence of dhvani [and there only] in the rasa of love.³

1. None of the commentators or translators remarks on this little word "and." It would seem to connect the present Kārikā with the immediately preceding Vṛtti in a way that can be shown by the following paraphrase. "The designation of clarity should be restricted primarily to the suggested meaning and the relative faults also are faults only where the meaning is suggested."
2. Four faults are intended, as first listed by Bhāmaha 1.44: śrutiḍuṣṭa, artha-ḍuṣṭa, kalpaṇāḍuṣṭa, and śrutiṭaṣṭa. They are explained below by *L*.
3. That is to say, indelicacy of sound and the like are faults only in vivaktitānyaparavācyadhvani where the *vyanigra* is śringārasa.

A Faults such as indelicacy of sound, which have been indicated to be relative, also need not be shunned when the literal meaning is the sole object, nor when a meaning other than the rasa of love is intended, nor when the rasa of love is not suggested by that type called the soul of dhvani. It is seen from illustrations that these faults are to be avoided only in the soul of suggestion, when love is suggested as the primary element [of the poem]. If this were not the case, these faults would not be relative.

So now the essence of dhvani, where suggestion is indicated without apparent sequence (*asamlakṣyakramavyāṇigra*), has been shown in general terms.

L Having previously shown that the distinction in usage between the words "quality" (*guna*) and "ornament" (*alankāra*) is a logical one only if one accepts our position (see 2.6 *L*), our author now sets forth to show that the distinction of absolute and relative faults also makes sense in our position only. Such as indelicacy of sound (*śrutiḍuṣṭa*): Words like *vānta* (vomited) are indelicate of sound¹ because

they bring to mind objects that one does not speak of in polite company. Indelicacies of meaning (*arthaduṣṭa*) are such as cause us to understand something indecent because of the purport of the sentence as a whole. An example is [the ambiguous verse]: "Seeking his chance, the great proud [man] advanced to the attack," [which can also mean "Seeking for the hole, the great stiff (penis) advanced to the attack"]. An indelicate arrangement (*kalpanāduṣṭa*) occurs by the arranging of two words: for example *kuru rucim* (do what you like) if arranged in reverse.² Harshness of sound (*śrutikasṭa*) is seen in such words as *adhäkṣit* (has burned), *akṣautsít* (has stamped), *trnedhi* (pierces). The relish of love is meant to include other appropriate *rasas* as well, because these faults are avoided in other *rasas* such as the heroic, the peaceful, the marvelous, etc.

Have been indicated: The early authors have not shown the relativity of these faults by showing any distinction in the areas [where they may and where they may not be used]. Neither have they shown how they differ from such [absolute] faults as error in meter, nor have they really shown how they differ from virtue.³ Our position is that they are allowable in the relish of disgust, of comedy, and of fury; and that they are to be shunned in the relish of love and the like. This explains why they are called relative. Such is what our author has in mind.

1. Place a *danda* after *śrutiduṣṭa* instead of *hetovah*. 2. I.e., *rucim* *kuru*. *BP* says that *cirkū* means the clitoris. The word is not listed in *PW*. Bhāmaha's example involves no reversal but merely an infelicitous juxtaposition: *sa śauryādharanāḥ* "this ornament of courage," which brings together the syllables *yābha*, the vulgar Sanskrit word for sexual intercourse. 3. An indecent ambiguity might be a virtue in a comic verse; one can easily find examples in the anthologies. As for Abhinava's negations, they are all strictly true of Bhāmaha. Bhāmaha admits that some of these faults may appear as virtues in just the right context (154-55) and he gives us two or three examples. But he states no general principle such as is stated here by Ānanda.

K The varieties of the elements subordinate to this [rasa or the like] and the varieties within itself, when one imagines all their possible combinations with one another, are infinite.

A It has been stated that a rasa or the like when suggested as the main element of a poem constitutes the very soul of that type of dhvani in which the literal meaning, though intended, is subordinate to a second meaning. Of its subordinate elements, namely the figures of speech which are based on word or meaning, there are endless varieties. And of the main element itself, the varieties, namely the rasas, bhāvas, rasābhāvas, bhāvābhāvas, bhāvapraśamas, taken together with the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicārins which produce these rasas, etc., are endless, having no limit in respect to the bases [in which they may be portrayed].¹ Now if one were to consider all the possible combinations of these [two sets of] varieties, one could not count up the varieties of a single rasa, much less of all. Thus, of the rasa śringāra there are two main categories to begin with: love in union (sambhoga-śringāra) and love in separation (vipralambhaśringāra).² Of love in union there are the varieties represented by the lovers' looking at each other lovingly, their sexual enjoyment, their recreation, and so on. Of love in separation we have yearning in separation, the separation caused by jealousy, by love quarrels, by exile, and so on. And all of these may be divided according to the vibhāvas, anubhāvas, and vyabhicārins in each case. And as there are differences of these according to the base in some location and the stage in some time-span [in which and at which they occur], even this one single rasa will prove to be endless in respect to the varieties which exist within itself. How much more so if we take account of the varieties of its subordinate elements! For if we consider all the varieties of subordinate elements [i.e., all the figures of speech] in their possible combinations with the varieties of each main element [i.e., with each rasa, bhāva, etc.], we shall surely arrive at infinity.

1. *svāśrayādpekyayā* (Text, p. 215, line 6) cannot mean "when considered in themselves," as Jacobi seems to have taken it, for that much is already implied by *svāgatās* in line 4. Ānanda expands the phrase on page 217, line 2 into *desakālādyāśrayāvasthābheda iti svāgatobhedādpeksayā*. In both cases *svāśraya* must refer to the *śraya*, the physical base, in which the *vibhāvas*, etc., reside. In the expansion Ānanda has added a reference also to their residence in time, that is, to the various stages of the emotion. There are notably nine stages of love in separation before the subject dies of it. Now the spatially qualified residences of the emotions can scarcely be anything else than the characters in whom the emotions are displayed, "the appropriate male and female characters," as Abhinava puts it. But Abhinava strangely misinterprets the expanded phrase. See below. 2. It may be well to give literal translations of these technical terms. *Sambhogasāringa* is literally love in enjoyment; *vipralambhaśāringa* love in frustration, for *vipralambha* means literally *varīcanā*, deception, frustration. The subtypes of love in frustration are *abhilāga-vipralambha*: frustration that takes the form of yearning; *īrṣyāvipralambha*: frustration caused by the jealousy of the woman; *virahavipralambha*: frustration caused by the woman's intentional separation (*viraha*) of herself from her lover; and *pravāsa vipralambha*: frustration caused by the man's leaving home (because of tour of duty, exile, etc.).

L Subordinate elements: that is, figures of speech. Within itself: belonging to itself (*ātmagata*), such as love in union and love in separation, and belonging to what belongs to itself (*ātmīyagata*), that is, whatever belongs to the *vibhāvas*, etc. One could not compute all the relations of principal and subordinate even by a marker and table of elements.¹

The bases: what is meant are such bases as the appropriate male and female characters. Looking at each other lovingly implies other varieties as well, such as talking together, etc. Sexual enjoyment is [divided into] sixty-four items, beginning with the [eight] embraces.² Recreation: that is, walking in the park. "And so on" will include such activities as water sports, drinking parties, watching the moonrise, games, etc. Yearning in separation is when a mutual love (*rati*) has arisen in a man and woman such that each values the other as his own life and when for some reason they are unable to meet, as in the case of the King of Vatsa and Ratnāvalī in the *Ratnāvalī* from the passage "Why do you ask whether she pleases me?" onward. But not before that passage in the play, because when mutual love (*rati*) is absent, one can speak only of the stage of physical desire (*kāma*). Separation caused by jealousy is to be taken as the estrangement of a woman

who has been injured by her lover's infidelity, etc. Separation caused by a love-quarrel refers to an experience with just such a woman, who has not accepted her lover's attempts to placate her and who is subsequently filled with remorse and longing because of his absence. Separation caused by exile refers to a husband's love for his wife whom he has left at home. "And so on" will include separation caused by a curse,³ etc. The word *vipralambha* is used in a secondary sense to mean that which is "like a deception,"⁴ for in a deception one fails to gain one's object; and such is the case here. Of these means "of love-in-union, etc." on the one hand and "of the *vibhāvas*, etc." on the other. If we were to take the base (*āsaya*) to mean a geographical location such as the Malaya Mountain which is the location of a *vibhāva* such as the Malaya breeze, its sense would already have been anticipated by the word "location" (*desa*). Therefore it is best to take "base" in the sense of "cause."⁵ An example [of such variety of cause] is found in a verse of mine:

I have kept this garland woven by my love
close to my heart.
Even as it fades, it drips ambrosia to dispel
my pain of loneliness.

This one: viz., *śrīgāra*. Main element: what is meant are the *rasas*; if we consider all the possible combinations with the various *rasas*.

1. For *loṣṭapraśtaranyāya* see Jacob, Vol. I, p. 44. The *loṣṭa* (piece of clay or pebble) is the marker that was moved from one position to the next to count up the number of possibilities. Abhinava uses the maxim again 3.161 L. 2. This is the dictum of the Bābhraviyas, Kāmasūtra 2.2.4 (Kashi ed. 2.2.5). The editor of our Text, Pandit Pāttābhīrāma Śāstri, lists the sixty-four items in his footnote p. 216. 3. As in the Sātūntala. 4. See above, 2.12 A, note 2. 5. It is difficult to see why Abhinava chooses this most improbable interpretation. We have explained our interpretation above (2.12 A, note 1). Even the interpretation to which Abhinava objects, presumably by some earlier commentator, is preferable to his, for Abhinava must interpret *teṣām desakālādyāśrayāvasthābheda* to mean "difference of these [aspects of love] brought about by place, time, etc., and by causes and stages." As an example of variety of cause, he cites a verse in which a garland acts as a peculiar cause (*uddipana vibhāva*) of *vipralambha* in that by reminding the lover of his beloved it pains him, but through his knowledge that she has made it assuages his pain.

K A mere indication will be given here, by which the minds of persons of education and taste may be furnished with a criterion for all other cases.

A Because persons of education and taste, if by a mere indication they recognize the [correct] relation of subordinate and predominant between the figures of speech and one particular *rasa* [viz., *sringāra*] will have a criterion for their judgment in all other cases.

L By which: sc., by which indication. Persons of taste: it has in mind those who wish to become great poets and connoisseurs. For all cases: this should be construed [with the *bahuvrihi* compound] to mean: a judgment by which a criterion, an understanding, a correct educated view, has been obtained with regard to all *rasas* and the like.

1. That is, the instruction is addressed both to writers and readers.

A This being the case, [we will state that]

K Alliteration used continuously in the same form, because of its laboredness, is not helpful in revealing love in any of its varieties when this love is [intended to be] predominant.

§ 2.15 A]

A The varieties of love when it is predominant have been given. In all these varieties, alliteration used continuously and always in the same form is not suggestive. By the use of the word "predominant" it is implied that the continuous use of alliteration in the same form is permissible when love is subordinate.

L This being the case: i.e., since we are about to give an indication. Because of its laboredness: because it can be accomplished only by labor; he means this as a reason [why such alliteration is ineffective]. He uses the phrase "the same form" to indicate that if one abandons this monotony and composes in varied alliterations, this will not constitute a fault.

K In love, when it is the soul of suggestive poetry, the use of echoing alliteration (*yamakas*)¹ and the like, even if the author is well able to compose them, is [what can only be excused as] carelessness on his part, especially in love-in-separation.

1. *Yamaka* is the repetition of a set of phonemes in the same order. If the sets bear meaning (i.e., if they form complete words), their meanings must differ.

A In love, the very soul of suggestive poetry when it is suggested as the primary sense by words and meanings [which are subordinate], the use of *yamakas* and similar figures, such as difficult [arrangements],¹ or puns involving the breaking up of words in two different ways,² even if the author is well able to compose them, is carelessness on his part. The word "carelessness" implies that while a solitary instance of *yamaka* may occur by accident, this figure should not be used in abundance as subordinate to a *rusa* in the way that other figures of speech may be used. By saying "especially in love-in-separation" it is shown that love-in-separation is exceptionally delicate. When it is being suggested, a subordinate *yamaka* or the like should not be employed.

1. We have translated *duskers* as a noun, rather than as an adjective, in accordance with Abhinava's interpretation and with Ānanda's use of the word in 2.16 (*yamakaduṣkaramārgesu*). 2. A simple pun (*sabdoślesa*) would be, for example, the word *guna* used so as to mean both bowstring and virtue. A *sabdabhanigaslesa* is a more complicated pun, a word that can be divided in different ways, e.g., *asoka* (= the *asoka* tree, or = *a-soka* "not grief").

L Yamakas and the like: the word *ādi* refers to similar figures. Difficult (arrangements): e.g., verses shaped like drums or wheels.¹ Puns involving the breaking up of words: note that a simple ambiguity (*arthasleṣa*)² is not a fault, as in the example "You are *rakta*".³ Even in puns involving the breaking up of words in two ways it is only the difficult ones that make for a fault, not [an easy pun] like *asoka*.⁴

1. Most of the handbooks of *alankāras* give descriptions of these *citra-bandhas*. The drum-shape can be read zigzag as well as linearly. See the illustration in the Kashi ed. of Śīśupāla facing p. 716. See also 3.41-42 A and note 1. 2. An *arthasleṣa* is not a pun but an ambiguous word, usually an adjective which can apply to two different substantives. It is distinguished from a pun (*sabdoślesa*) by the fact that the effect remains the same even when we substitute a synonym. 3. The example will be quoted in context 2.18-19c A. 4. See the example quoted in 2.18-19c A.

A The reason for this is:

K Only a figure which can be composed in the course of one's preoccupation with *rasa* and that requires no separate effort in itself is acceptable as an ornament in suggestive poetry.

A Although the emergence of a given figure of speech may seem wonderful, it may still be acceptable as an ornament in the type of suggestive poetry in which the passage from literal to suggested meaning is unnoticed, if it can be produced through one's very preoccupation with *rasa*. For only this sort of figure is, in the real sense of the term, a subordinate element of *rasa*. For example:

Your palm erases from your cheek the painted ornament
and sighs have drunk the ambrosial flavor of your lip;
the tears that choke you agitate your breast:
anger has become your lover, stubborn one, in place of me.

[*Amarasākha* 81; *SRK* 664, etc.]'

Inasmuch as a figure that is subordinate to a *rasa* is characterized by the fact that no separate effort is required on the part of the poet to create it, it follows that if a poet who is concentrating on putting together a *rasa* should leave² that trend of thought and apply himself to some other effort, the figure that might result would not be subordinate to the *rasa*. When one intentionally and repeatedly makes *yamakas*, there invariably is involved the undertaking of a separate effort, which takes the form of searching for the particular words that will fit. To the objection that the same will hold true of other figures of speech, we say not at all; other figures, even those which are difficult when described, will rush to present themselves to a poet of imaginative genius precisely while he is concentrating his mind on the *rasa*. An example is the passage in the *Kādambarī* where Kādambarī is [first] seen [by the hero]; again, in the *Setubandha* where Queen Sītā is shocked by the illusion of the severed head of Rāma. And this stands to reason, for *rasas* are suggested by particular meanings and by words that convey these meanings.³ Now it is figures of speech such as *rūpaka* (metaphor) and the like that are the particular meanings which are able to reveal *rasas*. Therefore they are not extraneous devices in helping to suggest these *rasas*. On the other hand, this [character of being extraneous] does attach to *yamakas* and difficult arrangements of words. As for those few *yamakas* and the like which are found to possess *rasa*, those are cases of the *rasa*'s being subordinate and where the *yamaka* or the like is the predominant element. In *rasābhāsa*, of course, it does not contradict [our theory] for a *yamaka* to be used as a subordinate element. But when *rasa* is to be suggested and is to be of primary

importance, *yamakas* and the like cannot be subordinated to the *rasa* because they require of the poet a separate effort.

The following is a verse-summary of the matter.

A great poet can produce with a single effort some matters that contain *rasa* together with figures of speech. But for composing *yamakas* and the like, he must make a separate effort even if he is well able to compose them. Therefore these figures cannot play a part subordinate to *rasa*. There is no objection to using *yamakas* and the like as elements subordinate to *rasābhāsa*. But this subordination is impossible in the case of love, the soul of suggestive poetry.

1. The point of citing the verse is that it contains several figures of speech which detract in no way from the overall *rasa*, which is love in separation caused by jealousy (*irṣyāvipralambha*). The figures are ambiguity (*arthaslesa*), metaphor (*rūpaka*: the anger acting like a lover), and contrast (*vyatireka*: anger is your lover, not I). 2. *atyūhya*: according to Pāṇ. 7.4.23 the *u* should be shortened: *atyuhya*. 3. Remove the *danda* after *ākṣepitavyāḥ* and place it after *sabbaiḥ*. The *tat* in *tatpratipādakaiḥ* refers to *vācyavīśeṣa*. The *tat* in *tatprakāśinaiḥ* refers to *rasas*.

L The reason: what is meant is a general principle. Only, etc.: on the road to *rasa* it is only what one happens on directly, as one is fitting the *vibhāvas* and the like into the combined¹ form of *rasa*, that can serve as ornament. Accordingly, *yamakas* and the like are always an obstruction to the *rasa* (aesthetic experience) both of the poet and of the reader, [not only in *śringāra* but] also in the heroic, the marvelous, and other *rasas*. That our author spoke [in 2.15] of avoiding those figures especially in love-in-separation was doubtless for the purpose of drawing the attention of persons who are in the rut of tradition and who have not attained the height of good taste.² And so in what follows he will speak in very general terms, saying, "therefore these figures cannot play a part subordinate to *rasa*."

The emergence: what he means is its self-generation through the favor of genius without any apparent making of it. May seem wonderful: that is, one wonders how it could have been formed.

[In the verse quoted from Amaru] a lady is described as resting her face on her tender hand, her lower lip pale because of her sighs, her throat choked by a welling stream of tears, and her breast shaken by her steady sobbing. The lady, unwilling to renounce her anger, is being

appeased by the speaker with flattering compliments. And while he does so his mind concentrates on relishing the symptoms (*anubhāvas*) [which appear in the lady] of this love in separation caused by jealousy. To this speaker [who is here the poet] such figures of speech as ambiguity, metaphor and contrast emerge effortlessly and cause no interruption of his relish, any more than they do of the relish of the reader.

Characterized: he means invariably characterized. Repeatedly (*prabandhena*): the word construes with the word "being made" (*kri-yamāne*); and since that which is made repeatedly must be made with intent, he uses the word "intentionally."³ A separate effort: an effort other than that of joining one component with another into a *rasa*. These spontaneous figures are described as being difficult (*nirūpyamāṇī durghaṭanāṇī*), that is to say, even if one wishes to make them one could scarcely do so. And they are difficult when described (*nirūpyamāṇe durghaṭanāṇī*), that is to say, they arouse the reader's wonder at their having been made. Will rush to present themselves (*ahampūrvikāyā parāpatanti*): the Sanskrit term derives from the phrase "me first!" meaning "I will go first." The abstraction of this is *ahampūrvikā* meaning a situation where each one seeks to go first. The element *aham* is a particle of the same phonetic structure as an inflected form of "I" and with the meaning of "I."⁴ This: viz., this rush to present themselves. Those few refers to those used by Kālidāsa and others.⁵

[In the verse summary] even if he is well able construes with "he must make a separate effort," not with what follows. These refers to *yamakas* and the like. What was said above [in 2.15-16] is here summarized in its essentials in the half verse: in the case of love, the soul of suggestion.

1. *samavadhāna* is a technical term of Nyāya meaning co-presence, e.g., the presence of *x* together (with *y*) in *z*. See *Upaskāra* on *Vaiśi*. 3.1.12 and 3.2.1 (p. 103, line 11); or *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvali* p. 167, line 2. Abhinava's use of the term here is very precise. He means when one is forming a *vibhāvo* or the like so as to fit with the co-presence (the presence of all the other elements: *anubhāvas*; *vyādhicārins*) required in a given *rasa*. He uses the same word again eleven lines farther on. 2. Abhinava imagines the author to be reasoning as follows. *Yamaka* is so well-loved a figure that it will be impossible to convince a conservative that it should be abandoned in all good poetry. I may be able, however, to make him see that its most glaring misuses are in bad taste. 3. Abhinava's intention here is to guard against taking *prabandhena* directly with *buddhipūrvakam*. It is not that the poet constantly

has the intention of making *yamatas*, but that he makes them constantly and we therefore infer that he makes them intentionally. 4. The doctrine of *vibhaktipratirūpakonipātas* goes back to a *Ganastṛita* on Pāṇ. 1.4.57. It is useful in justifying irregular and idiomatic expressions. To take the present case: if the *aham* in *ahampūrvikoyā* were the real pronoun *aham*, it would have to shift to its stem-form *mad* in the compound (Pāṇ. 7.2.98). 5. As in *Raghuvamśa* 9.1-54.

A Now it is shown that a whole group of ornaments (i.e., figures of speech) can suggest love, the soul of *dhvani*.¹

1. I.e., can suggest *śringārarasa* as the predominant meaning of a sentence. See 2.2 *K*, note 1.

K The whole group of ornaments such as metaphor and the like, when they are used with circumspection in *śringārarasa*, the soul of *dhvani*, will merit their name.

A An ornament is said to be a factor that beautifies the element of primary importance [i.e., the *rasa*] just as an external ornament [e.g., an earring or bracelet beautifies the person]. The whole group of expressed figures¹ such as metaphor and the like, both those that have been described [in the past] and those that will be described by anyone in the future—for figures of speech are endless—this whole group is such that if any of them is introduced [in a poem] with circumspection, it may serve as a source of beauty for all the varieties of suggestion where the passage from the literal meaning to the suggested meaning is unperceived (*alakṣyakramavyaṅgya*).

1. vācyālatikāra, expressed figures, as opposed to suggested figures of speech, which will be treated in 2.25-27.

L Now: he has in mind that the things to be avoided have been stated and that it is now time to state the things which should be sought. Can suggest: supply "which" and "how," [so as to understand the passage as "it is shown which group of ornaments can suggest love and how they can suggest it"]. Merit their name means to merit their name as causes of beauty. That have been described: sc., by Bhāmaha and others who have given definitions of the figures of speech. And those that will be described: he gives the reason for this in the words "for figures of speech are endless." He means that they will be described by other critics, for [critical] genius [also] is endless.

A Now this is the circumspection [that is needed] in introducing a figure:

K The intention must be to keep them subordinate [or helpful] and never acting as the chief element; they should be taken up and dropped at the proper time and should never be oversustained; when sustained [throughout a verse] special care should be taken to insure their subordination [or helpfulness]: these are the means of insuring the subordination of the figures metaphor and the like.

A A figure of speech which a poet intends as subordinate will be able to manifest a rasa,¹ as in this example where the poet gives great care to the forming of the rasa:

Many times you touch
 the trembling corner of her eye,
 as if telling secrets
 buzzing in her ear,
 or, while she shakes her hands,
 drinking Love's treasure in her lip.
 Here I am cursed with asking questions,
 while you, O bee, have entered heaven.

[Kālidāsa, Śākuntala 1.20]

for here the figure *svabhāvokti* (naturalistic description) of the bee is entirely harmonious with the *rasa*.

1. "Will be able to manifest a *rasa*" is the conclusion of the sentence, found nine pages later (Text, p. 233, line 5). For the analysis of this sentence, which we have broken up, see Abhinava's remarks below.

L By the word circumspection¹ he means what is stated in the *Kārikā*. In the first *śloka* and a half [of the two *Kārikās*] we have the means stated of achieving subordination. Of the figures metaphor and the like: this should be construed with each [preceding half *śloka*].²

[In the *Vṛtti* on these two *Kārikās*] we have a long complex sentence [of which the framework is as follows]. A figure of speech which a poet desires to present as subservient and not as the principal element; a figure which he takes up at the proper time and which he drops at the proper time; a figure which he does not push too far; a figure which [even if carried throughout the verse] he is careful to keep subsidiary: a figure so composed will bring about the manifestation of a *rasa*.³ Within this complex sentence other matter has been included in order to give: (a) the point which forms the occasion for furnishing an illustration; (b) the illustration itself; (c) the application of the illustration to the point; and (d) the justification [i.e., showing how the observance of a given point is congenial to the *rasa*]. Such is the structure of the passage in the *Vṛtti*.

Many times you touch the trembling corner: O bee, although we are eager for just such flirtatious action and words [as you are exhibiting], we are cursed, that is, we are burdened, with the trouble of seeking the truth of a problem that must be solved [sc., the nature of

Śakuntalā's parentage, whether it is noble or brahmin]. "While you": the particle *khalu* ("of course," "as is well known") indicates that the bee has gained his object effortlessly. These are the words of Duṣyanta, who desires Śakuntalā [and speaks to the bee as if to say]: "How can I become the recipient of her sidelong glance? How can I get her to listen to secret words that will suggest my intentions? How can I steal a kiss from her even if she is unwilling? All these aims which lie in the land of my daydreams have been accomplished by you with no effort." For the bee keeps touching the corner of her eye, thinking it a dark waterlily, which it does indeed resemble. And as his illusion continues, for her eye extends [like a lily ornament] to the opening of her ear, he continues to buzz there.⁴ And while she is frightened because of the timidity of her natural delicacy, he drinks her lower lip, which is as sweet as the fragrance of lotuses in full bloom and is the very treasury of love (*rati*). Thus the figure of speech, which is a *svabhāvokti* (a naturalistic description) of the bee, has become subordinate to that *rasa* [viz., *abhlāśavipralambhaśrigdṛ̥ṇa*] which is the poet's chief concern. Other [commentators], however, interpret the *Vṛtti*'s phrase *bhramarasvabhāvoktir alankārah* to mean "the figure of which there is an expression in the course of describing the bee's behavior" and they identify this figure as *rūpakavyatireka*.⁵

1. Clearly one must read *samīkṣā* in place of *samīkṣya* in order to get a feminine noun for *uktā* to agree with. In the next line one must correct *rūpakkādir* to *rūpakkāder* as in the Kārikā. 2. In other words, one is to understand *anigituena rūpakkāder*, *grahaṇatyāgau rūpakkāder*, etc. The same effect will be obtained in the translation by substituting "metaphor and the like" for "them" and "they." 3. Thus the relative pronoun *yam* in *yam alankāram*. Text, p. 224 line 2, is repeated p. 226 line 1, p. 227 line 2, p. 232 lines 1 and 7, and is finally resumed by the apodeictic *sa* alankāra on p. 233 line 5, where the sentence ends. A Sanskrit sentence (*vākyā*) of course admits of more parenthetical material than a sentence of Latin or English.
4. Abhinava is reading into the close succession of the first two images of the verse the suggestion that Śakuntalā's eye "stretches to her ear," this being the convention by which the erotic poets refer to a beautiful eye that keeps casting sidelong glances.
5. The *rūpaka* (the superimposition of the character of lover on the bee) would be suggested, the *vyatireka* (contrast) would be directly expressed. While this identification of figures is at least possible, it is surely not what Ānandavardhana meant when he used the phrase *bhramarasvabhāvoktir alankārah*. Whether Abhinava accepts the second interpretation is unclear. Usually he refers to other commentators only to disagree with

them. Accordingly, *BP* claims that he disagrees here, that is, that he prefers the first interpretation. But in 3.43b Abhinava seems to favor the second.

A "Never acting as the chief element" means never predominant. For it sometimes happens that an ornament which the poet has intended to be subservient to a *rasa* or the like actually appears to be intended as the chief factor. For example:

By the imperious command of his discus stroke
he rendered love's festival for the wives of Rāhu
empty of passionate embraces
and left only with a kiss.¹

In this stanza [there appears to be] an intention to make the figure *parydyokta* (periphrasis)² the chief element although the overall meaning of the sentence is a *rasa* or the like.³

1. The author of the verse is unknown. It refers to Viṣṇu's cutting off the head of the demon Rāhu with his discus. As Rāhu's disembodied head continued to live on—to be the cause of eclipses by its occasional swallowing of the moon or sun—it still remains possible for Rāhu's wives to enjoy his kisses. But they have been robbed of the full enjoyment of love. 2. *Parydyokta*: see 1.13 b L, note 1. The more restricted definition ("an implication of the cause by statement of the effect") will apply to our verse. 3. Ānanda's text is not as logical as one could desire and we have been forced to add the words "there appears to be" in brackets. The overall meaning of the stanza is the courage of Viṣṇu (*Vāsudevasya pratāpah*), which suggests the relish of heroism (*virūpa*). But the striking effect of the figure of speech, its cleverness and brilliance, casts this overall meaning into the shade and what appears as the predominant element in the stanza is the figure of speech. The difficulty with Ānanda's sentence lies in *vivakṣā*. How does he know what the poet intended? All we know is the result, from which we may say that the poet seems to have intended the figure to be the chief factor. We need the word *drṣyate* after *vivakṣā* just as we had it after *vivakṣite* two lines before the verse. But I fear to change the reading lest I be charged with emending the author rather than *etc.*

L He who, by means of his imperious command, that is, his untransgressible order [delivered] in the form of his discus stroke, made the festival of love to possess a mere remnant in the form of kisses; for this festival of love was rendered barren, that is, empty, of its amorous sportings among which embraces are the chief element.¹ But someone may object that what the poet here intended to be predominant was precisely the figure *paryāyokta* and not *rasa* or the like. So how can one claim that the overall meaning of the sentence is *rasa* or the like? But no. For what is intended to be expressed here is the courage of Viṣṇu. And this does not appear as a cause of beauty,² whereas the *paryāyokta* does. Although the poem is not faulty on this account, it may still serve as an example of how a subordinate figure can obscure the nature of the matter in hand which it was supposed to support. And from this there results a certain impropriety. Such is our author's view. And so when he states [a few lines below] that "the criticism of a great poet is simply a criticism of oneself," it must be clear that he did not give this example as an example of a fault.³

1. Abhinava takes ālīrīgānoddāmavilāsa as a *karmadhāraya* containing a *bahuvrīhi*. In doing so he takes *uddāma* as a noun in the unexampled sense of chief element. We have preferred to give *uddāma* its normal meaning and to take the compound as a *तत्पुरुषा*, literally, "a wild passion of embraces."
2. To explain this puzzling passage I suppose that Abhinava is interpreting the stanza as an instance of *rasavadalarikāra*, in which the poet intends the initial suggestion of the heroic *rasa* to subserve an ultimate suggestion of love of Viṣṇu: see 2.5 b and c A. But in the working out of his verse the poet has given greater brilliance to the *paryāyokta* than to the *virarasa*. This interpretation would allow Abhinava to avoid condemning the poem, for the ultimate *rasa* would still be an origin to the *anya* of *paryāyokta*. Only the intermediate *rasa* would be downgraded.
3. I doubt that Ānanda's intention was as Abhinava says. Ānanda's opinion here, it seems to me, is that the overall meaning of the stanza, which is the heroic *rasa*, has been spoiled by the cleverness of the figure of periphrasis.

A Even when a figure is intended as subordinate [or helpful to the *rasa*], it must be taken up at the proper time and not at the wrong time. An example of a figure taken up at the proper time is the *upamāsleṣā* (simile with ambiguity and puns) of the following:

[The translation of the second meanings is given in small print below the translation of the first meaning.]

It is bursting with new buds and pale of hue;
 She longing
 It has just begun to blossom
 she stretch with languor
 and exhibits a reaction to the constant advent of the breezes.
 her sighs.
 . this garden vine today on its madona tree
 in her passion
 is like a rival woman. and by my gazing on it
 her
 I shall doubtless make my queen's face flush with anger.
 [Harṣa-deva, Ratnāvalī 2.4]

1. The use of the simile helped out by puns and ambiguities is indeed felicitous, as Abhinava will point out. The king here describes a vine in the palace garden in terms that will apply to Ratnāvalī, who has recently arrived in his barem as a servant girl. The verse occurs in the play before the queen knows of the king's new infatuation with Ratnāvalī. The puns and ambiguities, given in small type in the translation, not only confirm the simile but prepare us for the scenes of jealousy to come. If the verse had been used after the queen's discovery, the figure would not be apt. The word *prārūḍha* *jimbhā* has been rendered by one translator with "has commenced to yawn." The translation carries a sadly inappropriate image to the English reader. What is meant is the impatient and anticipatory stretching of the body of girl who is daydreaming of her lover and forced to bide her time. The same expression is used in *SRK* 370. The same gesture arising from the same cause is described by the Latin poets also; see Juvenal 6.64-65.

L It is bursting with new buds, etc.: *uddāmoṭkalikām* mean "whose buds (*kalikāḥ*) have arisen (*udgatāḥ*)"; also "whose longin-

(*utkalikā*) has arisen." *Prārabdhajyimbhām kṣaṇāt* means "at a moment, i.e., at that very instant, it has begun to blossom"; but *jyimbhā* is also a stretching of the limbs caused by love. "Exhibits a reaction," namely the motion of swaying, a reaction on the part of the vine caused by the advent of the wind, namely the gentle approach of the spring breeze. The phrase also means "exhibits a reaction," that is, manifests the fever in her heart, by the succession of her sighs. *Samadanam* means "with a *madana*, a species of tree" and also "with passion (*kāma*)."
Here the figure *upamāśeṣa*, being placed as trail-blazer to the relish of jealous love that is to follow, calls our attention to the enjoyment of that relish. So the figure is taken up at just the right moment inasmuch as it comes forth just as this *rasa* is about to begin. That is what our author has in mind.

[One may] also [note that] the acting out of the primarily intended meaning, [namely that pertaining to the vine,] should be at every word, while the acting out of the secondary meaning [which pertains to the woman] should be only of the general meaning of the stanza and should be effected by *upāṅgas* (facial gestures).¹ On the other hand, it would be wrong to give no gesture at all [to the secondary meaning]. But enough on this incidental matter. The word "doubtless" (*dhruvam*) is the very heart of this preparation for the coming jealousy.

1. We wish we knew more about the *abhinaya*, the acting out a description by means of gesticulation and expression, that Abhinava has in mind. How would one act out the description of the vine? At just what point would one use an *upāṅga* to indicate that the description applies also to a woman? The *āṅgas* and *upāṅgas* are listed in *BhNS* 8.14 (Vol. 2, p. 3): *tasya śirohastorahparśvakafipādataḥ ṣad āṅgāni / netrabhrūnāśādharmakapolacibukāny upāṅgāni*. From this it will be seen that an *upāṅga* is a facial expression, a subtler indication of meaning than an *āṅga*, which is a gesture of the body.

A A figure that has been taken up, if it is abandoned at the right time for another figure better adapted to the *rasa*, will likewise [bring about the manifestation of a *rasa*], as in:

You are *rakta* with your new blossoms
 and I am too with my beloved's virtues;
 the *silimukhas* come to you,
 so do those shot by Love to me;
 the stroke of a damsel's foot brings joy to you,
 so would it me and both of us should be,
asoka tree, the same, if fate
 had not made me *sasoka*.

[Yāśovarman; also *Hanumannāṭaka* 5.24]¹

For here the puns and ambiguities (*slega*) with which the stanza begins, by their being abandoned for the expression of a contrast (*vyatireka*), give strength to the particular *rasa* [sc., love-in-separation]. It may be objected that there are not two figures of speech here, but one entirely different figure of speech, of composite nature like a man-lion, a figure consisting of ambiguity and contrast together.² But our answer would be no, because that composite type of figure has a different sort of distribution. The domain of the composite figure is where we apprehend the contrast³ in the very same word in which we apprehend the ambiguity, as in the line: "The god [Indra] is Hari by name (*sa harih*), [whereas] your majesty is *saharī* (one who has horses) because you have a host of steeds." But in our stanza one word is the domain of ambiguity and another is the domain of contrast.⁴ If we were to imagine the presence of the "entirely different figure" [i.e., *sankara*] in an area such as this [i.e., so wide as this], no area at all would be left for *samarṣṭi*.⁵

1. *Rakta*: "red" and "in love"; *silimukhas*: "bees" and "arrows"; *asoka*: name of a kind of tree and "without grief"; *sasoka*: "with grief." The *Hanumannāṭaka*, in which the verse occurs, is a cento made up of verses taken from many poets and adapted, sometimes by slightly altering the text, to the story of Rāma; see Kosambi, *HOS* Vol. 42, p. civ. The Subhāṣitāvalī (1364) ascribes the present verse to Yāśovarman, which is not improbable. To judge from line c the original context would have been one of love in separation caused by jealousy (*irṣyāṇipralambha*). There is a superstition that the *asoka* tree will blossom only at the touch of a woman's foot; see Bloomfield *JAOS* 40, 1-24 and Ingalls *HOS* Vol. 44, p. 111. As regards the lover, the stroke of his mistress' foot might serve as his penance and mark the end of her anger. But with the adaptation to the Rāma story the context becomes different. Sītā is not jealous, but has been abducted. Hence the commentators on the *Hanumannāṭaka* and on the *Rasogaṅgādhara* (K.M edition, p. 354),

with invincible logic but questionable taste, explain the kick desired by Rāma as a reference to an acrobatic position of intercourse.

The stanza has furnished matter for disagreement to Sanskrit critics for ten centuries (see Kosambi's references under *SRK* 770), so it is not surprising that even the present editors hold different opinions concerning the figure or figures of speech which it contains. The problem briefly is this. Ānanda quotes the verse as an example of a felicitous shift from one figure of speech to another. The verse begins with similes strengthened by puns and ambiguities. The lover in three respects is like the *asoka* tree. But the lover is separated from his beloved so that he is in grief (*sasoka*), whereas the *asoka* tree is, as its name proclaims, griefless (*a-soka*). The shift to contrast (*vyatireka*) in the last line is certainly effective in emphasizing the relish of love in separation.

The chief objection to Ānanda's analysis is that the stanza does not really drop one figure and take up another; the two figures are interlocked. The contrast cannot arise without the pun in "asoka" to support it. Ānanda himself raises this objection (2.18-19 d) and answers it, not very happily, by pointing to other cases where contrast is effective without the use of puns. On this matter J. Masson remarks, "It is perfectly true, as Ānanda says, that *vyatireka* can arise apart from *slesa*. But surely the point is not whether it can or cannot theoretically, but whether it does in the case of the verse 'rakta tuam,' etc." Accordingly, Masson finds himself on the side of the objector. But Abhinava supports Ānanda (see below), saying that the opponent's view is incorrect because it goes against one's inner feeling for the poem, a feeling that even the objector must share. Ingalls finds himself basically on the side of Ānanda and Abhinava. Granted that the figures are interlocked, the charm of the stanza derives from its shift, its turnabout. The logic of Ānanda's argument is not convincing, although Abhinava does much to improve it, as we shall point out in the notes which follow. But the poetic sensitivity of these two critics, it seems to Ingalls, was correct. After examining what Ānanda and Abhinava have to say, the reader may come to his own conclusion.

2. This "entirely different figure of speech" would be a form of fusion (*sankara*) as opposed to *samsṛti* (the association of distinct figures). The critics divide all cases of the presence of two or more figures in a single sentence or stanza into these two categories. *Sankara* (as opposed to *samsṛti*) is a figure distinct from the interlocked or interdependent members of which it consists. The objector is claiming that the *asoka*-stanza embodies that figure. Ānanda will argue that it embodies a *samsṛti*.

3. One should drop the *prakārāntareṇa* before *vyatirekaprūtītis*. It probably arose by dittography from the *prakārāntareṇa* in the preceding line.

4. This is strictly true: *rakta*, *silimukhāḥ*, mude and *asoka* are the domain of *slesa*; *asoka* and *sasoka* are the domain of *vyatireka*. The fact that the figures overlap in *asoka* does not make Ānanda's statement false.

5. For *samsṛti* see note 2 above. The argument from *nirvāsayatva* is a favorite with the grammarians. Ānanda has already used it before (2.5 e A).

L “Rakta” means red. “I am too”: here *rakta* means “my passion has been aroused.” One should understand the red color of the *asoka* bloom to be the stimulant (*vibhāva*) which arouses this passion. And hence the ideas expressed first in each quarter of the stanza are to be explained as stimulants [of what is expressed in the second half of the quarters].¹ So this is a *hetusleṣa*. For *sleṣa* is very commonly an aid to the figures *sahokti*, *upamā*, and *hetu*. This is all that Bhāmaha meant in describing *sleṣa* as being “of three varieties, viz., *sahokti*, *upamā*, and *hetu*.” In making that remark he did not intend to deny that *sleṣa* may be an aid to other figures also.²

The particular *rasa*: viz., love-in-separation. The word *saśoka*, which brings in the contrast, also gives scope to such transient states of mind (*vyabhicāribhāvās*) as depression, anxiety, and the like, which strengthen the relish of love-in-separation. But: this [different figure of speech] is the single figure fusion *sankara*, so there can be no question of discarding one figure (*sleṣa*) and adopting another (*vyatireka*). That is the objector’s point. That: i.e., fusion. For fusion is the flashing into view of two figures of speech in one area. Thus, the word *saharīḥ* is a single area. [It has two meanings:] “he is Hari” (*sa harīḥ*) and possessing horses (*saha haribhīḥ*).³ But in our verse: the particle *hi* is here used in the sense of “but” (*tu*).⁴ The reference is to the stanza *raktas tuam*. One word: the words *rakta*, etc. [i.e. *rakta*, *śilāmukha*, *mude*, which are the area of double meaning]. And another: viz., *asoka*, etc. [i.e. *asoka* and *saśoka*, which are the area of contrast].⁵ But it might be urged that if we take the area to be the whole sentence, we can still have fusion here residing in a “single area.” Anticipating such a suggestion, he says if. In an area such as this: that is, a [whole] sentence. The singular inflection of *vिषये* is intentional. The sense is, if one will call something a single area from its being a single sentence, then there can be no association (*samsṛṣṭi*) anywhere because it will be logically included in fusion.

1. In the second line, it is the sight of the bees flying toward the *asoka* flowers that excites the lover’s feeling of separation from his beloved. In the third line, it is the touch of a woman’s foot which gives delight to the *asoka* and may cause the lover to think of his own lady’s touching him in the same way. He is also excited at seeing the joy of the *asoka*. Abhinava’s point is that each element in the description of the *asoka* tree furthers the lover’s emotion and is therefore the cause of the second meaning of the ambiguous

expression. 2. Bhāmaha divides śleṣa into three varieties (3.17): sahokti-śleṣa, upamā-śleṣa, and hetu-śleṣa. Sahokti-śleṣa is where a word having the meaning "and" or "together with" (saha) is used in connection with the ambiguity, e.g., "Being easy to ascend (or approach) and generous of fruit (or reward), wayside trees and good men serve the benefits of others." Upamā-śleṣa is where a word meaning "like" is used, e.g., the same example with the substitution of "like" (iva or tulya) for "and" (ca). Hetu-śleṣa is where a cause is expressed, e.g., "Because you are unfathomable and because you never transgress the proper bounds, you are like the ocean." In this example of hetu-śleṣa (taken from Bhāmaha) both the word "like" and an expression of cause (the ablative case) are used. In the aśoka-verse a word for "like" is used and, according to Abhinava, cause is suggested. Bhāmaha would doubtless have identified the figure in the aśoka-verse as upamā-śleṣa, but Abhinava's extension of the term hetu-śleṣa allows a more suggestive interpretation of the verse. Whether Bhāmaha would have allowed śleṣa to be an aid to still other figures, as Abhinava claims, is uncertain. But the opinion is ancient. Dandin says that śleṣa can increase the beauty of any figure (2.363). 3. And so this one area furnishes both pun and contrast. 4. And so we have translated it. However, I think that the literal meaning of atra hi in Text 229, line 1 is the same as of the atra hi with which 2.18-19c A begins. The sentence here is furnishing another reason to explain Ānanda's disagreement with the objector (iti cen na Text 228, line 3). But Abhinava is fond of this explanation of the particle hi (e.g. 3.6a L) and uses hi in this sense himself (3.33k L, Text 434, line 7). 5. The correct reading is doubtless aśokādīḥ, to which some absent-minded scribe added saśoka without thinking to remove the ādi. As the text stands it is nonsense, for it is only the words aśoka and saśoka which carry the vyatireka.

A Should one object that our stanza is not an instance of *samsṛṣṭi* because the contrast comes into existence only by means of a pun [whereas *samsṛṣṭi* demands that the two figures be independent of one another], our reply is no, for we see that contrast can arise in a quite different manner also [i.e., without a single figure based on puns].¹ For example:

The wind of doomsday, whose fierce blast
 will tear down mountains, will not blow it out;
 its beauty blazes far by day,
 it is quite untouched by the soot of night.
Patarīga gives birth to this unique wick
 nor ever serves to extinguish it:
 may this light for the lamps of every land, this sunlight,
 ever bring you joy.

[Mayūra, *Suryasatata* 23]²

This is an example of contrast without the expression of any similarity at all.³ Again, it cannot be said that we perceive there [in the *asoka*-stanza] a cause of beauty to lie in the puns alone [without regard to similarity] and that the puns must therefore be intended to be subordinate to the contrast and not an independent figure on their own.⁴ Because in such an area [viz., the area of contrast] we find that beauty can result also from a well-stated simile alone [without puns], as in the following and other examples:

My groans are like your thunder;
 the water of my eyes, your ceaseless downpour;
 the fire of grief born of her separation,
 is like your flashing lightning;
 I bear my loved one's face
 within my heart, you hide the moon in yours:
 in all this we are similar, friend Cloud;
 why then would you destroy me?

[Yaśovarman]⁵

1. Ānanda's sentence suffers from both ellipsis and bad logic. Abhinava fills in the ellipsis, as we have done in brackets. But the conclusion does not follow from the premise. One cannot deduce a particular from a particular. For Abhinava's attempt to improve the logic, see his commentary below and our note 1 thereon.
2. The stanza contains a pun in *patarīga*: the sun (which gives birth to sunlight), or a moth (which serves to extinguish the wick of a lamp). So Ānanda will furnish another example below of contrast in the complete absence of puns.
3. There is no expressed similarity because the stanza contains no word "like" or "similar to (*tulya*)."
4. There is of course a suggested simile as Abhinava will point out. But Ānanda overlooks this point because it is unimportant. See end of note 1 on Abhinava's comment below.
4. The disavowed statement, if true, would imply that the verse contains the figure of interlocked members *sankara* and not the two figures *slega* and

vyatireka held distinct in *samsṛṣṭi*. 5. The verse occurs in *SRK* 240. It is attributed to Yaśodharman by *Saduktī* 993; to Yaśovarman by *SūktiM.* 43.33.

L Now an objection may be raised. Contrast always contains a simile within itself; and in the case here [of the *asoka*-stanza] the simile has been brought in by means of puns. So the puns in the verse are an aid to the contrast. Thus the stanza is the domain of the figure fusion. On the other hand, where there is no relation of aider and aided between the two figures, that can be a case of association, even if the two figures reside in one sentence. This [is the objection which] our author now states. By means of a pun: what he means is "by means of a simile which is brought in by force of a pun." Our author counters the objection with no. What he has in mind is this: Does contrast everywhere arise only when the simile [or similarity] is directly expressed, or does it arise when it is implied?¹ He rejects the first alternative by saying: in a quite different manner. He means, "even though the simile [or similarity] is not directly expressed.

"Will not blow out" means "cannot extinguish." The flame of a lamp, on the other hand, can be extinguished by a mere breeze. "The soot of night": soot in the form of night. "Not not freed from" means "quite untouched by." The wick of a lamp, on the other hand, is accompanied by night (or darkness) because, as the wick is very slender, soot envelops its surface. "From *pataṅga*, that is, from the sun." The wick of a lamp, on the other hand, is extinguished by a *pataṅga*, that is, by a moth, and does not take its birth therefrom.

Similarity: he means, with a series of similitudes or similes but without any word, e.g., "like" or "such as," proper to the conveying of this [relation]. This is as much as to say that as a simile by being merely suggested can be helpful to a contrast, the simile need not be expressed in so many words. Accordingly, the *ślesopamā* (simile occasioned by puns) was not taken into our verse for its being helpful to the contrast.

But, [a new opponent may object,] granted that this may not be the reason in other cases, in the case of the *asoka*-stanza the *ślesopamā* has been taken in because it was favorable to the contrast, because if it were not favorable, it would have no power to beautify. This is why the *ślesopamā* cannot be a separate *alaṅkāra* (figure of speech = beautifier). This [is the objection which] our author now states with it cannot be said. Our author realizes in his heart that the opponent's view is wrong because it goes against one's inner feeling [for the verse].

Accordingly, he produces an example in which beauty arises without puns, simply through simile, which silences the opponent, who is really denying his own inner feeling. He does this with the sentence because, etc.

In the exemplar verse the word "like" is to be construed with all the words ending in the instrumental case. Everything else is to be understood as in the case of the stanza on the *asoka*.²

1. Ānanda's argument is actually different from that which Abhinava here supposes. Ānanda in effect shows that (a) contrast can be produced by puns without simile, and (b) contrast can be produced by simile without puns. From this he passes to the conclusion (c) that the contrast in the *asoka*-stanza is not in need of either puns or simile: the figures of that stanza are independent. This is arguing from a particular to a particular. Doubtless Abhinava saw the logical fault, for he makes an attempt to remove it. He supposes an objector to base an argument on a universal, thus:

Contrast always involves simile,
the simile in the *asoka*-verse is *slesopamā*,
therefore the contrast and the *slesā* are i

This argument can be logically disproved by showing a single case where contrast does not contain a simile. The verse from *Mayūra* is such an example, for there is no expressly denoted simile in it. Nothing is said of its suggested simile, for that is beside the point. A suggested simile falls in the category of *dhvani*, not of figures of speech. Technically, the interlocking of *slesā* and suggested simile does not produce *sarikara*. 2. *BP* explains that the thundering of the cloud is to be taken as the cause of the speaker's groans, and so on for the other elements of the verse; see 2.18-19 c L and note 1 thereon.

A Again, when the poet's mind is concentrated on carrying out the *rasa*, a figure which he will not wish to press too far [will bring about a manifestation of the *rasa*].¹ For example:

In anger she has bound him
 tightly in the noose of her soft arms
 and in the evening leads him to the bedroom,
 where before her attendant friends
 she points to the signs of his deceit and conjures hi
 never, never to do such a thing again.
 O lucky lover:
 as he is hiding his transgression with a laugh,
 she weeps and strikes him.

{Amarasatāka 9}²

for here a metaphor (*rūpaka*), being introduced but not fully carried out, greatly strengthens the *rasa*.

1. The bracketed words follow in Text 233, line 5; see 2.18-19 L and note 3.
2. The stanza belongs to a type of Sanskrit verse which depicts a man's delight in provoking an outburst of jealousy from his mistress; see SRK 682. The essence of the situation is furnished by the collocation of the two contradictory words (almost an oxymoron) at the very end of the stanza: *rudatyā hasan* "he laughing (is struck) by her weeping."

L Having thus shown the application of [the advice for] taking up and dropping a figure of speech, he now explains the portion [of the advice] that says "they should never be oversustained." [Again, when carrying out] the *rasa*: the word "again" (*ca*) serves to add another variety of circumspection [see 2.18-19 A, note 1]. Were one to continue the metaphor furnished by the woman's creeper-like arms' acting as a noose for binding, the woman would become a huntress, the bedroom would become a prison or a cage, and so on, all of which would be most inappropriate.

"Before her friends": the implication is that they have all along been telling her that her lover is faithful; well, let them just look now. "[Conjures him] with faltering voice," that is, with a voice that is indistinct because of her access of anger and that is also a sweet voice. And what does she say? "Never do such a thing again." What she means by "such a thing" is shown by the word "deceit," for example nail-marks and the like [imprinted by a rival], to which she points with her finger. "She strikes him": she cannot be held back by the placations of her friends, because he is intent on hiding his fault under the pretext of

laughing and because he is so dear to her. Who would be able to bear the infidelity of such a man?

A Even if the poet decides to sustain the figure, if he takes care to keep it subordinate, [it will bring about a manifestation of the *rasa*], as in the following and other examples:

I see your body in the *syāmā* vines,
your glance in the startled eyes of deer,
your cheek in the moon, your hair in the peacock's tail,
the play of your eyebrow in the rippling stream.
Alas, my timid darling, I can nowhere
find your complete likeness in one place.

[Kālidāsa, *Meghadūta* 2.41 = Pathak ed. 109]¹

1. *Bhīru* (timid), on which *L* expatiates, is a characteristically Kashmiri reading, found also in Vallabha's commentary and in the *Subhāṣitāvali*, as opposed to the vulgate *cāṇḍī* (cruel).

L [Decides] to sustai is means, to carry all the way through.

In the *syāmā* vines: that is, in the fragrant *priyanigu* (*Aglaia odorata*), because it is pale, slender, and *kantakita* ("thorny" or "exhibiting horripilation"). In the moon: because of its paleness. "I see (*utpaśyāmi*)," that is, by effort I fancy. The sense is that he indulges this fancy in order to preserve his life. Alas: what a misfortune. The implication is that since I cannot find your whole likeness in one place, I wander about, but wherever I go I lack the satisfaction of a single likeness of you in anything. Timid: the sense is that one of timid heart will not put all her wealth in one place.

In this stanza the similarity [between the Yakṣa's wife and various objects of nature], which animates the figure *utprekṣā* (poetic fancy), a

sustained fashion just as it was begun and yet gives strength to the [dominant] relish of love-in-separation.

2.18-19 g

A A figure of speech which a poet forms under these precautions will bring about a manifestation of *rasa*. On the other hand, if he departs from these principles, a loss of *rasa* will certainly ensue. Examples of such loss are to be found in abundance even in the works of great poets. But we have not demonstrated these lapses because publishing the faults of great men who have shown their greatness in thousands of fine verses would be simply a criticism of oneself. However, the general direction has been given of how the whole collection of figures of speech such as metaphor and the like can be useful in suggesting *rasa*. If a good poet, with concentrated mind, will follow this lead, discovering still other principles on his own account, and will thereby construct the soul of *dhvani*, of which we have just spoken, (that is, a suggested meaning) which appears without a perceived interval, then this [type of *dhvani*] will arise in all its glory.¹

1. *Tasya* (Text, p. 234, line 1) refers back to *dhvaner dī*.

L But these, sc., examples, should be construed with the word "demonstrated." With however, etc., he shows that although no counterexamples have been given, one will achieve what is necessary by studying the positive examples. Other principles: he means other types of precaution; for example the taking up again at the right time a figure that has been dropped, as in a verse of my own composition:

If the rays of the moon are pencils of ambrosia
how come they to burn my heart?
Or were they long ago infected
by their dwelling with the *kālakūṭa* poison?
Then how is it they have not destroyed my life?
Perhaps it is saved by the magic syllables
in telling over my beloved's name.
Then why do I faint?
Also see T. 1.1.1.

In this verse the figures *rūpaka*,² *sandeha*,³ and *nidarsanā*,⁴ being successively abandoned and then again taken up,⁵ lead to a strengthening of the *rasa*. And so enough.

1. The moon is traditionally supposed to be the reservoir of ambrosia drunk by the gods, but it once dwelled in the sea where one of its companions was the kālakūṭa poison. Pencils of ambrosia (*amṛtacchaṭā*): the dictionary definitions of *chaṭā* are misleading. It is regularly used as a noun adjunct for things which are long and slender, e.g., *drṣṭicchaṭā* (Text 309, line 6 of Loc.), *sāśidyotacchaṭā* (Udbhaṭa, 2.^o15 Indrāja), *kaṭākṣacchaṭā* (SRK 465).
2. There is *rūpaka* (metaphor) in the phrase "if the rays are pencils of ambrosia." The figure is abandoned in the next clause for *sandeha*.
3. There is *sandeha* (poetic doubt) in "or were they long ago infected," etc. It is abandoned in the next sentence for *nidarsanā*.
4. The phrase "saved by magic syllables in telling over my beloved's name" (*priyatamāsanājālpamantrākṣarai rakṣyante*) contains the figure *nidarsanā*. This is the later conception of *nidarsanā* (from Udbhaṭa onward), more technically called *asambhavadvastusambhavanibandhanā* *nidarsanā*. This type of *nidarsanā* occurs where a relation (in the present example the relation between *rakṣyante* and *priyatamāsanājālpa*) is logically impossible unless we envisage a simile (unless we take the whole phrase to mean *priyatamāsanājālpena mantrākṣarair iva rakṣyante*), in which the qualifiers (*vīsesaṇōni*) of the *upamāna* and the *upameya* (in the present instance *priyatamā* and *mantra*) appear as image and reflection (*bimba* and *pratibimba*) of one another. In general, whenever a *rūpaka* is extended by *vīsesaṇas* qualifying the *upameya* and *upamāna* such that these *vīsesaṇas* appear as *bimba* and *pratibimba* the figure is called *nidarsanā* not *rūpaka*. In the stanza under discussion the *nidarsanā* is given up in the question which follows.
5. Apparently the last sentence of the stanza "I know not what to think" (*no vedmi keyam gatiḥ*) is regarded as reestablishing all three of the preceding possibilities and therefore reviving the three abandoned figures.

K That form of suggestion which appears after an interval and which is similar to the reverberation [of a bell] is itself distributed into two varieties: it can be dependent on the [suggestive] power of words (*śabdaśaktimūla*), or it can be dependent on the [suggestive] power of

§ 2.21 Introduction A]

A Of suggestion where the literal meaning although intended leads to a further sense, the variety which is similar to a reverberation because the suggested meaning appears at an interval [from the literal meaning] has itself two varieties, one based on the [suggestive] power of words and the other on the [suggestive] power of meaning.

L Having thus considered the first variety of that suggestion where the literal meaning although intended leads to a further sense, that is, the variety where the sequence is not perceived, he now proceeds to analyse the second variety with the words [that form of suggestion which appears] after an interval. These words of the first quarter of the *Kārikā*, resuming a subject from the earlier discussion, are used to furnish a reason [for the relative clause that follows]. The resonance of a bell always appears at an interval from the sound produced by the striking of the bell. Is itself: not only is suggestion basically divided into two varieties [viz., *avivakṣitavācyā* and *vivakṣitānyaparavācyā*]; and not only is *vivakṣitānyaparavācyā* divided into two varieties [viz., *asamlakṣyakramavyāngya* and *samlakṣyakramavyāngya*]; but even *samlakṣyakramavyāngya* is divided into two varieties [viz., *śabdaśakti-mūla* and *arthāśakti-mūla*].¹ This is the force of *api* ("also," "itself").

1. *Samlakṣyakramavyāngya* really has a third variety also, based on both the power of words and the power of meaning. See 2.23.

A Now it may be objected that if this domain, where a second meaning appears by the power of a word, is given to a variety of suggestion (*dhvani*), there will be no domain left for the pun ([śabda-]ślesa). But one can show that this is not the case:

K because it is where a figure of speech appears by the power of words, being only implied (*ākṣipta*) and without being directly expressed by a word, that we have this [variety of] suggestion that arises by the power of words.

A Since what we mean is, that a figure of speech, not a mere fact, appearing in a poem by the power of words, constitutes this type of *dhvani* arising by the power of words. But when two facts appear by the power of a single word, we have the [directly expressed] figure of the pun (*sleṣa*), as in the following:

[In the punning verses which follow, the translation of the second meanings will be given in small print below the translation of the first meaning.]

He who destroyed the cart and is unborn
 He who destroyed the mind-born god
 and who once, the conqueror of Bali, made his body into a woman;
 and who once made the body of the conqueror of Bali into his weapon;
 who slew the upraised serpent; whose ultimate state is sound;
 whose necklace and bracelets are raised serpents;
 who upheld the mountain and the earth;
 who upheld the Ganges;
 to whom the immortals give the praiseworthy name
 to whom the immortals give the praiseworthy name
 of the Seizer of the head of the moon-destroyer;
 of the Seizer (*hara*) who bears on his head the moon;
 who brought about a habitation for the Andhakas;
 who brought about the destruction of Andhaka;
 who is all-giving and named Mādhava;
 who is always the husband of Umā;
 may he protect you.¹
 may he protect you.

1. The mythological references are explained below by *L*. The stanza is ascribed by *SūktiM.* 2.104 to *Candraka*, by *Sadukti*, 163 to *Bhāravi*. It is left anonymous by *SubhĀ.*, *Mammāta*, and *Hemacandra*.

L By since he explains the word "because" of the *Kārikā*. By not a mere fact he shows what the *Kārikā* means to exclude when it says "a figure of speech." But when two facts: the word *ca* ("and") is used in the sense of "but."

[Interpretation of the verse as referring to *Viṣṇu*:] He who destroyed the cart while he was playing as a child; the unborn, that is, who is without birth; *balijit* [Abhinava takes the word otherwise than as we have taken it]: he who conquers the strong ones (*balinah*), viz., the demons; who made his body into a woman long ago at the time when the ambrosia was churned from the sea; who slew the upraised, that is, proud, serpent named *Kāliya*; whose dissolution is into sound, for it is said that *Viṣṇu* is the phoneme *a*;¹ who [as *Krishna*] held up the mountain *Govardhana* and [in his boar incarnation] raised up the earth from *Pātāla*; to whom the sages give a praiseworthy name. What is this name? He who destroys (*manth* + null-suffix *kvip*) the moon, *Rāhu*; [*Viṣṇu's* name] is "remover of the head of *Rāhu*." May this *Mādhava*, that is, *Viṣṇu*, who is all-giving, protect you. [Again] how is he qualified? As he who gave *kṣaya*, that is, habitation, to the tribe of *Andbakas* at *Dvārakā*; or one can take the term to mean he who, at at the time of the *Mausala* battle, made *kṣaya*, that is, destruction, of the *Andbakas* by means of the iron reeds.

The second interpretation [referring to *Śiva*]: Who, having destroyed *Kāma*, transformed the body of the Destroyer of the Strong Ones, that is, of *Viṣṇu*, into his weapon, that is, his arrow, at the time of the burning of the Triple Citadel; whose necklace and bracelets are upraised serpents and who bore the *Ganges*; to whom the sages give the praiseworthy name "he whose head carries the moon" and who is called *Hara*; may he, the blessed one, who himself was the cause of the demon *Andhaka*'s destruction and who is always, that is, at all times, the husband, the lover, of *Umā*, protect you.

In this stanza the second meanings which we perceive are simply facts and not a figure of speech; and so it belongs wholly to the domain of the pun (*sleṣa*).

1. Short *a* is the source of all the phonemes, from which comes the Veda, from which comes everything. God (Viṣṇu) in his ultimate form is *sabda-brahman*, the verbal source of the universe.

A But now there is a difficulty. Udbhaṭa has shown¹ that even when a separate figure of speech appears [together with *sleṣa* (an ambiguity or pun)], that [combination] is to be designated an instance of the figure *sleṣa*. So now it appears that there is no domain left for *dhvani* based on the power of words. In anticipation of this difficulty, the *Kārikā* has used the word "implied." Here is what is meant. Wherever by the power of words a figure of speech appears in addition [to *sleṣa*]—this figure being directly denoted—all that is the domain of *sleṣa*. But where by the power of words a figure of speech appears in addition [to *sleṣa*], this figure being implied by the inherent capability of the situation (*sāmarthyākṣipta*)² and not directly denoted—in other words, being suggested (*vyāṅgya*)—all that is the domain of *dhvani*.

The direct appearance by the power of words of a second figure [together with *sleṣa*] may be seen in the following:

As even without a necklace
they had a natural charm,
necklace,
in whom did this maiden's breasts
not arouse wonder?³

Here a transient state of mind (*vyabhicāribhāva*) of love, named "wonder," and the directly expressed figure of speech *virodha* (contradiction) both appear [together with a pun]. So this is in the domain of *sleṣa* favoring the semblance of *virodha*.⁴ It is not in the domain of that type of *dhvani* which is like a reverberation.⁵ However, it is in the domain of the type of *dhvani* where the suggestion appears without an interval, the suggestion being here suggested either by the pun or the *virodha*.⁶

1. This refers to Udbhaṭa, Indurāja 4.10 (*Vivṛti* 4.24), where he speaks of *sleṣa* as "generating the appearance of other figures of speech" (*slygam ... alaṅkārāntaragatām pratibhām janayat padaiḥ*). Both his commentators interpret his words to mean that where we have the impression both of *slesa* and of some other figure such as *upamā* or *rūpaka* one is to identify the figure as *sleṣa* only. The reason given is *anavakāśatvāt*, i.e., that *slesa* has no other scope. It never appears without the appearance of some other figure, whereas those other figures do have their own spheres where *slesa* is not present. If we do not have the overlapping instances to *slesa*, it will have no scope at all. Another solution, of course, would be to recognize the symbiotic nature of *sleṣa* and give it no independent domain. The overlapping instances would then be instances of fusion. In cases where *sleṣa* and a second figure are mutually dependent, Abhinava (in his comment on this section; see below) claims that Ānanda follows this anti-Udbhaṭa explanation. But that seems unlikely.

2. The translation is clumsy but I cannot find a simpler English phrase that does not falsify the meaning. *Sāmarthyākṣipto*, taken most literally, means "implied by the capability [inherent in the situation or in the sentence]." Compare 3.30 c *L arthaśāmarthyād iti vākyārthaśāmarthyād iti yāvat* (Text 411, Loc. lines 2-3). One may render it less literally by "implied by the available possibilities," or "implied by the principle of compatibility." Compatability is one of the glosses given to *sāmarthyā* by the grammarians on Pāṇ. 2.1.1.

3. The verse occurs without ascription of author in *SubhĀ* 1534. 4. The word *virodhacchādā*, which we have translated "a semblance of *virodha*," is not a synonym of the later term *virodhābhāsā*. Ānanda does not mean that the contradiction itself is false or merely apparent, but that it forms a false figure. The figure is not really *virodha* because the dictum of Udbhaṭa (see note 1 above) requires us to identify the figure as *slesa*. 5. Naturally not, for there is no suggested figure of speech in it. 6. Ānanda means that the stanza *tasyā vināpi hārena* suggests śrīgārārasa. It would thus fall under the type illustrated at 3.4 d A, where *rasadhvani* is helped out by figures of speech. It is disconcerting, however, to find the actual name of a *vyabhicārin* (viz., *vismaya*) given in a stanza which is said to suggest *rasa*, as this goes against the principle laid down in 1.4 g A. Presumably Ānanda regarded the word as merely incidental. Certainly it does not add to the *rasa*. Finally, one wonders why Ānanda wrote *uḍ* ("or") instead of *ca* ("and"). Abhinava's explanation seems unnatural.

L To show what the *Kārikā* means to exclude by the word "implied," our author begins with a possible objection: But even when a separate figure of speech.

As even without, etc.: Here the word "even" (*api*) directly denotes a contradiction¹ and so forces the denotative power [of *hārināu*]

into a double meaning. *Hāriṇau* may mean "they must" captivate one's heart," or it may mean "possessing a necklace (*hāra*)."³ And it is because of this [presence of *api*] that the word *vismaya* (wonder) strengthens this very sense. For if the word *api* were not present, there would be no direct denotation of a double meaning, since the natural charm of the maiden's breasts could be taken as the cause of wonder.⁴

A state of mind named wonder: he uses this phrase to furnish an illustration. Just as wonder appears directly through the very word "wonder" [and not as suggested by the description of an *anubhāva* or the like], just so does the figure of contradiction appear directly through the word "even" (*api*) [and is not a suggested figure]. Now one might doubt that there is any suggestion at all in this stanza. To allay that doubt he says, however, etc. Or by the *virodha*: by the use of "or" he shows that this is a case of the figure fusion composed of an interlocked *sleṣa* and *virodha*, for the word "or" indicates that due to the presence of mutual aid⁵ there is no basis for rejecting the one and accepting the other.

1. When the word *api* is used, a *virodha* is said to be directly expressed (*vācyā*). When it is omitted, the *virodha* is said to be suggested (*vyāngya*). Thus Rangacharya Raddi Shastri, commenting on Dāṇḍin 2.333, quotes Vāmana's exemplar verse (*KASV* 4.3.12.1) and says *eṣa ca apīśabdaprayoge vācyo, anyothā vyāngyah*. 2. For the interpretation of the -in suffix (*nīti*) as indicating necessity, see Pāṇ. 3.3.170. 3. Without the word "even" we would take the word *hāriṇau* only in the first, its common, sense. The word "even" makes us look for a contradiction, which we find in the second, unusual, meaning. 4. As the verse stands, the reader understands it to mean that men wondered at the contradiction, viz., that the maiden's breasts could have a necklace without having a necklace. If the word "even" were omitted, the reader might understand the verse to mean that men wondered at her breasts, which happen to be without a necklace, simply because the breasts were beautiful. 5. The presence of mutual aid (*anugrahayogat*): What Abhinava means is that the relation of aider and aided (*anugrāhyānugrāhabhāv*) between *sleṣa* and *virodha* is mutual. If there were no pun (if, for example, we substituted the the word *manoharau* for *hāriṇau*), there would be no contradiction. Again, if the contradiction expressed in *api* did not make us look for a second meaning, there would be no pun. According to Abhinava, Ānanda would go against Udbhaṭa's dictum (see 2.21 a 4, note 1) in such instances and identify the figure not as *sleṣa* but as *saṅkara*. This is putting words into Ānanda's mouth that he might reject.

A A similar instance occurs in a verse of my own:

As he holds in his hand the discus "Beautiful"
As he is one whose hand is beautiful
while her whole body merits praise;
as he had stepped across the universe
surpassed the universe
with the graceful motion of his lotus feet
while she had conquered the universe
with the grace of every limb:
as he bears an eye that is the moon
while her whole face is of lunar beauty:
it was with reason that Hari regarded Rukmini
as more precious than his very self.
as superior to his own body.
I pray that now she give you aid.¹

In this stanza *slesā* appears, favoring a *vyatireka* (contrast) through its direct expression.

1. The name of Hari's (= Viṣṇu's) discus is "Sudarśana" (the name means "Beautiful"). In three steps Viṣṇu covered earth, sky, and heaven. In his cosmic form his two eyes are the sun and the moon. Rukmini was his favorite wife when he lived as Krishna in Dvārakā.

L Normally *sudarśanakara* will mean "he who carries the discus Sudarśana in his hand." But in the alternative demanded by the contrast it will have to mean "he whose hands only, [not the other parts of his body,] are beautiful." "The graceful motion of his lotus feet," that is, the playful action of stepping across the three worlds. "Bearing an eye": possessing an eye that consists of the moon.

Through its direct expression: because the contrast is directly expressed by the words "superior to his own body."

A And another example is:

The cloud serpents pour forth water
pour forth venom
which brings to ladies whose husbands are away
a sudden dizziness, a listlessness and weariness of heart,
then fainting, darkness, emaciation, death.

[*Śakavṛddhi*]¹

Or again:

Whose war elephants are his mighty arms
whose fame has spread through their crushing
who have scattered pollen by their crushing
of the golden lotuses of the hearts of his foes
of the golden lotuses of Lake Mānasa
and whose flow of gifts is ceaseless
and who blow constantly with ichor.²

In these two stanzas *sleṣa* appears as aiding the semblance of metaphor (*rūpaka*)³ through its direct expression.

1. The ascription to Śakavṛddhi is furnished by Subhā. 1538, which quotes some twelve verses by this poet. Ānanda quotes the stanza again at 3.20b A. 2. The verb *camadha* is given by Pāṇasaddamahonṇava as meaning to crush; hence *camadha* (here *camaha*), crushed. "Of his foes" is supplied by Abhinava. The words *mānasa* (heart; also the lake of that name) and *dāṇa* (gift, or ichor) are puns. In the last quarter of the Prakrit one must read *ccia* for *iva* (see Hemacandra, Prāk. 2.184). This should be translated by *eva*, not *ivo*. The word *iva* would produce *upamā*, not *rūpaka*. It may also be remarked that Sanskrit has trouble in rendering the grammatical number of the Prakrit nouns. As the ending *-ā* represents equally the dual or plural in Prakrit, the war elephants (plural) of the king can be likened to his arms (dual) without any grammatical difficulty. But in Sanskrit with its distinct inflections this would constitute a fault, which the Sanskrit translator has avoided at the expense of giving the king more than two arms. 3. In the first stanza the compound *jaladabhuja* must be analyzed as a *rūpakaśamāsa* into the elements *jaladā eva bhujagāḥ*, where the *eva* shows that the metaphor is directly expressed. For the distinction of *rūpakaśamāsas*, which are justified by Pāṇ. 2.1.57, from *upamitaśamāsas*, which are justified by Pāṇ. 2.1.56,

see Nāgojī Bhaṭṭa on Mammata 10, example 421, and Rangacharya Raddi Shastri on Daṇḍin 2.66.

L In view of the meaning of "serpent," the word *vīra* cannot stop at its normal denotation of water but is forced to denote its second meaning, "venom," for without that meaning the denotative power [of the sentence] cannot be completed.¹ Dizziness and the other [afflictions], on the other hand, are common [to both interpretations].²

[The application of the second verse to the king is as follows.] The hearts, that is the hearts of his enemies, have been crushed by having been plunged in despair. These hearts are called lotuses made of gold because of their strength.³ Because of these [broken hearts], his "fragrance has been churned," that is, the essence of his valor has been spread abroad. His war elephants are his mighty arms, which flow constantly with gifts. Because of the presence of the word "war elephants" the words *camahia*, *parimala*, and *dāṇa* transmit the respective meanings crush, perfume, and ichor; but they have not completed their denotative function in so doing and they go on to denote the other meanings which I have enumerated above.

1. Water does not normally bring dizziness and death. To make sense of the literal meaning of the sentence, we have to understand the second literal sense of *vīra*, viz., venom, as well as the first, water, which was needed for the connection with clouds. 2. Dizziness and the other afflictions can result equally from snake-bite or from the absence of one's husband during the monsoon. Accordingly, the words *bhrumim*, etc., exemplify *arthasleṣa*, not *sabdasleṣa*. 3. The heart is often likened to a lotus. But *BP* notes the instance in *KumSam*. 5.19 where Parvati's heart is likened to a lotus made of gold because, while tender, it can endure the most severe exertions. The text of *L* is mispointed; one should place the *danda* after *sasāratvūt* instead of before. Again, in the next line, one should place the *danda* after *prasṛta-pratāpasōra(ḥ)* instead of before.

A Where the figure of speech, although implied, is then again directly expressed by some other word [in the stanza], we likewise cannot speak of *dhvani* in the form of a resonance arising by the power

of words. In such cases we must speak of some directly denoted figure such as *vakrokti* or the like,¹ as in this example:

O Keśava, my eyes were blind
 my judgment was blinded
 with the dust raised by your cattle;
 by passion for the cowherd;
 I could see nothing and so I stumbled;
 I fell from virtue;
 why do you not help me up, my lord?
 why do you not take me as a husband [takes a wife]?
 You are the one refuge of the weak
 of women
 when their hearts fail them on rough roads.
 in their troubles.

Thus did the Gopī once express a hint to Hari,
 who now, I pray, may grant his help to you.²

Everything of this sort we would place in the domain of the expressed figure *sleṣa*.

1. *Vakrokti* in its *sleṣa* variety is the figure exhibited in the verse which follows. Ānanda uses the term here in the sense of Rudraṇa 2.14 and Mammaṭa 9.1 (= sūtra 103), of a specific figure (*sabdālarikāra*) rather than in the general sense of "ornamented speech" employed by earlier writers. Mammaṭa's definition is "*Vakrokti* (crooked speech) is when a sentence expresses one meaning taken in one way and another taken in another, the combination being effected by puns (*sleṣa*) or by tone of voice (*kāku*)."*Vakrokti* of the first type is really nothing more than a complex or extended *sleṣa*. 2. The stanza is quoted in SūktiM. 2.93, where one MS ascribes it to Tribhuvanapāla.

L Having thus shown what was meant to be excluded by the word "implied" (*āksipta*) [in 2.21 K], he now proceeds to show what is excluded by the word "only" (*eva*): where the [figure although implied], etc. The meaning of this sentence is as follows. When words capable of denoting two senses are employed, if there is no reason for restricting the power of denotation to only one of these senses, as, for example, in the stanza "He who destroyed the cart" [2.21 A], or to take a different situation, when there is some reason [such as the use of words like "even"] which awakens us to the presence of a second power of denotation [which conveys a second sense], as for example in the stanzas beginning from "As even without a necklace" [2.21 a A] and

extending to "Whose war elephants are his mighty arms" [2.21 c A], it is of course obvious that that [second] sense is denoted, [not suggested]. But where there is some reason such as the context, which delimits the power of denotation to only one of the two senses, so that the power of denotation cannot extend to the second sense: in such a case the second sense is said to be suggested. Now even in such a case, if a word is then used [in the poem], by which that restrictive factor, such as the context, etc., loses its force, then that power of denotation, although once inhibited from rendering the second sense, is revived so to speak and such cases do not fall in the domain of suggestion. The particle *ca* [the second word in the sentence of the *Vṛtti* which has just been explained] has the sense of *api* and has been placed out of position; [it belongs after *āksipta*]. Thus what is referred to is a figure of speech which, although (*api*) implied, that is, it begins by giving the immediate impression of being implied, is not really implied, but rather is directly expressed because of the revival of the [second] power of denotation by some other word. The word again (*punah*) indicates this revival of the power of denotation as explained above. Thus the word "only" (*eva*) [in *Kārikā* 2.21] rules out a figure of speech that is apparently, but not really, suggested. This is the meaning.

"O Keśava": here the words have their powers of denotation limited by the context in the following sense. O Keśava, as my eyesight was blinded by the dust raised by [the feet of] the cattle, I could see nothing and because of that I stumbled on the way. Why now, that is, for what possible reason, do you not give me, who have fallen, your hand for support? For you alone, being of extraordinary strength, are the refuge, i.e., the means of support in rough places, for all those who are weak: children, the aged, and women, whose hearts are distressed and who are unable to proceed.

But while the context inhibits the denotative powers of the words from the second sense, which will be explained presently, these denotative powers are revived by the word *salesam* "with a hint." *Leśa* means something small and, as to hint at something is to make a small [reference] to it, *salesam* means "with a hint." The meaning hinted at is this: O Keśava, O cowherd, O lord of my life! Because my eyes were blinded by passion—or the words may be construed as follows: "Because I was deprived of my judgment by my passion for Keśava"—I stumbled, that is, I became guilty of a moral lapse. Why do you not assume *patitā*, that is, the office of a husband, toward me? You are the one, that is, you alone possess perfect success in love, for all women,

their hearts yearning with desire but without any stain of jealousy, worship you as their refuge, that is, for the preservation of their lives. This is the second sense.

1. In the prior interpretation *gopa* is taken as a separate word in the vocative. In the latter, and far preferable interpretation, *gopa* is taken as the stem-form in compound with *rāga*.

A On the other hand, where by the power of words a figure of speech in addition [to *sleṣa*] appears, this figure being implied by the inherent capability of the situation: all such cases are in the domain of *dhvani*. As [in a prose passage]:

Meanwhile the long period named Summer,
Meanwhile the God of Destruction,
when the market stalls are white with the laughter
whose terrible laughter is white
of their blossoming jasmine flowers,
as jasmine flowers,
expanded as it put an end to the two months of Spring.¹
yawned as He put an end to the aeons of time.

[Bāṇa, *Hṛṣacarita* 2, lines 19-20]

And as [in a verse]:

They are high, with flashing necklace
They are high, with flashing downpours
and dark with aloe paste:
and dark as aloe paste: —
whom would the breasts of this slender maid
whom would this wealth of clouds
not fill with yearning?

[Śakavṛddhi]²

iving joy to all creatures
to their progeny
by their absorption and release of water,
of milk,
scattering to all directions in the morning
and disappearing at the close of day:
and gathering together at the close of day:
they are a ship for crossing
the sea of transmigration, the source of our long pain.
May these rays of the blazing sun engender
May these cows
in your purified selves unmeasured bliss

[Mayūra, Sūryasatka 9]³

In these examples, by the power of words a second, non-contextual (*aprakaraṇīka*), meaning appears. In order that the sentence should not convey a [second] meaning that is unconnected [with the first], one imagines a relation of image and subject (*upamāna* and *upameya*) between the non-contextual meaning [e.g., cows] and the contextual meaning [e.g., the rays of the sun], this imagining being made possible by the inherent capability of the situation (*sāmarthyāt*). And so the *sleṣa* here is implied by the sense and not furnished by words.⁴ Thus the domain of that type of *dhvani* which is like a reverberation is indeed different from that of the [figure of speech] *sleṣa*.

1. The figure is *rūpaka*. We have translated according to Abhinava's interpretation. On the other hand, the natural way of taking *phullamallikā-dhavalāttahāso* is as a *rūpakaśomāśa*: "whose white laughter was the blossoming jasmine." But taking that compound as a *rūpakaśomāśa* would make the passage unfit as an example of a suggested figure of speech. Hence Abhinava's interpretation. Note that the way in which such passages are explained by the Ālankārikas may be defended logically but does not satisfy the psychological process of our apprehension. Meeting with the passage from Bāna, *atrāntare dhavalāttahāso mahākālah*, etc., the reader immediately sees what Ānanda regards as the suggested sense: "Then Śiva with his terrible laughter," etc. Only later and painfully does he absorb the other meaning. To Ānanda the direct meaning (*sāksādvācyā*) is the contextual meaning. After all, the story is describing the shift of spring to summer. There is no reason of syntax, no word marking a figure of speech (like *iva* for *upamā*, *tu* for *vyatireka*, *eva* for *rūpaka*), that would make us choose the meaning that refers to Śiva the destroyer. So that meaning, which the reader has absorbed

so readily, is to Ānanda the suggested meaning. But now for the psychological difficulty. This suggested meaning is defined as *samlakṣyakramavayaṇyā*, that is, a meaning which is apprehended at a moment recognizably later than our apprehension of the denoted meaning. In instances like that of the quotation under discussion, that simply is not true. 2. Here the suggested figure is simile. The girl's breasts are like clouds. The stanza is quoted by *Subhāṣitāvalī* (1538), which quotes some twelve verses by this same poet. 3. The text of the stanza is uncertain, with the variants *akūṭasārṣṭaiḥ* appearing in a (*Dhv.* ed. Badari Nath Śarma) and *pavāṇī tāḥ* appearing in d (*Kāvyaśamgraha*, Vol. 2). For the image of the salvific ship, one may note that the soul of the dying man passes by way of the rays of the sun to release (*Īśo Up.*) and that the cow, being sacred, is sometimes used as a psychopomp, the tail of a cow being placed in the hand of a dying man to lead him to heaven. 4. The *sleṣa* in the preceding three examples is furnished by the capability, inherent in the two senses of the stanza, of entering into a relation of *upamāna* and *upameya*. The two senses have an inherent similarity. If, for example, the two senses of Mayūra's stanza did not have this capability, we would not think of taking the words *prajānām*, *payobhū*, and *gāvah* in two senses. On the other hand, in a verse like "As even without a necklace" (2.21 a A), the *sleṣa* in *hāriṇou* is pointed out by the word *api*.

L Having thus distinguished the domain of the figure of speech *sleṣa*, he now explains the domain of suggestion(*dhvani*): on the other hand, where, etc.

[Comment on the first example from Bāna.] The contextual meaning is as follows. The summer puts an end to the two months that constitute the season of spring; [the summer,] in which the laughter, that is, the blossoming, the whiteness, of the full-blown jasmine flowers is such as to whiten, to make beautiful, the *affāni*, that is, the market stalls. If [*phullamallikādhavalāttaḥāśa* is] explained as [a *rūpakasamāsa*, viz.,] "[summer] which possesses Śiva's white laughter in the form of full-blown jasmine flowers," this example would be in no way different from "cloud serpents" [2.21 b A; it would be a case of a directly expressed metaphor]. It is a "long time" (*mahākālā*), that is, a long season, because its days are long and hard to endure. Here the denotative powers of the words are restricted by the context, namely a description of the summer season. For that reason *mahākāla* [which as a compound means the destructive form of Śiva] and the other [word *affāḥāśa*, which as a compound means the wild laughter of Śiva] do not follow the maxim that "the denotative power of a compound is stronger

than the denotative power of its components," but fulfill their denotative functions [by furnishing the sense of their component members] in the way we have described.¹ The apprehension of the sense [of the compound] which takes place afterward is the result of the power of suggestion based on the [denotative] power of words.

On this problem, some people hold the following view. Inasmuch as these words (*mahākāla*, etc..) have been seen in former contexts to have a different power [from that of *mahān kālah*, etc.], giving a different sense [from that of "a long season"], it is from that other power which has been seen to give that other sense that the hearer can now apprehend that sense from these words even when their denotative power is restricted by context, this apprehension being due to the operation of suggestion. Accordingly, there is no contradiction in saying that this sense is a suggested sense based on the [formerly experienced] denotative power of the word.²

Others say that since the second denotative power [e.g., the power in *mahākāla* that furnishes the meaning of "Śiva"] relies for aid on the inherent capability of the situation, namely the similar properties of summer to those of the terrible god, it is therefore said to take the form of a suggestive operation.³

Some follow the view that just as *sabdasleṣa* is possible only where two separate words are present, so also in *arthasleṣa* there must be two words because there are two denotations.⁴ Accordingly, in [both] these cases a second word is bought in. Sometimes this is done by a denotative operation, for example where the answer *sveto dhāvati* is given to two separate questions,⁵ or in riddles and the like. In these cases the figure [*sleṣa*] is a denoted figure. But where the second word is brought in by a suggestive operation, it is reasonable to regard the meaning understood from the second word as a suggested (*pratiyamāna*) meaning because it is based on that which is suggested.⁶

Others say that inasmuch as it is a second denotative power that is revived according to the explanation of the second view [put forth above], the second meaning must be denoted and not suggested. But there appears an identification of this second meaning, after it has been apprehended, with the first, contextual, meaning; and as this identification cannot come from a non-linguistic source, it must come from the suggestive power of the words; because one cannot suppose that any denotative power is responsible for it.⁷ And this [suggested identification] is based on the second denotative power, for without

that power it would not arise.⁸ Accordingly, it is reasonable to speak of this as the suggestion of a figure of speech (*alaṅkāradhvani*). And the *Vṛttikāra* is about to say, "in order that the sentence should not convey a [second] meaning that is unconnected [with the first]." Now in the previous [examples, where the figure was not suggested,] the lack of connection [in the verse "O Keśava, my eyes were blind"] was prevented by the word *salearam* "with a bint"; in the verse "He who destroyed the cart" a lack of connection simply did not appear;⁹ in the verse "As even without a necklace" the lack of connection was prevented by the word *api* "even"; in the verse "As he holds in his hand the discus," by the word *adhika* "superior"; in the verse "The cloud serpents," by the metaphor-compound [the *rūpakasamāsa* "cloud-serpents"]. [They say that] this is the overall meaning.¹⁰

[Commentary on the verse of *Mayūra*.) The word *payobhīh* means both "with water" and "with milk". *Saṁhāra* means "disappearance" and "gathering into one place." *Gāvō* means "rays" and "cows."

Conveying a meaning that is unconnected: that is, a meaning that is unintelligible. A relation of image and subject: By this relation, which is in the form [that the figurative operation takes] in simile, one should judge that contrasting [one thing with another], denying [one thing in favor of another], etc., in fact, any form of [suggested] operation, furnishes us with the chief goal of aesthetic delight, rather than the base and simile, etc., [on which these operations work].¹¹ This consideration applies to all suggested figures of speech.

By the inherent capability of the situation: that is, by the suggestive operation.

1. Other things being equal, one would naturally take *mahākāla* to mean Śiva. But the present context forces us to take the denoted sense as that of *mahān kālah*, a long season. If we also apprehend the sense of Śiva, that sense must be suggested, for the denotative operation has been completed.
2. This is the view accepted by *Mammata* 2.19 (Jhalkikar ed. p. 63) and by *Viśvanātha* (*SD* 2.14).
3. This interpretation stays closer to the language of Ānanda. The hearer already knows that *mahākāla* can mean Śiva. But hearing the word in a context where it must denote a long season, he would not think of the denotation Śiva unless there was some similarity in the new context that suggested that other sense. The fact that summer puts an end to a period of time, namely the spring, and Śiva puts an end to a period of time, namely the aeon, constitutes the similarity that allows the suggestion to operate.
4. This is the view of *Udbhaṭa* as is also the peculiar distinction of *sabdaśleṣa* and *orthaśleṣa*. *Udbhaṭa* defines *sleṣa*, by which he

means a sticking together, an adhesion, of two meanings or of two similar sound groups, in 4.9–10 Indurāja (4.23–24 Viṛti): *ekapryatnoccōryānām tacchāyām caiva bibhratām / svaritādigunair bhinnair bandhāḥ śīṣṭam iho-caye // alāṅkārāntaragatām pratibhām janayat padāt / dvividhair artha-sabdoktivisīṣṭam tat pratiyatām //* "The use of expressions that have identical phonetic shape, or of expressions that seem to have identical shape because their differences are in properties such as the Vedic accent, is called śīṣṭa (= śleṣa). This figure produces the appearance of other figures by means of word-pairs of these two types and is to be understood as characterized by a [conjoined] expression of meaning or of sound-groups [i.e., as arthaśleṣa or śabdośleṣa]." The commentators explain that in Udbhata's view there must be a separate word (padam) for every meaning. Thus, if *kara* is used to mean both "hand" and "ray," we have two words of identical phonetic shape. This usage he calls arthaśleṣa, adhesion of meaning, for two meanings adhere together in one phonetic datum. On the other hand, when the expression *asvāpaphala* is used to mean both "producing a result that is not easily obtained" (*a-su-ḍpam phaləm yasya*) and "the result of lack of sleep" (*a-suāpa-phalam*), we do not have two words of identical phonetic shape. According to Pāṇ. 6.2.172 the former will be accented *asvāpophalā* (a negative bahūrūhi has terminal accent), while by Pāṇ. 6.2.139 the latter will be accented *asvāpaphalā* (in a *tatpurūpa* the final member takes its natural accent). This usage Udbhata calls śabdāśleṣa, adhesion of sound, for two sound-units adhere so as to appear identical. Udbhata's two types are almost equivalent to Dandin's *abhinnapoda* and *bhinnapoda*. Udbhata's terminology is infelicitous because both types depend on sound and this terminology was abandoned by the later Ālāṅkārikas whose works are preserved to us. But the commentator from whom Abhinava is here quoting apparently accepted it.

5. The two questions are *ka ito dhāvati* "what is running hither?" and *kimvāmo dhāvati* "What color is the thing that is running?" The answer to the first is *svesto (svā ito) dhāvati*: "A dog is running hither"; to the latter *svesto dhāvati* "Something white is running." The second word (*svesto* "white") is brought in by denotative operation. The question demands that some color be denoted. The example goes back to Patañjali, *Mahābhāṣya*, Intr. to 1.1.1 (Kielhorn Vol. 1, p. 14) and 8.2.3 (Kielhorn Vol. 3, p. 388).

6. Context demands that *mahākālāḥ* apply to summer. So the "first word" denotes a long season. But we have previously heard a "second word" of identical phonetic shape, which means Śiva. If we now understand the meaning Śiva also, it is because the second word has been brought in by suggestion. *Vācyo* and *pratyamāna* are used, like *śrouta* and *ārtha*, of that which is expressed and that which is understood (suggested).

7. Because the denotative powers are used up in furnishing the first and second meanings.

8. The suggested identification is not furnished (*utpādita*) by a denotative power because the denotative powers are now exhausted. But it is based on, that is, it presupposes, a denotative

power. Specifically it presupposes the second denotative power because one cannot have the relation of identity without having a second term to identify with the first. 9. Both meanings of the verse furnish praise of God and so both are contextual. There is no non-contextual meaning in the stanza which could exhibit a disconnection.

10. According to *BP* this view (the fourth view of "others" given by Abhinava) is accepted by Appayya Dīksita in his *Kuvalayānanda*. 11. In characterizing suggested figures of speech Ānanda spoke merely of our being forced to imagine a similarity. Abhinava extends his statement, taking it as an *upadaksana* of other relations which we may be forced to imagine. He then points out that this imagining of various relations is what gives the chief aesthetic value to this species of *dhvani*. In denoted figures of speech our pleasure ends with the apprehension of the objects which are brought into relation by the figure, e.g., the subject (*upomeya*) and the image (*upamāna*). In suggested figures of speech we receive a special relish from imagining the relations.

A Other figures of speech as well [as simile] can occur in this type of suggestive poetry that is based on the power of words and where the suggested meaning is like the reverberation of a bell. Thus, contradiction (*virodha*) may appear in the form of a reverberation based on the power of words, as in Bhāṭṭā Bāṇa's description of the land called Sthāñviśvara:

where the women have the [slow] gait of elephants
have affairs with outcastes,
and are virtuous,
are of fair complexion and fond of wealth,
are Gauris and are fond of places where Śiva is absent,
are youthful and wear rubies,
are black and have the red color of lotuses,
have mouths that are bright with white teeth
have mouths as pure as those of pure brahmins
and breaths that are perfumed with wine.

[Bāṇa, *Harṣacarita*, p. 98, lines 3-4]
(Chapter 3, lines 228-229 out of 654)

For in this example one cannot say that the contradiction is directly expressed or that the puns favoring the semblance of contradiction are denoted; because the figure contradiction is not directly revealed by any word [such as "although"]. For where the figure of contradiction is directly expressed by a word, in such a poetic expression of ambiguity we have the domain of a denoted figure of speech, either contradiction (*virodha*) or pun (*sleṣa*).

An example may be given from the same work of Bāṇa:

She was the meeting place as it were of contradictions,
for her figure was brilliant
for there was the figure of the sun
although accompanied by the blackness of her hair.
even in the presence of the young night.

[Bāṇa, *Harsacarita*, p. 27, line 15]
(Chapter 1, Line 403 out of 689)

Or, [one may see an example of suggested contradiction] in a verse of my own own:

Bow down to the sole refuge of men, the everlasting,
to the soie house of men that is no house,
the overlord, the lord of our thoughts,
the non-lord of thoughts that is lord of our thoughts,
Hari-Krishna, fourfold of nature,¹ beyond all action,
the golden, the black, of dexterous self who does not act,
the destroyer of enemies who bears the wheel.
the destroyer of the spoke-holder who bears the wheel.

For in this verse contradiction in the form of a [suggested] reverberation based on the power of words is clearly understood.

Contrast (*vyatireka*) of the same sort also appears in my own:

May both sets of the sun god's feet lead you to welfare
[those which are his rays and those on which he stands]:
those which light up the sky, dispelling darkness,
and those whose toenails are resplendent;
and those which do not illumine the sky;
those which nourish the beauty of the pond lotus
and those whose beauty puts the lotuses to shame;
those which shine on the tops of mountains
those which shine on the heads of kings
and those which tread on the heads of the immortals.

In the same way there are other varieties of dhvani based on the power of words where the suggested meaning is like the reverberation of a bell. They may be sought out by sensitive readers on their own. I have not dealt with them here in detail lest my book should become too extensive.

A reference to the four emanations (*vyūhas*) of Viṣṇu.

L [Commentary on the first quotation from Bāṇa.] [*Mātanigā-*
gāminyah] means they walk like elephants. The contrast [with what follows] lies in the [second] meaning "they visit outcastes." "They delight in wealth" also means they take delight in a place where Śiva is absent. "They possess the gems called padmarāga (rubies)" also [means] they have the red color (*rāga*) of lotuses (*padma*). "Their mouths are pure," that is, bright "with white teeth (*dvija*)" also [means] their mouths are as pure as those of pure, that is, the most exalted, brahmins (*dvija*).

For where: namely in a poetic expression of ambiguity [where the contradiction is directly expressed], there we have the domain of contradiction (*virodha*) or pun (*sleṣa*), that is to say, of the figure fusion (*samkara*).¹ He means that this [figure in such instances] becomes the domain—of what?—of a denoted figure of speech, of a denoted ornament. The meaning is, it becomes the domain of something which possesses the property of a denoted figure of speech.² This is as much as to say that it is only in such cases that one may rightly call the contradiction or the pun a denoted figure.

[Commentary on the second quotation from Bāṇa.] Night, that is, blackness, was in her hair (*vāla*), or the night, that is, darkness, was young (*bāla*), new.

Now it might be objected that in the passage "Where the women have the gait of elephants," etc., the particle *ca* ("and") being used with the pairs of properties actually expresses the contradiction. For if a mere additive sense had been intended, *ca* would have been used with each property separately, or would have been used just once at the end, or would not have been used at all.³ With this objection in mind, he furnishes another example: or.

How can a śramaṇa, a house, be in the form of a-kṣaya, a non-house? How can he who is not dhīśa, lord of our thoughts, be lord of our thoughts? How can he who is golden (*hari*) be black (*krṣṇa*)? How

can one whose self is dexterous, valiant, be actionless? How can he who is the destroyer of that which possesses spokes proudly bear the wheel?

Contradiction: the word *virodha* here means contradiction in general [not the expressed figure of speech *virodha*.]⁴ Is understood: what he has in mind is that it is clearly understood but is not expressed by any word.

[Commentary on the final verse.] "Those whose toenails are resplendent" also means "which certainly do not shine in the sky." "Both" [sets of feet] means those which are his rays and those which are limbs composed of toes, heel, etc.

1. I.e., such an instance falls into the category of the figure fusion. See above, 2.21 a *A*, note 1 and 2.21 a *L*, note 4.
 2. I.e., such a case of the figure fusion falls into the category of a denoted figure of speech.
 3. The same effect appears in English. If I say, "He is wise and young, handsome and not proud," I am emphasizing the contradictions as I would not do if I used the word "and" three times, or just once (before "not proud"), or not at all.
 4. The reason for Abhinava's gloss is that in his view the suggested figure is *sankara*, not *virodha*.
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K On the other hand, we have another type of [*dhvani*] that arises from the power of meaning (*arthasaktiyudbhava*) when a meaning appears which by itself and without [the use of] words, manifests a second meaning as the *tātparya* (the chief meaning of the sentence).

A Where a meaning by its own inherent capability manifests, without the operation of words, another meaning, we have that variety of *dhvani*, arising from the power of meaning, where the suggested meaning is similar to a reverberation. For example:

While the heavenly visitor was speaking, Pārvatī,
standing with lowered face beside her father,
counted the petals of the lotus in her hand.

[Kālidāsa, *Kum.Sam.* 6.84]

For here the counting of the petals of the lotus subordinates itself and without the help of any verbal operation reveals another matter in the form of a transient state of mind (*vyabhicāribhāva*) [of the emotion love, namely shyness]. This example does not fall under the sole heading of "suggestion without a perceived interval" (*alakṣyakramavyāyāgya*), for it is only where we apprehend the *rasa* or the like directly (*sākṣat*, i.e., immediately) through a verbal presentation of the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, and *vyabhicāribhāvas* that we have a suggestion that is exclusively of that type,¹ as for example in the *Kumārasambhava* where, in the context of the advent of spring, we have the description of events beginning with the arrival of Pārvatī wearing spring flowers for jewelry, up to the point where the god of love places an arrow on his bow and takes aim at Śiva. All this, as well as the description of the particular actions of Śiva as his calmness is stirred, is conveyed directly by words. But in the present example the *rasa* is apprehended through its transient state of mind, which in turn is implied by the inherent capability [of the described action of counting the lotus petals, etc.]. Therefore this is a different variety of *dhvani*.

1. Note that Ānanda will admit, in 3.43 A, that this stanza does contain *rasadhvani*, for the suggestion of the shyness leads on to an apprehension of the *rasa*, *śringāra*. In the stanza the two varieties of *dhvani*, he says, are fused. What he says here is that the stanza does not contain *rasadhvani* only (*alakṣyakramavyāyādhvani*). It also contains a suggestion of perceived interval, namely the suggestion of shyness.

The phrase *sākṣācchabdānivedita* used here and three lines below has long caused difficulty. Śridhara in commenting on the *Kāvyaaprakāśa* (Vol. 1, p. 128) attributed the phrase to Ānanda's temporary forgetfulness or inattention. For modern discussions of the passage, in addition to Jacobi's note, ZDMG 56 (1902), p. 766, see K. Krishnamoorthy, *The Dhvanyāloka and its Critics*, p. 266, and M. V. Patwardhan and J. L. Masson, "Solution to a Long-confused Issue in the Dhvanyāloka," JOIBaroda 22 (1972-73), pp. 48-56, to which Krishnamoorthy has replied in a long note to his text and translation of the *Dhv.*, pp. 354-360.

The difficulty is this. Ānanda has already said (1.4g A) that *rasa* and the like (*rasādi*) are never *sākṣācchabdāvyāpāravिषया*, that is, never the object of the direct (denotative) operation of words; they are always suggested. And within the term "and the like" the *bhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* are included. If we take *sākṣācchabdānivedita* in the present sentence to mean "where the *vyabhicāris* are conveyed by direct denotation, or actually named," we will have to charge Ānanda with flatly contradicting one of his most basic theories. Furthermore, in the passages of the *Kumārasambhava* to which he refers as

exemplifications of alakṣyakrama, the vyābhicāribhāvas are nowhere directly named.

Abhinava's solution, followed by Patwardhan and Masson in the article just referred to, is to connect the sense of the adverb sākṣāt more closely with pratiṣṭaye than with saṃdāniveditebhyo. It is when we apprehend the suggestion directly, that is, immediately, from the description of the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyābhicārins that we have the type of suggestion where the interval is not perceived (asamalakṣyakramavividyadhvani). In Ānanda's judgment the verse which describes Pārvatī's counting the petals of the lotus does not belong in that category. He feels that we must reflect for a moment before we realize that what is being described is really the shyness of young love. So he assigns the verse to the samalakṣyakrama type.

Abhinava's solution becomes somewhat more difficult in the passage three lines below, where sākṣācchabdanivedita is used without the verb pratiṣṭaye, the sense of which must be understood. That is, we must understand "conveyed by direct words" to mean "conveyed by words which give an immediate understanding of the suggestion." Difficult or not, this interpretation fits with the whole tenor of Ānanda's aesthetics. We can now charge him perhaps with inexactitude of expression (Śridhara's inattention) but not with a lapse of theory (Śridhara's forgetfulness).

L Having in this way dealt with that variety of dhvani where the suggestion rests on the power of words, he now proceeds to explain the variety that depends on the power of meaning: [On the other hand], etc. Another: sc., other than that which rests on the power of words. By itself [manifests] as the tātparya: This word (tātparya), being followed as it is by a denial of the denotative function [in the words uktaṁ vīñā], must refer to the suggestive process, not to the tātparyasakti (the power belonging to the syntax of the sentence), for we have already said [1.4 b *L*] that the power belonging to the syntax of the sentence has exhausted itself once we have understood the literal sense.

With this same intention he now says in the *Vṛtti*: Where a meaning by its own inherent capability. The term "by itself" (*svataḥ*) of the *Kārikā* has been rendered by "its own" (*sva*) in the *Vṛtti*. He now explains the significance of "without words": without the operation of words. He illustrates: For example "While [the heavenly visitor], etc."

Another matter: shyness. Directly: the meaning here intended is that the vyābhicārins are "directly conveyed" where our perception

of them arises from their appropriate *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* without anything's being interposed, inasmuch as we do not perceive any interval [between the literal and suggested meanings]. Hence there is no contradiction with what was stated before [in 1.4 g A]. For it was stated before at some length that the *vyabhicāribhāvas*, being emotional manifestations (*bhāvas*), cannot be conveyed by being directly named (*svasaabdataḥ*). This is as much as to say that although *rasa*, *bhāva*, and the like are invariably suggested and never directly expressed, still they are not always in the domain of that type of suggestion where the interval [between the literal and suggested meanings] is not perceived. We have that type of suggestion only in those cases where the suggestion of *rasa* and the like occurs immediately from the full presentation of the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* belonging to the *sthāyibhāvas* and the *vyabhicāribhāvas*. For example:

Then came the daughter of the mountain king
with her attendant nymphs. Her loveliness
seemed to rekindle in the god of love
his near extinguished courage.

[*KumSam.* 3.52]

In this and the following stanzas there is a full description of [*Pārvatī*'s] nature which is well suited to act both as an objective and a stimulative determinant (*ālambanavibhāva* and *uddipanavibhāva*).¹

We are told how these *vibhāvas* take effect in the stanza:

As Śiva, favoring his devotee,
moved to accept the offering,
the love-god fitted to his flowery bow
the deadly shaft Infatuation.

[*KumSam.* 3.66]

But Śiva, stirring slightly from his calm
as the ocean stirs at moonrise,
busied his eyes on Umā's face
and her fruit-like lower lip

[*KumSam.* 3.67]

First we have been told of *Pārvatī*'s inclination toward Śiva and now we are told of Śiva's turning his attention toward *Pārvatī*. His prejudice in her favor has been indicated as a "favoring of his devotee."

From a strengthening of this prejudice comes the basic emotion (*sthāyibhāva*) love (*rati*). The author has revealed all the symptoms (*anubhāvas*) common to this basic emotion and to its transient states of mind (*vyabhicārins*) eagerness, agitation (*āvega*), instability (*cāpalya*), and the like. And so our relish of the determinants (*vibhāvās*) and the symptoms ends up as (*paryavasyati*) a relish of the transient states of mind. And as the transient states of mind are dependent [on the basic emotion], there is no perceived interval between our relishing of them and our aesthetic goal of relishing the basic emotion, which is like the string of a garland [of which the transient states are the separate flowers].

But in the stanza which our author is discussing, a young maiden's counting of lotus petals and lowering her face can be imagined as due to other causes [such as inattention or naivete] and so do not cause our heart to fix immediately on shyness [as her state of mind]. Rather, these acts suggest the idea of shyness in love only after the reader calls to mind the earlier incidents [of the poem], such as Pārvatī's asceticism [undertaken in order to win Śiva as her husband]. So the suggestion of [the accompanying emotion] shyness comes after a perceived interval.

The *rasa* in the stanza is also removed, but as it appears the moment that the true nature of [Pārvatī's] state of mind has been realized, it is not at a perceived interval from that. The suggestion of perceived interval in this stanza is with respect to the shyness. This is what our author has meant to indicate by his use of the words "sole" (*eva*) and "exclusive" (*kevala*).²

1. Pārvatī herself acts as the *ālambanavibhāva*; her physical qualities act as the *uddiponavibhāva*.
2. There is no strict or exclusive *asamṛakṣyakramadhvani* in the lotus petal stanza because while the *rasa* is *asamṛakṣyakrama* from the *vyabhicārin*, the *vyabhicārin* is *samṛakṣyakrama* from the presentation of the *anubhāva*. To put the matter in simpler form: there is a perceived interval between the presentation of the *anubhāva* (counting the lotus petals) and the suggestion of the *vyabhicārin* (shyness); there is no perceived interval between the suggestion of shyness and the suggestion of the *rasa* of love. This is a subtle distinction, which permits Abhinava to say that the *rasa* itself is always suggested without interval even when it "stands far off" (*dūrataḥ*) by reason of its transient emotion's being suggested at an interval.

A But a meaning which is aided by the [denotative] operation of words in suggesting a second meaning does not fall in this category [of suggestion by the power of meaning]. For example:

Knowing that her gallant had set his heart
on a rendezvous, the subtle lass
smiled and to show her meaning folded
the petals of the lotus in her hand.¹

Here we are expressly told of the suggestiveness of the girl's folding up the lotus blossom with which she is playing.

1. As lotuses close their petals at sundown, she means that he is to meet her at that time. Ānanda quotes the stanza again at 3.34 A as an example of *ālokṣyakramagunibhūtatyārigya*. The suggestion is the fact that her lover should come at night. We arrive at the suggested meaning immediately. The stanza is also found anonymously in *SubhĀ*, 2043. Daqīn has a very similar stanza, *KA* 2.261.

L He proceeds to show what is sought to be excluded by the Kārikā's phrase "without [the use of] words": But a meaning, etc. The particle *ca* ("and") here has the sense of "but." In this [category]: he has in mind that it may, however, fall in [a different category, namely] that of suggestion where the interval is not noticed.¹ He illustrates: "Knowing that her gallant, etc."

The suggestiveness: sc., that evening will be the right time [for the rendezvous]. Expressly told: sc., by the first three lines. It is true that no one word in these three lines, even in connection with its neighbors, has the power of denoting the sense of "evening," and to that extent the suggestiveness of the stanza is not undone. However, we are expressly told that the sense is suggestive of some other sense and thereby the very life of suggestion, which consists of the charm of something's being said in a hidden manner, is destroyed. It is as if some one should say:

I am a deep man.
No one knows what I will do.
I do not say anything
that my facial expression has indicated.

Here the speaker, who should indicate his depth of character by his facial expression, instead speaks of it outright. Hence our author says, "we have been told of the suggestiveness."²

1. Compare 2.21a A, end; also 3.38 A. 2. I am not sure that I have understood the verse fragment. Jagannāth Pāṭhak translates it into Hindi: *mām gambhīr hūm, bīn̄ batāe marā kām koi bhī nahīm jāntā, (is lie) kuch kahtā hūm*, "I am a deep man. No one knows of my doings unless I give a hint, (therefore) I say something." *BP* punctuates so as to get a very different sense: "I am not a deep man. Therefore no one knows my intention although it is indicated [by my expression]. So I will say something." Pāṭhak may be right. *BP*, I am sure, is wrong.

K When a meaning, even though it has been implied by the power of words or meanings, is then again revealed by the poet in so many words, it is [to be considered as] a figure of speech and different from *dhvani*.

A When a meaning, even though it has been implied by the power of words, by the power of meaning, or by the power of words and meaning, is then again proclaimed in so many words by the poet, it is [to be considered as] a figure of speech and different from this type of *dhvani* that is like a reverberation. Or, if there is a possibility in the verse of a suggestion of unperceived interval, this [implied and then revealed meaning] will be a figure of speech and different from that sort of suggestion.¹

An example of a meaning implied by the power of words (and then revealed) is:

"My child, come hither and be not distressed;
come to this one [Viṣṇu] and go not to the poison-eater [Śiva];
leave off this rapid upward surging breath;
abandon the rapid Wind-god and him of vertical motion [Fire];²
and why this heavy trembling? Have done with
what use is the god of Water or Brāhma? Have done with
this exhausting stretching of your limbs."
the proud destroyer of Bala [Indra]."

Thus Ocean, under guise of calming Lakṣmī's fear,
for she was dazed by the churning of the sea,
caused her to reject the other gods and gave her
to him who now, I pray, may burn away your sins.³

An example of a meaning implied by the power of meaning (and then revealed) is:

"That's where my aged mother sleeps, and there
sleeps daddy, the oldest man you've ever met.
Here sleeps the slave-girl worn out by her chores,
and here sleep I, who must be guilty
to deserve these few days absence of my lord."
By these statements the youthful wife suggested
to the traveler his opportunity.⁴

[Rudrata?]

An example of a meaning implied by both powers is "O Keśava, my eyes were blind" [2.21 d A].

1. The genitive *alakṣyakramavyāryagya* goes naturally with *sambhave* and *tādrī* refers most naturally to *alakṣyakramavyāryagya*. There is no need for the grammatical gymnastics employed by Abhinava (see below). 2. Vertical motion is a basic characteristic of fire in the Vaiśeṣika system (VS 5.2.13) and is used as an epithet of fire in poetry (e.g., Śiśupālavadha 1.2). 3. The stanza is quoted anonymously in SūktiM. 3.65 and under Kuv. 155. Lakṣmī was among the precious objects churned up by the gods from the sea. The motion might well have left her out of breath and trembling. For *jyāmbhita*, context as well as the opinion of Abhinava favors the meaning of stretching the limbs (*orīgasammardana*) rather than yawning; see also 2.18-19 b A, note 1. The ocean is pictured as Lakṣmī's father, comforting her and by puns directing her away from all suitors but her future husband, Viṣṇu. While the sequential suggestion of second meanings is destroyed by our being told of it in so many words, there is the possibility of the other type of suggestion, with no perceived

interval (*asamīlakṣyakramavyanyāgyadhuṇi*) in the verse. We may take the main purport of the stanza to be a relish (*śrīgāraraśābhāṣa*) of the poet's love of Viṣṇu (*Viṣṇuviṣṇayakaratibhāva*) of which the stimulant (*uddīpanavibhāva*) would be Viṣṇu's qualities which are here suggested to be superior to those of all the other gods by the fact that Lakṣmī chose him for her husband.

4. The reading *avasara* in line 4 is found in ancient quotations of the stanza only here and in *RG*. With this reading a literal translation of the line will be: "Thus was the traveler addressed by the young woman with a hint of his opportunity in her statements." Most ancient quotations (*SRK* 812, *Saḍuktī* 2.15.3, *Aufrecht ZDMG* 36, 539) read *abhimatam*: the wife informed the traveler of her intention. *SubhĀ.* 2247 reads *avasatha* (resting place): the young wife spoke to the traveler under the pretext of stating the resting places [of the members of her family]. The verse is variously ascribed in the anthologies to Rudraṭa or Bhaṭṭa. The two authors: Rudraṭa, author of the *Kāvyaśāṅkāra*, and Rudra Bhaṭṭa, author of the *Śrīgṛutiloka* are constantly confused in the anthologies. As Rudra Bhaṭṭa was apparently of later date than Ānandavardhana (see Kane *HSP*, pp. 149–151), it is Rudraṭa that has the best claim to the verse.

L The author of the *Vṛtti* wishes in a single construction to resume the foregoing two types of suggestion and to indicate a third type. Accordingly, he introduces the *Kārikā* with a phrase that serves both purposes: and in the same way.¹ The meaning is that together with the aforementioned two types a third type must be considered.

' [In the *Kārikā*] *sabdārtha* is an *ekāśeṣa* compound.² Different: it is not a suggestion but an [expressed] figure of speech such as *slega*. Or, taking "suggestion" (*dhvani*) [in the *Kārikā*] to mean suggestion with an unperceived interval, this suggested meaning can be considered an ornament of that suggestion to which it is subordinated, an ornament that is different from merely expressed figures of speech and one that forms a second, far superior (*lokottara*) type of figure of speech. He will explain the passage in these two ways in the *Vṛtti*.³

[Comment on the first verse.] *Viṣṭāda* (distress) [also] means eater of poison. "Of vertical motion" refers to Fire. [To obtain a satisfactory pun] one must understand the word "and" [as connecting *śvasanam* and *ūrdhvaprauṛttam*]. *Kampah* (trembling) [also] means lord (*pāḥ*) of waters (*kam*). Or [why] choose *kāḥ*, that is, Brahmā, your ancestor (*guru*)?⁴ Have done with *balabhid*, that is, Indra, who is *jīmbhita*, drunk with the pride of his sovereignty; that is [one] meaning. *Jīmbhita* also means a stretching of the limbs, which is *balabhid*, that is, destructive

of one's strength because it causes exertion. By the word "rejection" (*pratyākhyāna*) we are informed that a second set of meanings is denoted by the words. "Having caused her":⁵ now Lakṣmī had arisen from the sea with a desire for Pūndarikākṣa (= Viṣṇu) in her heart and so she naturally [would have] rejected the other gods; but because of the delicacy of her constitution she was in a state of shock from the crashing waves churned up by Mt. Mandara and was brought to do what was natural to her only by her father's reminder in the form of his revealing the faults of the other gods and his saying, "Come hither (come to this one, [Viṣṇu])" with a gesture indicating his respect for all the virtues [of her future spouse]. That is why the poet says "dazed by the churning." The structure of the sentence is this. May he burn away your sins, to whom Ocean gave Lakṣmī after causing, under the guise of stilling her fears in the manner described, her, who was dazed from the churning, to reject the other gods.

[That's where my aged] mother [sleeps]: the suggestiveness of the individual words in this stanza can easily be imagined by a sensitive reader, so we refrain from explaining them in so many words. The phrase "with a hint of" constitutes the direct expression which is the statement of the poet himself.⁶

Under the guise of summing up⁷ [what has gone before], our author has described and illustrated two varieties of suggestion. He now proceeds to mention a third variety: implied by both powers. [The stanza "O Keśava, my eyes are blind" contains sequential suggestion by] the power of words because of the puns in *goparāga* ["the dust raised by your cattle" or "passion for the cowherd"], etc.; the power of meaning because of the context.⁸ For so long as it is not known that Krishna is the object of the intense, secret love of all the young women [of Gokula], the second sense [i.e., the suggested sense] cannot be perceived. The word *salesam* ("with a hint") is the statement of the poet himself.

1. "In the same way" (*tathā*) refers to the foregoing two types "based on the power of words" and "based on the power of meaning." "And" (*ca*) indicates that there exists a further, third type "based on the power of words and meaning." 2. Pān. 1.2.64. Just as *vrksā* can be analyzed into *vrksa*-*vrksa*-*vrksā* = *vrksā* ca *vrksā* ca *vrksā* ca, so *sabdārthaḥ* can be analyzed into *sabdā* ca *arthā* ca *sabdārthaḥ* ca. 3. Ānanda explains the Kārikā phrase *sānyairālāṅktir dhvaneḥ* in two ways, but not in the two ways described by Abhinava. There is no need to take *dhvaneḥ* in the Kārikā as a genitive as well as an ablative. It appears as a genitive in the second explanation of the *Vṛtti*.

simply because it is in construction with *sambhave*. Nor is there any reason to suppose that Ānanda made a value distinction between the *āśrikāra* involved in the first interpretation and that involved in the second. 4. Abhinava here discovers still another pun, which we have not rendered in the translation. The interrogative *kasmati* in *RV* 10.121 "To whom shall we offer the oblation?" was understood as a name of Brahmā. Brahmā would be an impossible choice as husband for Lakṣmī as he was her grandfather. 5. *BP*: Abhinava is taking the causative suffix *nic* in the sense of causing a person to do what he is naturally about to do, not in the sense of setting him on a course which he has not begun on; because this interpretation is harmonious with the *rūpa* of the verse. 6. The statement "proclaimed in so many words by the poet," as *A* has put it, which gives away the suggestion. 7. The phrase *upasamṛhārvyadjena* may mean little more than "by way of summing up." But we have taken it at full value. Ānanda has actually done more than sum up what had been said before. His examples of sequential suggestion that fails or is spoiled by open revelation give us a fuller knowledge of this type of suggestion. 8. A knowledge of context, of course, is necessary in *sabdasāktyyudbhavadvani* also. But it is a particular kind of context that Abhinava has in mind, as his next sentence shows. The knowledge of Krishna's character permits the *arthasāktyyudbhavadvani* here just as the knowledge of the gay housewife's character permits the same type of suggestion in "That's where my aged mother sleeps."

K A meaning that reveals a second fact [or situation, *vastu*] is also of two kinds. It may be given body simply by an imaginative expression (*praudhokti*),¹ or it may be inherently possible (*svataḥ sambhavin*).

1. For an explanation of *praudhokti* based on the etymology of the word, see Abhinava below. The term is used of a sophisticated, striking (*comat-kārdnuguna*) expression arising from the poet's imagination rather than from the data directly-presented by the everyday world. We translate it by "imaginative expression," but the term always connotes boldness, vividness, fancy, and the unreality of what is expressed.

A In the type of suggestive poetry that is like a reverberation, within the variety that is based on the power of meaning, the suggestive

meaning is itself of two types: the first, which is given body simply by an imaginative expression of the poet or of a character created by the poet; and the second, which is inherently possible. An example of the type which is given body simply by an imaginative expression of the poet is:

The fragrant month prepares,
but gives not yet for his use against young maids,
the arrows, pointed with mango bud
and feathered with new leaves, to the god of love.¹

An example of the type which is given body by an imaginative expression of a speaker created by the poet is the verse already quoted "On what mountain, for how long" [see 1.13 m A]. Or,

Attentive youth
has lent a hand to your breasts
that they might rise as it were to greet
the visitor love.²

The type that is inherently possible occurs when the fact can be imagined as appropriate in the world of reality, a fact the substance of which is not produced only by a turn of phrase. An example is the verse we have quoted "While the heavenly visitor was speaking" [2.22 A]. Or,

The hunter's wife strolls proudly
with peacock feather behind her ear.
She strolls amid fellow wives
who are decked with pearls.³

[*Sattasai* 2.73]

1. The stanza describes the earliest days of spring before its full effect is seen. For similar descriptions see *SRK* 164 and 166. The syntax follows the metrical pattern. That is, there is a syntactic break after *suruhimāso*; the words *no dāvō* are to be construed with what follows. By failing to observe this, Jacobi's translation misses the point of the stanza. In line b the alternate reading *lakthasahe* given by *BP* is better than *lakthamuhe*, as it avoids the repetition of the word *muhe*. V. V. Mirashi in "Some Royal Poets of the Vākātaka Age," *IHQ* 21, pp. 196ff, ascribes this verse to the *Hariujaya* of the royal poet Sarvasena, for whom see below 3.10-14 e A. There is no compelling reason for the ascription, but the verse is written in the literary dialect and has the simple charm of other verses of that author.
2. The author is not known. Literally, "An abhyutthāna (rising to meet a guest) has been given to Love by your swelling breasts, an abhyutthāna that has the support, respectfully bestowed (*vitīma*), of the hand of Youth."
3. The readings of

the *Sattasai* are of a purer Māhārāṣṭri than Āpanda's: (a) *sūhipehunāvaamṣā
bahuō*; (c) *gaamottiaracia-*. Abhinava will explain the suggestions of this little stanza below.

L In this way the author has so far given a general definition of suggestion that arises from the power of meaning. He has also explained that its province is separate from that of figures of speech such as *slesa* and the like. He now proceeds to explain its subdivisions: It may be given body, etc. The meaning which [in the *Kārikā*] is said to reveal, that is, to suggest, another meaning is also of two kinds. Not only is reverberatory suggestion [i.e., *samlaksyakramadhvani*] of two kinds [viz., based on the power of words and based on the power of meaning], but even its second variety is of two kinds through the dichotomy of the suggestive meaning. That is the force of the word also.

[In the *Vṛtti*] he states that imaginative expression also has subvarieties: of the poet [or of a character]. Hence there are three varieties of the suggestive meaning.¹ *Praudha* is formed of *pra* in the sense of highly, extremely (*prakarṣṇa*) and *ūdhah* "carried out," that is, [of a meaning, when it is] fully competent for the matter to be conveyed; so *praudha* means effective. An expression also is called *praudha* when it is appropriate to the matter to be conveyed.

[Abhinava gives a Sanskrit translation of the Māhārāṣṭri verse "The sweet month." He then comments.] Here spring, figured as a sentient being and the friend of the god of love, only prepares but does not give over [the arrows to his friend]. By this expression, which is effective in conveying the meaning which should be conveyed, that stage of spring is referred to when the mango is just coming into bud. It is hereby suggested that the depredations of love are just beginning and that they will gradually grow stronger and stronger. If, on the other hand, the poet had written, "In the spring the mango begins to bud and leaf," he would have stated a fact that suggests nothing. This is an imaginative expression of the poet speaking in his own person.²

"On what mountain": here if the poet had written "the parrot bites a red bimba fruit," there would be no suggestiveness at all. But when there is an imaginative expression of this sort contained in the stanza, spoken by a young man of the poet's invention, who is filled with desire, there is suggestiveness.

[Abhinava gives a Sanskrit translation of the Māhārāṣṭri stanza "Attentive youth" and then comments.] Here the girl's breasts have become great persons, but love is worthy of still greater respect, so they are figuratively said to rise up to greet him; and youth acts as their attendant servant. By this striking expression the speaker's intention is indirectly suggested: that "every man will fall deeply in love with you as soon as he sees your breasts." If he had said, "Your breasts are high because of your youth," there would be no suggestion.

Not [produced] only by: this phrase implies that strikingness of expression is always useful.

[Abhinava translates the Māhārāṣṭri stanza "The hunter's wife" and then comments.] In his attachment to her the most that he can do is kill a peacock. When attached to his other wives, he killed even elephants.³ Thus the success in love (or sexual attractiveness, *saubhāgya*) [of the new wife] is suggested [*ukta*, i.e., *vyāñjita*] by the wording of the stanza. By saying that the other wives are decked with pearl ornaments, that is, possess pearl ornaments which are variously arranged, it is suggested that because these wives are not preoccupied with sexual enjoyment their major occupation is a display of skill in the arrangement of these ornaments, which in turn suggests that now [after the arrival of the new wife] they suffer the greatest neglect. One need not fear that the poet's statement that she is "proud" gives away the suggestion, because it is possible for the wife's pride to come from the ignorance of youth or the like [and not from a realization of her success in love]. This matter, as it is described, or put aside the description and suppose that one were to see it directly in the external world, suggests the great success in love of the hunter's wife. [Hence it is an inherently possible situation].⁴

1. Abhinava soon overlooks the subvarieties of *praudhakti* and will speak of "the two varieties of suggestion arising from the power of meaning," 2.25 L, first sentence. Of later authors Hemacandra (*AC*, p. 73) denies explicitly, and Jagannātha (*RG*, p. 136) implicitly, that there are three types. 2. Spring is not really a sentient being and does not prepare and hand over or refrain from handing over arrows to the god of love. 3. Later commentators note that the elephants would be farther off in the forest, with the result that killing them would require of the hunter a longer renunciation of his amorous sports. 4. I should prefer a simpler explanation of the stanza. The young bride might well be proud of her peacock feathers, for they are the very hallmark of a hunter, worn next to his body, around his waist (see *KumSam*. 1.15). But Abhinava's explanation is essentially the same as that given by Ānanda under 3.1i A and it remains the explanation invariably given by

later commentators. Also in its favor is the large number of similar verses in Prakrit. See the whole of Section 22, on bunters, in the *Vajjälagga*, together with Patwardhan's translations and notes.

K Also where a new figure of speech is understood by the power of meaning, we have another variety of suggestive poetry in which¹ the suggested sense is like the reverberation [of a bell].²

1. In the *Kārikā* the relative clause modifies *prakārṣoh* (variety). In the *Vṛtti* it modifies *dhūṇih* (suggestion). The difference in meaning is minimal. 2. In the previous four examples of sequential suggestion arising by the power of meaning (*arthasāktyudvahavasamālaksyakramavyanyadhuvi*) a meaning suggested a fact or situation (an *artha* suggested a *vastu*). The present *Kārikā* shows that a meaning may also suggest a figure of speech (an *artha* may suggest an *alankāra*).

A Where a new figure of speech, that is, a figure other than an expressed figure of speech, appears to our understanding from the inherent capability of a meaning, that is another [type of] suggestive poetry, arising from the power of meaning, in which the suggested sense takes the form of a reverberation.

L The two varieties of suggestion¹ arising from the power of meaning have heretofore been described as a form of *vastudhvani* (the suggestion of a fact or situation) because that which was suggested in both types was a mere *vastu*.² He now states that this [same type of suggestion arising from the power of meaning] can be an *alankāradhvani* if that which is suggested is in the form of a figure of speech. Thus he says Also where a new figure of speech, etc. The purport of the word "also" is that a figure of speech is not necessarily suggested by the power of words, as has been described, but may also be suggested by the power of meaning. Or, we may explain the word "also" as meaning that it is not only a *vastu* that may be understood there [viz.,

in suggestion by the power of meaning], since a figure of speech also may be suggested.

The *Vṛtti* explains the word "new" (*anya*): other than an expressed figure of speech.

1. See 2.24 L, note 1. 2. Abhinava fails to mention here that in the *svataḥ sambhavī* variety the suggestion may be of a *rasādi* rather than a *vastumātra*. An example is the stanza quoted in 2.22 A.

A Lest it be thought that the scope of this [type of suggestive poetry] must be very small, the following is said:

K It has been shown that the whole collection of figures of speech such as metaphor and the like, which use direct expression, are often met with in suggested form.

A It has been shown by the venerable Bhattodbhāṭa and others that figures of speech such as metaphor and the like, which are well known to be directly expressed in some occurrences, in other occurrences are understood (i.e., suggested), and this quite frequently. For example, it has been shown that in such a figure as doubt (*sasandeha*)¹ there may appear the figures simile, metaphor, hyperbole, and the like. And so it is not difficult to prove that one figure of speech may be found suggested in another figure of speech.²

1. *Sasandeha*: In the light of Udbhaṭa's only surviving work one would say that Ānanda, and following him Abhinava, are here using the wrong word. Udbhaṭa distinguishes *sasandeha* from *sandeha* (see 1.13 i L, note 7) and says specifically that it is the latter figure which gives rise to the appearance of other figures. His example of *sandeha* (6.3* Indurāja, 6.6 *Vivṛtti*) is a stanza which describes Viṣṇu "of whom, black of color and riding on the sun-bright king of birds, one doubts whether he is a black cloud on Mt. Meru or smoke over the fire of doomsday." Indurāja identifies the suggested figure in this stanza as poetic fancy (*utpreksdī*). Udbhaṭa's two examples of *sasandeha* do not suggest a second figure in this fashion. If the reading of our text is wrong, the error must be ancient, for Abhinava (see below) clearly read *sasandeha* Krishnamoorthy in his var. lect. notices *sandeha*, which he attributes to BP. But this is an error; the word does not occur in that text. 2. This is the sense that Abhinava finally assigns to the passage. He begins, however, by taking *alaṅkārāntare* as a locative of cause, which would give the passage the meaning, "it is not difficult to prove that one figure of speech may be suggested because another [directly expressed] figure is present."

L Lest it be thought: the source of his concern is that it is easily understandable that by the power of words such figures as śleṣa and the like may appear, but it is hard to see what figure of speech could appear through the power of meaning. By the words "the whole [collection]" and "has been shown" he makes it clear that this difficulty is specious.

[Bhāmaba 3.43 and Udbhaṭa 6.2 have defined *sasandeha* as follows.] "A statement containing doubt made for the sake of praise by a person who states the identity [of the upameya] with the upamāna and then again its difference, is known as *sasandeha*.¹ For example,

Is this her hand, or might it be
a frond whose finger-leaves are moving in the breeze?²

In such lines there is a suggestion of either simile or metaphor. And as for hyperbole (*atiśayokti*) it is suggested in almost all expressed figures.³

Because another figure of speech is present: [Abhinava begins by understanding the *Vṛtti* to say that one figure may be suggested because another figure is present, i.e., by means of another figure; cf. 2.26 A, note 2.] If a figure of speech suggests another, it is not impossible that a figure may be suggested by a *vastu* (fact or situation). If this is the meaning, the author of the *Vṛtti* has used the word *alaṅkārāntare* [to exclude that possibility here], but it does not fit the context. The

context here is not that a figure can be suggested by a figure. The context is that in *dhvani* based upon meaning, a figure, just as well as a *vastu*, can be suggested. Thus in the passage where the subject is summed up, the *Kārikā* (2.28) will state that "these figures attain the highest beauty when they form a part of *dhvani*"; on which the author of the *Vṛtti* begins by saying that a figure can belong to suggestion in either of two ways [viz., by suggesting or by being suggested] and concludes that "here, because of the subject at issue we must understand 'a figure that is suggested' to be meant, [not one that suggests]." As an alternative [which will avoid this lapse from the subject at issue] we shall take the word *antara* in both occurrences to be a synonym of *viśeṣa*⁴ and take the locative as a locative of the sphere rather than a locative of cause.⁵ Thus the meaning will be as follows. "In an area of expressed figures various suggested figures [may also] appear." This has been stated by Udbhaṭa and others and they have thereby admitted that a figure can be suggested by the power of meaning. The only qualification to be made is that as they were definers of figures of speech, they spoke of these [suggested] figures in an area of expressed figures. Such is the real meaning of the passage.

1. Abhinava does not quote the verse which follows this in Udbhaṭa (6.3 Indurāja, 6.5 Viṁśti), where Udbhaṭa specifically states that in *sandeḥa* (not *sasandeḥa*) one figure may suggest another.
 2. The source of this example is unknown to us.
 3. See below, 3.36.
 4. One of the thirteen meanings of *antara* given by the *Amarakośa* is *bheda* = *viśeṣa* = difference, variety.
 5. See 2.26 A, note 2.
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is much deserves to be stated:

K Even where a second figure of speech is apprehended [without being directly expressed], if the [first,] expressed figure does not appear as subordinate to it, we are not on the road of *dhvani*.

A Even where there is an apprehension, like a reverberation, of other figures of speech in [expressed] figures of speech, if the beauty of the expressed figure does not appear chiefly in its conveying of the suggested figure, we are not on the road of *dhvani*. For example, although simile is regularly understood in a figure like zeugma (*dipaka*), if the beauty of the zeugma does not lie in its suggesting the simile, one should not use the designation of *dhvani* [i.e., one should not label the simile as *upamādhvani*]. For example:

Night is ennobled by moonlight,
the pond by its lilies, a vine
by its clusters of flowers,
the beauty of autumn by wild geese,
and the very name of poetry
by good listeners.¹

In passages of this sort, although a simile is contained [within the *dipaka*], the beauty of the poem lies chiefly in the expressed figure and not in any subservience of it to the suggested figure. Therefore it is reasonable for the poem to be given its designation by the expressed figure.

1. Author unknown. For *kāvyakathā*, literally "all talk of poetry," see Abhinava's remarks below. *Sajjanaiḥ* means literally "by good persons." But what is meant is persons of taste and fair judgment, the opposite of those *asajjanāḥ* (*SRK*, Section 38) who seek out the faults of a poem "as a camel looks for thorns" (*SRK* 1255). The expressed figure of the verse is *dipaka* because the same action, ennobling, is predicated of several subjects, one of which is *prākṛta* (truly the subject matter, here "poetry") and others of which are not.

L Now it might be objected that if all this has been said by former authorities, there is no need for our author to exert himself. Sensing this objection, he says: but this much [deserves to be stated]; supply "by us." The word "but" indicates that there will be some difference [in what he will say] from what those [authorities] have said.

"By moonlight": moonlight achieves its greatest glory only at night; and what would good listeners be good for without poetry?¹ The ennobling of night by moonlight consists in its rendering the night brilliant

and enjoyable; the ennobling of the pond by its lilies in their giving it beauty, fragrance and wealth; the ennobling of the vine by flowers, in giving it attractiveness and charm; of the autumn by wild geese, in their making it a delight to the ear and charming. All these [effects of ennoblement] are granted to poetry by good listeners. All these meanings are furnished by the words "is ennobled" by force of the zeugma (*dipaka*).² The "name"³ of poetry implies this: put aside the subtle distinctions of poetry; the very word "poetry" disappears without good listeners. But when they are present, a mere collection of words becomes blessed and possessed of the appellation "poetry," for the effect of these [good listeners] is to bring it to a position of honor. Thus it is the figure *dipaka* that predominates here, not the simple.

1. It is odd that Abhinava begins his comment on the stanza by eliciting this incidental suggestion from a reversal of its terms. This reverse implication is not important and he does not refer to it again. 2. That is, the sense "is ennobled by" is supplied to each pair of subject and agent by the figure of speech. 3. Abhinava is here explaining why the word *kāvya-kathā* (literally, "all talk of poetry") is used rather than the simple word *kāvya* (poetry).
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A But where the expressed figure of speech is placed in subordination to a suggested figure, it is reasonable to designate the poem by the suggested figure. As in

"Why should he, who has attained to royal glory,
 who has won Śrī for wife,
burden me again with the pain of churning?
I cannot believe that one so active
should seek his former sleep.
Why, when he is attended by lords of all the islands,
should he build a bridge once more?"
Such are the doubts, it seems, which make the ocean tremble
when your Majesty marches to its shore."⁴

§ 2.27 a L]

Or² as in a verse of my own:

Truly insensate is the ocean
that it is not now stirred by this your smiling face,
tremulous-eyed beauty,
which fills the horizon with the splendour of its loveliness.³

In instances such as these, inasmuch as the beauty of the poem lies in a metaphor that appears like a reverberation, it is reasonable to designate the poem as poetic suggestion of metaphor (*rūpakadhuṇi*).

1. Author unknown. The stanza flatters the royal patron of the poet by suggesting, in a fused figure (*samkara*) of doubt (*sandeha*) and poetic fancy (*utpreksā*, indicated by "it seems"), that the patron is Viṣṇu whom the ocean knew on three previous occasions: before the obtaining of Śrī from the churning of the sea, in the time of *pralaya* when Viṣṇu slept on the sea, and when, as Rāma, he built a bridge to Laṅkā to defeat Rāvaṇa. 2. At this point we should probably read the passage rejected by Abhinava; see below. We omit it in the translation only in order to avoid repetition. 3. The verse contains a pun. The woman's face, like the moon, should stir the ocean (*jalorāśi*) if it were not insensate (*jadardāsi*). In puns *l* and *d* are regarded as identical (*ladayor abhedah*). The verse has been picked up by several of the anthologies; see Kosambi's apparatus on *SRK* 421.

L In this way he has shown the [negative] meaning of the *Kārikā* by a [negative] example. He now explains the positive intention implied by what the *Kārikā* has excluded. This positive intention is that where [the expressed figure shows] subordination to the suggested figure, we are on the road of *dhuṇi*: But where, etc. Actually there are three possibilities here [viz., in the area of figures of speech suggested by the power of meaning]: (a) a second figure may be suggested by an expressed figure; (b) there may be an expressed figure but one that does not suggest; and (c) there may be no expressed figure at all. One should attach these possibilities, each as it may fit, to the examples [that follow].¹

He illustrates: "Why should he, who has attained to royal glory," etc. A certain king has come to the shore of the sea with an immense collection of troops, whereupon the sea begins to tremble (or surge) either because of moonrise or because of the plunging of these troops into it.² As this trembling is fancied to be due to doubts [as described in the stanza], we have the fusion of *sasandeha* and *utpreksā*, so the

expressed figure is fusion (*samkara*). And by this there is suggested the superimposition of the character of Vāsudeva [= Viṣṇu] on that king [i.e., the figure *rūpaka* is suggested]. Granted that a contrasted superiority (*vyatireka*) of the king [to Vāsudeva] also appears, that is because of a superiority to Vāsudeva in his former, not in his present, condition. Because the blessed Vāsudeva has now obtained Śrī and lives as an active monarch who is victorious over the kings of all the continents. The *rūpaka* is not forced upon us by any impossibility of the fancied doubt so that we might say that it served simply as a support (*upaskāra*) to the expressed figure,³ for we can imagine [the ocean's] reasoning to take the form that anyone who has not obtained wealth and is inspired by an unconcealed desire of conquest might be likely to churn its waters.⁴ Nor is this sense [of the identification of the king with Vāsudeva] forced on us by the words "again" (*punar api*), "former" (*pūrvam*), and "once more" (*bhūyāḥ*). Because the words "again" and "once more" can reasonably be used even if the agents should differ, since the ocean remains the same. As one might say, "The earth was formerly conquered by Kārtavīrya and then again by Jāmadagnya."⁵ And "his former sleep" can be explained as the king's habit of sleep when he was a prince [before he had assumed the responsibilities of a ruler]. Thus it is established that the stanza is an example of suggested metaphor (*rūpakadhvani*)⁶ [and not a case of a metaphor subordinate to an expressed figure]; because we apprehend the superimposing [of the character of Vāsudeva on the king] in the absence of direct denotation simply from the beauty of the expressed sense.⁷

Here some [authorities] read another example: "And as in

On this sand bank of the Sarayū
whitened by flooding streams of moonlight
two angels once held long debate.
One claimed that Kesi was the first to die;
the other, Kamsa. Tell us truly now
which did you slay first?"

This passage is spurious,⁸ because the sense that "you are Vāsudeva" is here made clear by the direct expression of the word "you."

"Loveliness" (*lāvanya*), that is, a charm of configuration; "splendour," i.e., brilliance. The horizon is "filled," that is, furnished with, made enchanting by, these two qualities of your face.⁹ "Now": now that your face inclines toward graciousness after its recent disturbance by [the] anger [of jealousy]. "Smiling": with lips slightly parted in a smile.

"Tremulous-eyed beauty": the word is a vocative, designating a person of whom the eyes are tremulous, that is, beautiful because of their motion and dilation prompted by their owner's graciousness. And yet the ocean is not stirred "now," although it was stirred a moment ago [when the moon rose]. Inasmuch as your face, flushed by its [recent] disturbance of anger and [now] smiling is the very disc of the full moon rising at sunset,¹⁰ any sensitive being must be stirred, must experience a motion of the heart. As the ocean "is not stirred," it clearly exhibits an accumulation of insentience (*jādyasañcaya*) in conformity with its name "the accumulation of waters" (*jalarāśi*). We have said before [see 1.1 Intro. L and note 10 thereon] that adjectives like *jada* can be nominalized [e.g., *jada* can be used in the sense of *jādya*]. In the stanza the denotative function of the words comes to a halt after furnishing the sense "a sensitive person must be stirred," must experience an alteration brought about by love, "on looking at your face." Accordingly, the metaphor (*rūpaka*, i.e., the identifying your face with the moon) must be the work of suggestion. The pun (*sleṣa*) is an expressed figure of speech in the stanza, but this pun does not suggest anything. The metaphor that appears like a reverberation is suggested by the power of meaning; and as the beauty of the poem depends on this metaphor, the poem should be designated by it as an instance of *rūpakadhvani*. This is the connection [between the verse and the thesis that stood in need of illustration].

1. The passage from "actually there are three possibilities here" (*tatru ca. etc.*) to "one should attach to the [following] examples" (*udāharaneśu yogyam*) becomes clear after one reads further in the commentary. Abhinava was apparently struck by the fact that several of the examples given under this *Kārikā* by the *Vṛtti* do not exhibit a figure suggested by another figure. Although that seems to be the area marked out by the *Kārikā*, the *Vṛtti* covers the wider area of figures suggested in any way by the power of meaning. Abhinava divides this wider area into three categories. The first, which is clearly referred to by the *Kārikā* is where the suggested figure is suggested by an expressed figure. This is exemplified by the following example, *prāptasārī eṣa* "Why should he." The second, where the verse exhibits an expressed figure but where the suggested figure is suggested by something other than the expressed figure, is exemplified by the stanza *lāvanyaakānti* "Truly insensible is the ocean." The third, where there is no expressed figure but where there is a suggested figure, would be exemplified by the verse *jyotsnāpūraprasara* "On this sand bank of the Sarayu, which Abhinava rejects as an insertion, if the suggestion were not spoiled by the direct expression "you."
2. These

are the real causes of the surging of the sea, as opposed to the fancied cause. In supposing that the trampling of an army could disturb the sea, Abhinava was doubtless picturing in his mind a Kashmirian lake rather than the Indian Ocean. 3. If the *rūpaka* arose in this way, it would be subordinate to the *samkara* and we could not categorize the poem as *rūpakadhvani*. The point of view that Abhinava here denies might be put as follows. So long as the character of Viṣṇu is not superimposed on the king, the speculations (*vitarka*) regarding the purpose of the king's visit to the ocean, which constitute the *sondehālariikāra*, are not reasonable. Nor is the fancy (*utpreksā*) that these speculations are the cause of the ocean's agitation reasonable. The superimposition is needed in order to justify or rationalize the expressed figures. But Abhinava denies this view. The speculations regarding the purpose of the king's visit to the ocean do not force the *rūpaka* upon us, he says, because they can be differently explained. 4. As the ocean was supposed to be a

line of jewels, anyone desiring wealth would be a potential mōre of these jewels. Again, a king bent on conquest would be likely to churn the sea by transporting his army to distant lands. It does not take a Viṣṇu to think of troubling the sea. 5. The argument which Abhinava rejects might be put thus. We grant that any ambitious king might churn the sea. But only Viṣṇu could churn it "again" and build a bridge across it "once more." Abhinava's rejection points out that the adverbs can refer to the relation of verb and object rather than to the relation of verb and subject. The sea, churned by Viṣṇu, can be agitated at the thought of being churned by someone else.

6. This categorizing of the verse by Ānanda and Abhinava is criticized in *RG*, p. 247. 7. These words are added to make it clear that the present example is a case of *arthasāktyudbhavadhvani*. 8. Abhinava's criterion of textual authenticity is that what the text says must be worthy of his author. If, in his opinion, it is not, the text must be spurious. By modern principles of textual criticism the rejected passage has a good claim to be genuine. It is included in the Nepali manuscript of the *Dhv.* (see Krishnamoorty's ed.) and is cited in the *Vyaktiviveka* (p. 430) where it appears between the verses *prāptasārī* *eṣā* and *lāvanyakānti*, precisely its position in the Nepali MS. 9. Abhinava takes *lāvanyakānti* as a *dvandva*. In the translation we have taken it as a *tolpurusa*.

10. The full moon also as it rises turns from red to white.

A The following is an example of the poetic suggestion of si (*upamādhvani*).

The eyes of warriors take not such joy
in their ladies' saffron painted breasts
as they take in the cranial lobes, painted with red minium,
of their enemies' elephants.¹

Another example is from my *Visamabānalilā*, speaking of the conquest of the demons by the god of love:

Their hearts once bent on theft of those gems
born of the same womb as Śri
were transferred by the god of flower arrows
to the bimba-like lips of their women.

1. The comparison of a woman's breasts to the two frontal lobes of an elephant's cranium is a stock simile of Sanskrit poetry, but the notion that a warrior might take more joy in handling and crushing the *upamā* than the *upameya* of this simile is original.

L Our author gives two examples of suggested simile (*upamādhvani*), but does not state expressly how the definition [of a suggested figure] applies to them because the application is the same [as in the preceding examples of suggested metaphor].

[Abbinava gives a Sanskrit translation of the Prakrit verse "The eyes of warriors," on which he comments as follows.] Here, while there is a weighing of the inclination [of these warriors] to fondle their ornamented ladies against their emotional eagerness for an approaching battle, the eagerness for battle is [shown to be] greater. Thus the directly expressed figure of speech is contrast (*vyatireka*). But a similitude is suggested between the cranial lobes of enemy elephants, ready for battle, objects of terror to all men, and the swelling breasts of their ladies. By this simile we see the esteem [of these men for battle], as if they were deriving sexual pleasure from it, and this simile effects a striking

portrayal of their heroism. Hence the [suggested] simile is of primary importance [in the verse].

The conquest of the demons: for in that poem his conquest of all three worlds is described. "Their hearts," that is, the hearts of the demons who dwell in Pātāla and who had engaged in every sort of outrage, such as injuring the city of Indra and the like; hearts whose resolution was unsheathed by the most arduous adventures.¹ "Born of the same womb as Śrī": the sense is "and therefore of inexpressible value." The hearts of these demons which had been bent on, that is, wholly intent on, the theft, that is, the abduction from every [hiding place], of these gems: these hearts were transferred by the god of flower arrows—he was supplied with the gentlest artillery imaginable—to the lips of their women; that is to say, Kāma brought their hearts to regard the gazing at, kissing, and biting of these lips as the highest purpose of these demons' lives, whereas their hearts had just now been blazing with the fire of martial ambition. Here the expressed figure of speech is hyperbole (*atisayokti*).² The suggested figure is simile, for the bimba-like lips are similar to the best of all gems and hence the high value placed upon these lips is real. That is why the suggested figure is not *rūpaka*, because a *rūpaka* is a superimposition [of the character of one object on another, actually different, object] and so is unreal.³ The similarity of the lips of their women to the best of gems appears to these demons as a matter of actual fact and this similarity by its predominance is the source of the striking effect of the verse.

1. The words *tam hrdayam* of the verse are glossed by Abhinava by *hrdayam tac ca*: the heart, and such a heart! 2. Mammata quotes this verse (Book 10, vs. 515) as an example of the trope *paryāya* (where one obj. t, here "their hearts," is described as existi in different places). *Paryāya* is apparently an invention of Mammata's, as it is not found in such older authors as are preserved to us. His reason for the assignment of it to this verse is that *atisayokti* had ceased to mean hyperbole in his time and the verse will not fit easily into any of his four types of *atisayokti*. But the verse fits naturally into the older definitions, e.g., that of Bhāmaha 2.81 "A statement the sense of which exceeds reality, when made for some [poetic] purpose should be considered *atisayokti* (hyperbole)" or of Udbhaṭa (Viṛtti 2.23). BP by ingenuity manages to fit the present verse even into a late definition of *atisayokti*. "Heart," it says, really refers to nothing more than *cittavṛtti*, a mental or emotional state. The demons' emotional drive toward robbery really had no connection with their later amorous state, but the two states are here pictured as connected. This fits the definition *asambandhe sambandhaḥ* of

Alankārasarvasva, p. 83 and of *SāhDarp.* 10.47. 3. If I say "My lady's face is like the moon," my statement is true or real because the face does have, at least to me, qualities of brightness and charm which are like those of the moon. But if I say her face is the moon, the literal sense of my words is false. This distinction between the reality of *upamā* and the unreality of *rūpaka* goes back to the beginning of the Alankara tradition; cf. *BhNS* 16.56, *savikalpena racitam rūpakam*, "rūpaka is a figure formed by one's imagination."

A An example of poetic suggestion of *ākṣepa* (feigned or pregnant denial) is as follows:

He can express all Hayagrīva's virtues
who can measure by jars the water of the sea.¹

Here by means of the [expressed] figure hyperbole there appears a [suggested] *ākṣepa*, which takes the form of proclaiming that Hayagrīva's virtues are indescribable and which has the purpose of showing that in their excellence these virtues are unique.²

1. The verse is later quoted by Hemacandra *AC* 1.77 and *AlSorv*, p. 151. Possibly it is taken from Bhartr̄imētha's lost poem, the *Hayagrīvavadha*.
 2. The directly expressed figure here, in the older system of poetics, is hyperbole (*atīsayokti*) because measuring the sea in jars is a purely imaginary action that exceeds the bounds of reality; see 2.27 b L, note 2. In the later system the figure would be identified as *nidarsāndā*, as it is identified by our late commentators on *Śāk.* 1.16, which contains a similar turn of phrase. The suggested figure is *ākṣepa*, a denial which hints at something unexpressed; cf. 1.13e A, note 3. Bhāmaha (2.68) defines the figure as "a feigned denial of what is or was one's intention, made with the purpose of emphasis (or exaggeration)": *pratisēdha ivesfasya yo vīsesābhidhītsayā*. What he means can best be seen from examples. "It is wonderful that you have no pride although you have conquered the earth. But what can produce an alteration of the sea?" (Bhāmaha 2.70). "As he thought about her, it was wonderful that his thought knew no end. But where is there any end to thoughts of love, or time?" (Udbhata, 2.2^a Indurāja, 2.5 *Virtu*). In both examples there is implied a denial (the denial is not directly expressed in these examples) of the predication "wonderful," but in both cases the denial is not because the

denied fact is not wonderful (it is wonderful) but because the word wonderful is not strong enough. The graciousness of the conquering king and the never ceasing thoughts of the lover are more than wonderful; the one is as steady as the ocean, the other as ceaseless as time. In the present example cited by Ānandvardhana, there is an implied denial that the virtues of Hayagrīva can be enumerated or described (both Ānanda and Abhinava speak of *avṛṇāṇīyatā* rather than *aparisaṅkhyeyatā*). This is not because the poet really means that they are indescribable (his poem doubtless went on to describe them), but because he wishes to emphasize or exaggerate. He means that Hayagrīva's virtues were unique.

L By means of hyperbole: he means, as the expressed figure. The implication that his virtues are indescribable is a form of *ākṣepa* (feigned or pregnant denial), because it is a denial of what is actually intended.¹ He shows us that this *ākṣepa* forms the predominant sense of the verse by the adjectival compound "[which has the purpose of showing that] these virtues are] unique."

A Poetic suggestion of the figure substantiation (*arthāntaranyāsa*) is possible both as a suggestion arising from the power of words (*sabdasaktyudbhavavyaṅgyadhvani*) and as a suggestion arising from the power of meaning (*arthasaktyudbhavavyaṅgyadhvani*). An illustration of the former is:

Since fruit depends on fate, what can be done?
 This much, however, we can say:
 the flowers of the red *āśoka* tree
 are unlike those of others.

[*Sattasai* 3.79]¹

As the suggestion is here revealed by a word [viz., *phale* "fruit"], it does not conflict with the overall sense of the sentence, which is different.

§ 2.27 d A]

An example of the second variety is as follows:

O clever lover, to apologize
even when I have disguised my face
and hidden the grievance in my heart.
Though you have been unfaithful,
one cannot be angry.²

By the fact that one cannot be angry at a particular individual denoted [by the primary force of the words], who is clever though unfaithful, there is suggested as the primary sense a substantiating general statement connected [with that particular statement].

1. The *Sattasai* reads devāttammi, the regular reflex of Sanskrit devātta, and Pischel knows only the form *ātta*. But āya might change to e on the analogy of aya, so our reading may be correct. For karikillapallavāḥ read karikellipallavā. Karikelli is the Māhārāṣṭri name of the asoka; see Hemacandra, Abhidhānacintāmaṇi 1135. The word occurs again in *Sattasai* 5.4. The asoka tree bears brilliant red flowers, which appear on its fronds (*pallavāḥ*) before the leaves appear. Its fruit is inconspicuous. The direct meaning and suggested figures of the stanza are as follows. Direct meaning: "The asoka tree bears no fruit; that cannot be helped. It bears beautiful flowers." There is no arthāntaranyāśa (substantiation, see 1.13 i L, note 8) in the direct meaning because a particular cannot be substantiated by a particular. The first suggestion arises from the double meaning of the word phale (fruit, reward) and so is a suggestion arising from the power of a word. "The asoka tree bears no-fruit. The reward of all living things depends on fate." This is arthāntaranyāśa of Mammata's second type (10.109), where a particular statement is substantiated by a general statement. The second suggestion depends on the power of meaning and derives from the stanza as a whole, read in the context of advice to a king. "Even a hero may fail of success, for success depends on fate. But his virtues shine above those of other men." This is aprastutaprāśamsā, a figure which consists in a statement (*prāśamsā*) of a non-contextual or allegorical (*aprastuto*) meaning and which suggests a contextual (*prastuta*) meaning, that is, a sense that concerns the matter that is really in one's mind. The *prastuto* meaning in an *aprastutaprāśamsā* is always suggested; it cannot be expressed. A problem now arises. Our text has said that we can speak of a suggested figure of speech only when that figure forms the predominant sense of the verse (2.22 K). How can there be two predominant suggested senses in one stanza? Ānanda does not answer the question very satisfactorily. He merely says that there is no contradiction because one figure is suggested by a single word, the other by the sentence as a whole. 2. Viewing this little verse out of context and without reference to the commentators, one may be

puzzled how to take it, whether as the remark of a woman who is naive, forgiving, cynical, or clever. Ānanda's implied and Abhinava's expressed opinion is that it is the remark of a clever woman, who has been hurt and who is letting her husband or lover know that she sees through his excuses. This is why they assign the verse to "suggested substantiation" (*arthāntaranyāsadhvani*), a figure that demands that a particular statement be substantiated by a general statement or vice versa. The particular statement of the woman concerning her lover suggests the general principle that false lovers always act in this way. After reading Abhinava's comment on the verse one will agree, I think, that this interpretation gives the verse a greater charm than it would have under other interpretations.

L Is possible: by this word he shows that the consideration at this point of suggestion based on the power of words is incidental [the matter properly under consideration being suggestion based on the power of meaning].

[After translating the Prakrit stanza "Since fruit depends on fate," etc., into Sanskrit, Abhinava continues:] Unlike other trees such as the mango and the like, the *asoka* tree does not bear fruit. What can be done about it? But its flowers are extremely beautiful. By expressing this much the denotation of the sentence is complete. Before [we reach this point], we apprehend a substantiation of this [particular] fact through the [double] power of the [ambiguous] word *phale* (fruit or reward). The general proposition takes the form of the following observation: "Sometimes, because of fate, the result in the form of success may not be achieved even by a man of uncommon ambition who sets forth with the correct means." But now a difficulty arises because an allegory (*aprastutaprośamsā*) is suggested¹ as the predominant meaning of the sentence as a whole. How then can the figure substantiation be suggested, since two predominant meanings cannot coexist? In view of this difficulty he says, As the suggestion is here revealed by a word. For it will be stated [in 3.1-2] that all the forms of suggestion are revealed either by single words or by complete sentences. In the verse we are discussing substantiation (*arthāntaranyāsa*) is the predominant suggestion in a single word, whereas allegory (*aprastutaprośamsā*) is the predominant suggestion in the sentence. But of these two it is the relation of substantiating and substantiated statements (i.e., the *arthāntaranyāsa*) furnished by the word *phale* that appears in greater predominance² and so one will categorize the verse as an example of suggested substantiation (*arthāntaranyāsadhvani*).

"When I have bidden the grievance in my heart": literally, "I being one by whom the grievance is placed within the heart and not revealed." Accordingly, you clever one who apologize to me even when I show no anger in my face, there can be no cause of anger at you although you have been unfaithful. The vocative singular "O clever one" determines [the denoted sense to refer to] a particular. But then as one considers the sense, a substantiation in the form of a general statement is apprehended and this is strikingly poetic. For we have here a woman who has been wronged [by her husband or lover], who is clever and who, when he apologizes, shows her annoyance by saying [in effect]: "Every clever rascal although he has been unfaithful covers up the occasion of his transgression in this way; do not pride yourself falsely on that account." Connected: sc., because the general statement is connected with the particular.

1. *aprastutaprasamsā prādhanyena vyāngyā*: Abhinava is speaking inexactly, as *BP* points out. What he means is that the contextual (*prastuta*) meaning of the *aprastutaprasamsā* is suggested (*aprastutaprasamsāsthale prastutārtha vyāngyah*). The distinction should be kept in mind because in 2.27 h Abhinava will give us an example where the *aprastuta* sense as well as the *prastuta* sense is suggested. That is not the case here. 2. Abhinava gives no reason for this greater predominance. *BP* says simply that it appears that way to men of taste.

4 Poetic suggestion of contrast (*vyatirekadhvani*) is also possible in both forms [sc., by the power of words and by the power of meaning]. The first of these types has been illustrated above [2.21 f A]. An example of the second is this:

I would rather be born somewhere i
as a crippled, leafless tree
than be born in the world of men, a man
yearning to give and poor.

[*Sattasai* 3.30]

In this example it is directly stated that to be born as a poor man who wishes to be generous is not a matter for rejoicing and that to be born

as a stunted, leafless tree is a matter for rejoicing. This statement, after we first apprehend the comparability (*upamānopameyavat*) of such a man with such a tree, shows as the predominant meaning of the verse that the man's degree of misery is greater.

L A suggestion of contrast is also possible: By using the word "also" he shows that just like the suggestion of substantiation (*arthāntaranyāsadhuṇi*), the suggestion of contrast *vyatirekadhvani* is also of two kinds. Above refers to the verse "May both sets of the sun god's feet" [2.21 f A].¹

"I would rather be born somewhere in a forest": in a secluded part of a forest, in a thicket where, being surrounded by the luxuriance of numerous conspicuous trees, I shall not even be noticed by anyone. "Crippled": unfit for being made into any shape. "Leafless": the meaning is that it affords no shade, how much less should it have flowers or fruit. What the poet wishes to convey is that even such a tree might be useful for making charcoal or might serve as a roost for owls. "Of men": that is, where suppliants are plentiful. "In this world": sc., where he is seen by suppliants and where suppliants are seen by him and yet he can do nothing [to help them]. The poet means that this is an agonizing situation. There is no directly expressed figure of speech in the verse.

Comparability: thus our author prepares the ground for contrast (*vyatireko*) [as contrast is always based on similarity]. Shows that the degree [of misery is] greater: i.e., shows the contrast.²

1. In our text 'kham ye 'tyujvalayanti' iti is followed by 'raktas tuam navapallaviññi' iti. As BP notes, the second reference is in error, for that stanza was not an example of *vyatirekadhvani* but of *vācyavyatireka* adopted after giving up the *slegopamā*. It is easier to suppose that a careless reader added the extra reference than to suppose that na tu has fallen out before *raktas*. 2. Cf. Mammāta 10.105 *upameyasya vyatireka ḍdhikyam* "Contrast" is where the subject of comparison (*upameya*) possesses [some property in] a greater degree [than the image (*upāmāna*)]."

A' An example of the poetic suggestion of fancy (*utpreksādhvani*) is this:

In spring the Malabar wind,
swollen by the breathing of snakes
that encircle sandalwood trees,
makes travelers swoon.¹

For in this example the capacity of the Malabar wind to cause travelers to swoon in spring is [actually] due to its stimulation of love. But this capacity is fancied (*utpreksita*) to be due to the swelling of the wind by the poisonous breath of snakes wrapped around the sandalwood trees [of Malabar]. This fancy, although it is not directly stated, is noticed like a reverberation because of the inherent capability of the sentence meaning.² One may not object that because there is no use of such words as *tva* [e.g., "as if," "like," "as it were"] the fancy in such cases is disconnected (*asambaddha*, also "nonsensical"), for it is readily understandable, as we find in other cases too that fancy arises through suggestion even in the absence of such words. For example in

Although your face is afflicted by anger,
the full moon, having achieved this once
a similarity thereto,
cannot, it seems, contain himself.

Or, as i

A timid deer ran about among the tents.
No men with bows pursued him; yet he rested not,
his lovely eyes being struck with shame
by the ear-reaching arrow-glances of the women.

[Māgha, Sīśupālavadha 5.26]

When it comes to the relation between words and sense [i.e., to the question whether particular words suggest a given sense or not], the generally accepted view is authoritative.³

1. Sandalwood trees grow in Malabar and are said to be a favorite haunt of snakes (SRK 801, 1078). The verb *mūrcchati* means both to swell and to swoon. Swooning may be caused either by snake bite or unfulfilled love. The spring breeze brings back to travelers memories of their wives and mistresses waiting at home. With this verse compare Dandin 2.238. 2. Or, because of the natural compatibility of the sentence meaning with such a fancy. On *sāmarthyā* see 2.21a 4, note 2. 3. *BP*: As persons of taste will understand the sense of fancy in such passages even in the absence of a word like *iva*, the rejection of such passages as disconnected or nonsense is wrong.

L Is fancied: because [it is fancied that] the wind, swollen by, that is magnified or increased by, poisonous exhalations, causes swooning. Furthermore, it is fancied that one individual among the travelers [viz., the wind], being poisoned (*mūrcchita*), causes *mūrcchā*, that is, loss of health, to other individuals. So we have a double fancy (*utprekṣā*). Now it might be objected that we have no fancy here at all, because the adjectival phrase ["swollen by the breathing of snakes"], being otherwise a useless addition, makes sense only if taken as giving the cause [of the increase of the wind and the swooning of the travelers]. But what if the phrase is taken as giving the cause. This is not the real cause [of those effects]; rather, it is fancied as the cause. So the objection amounts to nothing.¹ Of such words: because we see that this sense, viz., that of something fancied, may be understood even when words like *iva* are not used. He now illustrates this point: As in, etc.

"Afflicted by anger": tinged with redness. Should the moon attain similarity to your face when your face is pleased, or that it should always be similar, then what would it not do [in its joy]? That it could really become your face—why, this would be beyond the power even of its daydreams. This is what the word "although" (*api*) conveys. He "cannot contain himself" in his own body, as he is filling the horizon [with moonlight]. "Just this once" means after such a long time and then too for one night only [sc., for the night of the full moon]. In this stanza the filling of the horizon by the light of the full moon, which is a natural event, is fancied in this manner [sc., as being prompted by the moon's desire to equal the face of the woman].

But now our author senses that the word *nanu* ("it seems") might be regarded as a expression of reflection, that is, of fancy (*utprekṣā*), and that by this direct expression the disconnection (*asambaddhatā*) [to remove which, as we have claimed, the reader supplies a suggested

fancy] might be removed. Accordingly, he gives us another example: Or, as in, etc.

That the deer, running among, that is, all about, the tents, did not halt although it was not chased by any men with bows and arrows, was due, in actual fact, to its natural timidity and restlessness. But a poetic fancy is here suggested: that the deer did not halt because the beauty of its eyes, which was the deer's most treasured possession, had been hit [i.e., surpassed] by the women with arrows in the form of their large eyes [also: arrows pulled back on the bow string as far as the ears]. Our author anticipates a criticism, namely that this verse too² is disconnected (or nonsense) as there is no word like *iva* to denote the fancy; and so he says: when it comes to the relation, etc.

1. In actual fact the wind is not appreciably increased by the breath of snakes, nor in actual fact does it poison travelers so that they swoon. 2. As well as the verse, "In spring the Malabar wind."
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A The following contains a poetic suggestion of puns (*slesa*).

Where young men with their wives enjoyed
covered terraces with sloping eaves,
with curving folds at the waist,
decked with banners to give them beauty
winning fame because they were beautiful
and stirring passion by their privacy
by their adornment.¹

[Māgha, *Sisupālavadha* 3.53]

In this stanza after we have perceived the direct sense of the sentence, viz., that with their wives they enjoyed the terraces, we perceive puns (*slesa*) to the effect that the terraces are like the wives. This *slesa*, [which arises] from the non-verbal inherent compatibility of the [expressed] meanings [with the second meanings], acts as the predominant figure of the stanza.

1. This stanza, which forms part of Māgha's description of the city of Dvārakā, has been analyzed by Vallabhadeva and Mallinātha as well as by Ānanda and Abhinava. There is no disagreement about the double meanings of the adjectival phrases. But the commentators disagree on how to interpret the little word *samam* ("together with") and on this question hangs the understanding of the expressed meaning of the stanza, the identification of its figures, and the problem of what, if anything, the stanza suggests. *Samam* is an adverb, but does it modify the verb's relation to its subject or to its object? In the first case, the direct meaning will be: "together with their wives the young men enjoyed the terraces." In the second case, the direct meaning will be: "the young men enjoyed the terraces together with, that is, as well as enjoying, their wives." Only Mallinātha takes the latter course. Ānanda and Abhinava take the former course and explain the appearance of the second meaning as a suggestion. Ānanda's explanation, which is elliptical, and Abhinava's, which is clearer, may be put as follows. After we have understood the direct meaning (the first of those just given), there occurs to the mind the second meanings of the adjectival phrases. These senses are suggested to the mind by the natural compatibility of the primary sense for these second meanings. What our authors mean is that the primary sense gives us an erotic context in which it is entirely appropriate that the women be beautiful, endowed with the graceful triple fold at the waist, and elegantly adorned. Once we perceive these puns, we realize that the terraces are like the wives. That is to say, we arrive at the second meaning by way of a simile that grows out of the suggested puns. As the charm of the verse lies in the suggested puns, it should be counted as an example of *slegadhvani*. Mallinātha, setting off from a different direct meaning of the verse, sees in it the expressed figure *tulyayogitā* (paired objects). The *Dhvonyāloka* analysis seems to me a better description of the psychological process of understanding the stanza; Mallinātha's of course is simpler.

L "Possessing *patākāḥ*," that is, [of terraces] possessing flags on flagstaffs. The phrase *ramyā iti* ("to give them beauty") expresses the cause.¹ [As applied to the women] "possessing *patākāḥ*" will mean possessing fame. The phrase *ramyā iti* will then express the form that this fame takes [i.e., the fame of being beautiful]. *Viviktāḥ* (private) [is used of the terraces] because they are not crowded with people; and for that reason they increase *rāga*, that is, the desire for sexual enjoyment. Other [commentators], however, explain *rāga* here as color, "having a profusion of beautiful color."² Also, [as applied to the women,] the sense will be "increasing [their husbands'] passion (*anurāga*) since they are *viviktāḥ*, of ornamented limbs, that is, handsome. [The terraces] have

curved eaves, that is, curved edges of the thatch. [The women] have curved lines at their waist in the form of the triple fold. *Samam* means together with. But someone may say that from the word *sama* (equal, similar to) one understands [that the terraces are] similar to [the wives]. That is true; that too [is understood] from the puns. But the puns are not brought in by the denotative force of the words, but by the inherent compatibility³ [of the primary sense for these second meanings]; and so the puns are most certainly suggested. That is why the author of the *Vṛtti*, while he says that the terraces are like the women, does not say that we have here a case of suggested simile (*upamādhvani*), because the simile is based on the puns. If the poet had said clearly [that the young men enjoyed terraces which were] *samāḥ* (similar to) [their wives], then the simile would be directly expressed and the puns would be brought in by the simile. But the indeclinable *samam* has the direct meaning of *saha* ("together with"), which can furnish a pun only by suggestion through its modifying the verb.⁴ If we omit the puns, there is no incompleteness of the denotative power of the words. So it is only after the denotative power of the words has exhausted itself that a second meaning is understood and this only by persons of refined taste, who understand it without any separate effort.⁵ As has already been said [1.7 K], "Not by a mere knowledge of grammar and dictionaries is the suggested sense known." And this [principle of analysis] is to be followed in all [these] examples.⁶ In the sentence "Fat Caitra does not eat by day," it is the denotative power that is incomplete and that demands a further meaning or a further word for its exhaustion. And that demand furnishes occasion for the inference (*anumāna*) of a *Naiyāyika* or the verbal presumption (*śrutārthāpatti*) of a *Mīmāṃsaka*. There is no occasion there for suggestion.⁷ But enough of this long [explanation]. It is this [principle of analysis] that our author refers to when he says non-verbal.

1. The terraces were decked with flags because they (the flags) were beautiful; *rāmyā* refers to *patākāḥ*, not to *valabhiḥ*.
2. Abhinava is here probably referring to Vallabhadeva, who in his commentary on the *Sisupālavadha* explains *rāgo* in this verse as referring to the painting of the terraces with red realgar and minium.
3. The context, I think, demands *arthaśāmarthyā* in place of *arthaśaundarya*.
4. In *vadhūbhīḥ samā valabhiḥ* the word for similar connects "terraces" and "wives" directly. In *vadhūbhīḥ samāḥ valabhiḥ* *asevyanā* "terraces" and "wives" are connected only through the verb.
5. If the denotative sense were incomplete without the puns (as in the verse of 2.21c A

"The cloud serpents pour forth water"), the puns would be part of the denotative process and would not be suggested. Furthermore, the understanding of the two meanings of the puns would be by two separate efforts, for there would be two denotative powers to understand. Here the second meaning arises after the denotative process has ceased and its understanding is part of the same effort by which we understand the denoted meaning. 6. By "this principle" Abhinava evidently means the rule that once a logically complete meaning has been given by direct denotation, any further meaning that appears in a poem does so by suggestion, not by *anumāna* or *arthāpatti*, of which he goes on to speak. 7. The Naiyāyika regards the sentence "Fat Caitra does not eat by day" as furnishing the *linga* for the inference that Caitra eats at night. The Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsaka regards it as presuming a suppletion by the word *rātrau* ("at night").

A An example of poetic suggestion of *yathāsanikhyā* (ordered sequence) is the following:

The mango tree puts forth
sprout, leaf, bud and flower.
In our heart love puts forth
sprout, leaf, bud and flower.¹

In this stanza there is a beauty similar to a reverberation in the fact that the words "sprout," etc., used in the predicate of "love," occur in the same sequence in which they were used in the prior statement [about the mango]. This beauty is noticed as something distinct from the expressed figures of *tulyayogitā* and *samuccaya* that apply to love and the mango tree.²

In this way other figures of speech may be adduced [as examples of figures suggested by the power of meaning], according to the proper connection in each case.³

1. BP notes that for the nominatives in the first verse-half another reading gives locatives; and such is the reading of SRK 188 and Saduktī 1232: *anikurite pallavite karukite puspite ca sahakare*. But the change to nominatives is doubtless intentional on Ānanda's part and is repeated in the *Vyaktiviveka*, p. 442; see the following note. None of the sources gives the author's name

2. The expressed figures are *tulyayogitā*, the assignment of the same verbs to two different subjects (the mango tree and love) that are both proper to the context; and *samuccaya*, defined by Rudraṇa 7.27 as the occurrence of the same quality or action in two different objects at the same time. *Yathāsārikhyā* (ordered sequence) occurs when a number of things are referred to in a later passage in the exact order in which they were referred to in a prior passage. In an expressed *yathāsārikhyā* the sense of the sentence is not logically complete or satisfactory unless we apply this principle of ordering. "You surpass the lotus, the moon, bees, elephants ... by your face, radiance, eyes, gait ..." (Bhāmaha 2.90). If we mix up the references, we get nonsense. So *yathāsārikhyā* is necessary for an understanding of the primary sense. The same necessity applies to our present verse if we read locatives in the first half line, for the verse will then mean that as the mango puts forth sprouts, love begins; as it leafs, love unfolds; as its buds appear, love develops into a sharp yearning; and as it flowers, love reaches its full development. The *yathāsārikhyā* principle is needed in order to assign the appropriate conditions to the appropriate effects. But if we read nominatives, the verse sets two whole sentences against each other, as we have done in the translation of A. It is not necessary to correlate the components of the two sentences in order to avoid nonsense. Rather, the perception comes as a pleasant surprise, after we have understood the direct meaning, that the components of the two sentences can be sequentially paired off. Thus the *yathāsārikhyā* appears as a suggestion similar to a reverberation and not as an expressed figure. One may note that Simhabhū-pāla (also spelled Śīṅgabhū-pāla and Singabhū-pāla) equated the terms of our little verse with various Sanskrit words for love: *arikura* with *prema*, *pollava* with *mána*, *koraka* (= *kalikā*) with *prunaya*, *puspa* with *sneha*, *phala* with *rāga* (*Rasārṇavasudhākara*, ed. T. Venkatacharya, 2.111ff.). Mallinātha refers to this passage at *KumSam.* 8.15. 3. In some cases the connection will be with a suggestor (*vyāñjaka*) which is itself a figure of speech; in other cases with a suggestor that is a *vastu* (fact or situation).

L In this way other [figures of speech]: Every figure of sense (*arthālankāra*) can be found in suggested form. For example, a suggestion of *dipaka* (zeugma) is:

Not fire or wind
or maddened elephant!
Not ax or lightning!
O tree, may you be ever
safe with your vine.

(The meaning of the verse is "May fire, wind, etc., not harm you," but) the zeugma of the verb "harm" is hidden, from which we understand

that the tree is specially dear to the poet¹ and by which the verse is given beauty.

A suggestion of *aprastutaprasāmsā* is as follows:²

Flying about the *ketaka* trees,
you will kill yourself on their thorns, O bee;
while in your wandering you will not find
a flower sweet as the jasmine.³

A certain lady, walking in a garden with her lover, sees a bee and addresses these words to it. Thus the direct statement about the bee is contextual.⁴ You cannot say that we understand this meaning to be non-contextual from the use of the vocative,⁵ because the vocative can be contextual, being due to the lady's simplicity.⁶ So the *aprastuta-prasāmsā* cannot be reached simply by the power of denotation. It is only after the denotative process has been completed that a reference to some other matter is suggested by the force of the directly expressed sense.⁷ The suggestion is that a lady of good family, beautiful and proud, comparable to a delicate, sweet-smelling jasmine, prompted by her sincere love, berates her lover who has been roaming hither and yon among prostitutes of low birth, who have gained a reputation for their artificial skill, who are surrounded by thorns in the persons of their bawds, and who can well be represented by a grove of *ketaka* trees with its far-reaching perfume.

A suggestion of *apahnuti* (denial accompanied by false affirmation) is found in a verse by my teacher Bhaṭṭendurāja:

On this reservoir of nectar, whose bold and lovely curve
is like the curve of a pale maiden's breast,
that which we see, precious as the application
of ornamental markings in black aloe,
is Love, my graceful lady, stretching out his limbs
on that cold bed to assuage the heat engendered
by his dwelling in the heart of many a damsel
burning with the fire of separation.⁸

In this verse a denial of the mark on the moon is suggested by the [false] affirmation that it is the figure of Love, turned black by the fire arising from the hearts of damsels who suffer the fire of separation.

The same verse carries also a suggestion of the figure *sasandeha* (doubt), for the mark of the moon has not been mentioned by name but has been referred to as exhibiting the value, or excellence, of the spot painted with ornamental markings of black aloe on the moon as represented by the curve of a pale maiden's breast. Accordingly, a doubt

is suggested to the effect that "I do not know what it is." There is also a suggestion of *prativastūpamā*.⁹ The *prativastūpamā* that is suggested is this. A lady who has refused to accept her lover's apologies subsequently feels remorse and pain at the separation occasioned [by her anger], so she prepares to welcome her lover back and after completing the decoration of her person is ready in the love chamber for his arrival. It is a full-moon night and her lover arrives, guided by the go-between. The lover flatters the lady, telling her, "the ornamental markings on your swelling breast stir my passion," to which the analogous sentence is that "this beautiful appearance, dark as the petal of a blue waterlily, on the moon does the same."¹⁰ The term "reservoir of nectar," although it is used only as a synonym for the moon, still suggests the reason for the god of love's seeking to allay his heat there. So we have also a suggestion of *hetualankāra* (the figure cause).¹¹ There is also a suggestion of *sahokti* (pairing) in the form that the beauty of your breasts and the beauty of the moon together stir my passion. From the apprehension of the sense that "the moon is like your breast and the curve of your breast is like that of the moon, the figure *upameyopamā*¹² is also suggested. In this way, other varieties [of suggested figures of speech] can be imagined. For these words of a great poet are like a magic wishing-cow, [endless in the gifts they can furnish]. For it has been said:

The playful gesture of one man produces
results unending; another's effort
cannot achieve a particle of gain.
If an Elephant of the Quarters stirs a hair,
he shakes the earth, while if a bee should fall
from heaven itself, he would not shake a vine.¹³

The combination of these figures [in Bhāṭṭendurāja's verse] into *samsṛṣṭi* and *sāṅkara* (associated and fused combinations) can be worked out [by the reader for himself].

A suggestion of *atīśayokti* (hyperbole) is in a verse of my own:

Your eyes are the chief embodiment of beauty's springtime
when it sends forth its first shoots of gaiety;
the successive motions of your eyebrow are the bow
bending in Love's hand to its varied curvature;
the wine of your lotus mouth, fair lady, at first sip
begets intoxication: truly God has centered
in you alone the treasures of his universe.

There is a suggestion of *atियोक्ति* here, for while spring, love, and wine are blessed with success in the world by reinforcing one another, they are here [said to have] combined into an unique body in your person.¹⁴ There is also a suggestion of the figure *vibhावना* (the occurrence of a result in the absence of cause), for by saying that "the wine of your mouth causes intoxication at first sip" it is suggested that a result, namely intoxication, comes about without its proper cause, namely a frequent imbibing [of the inebriant]. There is also a suggestion of *tulyayogitā* (paired subjects) in saying that the lady's two eyes are the chief embodiment of beauty's springtime.

It should be understood that in this way every figure of speech can be suggested. It is not that only certain figures can be suggested within certain limits as some writers claim.¹⁵

According to the proper connection in each case: one should connect [with the suggestion] the [power of] meaning that is appropriate in each case. In some cases the suggestor will be a figure of speech; in some cases it will be a *vastu* (a fact or situation).

1. It is so dear to him that he silences the unlucky word *bādhīṣṭa* ("harm"). The *dipaka*, not being expressed in words, is suggested by the contextual meaning. One cannot argue that as the verb must be supplied in order to get a logically satisfactory sense, the *dipaka* should belong to the denotative operation; because we might get a satisfactory primary sense by supplying a different verb with each subject (may fire not burn you, wind not break you, etc.). The choice of a single verb, which occasions the *dipaka*, is due to suggestion. Abhinava does not here observe the distinction between *dipaka* and *tulyayogitā* that we find in Udbhaṭa and later authors. See 1.13f L, note 1.
2. Here Abhinava is speaking precisely (contrast 2.27d L, note 1). Not only the contextual (*prastuta*) meaning but the non-contextual meaning (*aprastuta*) itself will be suggested.
3. The verse is included as stanza 985 in Weber's supplement to the *Sattasai* (*Das Saptatikam des Hāla*, p. 512). It is also quoted by Mammaṭa. The *ketaka* is *Pandanus odoratissimus*, Linn., a tree with leaves "drooping, from three to five feet long, tapering to a very long, fine, triangular point, very smooth and glossy, margins and back armed with very fine sharp spines" (Roxburgh, 707). Without being given some special explanation one would take the verse as a directly expressed *aprastutaprasamsā*. It is only by inventing a special context that the figure can assume the form of a suggestion. Abhinava proceeds to furnish such a context.
4. That is to say that the expressed meaning is not *aprastutaprasamsā*, where the direct meaning must be non-contextual.
5. The point of the objection is that a person would not normally address a bee in this personal fashion. In order to make sense of the vocative we have to suppose that the lady is really

referring to something else. 6. The lady is not a biologist or a logician. She might well address a personal remark to a bee. 7. The description of the bee's folly is singularly compatible with the folly of the lady's lover. So a reference to his fickleness suggests itself to us. 8. The "reservoir of nectar" is the moon. That which appears on the moon is its mark (our "man in the moon"). Women painted designs (*pattrabhariga*) in red saffron or in black aloe on their breast or cheek; see Ingalls, *An Anthology of Sanskrit Court Poetry*, HOS Vol. 44, note on vs. 389, p. 498. This verse is discussed by J. L. Masson, "Abhinavagupta as a Poet," *Journal of the Oriental Institute* (Madras) Vol. 19 (1970), pp. 247-253. 9. A *prativastupamā* is a figure consisting of two sentences, the latter forming an analogy to the former. In the later system of figures (from Udbhaṭa onward) a *prativastupamā* must fulfill three conditions: (1) there must be no word such as *iu* to denote the similarity; (2) the analogous objects must possess the same quality or action (not a similar one as in the figure *udāharana* ("example")); (3) the common property must be expressed by a different word or phrase in each of the two sentences. An example is Kālidāsa's description of King Dilipa (Ragh. 1.18) "To benefit his people he took taxes from them. The sun draws up water to pour it forth a thousandfold." "Take" and "draw up" refer to the same action by different words.

10. The literal sense of the stanza is that a substance which lies on the moon and which has a beauty like the beauty of aloe markings on a woman's breast, is really the god of love. This suggests two sentences related as in a *prativastupamā*: (1) The aloe markings on your breast are really the god of love"; and (2) "The dark substance on the moon is really the god of love." The phrase "dark as the petal of a blue waterlily" is introduced by Abhinava in order to fulfill the third condition of a *prativastupamā*, mentioned in the previous footnote, that the phrase used to describe the common quality in the second sentence must be different from the phrase used in the first sentence. 11. *Hetu* is Dandin's name for the term (2.235). Udbhaṭa (Indurāja 6.7) calls it *kāvyahetu* and later writers know it as *kāvyaśrīga*. 12. *Upameyopamā*: a simile followed by a sentence in which the two terms of the simile are reversed. 13. Source unknown. In the cosmology that regards the earth as flat and circular, four (or sometimes eight) elephants are said to support it at the chief compass points. Their stirring causes earthquakes. The impact of a bee, on the other hand, though the bee falls from a great height, is scarcely felt. 14. For once BP errs in interpreting the sentence. The identification of the lady's eyes with springtime, of her eyebrows with love's bow, and of her mouth with wine are metaphors (*rūpaka*) and are directly expressed. The *atīśayokti* consists in joining three objects (spring, love and wine) which in the real world are not joined but merely cooperative. This joining is only suggested. Spring, love and wine are not actually said to be joined in the stanza, but as they are identified with the eyes, brow and mouth of a single

body, we see that they must be pictured as joined. 15. We do not know who these authors were.

A Having thus analysed the province of suggested figures of speech, in order now to show their usefulness [the Kārikā] says:

K Those figures of speech which cannot be made into the body of a poem when they are directly expressed, attain the highest beauty when they form a part of dhvani.

A Forming a part of dhvani can occur in two ways, by being a suggestor or by being suggested. Here, in view of the context, we are to understand that being suggested is meant. But figures of speech, even when suggested (*vyanigra*), form a variety of dhvani only when they form the predominant sense of the passage. Otherwise they fall under "subordinated suggestion," as will be explained [viz., in 3.34].

L Now figures of speech have long ago been defined by the critics, so it might be doubted that anything very wonderful has been accomplished by our author in showing that they may be suggested. To allay this doubt he says, Having thus analysed, etc.

[Abhinava first interprets the Kārikā by taking *vācyatvena* as a single word, thus eliminating the negative.] "Those figures of speech which by being directly expressed are made into the body of a poem." Making into the body of a poem means taking a figure, which as it is something other than the subject matter in hand is not naturally the body of the poem any more than a bracelet or the like is the body of the person

who wears it, and making this figure into the body of the poem, a transformation that can be effortlessly achieved by great poets.

[Abhinava next gives the more natural interpretation of the *Kārikā*, dividing the word *vācyatva* from *na* so as to express a negative.] Or [we may interpret the *Kārikā* to say that] figures of speech which are not made into even the body of a poem—the sense is that it is difficult so to make them—when they are directly expressed: these same figures of speech by taking a suggested form become an integral part of the operation of suggestion or of the poem itself and even attain to the highest and rarest beauty, which one may call the very soul [of the poem]. What is implied is this. A good poet, like an experienced woman, uses ornaments skilfully; and yet, it is difficult for him to make an ornament pass for the body of a poem, just as it is difficult to make rouge pass [for the true flesh]; how much less can an ornament become the soul itself. But such is the property of being suggested that it imparts to an ornament, even when the ornament is not predominant, a superiority over expressed ornaments. It is like the property of royalty which imparts a peculiar distinction even in the games of children.¹ It is with the foregoing in mind that our author says, otherwise, etc.

1. The "king" even in children's games acts differently from other children. Compare Horace, Epist. I, i, 59–60.

A Now there are two ways in which a figure of speech can be suggested as the predominant element: it may be suggested by a mere fact or situation (*vastu*), or it may be suggested by [another] figure of speech. Of these [two ways],

K when figures are suggested by a mere fact or situation, they invariably form a variety of *dhvani*.

A The reason for this is that

K the poetic functioning is founded on them.

A That is, because in such cases the whole poem comes into being in dependence on this sort of suggested figure. Otherwise the poem would be merely a statement [and no poem at all].

L Of these: there being these two ways. The reason for this: these words form part of the *Vṛtti*, [not the *Kārikā*]. Because the "poetic functioning," that is, the functioning of the poet's activity is slanted toward the figure which depends on that [fact or situation]. Otherwise; sc., if it did not come into being in dependence on that. Accordingly, there is no room in such cases for a suspicion that the suggested figure might be subordinate.¹

1. The reasoning that underlies *K*, *A*, and *L* in this section is the following. In order to have poetry one must either have suggestion predominant in the poem (as in *dhvani*), or one must have an *alaṅkāra* predominant in the poem (as in subordinated suggestion). When one *alaṅkāra* (directly expressed) suggests another *alaṅkāra*, the question can arise whether the second *alaṅkāra* is predominant or the first. But where a mere fact or situation suggests an *alaṅkāra*, the suggested *alaṅkāra* must be predominant, for if it were not, the verse would not be poetry at all.

A These same figures

K when they are suggested by another figure,

K they will form a part of dhvani if the suggested sense is seen to be predominant by its greater degree of beauty.

A for we have already said [1.13 e A] that "the decision whether the literal or the suggested meaning is the more important depends on which is the more charming."

The province of figures of speech which are suggested by a mere fact or situation can be deduced from the examples just given. Accordingly, *arthasaktiyudbhavānurāpananarūpavyāṅgyo dhvaniḥ* (that type of suggestive poetry where the suggested sense appears like a reverberation arising from the power of meaning) is to be understood as occurring wherever a meaning of any sort, or a meaning in the form of a particular figure of speech, gives rise to a second meaning or a second figure of speech such that the second is predominant by its possessing a greater degree of beauty than the first.

L These same figures: this furnishes the words that must be supplied in the Kārikā which immediately follows. Then: this word is supplied in the middle of the Kārikā. The word *dhvanyāṅgatā* [used in the Kārikā and meaning literally "a property of dhvani"] means "a variety of dhvani". If the suggested sense is predominant: the reason follows: by its greater degree of beauty. "If": what our author has in mind is that if the expressed sense rather than the suggested sense is predominant, the suggested sense will belong to "subordinated suggestion."

Now a figure of speech is sometimes suggested by a fact or situation and sometimes it is suggested by another figure of speech. So it may be asked why our author did not give examples [of the former variety as well as of the latter].¹ He replies [to this question by the sentence, "The province of figures of speech which are suggested] by a mere fact or situation, etc."

He summarizes the whole matter in conclusion: Accordingly, etc. The upshot is that there are four varieties of *arthasaktiyudbhavādhwani*

(suggestion arising from the power of meaning), deriving from the two forms, *vastu* (fact or situation) and *alanikāra* (figure of speech), in which either the suggestor or the suggested may appear.

1. All the examples under 2.27 are of an *alanikāra* suggested by an *alanikāra*. Under previous Kārikās examples were given of suggestion by a *vastu*, but not of an *alanikāra* being suggested by a *vastu*.

A Thus the varieties of *dhvani* have been given. The following is now said in order to distinguish them from the false varieties.

K Where the suggested meaning appears indistinctly,¹ or as subordinate to the expressed meaning, that is not the province of this [type of] *dhvani*.

1. Manuscript authority seems to be equally divided between *pramisṭatvena*, "indistinctly" (see Pāṇ. 7.2.18) and *praklisṭatvena*, "with difficulty."

A A suggested sense is of two sorts: it may be clear or indistinct. Whether occasioned by the power of words or of meaning, it is only that suggestion that appears clearly that falls in the province of *dhvani*, not an indistinct suggestion. And even a clear suggestion is not in the province of the [type of] *dhvani* where the suggested sense is similar to a reverberation, if it appears as subordinate to the expressed meaning. For example:

O auntie! Without touching the lotuses
or scaring away the geese,
someone has laid out a cloud
upside down on the village tank.¹

(Mianka, Sattasai 2.10)

The suggestion here, that a naive girl has seen the reflection of a cloud in the water, is subordinate to the expressed meaning.

1. *maliā* = Sanskrit *mr̥ditāḥ* (Pischel p. 171), not *malitāḥ* as given in the *chāyā*. *piucchā* = Sanskrit *pitr̥vasar* (Pischel p. 112); I know not what confusion has lead to the gloss *sahasā*. *uttāṇoam*: on its back, i.e., in the reverse of the position it held in the sky. *phalisham* (= Sanskrit *sphaṭika*, *parigha*, *parikhā*) makes no sense to me; surely it cannot mean *prakṣiptam* as Abhinava seems to take it. I have substituted the *Sattasai* reading *vr̥ūḍham* (= *vyūḍham*). Both Ānanda and Abhinava see nothing more in the verse than a naive expression of wonder. If that is all there is, they are correct in finding a greater charm in the naive expression itself than in the suggested explanation of optical illusion. But the commentators on the *Sattasai* see much more. A young wife, they say, has gone off in the early morning on the pretext of drawing water from the village tank before it is muddied by the advent of others, but really in order to keep a rendezvous with her lover. The lover, however, failed to appear. Later he comes by as the young woman is chatting with her aunt. The verse is spoken by the woman in order to inform him that she kept her promise as he did not, but at the same time to hide this information from her aunt. As so often with verses from the *Sattasai*, one does not really know how much the author himself intended.

L Thus [the varieties of *dhvani* have been given, etc. The two major divisions [of suggestion] are: *avivakṣitavācya* (where the literal sense is not intended) and *vivakṣitaparavācya* where it is intended, but is subordinated to a further, suggested, sense). The former, is divided into *atyantatiraskṛtavācya* (where the literal sense is entirely set aside) and *arthāntarasāṅkramitavācya* (where the literal sense is shifted). The latter is divided into *alaksyakrama* (where no interval is perceived between the literal and suggested meanings) and *anurāṇanarūpa* (where the suggestion is similar to the reverberation of a bell). Of this pair the former has endless varieties. The latter has two: *śabdaśaktimūla* (where the suggestion arises by the power of words) and *arthaśaktimūla* (where the suggestion arises by the power of meaning). This last has three subdivisions: *kavipraudhoktikṛtaśārīra* (where the suggestion is embodied in an imaginative expression of the poet), *kavinibaddhavaktipraudhoktikṛtaśārīra* (where the suggestion is embodied in an imaginative expression of a character invented by the poet), and *svataḥsambhavī* (where the suggestion is inherently possible in the real world). Now each of these three subdivisions is of four kinds depending on the distinction just given that the suggested sense and the suggestor may be either [a *vastu* (fact, situation) or an *alankāra*

(figure of speech)]. Adding to these the four major divisions of suggestion that were mentioned first (viz., *atyantatiraskṛtaudcyā*, *arthāntara-saṃkramitavācyā*, *alakṣyakrama*, and *sabdaśaktimūla*), we arrive at sixteen varieties of suggestion. Now each of these sixteen varieties will be stated [3.1 K] to be twofold according as the suggestion is revealed by a word or by a sentence. But as *alakṣyakramadhvani* is revealed not only by words and sentences but by phonemes (*varga*), by style (*saṃghatānādā*), or by an entire work [cf. 3.2], we get in all thirty-five varieties.

To distinguish, that is, to separate, [these thirty-five varieties] from the false varieties of suggestion

That sort of poem is not the province, not the domain, of this *dhvani* which is the soul [of poetry].

[Abhinava translates the verse from the *Sattasai* into Sanskrit as follows.]

The lotuses have not been sullied
and the geese have not suddenly been driven off
[but] someone has thrown a cloud
upside down into the village tank.

But others say that *piucchā* [does not mean "suddenly," but] is a vocative, meaning "aunt." "Someone": some one extremely dexterous.

Subordinate to the expressed meaning: from the expressed meaning, it being in the form of a manifestation of wonder, we understand the extreme naïvete [of the girl]; and so the charm of the verse lies just in the expressed meaning. On the other hand, it is only because the expressed meaning wants support in order to become rationally intelligible that it suggests to us a second meaning.¹

1. To say that a cloud has been thrown (as Abhinava understands the verse) into the village tank is absurd and irrational. The absurdity is rationalized by our accepting the suggestion that the girl has seen a reflection of the cloud in the water.

As the young wife
busy with her housework bears birds
flying up from the cane thicket,
her limbs fail her.¹

Such verses, as will be shown later, are generally to be adduced as examples of subordinated suggestion.

1. The verse is included, as number 874, in Weber's edition of the *Satasai*. The young woman has apparently promised to meet her lover in the cane thicket but is prevented by the dreary chores of her married life. The flight of the birds tells her that her lover has kept his promise and is awaiting her in vain. The suggestion (that her lover has entered the thicket) has no particular charm or beauty; hence Mammata categorizes the verse under *asundaram vyāngyam* (5.132). The description of the young woman, however, physically broken by her disappointment, moves our emotion. Thus the expressed meaning is predominant over (more beautiful than) the suggested.

L [After translating the Prakrit verse, Abhinava comments as follows.] What is here suggested, namely that the secret lover has arrived at the agreed upon rendezvous, serves merely to support (or rationalize) the expressed meaning. To explain: "busy with her house-work": although her mind is intent on other things. "The young wife": although she is constrained by great shyness and by subserviency [to her elders]. "Her limbs": there is not a single limb which can be prevented by the deepest dissimulation [from revealing her longing]. "Fail her": far be it from finishing the housework, she cannot even support her own body. While she was engaged in housework her limbs were not seen to be in that state. From this expressed sense we understand that the young woman is utterly overcome by love and from this comes the charm of the verse.

A But where the particular meaning of a direct expression has been determined by our understanding of the context or some like factor

and where this expressed meaning then appears as subordinate to the suggested meaning, we are indeed on the road of this type of *dhvani* that is similar to a reverberation. For example:

O farmer's bride,
gather the flowers on the ground
and don't shake the *sephālikā* tree.
Your bangles will end on an ugly note
if your husband's father hears them.¹

Here we have a wife, who is engaged in sex with her paramour, being warned by a friend because of the noise, heard afar, of her jingling bangles. This [context] is necessary in order to understand the direct meaning. But after the expressed meaning has been understood, inasmuch as it has been expressed only in order to furnish the final meaning which is the hiding of the woman's adultery, it becomes subordinate to the suggestion. Accordingly, the verse should be included in the type of *dhvani* where the suggested sense is similar to a reverberation.

1. This verse too is included in Weber's edition of the *Sattasai* (number 959). The reading of our text in c can scarcely be right, as *vr̥āvō* repeats the sense of *saddo*. The *Sattasai* reading is *esa avasānairaso*. Abhinava seems to have read *esa avasānairisamo*. For the *sephālikā* (or *sinduvāra*) tree, see M. Emeneau, *University of California Publications in Classical Philology* 12 (1933-34) pp. 333-346 and Ingalls, *HOS* 44, p. 490 (note on vs. 271a). The tree blooms only at night, with beautiful, scentless white flowers. Thus the time of the adultery as well as the place (a garden) is indicated. The father-in-law is presumably within hearing of the friend's advice. He might well be annoyed at his daughter-in-law's shaking flowers from his favorite tree, but the friend regards the rousing of such annoyance as a lesser evil than the fury which would seize the old man if he guessed the true cause of the jingling bangles.

L But where: where the sense has its nature determined by our understanding of a factor in that set of factors beginning with context and including the proximity of another word, inherent capability, gender, etc.,¹ but where this expressed meaning then—then because, having been directly expressed, its own understanding has been completed—does not conclude the sentence meaning by just this sense but goes on to assume a subordinate role in a suggested meaning: such an instance is in the realm of *dhvani*. Our author's clearly stating the connection with a final meaning in the form of suggestion is tantamount

to saying that we must consider such cases to be the very opposite of "subordinated suggestion."

"Your bangles will end on an ugly note if your husband's father bears them": because the father-in-law has been preserving the *śephālikā* tree with particular care and will be angry at its being pulled or shaken. We are to suppose [the expressed meaning to be] that the ugly result will be on this account, for otherwise [that is, if the ugly result were taken to be on account of the daughter-in-law's adultery], the suggested sense of the verse would be given away by the direct expression. Beyond this, we are to interpret the stanza as we did the stanza, "Who wouldn't be angry" (*kassa vā na hoi roso*).²

This, i.e., this suggestion, is necessary for our understanding, our getting at, the direct meaning. That is to say, without it no direct meaning can be got because this meaning [without the suggested sense given by the context] would be something perfectly obvious [to the adulteress] and so not worth saying. But now it might be objected that at this rate the suggested meaning serves merely to support (or rationalize) the expressed meaning [and so is subordinate to it]. To prevent such an objection our author continues: but after the expressed meaning has been understood; in other words, after it has been directly expressed.

1. The reference is to the list of factors by means of which an inherently ambiguous expression can be narrowed down to the particular sense intended. The list occurs in *Bhartṛhari*, VP 2.315-316 and is repeated by Mammaṭa under 2.19. 2. See 1.4 f A, L, where Abhinava gave six different suggested senses, the suggestions differing according to the various persons supposed to be overhearing the verse. Tripathi (p. 649), following Abhinava's direction, does the same for the present stanza.

A While on the subject of distinguishing in this way *vivakṣitavācyā dhvani* (suggestive poetry where the literal meaning is intended but leads to a further meaning) from the appearance thereof, one may distinguish *avivakṣitavācyā* (suggestive poetry where the literal meaning is not intended) in the same way. To do this, the *Kārikā* says:

K If a word that shifts [from its primary meaning] (*skhaladgati*) is used out of lack of mature judgment (*avyutpatti*) or lack of skill, such [a word] too is not in the province of *dhvani*.

A If a word that shifts [from its primary meaning], that is, a word of secondary sense (*upacarita*), is used out of lack of mature judgment or lack of skill, such [a word] too is not in the province of *dhvani*.

L While on the subject of distinguishing: this is a locative, used causally. The sense is, because of the cogency [to the subject about to be raised] of the [previous] mention (*prastāva*) of the distinction from the appearance—appearance of what?—the needed completion of the sense is furnished by the word *vivakṣitavācyasya*. On the other hand, if we take *prastuta* in its simple (*spṛṣṭa*) meaning [of “begun” or “under discussion”], the passage makes no sense, for the distinguishing of *vivakṣitavācyā* from the appearance thereof has already been completed; it is not now begun, nor is it to be continued in what follows.

A word that shifts from its primary meaning: that is, a metaphorical (*gaṇa*) word or a word used in a relational secondary sense (*lākṣanika*).¹ Lack of mature judgment: as writing with a view merely to compose alliterations and the like; for example:

Prenkhatpremaprabandhapracyaraparicaye praudhasimantinīnām
cittākāśāvataśe viharati satatam yaḥ sa saubhāgyabhūmiḥ.

Happy is he who strolls within the rooms
of women's hearts, the which are well acquainted
with every subtle sort of swaying love.

Here the word “swaying” (*prenkhat*), used in a relational secondary sense [sc., for unsteady, fickle], has been used because of the poet's passion for alliteration and the metaphor “rooms” which the poet has used [for hearts²] leads to no beautiful goal whatsoever in the form of suggestion.³

Lack of skill: such as inability in filling out the meter; for example:

O foremost of the numerous entourage of Love,
your sinking to the ocean, this dish of rolling waves,
has imparted undulation to your level self.

Here the first word (the compound word "foremost of the numerous entourage of Love") is an indirect expression for the moon; "dish" is used for receptacle; and "level" (literally "wall-like") for unmoving. None of this produces any beauty [or has any use at all] except to fill out the meter.⁴

Such [a word] too: In the first Uddyota, apropos of "poets who use words in senses furnished merely by convention," our author gave an example of secondary usage (*bhākta* = *upacarita*), viz., "the lotus-petal couch speaks [the fever of a slender maid]." [1.14 A]. The force of the word "too" in the present passage is to say that not only was that example not in the domain of suggestive poetry, but so also a word such as is here referred to.

1. See 1.1 K, note 2. 2. BP seems to take *cittākāśa* as a *rūpaka-samāsa*, i.e., *cittāvākāśa*, heart and space having the same property of imperceptability. Such an interpretation explains Abhinava's denomination of *ākāśa* as *gaṇa*. But it would be more natural to take *cittākāśa* as equivalent to *hrdayākāśa*, the physical interior of the heart. The real vice of the stanza, it seems to me, is not its misuse of *lakṣanā* but its verbosity: *avakāśa* adds nothing (except alliteration) to *cittākāśa*, *pravara* is needless; *saubhagya-bhāṣmī* achieves a repetition of the phoneme *dh* but means nothing more than *saubhagya*. 3. The only poetic purpose of using *lakṣanā* is to produce *dhvani*. Here it has been used only to produce alliteration. 4. The *drutavilambita* meter, incidentally, is mishandled despite all the padding, for the first caesura (between *sañcaya* and *pravara*) falls within a word, forcing an unnatural prolongation of the final syllable of *sañcaya*.

K the clear appearance of the suggested sense as the predominant sense of the passage is the essential mark of *dhvani* in all its varieties.

A And this mark is found only in such examples as we have given.

Here ends the Second Chapter of the *Sahrdayāloka*¹ composed by Śrī Rājānaka Ānandavardhana.

1. As in the colophon to the First Chapter, the MSS vary between *Sahrdayāloka* and *Kāvyāloka*. None of them reads *Dhvanyāloka*, the form printed in the Kashi text.

L Taking the view that the *Kārikā* now repeats the definition of *dhvani* as a cause for distinguishing it from the appearance thereof, the author of the *Vṛtti* introduces the *Kārikā* with because.

The appearance: what is meant is "the suggested sense appearing clearly [as the predominant sense]"; this on the principle that when told to bring a verbal abstract, one brings a substance [qualified by that verbal activity]¹ The essential mark of *dhvani*: that is, the full nature of *dhvani*. Or we may take "appearance" to mean the perception of *dhvani*; that is the mark, i.e., the proof (*pramāṇa*) of *dhvani* and it is complete, for it informs one of the whole nature of *dhvani*. Or, the perception is the mark of *dhvani* because the mark of *dhvani* can only be ascertained by perception [of the suggested sense].

By the word only the author of the *Vṛtti* indicates that what differs therefrom is a false appearance of *dhvani* and has thereby carried out the purpose which he undertook to distinguish *dhvani* from the appearance thereof. [May my words prove] auspicious.

I, Abhinavagupta, praise God's perceptive force,
which by its perceiving of the world,
this vast and mere appearance,
makes it to seem other than Himself.²

Herewith the Second Chapter of the *Sahrdaydlokalocana*, an exposition of *dhvani*, revealed by the great Śaiva master, the revered teacher, Abhinavagupta.

1. The principle is enunciated by Patañjali on Pāṇ. 2.1.51 and again on 5.1.59. For example, we cannot bring a "collection of five bushels," if we understand "collection" (*samāhāra*), as Patañjali does in those passages, to be a verbal abstract meaning "the activity of collecting." We bring the five collected bushels. 2. In the Perceiving (*Pasyanti*) stage of metaphysical or linguistic evolution, arise time, the concept of the ego, and a differentiation of subject and object. See 1.19 L, note 5.

CHAPTER THREE

A In this manner the nature of dhvani and of its varieties has been described through [an analysis of] that which is suggested. It will now be described again through [an analysis] of those factors which act as the suggestors.'

L I call to mind the Goddess,
who, after Śiva had shown his skill
in effortless annihilation of Love's body,
stole half of Śiva's body for herself.

The author of the *Vṛtti* proceeds to establish a logical connection with the preceding chapters: In this manner, etc.. While it is true that in the preceding chapters the types [of dhvani] such as *avivakṣitavācyā* were distinguished by means of the literal sense (*vācyā*) and thus, insofar as the literal sense may act as a suggestor—and we see from 1.13 "either sense or word, etc." that it can—these types have already been distinguished by the factors which act as suggestors, nevertheless these literal senses were there analysed according to what was suggested by them. Thus the unintended literal sense (*avivakṣitavācyā*) was subordinated to the suggested sense and the intended literal sense (*vivakṣitānyaparavācyā*) was said to "lead toward the suggested sense." Thus the meanings that act as suggestors of the basic types of suggestion and of the sub-types were distinguished only by recourse to, by reference to, the meanings they suggested. Therefore he says: through an analysis of those factors which act as the suggestors.

But more than this, while it is true that a meaning that acts as a suggestor may also be capable of being suggested, a word can act only as a suggestor and can never be suggested. For this reason too he says: through an analysis of those factors which act as the

suggestors.¹ [By the *Vṛttikāra*'s use of the word *punah* ("again") he indicates the following.] It is not the case that in analyzing *dhvani* through the types *avivakṣita*, etc. there was no analysis by reference to suggestor factors. That analysis was indeed made by reference to suggestor factors. But although made, it will now be made again by reference to purely suggestor factors.² Thus, without reference to the suggested sense, one can divide suggestors into words, sentences, phonemes, word-components, texture (*saṅghaṭanā*), and long sections of poetry. But none of these, like the literal meaning, is ever capable of being suggested. So the point of his statement is that the varieties [of *dhvani* in the Third Chapter] will be described exclusively on the basis of the [verbal] suggestors.

A certain commentator³ has explained the *Vṛtti*'s phrase "through an analysis of what is suggested" as follows: "by reference to that which is suggested, namely *vastu*, *alankāra*, and *rasa*." He should be questioned in these terms: It was not the author of the *Kārikās* who made this threefold division; it was the author of the *Vṛtti* who pointed it out [cf. 1.4 a A]. And it is not the author of the *Vṛtti* who will make the [new] divisions [in Chapter Three].⁴ Therefore, what kind of logic would it be to say, "he did that and now he is doing this," when the agent is not one and the same person?⁵ Moreover, this explanation hardly makes a contextual connection with the whole of the book that has gone before, because other varieties also, such as *avivakṣitauḍya*, have already been shown.⁶ But enough argument with an elder member of my own family.⁷

1. I.e., the discussion in Chapter Three will be distinguished by its treating suggestor words (as opposed to suggestor meanings), which were not treated in the previous chapters.
2. By purely suggestor factors (*suddha-vyanjaka*) Abhinava means words, phonemes, etc., which are purely suggestive, never suggested.
3. The reference is to Abhinava's kinsman, the author of the *Candrikā*.
4. The division into *padaprakāśatā*, *vākyaprakāśatā*, etc., is given by the author of the *Kārikās* in 3.1-2 K.
5. Certainly Abhinava here speaks as if he supposed the author of the *Kārikās* to be a different person from the author of the *Vṛtti*. But in introducing 3.2 he will take quite the opposite point of view. For the question whether *Kārikākāra* and *Vṛttikāra* were the same man, see Introduction, pp. 25-27. In view of Abhinava's own ambiguous stance in regard to the question, his criticism of the *Candrikākāra* here seems a carping one. Nor is it greatly strengthened by the argument that Abhinava subjoins.
6. Abhinava's point is that the explanation given by the earlier commentator can, at the very most, demonstrate the logical

connection of the third chapter with only a part of the earlier portion of the work, namely the portion in the first chapter where *vastu*, *alankāra*, and *rasa* were mentioned as divisions of *dhvani*; it will not demonstrate the logical connection with chapter two, where *avivakṣitavācya* and *vivakṣitānyaparavācya* have been mentioned as divisions of *dhvani*. T. Kane (HSP p. 198) is probably correct in here emending *pūjyajanasa-gotraḥ* to *pūrvajanasa-gotraḥ*, for Abhinava in other passages regularly refers to the author of the *Candrikā* as *pūrvavāmī*, and *sogotra* is merely a synonym of *vanya*. The printed reading, if we take it to mean "with my own relatives who are persons I should respect," is awkward because of the separation of *nija* from *sogotraḥ*.

K Either a word or a sentence may serve as the suggestor in the type of *dhvani* where the literal sense is not intended and, of the other type, in that sub-type where the suggested sense resembles a reverberation.

,*A* One sub-type of *dhvani* where the literal sense is not intended is that where the literal meaning is entirely set aside. In this variety a word may serve as the suggestor, as in this line of the great sage Vyāsa:

these seven are the kindling sticks of royalty.¹

Another example is in a line of Kālidāsa:

When you put on your armor, who could be
forgetful of his wife pining in his absense?²

for what serves not as ornament
to a sweet configuration?³

In these examples the words "kindling sticks," "armor," and "sweet" have been used for their suggestive qualities.

1. From Vidura's advice to Dhrtitarāstra, *Mbh.* 5.38.35. The verse is quoted in full by *L* below. The *samidhah* were the sticks laid out at the base of the sacrificial fire, for the choice and arrangement of which elaborate directions are given in the ritual texts. The word is here used metaphorically of the virtues upon which the success of a king must be based. 2. Words of the Yakṣa to the cloud in *Meghadūta*, vs. 8. As the monsoon season was normally a time for staying at home and enjoying domestic bliss, the sight of gathering clouds would naturally remind a traveler of his wife waiting for him at home. As a cloud does not actually don armor, one takes the word *sammaddha* in the secondary sense of *udyata*, prepared as for a campaign, here accompanied by wind, thunder and lightning. The suggestion, as *L* will point out, is of a cruel and irresistible opponent. 3. *Sākuntala* 1.17. The whole verse:

The pond lily circled by moss is charming;
 the moon's mark though black,
 gives it a royal beauty;
 and this slender damsel,
 even in her rough dress, is lovely;
 for what serves not as ornament
 to a sweet configuration?

L In the *Kārikā* the word "and" (*ca*) serves to prevent a sequential ordering of the two pairs of terms.¹ Thus *avivakṣitauvācyā*, in both its types, is twofold insofar as it can be suggested by either a word or by a sentence. The type, namely "suggested gradually" (*kramadyotya*), of *vivakṣitānyaparauvācyā*, which latter is other than *avivakṣitauvācyā*, along with its sub-types [namely *sabdaśaktimūla* and *arthasaktimūla*] is likewise twofold. It is called *anurājanarūpavyāryāgya* because its suggested meaning (*vyāryāgya*) is such that its appearance is like the appearance of a reverberation.

The great sage: this harks back to what was said earlier [1.1e A], that suggestive poetry "is also found in such works as the *Rāmāyana*, *Mahābhārata*, and the like."

Firmness, forbearance, self-control
 purity, pity, kindness of speech,
 and constant faithfulness to friends:
 these are the seven kindling sticks of royalty.²

Here the literal meaning of the word kindling sticks is completely set aside because it is impossible. What the word "kindling sticks" suggests

is the intention of the speaker, the suggested sense, namely that the capacity to strengthen royalty depends on nothing other [than these seven factors].³ Although the purpose of giving the present example has been served by such examples [already given] as "like a mirror blinded by breath [cf. 2.1 c A], nonetheless these further examples have been given here, where an occasion for them arises, in order to show how they pervade a great part of literature. As one may easily supply the discarding of the literal sense here from what our author has just said, there is no need for his expressly repeating the fact.

The word *armor*, because it is here impossible in the literal sense, conveys, by secondary usage, the sense of being prepared, and thus suggests what the writer intends, namely cruelty, irresistibility, rashness, etc. In the same way, the word *sweet* conveys, by secondary usage, the giving of pleasure, satisfaction and the like, to all people, and suggests the speaker's intention, namely that it is not surprising that such a shape should be the object of intense desire.⁴

1. Withoutca, we should follow the principle laid down by Pāṇini (1.3.10) and connect the first member (*avivakṣitavācyā*) of the pair of suggestions with the first member (*pada*) of the pair of suggestors; likewise the second member (*anurananarūpavyānyigya*) of the suggestions with the second member (*vākyā*) of the suggestors. This would be wrong, for either *pada* or *vākyā* can suggest either *avivakṣitavācyā* or *anurananarūpavyānyigya*. 2. See note 1 to A above. In pāda a our text reads *dayā* instead of *damah*, doubtless a misprint or a scribal error, for *dayā* would be nothing more than a synonym of *kārunya* in pāda b. 3. In a footnote to our text Pt. Śrī Mahādeva Śāstri points out this distinction. The secondary meaning (*lakṣyārtha*) of the word *samidh* is capability of production; what is suggested (*vyanigyārtha*) is the fact that royalty depends on nothing other than these seven factors. 4. In his commentary on Śāk 1.17 Rāghava Bṛatṭa repeats Abhinava's remarks on *madhura* almost word for word.

A Of the same type, [in the variety] where the literal meaning is shifted, [a word may serve as the suggestor], as in this:

Rāma, being overmuch in love with life,
has failed, my beloved, to be worthy of his love.

Here the literal sense of the word "Rāma" has been shifted to the suggested sense of one who possesses the very quintessence of courage, etc.

Again,

Let others thus compare
her cheek to the lunar orb;
yet if they really compare, the moon
is no more than the poor old moon.

Here the sense of the second occurrence of the word moon is shifted from the literal.

L Of the same type: viz., the type where the literal sense is not intended; of this type he refers to the second variety. [The complete stanza from which he quotes is as follows:]¹

The cruel demon treated you as one expects
of such a being angered by rejection:
and you too bore the blow as a lady of high birth
should bear it, with your head held high.
But the witness of your death, who bears
his weapon now to no avail,
Rāma, being overmuch in love with life,
has failed, my beloved, to be worthy of his love.

When [Rāvaṇa] was forcibly rejected [by you], since he is cruel by his very nature as a demon and through evil pride feels that his orders are not to be disobeyed, he acted, blind with rage, in conformity with his spirit when he cut off your head, for his intention was that no one else should ever transgress his command. Treated "you": the sense is, you, by whom even such [a despot] was not heeded. And you bore the blow without flinching, open-eyed and with a face as calm as on a holiday. "As": in the manner of. "A lady": even a woman of low birth who wishes to be called a lady will hold her head high to give the impression that she is a lady. But you held it up bravely at the moment of decapitation, as if to say, "let it be done quickly." You held your head high as real ladies do because you had always done so. Thus both Rāvaṇa and you behaved throughout with propriety. But the part I played turns out to be most improper. My banishment robbed me of opportunities to use my bow, but it might at least have proved useful in protecting my wife. Now that I have failed to protect

you in your need, it becomes wholly useless; yet here I still carry it. The only reason one can imagine is to protect my own life; and this is not proper. "By Rāma": the meaning of this word is developed into suggested qualities² [beside the literal meaning of Rāma, the son of Daśaratha], such as being disposed to unequalled daring, truthfulness, appropriate behavior, etc. The explanation of the term "et cetera," found in a [certain] commentary, that it stands for cowardice and other such qualities, is incorrect. For this behavior, far from being inappropriate, would be proper in the case of a coward. "My beloved": this has become a mere word now, for that which justifies the use of the word "beloved" is love, and that has been sullied by impropriety. Thus, the tragedy of Rāma³ is made clear by the combination of [the *sthāyibhāva*] grief, the *ālambanavibhāva* [namely Sīta's death], and the *uddippanavibhāva* [namely her noble behavior].

Let others thus compare: [After translating the Prakrit stanza Abhinava continues:] By "thus" the poet implies that people are naturally blind to distinctions. "People": that is, those whose only course is the steps of those who have gone before. "Her cheek": that is, of her whose precious figure possesses unique beauties. "Give the moon as a comparison to her cheek": In order to furnish a rhetorical comparison to her cheek, which is the central and predominant element of a face which is the perfection of genuine beauty, one must find some object that is of greater beauty; whereas the orb of the moon, being spoiled by its spot, is grossly inferior. Thus, although ordinary people follow in a line like sheep, if discriminating people will consider the matter, [they will see that] this wretched thing deserving of pity that is called the moon is really a thing to which should attach the properties of waning, of being without real charm, and of being sullied. For the shift of the literal sense to various suggested properties, one may compare what I have said previously [viz., in 2.1 a *L*]. The same appears in what follows.

1. The verse is taken from some Rāma play that has not been identified. Apparently it contained a scene in which Rāvaṇa produced before Rāma an illusion of the severed head of Sīta, an illusion that elicits from Rāma the present verse. Such an element of plot would be an easy invention in view of the scene in the Rāmāyaṇa where Rāvaṇa produces before Sīta an illusion of the severed head of Rāma. 2. See 2.1 a and *L*. 3. Abhinava writes loosely here. The tragic experience (*karunarasā*) does not belong to Rāma

but to the reader or auditor of the play. What belongs to Rāma is the emotion grief (*soka*).

A [Coming back to] the sub-type where the literal meaning is entirely set aside, [we find that] in this sub-type a sentence [just as well as a single word] may serve as the suggestor. Thus:

In what is night to all creatures
the true ascetic wakes;
where others wake, the sage who sees
sees that it is night.

[*Bhagavadgītā* 2.69]

For in this sentence the meanings night and waking are not intended. What is communicated is rather the attention of the saint to a knowledge of truth and his aversion to what is not truth. Thus the suggestive force is of the sub-type where the literal meaning is entirely set aside.

L Having in this manner illustrated the two sub-types of the first variety as revealed by single words, he now illustrates them as revealed by sentences: "in what is night." Intended: if we take the words literally, they furnish no advice for those who are to be advised.¹ What would be the use of saying that one must remain awake during the night and that one must act as if it were night the rest of the time? Therefore this sentence, its primary sense being obstructed, suggests that the ascetic, because of his extraordinary nature, is attentive to the preception of truth and averse from false perception. As the word "all" is a relative term, the literal statement is logically possible. Accordingly, it is wrong to suppose that the true sense is [not suggested but is] implied (*dkṣipita*) by the fact that "all" cannot otherwise be logically construed.²

[Now to interpret the verse:] That which is night, that which causes utter confusion, to all fourteen classes of living beings from Brahmā down to plants is the vision of truth. The true ascetic wakes here,

seeking to attain it. This rather than mere avoidance of sensual pleasure is what asceticism really consists in. Or, one may take the words differently. That which is night to all creatures is the deception [of *máyā*.³] The ascetic wakes here, seeking to avoid it. On the other hand, all creatures wake in false perception, that is, they are wide awake to [its presentations], whereas to the ascetic it is night, a field of non-awareness, for he is not awake to its activity. Thus he whose conduct is defined as extraordinary [i.e., the true ascetic] really sees and thinks. Of him alone are the outer and inner organs of knowledge profitably employed. Others do not see and do not think. The general sense of the verse is that one must be intent on the perception of truth. In the same way, the words "sage" and "who sees" do not cease operating on rendering the literal meanings, but only after giving a suggested meaning. As the pronouns *yat* and *tat* [represented in the translation by "what" and "where"] are dependent on the other words of the sentence, we may say that the whole sentence, verbs and all, is suggestive. Our author states as much in the words *For in this sentence, etc.* Is communicated means is suggested.

1. It is assumed that every verse in the *Bhagavadgītā* must constitute God's advice to those who are in need of it. A verse from the *Gītā* must therefore be so interpreted as to furnish such advice. 2. An objector claims that the intended sense of the verse is furnished by *arthāpatti* (that which one supplies in order to resolve a logical contradiction). Abhinava insists that the intended sense is furnished by suggestion. The objector's argument would run as follows. "The literal sense of 'night' is 'a time for sleeping.' Now there is a logical contradiction in saying 'the ascetic wakes in the sleeping-time of all creatures,' for 'all creatures' is inclusive of ascetics. Thus the so-called suggested sense of waking at night, viz., the pursuit of truth, is a necessary implication, not a suggestion." Abhinava rejects the argument by allowing "all" to mean "most" or "all other." Thus the literal sense becomes merely inappropriate, not logically impossible. 3. The second explanation is the one chosen in Abhinava's *Gītabhāṣya*: *yā sarveṣāṁ bhūtānāṁ nisā, mohini máyā, tasyāṁ munir jāgarti katham iyam heyeti*. With this and with the statement just above that the true ascetic is more than one who simply avoids sensual pleasure, one may compare Abhinava's comment in his *Gītabhāṣya* on this verse: "yogī ca sarvavyavahārān kurvāno 'pi lokottara iti nirūpayatā parameśvarena samksipyāsyā suarūpam kathyate: "God (i.e., Krishna) here shows that the yogin, though he may take part in every sort of worldly activity, is of extraordinary nature; and he tells us briefly what this nature is."

A Of the same type but of the sub-type where the literal sense is shifted a sentence may serve as suggestor, as in the following:

The passing of time is poison to some,
nectar to others;
part poison part nect to some,
neither poison nor nectar to others.¹

For in this sentence the information is conveyed by words which have been shifted from their literal sense of poison and nectar to the sense of pain and pleasure. Accordingly, the suggestive force is of the sub-type where the literal sense is shifted.

1. Source unknown. In our printed text *pāda a* is two mātrās short. Badarinath Śarma corrects it by inserting *via* after *visamaīo*. In *b* he reads *boleī* = Sk. *vyapacala(ya)ti* (cf. Turner Dict. 12167), which is better than *vidleī* = *valayati*, though the latter is barely possible (time "rolls on").

L That which is made of poison (*visamayitah*) means that which has come to consist of poison (*visamayatām prāptah*). [The first group of] "some" are those who are wicked or those who have a keen judgment. For (the second group,) those who are virtuous or those who lack judgment, times passes as if it were made of nectar. For some, who are of mixed conduct or who are partly of sound, partly of weak judgment, [time is] part poison, part nectar. While for those who are complete fools or who have reached the final stage of yogic concentration, time passes as if it were neither poison or nectar.¹ This is the construction. The words poison and nectar, by a sort of dead metaphor such as one sees in the word *lāvanya*,² are used in the sense of causes of pain and pleasure, just as we say that a lemon is poison and a wood-apple is nectar; but they end up by referring to the pain itself and the pleasure that they cause. However, it is not the intention of the sentence that they should not at all refer to the cause, for without the cause pleasure and pain would not exist. This is what our author means by saying that they have been shifted from their literal sense.³ [The sense

of the other words in the sentence has been shifted also:[⁴ the sense of "some" is shifted from the indefinite to the definite [groups which the author has in mind]; the sense of "passes" is shifted to the general sense of an activity; the sense of "time" to all the elements of worldly life. The author of the *Vṛtti* has used the shifting of the single words poison and nectar as an example (by which the other shiftings may be judged). That is why he specifies "in this sentence."

1. Time brings pain to the wicked by bringing them retribution for their bad deeds. It is likewise painful to the man of judgment, who sees the essential misery of transmigration. Groups two and three follow naturally from the first. Group four is composed of those unaffected by time—those whose abedony is due to stupid insensitivity and those who have overcome the emotions by yoga. 2. For *lāvanya* see 1.16 K and L. When used as a frozen metaphor to mean charm, beauty, it cannot give rise to *dhvani*. The same holds for the words *vīsa* (*vīsa*) and *amṛta* (*amīra*) in the present stanza. It is not these words but the stanza as a whole that gives rise to *dhvani*. 3. So the primary intention of the author of the verse is to suggest the pain and pleasure of the world as it affects different types of persons. He does this by a secondary use of words, but the literal sense of the words is not wholly abandoned. 4. Abhinava here guards against an objection which might be made to Ānanda's example. We might ask how this example differs essentially from the example in 3.1 a, where a single word is shifted. Is the only difference that here two words are shifted? It will be seen that by Abhinava's interpretation the present example is essentially different from that of 3.1 a. The suggestion here comes from a shift of meaning of the whole sentence. The way in which anything in the world affects persons depends on their karma, their judgment, and their practice of yoga.

A Of that type of *dhvani* where the literal sense is intended but where there is [subordination to] a suggestion resembling a reverberation, in its sub-type arising from the power of words, a single word may act as suggestor, as in the following:

If fate will have it that I am not born
to fill the wants of needy men for riches,
why was I, being *jāḍa*, not made to be a well
or pond of limpid water by the wayside?

Here the word *jada* (witless, insentient, cool), used by the discouraged speaker in grammatical agreement with himself, comes to have, as a reverberation brought about by its own power, grammatical agreement with the well.¹

1. A question may arise how to correlate the present passage with Ānanda's statement in 2.21. He said there that we have *sabdośaktiyudbhavodhvani* only where an *ālankāra* is suggested. Where *vastumātrām* (a mere fact or situation) is suggested, we have *slesa*. In the light of that statement the present verse at first sight would seem to exhibit *slesa* and not any form of *dhvani*. The answer is that the present verse does carry the suggestion of an *ālankāra*. Although neither Ānanda nor Abhinava mentions it here, both of them refer to it in 3.33c. The verse suggests a simile (*upamā*), for the speaker is likened to the pond and well. One should note that the term *sabdośaktiyudbhavodhvani* applies here only to the suggestion of simile. There is also *rasadhvani* in the verse, namely, a suggestion of *sāntarasa*: "As my lot is so much worse than that of an insentient pond or well, all worldly objects must be regarded as useless and empty." This final suggestion of the verse is referred to in 3.33c (see 3.33c A, note 6 and 3.33c L). It is immediately perceived by the sensitive reader and does not arise like a reverberation.

L Having in this manner given examples of the four kinds [of *dhvani*] referred to in the first half of the *Kārikā*, he now proceeds to give, in order, examples of six other varietes covered by the second half [of the *Kārikā*] by saying: Of that type of *dhvani* where the literal sense is intended, etc. *Prātum* means "to fill." The plural in "riches" is meant to suggest the fulfilling of whatever need any particular suppliant may have. This is why the word "needy" has been used. "Of men":¹ because generally people want money; they do not want help from virtues. "By fate," the decree of which cannot be questioned. "I": that is to say, someone else certainly has been created [for this purpose], but not I, for which reason the speaker is dejected. A pond of limpid water is one that is useful to people. "Or a well": the suggestion is: "even although it is not noticed by people." Used in grammatical agreement with himself: the word *jada* has the sense "unable to think of what to do." In the same sense *jada* can apply to a well, for a well lacks knowledge of who needs what. And that is why the well is *jada*, "cool," i.e., not fevered by distress at the situation. At the same time the well is *jada* by its connection with cool water (*sītalajala*)² and so is able to help others. In this third sense the word

jada if applied to the pond would be tautologous.³ So he says that it comes to have grammatical agreement with the well. By its own power: thus he assigns the suggestion to the category of those arising from the power of a word.⁴

1. Abhinava's point in this remark is that the word *jana* (men in general, ordinary people) has been used because the common run of men want just wealth. It is only a few unusual persons who may want moral or spiritual aid, which the speaker might be able to give. 2. In interpreting puns and suggestions, *d* and *l* are regarded as interchangeable. So *jada* can be the same as *jala* (water). 3. Abhinava here seeks to explain why the *Vṛtti* speaks of *jada*'s attaining grammatical agreement with the well rather than the pond. It is because this third meaning which he has discovered of *jada* (possessing cool water) would be tautologous with *prasannāmbudhara* (containing limpid water) already used of the pond. 4. More literally, thus he joins [to the suggestion] the property of arising from the power of a word.

A In the same sub-type of *dhvani* a sentence may act as a suggestor, as in the speech of Simhanāda in the *Harṣacarita*:

In this great disaster you are now all that is left
In this cosmic destruction you are now the world-serpent Śeṣa
for the support of the earth.⁵

[*Harṣacarita*, p. 192 bottom
(Chapter 6, lines 421-2 out of 628)]

for this sentence clearly suggests by the power of its words a second sense that comes like a reverberation.

1. Simhanāda, the field marshal, is addressing Harṣavardhana after the deaths of the latter's father and elder brother.

L The word *mahāpralaya* in its first sense is to be analyzed as *maha-ā-pralaya*, the complete cessation of happiness. When this cause of grief has occurred, you are the only one remaining for the support,

the consolation, of the *dharanī*, that is, the yoke-beam, of empire.¹ When the sense of this sentence has been thus completed, a second sense ensues, namely that after the elephants of the quarters, etc., have perished, the king of serpents alone is able to support the weight of the earth.²

1. Abhinava tries to elicit a pun from every word in the sentence. Surely no reader would understand this "direct meaning" at a moment noticeably previous to the "suggested meaning." See 2.21e A, note 1. 2. One might add that the two senses in conjunction suggest a simile, viz., that King Harṣa
is in qualities to the world serpent.

A In the same type of *dhvani* [viz., where the suggested sense appears like a reverberation] but in the sub-type where the suggestion arises from the power of a meaning furnished by a poet's imaginative expression [cf. 2.24], a word may be the suggestor, as in the *Harivijaya*.¹

The face of early spring is decked with mango buds
and scented with the rich sweet wine
that soon will flow.
The god of flower arrows
snatches from her a kiss without consent.²

Where it is here said that the god of love snatches a kiss from the face of spring without her consent, the word *asamarpitam* (lit., "unoffered"), which denotes the state [of early spring], suggests by the power of its meaning [since it implies that Love seized Spring without her consent] the violence of the god.³

1. For this lost Prakrit poem by the royal poet Sarvasena, see V. Raghavan, *Bhoja*, pp. 810-11. It described Krishna's victory over Indra and his carrying off of the *parijāta* tree as a present for Satyabhāmā. A. K. Warder identifies the author with the fourth-century Vākāṭaka king of that name (*Indian Kāvya Literature*, Vol. 3, p. 59). 2. The correct reading of the second pāda is that given by Hemacandra: *chanapasaramahagghamanaharasurāmoam*. For Prakrit *manaham* = Sanskrit *manohara*, see Pischel, para. 347. *Dhvanyāloka*

KM edition (followed by Badarīnāth Śarmā) emends the verse to bring it into strict *giti* meter, but this is wrong. All the *gāthās* that are preserved of the *Harivijava* appear to have twenty *mátrás* in the second *pāda*; see *Sarasvatī-kanthābhāraṇa* 4.235; 5.287, 330, 350, 351. It will be seen that I interpret the verse differently from Abhinava. His interpretation seems to me impossible. 3. Hemacandra (on *AC* 1.74) makes the suggestion more specific: "when spring has come fully of age, what will he not do!"

L The beginning of spring, or the face of spring, in which there is delight (*āmoda* = *camatkāra*) on the part of the god (*sura*) Manohara (= the god of love Manmathadeva) because of the precious (*mahārghena*) festival-influence (*utsavaprasareṇa*). Here the attributive "precious" is placed after its noun in the compound because there is no rule of order in Prakrit.¹ *Chāra* means festival. *Mukham* means both beginning and face: and this is joined to *surāmodam*.² The basic meaning is that in the beginning of spring love stirs our hearts. But this becomes suggestive of a further sense because of the striking expression of the poet.

1. But this is not true. If it were, the Prakrit language would be unintelligible. Furthermore, in Abhinava's interpretation *prasara* makes very little sense. 2. Abhinava's interpretation amounts to this. At the very beginning of spring comes the Love-Festival (Manmathotsava). Under its influence the love god in our hearts takes delight in the vernal beauty and seizes it even in its childhood. This suggests how violent our love will become when spring is fully grown. Abhinava does not note the obvious meaning of *surāmodam* (scented with wine).

A Within the same sub-type a sentence may act as the suggestor, as in the verse already quoted "The fragrant month prepares," etc., [see 2.24 A]. There the meaning of the sentence, viz., that the fragrant month prepares but does not yet give the arrows to the god of love, being embodied in an imaginative expression of the poet, suggests spring's destructive stage of stirring up love [which is about to come].

L Our author has not given an example either of a word or a sentence as suggestor of the sub-type of suggestion arising from a meaning embodied in an imaginative expression of a character invented by the poet [cf. 2.24 A]. This is because what he has given is sufficient to illustrate the specific words of Kārikā 2.24: "it may be given body simply by an imaginative expression." An example of a word acting as suggestor in that sub-type would be:

Truly fair women are obj
and truly wealth is fair;
but life is unsteady and as quickly gone
as the glance of a tipsy girl.

[Cāṇakya-rājājanītiśāstra]¹

In this verse there speaks a disenchanted (*virāgin*) character created by the poet, suggesting by force of the meaning embodied in the word "life" the following. All these sensual pleasures and riches are of use only to one's life. When one's life is gone, even though they still exist, they come to be as if non-existent. And life, which consists in preserving the vital breaths,² is nothing to rely on, because the functioning of the vital breaths is so tenuous. So what is the point in maliciously proclaiming the faults of the poor objects of sense? [Rather,] one's own life is to be blamed. But since life is by its very nature so unsteady, even it is not at fault. All this leads to a thorough disenchantment with the world(*vairāgya*).

An example [of suggestion of this sub-type] produced by a sentence is the verse "On what mountai ,," etc. [see 1.13m A].

1. Ānandavardhana will quote this verse under 3.30. It occurs in many Cāṇakya collections, as well as in SRK 1608, and is quoted by Hemacandra, Kṣemendra, and others. For particulars see Sternbach, *Cāṇakya Nīti Tradition*, Vol. II, p. 231, item H. 2. This is the definition of DhP: *jīva prāṇadhārane*.

A [In the same type of *dhvani*] in the sub-type where the suggestion springs from a meaning that is embodied in something inherently possible, a word may be the suggestor, as in:

Ab merchant, how should we have ivory
or tiger skins for sale,
when daughter-in-law is strolling about the house
with the curls dancing on her forehead?¹

Here the word *lulitālakamukhf* ("with curls dancing on her forehead"), by the power of the situation, inherently possible, to which it refers, suggests the young wife's eagerness for sexual play and her husband's weakness from his constant enjoyment of that pleasure.

1. The verse is again quoted by Mammata (10, vs. 528, p. 709) and is included in Weber's *Sattasai* (951). *Parisakkte*: DhP lists the verb *suaskate* (DhP 1.100) in the sense of motion; it has been found only in Prakrit. *Lulitālakamukhf*: lit., whose face bears tossing curls; but as *alaka* regularly refers to the curls in what we call the bangs, I have translated "on her forehead." The picture is not of a slattern who hasn't time to fix her hair, but of a young woman who gives careful attention to arranging her hair so that it will be attractive to her husband.

L [Abhinava translates the stanza, then adds:] *Parisakkte*: walks about flirtatiously. There is no difficulty here in applying the literal sense of the words.¹ The adjective "[with curls] dancing [on her forehead]" is a simple description of [the wife's] appearance, while the husband's failure to procure ivory might be due simply to his arrogance.²

1. If the literal sense of the words were illogical, it might be argued that the suggested sense was forced on us (*ākṣipta*) as a necessary inference rather than being suggested (*vyarigya*). That is not the case. 2. BP: he might feel that he had made enough money already.

A In the same [sub-type] a sentence may act as a suggestor, as

The hunter's wife strolls proudly
 with peacock feather behind her ear.
 She strolls amid fellow wives
 who deck themselves with pearls.

(*Sattasai* 2.73)¹

This verse suggests the good fortune in love of a certain hunter's wife, newly wed, who wears a peacock feather behind her ear. For it is suggested from the meaning [i.e., from the given situation] that her husband, wholly intent on enjoying her charms, is now able to kill only peacocks; while the ill fortune of the other wives, who have been married a long time, is revealed in their decking themselves with pearls, for it is suggested from the situation that the same husband had time, when he was enjoying them, to slay elephants.

L "The hunter's wife," etc. The verse has been quoted i precedes.

"**A** Now the following objection may be raised. "You have claimed that *dhvani* is a type of poetry [cf. 1.13 *K*]. How then can there be a revelation of it in a single word? For a type of poetry is a particular collection of words that causes us to apprehend a particular meaning. Its nature is such that a single word cannot reveal it, for the individual words remind us of objects; they do not denote."¹ To which we

reply: There might well be a fault here if it were the denotative power that occasioned our use of the term *dhuṇi*, but it is not so; it is by the suggestive power that we assign the term.² Furthermore, poems, like human bodies, are collections defined by a particular arrangement of parts. The idea that we form of their beauty can be assigned, by positive and negative agreement, to particular parts of the collection. Accordingly, there is no contradiction in our assigning of *dhuṇi* to individual words insofar as they are suggestive [of this kind of beauty in the whole poem]. The following *slokas* will give support [to our position].

"Just as the sound of what is unpleasant makes a verse faulty, as is manifested in the faults *śrutiduṣṭa*, etc.: just so does the reminding us of what is pleasant constitute a virtue.

"Therefore there is beauty in all those varieties of *dhuṇi* which appear in single words, even though a single word serves only as a reminder.

"Just as a woman appears beautiful by a single ornament which imparts to her some special attraction, so the speech of a good poet is beautiful by means of the *dhuṇi* revealed by a single word."

1. The objection must come from a Prabhākara Mīmāṃsaka. In Prabhākara's theory *vācakatva*, conceived as the power of transmitting valid information, must produce a new cognition. The individual words simply remind us of objects which we already know. 2. Abhinava will point out that this answer is a *chala*, a trick in which the opponent's meaning is intentionally misunderstood (cf. *Nyāya S.* 1.2.10-17). By *vācakatva* the Prabhākara means the power to convey a specific piece of new information, whether fact or suggestion. Ānanda takes it in the more limited sense which it bears in his own system, viz., as the power to denote, as opposed to the power to suggest, a meaning.

L Now, etc.: The objection arises from the view that *dhuṇi* is a collection.¹ Its nature: that is, the nature of a type of poetry. He first takes the phrase used by the objector "because words do not denote (*avācakatvāt*)" and by intentional misunderstanding² shows that this is an insufficient reason for the conclusion. Thus he says, There might well be a fault here, etc. After answering the objection by this trick, he then answers in all seriousness with Furthermore, etc. Suppose the objector were to reply,³ "I am not taking the word's lack of denotative power as a cause of its lack of *dhuṇi*. I am saying that *dhuṇi* is a poem. And a poem is a sentence which conveys a complete meaning; it

is not a single word." Our author might continue, "True; but neither have we said that *dhvani* is a word. *Dhvani* is a collection. That is why the word 'reveal' (*prakāśa*) may be used in speaking of it: '*dhvani* is revealed by a single word.'" Now the objector may ask how it is, if a single word has such a capability, that the process of understanding [suggestive poetry] is an unbroken whole. It is with this in mind that our author says: poems [like human bodies], etc. For it has been said before: "the teaching that [a sentence] has parts applies only at the time of analysis."⁴

But how can we shift the area in which we apprehend beauty to the parts [of the sentence, which are its words], for the individual words do not express the sentence meaning but merely bring objects to mind? Well, why not? Why should words not be causes of our apprehending beauty, since they remind us of beautiful suggestions? To take a contrary instance: a word such as *pelava* "delicate" is not denotative of any obscene sense such as *pela* "testicle," but merely brings that sense to mind; and on that account a poem, as being a thing of beauty, is "spoiled by its sound (*śrutiḍuṣṭa*)."⁵ This fault of being *śrutiḍuṣṭa* is assigned by positive and negative agreement to the parts of a poem. The same should be the case with [the causes of beauty] which are under discussion. He puts the matter thus: Just as the sound of what is unpleasant, etc. The sense is, the sound of what reminds us of that which is unpleasant. Makes a verse faulty: that is, un-beautiful. Virtue: as much as to say beauty. Having thus given a [counter-]example in the first three quarters of the *śloka*, he gives that which the example illustrates in the fourth. Then he sums up: Therefore there is beauty, etc. The syntax [of his argument] is this. As the memory of what is pleasant constitutes a beauty, therefore in all varieties of *dhvani* that have been described, even in that which appears in single words, even in that which is revealed by a single word, there is beauty, even though words function only as reminders. The word *api* ("even though") is construed in both directions on the principle of a crow's eye.⁶ Finally he shows by positive and negative agreement how our apprehension of beauty arises from a single word: Just as a woman, etc.

1. That is, the view is based on the fifth of the five meanings assigned to *dhvani* by Abhinava (1.131). From the points of view represented by the other four definitions the objection could not arise. 2. See 3.1j A note 2. 3. What follows is a *pratyavasthāna* (see *NyāyaSBhāṣya* 1.2.12), a correction,

of Ānanda's misinterpretation. 4. Cf. Vākyapadiya 1.90. 5. In the second *parikaraśloka* the word *api* is to be taken both with *smarakatve* and with *pada-mātrāvabhāsinah*. A crow is popularly supposed to have only one eye, which he shakes from one side of his head to the other when he would change the direction of his gaze. Hence the term *kākākṣinyāya* for the construction *āñō kolvov*.

K But [that variety of] *dhuani* where the passage from the literal to the suggested meaning is imperceptible shines forth in phonemes, words, etc., as well as in a sentence, in texture, and in a complete work.

L Having commented thus on the [first] *Kārikā*, he now proceeds to set forth in detail that variety [of *dhuani*] which was not included there, namely, where the passage from the literal to the suggested meaning is imperceptible:¹ But [that variety], etc. The word "but" serves to contrast this variety with those treated above. A word is a collection of phonemes. A sentence is a collection of words. Texture is a property both of words and sentences. A complete work is a collection of connected sentences. It is with this in mind that the author of the *Kārikā* has listed phonemes, etc., in the order here given. The term "etc." refers to parts of a word, groups of two words, etc. The locative in *varnapadādīsu* is the locative of cause.² The term "shines forth," as it implies the illuminating of the entire poem, confirms the nature of [*dhuani* to be] a type of poetry, as [we have seen] before.

1. Note that in this sentence Abhinava writes as if the author of the *Vṛtti* were the same person as the author of the *Kārikās*. Contrast 3.1 Intr. *L*, note 5. 2. Wherever possible Abhinava wants to understand *dhuani* as "suggestive poetry," rather than as "suggestion." He is able to do so here by taking the locative according to Vārttika 6 on Pān. 2.3.36 (*carmāṇi duśpinam hanti*: one kills a leopard for its skin). Instead of meaning "*dhuani* (i.e., suggestion) shines forth in phonemes, words, etc.," the *Kārikā* will mean, by Abhinava's interpretation, "*dhuani* (i.e., suggestive poetry) shines forth

because of [skilfully employed] phonemes, words, etc.⁷ The locative in *vākye*, however, he will take differently; see 3.4 c L.

A Lest one should hesitate in accepting this statement, feeling that phonemes are meaningless and therefore cannot suggest anything, the following is stated.

K The phonemes *s*, *ś*, *dh*, and conjunct phonemes containing *r*, when used to excess, are hindrances in [the rasa of] love. These phonemes do not produce rasa [of that variety].

These same phonemes, when used in the rasa of loathing, [cruelty,] etc., illumine their goal. Hence they do produce rasa [in those varieties].¹

1. In Kārikā 3 one must read *te na* separately; in 4 one must read *tēna* as a single word. *Rasacyut* can only mean "dripping rasa"; cf. the similar compounds *madacyut*, *madhucyut*, etc. In other words, Abhinava's first explanation (see below) is the only one that can be justified by idiom. The varieties of harshness remarked on in these Kārikās pass unnoticed in so generally harsh a language as English, but they have often been noticed in more musical languages. For the effort to avoid sibilants in Latin, see Quintilian 9.4.37-38, for other harsh conjuncts *ibid* 11.3.35. The letter *r* was called by Persius (1.109) *canina littera* (the dog's letter) from its suggestion of a dog's growl. Both Latin and Sanskrit had a sharply trilled *r*.

A In this pair of *ślokas* the suggestive power of phonemes has been shown by positive and negative [precept].

L [Commentary on *K*:] When used to excess is to be construed with each [of the phonemes]. Thus one should explain as "where *s* is used to excess, [or where *ś* is used to excess," etc]. Conjunct phonemes in which *r* is predominant: e.g., *kr*, *rhr*, *rdr*.¹ Are hindrances: the harsh alliteration² is opposed to *śrigāra* because these (*te*) phonemes when used to excess do not (*na*) emit, that is, do not let the *rasa* flow. Or, [we may interpret as follows:] therefore (*tena*), viz., because they are opposed to *śrigāra*, the phonemes *ś*, *ṣ*, etc.. fall off from *rasa* (*rasāc cyavante*), that is, do not suggest *rasa*. This is the negative precept. These same [phonemes]: viz., *s*, etc. Their goal, viz., the *rasa* of loathing (*bibhatsā*), etc. Illumine: reveal or suggest.

[Commentary on *A*:] He explains the overall sense of the two *Kārikās*: In this pair of, *sloras* (*slakadvyena*). His avoidance of the dual form (*ślokābh्याम्*) is to prevent our taking the expression by the principle of sequential ordering,³ for the negative precept is given by the first verse and the positive by the second.

The net result of the teaching here given is that a man who seeks to be a good poet should not use the phonemes *s*, *ś*, etc.. in that which is characterized as *śrigāra*; and it is because of this negative result of the teaching that the author of the *Kārikās* places the negative precept first. The positive precept comes after in the form of a qualification that this usage is not always to be avoided but is permissible in such *rasas* as *bibhatsā*. The author of the *Vṛtti*, on the other hand, places the positive first in order to observe the custom of placing the word *anvaya* before the word *vyatireka*.⁴

The following is meant. Although the cause of aesthetic pleasure (*rasa*) is the combined apprehension of the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, and *vyabhicāribhāvas*,⁵ it is self-evident that the *vibhāvas*, etc., are conveyed by words of a given phonetic shape. Therefore even the particular character of phonemes, as soft, harsh, etc., which is grasped by the ear regardless of whether the meaning has been noticed at the time when they are heard, is helpful to the relishing of *rasa*. It is on this account, namely in order to convey the fact that phonemes are helpful, that the locative of cause was used [in 3.2 *K*] in the expression *varnapadādīsu*. It is not that *rasa* is suggested solely by phonemes, for we have said many times that aesthetic pleasure arises from a combination of the *vibhāvas*, etc. But phonemes have a nature of their own, grasped only by the ear, which does take part in producing the flow of aesthetic pleasure. They

are similar in this respect to the sounds of a song without words, or to the various notes (*jāti*), rhythms (*karana*) and *ghra*, etc.⁶ of a drum, guitar, or the like.

1. By Abhinava's addition of the word *pradhāna*, it would seem that he interprets the verse as a warning against conjuncts that contain a predominance of *r*'s, i.e., more than one *r*. If so, we should expect *rkr* instead of *kr* in the first example. But the combination *rkr* is not likely to occur in Sanskrit.
 2. *Paruṣā vṛitiḥ* "harsh alliteration" is defined by Udbhaṭa, 1.4 Indurāja, 1.6 Viृtti, as containing these phonemes.
 3. If Ānanda had written *slokābhyaṁ anuyaya-vyatirekābhyaṁ ... darsitam*, we would naturally take his meaning to be "it has been shown by these two verses, by the positive statement (of the first) and by the negative statement (of the second)."
 4. The order *anuyaya-vyatireko* is made obligatory by Pāṇ. 2.2.33.
 5. See above, 1.18 L and note 20; also Introduction, p. 16.
 6. Our text reads *ghrādi*; others read *ghādi*. We are ignorant of the meaning.
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A In the variety of *dhvani* where the passage from the literal to the suggested meaning is imperceptible, suggestiveness may also be present in a word, as in the following:

You were trembling; in your fear
the robe was slipping from your shoulders;
and you cast those eyes
helpless in all directions.
But the cruel fire, pitiless,
burned on with swift att
blinded by its smoke,
it destroyed you without seeing.

Mātrarāja, Tāpasavatsarājacarita 2.16¹

For in this verse it will be clear to sensitive readers that the word "those" (*te*) is full of *rasa*.

1. The verse gives the words of King Udayana, who wrongly believes his queen Vāsavadattā to have perished in a palace fire. The situation has been dramatized in many plays but this particular verse is from the play of Mātrarāja. In commenting on this verse as quoted by Mammata (7, ex. 187) Nāgeśa Bhatta and others have erroneously ascribed it to the Ratnāvali. Some MSS follow this verse by another verse exemplifying the same suggestive use of the word *te*. The extra verse, which is not commented on by *L*, begins *jhogiti kanakacitre* and is given by our text in a footnote to page 304. Its translation is as follows.

The moment the golden deer appeared,
my beloved's eyes blossomed and sent forth those glances,
like blue waterlily petals ruffled in a breeze,
which as I remember them still burn my heart.

The words will be those of Rāma remembering Sītā.

L May also be present in a word: that is, may be present also when a word acts as a cause¹ of the suggested sense. Thus the intention is as follows. Aesthetic pleasure comes [strictly speaking] only from the *vibhāvas*, etc. But when these *vibhāvas*, etc., being conveyed by some particular word, bring about a specially delightful relish (*rasa-camatkāra*), we ascribe the power [of suggestion] to the word alone.

For in this verse: this is the lament of Vatsarāja, in whom heavy sorrow is aroused by his hearing of the burning of Vāsavadattā. And inasmuch as the sorrow has here arisen from the destruction of a beloved person, such gestures of that person as the motions of her eyebrows or her sidelong glances, which formerly made her an object of sexual desire—these very gestures as now recurring to his memory—give rise to tragedy (*karuṇa*), in which the sense of loss is absolute.² This much is clear. Now, in the phrase "those eyes," the word "those" (*te*) serves as the special cause of the tragic *rasa* by suggesting various memory-pictures of the qualities that her eyes possessed. qualities which are indescribable and which can only be felt by the speaker.

Thus, what a certain [commentator] has objected to and answered are both false. He objected that the word "those" cannot possess this power, since it must refer to something previously mentioned.³ His answer was that the speaker was under the influence of *rasa* [when he spoke].⁴ Neither the objection nor the answer should ever have been raised.⁵ Where the relative *yad* has shown that a thing possesses a property that may occur together with some second property still to

be mentioned, there the word *tad* then shows the copresence [of that second property] with the first property that we still bear in mind.⁶ So the rule that "yad and *tad* must go together" refers to the anaphoric usage of *tad*. On the other hand, where the word *tad* is used to suggest a particular memory-picture induced by some cause,⁷ as in the phrase "that pot" [meaning the pot which I remember as having seen before], in such and similar expressions, the word *tad* has no reference whatever to anything mentioned previously. So enough of arguing with persons who think themselves learned but whose references are wrong.

By the words "trembling," etc., the speaker of the stanza imagines the symptoms (*anubhāvās*) of the queen's fear. The thought that he has been unable to prevent [that fear] is a stimulus (*vibhāva*) of the sorrow which fills him. [He speaks of] casting "those" eyes, that is, eyes which, although they were always the unique abode of beauty-in-motion, were now helpless, finding no goal of sight in their terror and as if asking "Who will save me? Where is my husband?" That "those" eyes of hers should have been reduced to such a condition acts as a stimulant (*uddipana*) of the speaker's sorrow in an exceptional degree. "Cruel": such is the very nature [of fire] and cannot be helped. And yet, the fire was blinded by smoke and so was unable to see [the queen], for it is inconceivable that an informed agent should do such an improper deed. Thus the memory of the beauty of her eyes now acts as a stimulus of the sorrow which overwhelms the king. All this development of meaning is achieved by the presence of the word "those." In this manner [the suggestive power of particular words] should be explained in the case of other examples.

1. Abhinava is taking the locative word *pade* (Text, p. 304, line 1) as *ni ittasaptamī* rather than as expressing place where. See above, 3.2 L, note 1.
2. BĀNS distinguishes tragedy (*karuṇārasa*) from love in separation (*vipralambhaśrīgāra*) by the fact that the emotion (*bhāva*) is absolute, unqualified (*nirapekṣa*), whereas in *vipralambhaśrīgāra* the emotion is relative; its object is merely removed, not destroyed.
3. The commentator who is being criticized (presumably the Candrikākāra) based his criticism on the anaphoric use of the pronoun *tad* (its use as "picking up" the relative *yad*).
4. And hence apparently unable to remember grammatical requirements. The remark is historically interesting, as it shows that the Candrikā-kāra still held to the old conception of *rasa* as simply a heightened form of *bhāva*. See Introduction, p. 18 and footnote 29.
5. For the expression *anuṭṭhānopahata* see 2.4 L., note 40.
6. The passage becomes more lucid if we read *anūḍdeksyamāna*, as BP suggests, in place of *anūḍdīyamāna*. In the sentence *yo vidvān*

sa pūyata, "he who is learned is worthy of honor," the relative pronoun *yo* shows the man's possession of the property *vidvattva* to be combinable with some second property. This second property turns out to be *pūyatva*. The anaphoric pronoun *sa* shows *pūyatva* to be something copresent with the *vidvattva* that we still bear in mind. See also 3.161 L, note 3. 7. The appearance of recollections is always due to some cause, such as the experience of something similar to or something in some way connected with the recollection.

A The suggestion may arise through a part of a word [e.g., through a single component of a compound word], as in the following.

Her face was bowed in shyness
in the presence of our elders
and she forced back the grief
that gave motion to her breast.
But did not the mere corner of her eye,
lovelier than a startled deer's,
somehow, as it dropped a tear,
tell me not to go?¹

Here the component *tribhāga* ("corner")² [in the compound *netratribhāga* ("eye-corner") is suggestive].

1. The verse is ascribed by Śāṇig. 3464 to "Eye-corner" Brahmayāśavin, as though the poet had taken his sobriquet from this verse. In *SūktiM.* 43.21 the verse is given as anonymous (*kasyāpi*). One may supply a context in which a husband tells his friend of the difficulty in taking leave of his young bride to go on some journey. 2. The literal meaning of *tribhāga* is "a third." A "third of the eye," as Jacobi notes in his translation of the present passage, implies the pupil of the eye. But what is precisely meant is the pupil in a position at the corner of the eye, as in a sidelong glance. It is this meaning that gives suggestiveness to the element in the present verse. If so small a fraction of a remembered trait could tell the speaker of his bride's love, how great must be his pain in separation from her.

L The component "corner": The speaker remembers how she looked at him, despite the presence of their elders, with a sweet glance that contained yearning, grief, and despair.¹ The recollection serves as a stimulant of the grief of separation, caused by a journey, of persons who cannot live without each other.² This stimulation is made clear by the presence of the word element "corner."

1. The reading of the Kashi edition -garvamantharam makes very little sense. We have preferred the *KM* reading (also accepted by Badarināth Śarmā) -garbhamadurum, and have so translated. 2. *Parasparahetukatvaprāṇa* seems to mean that each one is the cause of the sustenance of the other's life, i.e., if one should die, so would the other.

A Where the passage to the suggested meaning is imperceptible, *dhvani* having the form of a sentence is of two sorts, being either pure, or mixed with a figure of speech. Of these, the pure type is exemplified in the verse from the *Rāmābhyaṣaya* "though with feigned anger."¹ For the sentence taken as a whole shows how the love [of Rāma and Sītā] for each other has reached full bloom and so reveals the perfect essence of *rasa*.

1. The complete verse is given below by Abhinava. The lost play *Rāmābhyaṣaya* was written by Yaśovarman, the eighth-century king of Kanauj and patron of Vākpatirāja and Bhavabhūti.

L Having the form of a sentence: the term is expressed in the nominative in order to show that the sentence and the *dhvani* are coextensive.¹ For while the suggested meaning appears when phonemes, words, or components are present [as special causes], that meaning appears [over a greater area than theirs] as running throughout the whole verse, for it takes its life from the combination of *vibhāvas*, [*anubhāvas*, and *vyābhicāribhāvas*]. Thus it is that phonemes, etc., are

merely subsidiary causes of dhvani where the passage from literal to suggested is imperceptible, but the sentence is not a subsidiary cause, merely helpful like the phonemes, etc., but is engaged in conveying the whole complex of vibhāvas, etc., and so appears as wholly made up of rasa or the like.² Accordingly, where 3.2 K says [that the suggested meaning may] "appear in a sentence," the word vākye ("in a sentence") is not to be interpreted as a mere locative of cause but rather as a locative [of place] having the sense that this type of dhvani can occur in no other area.

The pure type, that is, unmixed with any figure of speech [is as follows].

Although with feigned anger,
with tears and with despairing glances,
my mother sought to hold you back,
you followed me in exile out of love,
who now, without you, gaze upon
the horizon black with its new clouds:
how hard this shows your lover's heart
to be, my love, that he still lives!

Yaśovarman, Rāmābhūyudaya

Her following him despite his mother's seeking to hold her back in these various ways shows that she disobeyed the command of a parent out of the depth of her love. The collocation of "your lover" and "my love" expresses the basic emotion (*sthāyibhāva*) of love where each of the lovers is the very life of the other. "New clouds" shows that Rāma is gazing at the clouds of the monsoon season which he has never before endured [in the absence of Sītā] and so expresses a stimulant (*uddīpanavibhāva*) of love-in-separation. In the phrase "still lives" (*jīvati eva*) the particle "still" (*eva*) by its expressing a qualification prevents the appearance of tragedy.³

Taken as a whole: the sense is that no one word reveals the rasa more than another. Essence of rasa: the essence, that is, of love-in-separation (*vipralambhaśringāra*).

1. If the *Vṛtti* had said vākye dhvaniḥ "suggestion occurring in a sentence," one might take the sentence to be merely a special cause of the suggestion, just as "in a word" and "in a component part" were taken in that sense (*nimittasaptami*) by Abhinava in the foregoing comment on Kārikā 3.2.

2. "Or the like" refers to *rasābhāsa*, *bhāta*, *bhāvābhāsa*. 3. If the verse pictures Rāma and Sītā as never to meet again, its effect will be tragedy

(*karuna*). If it is felt that they will meet again, its effect will be the sad variety of the erotic (*vipralambhaśrīgāra*); see 3.4 a L, note 2. Abhinava here argues that the statement that Rāma still lives implies that the lovers will meet again; for otherwise Rāma surely would have died. One may of course challenge his interpretation. It is true that Rama will meet Sītā again. But Rāma, as pictured in this verse, does not know this; only the audience knows. And Abhinava has said (p. 107 = Text p. 79, line 1) that *paurvāparyavimarsā* is not relevant to the immediate aesthetic impact on the reader. That is why, as he explains, Rāvana's love for Sītā is a case of *śrīgāra*, not of *hāsa*, although ultimately it becomes *hāsa* as the love is not shared. By analogy a case might well be made for assigning the present verse to tragedy.

A The type that is mixed with a figure of speech may be exemplified by such a verse as "carried together by the flooding river of passion."¹ for in this verse the *rasa*, [viz., love-in-separation] is strongly manifested and is adorned with metaphor following the rules laid down above [viz., in 2.18] concerning the suggestor.

1. The verse, from the *Amarasatka*, is given in full by Abhinava below.

We have seen lovers carried together
by the flooding river of passion.
who find the flood to be blocked
by a dam in the form of their parents.
When forced, with desire unfilled,
to stand frozen as in a painting.
they still drink of each other's love
through the lily stems of their eyes.

Narasimha (Subhā. 2057 = *Amaru* 104)

With metaphor: passion is the flood of a new river, that is, a monsoon freshet, because it has swollen up suddenly. "Carried together" by this, that is, brought face to face without having so planned it. Thereupon their parents (*guravah*), mother-in-law and the rest, act as dams

by blocking the flood of their desire.¹ [There is also a pun here, for] the dams are heavy (*guravah*), that is, impassable. The will [of the lovers] is thereby blocked and so they stand "with desire unfilled." However, interchanging their persons as they face each other, with limbs as it were painted because devoid of all motion in their bodies, they pass their time in the strategem of mixing slender glances of mutual longing, tasting the relish of each other's longing which is brought to them by the lily stems which are their eyes.

Now it may be noticed that the metaphor is not made complete, for the lovers have not been identified with a pair of wild geese or *cakravāka* birds or the like, for such birds are accustomed to play at drinking water from a single lily stem.² That is why our author speaks of the rules laid down above. For it was said above "the intention must be keep them [viz., the figures of speech] subordinate and [they] should never be oversustained" [2.18 K]. "Adorned": by the ornamentation of the *vibhāvas* the *rasa* is also adorned.

1. In India it is considered unseemly for young married couples to kiss and fondle one another in the presence of their parents and in-laws. Thus the verse does not imply, as an English reader might at first take it, any opposition on the part of the parents to the relationship between the young people. The obstruction is merely to overt gestures. 2. Sanskrit poetry is full of references to the monogamous affection of sheldrakes (*cakravākas*) and wild geese (*hamsas*). A common picture is of a pair of such birds nibbling at the two ends of a *nalinī*, the long stem of the water lily which descends below the surface of a pond. Now the eyes of the lovers have the shape and dark color of water lily buds. Their mutual glance is likened to a lily stem. They drink *rasa* just as the birds drink the water contained in the stem. Thus the poet could have completed, or elaborated, his metaphor by likening the lovers to such birds. But he did not.

A It has been said [in 3.2 K] that the variety of suggestive poetry where the passage from the literal to the suggested meaning is imperceptible may shine forth in texture (*sanghaṭanā*). So it is here necessary first to define the nature of texture.

K Texture has been said to be of three sorts: lacking in compounds, having compounds of medium length, and having long compounds.

A "Has been said," that is, by certain [critics].¹ After simplyinding the reader [of this definition],² the following is stated.

1. Presumably, then, *Kārikā* 3.5 is a quotation, but it is not known from whom. The term *sarighaṭanā* is not used by the early critics, who use *raṇḍā* or *rīti* instead. On the evidence of Abhinava's comment on 3.6 it appears that Udbhaṭa used the term. He may have been the first to use it and the present *Kārikā* is possibly a quotation from him. 2. In other words the definition will be accepted without criticism or discussion.

L In Texture: the word *sarighaṭanāyām* is [an abstract noun] formed [from the verb *sarighaṭ-* "to put together"] with an abstract suffix [viz., *yuc* = *ana*]. The form is locative of cause, like the forms of *varṇa*, etc.¹ Has been said: viz., in 3.2 *K*. To define: that is, to determine how it differs from the qualities.

K This, standing in dependence on the qualities (*gunāñ cāśrītya tiṣṭhanti*) such as sweetness, manifests the *rasas*. The principle by which it is regulated is that it must be appropriate to the speaker and to what is said.

A This texture, standing in dependence on the qualities, manifests the *rasas*, etc.¹ Now in this matter² one can imagine two main positions: (1) that texture and the qualities are one; or (2) that they are different. And if they are different, two further views are possible: (2a) that texture depends on the qualities; or (2b) that the qualities depend on texture. Now if we accept the position of unity, or the view that the qualities depend on texture, the meaning of the verse will be that texture, depending on qualities that are its own self, or on qualities that reside in it, manifests the *rasas*. But if we accept the position of difference and within that position the view that texture depends on the qualities, then texture, standing in dependence on the qualities, will be by nature subordinated to the qualities but will not be identical with them.

1. By adding "etc." the *Vṛtti* shows that *rūḍbhāṣa*, *bhāva*, and *bhāvabhāṣa* are to be included. 2. The long and complicated commentary which follows is motivated by Ānanda's desire to justify his very different view of texture from that of the older poets. Bhāṇava (2.1–2) implies that the *gunas* of a poem depend on the degrees of word compounding in the texture. Vāmana states explicitly (1.2.7–8) that the *gunas* are special properties of the texture (which he calls *rīti*). Udbhaṭa, according to Abhinava and others (see 3.6 L, note 2), states that the *gunas* are properties of the texture (*saṅghatāṇḍ*); and a property both resides in and is dependent on the substance in which it resides. So the older view was that the *gunas* depend on texture. Ānanda shows (in 3.6a A) that this older view fails to accord with the facts of literature. His own view of *guna* and texture is radically different. In Ānanda's view the *gunas* reside in the *rasas*. The *sṛigārāraśa* is sweet (has sweetness), the *rāudraṇāraśa* is strong. The *gunas* are not related to the texture in this way. The texture, since its purpose is to manifest *rasa*, may rather be said to depend on the *gunas*. Abhinava points out that "depending on" (*āśritya*) is here used in a different sense from the sense which it bears in the older view. Ānanda does not mean that a given texture resides in a *guna*; he means that it follows the lead of, is subordinate to, operates for the sake of, a *guna*. The *Vṛtti* is complicated by its examining other views, notably the *guṇasaṅghatanaikyapakṣa* or view that texture and *gunas* may be identical (3.6e A). The conclusion of the *Vṛtti* is that on either view, Ānanda's or that of identity, some regulation of the use of the various textures must be given. That rule is furnished by the second half of the present *Kārikā*: the texture must be appropriate both to the speaker and to the content (*rasa* or otherwise) of what is said. Thus, Ānanda accomplishes his underlying purpose of

subordinating the old concept of texture (*rīti* or *sāṅghaṭanā*) as well as the old concept of the *guṇas* to his new concept of *rasas* which must be suggested. See Introduction p. 21.

L [Commentary on *K*:] "The *rasas*" forms the initial word of the second half verse. The whole second half reads as follows: "the *rasas*. The principle by which it is regulated is that it must be appropriate to the speaker and to what is said."

[Commentary on *A*:] The *Vṛttikāra* shows that the plural inflection of the word *rasān* is meant to include similar entities: the *rasas*, etc. Now in this matter, i.e., in regard to [what is said in] the first half of the verse, it is possible to imagine, or to explain, these various matters by means of alternatives, which he states: that texture and qualities are one, etc. He shows how three possible views can be explained: Now if we accept the position of unity, etc.

That are its own self: To show the exact nature of a thing we often use an expression which refers to it as the basis of some entity hypothetically distinguished from it, as when we say that the property of tree-ness belongs to a *śimśupa*.¹ Which reside in it: According to Bhaṭṭodbhāṭa and others the qualities are properties of texture;² and the generally accepted view is that properties depend on their property-possessor.

Will be subordinate to the qualities: in this case the expression "depends on" will not refer to a physical relation of superstratum and substratum (*ādhārādheyabhāva*).³ For the texture does not reside physically in the qualities. So the sense is similar to what is intended when we say that the estates are based on the king, meaning that the ministers and the like are appropriate to that (kingdom) on which the king is based. Thus we arrive at the sense that texture is by nature subordinate to, is at the mercy of, looks up to, the qualities.

1. A *śimśupa* is a tree. But in order to show this point clearly, we hypothesize as different from it a property tree-ness, which we then say belongs to the *śimśupa*. So in the case at issue. According to one theory, a given quality, strength, consists in (and so is really one with) the texture of long compounds. But we may bring out its nature with clarity by saying that the texture of long compounds belongs to the quality strength. 2. The view is attributed to Udbhaṭa also by the *Ratnaprabhā*, which comments on the words of the *Pratāparudriya*, *sāṅghaṭanāśrayā gunāḥ* (p. 245, lines 2-3 = Section 7, lines 9-10) by stating *Udbhatamatenoktam eva*. Presumably Udbhaṭa

expressed this view in his lost *Bhāmaḥavivaraṇa*. In his only preserved work he has no occasion to speak of gunas or texture, as he is concerned only with figures of speech. 3. Ādhārādheyabhāva is the relation that obtains between property and substance, part and whole, etc.

A Now what is the point in raising these various possibilities? It is this. If texture and qualities are one (1), or if the qualities depend on texture (2b), we shall be forced into the untenable position that the qualities, like texture, have no fixed rules of usage. [It is an untenable position.] because, of the qualities, we know that a high degree of sweetness' (*mādhurya*) and clarity (*prasāda*) is limited to the area of tragedy and love-in-separation and that strength (*ojas*) belongs to fury (*raudra*), wonder (*adbhuta*), and the like. Furthermore, sweetness and clarity are found only in the area of *rasa*, *bhāva*, *rasābhāsa*, and *bhāvābhāsa*. Thus the sphere of the qualities is regulated. But this breaks down in the case of texture. Thus we find the texture of long compounds in the area of love as well [as in the area of fury] and uncompounded texture in the area of fury [as well as in love]. Of these [irregularities] an example of the texture of long compounds in love is:

mandhāra-kusuma-reṇu-piṇjaritālakā
with locks engoldened by the pollen
of the flowers of Paradise;

or such a verse as:

anavarata-nayana-jala-lava-nipuna-parimūsita-patralekham i.e., etc.

Who would not grieve, fair lady, to see your face
supported by your open hand
as the ever dropping tears
rob it of its painted ornament?

In similar disagreement, the uncompounded texture is found in examples of fury such as:

Whatever man proud of his strong arm.¹

Accordingly, the qualities are not one with the textures, nor are they dependent on the textures.

L Like texture: because in the first view, since qualities and texture are held to be one, they will be equivalent in all respects, while in the other view (*2b*), because the qualities are held to be properties of the texture. Suppose that there are indeed no fixed rules of usage. With this in mind, he says, because, of the qualities, etc. The word "because" here has the sense of "but."¹ On the one hand, this does not square with the facts [because the qualities are in fact regulated], while on the other hand, it is forced upon us by logic [if we accept either of these two views]. This: this regulation that has been laid down for the qualities. He now sets forth examples from the literature to prove that such is the case: Thus.

By saying "we find," he has let us know that there are places where this may be observed. This lays the ground for [his furnishing] an example: Of these. Lest some one object that there is no śrīgāra in this example,² he gives a second example: or such as. This is the speech of a lover for the purpose of placating his beloved who is angry over a love-quarrel. Accordingly: that is to say, these two views do not fit with the *Kārikā*.

1. See 2.18–19c *L*, note 4. Abhinava's interpretation comes to the same result as ours, but is less literal. 2. Śrīgāra is produced by a combination of vibhāvas, anubhāvas, and vyabhicāribhāvas. In the first example, as it is only the fragment of a verse, we are given only the dālambhanavibhāva.

A Now if the qualities do not depend on texture, on what do they depend? The answer has already been given [in the Second Chapter]: "Whatever depends on the predominant sense should be regarded as qualities. On the other hand, whatever depends on the non-predominant sense should be considered as ornaments (figures of speech), just like bracelets, etc" [2.6 *K*].

Or we can even let the qualities depend on words [rather than the sense of the words]. They will still not be on a par with alliteration and

the like. For alliteration and the like are properties of words regardless of the meaning of the words, whereas qualities are the properties of words capable of expressing a primary sense which gives rise to a certain suggested meaning. These qualities can be called properties of words although they really depend elsewhere, just as heroism and the like are said to depend on the body [as the body is the place where they are manifested].

L On what do they depend: what he has in mind is that it has already been remarked on by previous [critics] that if they depend on words and meanings, they would differ in no way from figures of speech. Has already been given: viz., by the author of the *Kārikās*.

Or: This alternative is possible because it does not follow from the fact that two things depend on [i.e., reside in] the same base that they are identical. If it did, the color [of an object] and its contact [with some other object] would be identical. If you object that the contact requires a second object [and so does not, strictly speaking, rest on the same base as the color¹], the same may be said of the point at issue: the quality requires [in addition to its word base] a literal meaning [of that word] that may help it to a suggested sense. But this is not really my [i.e., the *Vṛttikāra's*] point of view. I would merely let the qualities be the property of words according to the opinion of those who do not make clear distinctions, just as they take heroism and the like to be the properties of the body. For the man who does not make clear distinctions is unable to distinguish between primary and metaphorical usage. Still, there will be no fault. This is what I intended by my remark.

So he says they can be called properties of words. The sense of although they really depend elsewhere is: although they really belong to the soul.²

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1. Its base comprises two objects whereas the color base is one obj
 2. I.e., to the rasa in the case of the poetic gunas, to the jīvātman in the c of heroism, etc.

A Now it may be objected that if the qualities depend on words, it will follow that they are identical with texture, or that they depend on texture. For words that are untextured (*asāṅghatita*, i.e., not structured into a sentence) cannot be the basis of the qualities, because such words cannot express qualities, which depend on *rasa* and the like, since *rasa* and the like are conveyed by specific meanings [viz., the *vibhāvas*, etc., not by the general meanings that belong to words taken individually].

But this objection does not hold, because it has been shown that *rasa* and the like can be suggested through phonemes and words. Or, if we admit that sentences suggest *rasa* and the like, we need not admit that these sentences depend by rule on any particular texture. One may thus say that the base of the qualities consists only of words, words that are untextured [i.e., free to belong to any one of the three textures] so long as they are accompanied by some particular suggestive meaning.

L Depend on words: if, metaphorically speaking, the qualities reside in words, the conclusion will be as follows. The quality sweetness (*mādhurya*) is the capacity of words to convey a literal sense which [in its turn] suggests such *rasas* as love; and that capacity of words can be attained only by a specific texture. It follows that the texture is nothing separate [from the words]. Rather, it is textured words to which this capacity belongs. This amounts to saying that this capacity [to express the *rasa* of love, etc.] depends on texture. Such would be the conclusion.

But let the *gunas* be properties of the words, or even identical with the words. What need is there to bring in texture? Anticipating this response, the objector continues: For words that are untextured cannot, etc. The *rasas*, *bhāvas*, and the false varieties and cessations of *rasa* and *bhāva* are suggested when they are conveyed by specific meanings [i.e., the *vibhāvas*, etc.], not by the general senses of individual words¹ unconnected with one another. Even metaphorically speaking, untextured words cannot be the basis of qualities dependent on, or

strictly speaking residing in, these *rasas* and the like. The reason for this is because such words cannot express, etc. For untextured words cannot express a literal meaning which is syntactically complete and therefore useful to the production of a suggested meaning. This is the sense.

He now refutes [the foregoing objection]: But this objection does not hold. For just as it has been said that a phoneme can suggest a *rasa*, just so can a word, without expressing any meaning, suggest sweetness, which becomes the manifestor of a *rasa*, by the beauty that results from the mere hearing of it, as in the case of the phoneme. What need is there for texture? And just as it has been said that *dhuani* may be manifested by words, just so may a separate [unstructured] word, by its reminding us of its [general] sense, reveal a meaning capable of suggesting *rasa*. And this [meaning] in itself is sweetness. Here again what use is there of texture?

Now it may be objected that at least in that variety of *dhuani* which is manifested by the sentence it will be necessary to introduce texture, for without it how could the sentence or how could its literal meaning have any beauty? With this objection in mind, he says: Or, if we admit. The word "or" is used in the sense of "also" and should be construed with the word *vākyavāyavāgyavat*.¹ This is as much as to say: bring in texture; we make no objection to its presence. But a specific texture is not the base of, nor one with, sweetness, for sweetness and the like exist without it wherever *rasa* and the like are suggested by phonemes and single words. It follows that where *rasa* and the like are suggested by a sentence, it is the sentence, independently of any given texture, that suggests *rasa* and that the texture, although present, is needless for suggesting *rasa*. Hence, even if we speak metaphorically, the qualities depend only on words, [not on texture]. He states this conclusion by saying, only of words, etc.

1. The objector is following the *Mimāṃsā* theory that the individual word denotes a general or class character. See 1.4 b L, note 2. 2. i.e., the meaning intended is *abhyupagata vākyavāyavāgyavat 'pi'*: "if it is also admitted that *rasa* and the like can be suggested by sentences.

A Objection: "We can understand that this might be the case as far as sweetness is concerned, but we cannot understand that strength does not depend on words as set in a particular texture. Because a texture without compounds could never serve as the basis of strength." This objection too we are not unwilling to answer, if your mind is not spoiled by habitual acceptance of what is commonly believed. Why should a texture without compounds not be a basis for strength? After all, it has already been shown [2.9 *L*] that strength is just another name for the excitement of a poem conveying the *rasa* of fury and the like. What fault is there if strength is expressed in a texture without compounds and sensitive readers find no lack of beauty therein? Accordingly, there is nothing wrong with saying that qualities depend upon words that are not regulated by any particular texture. But these [qualities] will not stray from their own field any more than will the eye, etc., relate to a sense object which is not their own [e.g., the eye will not hear sounds]. Therefore the qualities are one thing and texture is another. Nor are the qualities dependent on texture. This is one view.

L Objection: some [commentators] say that this objection is concerned only with *dhvani* suggested by sentences. But we would say that in strength, which is the special character of the *rasas* fury and the like, even when this strength is suggested by a phoneme or a word, its special beauty does not really blossom in the individual phonemes and words until they are given the mark of texture. And so we would take the objection as a general one. Conveying: the present participle (by Pāṇ. 3.2.126) expresses characteristic or cause. Here the sense is that strength is characterized by the conveying of fury and the like.¹ And [sensitive readers]: the word "and" has the sense of "for." What he means is that since there is no lack of beauty in "Whatever man proud of his strong arm" [see 2.9 *A* and 3.6 a *A*], it therefore follows, etc. By these: these qualities. Their own: the field [of love] has been restricted [to sweetness] by the statement: "it is just śringāra that is the sweetest and most delightful flavor" [2.7 *K*].

1. Abhinava does not express his meaning clearly. *Prakásayataḥ* actually agrees with *kāvyaśya*, not with *ojas*. But presumably he identifies the two: the strength of a poem which conveys *rasa* is a strength which conveys *rasa*. His meaning is that from the conveying of fury, etc., we can infer the strength of the poem. This is on the analogy of the stock example of Pān. 3.2.126: *sayānā bhūñjate yavānāḥ* "the Greeks eat lying down." From the knowledge that someone eats lying down we can infer that he is a Greek.

A Or let us consider [another view, namely] that the qualities are one with texture. But it was said earlier that [if they are one,] the qualities, like texture, would have no fixed rules of usage, for in literature we find irregularities [in the correlation of texture and *raso*]. The reply to this is that when in literature we find an irregularity in a sphere that we have circumscribed, we should regard it as an aberration (*virūpa*). If you ask how it is that sensitive readers nonetheless find beauty in such instances, our reply is: because the aberration is concealed by the poet's skill (*sakti*). For a poetic fault is of two kinds: it may be due to the poet's lack of mature judgment (*avyutpatti*) or it may be due to his lack of skill. A fault that is due to lack of mature judgment may be concealed by the poet's skill and so never be noticed. But a fault that is due to the poet's lack of skill will appear immediately. The following *śloka* will give support to our position: "If a poet commits a fault out of lack of mature judgment, it may be concealed by his skill. But if the fault is due to lack of skill, it will immediately appear."

And so it is that the impropriety of a great poet, such as his well-known writing of the sexual enjoyment of the highest gods, does not appear as vulgarity because it is concealed by his skill. An example is the description of [Śiva's] enjoyment of Pārvatī in the *Kumārasambhava*.¹ That the charge of impropriety cannot be cancelled in such cases² has been shown in what follows [3.10-14 b A]. But it will appear in conclusion by positive and negative examples that this fault can be concealed by poetic skill. That is why, if a poet devoid of this skill were to describe this type of love in the area of such actors, his work would

clearly appear faulty. But if we adopt this view [that texture and qualities are one], what lack of beauty can we find in such such a stanza as "Whatever man proud of his strong arm"? The answer is that we may hypothesize a lack of beauty which is not perceived because it is concealed by skill.³

1. The reference is to the Eighth Canto, of which there is no good reason to doubt Kālidāsa's authorship. While the general meaning is clear, the exact wording and interpretation of Ānanda's text are in doubt. In the *BP* text, which we have adopted, it would also be possible to break the compound as *uttama-devatā-avīṣaya*; "(sexual enjoyment,) which is an improper area in dealing with the highest gods." Compare Abhinava's analogy *nir-vyājaparākramasya purusasyāviṣaye* 'p1. Furthermore, Dr. Krishnamoorthy has reported from his Moodabidre MS the reading *uttamadevatāviṣayapratiśiddhasambhogasṛṇigāra*: "such as his writing of sexual enjoyment, which is forbidden in the case of the highest gods." 2. *acūtiyatydāgas* (*MB MS.*, Krishnamoorthy) gives better sense than *acūtiyatydāgas* (*Kashi ed.*). 3. The quoted stanza fails to use long compounds to express the *rasa* of fury. Accordingly, since the quality strength (which by tradition is to be expressed by long compounds) belongs to fury, if quality and texture are the same, the stanza breaks the rules. I have long puzzled over this passage before deciding to adopt the interpretation suggested by the punctuation of the *Kashi* text and the specific direction of *BP*, which states that *nanu kim acārvutvam* is an objection, to which *apratiyamānam evāropayāmāḥ* is the answer. By so interpreting we are forced to recognize the *gunasarighaṭanaikya* theory as an alternative acceptable to Ānanda. My chief reason for accepting such a conclusion is that Ānanda uses the hypothesis of "fault hidden by skill" in 3.10-14 b A as though he approved of it. The reader will do well, however, to consider carefully a very different interpretation proposed by Badarināth Sārmā in his Sanskrit commentary, p. 272. The whole *gunasarighaṭanaikyapakṣa*, he says, is wrong and is not accepted by Ānanda. He interprets the present passage as follows. "But if we adopt this view [that texture and the qualities are one], will we [be willing to] superimpose on such a stanza as "Whatever man proud of his right arm" some wholly unperceived lack of beauty?" He goes on to say, "To hypothesize wilfully a lack of beauty in this stanza, when this lack is not perceived even by connoisseurs, is grossly unreasonable (*mahiṣasy anupapattiḥ*). Accordingly, this view [of the identity of quality and texture] is wrong."

L Or [let us], etc. What he has in mind is that the power of words to manifest *rasa* consists in their being textured in some particular fashion. Skill: the word *sakti* (lit., "power") means *pratibhāna*

(imagination or skill), the ability to make new presentations of everything one wishes to describe. Mature judgment (*vyutpatti*) is skill in the careful weighing (*pūrvāparaparāmarśa*) of all that may be helpful to such [presentation]. His lack of skill: that is, the poet's. Impropriety: the most important point in [producing] *rasa* is to avoid any disturbance of delight to those who are relishing it, because *rasa* is wholly tied to this relishing. Now treating the sexual enjoyment of the highest gods is like treating that of our parents. Shame and horror will leave us no room for delight. This is his meaning. Because it is concealed by his skill: for even sexual enjoyment is there so described by the imaginative poet that our heart fixes on the description itself without any careful weighing of the context, just as when a man of unimpeachable valor is engaged in a battle, even if it be in a wrong cause, we give him our bravos at that moment, but not later when we weigh the matter carefully. Such is our author's meaning.¹ Has been shown: he uses the past tense because the passage is by the author of the *Kārikas*,² for it will be stated that "for the spoiling of *rasa* there is no cause other than impropriety" [3.10-14 a A]. Is not perceived: that is, not even by those well-trained, who weigh matters carefully.

1. We are not convinced of the justice of this interpretation, however artistically Abhinava has phrased it. Ānanda says nothing about subsequent compunction. He says only that the impropriety is *tiraskṛta*, concealed, or 'more literally, set aside, by the poet's skill. Nor do we find that those who have once loved the Eighth Canto of the *Kumārasambhava* ever reverse their opinion of its beauty. Those critics who are shocked by its impropriety were doubtless shocked at their first reading. 2. This is an extraordinary statement, for the quoted passage is not a *Kārikā*. Nowhere else does Abhinava ascribe one of the *sāṅgraha-slokas*, or the *parikara-* or *sāṅkṣepa-slokas*, to the *Kārikākāra*. If one is to distinguish the *Kārikākāra* from the *Vṛttikāra*, the *śloka* here indicated (3.10-14 a A) must be ascribed either to the *Vṛttikāra* or to some extraneous author. If the *śloka* in question were a *kārikā*, the *Vṛttikāra* would have commented on it. I can only suppose that Abhinava's eagerness to justify the past tense of *darsitam* has led him into confusion.

A So, whether we suppose that texture and qualities are one or that they are different, we shall need some other determinant¹ of the correct use of texture. Accordingly, the *Kārikā* goes on to say: "The principle by which it is regulated is that it must be appropriate to the speaker and to what is to be said (*vācya*)."

1. Other than the rule which says that heavily compounded texture, as identical with strength, is productive of the *rasa* of fury.

L Or that they are different: if the two are different, there will be no principle for regulating the texture, while if they are one, the *rasas* cannot furnish the regulation.¹ So some other principle must be given.

The principle by which it is regulated, etc.: this forms the remaining portion of the *Kārikā* [3.6].

1. Because we see that the same type of texture can be used for quite different *rasas*.

A Of the two factors, the speaker may be the poet or a character invented by the poet. If the latter, he may be devoid of *rasa* and *bhāva*, or he may be possessed of *rasa* and *bhāva*.¹ The *rasa* may belong to the hero of the story, or to his rival. The hero of the story may be brave and noble (*dhirodātta*), or may belong to one of the other categories of heroes. Then too there are primary and secondary [heroes]. All these distinctions are possible. What is to be said (*vācya*) may be subsidiary to true *rasa*, which is the soul of *dhvani*, or it may be subsidiary to false or unconventional *rasa* (*rasābhāsa*). Its meaning may be dramatically representable or not. It may be concerned with upper class characters, or with others. Thus there are many varieties [of both speaker and content].

1. It is perfectly clear that Ānanda is here using *rasa* in its old sense of a particularly vivid emotion (*bhāva*), especially of love, not in the new sense established by Abhinava, of aesthetic delight. See Introduction, pp. 18-19.

L The hero of the story, called the *nāyaka* (leader) because he leads the story in the sense of subordinating it to his own activity, is he who enjoys the reward at the conclusion. Brave and noble, etc.: a brave and noble hero is most notably heroic in justice and righteous war; a brave and arrogant hero (*dhiroddhata*) is notable for herosim and fury; a brave and amorous hero (*dhiralalita*) is noted for heroism and love; a brave and spiritually calm hero (*dhirprasānta*) is noted for heroic generosity and justice and for his spiritual calm. These four types of hero are for the most part represented by the *sātvatī*, *ārabhatī*, *kaisikī*, and *bhāratī* modes of gesture and speech (*vṛtti*)¹ respectively. Primary refers to the main hero, secondary to the secondary hero. Distinctions: differences of speaker.

What is to be said (*vācya*): here "subsidiary to true *rasa*" means being a manifestor of this *rasa* which is the soul, that is, the very nature, of *dhvani*. [As *vācya* has also the more technical sense of "primary meaning," Abhinava now seeks to justify Ānanda's statement if the word is taken in that sense.] A primary sense (*vācya*) of dramatically representable meaning (*abhineyārtha*) is one where meaning in its suggested form, that is, the very nature of *dhvani*, can be brought (*neya*) into (*ābhimukhyam*) almost direct representation through speech, gesture, inner symptoms,² and costume. This is what is called [by Bharata] the goal of poetry (*kāvyārtha*). It alone is susceptible of enactment. As the sage [Bharata] has said in several places in such words as, "The *bhāvas* produce (*bhāvayanti*) the goals (or meanings) of poetry (*kāvyārtha*) with their accompaniment of speech, gesture, and inner symptoms."³ But as the primary sense (*vācya 'rthāḥ*) in the form of the *vibhāvas*, etc., is acted out in the course of enacting the *rasas*, it is quite proper to speak of the primary sense (*vācya*) as having a [further, suggested] sense that is dramatically representable (*abhineyārtha*).⁴ We should not speak here of *vyapadeśivadbhāva* as others have done.⁵ Others: that is, it may be concerned with middle class or lower class characters.

1. These four *vṛttayah* are described *BhNS* 20.8ff. They are not there associated with the different types of hero, which are listed *BhNS* 24.17. But

the first three associations are natural enough. The *sātuati* is the heroic mode *par excellence*, the *ārabhati* is the mode of violence, and the *kaisikī* the graceful, delicate mode. The *bhārati* is more difficult to characterize and is usually limited to speech, not gesture. For the history of the modes in criticism see V. Raghavan, *JOR* 6.346-370 and 7.34-52, 91-112. In what follows Kārikā 3.33 will refer briefly to the modes. *Vṛtti* in this sense is to be distinguished from *vṛtti* as a type of alliteration (see 1.1 a A, note 4). 2. Inner symptoms (*sattva*): what is meant are the *sāttvikabhadras*, e.g., blushing, perspiration, etc. 3. *BHNS*, prose preceding 7.1. We know of no other statement to this effect in *BHNS*. 4. Abhinava's point is that it is only the suggested meaning, the *rasas* and the like, that are really *abhineya* (to be dramatically represented). But it is justifiable to speak of the primary, literal sense as *abhineya* because it forms an ever-associated part of the process. 5. For *vyapadesivabhdva*, see *Paribhāṣendusekhara* 30. It is a grammatical technique by which one treats a linguistic element that lacks some particular mark as if it were an element which bears that mark. The following is a non-linguistic example. The demon Rāhu consists only of a head, but we speak of *rāhoḥ sīras* "the head of Rāhu," placing *rāhoḥ* in the genitive case as if Rāhu, like other beings, possessed a head. In the case at issue, some commentator(s) previous to Abhinava interpreted *vācyam* in *vācyam abhineyārtham* by this principle. The *vācyam* (primary meaning), they must have said, is nothing other than the *abhineyārthah* (the dramatically representable meaning). But in the grammatical analysis *yasya ortho 'bhineyas tād vācyam* it appears in the genitive, as if distinct. Abhinava solves the difficulty by saying that the dramatically representable meaning is not the literal meaning but the suggested meaning to which the literal meaning leads.

A Among these cases, when the poet as speaker is devoid of *rasa* and *bhāva*, the type of structure (*racanā*) is optional. The same holds when the speaker is a character invented by the poet and is without *rasa* and *bhāva*. But when the speaker, either the poet himself or a character invented by him, is possessed of *rasa* and *bhāva*, and when the *rasa*, from its being the predominant element, forms the soul of *dhvani*, then, by necessity,¹ only the uncompounded texture or the texture employing compounds of medium length can be used. But in the *rasas* of tragedy and love-in-separation [the restriction is greater and] only

the uncompounded texture [is allowed]. Why is this? Our answer is, that when a *rasa* is set forth as primarily important, one should do one's very best to avoid anything that interferes with or opposes the perception of it. As compounds can be interpreted in many ways, a texture of long compounds sometimes interferes with our perception of the *rasa*. Accordingly, in passages of *rasa*, the frequent use of this texture spoils the effect, especially in drama and, in other forms of literature, especially when the *rasa* is tragedy or love-in-separation, for these are very delicate *rasas* where the slightest lack of clarity delays our understanding of the words and meaning. On the other hand, when other *rasas* are being presented, such as fury, a texture of medium length compounds and sometimes, in order to describe the action of a hero who is brave and arrogant, even a texture of long compounds, may not be at fault and need not be entirely avoided, in view of the needs of a literal meaning that becomes appropriate to the *rasa* only by recourse to this texture.²

1. See note 1 on Abhinava's commentary below. 2. Ākṣepa: literally, a drawing toward oneself, or introducing into one's work. Badarīnātha Śarmā explains the implication of its use here by the gloss, ākṣepo 'nupopattimūlako 'dhyādhāraḥ, "the supplying of an element because failure would otherwise ensue." Note how Ānanda justifies the use of texture here. It is "appropriate to the *vācya*, because it enables the *vācya* to be appropriate to the *rasa*.

L Having thus listed the varieties of speaker and the varieties of what is to be said (or primary sense), he now states the appropriateness to each of these which regulates [the texture]: Among these cases.

Of structure: that is, of texture. An ascetic devoid of, that is, unmoved by, *rasa* or *bhāva*, may be helpful to the main *rasa* by his functioning in the plot, although he himself is indifferent. In his proper character, however, he is called devoid of *rasa*. The same: viz., option [of texture]. Having thus considered propriety as it relates solely to the speaker, he goes on to speak of it as combined with propriety to what is said: But when. Although the poet when he speaks should be filled with *rasa*, for otherwise the poem will be tasteless, as our author will state in the passage "If he himself becomes dispassionate," etc. [3.41-42a A], still, when he gives his chief attention to exhibiting skill in complicated figures such as *yamakas*, he is said to be devoid of *rasa*. [When] the speaker is restricted (*niyamena*) to one filled with *rasa* and *bhāva*, and so is not indifferent; and [when] the *rasa* is limited (*eva*)

to that type which is the soul of poetry, not being of the type which exhibits *rasa* as a figure of speech (*rasavadalañikāra*); then the type of texture must be only (*eva*) that which lacks compounds or which has compounds of medium length, whereas otherwise long compounds [are permissible]. This being the logical structure, one cannot complain of tautology in the use of the word *niyama* (restriction) and two restrictive particles *eva* [in one sentence].¹

Why is this: his attitude is, is this a pronouncement of some legal text? Our answer is: i.e., a reasonable explanation is. [Whatever interferes with] the perception of it: whatever interferes with the relishing of the *rasa*, that is, whatever is an obstacle to the relishing or opposes it by containing some contradictory relish. Can be interpreted: the compounds can be interpreted [by the reader] in many ways; but the texture is [also] a causal agent in this interpretation. Hence there are two causal suffixes in *sambhāvanā*.² Especially in drama: to begin with, one cannot act out the meaning of a compound without breaking up the suggested sense. The shifts of intonation and the like and the *antara* and *prasāda* songs³ are difficult to perform in this case. Furthermore, in this case [i.e., in the use of long compounds] the understanding [of the audience] is subject to constant doubts, which is improper in a play, because in a play the understanding should be direct and immediate. And in other forms of literature: in non-dramatic forms.

Delays our understanding: the sense is that our relishing of the *rasa* is hindered by the obstacles presented to it. [May not be at fault;] The reason why a texture of long compounds may cease to constitute a fault is that it may be needed by a literal meaning which has been chosen in order to suggest a *rasa*, which is appropriate to the *rasa*, but which is incapable of suggesting the *rasa* without the texture of long compounds. The explanation that has been given [by a previous commentator] of *tadākṣepa* as "[only] by drawing in the action of this hero" [instead of "by recourse to this texture"] does not fit well; so enough of that.

1. The problem is to explain the apparent presence of three expressions of restriction in the single sentence *yodā tu kovī ... saṅghatane*. Abhinava does so by explaining that three different variables are restricted, three areas are excluded. This explanation plays havoc with the word order; *niyamendiu* must go together. 2. Abhinava here avails himself of a grammatical fiction based on Pāṇ. 6.4.51 *ner anīśi*. By this rule the causative suffix *nic*

(= i > e > ay) drops before any further suffix that is anit. As nic itself is anit, a causative suffix will drop before a second causative suffix and a double causative will be phonetically the same as a simple causative. Thus "Caitra causes Maitra to cause the boy to eat rice" becomes *caitra maitrena bālam odanam bhojoyati* (= bhuj + [nic] + nic + sōp + ti). In the case at issue Abhinava is interpreting *somāśānām anekopratikārasambhāvanā* as "the causing by the texture of the reader to cause [i.e., bring about] a manifold analysis of compounds. 3. For *antaragāna* and *prasādagāna*, see ABh. on BHNS 6.29.

A The quality called "clarity" is required throughout all types of texture, for it has already been said that it is "common to all the rasas and common to all the textures."¹ If one swerves from clarity, even a texture without compounds will not suggest tragedy or love-in-separation. If one holds to it, even a texture of medium length compounds will not fail to reveal them. So clarity is always to be sought. Accordingly, if you feel that the quality strength is missing in the verse "Whatever man proud of his strong arms," [we would point out that at least] it has the quality called clarity and it does not have sweetness.² Furthermore, it does not lack beauty since it reveals the rasa which its author intended. So whether texture is one with qualities or whether it is different, the sphere of [the various types of] texture is regulated by the proprieties set forth above. In this way texture too is a suggestor of rasa. And the above mentioned principle of the regulation of texture as a cause of the manifestation of rasa [namely appropriateness to speaker and content] is precisely what regulates the qualities. So there is no contradiction in saying that the distribution (*vyaavasthāna*)³ of texture is dependent upon the qualities.

1. Ānanda is quoting his own remark from 2.10 A, substituting the synonym *sāṅghatana* for *rācana*. 2. Ānanda's point is that strength may not be required for *raudra rasa*. The quality of clarity without sweetness may suffice. 3. *Vyaavasthāna* implies the assignment of one type of texture to one type of speaker or content and of another type to another.

L Throughout: this is as much as to say that every type of texture is to be so constructed that there shall be immediate perception of

the primary sense. Has already been said: viz., under *Kārikā* 2.10: "A poem's ability to communicate," etc. Will not suggest: he means, because the suggestor will not transmit its own literal sense. To it: if one holds to clarity. As the matter [of clarity] is so important to our author, he explicitly gives a positive as well as a negative statement. It does not have sweetness: he implies that as strength and sweetness have already been described as mutually contradictory,¹ a combination of the two is quite unheard of. Intended: the sense is that the *raso* has been revealed simply by clarity; it is wrong to say it has not been revealed. So: The meaning of the whole passage [3.6-3.6 i] may be stated as follows. If the qualities are one with texture, the regulation of the texture will be identical with the regulation of the qualities. In the view that texture depends on the qualities, we reach the same conclusion. Even if the qualities depend on texture, the very appropriateness to speaker and content which have been described as regulating, as being sources of, the texture, will likewise be sources for the regulation of the qualities. Thus there is no serious fault in any of the three views.²

1. See 2.9 L, last paragraph. 2. This may be true, but Ānanda never specifically defends the third view.

K Also another sort of appropriateness, namely to the [particular] *vishaya* (genre) [in which one is writing], regulates the texture, for texture differs as it is found to occur in different varieties of literature.

A In addition to what is appropriate to speaker and content, that which is appropriate to the *vishaya* (genre) also regulates the texture. For the varieties of literature are many, such as the *muktaka* (independent stanza), which is written in Sanskrit, Prakrit, or Apabhraṃśa; the *sandānitaka* (couplet), *viseṣaka* (triplet), *kalāpaka* (quatrain), and *kulaika* (connected group of more than four stanzas); the *paryāyabandha* (poem on a fixed subject); *parikathā* (round of stories); *khandakathā*

(short story) and *sakalakathā* (complete story); the poem in canto (i.e., the Sanskrit *mahākāvya*); the play; the *ākhyāyikā* and *kathā* (two types of tale); and others. Texture assumes a particular form as it occurs in one or another of these.

L He shows that there is another principle of regulation: to the *vिषया*. The word *vिषया* means a particular aggregate (*saṅghāta*). And just as a man who enters a social aggregate such as the army, even if he should be individually a coward, adapts himself to the character appropriate to an army, just so a poetic sentence introduced into a particular aggregate such as a couplet, must become appropriate thereto. If the *muktaka* (independent stanza) has been listed under the word *vिषया*, this is only in order to show that because of the absence of any aggregation of poetic units in the *muktaka*, it is entirely free [of regulation by aggregate] and rests on itself like the ether [of the Upanishads].¹

By the word also he as much as says: when there also exists a need to be appropriate to speaker and content, the need to be appropriate to the *vिषया* extends only to differences of degree; the need to be appropriate to speaker and content is never set aside by the need of the *vिषया*.

The *muktaka*: the term is formed from *mukta*, "freed," not bound to anything else, plus the suffix *kan* used in forming a conventional term (*sañjñā*).² Because of [the conventional associations of] this [term], a verse occurring independently in a cohesive form of literature, even if that verse is in no need of syntactical completion, is not called a *muktaka*. The adjectival phrase "written in Sanskrit, [Prakrit, or Apabhramśa]" qualifies *muktaka* only.³ He names the languages in this order because they originated in this order. In a *sandānitaka* the syntax is completed in two verses, in a *videṣaka* in three, in a *kalāpaka* in four, in a *kulaka* in five or more. These varieties are expressed in a copulative compound because they all possess the property of being distinguished by the length of their sentences. *Paryāyabandha* is a description of springtime, etc. Although the sentences (i.e., stanzas) which it contains are complete in themselves [and so make up a plurality, so to speak] it goes under the title of the single object which is to be described.⁴ A *parikathā* concerns one or another of the four goals of man, such as *dharma*, which it exhibits variously with a wealth of incident and description.⁵ A *khandakathā* contains only a portion [of

the above]. A *sakalakathā* follows all the plots to their conclusion. These two types have been named together in a copulative compound because they are both commonly found in Prakrit. In the previous types, from the *muktaka* on, there is no limitation of language. The poem composed in cantos (*sargabandha*) is the *mahākāvya*, treating all the aims of man and describing everything.⁶ It is written in Sanskrit only.⁷ The play consists of the ten types together with such sub-types as the *nāṭikā*, *troṭaka*, *rāsaka*, *prakaranikā*, etc., and is written in a mixture of languages. The *ākhyāyikā* is a tale divided into chapters called *ucchuḍsa*, etc., and contains occasional verses in *vaktra*, *apavaktra*, and other meters. The *kothā* lacks these two characteristics. The two are expressed in a copulative compound because they are both written in prose. And others: this will include the *campū*. Dandin says: "the *campū* is written in a mixture of prose and verse." (1.31).

1. Abhinava's interpretation of *viṣaya* as *saṅghāta* gives him an opportunity for the fine simile of the man in the army, but it falsifies Ānanda's view. *Viṣaya* (area, sphere, genre) simply does not mean *saṅghāta* (aggregation). Ānanda means, for example, that one type of texture (relative lack of compounds) is appropriate in the sphere of plays, another type of texture (relatively long compounds) is appropriate in the sphere of the *ākhyāyikā* and *kathā*. This is borne out by the majority of extant examples of these genres. Compare, for example, the texture of the *Ratnāvalī* with that of the *Dasa-kumāracarita* or the *Kādambarī*. The reason that a sentence of the *Kādambarī* may be textured in long compounds is not that it must fit with other sentences of the *Kādambarī*; this would be circular reasoning. It is permitted to be so textured because it is in the sphere (genre) of the *kathā*. Abhinava's difficulty in explaining how the *muktaka*, an independent verse that has no fellows, can be brought under the word *viṣaya* is a difficulty of his own making.

2. See Pāṇ. 5.3.87. It is important from Abhinava's view to derive the word thus, rather than from *mukta* + *svārthe kah*. A *sañjñā* always denotes something more specific than the mere etymology of the word would warrant. Thus, *kroṣṭa* as a common agent noun means "a bowler"; but as a *sañjñā* the same word means only a jackal. So in the case at issue. As a common noun *muktaka* would mean a free entity or a small, free entity. As a *sañjñā*, according to Abhinava, it means, more specifically, a verse that is free not only by the fact that its syntax is not bound to its neighbors, but by the fact that it is not inserted into some other genre of literature. Krishnamoorthy translates *muktaka* as "a pearl," as if derived from *muktā*, but one cannot justify such an etymology by Pāṇini.

3. Something is wrong here. Either the word *eva* must be rejected, or a sentence of explanation must be supplied; because Abhinava says below that the types from *muktaka* onward (presumably on

through *parikathā*) are all unregulated in respect to language. *BP* supplies the needed explanation: "the adjective compound applies [strictly] only to *muktaka* because the termination of the compound is singular. But we are to draw it down to *sandānitaka*, etc., and supply the necessary conversion to plural." 4. This definition would fit many of the *sakatas* preserved in Sanskrit. 5. Bhoja's example of a *parikathā*, the *Sūdrakakathā*, seems to have taken *kāma* for its subject, on which it gathered a number of stories around (*pari*) King *Sūdraka*. It was written in Prakrit, whereas Abhinava seems to imply that such works should be in Sānskrit. On the type see V. Raghavan, *Bhoja's SP*, pp. 591-593, 604, 805-806. In the same book he also gives such information as is available, unfortunately very little, on the next two genres. 6. "Everything" is an exaggeration. What is meant is the long list of subjects demanded by the ancient critics, e.g., *Dandin* 1.16-17. 7. Prakrit poems of the same type were called *skandhakabandha* (*Dandin*) or *āśvābandha* (Bhoja).

A Among these [different genres], the principle that applies in *muktakas* is that when the poet seeks *rasa* formation, the texture should be appropriate to that [*raso*]. This has already been shown [cf. 3.6 b A]. When [his intention] is otherwise, [the texture is] optional. There are examples of a poet's seeking *rasa* formation in the genre of *muktakas*, just as he might seek it in a long poem. It is well known that a single *muktaka* of the poet Amaru, for example, may flow with a flavor of love (*śringārarasa*) equal to that of a whole volume. But in the *sandānitaka* and the other [syntactically connected verse sequences] a texture of medium length or of long compounds is in order, because of their appropriateness to the wider area of composition. Where these sequences occur, however, in long poems, the texture should follow whatever is appropriate to the given longer poem.

But in the *paryāyabandha* [as opposed to the *sandānitaka*, etc.,] the texture is non-compounded or of medium length compounds. Even if on occasion one may use long compounds because of their appropriateness to the subject matter, one should avoid both the harsh and the vulgar types of alliteration.¹ In the *parikathā* the texture is optional, for its concern is solely with the telling of stories and there is therefore no

particular intention to create *rasa*. The *khandakathā* and *sakalakathā* are commonly found in Prakrit. As they contain many *kulas* and other [syntactically connected verse sequences], there is no objection to their having long compounds. The choice of alliteration² should accord with the *rasa*.

In the Sanskrit *mahākāvya* when its overall purpose is *rasa*, the texture should be appropriate to the *rasa*; otherwise, the texture is optional. For we see that the authors of *mahākāvyas* have traveled on both roads. *Rasa* is the better purpose to have in view.

In plays, as opposed to the foregoing genres, one should always seek *rasa* formation.

1. Harsh and vulgar *vṛttis* have reference to types of alliteration that are too obvious, the first by its piling up of harsh phonemes and conjuncts, the second by its exclusion of all conjuncts and its overuse of soft phonemes; see 1.1 a A, note 4 and 1.1 a L, note 4. *Vṛtti* is here used in the sense employed in 1.1 a A, to be distinguished from that of 3.6 g L. 2. The compound *vṛtyaucitya* is evidently of different formation from the compounds *prabandhaucitya* and *orthaucitya* used a few lines above and from the terms *vaktrvācyaucitya* and *viṣayaucitya* used by Abhinava in 3.7 L. The present compound means the appropriateness of the alliterative style, whereas those other compounds were elliptical, e.g., *prabandhaucitya* = *prabandhagataucitya* or *prabandhāśrīaucitya*, "the appropriateness to the type of work." Ānanda uses the term again 3.16 f A, 3.19 K, and 3.18-19 c A.

L When otherwise: sc., when he does not seek rasa formation.

Now it may be asked, how can there be a combination of *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, and *vyabhicārins*, by which a *rasa* could be attained, in [so short a space as] a *muktaka*? With this in mind, he says: "there are examples [in the genre] of *muktakas*." In the following stanza of Amaru there is a clear perception of the *vibhāvas* and the rest in all their perfection.

She had suffered in his absence
and finally agreed to take her lover back;
and then he called her carelessly
by another woman's name.
She pretended not to hear, but glanced aside
in terror that her unforgiving friend had heard;
then seeing that her friend
had left the room, she ceased to care.

The wider area: What he means is that if a texture without compounds is used [in such long sentences], our understanding is delayed, being held in suspension and forced to travel the long road to the verb, so that by the time it has apprehended the literal meaning it is already weary and not in a position to relish the [suggested] *rasa*.¹ Occur in long poems: That is, when any of the verse sequences from the *sandānitaka* to the *kulaka* so occur. Or we may take the view that the *muktaka* may occur in a longer genre as well [as in a collection of *mutakas*], for a *muktaka* can be any stanza the relishing of the *rasa* of which is independent of what precedes and follows, as the stanza "When I would paint you as you stood after we had quarreled."² On occasion: viz., in the area of fury and the like. No particular intention: The logical connection is: the texture is optional because there is no particular intention to create *rasa*.

The choice of alliteration: the harsh, gentlemanly (*upanāgarikā*) and vulgar types of alliteration should be appropriate to the type of work and to the *rasa*. Otherwise: When its purpose lies only in the narrative, the type of alliteration also is optional. On both roads: the word is locative. A *mahākavya* like the *Kādambarikathásāra* of Bhāṭṭa Jayantaka³ is concerned only with narrative, while poems like the *Raghuvamśa* are concerned with *rasa*. Others have explained "both roads" as referring to Sanskrit and Prakrit. But this would be an unpardonable obscurity,⁴ for to what then would our author be referring when he says that of these "*rasa* is the better purpose to have in view?"

1. One must bear in mind that in *rasadhvani* the *rasa* unfolds immediately from the poem. Where there is a delay in the perception, as in *lakṣitakramavayangya*, we are dealing with a different type of poetry. Now this immediate, unitary perception can be achieved without compounds in short sentences, for they follow the natural syntax of everyday speech. But in a sentence extending over several verses the suspensions become difficult. We must hold the sense of three or four words in our mind before we come to the verb that gives them meaning. Even after we come to the verb, there may be a delay while the mind fits the puzzle together. In such sentences the comprehension is aided in Sanskrit by compounds, just as it is aided in Greek and Latin by the conventions of classical syntax (subjunctive, optative, infinitive clauses), which Sanskrit lacks.
2. This is *Meghadūta* 110 (2.42). Abhinava calls it a *muktaka* because it can be taken out of the *Meghadūta* with no harm to the *rasa* of the verse, which could apply to any lover separated from his love. At this rate, of course, many of our favorite verses of Kālidāsa would be

muktakas. 3. Our text reads *bhattajayantakasya*, but the reading is in question and the fact is that the *Kādambarikāthāśāra* was written by Abhinanda, the son of Jayantabhaṭṭa. Conceivably the *ka* of *jayantakasya* is a diminutive or pejorative. But V. Raghavan (*Bhoja's SP*, p. 592, n. 2) reports that India Office MS 1135 (of the *Locana*) here reads *bhattajayantasutasyābhinandasya* etc. *kādambarikāthāśāre*. 4. For the fault of *neyārtha* see *Bhāmaha* 1.38 and *Vāmana* 2.1.12.

A As the *ākhyāyikā* and *kathā* consist chiefly of prose and as the methods of prose composition differ from those of verse, the basis of the regulation [of the texture] in prose, which has not been touched on before, is here set forth briefly.

K The aforesaid propriety governs texture everywhere, even in prose, although it lacks the regulations of meter.

A The regulation already given of texture, that it must be appropriate to the speaker and content with due consideration given to genre, is the source of regulation in prose, even though prose lacks the regulation of meter. Thus, there too, when the poet or the character invented by the poet is devoid of *rasa* and *bhāva*, [the type of texture is] optional; but when the speaker is possessed of *rasa* or *bhāva*, one must follow the aforesaid regulation. Even here [sc., in prose], appropriateness to genre [is to be observed]. The *ākhyāyikā* is distinguished by a predominance of medium length or long compounds because the beauty (*chāya*) of prose depends on its long sentences and they are carried to the greatest extent in the *ākhyāyikā*. In the *kathā*, although it contains many long sentences of prose, one should observe the proprieties relating to *rasa* which we have given.

L With due consideration given to genre: by the word *viṣaya* we are here to understand the varieties of prose composition.

K Whenever it is based on the aforesaid appropriateness to *rasa* formation, the texture (*racanā*) will be beautiful. But this [factor of propriety] is given some variety by considerations of genre.

A Rather, [we may put the matter thus.] In prose just as in verse a texture (*racanā*) based on the aforesaid appropriateness to *rasa* formation will be everywhere beautiful. This [propriety] will assume some alteration by considerations of genre, but will not be wholly changed. For example, even in prose a texture of very long compounds will not be beautiful in an *ākhyāyikā* in passages of love-in-separation or tragedy, while in a play a structure [completely] without compounds will not be beautiful in a description of fury or heroism. But the appropriateness to the genre takes away from or adds to the measure [given by the *rasa*]. Thus in an *ākhyāyikā* one will never go so far as to write without any compounds at all, while in plays, etc., which are the sphere [of uncompounded texture], one will never go so far as to write with really long compounds. This is the direction to pursue in the matter of texture.¹

1. A summary verse appears at this point in MS ga of the KM edition, in Krishnamoorthy's Moodabidre MS, and in the *Kalpadatāviveka*. It has been accepted in the text printed by Badarināth Śarmā. *Iti kāvyārthaiveko yo 'yam cetāscamatkṛtividhāyi / sūribhir anusṛtasārair asmadupajño na vismar-yah*: "This discriminative understanding of poetry, which imparts delight to the mind and has been discovered by us, should not be forgotten by scholars who are in search of basic principles." We must understand *asmadupajño* as a *bahuvrihi* modifying *vivekoḥ*, although such compounds are normally used as neuter *tatpuruṣas*; cf. Pāṇ. 2.4.21. It is not clear to just what *ayam kāvyārthaiveko* refers and the verse is not mentioned by Abhinava. It seems unlikely that it belongs in Ānanda's text.

L He now sets forth clearly the correct position: Whenever it is based on the aforesaid appropriateness to rasa formation, etc.

In the *Vṛtti* the word "rather" (*vā*)¹ indicates that this position alone is correct, as in the verse:

Women, kings, poison, fire,
may be used, carefully, to advantage.
Or rather say, however used,
they bring us only grief.

Racanā: the word means *sanghaṭanā* (texture).

Is appropriateness to the genre then wholly abandoned? He says, not so. The very appropriateness to the rasa by its dependence, for help, on the genre, becomes a factor possessed of some variety, that is, of subsidiary variations, in the course of its development. This is what he explains in the sentence beginning with this [propriety].

Wholly: the word *śarvākāram* is used as an adverb. Without compounds: supply "completely." For the sage [Bharata] has said in defining dramatic presentation (*vakyābhinaya*) "by clear, uncompounded words," etc.² [He here states an exception: "and not," etc.]³ In plays, etc.: this construes with "which are the sphere."

1. In other contexts *vā* means no more than "or." But when introducing the second or last point of view in a discussion, it often indicates the author's preference for that point of view. The verse here quoted by Abhinava exemplifies this force of indication. 2. *Cūrṇapadaḥ prasannaiḥ*: Is the text here corrupt? The only pertinent quotation we have found in Bharata is: *nānārasārthaḥ urttanibaddhais kṛtaḥ sacūrṇapadaḥ / prāktasamksṛtapātho vākyābhinayo budhair jñeyah* (*BhNS* 22.44). The term *cūrṇapada* (uncompounded words) is defined *BhNS* 14.40. 3. As there is no *na ca* in our printed text of the *Vṛtti*, we bracket the passage. But Abhinava might have read *na ca raudravirādiuvarṇane* (Text p. 328, line 3).

3.10-14 Introduction

A Now it is well known that *dhvani* where no interval is perceived between the literal and suggested meanings, in its whole-work variety,¹ appears in such works as the *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata*. Just how it is so made to appear, however, will be explained in the following.

1. That is, in that variety where the whole work rather than a word or sentence, etc., acts as manifestor. For the word *ātman* in the sense of "variety," cf. 2.20 A, opening sentence.

L It has been explained above how poetry of unperceived interval is revealed in the presence of texture.¹ That it may be revealed by a work taken as a whole is a matter beyond dispute that needs no special statement. In order, however, to instruct poets and sensitive readers in the means of achieving such suggestion in a work as a whole, these means should be described. Hence what follows. Now: the syntax of this word carries on. The sense is: "now the various means will be explained."

1. The locative case is here *ni* indicating that the texture acts as a cause of the revelation.

3.10-14

K The means by which a work as a whole becomes a suggestor of *rasas* and the like [are five].

(1) The forming of a plot, either traditional or imagined, which will be beautiful because of the appropriateness of its *vibhāvas*, (*sthāyi-*) *bhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, and *sāncārins*.

(2) The abandoning of a pattern traditionally imposed on a story if it fails to harmonize [with the intended *rasa*]; and the introduction, by invention if need be, of incidental narrative appropriate to that *rasa*.

(3) The construction of *sandhis* and *sandhyāngas* designed to reveal the *rasa* and not brought in merely out of a desire to fulfill the requirements of a textbook system.

(4) Intensifying and relaxing of the *rasa* at the appropriate occasions within the work; and the revival of the predominant *rasa* whenever it begins to fail.

(5) The application of figures of speech in conformity with the *rasa* even though one may have the ability to construct more elaborate figures.

A It has been said above [3.2] that a whole work may be a suggestor of *rasa* and the like. "The means by which it becomes a suggestor" are: first, "the forming of a plot which will be beautiful because of the appropriateness of the *vibhāvas*, (*sthāyibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, and *sañcārins*)." That is to say, if [each] *vibhāva*, *bhāva*, *anubhāva*, and *sañcārin* is adapted to the *rasa* or *bhāva* which the poet wishes to convey, the plot will be beautiful because of the appropriateness of these elements. The forming of such a plot is one means by which a work as a whole becomes a suggestor. What is meant here by appropriateness of the *vibhāvas* to the *rasa* is obvious. Appropriateness of the (*sthāyi-*) *bhāvas* is derived from appropriateness of the characters. Characters differ by their having the emotions (*bhāvas*) of the upper, middle, or lower classes and by their having the emotions of gods or humans. A basic emotional drive (*sthāyibhāva*) that is described by following these distinctions and not confusing them will be "appropriate." On the other hand, if one describes the energy (*utsāha*) or the like of a god as belonging to a mere human, or that of a mere human as belonging to a god, the emotion will be inappropriate. For example, in a passage dealing with a king who is a mere human, if one describes activities in which he leaps across the seven seas, one's description, even if beautiful in itself, will as a rule be without *rasa* and tasteless. The reason for this would be its inappropriateness.

L First: The various means by which a work as a whole may be suggestive of *rasa* can be described helpfully only if presented in a

certain order. First, then, comes of the consideration of plot. Next, the insertion of other elements, the carrying [of the whole] to a conclusion, watchfulness over the *rasa*, and finally the appropriateness of the figures of speech used to describe the appropriate *vibhāvas*, etc. [The Kārikās] now set forth these five elements in order: The means by which, etc.

The appropriateness of these elements: If one would describe love, one should adopt a plot in which there may be a clear appearance of such *vibhāvas* as seasons,¹ garlands, etc., of *anubhāvas* such as playful gestures (*līlā*),² and of *sācarins* such as joy, firmness, etc. Obvious: being known from everyday life as well as from Bharata's textbook. Activities: the term is meant to include the basic emotional drive of energy which would find its scope in such activities. For it is the appropriateness of a *sthāyibhāva* that is under discussion at this point, not the appropriateness of an *anubhāva*.³ Even if beautiful: so far as the power of description is concerned. For this: viz., for this tastelessness.

1. Springtime is a favorite *uddīpanavibhāva* of love-in-enjoyment, the rains of love-in-separation. 2. Bharata places *līlā* among the *vibhāvas* rather than the *anubhāvas* (*BhNS* Vol. I, p. 303), but by the term he probably means graceful costume or general attractiveness of the characters. Abhinava, on the other hand, seems to be using the word in its sense of playful or amorous gesture; it would thus include the sidelong glances (*BhNS* 1, p. 305), revealing motions of the arms (*Bhaṭṭalollāṭa*, quoted by Mammata, p. 87), and similar gestures, regularly included in the *anubhāvas*. 3. The *vyāpāra* (activities) of the king would properly speaking form an *anubhāva*, a subject not properly under discussion here. Hence Abhinava's explanation that *vyāpāra* really refers to the *utsāha* (a *sthāyibhāva*) which prompts the activities.

3.10-14 a

A But now we hear of such adventures as journeys to the nether world taken by King Sātavāhana and others. So what impropriety is there in describing the extraordinary and superhuman power of kings who ruled over all the earth? The objection is not to the point. We do not say that descriptions of the extraordinary power of kings are inappropriate; rather, that in a narrative which has been invented and

is based on purely human characters, matters that are appropriate to gods are unfitting. If the character in a narrative is partly divine and partly human, there is no contradiction in introducing matters appropriate to both, as in the narrative of Pāndu and his sons. As for the heroic deeds traditionally ascribed to Sātavāhana and others like him, if we treat of their deeds within the traditional limits, our description will be proper. But anything other than that, even in the case of such kings as these, will be improper. The heart of the matter may be put thus:

For the spoiling of rasa there is no cause
other than impropriety. On the other hand,
composing a work within recognized proprieti
is the very Upanishad of rasa.¹

Accordingly, Bharata has laid down a rule which must be observed in the making of plays of the nāṭaka type: that "they shall contain a well known plot and a hero who is well known and noble" (*BhNS* 18.10). By this means the poet will not find himself in doubt concerning the hero's appropriateness to the rasa or his lack thereof. But if one were to compose a nāṭaka or some other type of play² by using an invented plot and a hero that is not well-known and not appropriate, he would commit a great folly.

1. Upanishad: i.e., the true means of attaining the goal. The verse has already been referred to by Abhinava 3.6 e L. 2. The word *nd̄takādi* presents difficulties, for strictly speaking a play with an invented plot cannot be called a nāṭaka. Abhinava offers several explanations; cf. end of L section below. It seems to me that Ānanda's lack of clarity is due to his compressing several ideas into a short space. He seems to mean the following. If one were to compose a nāṭaka with a hero whose character does not fit the recognized proprieties, or if one were to compose a play other than a nāṭaka with an invented plot and an inappropriate hero, for the likelihood of the hero's impropriety would be greater in an invented plot, the result would be faulty.

L But anything other than: i.e., in addition to that. What our author really implies is this. Matters should be so described that there may be no breach in the credence of the audience. That a mere mortal should leap over the seven seas in a single stride is quite impossible and would strike the hearer's heart as a falsehood. Hence it would instill into his judgment a suspicion that the poem's teaching

concerning the means to all the four goals of man was also untrue.¹ A similar feat, however, if told of Rāma, would not strike the audience as untrue, for it would have acquired conviction from a long line of ancient tradition. It is for this reason that our author says that even in the case of Rāma, if other wondrous powers are invented, they too will be improper. So one should not describe something that cannot be believed.

By this means: viz., by using a well known plot and a noble hero. Find himself in doubt: i.e., ask himself what he should write. If one: if a poet. A great folly: The general sense is that this is the reason why the sage Bharata did not describe nāṭakas and the like with invented plots and thus one should not attempt them. The element ādi in nāṭakādi means "similar to." Its purpose is to refer to the dīpa and the like, where the well known exploits of a god are described. Another commentator, however, has said that nāṭakādi is a bahuvrīhi denoting a subsidiary element² and that what is meant is a prakarana. Or, we may take a different reading: nāṭikādi. There again the sense of ādi will be "similar to." Now Bharata defines the nāṭikā as a play in which "by its combining the character of a prakarana and a nāṭaka the plot is invented and the hero is a king" (BhNS 18.58). Accordingly, we are to understand [the term nāṭikādi] as referring to the invented plot [of the one component] and the kingly hero [of the other component] respectively.

1. Abhinava expatiates on this subject (*propattāv ayogyatā*) in ABh 1, pp. 280 ff. Cf. also Masson and Patwardhan, Sāntarasa p. 74. 2. By this explanation nāṭakādi would be an *atadgunasamivijñānabahuvrīhi*, meaning "a play belonging to the list of play types in which nāṭaka stands first." The term would not refer to nāṭaka, but to the subsidiary members of the list, such as the prakarana, the type of play with invented plot. Two objections may be raised. First, ādi-compounds are invariably of the other, *tadguna*, type (see *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇ. 1.1.27) except in the hands of ingenious commentators (e.g., Kāśikā on Pāṇ. 6.1.6; Śaṅkara and Bhāskara on *Brahmasūtra* 1.1.2, etc.). Second, suppose we allow nāṭakādi to stand for prakarana. If a play were to have a well known hero, it could not be called a prakarana. So we have jumped out of the frying pan into the fire.

3.10-14 b

A An objector may here grant that in describing the basic driving force of energy and the like the poet must take into some consideration the differing proprieties of the human and the divine. But what is the use of such consideration, he may ask, in dealing with love? Surely the love of gods may be described by the actions that are appropriate to love here in India. Such an objection would be wrong. From improprieties in this area even greater faults will ensue. Thus, if we assign a type of love to characters of the upper class by recourse to what is appropriate to the lower class, how ridiculous will be the result! Even in India what is appropriate in love differs according to the three classes of men. But, says the objector, that the proprieties of the gods should differ from those of humans [in matters of energy and the like] cannot help us here in dealing with matters of love. We answer by pointing out that we do not claim any difference between divine and human proprieties in the sphere of love. Indeed, love among the gods will be well described if it is based on love as practised among the upper classes, such as kings, here in India. But just as what is recognized as vulgar love is not found to be attached to kings in plays of the *nāṭaka* type and the like, just so should it be avoided in writing of the gods. If you say that *nāṭakas* and the like are performed, and that it is because the performance of sexual enjoyment is indecent that this subject is there avoided, we reject [your limitation]. If a performance of this subject is indecent, how can a poetic description of the same subject be free of the same charge? Accordingly, whether in the literature of performance or in poetry which is not performed, the description of vulgar sexual enjoyment between characters of the upper classes, kings and ladies, is highly indecent, just like a description of the sexual enjoyment of our parents. Precisely the same charge appears within the sphere of the gods.

Furthermore, sexual intercourse is not the only form of love-in-enjoyment (*sambhogasāringāra*). Other forms, such as the interchange of glances and the like are possible and can be used in writing of upper class characters. Thus, that which is appropriate to the character is to be followed in treating of sexual desire (*rati*) just as of energy (*utsāha*). The same is true of wonder (*vismaya*) and the other *sthāyibhāvas*.

The fact that literature furnishes examples of careless writing by great poets in this area [of sex] is to be accounted a fault of those poets. But, as they have concealed it by means of their skill, it passes unnoticed, as we have already remarked (3.6 e A).

The need for appropriateness of the *anubhāvas* {to the *rasa*} is obvious in Bharata and other authorities.

L In answer to the question how a poet is then to write about love-in-enjoyment, he says "[sexual intercourse] is not [the only form]," etc. Thus: Bharata too, in various places and in diverse ways, has made appropriateness to the character a criterion [for the description] of *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, and the like, as when he says [of the *vyabhicāribhāva* surprise (*āvega*)] that it is received "with fortitude by upper and middle class characters and with consternation by the low."¹

BhNS 7.63, where the text reads *cāpasarpanaiḥ* (running away) in place of the consternation (*sambhramena ca*) here quoted.

3.10-14 c

A What the foregoing amounts to is this. A poet who follows the system of Bharata and others, who studies the work of great poets of the past, and who gives rein to his own genius, must still be attentive and exert the greatest care not to relax or depart from the proprieties of the *vibhāvas* and the other factors of *rasa*. In saying that the choice of an appropriate plot, whether traditional or invented, will be suggestive of *rasa*, the *Kārikā* implies that however many and delightful (*rasavat*) may be the tales furnished by tradition and history, the poet must choose for his plot only such a one as will furnish *vibhāvas*, etc., appropriate to his *rasa*. He must be even more careful if he invents his plot than if he takes it from tradition, for if the poet stumbles here out of heedlessness, he will incur a heavy suspicion of his lack of judgment. The following verse gives support {to our position}.

A plot consisting of invented matter should be so made
that every portion of it may appear full of *rasa*.

The means of achieving this is to keep exactly to the proprieties of *vibhāva*, etc. And this we have shown.

L What the foregoing amounts to: in brief, the poet should follow knowledge of the rules, a study of the literature, and the inspiration that is given him by destiny. The word *rasavat* (lit., possessing *rasa*) is a locative of despite.¹ The possession of *rasa* (by such tales) is here considered as merely the false opinion of the undiscriminating, for how could they possess *rasa* without the *vibhāvas*, etc., appropriate thereto? The poet: the reason is that he cannot here plead the excuse that he was led astray by tradition. Of achieving this: of achieving fulness of *rasa*.

1. This is the same abuse of Pāṇ. 2.3.38 that Abhinava employed in explaining *suyodhanasya* in 2.9 A. It allows him to take *rasavatīṣu* here in its technical sense, whereas we have taken the word in its popular meaning ("delightful").

3.10-14 d

A A further point:

There are sources of stories like the *Rāmāyana* which are famous for perfected *rasa*. One must not join matter of one's choice with them if it contradicts this *rasa*.

Into these stories one must not add matter of one's own choice. As has been said: "not the slightest departure from the story's path."¹ Even if one should add matter of one's own choice, one must not add anything that contradicts the *rasa*.

1. As Abhinava informs us, the quotation is from Yaśovarman's *Rāmābhūdaya*. We can judge from Bhoja, who quotes the whole verse, that the passage comes from the introduction to that lost play. The date of its composition doubtless falls before the defeat of its author by Lalitāditya of Kashmir (see *RajTār.* 4.134-140), which is perhaps to be set in A.D. 733 (see Introduction, p. 2) and certainly within a few years of that date. For the text of the complete verse, see V. Raghavan, *Bhoja's SP*, pp. 393, 418. It runs as follows:

acūtyam vacasām prakṛtyanugatam sarvatra pātrocitā
puṣṭih svāvasare rasasya ca kathāmarge na cātikramah
śuddhiḥ prastutasamvidhānakavidhau praudhis ca śabdārthayoh
vidvad�hiḥ paribhāvyatām avahitair elāvad evāstu nah

Words appropriate to each character
and each character appropriate to the whole;
a fulness of rasa at the right occasion
and no departure from the story's path;
a clear arrangement of component parts
together with elaborated words and sense;
such are the virtues which we hope may win
attention from our learned audience.

L Perfected (*siddha*): in such works the rasa awaits only the relishing; there is no need to work it out. Sources of stories, that is, histories. Matter of one's own choice should not be added to the matter of these histories. A relation of accompaniment [expressed by the instrumental case] here in the quoted verse is explained [in the *Vṛtti*] by the relation between area and occupant of the area. Thus the *Vṛtti* says, into these stories, using the locative case. Matter of one's choice must not be added into these stories. If for some reason or other something is added, it must not be something that contradicts the established rasa. For example, if one were to give Rāma a brave and amorous character and make him the hero of a nātikā, the result would be outrageous. As has been said: viz., in the *Rāmābhydaya* of Yaśovarman.

3.10-14 e

A [Commentary on point (2) of 3.10-14 K.] Now for another means by which a work as a whole may become suggestive of rasa: the abandoning of a pattern traditionally imposed on a story if it fails in any way to harmonize with the rasa; and the introduction, by invention if need be, of incidental narrative appropriate to that rasa. This is to be carried out as it is done in the works of Kālidāsa and in the *Hari-vijaya* of Sarvasena¹ and in my own *mahākāvya*, the *Arjunacarita*. A poet when writing a poem must concentrate with all his soul on the

rasa. If he observes a pattern in the story that goes against the *rasa*, he should eliminate it and bring in some other story appropriate to the *rasa* by his invention. A poet has no need to carry out a mere chronicle of events. That is a task accomplished by the historian.

1. See 3.1f A, note 1 and Abhinava's remark on the present passage.

L A pattern: The way the narrative is arranged.¹ Of Kālidāsa: the descriptions of the marriages, etc., of such kings as Aja in the *Raghuvamśa* are not found in the traditional histories. In the *Harivijaya* the abduction of the pārijāta tree is described as part of Krishna's assuagement of his beloved, a pattern which is not found in the traditional accounts.² Again, in the *Arjunacarita* the description of Arjuna's victorious battles in Pātāla and such like matters are not found in traditional accounts. This is quite right according to our author, who goes on to say: A poet, etc.

1. *yathāsāyā*: see 1.13b *L*, note 6. 2. The remark is of interest, for this is precisely the pattern of the story in the Vulgate version of the *Harivamśa*; see Bombay text 2.65-76. These chapters follow on the simple statement of 2.64 that Krishna dug up a pārijāta tree and took it to Dvārakā. They record the jealousy of Satyabhāmā, Krishna's assuaging promise to give her the tree which brings youth and assures a wife of her husband's love, Krishna's battle with Indra, and the transportation of the stolen tree to Dvārakā on the back of an elephant. These chapters are found in all MSS collated by the critical edition except those of the Sāradā family, from Kashmir, and M 1-3 from Kerala. The critical edition relegates them to Appendix 1, number 29. Abhinava's remark is evidence that the pārijātahorūpa was never regarded as scriptural in Kashmir. It is tempting to make the further inference that the scriptural accounts now available are based on the imaginative work of Sarvānena. There is room in a history of Sanskrit literature for a small chapter on Purānic borrowings from kāvya next to the large chapter on the borrowings of kāvya from the Purāṇas.

3.10-14 f

A [Commentary on point (3) of 3.10-14 K.] Now for a further, major means by which as work as a whole may become suggestive of

rasa. One should construct the *sandhis* (the successive stages of plot development), which are called *mukha* (beginning), *pratimukha* (development), *garbha* (the center), *avamarsa* (dubiety, also called *vimarṣa*, "the struggle"), and *nirvahana* (conclusion), as well as the component parts of these *sandhis*, which are called *upakṣepa* (planting the seed),¹ etc., with a design toward the revelation of *rasa*, as has been done in the *Ratnāvalī*, and not merely toward fulfilling the prescriptions of a textbook, as for example in the *Venīsamhāra*, where the component known as *vilāsa* (amorousness) has been used in the development section in the Second Act simply out of a desire to follow the dictates of Bharata, although this component is inharmonious with the *rasa*.

1. The *sandhis* and *sandhyāgīas* are defined in *BHNS* Chapter 19 and in *DR* Chapter 1. For a detailed study of how the traditional prescriptions are applied in the case of a classical play (the *Uttararāmocarita*) see Margaret Kane, *The Theory of Plot Structure in Sanskrit Drama*.

L The *sandhis*. Princes, who are not educated in scripture—those works of *śruti* and *smṛti* which consist in commands, like those of a master, to do this or that—and who have not received instruction from history, which like a friend reveals to us the connection of cause and effect with such persuasive instances as "This result came from such an act," and who are therefore in pressing need of instruction, for they are given the power to accomplish the wants of their subjects, can be given instruction in the four goals of man only by our entering into their hearts. And what enters into the heart is the relish of *rasa* (*rasāsvāda*, the imaginative experience of emotion). Now since this *rasa* is brought about by the union of the *vibhāvas* and their related factors, a union which is invariably connected with instruction in the four goals of man, it follows that the subjection of a man to the relishing of the *rasas* by a literary construction of the *vibhāvas*, etc., appropriate to *rasa*, serves at the same time for the instruction (*vyutpatti*) that naturally results. In this way [literary] delight (*pratīti*) is an aid to instruction. Our teacher [Bhaṭṭatauta] has put the matter thus: "*Rasa* is delight; delight is the drama; and the drama is the Veda [the goal of wisdom]." Delight and instruction are not different in nature, for they occupy a single realm.¹ It is the appropriateness of the *vibhāvas* and their related factors that is the basic cause of literary delight, as we have said more than once. Our inner understanding (*svarūpavedana*)

of the nature of the vibhāvas, etc.—that they are appropriate to this or that rasa—may be called our instruction insofar as it ends in that result.² Now results may be brought about by the unseen force of our karma, or by the grace of the gods, or otherwise [sc., by accident]. But none of this is to be taught, for we would then not be applying our instruction to the means.³ Accordingly, by showing in the person of the hero and the villain how success attends upon him who employs right means and destruction upon him who employs wrong means, we should educate the audience in the distinction between means which are helpful and those which are harmful.

A means when employed by a human agent falls into five stages (*avasthās*): *svarūpa* (the directed activity itself in its undeveloped stage), then a certain swelling or development [from the *svarūpa*], then its attainment of a state fit to produce a result, then its falling into a position of doubt under the attack of opponents, and finally, when the opposition has ceased and all hindrances have been hindered, the definitive result. These are the elements of the causal process at least so far as it appears in characters who are capable of enduring hardship, who fear to be separated [from their loved one], and who act with circumspection.⁴ The five stages of this causal process have been described by the sage Bharata:

Writers should know that where a goal is to be achieved, the causal activity takes place in five stages in the following order: beginning, effort, possibility of success, certainty of success,⁵ and achievement of the goal. [BhNS 19.7-8]

Such are the stages of the causal process. The plot by which the actor carries them out is likewise divided into five *sandhis* (joints): the *mukha*, *pratimukha*, *garbha*, *avamarṣa*, and *nirvahana*. They are called "joints" in accordance with their function, for they are the parts of the plot which are joined together (*sandhiyante*) [to make the play]. Since we observe a certain order within the function carried out by each of these *sandhis*, the plot is further divided into subsidiary divisions. These are the *sandhyāgas* (components of the *sandhis*) such as the *upakṣepa* (planting the seed), *parikara* (working it in), *parinyāsa* (reaffirmation), *vilobhana* (temptation), etc.⁶

The five *arthaprakṛtis* (plot stimulants)⁷ are included within the *sandhis*. To be specific, there are three *arthaprakṛtis* belonging to the hero insofar as his success depends on his own efforts (*svāyattasiddhi*):⁸ the *bīja*, the *bindu*, and the *kārya*. The *bīja* [prompts] all his actions, the *bindu* sets them in motion again [after an interruption], and the

kārya brings them to a conclusion. These are three different natures (*prakṛtis*) or dispositions of the agent, namely that of observation, pursuit, and achievement, in attaining of his goal (*artha*). Insofar as the hero's success depends on his friends, the action of his helper may be for the hero's sake, or for the helper's sake, or for the helper's sake as well as the hero's.⁹ As the type of action common to both these purposes can be designated as *prakṛti* when it is extensive and as *patākā* when it is particularly noticeable, these two terms *prakṛti* and *patākā* have been used [by Bharata as names of the fourth and fifth *arthaprakṛtis*].

Thus the principal action, which ends with the achievement of the stated goal, should be composed with five *sandhis* and a full set of *sandhyārigas* and should impart instruction to all people. But in the subordinate action these rules do not apply. Thus Bharata has said:

In a subordinate plot, because it depends on something else, (namely, the main plot,) these rules do not apply. [BhNS 19.19]

Such are the rules. And so in the *Ratnāvalī*, a play in which the character of the hero, as "brave and amorous," removes any impropriety in his pursuit of enjoyments so long as they are not opposed to *dharma*—indeed their pursuit is praiseworthy by the maxim that "one should not be without pleasure"¹⁰—we find a mention, at the very beginning¹¹ of the play, of the aim as the obtaining of a maiden, an aim closely connected with another great aim, the obtaining of universal sovereignty.¹² With this revelation as a beginning, we are then shown the five *sandhis* with the five stages and all the appropriate *sandhyārigas* and the *arthaprakṛtis*. For the requirements that begin with the *bija* have been displayed in the words "In this undertaking which will cause my lord's prosperity" [*Ratn.* 1.8], and the requirements that begin with the *upakṣepa* have been displayed by the words "Through whom all talk of war has ceased" [*Ratn.* 1.9] and "The kingdom is now without an enemy" [*Ratn.* 1.10] and "Now is the time to pursue enjoyment."¹³ But to exemplify all the *sandhyārigas* by adducing the full text in each instance would add too much to the size of my commentary, while if I were to exemplify them without giving the context, my examples would only lead to confusion. So I say no more.

As our author wishes to emphasize the care that should be given to this matter [of harmonizing the *sandhyārigas*, etc., with the *rasa* of the play], he comments on the contrary fault, which the *Kārikā* expressed in the words "and not brought in merely to fulfill the requirements," by explicitly giving an example: not merely, etc.

The reason for the use in the *Kārikā* of the words "merely" and "out of a desire" is as follows. Bharata has stated that the purpose of the *sandhyāngas* is to be auxiliary to the *rasa* by rendering the plot beautiful. They are not intended to have an invisible effect or to remove obstacles, as do the components of the *pūrvāranga*.¹⁴ Thus he says:

The purpose of the *āngas* in this textbook is visible and is sixfold: (1) the proper arrangement of the subject matter; (2) preserving the plot from failure;¹⁵ (3) enabling one's production to please the audience; (4) hiding [i.e., leaving out] that which should be hidden; (5) expressing [the matter] in a wonderful [i.e., impressive or striking] way; (6) revealing [all of] that which should be revealed. [BhNS 19.15-52]

And later, in defining *vilāsa* (amorousness) as a component of the *pratimukhasandhi*, he says: "Vilāsa is said to be a yearning for the enjoyment of *rati*" [19.76]. The term "enjoyment of *rati*" is used to imply such *vibhāvas* and the like as shall suggest the basic emotional drive (*sthāyibhāva*) of the main *rasa* of the play. [The author of the *Venisamhāra*¹⁶] has failed to understand the meaning properly, for in that play the *rasa* in question is the heroic (*vīra*).¹⁷

1. Both are found where *rasa* is present. 2. Compare *Namisādhu* on *Rudraṇa* 1.18: *yuktāyuktaviveka ucitānucitataparyujñānam* [*vyutpatti* iyam] "Education (*vyutpatti*) is the discrimination of right and wrong, the thorough knowledge of what is appropriate and what is not." 3. The only useful thing to teach is that results come about by human effort (*puruṣakāra*). Then we have a subject for instruction, namely the means that our effort may employ. 4. The reason for this qualification appears from Abhinava's comment (*ABh*) on *BhNS* 19.17-18. In the types of play called *dīma* and *samavakāra*, the fourth stage of the causal process is not expressed and consequently the fourth *sandhi* is dropped. This, Abhinava tells us, is because the heroes of such plays are so arrogant (*atyuddhata*) that they do not fear any opposition such as appears in the fourth *sandhi*. Where the hero is *ārtisohiṇu* and worries about opposition, all five *sandhis* must be given. In the *vyādyoga* and *thāmṛga* types two *sandhis* are omitted, in the *prahasana* type three (the second, third, and fourth). In the *prahasana* the hero is *adharmaprāya* "pretty much a rascal." Presumably he would lack all the qualities here mentioned, *ārtisohiṇutā*, *vipralambhadhīrūtā*, and *preksā-pūrvakāra*, that necessitate the full set of *avasthās*. 5. *Niyataphalaprāpti*. The Indian tradition is unanimous in interpreting this phrase as "certainty of achieving the goal," although the commentators are forced to qualify it by adding "if some particular opposition can be overcome." Sten Konow, *Das Indische Drama*, p. 19, took the phrase to mean "withheld success" (*zurückgehaltene Erlangung*). This is etymologically possible and makes better sense

§ 3.10–14 f L]

than the traditional interpretation. 6. For definitions of the *sandhyārīgas* see *BhNS* 19.69 ff., *DR* 1.27 ff., Lévi p. 36 ff. 7. The syntax of the Sanskrit is obscure in parts of the passage which follows. The content consists in an effort to derive the meaning of *arthaprakṛti* from the meaning of its component words and to assign the individual *arthaprakṛtis* to their proper agent. Abhinava here takes *arthaprakṛti* to mean the disposition or nature which the agent assumes in his pursuit of his goal. In *ABh* 19.20 he offers a different analysis, viz., the various means (*prakṛti* = *upāya*) which are used in pursuit of the goal. Neither explanation, it seems to me, throws much light on the subject. What we have in the *arthaprakṛtis* are five very disparate factors by which the plot is impelled forward. The nature of the separate factors can best be understood by reference to examples. In the *Sākuntalā* the *bija*, or seed, first appears in Act I, verse 11, where the ascetic who greets Dusyanta blesses him with the words "May you obtain a son who shall be a universal monarch." The achieving of such a son becomes the seed of the whole drama which follows, the final cause, in Aristotelian terms, of all the action. The *bindu* ("drop") appears in Act II after verse 7. The main business of the drama has been interrupted by the general of the army with his plans for the king's hunting expedition. Dusyanta cancels the expedition and, left alone with the clown, reverts to a confession of his love for *Sākuntalā*. Thus the "drop" sets the main action in motion again. The metaphor of a drop may have arisen by reference to a drop of oil which spreads out over water (so *ABh* on 19.23), or by reference to the continuous dripping of ghee which keeps a fire burning (*Bhoja's SP* p. 578). The *kārya* ("result") comes in Act VII with Dusyanta's discovery and recognition of his son. The *prakṛti* and *potḍikā* are two types of interlude, long and short respectively, in which the chief characters do not appear. They too help the plot forward by bringing to bear on it events which are undiscoverable from the action directly represented through the hero and heroine. As for the term *arthaprakṛti* itself, the original sense must have been the forwarding or advancing of the dramatic goal, then by metonymy the factors which so advance it. The three categories *avasthās*, *sandhis*, and *arthaprakṛtis* may be distinguished functionally as follows. The *avasthās* are the stages of the causal process from onset to denouement. The *sandhis* are the plot-segments corresponding to these stages. The *arthaprakṛtis* are five factors which stimulate the action through the course of these stages and segments. 8. In *ABh* 3, pp. 5–8 Abhinava distinguishes two types of hero: the hero whose success depends on his own efforts (*svāyatasiddhi*), such as Rāma, and the hero whose success depends on the effort of his friend or minister (*sacivāyatasiddhi*), such as King Udayana in the *Tāpasa-vatsarājā*. Here, however, he seems to envisage the hero as characterized in both ways. 9. In *ABh* on 19.20 Abhinava claims that the chief character of the *patākā* works both for his own aim and for that of the hero (*svārtha-siddhi-sahitayā parārtha-siddhyā yuktah*).

whereas in the *prakārī* he works solely for the hero (*parārthaśiddhyā śuddhayā yuktah*).

10. *Arthaśāstra* 1.7.3 (p. 39). 11. *prastāvopakrama*: "at the very beginning." One cannot take *prastāva* in its technical sense of "prologue," as the *bija* is revealed directly after the prologue, in the first speech of Yaugandharāyaṇa. 12. It has been foretold that the king will gain such sovereignty if he marries the Princess of Ceylon, Sāgarikā. 13. To make sense of the text one must emend *hi* to *ca*. But is this the sense that Abhinava intended? Dhanika on *DR* 1.27 gives *Ratn.* 1.6 as the *upakṣepa*. One could equally well choose *Ratn.* 1.8, which likens the hero to the bow of the love god. One might then take the next two quotations to exemplify the immediately following *sandhyāngas*, the *porikāra* and the *parinyāsa*. Our present text of the *Ratnāvalī* lacks the last of Abhinava's quotations. Reference to the *ABh* is no help, for there Abhinava takes his examples from the *Venīsamhāra*. 14. The components of the *pūrvavarāṅga* (the musical ritual preliminary to the play) are essentially religious and so have an *adrśṭārtha* like a Vedic sacrifice (*yajñā*) where one must follow the scriptural rules in every detail. The *sandhyāngas*, on the other hand, have a visible effect, namely the beautifying of the play. It is that effect which determines how much of the instruction one shall use in a given context. Abhinava draws a similar contrast in *ABh* Vol. 3, p. 32, but there states, more accurately, that the effect of the *pūrvavarāṅga* is partly invisible (religious) and partly visible (secular). After all, the *pūrvavarāṅga* too can be beautiful. 15. "So that it may have clarity and not appear like so many sticks [thrown together]," *ABh* Vol. 3, p. 32. 16. Surely some words must have dropped out of the text. 17. Abhinava's meaning in this passage is obscure, perhaps because of a lacuna in the text. It can be clarified by reference to his remarks in *ABh* Vol. 3, p. 42, where he takes Bharata's term *ratibhoga* to mean not "enjoyment of sexual pleasure" (the natural meaning) but "enjoyment of one's emotional needs," the emotion being that given by the *rasa*. His remarks run in part as follows. "The *vिलास* that is exhibited between Duryodhana and Bhānumati [the *Venīsamhāra* is most inappropriate in Duryodhana in the situation he is in. This has been remarked on by former critics, as by the author of the *Sahṛdayāloka*. [He then quotes our 3.12 K and continues.] I have explained the matter at length in my *Vivarana* [on Bhāṭṭatauta's *Kāvyakautukta*; see Introduction, p. 31]. In the text of Bharata here the term *rati* refers by implication to a *sthāyibhāva* useful to a man's needs (*pumupayogin*) and belonging to the *rasa* of the play. Accordingly, in a play where *vira* is predominant, especially in the *pratimukha*, energy (*utsāha*) should be placed [emend *hy* *āsthā* to *pratiśāhopyo*?] as the *rati*.

3.10-14 g

A [Commentary on point (4) of 3.10-14 K.] And now for another means by which a work as a whole may become suggestive of *rasa*: the intensifying and relaxing of the *rasa* at the appropriate occasions within the work, as in the *Ratnāvalī*; furthermore, the revival of the predominant *rasa* wherever it begins to fail, as in the *Tāpasavatsarāja*.

L Intensifying: by intensifying the *vibhāvas* and their related factors, as in the words of Sāgarikā: "So this is King Udayana." etc. [*Ratn.* 1.24 +1]. Relaxing is exemplified when she later flees from Vāsavadattā [*Ratn.* 1.24 +14]. The *rasa* is again intensified at the mention of the painting [*Ratn.* 2.0 +23].¹ It is again relaxed at the entrance of Susāngatā [*Ratn.* 2.0 +43].² The constant close handling of a *rasa*, like that of a delicate jasmine flower, causes it to fade quickly [cf. 3.18-19 c 4], especially if the *rasa* is love. As Bharata has said:

It is because of her frowardness, because of her refusals, because she is hard to get, that a woman is a lover's chief passion. [BHNS 22.207]

The same principle holds in works of the heroic *rasa*. If there is no intensification and relaxation at the right occasions and if the result is achieved quickly like some miraculous reward, the relation between means and end that the author had intended to display will not be shown.

Furthermore: the reference is to cases where, because of the exigencies of the plot, we find a *rasa* of which the failure, the breaking off, has begun, that is to say, seems likely soon to occur, but has not yet fully occurred. By [the revival of] the principal *rasa*: what he means is by [a revival of] some element that is subordinate to the [principal] *rasa*.³ For in the *Tāpasavatsarāja* the king's love for Vāsavadattā, which is such that he values her more than his own life, takes on various disguises as it flows through the play, appearing as tragedy, as love-in-separation, and in other forms, depending on the propriety of the *vibhāvas*, etc., to these forms. But it persists because the final goal of the play, namely the recovery of Vāsavadattā, is what the king by a great measure most desires, [although it is] enhanced by the recovery

of his kingdom through the skilful machinations of his minister, a recovery to which the obtaining of Princess Padmāvatī is attached as a subordinate element. [This is clear] because the play ends in a conclusion which shows the overriding importance of the recovery of the queen: "I have obtained my queen and [sovereignty of] the earth and have formed an alliance with Darśaka" [Tāpas. 6.9]. The king's continuing love for Vāsavadattā is like a wall on which the variegated plot is painted,⁴ for it remains throughout, from the first plotting of the minister, and remains even in the marriage to Padmāvatī. So it is that this love for Vāsavadattā, even when it seems about to fail because of the exigencies of the story, is revived.

Thus, in the very first act the love is given clear form in the verse:

I have spent the day in gazing at her moonlike face,
the evening in her conversation, and the night
in her embrace, to which the God of Love gave ardor.
Why should my heart yearn, even now as I set forth
to find her waiting with her eye fixed on my path?
But yes, our festival of love is still unfinished.

[Tāpasavatsarāja 1.14]⁵

And in the Second Act, after this love has been interrupted [by the report of Vāsavadattā's death in the palace fire], the king's love survives:

Did not your eyes rain moisture
and your mouth stream honey?
Was not your heart dripping with love
and your limbs with sandal ointment?
What foothold could an earthly fire
find on your body to do its cruel will?
Surely the flame that did the deed
Was of remorseless lightning.

[Tāpasavatsarāja 2.9]

, in the Third Act:

The rooms are blazing on all sides;
her attendants have all fled;
the queen is trembling in her fear
and falls at every step.
The fire that ended that unhappy lady's life
as she cried out for her lord,
though now long since burned out to ash,
keeps burning me.

[Tāpasavatsarāja 3.10]⁶

§ 3.10-14 g L]

And in the Fourth:

If I slept, I should doubtless dream about the queen
and if, in dreaming, I should call this beauty
by the queen's name, I should deeply wound her pride;
wherefore I somehow kept myself awake,
only to suffer the alternative and lose
all night by my accursed courtesy
the chance of seeing my beloved queen.

[*Tāpasavatsarāja* 5.3]⁷

In the Fifth Act, where the *rasa* of tragedy gives way before the hope of reunion, the *rasa* of love-in-union begins to arise:

When the sage's words come true, my love
will scarce be able to restrain her anger
at my unfaithfulness.
"Forgive me," I will plead
and she will stand before me,
her sweet words broken by the flowing tears,
saying "I am not angry."

[*Tāpasavatsarāja* 5.1]⁸

th Act:

My ministers persuaded me to live
by tempting me with your recovery

[*Tāpasavatsarāja* 6.3a]

and so on.

1. Enter Sāgarikā, holding a painting board and enacting her state of love. Sāgarikā: "Be still, my heart, be still. Give over this constant seeking of a person who cannot be obtained," etc.
2. The attention of the audience would be distracted for a moment by the entrance of another character. But the relaxation is very brief. Susāṅgatā's sympathy soon prompts her friend to exhibit intense symptoms of love.
3. Abhinava alters the obvious meaning of Ānanda's text because the principal *rasa*, in a well-constructed play such as the *Tāpasavatsarāja*, never really dies. Technically, therefore, it cannot be revived. What can be revived is some subordinate element such as a *vibhāva*. This revival may make us more sharply aware of the predominant *rasa*.
4. Literally, "in the painting, which is the plot, the love of V. is the wall."
5. This stanza is quoted by Kuntaka for its felicitous turn of phrase in the last line (*Vakrokti* 1.7, *Vṛtti*, p. 23). Abhinava quotes only the beginning and end. I have supplied the middle from Śrī Rāmānuja Muni's printed text of the *Tāpas*. In the next stanza Abhinava gives only the first line. For the rest

I follow the text of *Tāpas*, except for reading *te* (with *BP*) in place of *kim i* *pāda* c. 6. The scene of Act Three is Rājagṛha, where Princess Padmāvatī, through the machinations of Yaugandharāyana, has been shown a portrait of King Udayana and by its means has fallen in love with him. Yaugandharāyana has also arranged for Queen Vāsavadattā, who, unknown to the king, escaped the fire and is cognizant of the plot necessary to her husband's welfare, to be given into the care of Padmāvatī. Through the conversation between the two young ladies concerning the subject of the portrait, our attention is drawn from the central love of the play to the new love arising in Padmāvatī. Then King Udayana enters, clad in the garments of an ascetic (*tāpasa*). His first verse as he comes on stage is the one here quoted, in which the central theme of the play is vividly revived. 7. The stanza appears as 5.24 in the printed text of the play, but the figure is corrected to 5.3 in the errata (*skholitasodhana*) inserted in the middle of the index of verses. In the appendix (*pariśīla*) of his Sanskrit introduction (*bhūmikā*) the editor discusses the discrepancy in the number of the Act between this passage of the *Locana* and the manuscript text of the play. He insists that "there is no chance whatever of this stanza's being connected with the Fourth Act." I am inclined to agree for the following reason. The stanza is spoken by Udayana on the morning after his marriage to Padmāvatī, "this beauty" whom he fears to offend. The marriage, which we are told of but do not witness, must occur between Act IV, where the king rescues Padmāvatī from suicide and in pity for her betrothes himself, and Act V. As all the events of a single act in a Sanskrit play take place in one day and as the present verse could not be spoken before the day after the marriage, it must fall in Act V. Abhinava's memory has apparently played him false. 8. The Vidiśaka has reminded the king long since (Act 3, 13 + 13-14) that a holy man had foretold that "after marrying a maiden similar to the queen" he would meet with the queen again. Then on first meeting Padmāvatī the king was struck by her resemblance to Vāsavadattā (3.14-15). Before his marriage to Padmāvatī he already remarked (4.12) that if he should facilitate the prediction by entering this marriage, his queen would be jealous when he regained her. In the present verse Vāsavadattā has not yet reappeared, but the king's eagerness to regain her overcomes his concern for her anger. I have taken the *Tāpas* reading *purāḥ* in *pāda* d, as the verse gains in vividness by the king's desire to have the queen, whether angry or jealous or sad, at least standing before him in the flesh.

3.10-14 b

A [Commentary on point (5) of 3.10-14.] For a work as a whole, such as a *nāṭaka*, to become suggestive of *rasa*, we should understand this further means: that the application of figures of speech should be in conformity with the *rasa* even though one may have ability [to construct more elaborate figures]. For sometimes an able poet becomes engrossed in the construction of figures and thereby fails to take into consideration how the *rasa* is to be built. These words may serve as a warning, for there are many examples of poets who have been solely intent on figures and who have neglected *rasa*.

L Of figures: this is an objective genitive, to be taken with "application." Many examples: as in the play called *Svapnavāśavadatta*:

Opening by the stroke of her beauty
the eyelash doorpanels of my eyes,
the princess entered the chamber
of my heart.¹

1. The verse is not found in the extant *Svapnavāśavadatta* and has therefore provoked much comment. It is likely, but not certain, that the extant play is a version of a play by Bhāsa and that Abhinava is referring to another version of the same play. See Kuppusvāmī Śāstri, Intr. to *Āścāryacūḍāmani*, p. 24; M. Winteritz, *Woolner Comm. Volume*, pp. 297-308; Otto Stein, *IHQ* 14 (1938), pp. 633-59; E. J. Thomas, *JRAS* 1925, pp. 100-104; A. D. Pusalkar, *Bhāsa.—A Study*, sec. ed., pp. 26-28 (with further references).

A Furthermore:

K The type of *dhvani* that is similar to a reverberation also appears throughout some extended passages.¹

1. In both *K* and the following *Vṛtti* we take the natural interpretation of the words *dhvaneḥ asya*. As will be seen, Abhinava gives a very different interpretation.

A This type of *dhvani* where the literal meaning is intended but only as leading to an additional meaning, which has been described as carrying a suggestion similar to a reverberation, in both its subtypes, also appears throughout some passages, as for example in the words of Pāncajanya in the *Madhumathanavijaya*,¹ or in the scene where the God of Love meets with his friends in my *Viṣamabāṇalī*,² or in the Conversation of the Vulture and the Jackal in the *Mahābhārata*.³

1. The *Madhumathanavijaya* was a Prakrit *khandakathā*; see V. Raghaban, *Bhoja's SP*, p. 883. Two verses from it are quoted by Śridbara on *KP* p. 121. The verse quoted by Abhinava below is also quoted by Hemacandra, *Viveka*, p. 81. 2. For the *Viṣamabāṇalī* see Introduction, p. 10. 3. *MBh* 12.149.

L An extended passage may suggest *rasa* not only directly, but indirectly. In order to show this he begins with the word *Furthermore*. That variety of *dhvani* which has been described as similar to a reverberation, whether based on the power of words or on the power

of meaning, sometimes occurs as the suggested element where the passage as a whole occasions the suggestion. Nevertheless this suggested element stands—we must here supply "as a suggestive factor"—to rasadhvani, the matter with which we are here concerned. The passage in the *Vṛtti* is to be interpreted in the same way.¹ Or, we may construe "dhvaner asya" [as a genitive of instrument] with the words "dyotyo 'lakṣyakramah" of the next *Kārikā*. The sense will thus be: "sometimes by an extended passage, the dhvani of imperceptible succession is also suggested by this variety which has been described as resembling a reverberation."

This amounts to saying that sometimes a whole passage may directly suggest dhvani of the type where the suggested meaning appears like a reverberation, but this ends up by being transformed into rasadhvani. On the other hand, if we interpret the text in a straightforward manner, the present passage, set as it is between preceding and following passages that deal with suggestion of imperceptible interval, will appear as a non sequitur. Furthermore, the words of Pāñcajanya and similar passages would be without rasa.² So enough of this discussion.

In such passages as the following

How can it be that you who lifted
on the tip of your tusk the whole circle of the earth
now find even a lotus-stem bracelet
too heavy for your limbs!³

we have the suggestive words of Pāñcajanya, which are intended to reveal Krishna's feelings on being separated from Rukmini. Once these feelings are suggested, we end up with the relevant rasa [love-in-separation] itself.⁴

Where the God of Love meets with his friends: viz., Spring Youth, and Malabar Breeze, we have such words as the following:

Though I may have acted out of line,
without restraint, without consideration,
know that never, even in my dreams,
have I forgotten my devotion to your doctrine.⁵

Such words suggest the nature of Youth and the other [companions of Love], suggestions which end us up with the relevant rasa itself.⁶

Or [in the Conversation]: In order to deceive the parents who have come to a burning ground for the office of cremating their son, a

vulture, who hoped to eat the corpse while it was still day, told them to leave quickly. He urged them in these words:

Stay not at the burning ground
amid its vultures and its jackals,
gruesome with its skeletons
and fearful to all living beings.

Whether hateful or whether dear,
once he has met with Time's decree
no one has here returned to life:
such is the way of mortal man.

[Mahābhārata 12.149.8-9]⁹

But the jackal thought to himself, "Let them stay here till night. Then I shall get the corpse away from the vulture and eat it myself."¹⁰ So he urged the parents thus:

The sun still shines,
so show your love of your son.
This may be but a moment of danger
which when it passes he will live.

How can you be deceived
by the words which the vulture spoke?
How can you abandon
your gold-complexioned child?

[Mahābhārata 12.149.15 and 60]⁹

The intentions of the vulture and the jackal, being thus suggested, bring us to very height of sāntarasa.¹⁰

1. Abhinava's interpretation of *dhvaner asya* in *K* and of *asya ... dhvaneh* in *A* as meaning *rasadhvaneḥ* (instead of *visvaksitānyaparavācyā*) is surely wrong. It necessitates the supplying of words that would not have been omitted if they were intended. Equally unnatural is his second explanation, which follows. Abhinava has been led to these unnatural interpretations by a desire to exculpate his author from a charge of non sequitur. *K* and *A* had been speaking of *rasadhvani* and will continue to speak of *rasadhvani* in 3.16. By hook or by crook Abhinava seeks to avoid a departure from that subject in the present section. 2. Abhinava's point is that the passages from the *Vigamabāṇaīḍā*, which Ānanda has in mind, do in fact contain *rusa* and that consequently Ānanda could not have meant the straightforward interpretation, which excludes *rasadhvani*, to be accepted. 3. The text of the verse as printed in the Kashi Locana is corrupt. One can make out an acceptable text

by drawing on Hemacandra's quotation, Viveka 1.151 (p. 81), and on BP's emendations. Thus,

lūḍādādhagguvūḍhasaalamahimandalassa cia aja
kisa muṇḍāḥaranaṁ pi tuyha gurudi arigammi.

The word *lūḍā* is used of any attribute of an incarnation of Viṣṇu, as these attributes are all assumed by the god playfully, not as a result of the karmic process. Thus *lūḍā-dādhā* means "the tusk which you assumed in your boar incarnation." For *dādhā* = Sk. *damṣṭrā* see Pischel, para. 76. *Uvūḍha* must be a lightened form of *uvūḍha* (*metri causa*). The BP reading *uddharia* is metrically impossible. On the other hand, BP is correct in reading *mahi* (Hemacandra, *mahi*). For *cia* = *eva*, see Pischel, para. 336. A literal (un-metrical) Sanskrit rendering of the stanza would be, *lūḍdamṣṭroḍvūḍhamahi-mandalasyavādyā / kasmān mrṇḍāḥharanam apि tava guru bhavaty arige // 4.* The suggestiveness of the verse, as Abhinava sees it, is similar to that of *KumSam*. 6.84 (see 2.22 A, above) or *Sottasāī* 2.73 (see 2.24 A, above). It takes the reader, or bearer, a moment to assign a cause for the apparent contradiction (*virodhābhāṣa*) in what Pāñcajanya says. If Viṣṇu, who lifted up the earth on his tusk in his boar incarnation, now as Krishna finds a lotus-stem bracelet too heavy, it must be because the fever of love makes insupportable even those objects which are normally cooling agents. But as soon as we understand Krishna's fever of love, we immediately have a relish of *vipralambha-śringāra*. Compare our remarks in 2.22 L, footnote 2. 5. The text of this stanza is wildly corrupt in the Kashi text. One is forced to reconstruct it on the basis of BP, Hemacandra (Viveka 1.152, p. 82), and Mammata (KP 7, exemplar-verse 320, p. 432). All these agree on the first half (in the form printed at the end of this note). But all three show different readings in the second half. BP has *sivine vi tumammi puno bhattim* [misprint for *bhattim*] *na pasomerāmi*. Hemacandra has *sivine vi tuyha samae patti bhattim na pupphusi* i. Mammata has *sivine vi tumammi puno pattihi bhattim na pa-sumardāmi*. Of these versions Hemacandra's is the only one that is metrically correct; but I make no sense of *patti* and I think that the final verb should be *pummaḥasi* i (from *pro-mṛṣ*, to forget). So I would reconstruct the stanza and its Sanskrit translation as follows:

humि avahastiareho nirantuso aha viveharahio vi
sivine vi tuyha samae pattihi bhattim na pummaḥasimi.

[bhavāmy apahastitareko nirantuso 'tha vivekarahito 'pi
svapne 'pi tava samaye pratihi bhattim na vismarāmi]

6. By suggesting the way in which Youth is affected by Love and presumably in later verses the way in which Spring and Malabar Breeze are devoted, the passage as a whole gives us śringārasa itself. 7. MBh reads *punar* for *ceha* in 8c. 8. The vulture cannot see at night and so eats carrion only

by day. The jackal can see at night. 9. Abhinava's readings in these two verses are quite peculiar, being furnished by none of the MSS, including those from Kashmir, which are collated in the Critical Edition. But such was his authority that Hemacandra (*AC* p. 81) and Mammaṭa (*KP*, exemplar vss. 95-96) repeat his version without correction. The *MBh* variants are as follows. 15b, *mā bhayam* (*sāmpratōm*); c, *bahurūpo*; d, *jīvetāpi*; 60a, *imam* (*amum*); b, *bhūṣanaiḥ samalāñkṛtōm*; c, *putram* (*bālās*); d, *pitrpindadām* (*avisañkītāḥ*). In 15c one may argue that Abhinava's version is superior. His sense seems to be as follows. This particular hour, viz., near twilight, is subject to many dangers from evil spirits. Accordingly, it is possible that the child is temporarily possessed by an evil spirit. When the hour has passed, viz., at sundown, he may come to life again. *Bahuvīghno* leads to this sense better than *bahurūpo*.

10. The intentions of the two animals are suggested. This is the *vastu-dhvani*. Once we realize how callous and self-interested they are and, by implication, that most people are similar, we become disgusted with the world. This feeling of disenchantment is the basis of *sāntarasa* (the aesthetic perception of peace).

K The *dhvani* (suggestion) of imperceptible sequence [i.e., *rasa-dhvani*] is sometimes suggested by *sup* (case endings), *tiri* (personal endings of a verb), *vacana* (grammatical number), *sambandha* (relationship as expressed by the genitive); by the force of the *kārakas* (complements of the verbal activity: agent, object, locus, etc), and by *kṛt* (primary suffixes attaching to the verb root), *taddhita* (secondary suffixes attaching to a substantive stem), and by compounds.¹

1. The distinction between *sup*, a morphological category, and *vacana*, *sambandha*, or *kāraka*, which are semantic categories, must be maintained in grammar but is of no real importance to the present purpose. Take the two sentences: *annam labhate* "he receives food" and *annāya urajati grāmam* "he goes to the village for food." In both sentences food is the object complement of an activity (*karmakāraka*). In the first, where the activity is expressed by a verb, the accusative *sup* is used, whereas in the second, where the activity ("to seek") is unexpressed by a verb, the dative *sup* is used; cf. *Pān.* 2.3.14. But in a context where *rasa* (say, *karunarasa*) is occasioned by the fact that

food is the object of a poor man's journey, one may point equally well to the *sup* or to the *kāraka* as the suggestive factor. Hence it is that in the examples which follow one may often substitute one of the listed factors for another.

A *Dhvani* in the highest sense (*dhvaneś atmā*), which is of imperceptible sequence, namely *rasa* [*bhāva*, *rasābhāsa*, and *bhāvābhāsa*], is [sometimes] found to be manifested by the use of particular case endings, particular personal endings, particular grammatical number, particular relationships; by the force of the *kārikas*, by particular primary suffixes, particular secondary suffixes, and particular compounds. By the use here of the word "and" we may understand particles, verbal prefixes, tenses, and other such factors to be included also. Thus:

It is already a humiliation
that I should have opponents. But that among them
there should be a holy man and that he here should slay
a host of demons: can it be that Rāvana lives?
Shame on my son akrajit! What use
was in the waking of my brother Kumbbakarṇa?
What use these twenty arms, so vainly proud
of having robbed that miserable village known as heaven!
(*Mahānāṭaka* 9.15 = *Hanumannāṭaka* 14.6, variant)¹

In this verse nearly all the above factors can be clearly seen as suggestors. The suggestiveness of *sup*, *sambandha*, and *vacana* appears in the phrase *me yad arayah* "that there should be opponents of me."² In the phrase *tatrāpy asau tāpasah* "even among them this holy man" we have suggestiveness of a secondary suffix and a particle.³ In the passage *so 'py atrāva nihanti rākṣasabalam jīvati oho rāvanah* "that he should slay here a host of demons [and] that Rāvana lives" we have the personal endings of the verbs [*ti* of *nihanti* and *jīvati*] and the force of the *kārakas* [locus expressed by *atra*, object by *balam*]. In the second half of the verse, *dhig dhik śakrajitam*, etc., "shame, shame on Śakra-jit," etc., we have suggestiveness of a primary suffix [the *kvip* suffix of *śakrajit*], of a secondary suffix [the suffix *ṭikac* of *grāmaṭikā*], of a compound *svargagrāmaṭikā*, and of a verbal prefix [*vi* in *vilunṭhana*].

In a poem of this sort, put together with so many suggestive factors, an extraordinary beauty of composition is apparent. For if there is a certain beauty of composition in a poem where a single word reveals a suggestion, how much greater is this beauty where there is a combination of so many [suggestive factors], as here in the verse just quoted. For

while the word "Rāvapa" is here ornamented by the type of suggestion where the denoted meaning is shifted (*arthāntarasamkramitavācya*), many other kinds of suggestion, which we have just explained, appear in the stanza.

1. It is worth noting as indicative of the differences of evaluation among Indian critics that this verse, so much admired by our authors, is quoted as an example of poetic faults by Mammaṭa (7, ex. 183). Mammaṭa objects to the word order of the first line and to the attributive position in the fourth line of *vṛthā*, which should be in predicative position. A fault that most commentators pass over in silence is the use of *prabodhitavat*, active, for metrical reasons in place of *prabodhitena*, passive. Nāgoji explains it as *prabudh + bhāve kta + matup*: "being one of whom there has been an awakening." 2. *Sup* and plural number appear in *arayoḥ*. The sambandha of self and opponents is expressed by the genitive in me. Each of these factors emphasizes the outrage felt by Rāvana and consequently the raudrārasa of the verse. 3. *tāpasāḥ* = *tapas + taddhita suffix an* (Pān. 5.2.103). The particle is *api*: "even." For the suggestive force see Abhinava below.

L In the foregoing text our author has shown all the suggestive factors of *rasadhvani*, which arises without perceived interval, from the phoneme up to the work as a whole. There would thus appear to be nothing left in the area to describe.¹ However, in order to furnish instruction to lovers of poetry, he examines the suggestive factors further, testing them in a subtle way by positive and negative agreement: by *sup*, *tiṇi*, etc. But² I would understand the following statement [of the *Kārikā*] together with [that of] the *Vṛtti*, in this way. A suggestion of the type similar to a reverberation may appear through the agency of *sup* endings, etc., this suggestion taking the form of a speaker's intention. Now this suggestion similar to a reverberation effected by *sup* endings, etc., in turn suggests that type of *dhvani* where the succession is imperceptible.

Sometimes: this is to be construed with the preceding *Kārikā*.³ For *sup* endings, etc., always reveal a particular intention of the speaker; but in the examples here given this suggested intention by its assuming the form of a *vibhāva* suggests the *rasa*, [*bhāva*,] etc., appropriate to that [*vibhāva*]. To state the matter in other words: *Rasa* may be suggested directly by the various suggestive factors from a single phoneme up to the work as a whole by [the poet's directly] designating a *vibhāva*;⁴ or it may be suggested indirectly through the suggestion [rather

than the designation] of a *vibhāva*, etc. Now it is here [viz., to this latter case] that the statement [of 3.15] applies, which spoke incidentally of this indirect sort of suggestiveness belonging to a work as a whole.⁵ Now the present *Kārikā* speaks of this [indirect suggestiveness] as belonging to phonemes, words, etc. Hence where the *Vṛtti* says is found to be manifested and later says can be seen as suggestors, we must supply "indirectly, through the suggesting of a *vibhāva*, etc."

[Comment on the verse:] "That I should have opponents": here the impropriety of a relation (*sambandha*) of opponents to "me" and the plural of "opponents" suggest a stimulation (*vibhāva*) of anger.⁶ [That is to say, Rāvana feels that no one should dare oppose him, how much less many persons.] *Tāpasa* (holy man) is formed by the secondary suffix *an-* added to *tapas* (ascetic fervor) with possessive sense: "he of whom there is ascetic fervor." By this suffix is suggested [Rāma's] lack of manliness. The combination of particles *tatra'* and *api* ("even among them") suggests the utter impossibility of Rāma's opposition. So long as I live there should be no slaying [of my rāksasas by enemies]. The [second] *api* (that "even" he should slay) suggests that the agent of this slaying is a mere human. "Here" viz., in a land ruled by me: this is the locative complement of the verbal activity while "a host of demons" is the object complement through their being altogether slain by him. The words that carry the personal ending (i.e., *nihanti*) and the force of these complements (i.e., *atra*, *rāksasabalam*) suggest a failure of active measures [on Rāvana's part] inasmuch as this inconceivable situation has come upon him. The word "Rāvana" carries suggestion of the sort "shifted to another object," as has been explained before.⁷ The particles *dhiq dhiq* (shame, shame!) taken together with the *upapada* compound [viz., *sakrūjīt*] suggests that [the literal meaning of that compound, namely that] "he has conquered Indra" is a myth,⁸ while the compound beginning with "heaven," viz., *svargagrāmatikāvilunṭhanavṛthāchūnaiḥ*, suggests Rāvana's memory of his own brave deeds. The secondary suffix *ti-* in *gramatikā*, indicating smallness,⁹ together with its semi ine inflection, suggests a village deserving of no respect. The prefix *vi-* in *vilunṭhana* (robbing) suggests a pitiless invasion. The indeclinable *vṛthā* ("in vain") suggests a belitteling of his bold deeds. The word "arms" by its plural number suggests that these arms rather [than being helpful] are a mere burden. What else can we say than that every portion of this verse, no matter how minutely we analyze it, appears to be suggestive.

He now shows the result of this demonstration: [In a poem] of this sort, etc. He then exemplifies what he has said about a single word's [giving beauty to a poem]: as in the verse just quoted.¹¹

1. That is to say, the analysis of suggestive factors is logically complete without the present *Kārikā*. All cases of the suggestiveness of sup, tīr, etc. fall under the categories phoneme, word, sentence, work as a whole, already listed. But it may be useful for the exact appreciation of a poem or for guidance in the writing of poetry to observe just what sorts of words and word elements give rise to the suggestion of *rasa*. By observing the effect of a poem with (*anvaya*) and without (*vyatireka*) a particular sup, tīr, etc., one can see in greater detail exactly where the suggestiveness of *rasa* may lie. 2. The adversative particle *tu* may, but does not necessarily, imply that another commentator had understood the passage otherwise. Abhinava is here continuing the line of interpretation that he adopted in 3.15. The particle *tu* differentiates this line from the straightforward interpretation. The straightforward interpretation would see in all the examples of suggestion that Ānanda notices in the *Mahānāṭaka* verse so many instances of direct *rasadhvani* (of imperceptible succession). Abhinava denies this. What we have, he says, is first a *vastudhvani*, a suggestion of Rāvaṇa's intention or feelings. This suggestion comes after a perceptible interval from our noticing the suggestive factors such as sup, tīr, kārakasakti, etc. But once we have this suggestion of Rāvaṇa's feelings, we have the very *vibhāva* (stimulative or revelatory factor) that immediately suggests *raudrarasa* (the aesthetic perception of anger and cruelty). The succession from sup, etc., to *rāvaṇābhīprāyayakti* is perceptible; the succession from *rāvaṇābhīprāyayakti* to *raudrarasa* is not perceptible. Abhinava here shows an admirable analysis of the aesthetic process, but I cannot believe that his interpretation renders accurately Ānanda's intention. 3. Abhinava construes thus: *dhvaner asya* [i.e., *anurāṇanopamadhvane*] *dyotyo 'lakṣyakramah* *kuacit*, "the alakṣyakrama variety is suggested by this [*anurāṇanarūpa*-]*dhvani*". 4. Place a comma at Locana, p. 348, line 2, after *pratipādanadvārena*. One must understand *abhidhāyā* before *vibhāvādipratipādanadvārena*, in contrast to cases where the *vibhāvas*, etc., are suggested rather than directly expressed. 5. *Bandhasya* here equals *prabandhasya*. Abhinava uses the word *prasarīgāt* (incidentally) to show that *anurāṇanopamadhvani* was not in itself the subject of discussion in 3.15 but was brought in because of its indirect effecting of *rasa*. 6. I have supplied the word *ca* at the end of the sentence *mama bahuvacanam*. This keeps *sambandha* and *vacanam* parallel, as they are in the *Vṛtti*. 7. *tatra* is listed in the *cāḍigāṇa* (Pāṇ. 1.4.57) of *nipātas*. 8. "Rāvaṇa," in addition to directly denoting an individual, suggests that individual's possession of those properties of strength, heroism, cruelty, for which Rāvaṇa was famous. Cf. the remarks on the word "Rāma" 3.1 a L, above. 9. One may put a comma after

the word *sahakṛtāḥ* of Locana p. 349, line 4. With *ākhyāyikeyam iti* one must supply *vyanjaktvam* from the clause which follows. The formation *sakrajit* is prescribed by Pāṇ. 3.2.61. Although Pāṇini does not give the formation & sense of past time (*upapada* suffixes with the sense of past time begin only after Pāṇ. 3.2.84), it is often so taken by commentators and dictionaries; thus Śabdakalpadruma defines the word *sakrajit*: *sakram jitauṇ, Rāvanapuṭrah*. The Rāmāyaṇa tells of his gaining the name Indrajit (= Śakrajit) by his having defeated Indra (Rām. Vulgate, 7.29.20ff.).

10. For *iti svārthikataddhitaprayogasya* we should probably read *ity alpārthikataddhitaprayogasya*. Compare Nāgoji's *Uddyota* commenting on the same verse as quoted by Mammāta 7, ex. 184: *grāmaśabdād alpārthe taddhita iti bahuvacanabodhyoṣ tīkacpratyayah*. This suffix *tīkac* is not mentioned by Pāṇini. Nāgoji justifies it by the fiction invented by Kāśikā on 4.1.76, that the word *taddhītāḥ* in that sūtra, being used in the plural, implies that there are many *taddhita* suffixes, even in addition to those prescribed by Pāṇini. One of these, according to Nāgoji, is *tīkac*, used after *grāma* and carrying the sense of "small." 11. What Abhinava means is that the following explanation of the *dhvani* carried by the word *Rāvana* exemplifies the beauty that the suggestiveness of a single word can give, as opposed to the greater beauty furnished by a plurality of suggestors.

A This sort of composition is frequently found in the works of great men who are endowed with special imaginative genius. Take, for example, this verse of the great sage Vyāsa:

All times of happiness are passed,
times of hardship are at hand;
tomorrow and tomorrow every day grows worse,
for the earth has lost her youth.

(*Mahābhārata* 1.119.6)

In this verse we see primary suffix, secondary suffix, and grammatical number producing a suggestion of imperceptible succession [i.e., *rasa-dhvani*]. In the phrase "the earth has lost her youth" we can see a suggestion of the type where the direct meaning is entirely set aside.¹

1. The word *yauvana* (youth) in its direct meaning can refer only to an age span of living creatures. As applied to the earth it can only be used metaphorically, the direct meaning being set aside. Cf. 2.1c A, L.

L Times in which happiness has "passed" (*atikrānta*), that is, in which happiness does not ever occur as a present reality.¹ All such times have passed; not the smallest portion of time now makes for happiness.² "Times of hardship are at hand" (*pratyupasthita*), that is, they are facing us, they have returned to us, having been afar they are now present. Since every portion of time now furnishes the most manifold misery, time [as a whole] first suggests a disenchantment with the world and this suggests *sāntarasa* (the aesthetic perception of peace).³ He speaks of space as well [as time]: the earth [a vast extension of space] is such that tomorrow and tomorrow, that is, morning after morning, from day to day, its days are *pāpiya*, that is, connected with evil ones, under the guidance of most evil persons.⁴ The sense is that time is inherently evil to begin with, but by the spacial evil consisting in a space coterminous with earth being under the governance of the most evil persons, time has become especially evil. Thus, tomorrow and tomorrow, that is, from day to day, [the earth is] losing its youth, is becoming like an old woman with whom the pleasures of sex are unimaginable; and because of this loss of youth every day that arrives is worse than the day that has passed. Alternative explanations are that the sage has used *pāpiya* as a word ending in the comparative suffix *īyasun*,⁵ or that he is using a denominative ending in *nīc*.⁶

Is entirely set aside: He means that this type of suggestion is subordinate to the *rasadhvani*.

1. This is what is suggested by the past participial suffix *kta* (a primary suffix) of *atikrānta*. 2. This is what is suggested by the plurality of "times." 3. Abhinava here specifies the double process of suggestion that he holds to throughout his interpretation of 3.15-16. The first, delayed, suggestion (*anurānanopamadhvani*) is of the speaker's intention, viz., that he is disenchanted with the world. This leads to an immediate suggestion (*asamlakṣitakramavyāgya*) of *sāntarasa*. 4. This farfetched interpretation is in order to avoid admitting that the author has committed a solecism in writing *pāpiyadivasa* for *pāpiyodivasa*. Abhinava is taking *pāpiya* to be formed from *pāpa* plus the *śaikṣa taddhita* suffix *cha* (= *īya*), which according to Pāṇ. 4.2.114 may be employed after stems with an initial *vrddhi* vowel (such as *pāpa-*). Its sense could be the general sense of connection therewith (*tasyedam*, Pāṇ. 4.3.120).

which Abhinava renders more specific by *tatsvāmika*. Later he will admit the natural analysis (*īya* = the comparative suffix *-īyas*) as an alternative explanation. 5. In which case the dropping of *s* would be *ārya* (by epic licence). 6. *BP* explains: First one forms the comparative *pāpiyas* "more evil." One then adds *nic* (= *i*) to form a denominative verb meaning "it makes greater evil" (*Patañjali* 3.1.26, Vārt. 5, *tat karotīl upasankhyānam*). One then adds *ac* to form an agent noun: *pāpa* + *īyasun* + *nic* + *ac* "[days which are] makers of ever greater evil." Now before the *nic* suffix the noun stem (by 6.4.135, Vārt. 1, of which a variant is included as a *ganasūtra* in the *curādi dhātupāṭha*) must be treated as it would be treated before the suffix *īṣṭha*; that is, the last vowel of the stem together with its following consonant must drop (*īlopa*). This gives us *pāpiy* + *nic* + *ac*. Finally *Pāṇ.* 6.4.51 (*ner anīti*) comes into play: the suffix *nic* drops before any further suffix that dispenses with the union vowel *i* (as does *ac*). Hence *pāpiy* + *a*.

A The suggestiveness of case endings and of these other elements is frequently found in the works of great poets both singly and in groups. An instance of the suggestiveness of a word because of its case ending¹ is:

On which your friend the peacock perches,
learning how to dance
from my beloved's clapping of her hands
beautiful with bracelets.

[Kālidāsa, *Meghadūta* 2.16cd]²

1. Literally "of a word with case ending"; but as every noun in Sanskrit has a case ending, the meaning is as we have translated. The suggestiveness of the instance quoted could equally well have been attributed to the grammatical number of the noun: compare our remarks in footnote 1 to 3.16 K.
2. The half verse is part of the Yakṣa's address to the cloud messenger. Peacocks are the friends of clouds because they dance as though in joy as the monsoon approaches. Abhinava explains the suggestiveness of the plural in "clappings," which I should fail to see without his aid. Note that Ānanda preserves what is doubtless Kālidāsa's original reading *śinijadvalaya* (with the participle *śinijat*) in place of the corrected form *śinijāvalaya* (with the noun

śinjād) transmitted by Mallinātha. See Pathak's note, p. 106 of his ed. of *Megh*. The reason for Mallinātha's correction is that *śiji* (*Dhātupāṭha* 2.17) is an *anudāttet* verb. Thus its present participle, if used, should be *śinjāna*, not *śinjat*.

L Of a word because of its case ending: What our author has in mind is to give examples of the suggestiveness of these factors taken singly, now that examples of their combined use have been given. "Clappings": the plural suggests that her skill [in music and dancing] is of many varieties and so stimulates the *rasa* of love-in-separation.¹

1. *Tāla* means not only clapping of the hands but also musical tempo. The suggestion seen by our authors seems to be that the Yakṣa's wife teaches the peacock various rhythms. Her doing so implies an artistic skill that renders her absence more poignant to the Yakṣa.

A An example of a verb that is suggestive because of its personal ending is:

Go away! Don't wipe
my miserable eyes.
God intended them
only for weeping.
So they got drunk
on the first sight of you,
and failed to show me
what your heart was like.¹

1. The verse is found in a non-vulgate version of the *Sattasai* (Weber No. 706). In the Kashi text of the *Locana* the Prakrit as usual is corrupt. For the opening words read *osara rottum*; in the second half read *damsana-* and *jehim*. For the Prakrit word *pumsa* (= Sk. *apamṛṣṭa*) see Pischel, para. 486.

L [After giving a Sanskrit translation of the verse, Abhinava continues:] Since a drunkard knows nothing, no one is at fault here;

everything has been done by fate. Go away! Make no false efforts [at reconciliation], for fate cannot be reversed. Here the imperative with its personal inflection is suggestive, as are the other words which it flavors.¹ This is what our author has in mind.

1. BP says that what "go away" suggests is the woman's jealousy. Actually, the second person active of the imperative (*osara* and *mā pumsa*) is more violent and emotional than it would be in Latin or English. Politeness normally dictates a use of the third person passive in Sanskrit imperatives.

A. Another example is:

Don't block my way; move on.
 Young fool, you are utterly shameless!
 I cannot stay from my chores;
 I have to take care of an empty house.¹

1. The verse presupposes that a traveler has stopped a young woman on the road and has tried to engage her in conversation. Secretly she wishes to accept him as a lover. So under the pretense of sending him off she informs him that there is an empty house nearby where they can make love unobserved. An "empty house" is the conventional rendezvous of village lovers in Sanskrit poetry; see note on *SRK* Translation, 813. The woman is probably not referring to her own house. The verse is given with different readings in Weber's *Satasai* 961 and in Hemacandra's *AC*, Parikh's edition, p. 84 (the *NS* edition simply copies from the *Locana*). In the *Locana* version we must emend to *rundhī no* [Weber: *mā pantha rundhasu paham*; Hem.: *mā pantha rundha maham*]. For *aniricchāo* read *anirikkhāo* = Sk. *anirikṣyakāḥ* "not free from constraint," i.e., dependent on the command of others.

L [After a translation of the Prakrit, Abhinava continues:] Here the imperative "move on" with its personal ending suggests the following. You are inexperienced to show your feeling thus where other people are present. But there is an empty house that could serve as a rendezvous. That is where we should go.¹

1. Both this verse and the next exhibit some similarity to the verse quoted under 1.4 b 4, "Go your rounds freely, gentle monk," etc. In all three verses a command is to be understood otherwise than as expressed. But our authors took the verse of 1.4 b as an example merely of *vastudhvani* whereas these two verses are said to exhibit *rasadhvani*, directly according to Ānanda if we understand him correctly, indirectly by a suggestion of *vastudhvani* leading immediately to *rasadhvani*, according to Abhinava. One may ask where one draws the line. Where does an ironic use of words lead only to the lower form of suggestion (*vastudhvani*) and where does it become the soul of poetry (*rasadhvani*)? The answer, I think, lies in the passion of the utterance. In both this verse and the following a woman is directly addressing her potential lover. We feel her passion in the imperatives that she uses. The verse *bhamma dhammadia*, addressed to a stupid old monk, while it hints at an erotic situation, lacks any passion of utterance and ends up in the reader's heart as merely comical.

A An example [of a suggestive relationship expressed by] theative is:

Go somewhere else you innocent puppy.
Don't stand here staring at me bathing.
A bathing beach is not a place
for men afraid of their wives.¹

Prakrit verses that make use of the suffix *ka*² show the suggestiveness that is possible in secondary suffixes. *Ka* expresses heavy scorn.

1. In the text of the Prakrit verse join *hñānti*, together and separate *puloesi eam*. *Eam* represents the Vedic etad "bere, thus," not Sk. *evam*, which is *evam* in Prakrit. In the second half, read *cia na hoi* for *vianā hoi*. 2. As in *bälaka*[*k*a] and *bhiru*[*k*]āñam in the verse.

L Go somewhere else, *bälaka* [lit., pitiable child], you of ungrown intelligence. Why do you keep looking at me here as I am bathing? *Bho* (you!) is a form of scornful address. A beach is not to be related to men afraid of their wives. That is, between those who are afraid of their wives and this place the relation is widely remote. By expressing

such a relation, a woman who is covertly in love with the man shows her jealousy.

That make use of the suffix *ka*: By mention of *ka* he implies the same possibility of other secondary suffixes. Specifically he is speaking of sentences of poetry in which the suffix *ka* is used, as in *jāyābhīru-kāṇḍam* (pitiable men who are afraid of their wives). In this word the suffix *ka* expresses the heaviest scorn, as if to ask, "Who are more despicable in the world than they whose affection is bound to their wives and who are strangers to real passion?"

A There is a suggestiveness of compounds when they are used with appropriateness of literary style.¹ And there is suggestiveness of particles, as in:

I cannot bear to lose my love
and at one stroke endure these days.
to which the newly risen clouds
impart their lovely shade.

[Kālidāsa. *Vikramorvāsiya* 4.10]²

Here the particle "and" (*ca*) is suggestive.

1. *Vṛtyoucītyena*: the same term as in 3.7 a A; see footnote 2 on that passage. But Ānanda probably means here that the degree of compounding must be in accord with the genre of the work. Ānanda gives no example here of this type of suggestiveness. 2. The association of the monsoon with days spent at home in marital bliss (cf. *HOS* Vol. 44, p. 127, para. 6) makes Purūravas' loss of Urvāśi harder to bear. In *d* the reading of our text *nirātāpārdharamyaiḥ* makes no sense to me. Dr. Krishnamoorthy does the best he can with it: "I believe the beauty of days will be halved for want of any sunshine." but the point of the verse must be that the days are too beautiful to bear, not that their beauty is reduced. So I have taken the reading of the printed editions of the play *nirātāpatuvaramyaiḥ*.

L The particle *ca*: he uses the singular in the sense of a class to refer to the two occurrences of *ca* ("both and"). These two

occurrences tell us that the separation [from Urvasî] and the advent of the moonsoon, coming by chance together, like a boil on a tumor, are more than life can bear. By this means the word "lovely" (*ramyâsh*) becomes especially stimulative of *rasa*.

A Another example is:

She turned her face aside, with its long lashes,
and her fingers covered her lips which struggled
to pronounce the words of prohibition.
I dared to lift her face, but dared not kiss it.

[Kâlidâsa, *Sâkuntala* 3.22]

Here it is the particle "but" (*tu*).

L The particle "but": By its indicating his regret it suggests that if the king had only received one kiss, he would have satisfied his every desire. This is what our author has in mind.

A Note that while the suggestive function of particles has generally been recognized [by the grammarians], what we are referring to here is their suggestiveness with respect to *rasa*. Verbal prefixes have [this sort of] suggestiveness in such verses as:

Rice grains lie scattered at the foot of trees,
dropped by the parrots from their nesting hol
Here and there are rocks profuse with oil,
that show where oil-nuts have been lately ground.
The deer with long-accustomed confidence
stroll by untroubled by the sounds of men.
The paths that lead from the waterside are tracked
with drippings from the hem of hermits' bark-cloth.

[Kâlidâsa, *Sâkuntala* 1.13]^{1,2}

1. The verse describes Kāśyapa's hermitage, which King Dusyanta and his charioteer have just entered. "Oil-nuts" (*ingudiphala*): *Terminalia catalpa*. The leaves were fed to camels (*MBh* 2.47.4). The oil expressed from the nut was used to heal wounds (*Sāk.* 4.14) and, by persons living removed from civilization, as a substitute for mustard or sesamum oil. Mārkandeya Purāṇa 28.26 remarks that the *vanaprastha* must use "wild oil." The point of Ānanda's quotation lies in the word *prasnigdhāḥ* "profuse with oil," where the prefix *pro* intensifies the basic sense of *snigdha* "oily." 2. The Kāvyamālā edition here adds a second quotation and a summary remark of the *Vṛtti*. As Abhinava does not comment on the passage, it may not be genuine. But given the rarity of remarks in Sanskrit on the aesthetic effect of meter, the passage is of interest. It runs:

madamukharakapotam unmayūram
pravirajavāmanaurkyasanvivesam
vanam idam evagāhamānabhīmam
vyasanam ivopari dāruñatvam eti

ityādau prasabdasyaupacchandikasya ca vyanjanatvam adhikam dyotata,

which may be translated:

With its enraptured sound of doves and eager peacocks,
this waste land of sparse, dwarfed trees
is like unto human vice: it is dangerous to him who enters
and bodes cruel consequence.

In these examples suggestiveness is intensified by the prefix *pra* [sc., in the example from the *Sākuntala*] and by the *upacchandasita* meter [sc., in the example just given].

With regard to the meter the remark seems to me to be just. The contrast between the happily tripping syllables of the line openings and the heavy cadence (— — — — —) is very nicely parallel to the contrast between the tempting beauties of the forest (and of vice) as first seen and then the heavy disaster which follows if one yields to the temptation to enter.

L Has generally been recognized: He says this because it is proclaimed in the schools of the grammarians that particles are suggestive (or indicative, *dyotaka*) on the ground that they lack the properties necessary for direct denotation. Thus, they are used as prefixes [to verbs], or are dependently used; they lack case inflections and they lack gender and number.¹

"Profuse with oil": The prefix *pra* intensifies the meaning and by telling us that the *ingudi* nuts were especially juicy suggests the great

beauty of the hermitage.² [Another commentator has made] the remark that "what is suggested is the strong craving of the hermit for this particular kind of nut." This is wrong, for in the play this is the speech of the king, not of the hermit.³ So enough.

1. A particle can only indicate which of several potential denotations is to be given to the independent, inflected words. See *Vākyapadiya* 2.189–206 and Abhyankar, *Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar*, s.v. *nipātoddyyotakatva*. But this sort of *dyotakatva* has nothing to do with *rasa*. 2. This remark is quoted verbatim, but without attribution, by Rāghavabhaṭṭa in his commentary on the *Sāk.* ad loc. 3. If the hermit had been speaking, the intensive expression might suggest his intense feelings about *ingudī* nuts. But the king has no use for *ingudī* oil. If he notices its profuseness it can only be to suggest the wealth and beauty of the forest products in the hermitage.

A The use of two or three prefixes in a single word is not to be counted a fault if it is consistent with the suggestion of *rasa*, as it is in the passage:

When darkness drops her garment, straightway the sun god,
perceiving from on high the nakedness of creatures ...

[*Mayūra, Suryasatka 4ab*]⁴

or in the verse:

So human is the guise in which you serve ...

1. Perceiving their nakedness, the sun sends forth his rays to clothe them. The word *samudvīksya* (perceiving from on high) contains three prefixes. 2. Abhinava completes the verse, the source of which we have not found. It sounds very like the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa*. The reference is doubtless to God's incarnation as Krishna.

L Two or three: By this he would prohibit more than three. That the blessed sun god looks with care (*vi-*), from above (*ut-*), with

perfect [comprehension] (*sam-*), suggests his great compassion. The second verse referred to runs as follows:

So human is the guise in which you serve
that the foolish seek to understand you, reasoning
with inferences made according to their wit:
you, incomprehensible
even to the greatest yogis.

The participle *samupdācarantam* is to be understood as "acting toward (*ā* = nearly, or in behalf of) in perfect (*sam* = *samyātic*) disguise (*upa* = *upamāsukṛtvā*). Hereby is suggested the extraordinary compassion of God as he acts in various ways [in behalf of his devotees].

A Particles may be similarly [multiplied with suggestive effect], as in

Ah verily, your courage must be envied!
(Kālidāsa, *Kumārasambhava* 3.20)¹

or in such verses as:

Once, when people saw a man of virtue
they thought that only then they lived,
nor could contain themselves but danced for joy
as tears coursed down their happy cheeks.
Woe is me, alas, alack! Nowhere
can I find a refuge of such people,
for Fate, the scoundrel, prospering only those
who hate the good, has brought them all to death.²

1. The remark applies to Kāma as he offers to attack Śiva. 2. The Kāvyamālā ed. has *svavapuṣi* for *sma vapusī*. While *mānti svavapuṣi* is more idiomatic, one needs the *sma* to throw the first half of the verse into past time. The contrast of virtuous past with vicious present is an important part of the suggestion of the verse.

L Similarly: the sense is that the use of two or three such particles if done suggestively is not to be counted a fault. In the first of the two quotations the two particles *aho* and *bata* increase the suggestion of wonder. In the second quotation *hā* and *dhik* increase the suggestion of disenchantment.¹

1. Thus the first verse quoted suggests *adbhutaraso*, the second *sāntarasa*. In the second verse there are actually four exclamations: *hā*, *dhik*, *kastam*, and *bata*. But *kastam* is not a *nipāta*, because it can be inflected.

A The repetition of a word, too, if used for suggestiveness, sometimes adds beauty, as in a verse like the following:

A scoundrel aims at his own interest,
puts his mind to deception, and brings forth words
filled with flattery and artifice.
It is not that good men do not know his tricks;
they know, but cannot bring themselves
to disappoint him of a favor.¹

1. The verse, attributed in *Subhāṣitāvalī* (271) to an otherwise unknown Bhagavattārāgya, is quoted by Mammata (7 ex. 312) and Hemacandra (*AC* 3, ex. 232). The repetition of the negative suggests that good men know these tricks very well. What the repetition of *vidanti* suggests is less clear. Abhinava takes it to suggest that they know still more. Perhaps he means that they are aware of the selfishness and deceitfulness of most men. Mammata and Hemacandra say that it excludes others from this knowledge. In any event the two repetitions seem to emphasize the wisdom and generosity of good men.

L The foregoing brings up the subject¹ of another form of repetition which may be suggestive: The repetition of a word, etc. The

term "word" is meant to imply the inclusion of sentences and other units also wherever they may be [repeated suggestively].

"They know": The suggestion is that they know everything else as well. An example of a repeated sentence is [in the *Ratnāvalī*] where, after [the stage manager speaks] the words "Look you, from even the farthest island," etc., there follows [the speech of Yaugandharāyana] "No doubt about it; from even the farthest island." The repetition here suggests that the goal of the play will be obtained without obstruction.² In the repeated passage "What, what! Shall they be safe while I still live?" what is suggested is [Bhīma's] excessive wrath.³ [In the *Vikramorvāsiya*] the repetition of the words "Lord of all mountains, have you seen that perfect beauty?" suggests [Purūravas'] excess of madness.⁴

1. The subject is incidental to the main topic, as the suggestions under this heading are of the *vastuhuṇī* type, not of *rāsa*. 2. The passage here referred to (*Ratn.* 1.7 and ff.) exemplifies the *kathodghāṭa* type of *prastāvāṇī*, as Abhinava states in his *ABH* (*BANS* Vol. 3, p. 94). The *prastāvāṇī* is the introduction or prelude to a play. Bharata (20.33) speaks of its five *ṛigāṇī* (Abhinava interprets as "types"), of which the *kathodghāṭa* is where a character enters by taking up a sentence that has been used in a conversation between the stage manager and one of the actors (20.35). As appears from other accounts of the *kathodghāṭa* and from the examples adduced, the sentence must be applied to one situation by the stage manager and repeated with an application to the plot of the play by the entering character. In the *Ratn.* the stage manager has been comforting his wife, the chief actress, by assuring her that fate will bring back her daughter "from even the farthest island." Yaugandharāyana, on the other hand, applies the words to the princess of Ceylon, whom he hopes to see married to King Udayana. He has just heard that she has been saved from shipwreck and brought to Ujjayini.
3. The passage here referred to forms the *kathodghāṭa* of the *Venīśamīhāra* (Poona ed. 1.7-8; Madras ed. 1.9-10). The stage manager concludes his stanza of propitiation with the words "And may the sons of the Kuru king rest safe with all their followers" (*svasthā bhavantu kururājasaulāḥ sabbṛtyāḥ*). There are then heard offstage the words of the wrathful Bhīma. The text differs in the different editions, but all contain the words *svasthā bhavantu* (or *bhavanti*) *maya jīvati* "shall they rest safe while I still live?" The stage manager then retires and Bhīma enters with Sahadeva.
4. The reference is to the scene of Purūravas' madness *Vik.* 4.51. He asks the mountain if it has seen his lost Urvaśī: *svavakṣitibhṛtām nātha, dṛṣṭā sarvāṅgasundarī... mayā virūhitā tu�ā* "Lord of all mountains, have you seen that perfect beauty lost by me?" He then listens to the echo of his words from the mountain caves. The echo repeats the words exactly but Purūravas construes them differently, as "O lord

of kings, I have seen that perfect beauty lost by you." In the *ABh* (*BHNS* Vol. 2, p. 458) Abhinava gives this passage as an example of the *vīthyāṅga* called *trigata*. The "parts of a *Vithi*" (*vīthyāṅga*) are often transposed to types of plays other than the *Vithi* proper; see Raghavan, *Bhoja's SP*, p. 573. "That is to be known as *trigata* where because of similarity of sound many meanings are artificially construed" (*BHNS* 18.124, Vol. 2, p. 458). Commenting on Bharata, Abhinava says, "many meanings: sc. where the text is made out to consist of question and answer." In the exemplar verse, the sentence that is first construed as a question is next construed as an answer. A simpler version of the same rhetorical trick is found in Ovid's delightful story of Echo and Narcissus, *Meta.* 3.380ff. (*dixerat, ecquis adest? et, adest, responderat Echo, etc.*).

A A tense may be suggestive, as in the followi

The floods level out high and low;
ever fewer come travelers
over the roads, which soon wi
impassible even to wishes.

[*Sattasai* 7.73]¹

Here the phrase "roads, which soon will be" the suffix of the word *bhavīṣyanti* (will be) by its expressing a particular time shows itself as a strengthening of the *rāsa* (emotional content), for the sense of the verse contains *rāsa* when it is viewed as stimulative of love-in-separation caused by the husband's staying abroad.

Just as it is here the suffix of a word that proves suggestive, it may elsewhere be the stem. For example:

That house with crumbling walls, and now
this palace stretching to the skies;
that old decrepit cow, and here comes marching
this troop of cloud-black elephants;
that bumble sound of pounding rice
and this sweet singing of young damsels:
wonder of wonders, that the days have raised
the brahmin up to such prosperity!²

In this stanza, it is the stem of the word *divasaiḥ* ("days") that is suggestive.³

Pronouns, too, can be suggestive, as in the verse just quoted.⁴ And it is because he realized that the pronouns were suggestive that the poet did not use a word [directly expressive of contrast,] like *kva* ("how different!").⁵ Sensitive readers will be able to ferret out along these lines even other types of suggestive factors. All of these of course were included in [our] speaking of the suggestiveness of words, sentences, and style (cf. 3.2 K'), but the subject is retraced with this subtlety of distinction for the purpose of instruction.

1. Gaṅgādharabhaṭṭa's first explanation is doubtless the correct one: "To a companion who has been trying to console her when the gentleman has not returned even at summer's end, the lady speaks these words." The Sanskrit contains a pun that I have not rendered in English: *manoratha*: desire or, in its apparently literal sense, the chariot of the mind. 2. The verse is quoted by Mammaṭa (10, ex. 517) as an example of the figure of speech *paryāya*. In his commentary on that passage Bhimasena Dīkṣita identifies "the brahmin" as Sudāman, whom Krishna had enriched. Hemacandra also quotes the verse AC 1, ex. 91. 3. The commentators on Mammaṭa point out that the word *divasaiḥ*, "days," as opposed to months, years, or time in general, suggests the rapidity with which the brahmin has gained his prosperity. This adds to the *adbhutarasa* (relish of wonder) of the verse. 4. The reference is to *tad* and *idam* ("that" house ... "this" palace, etc.). 5. E.g., *kva dhenur jaratī kva ca karino ghanābhāḥ*.

L A tense: A finite verb through its tense, number, *kāraka*, and *upagraha*¹ contains a package of meanings. Our author feels that we should investigate suggestiveness in such detail as to assign it, by positive and negative example, to one or another of these elements. *A strengthening of the rasa:* What is here suggested might be put thus: "If the time of the rains makes me tremble in its anticipation, what will it do when it arrives?"

Apropos of the distinction of part and possessor of the part (e.g., of suffix and stem), he says, Just as, etc.; for the sense of the word "days" here suggests the utter improbability of the thing described.

Pronouns too: he means, together with the stem of a word. That is to say, it is the pronoun as taken together with a word stem that is suggestive. Hence there is no tautology.² Thus the pronoun *tad* (that) taken together with the stem of the word *natabhitti* (of crumbling walls) suggests a house that is overrun with mice and miserable

in every way. For if the word "that" had been used alone [to qualify the word "house"], one might suppose the house to have been very prosperous; while if the word "of crumbling walls" were used [without the pronoun "that"], the extreme misery of the place would not have been suggested. The same reasoning applies to "that cow," etc. In all such cases the word "that" suggests something that one remembers and is to be distinguished, as previously stated, from the "that" that is correlative with "which."³ Thus it is by such words as *tad* and *idam*⁴ ("that" and "this"), through their suggesting the contradictions between [the speaker's] memory and his present experience, that the stimulants of wonder are brought together. For if the words *tad* and *idam* were omitted, the images would not hold together. Thus we may take it that the very heart [of the suggestiveness or charm of the verse] lies in these portions, *tad* and *idam*.⁵ This double combination [of suggestive factors] implies that we may have triple combinations.⁶ Thus by using a marker and a table of elements,⁷ we may say that the varieties [of suggestive factors] are endless, as our author is about to state in the passage even other types, etc. As this [analysis] has been spread over many [pages], he draws it together, lest the student have missed the point, with All of these, etc. At the same time, he reminds us of the purpose that has led to this breadth of analysis, with the words, [the subject is retraced] with this subtlety of distinction [for the purposes of instruction].

1. A verb has agent or object or agent-object *kāruka* as it is active, passive, or reflexive in meaning. *Upagṛha* refers to the choice of *parasmipada* or *ātmanepada* endings. This choice may tell whether the verb denotes action that benefits (or affects) the agent, or action that benefits someone else.
2. If the stem of a word were already suggestive of something, there would be no need of a pronoun to suggest the same thing.
3. See 3.4 a L and our note 6 on that passage. One might put the matter as follows. In expressions such as "O those eyes!" "Ah that house," the pronoun takes the deictic construction (as in "those eyes are brown," "that house is miserable"), not the anaphoric (as in "that house which stands on the hillside"). The reason is obvious: one may point to something in one's memory as well as to something in the outer world.
4. "Such words" (*ādi*): the *ādi* refers to the pronoun *tad* used in the second line of the verse.
5. As opposed to the portions consisting in the qualified substantive stems.
6. The double combination is pronoun and substantive stem. A triple combination might be pronoun, stem, and suffix.
7. See 2.12 L, footnote 1.

3.16 m

A At this point it may be objected that we have described the rasas, [bhāvas, rasābhāsas, and bhāvābhāsas] as being suggested (*ākṣepya*) by the force of [sentence-]meaning and that it is therefore illogical to speak of case endings, etc., as being various suggestive factors (*vyanjaka*). But we answered this objection when we spoke of the suggestiveness of words [cf. 3.1j above]. Moreover, even if the rasas are suggested by particular [sentence-]meanings, since these meanings cannot arise in the absence of suggestive words, a thorough knowledge of the nature of suggestors, dividing them up in the manner shown above, cannot fail to be useful. Furthermore, the beauty of particular words, as it has elsewhere¹ been shown with careful distinctions, must be understood to be wholly contingent on their suggestiveness.

Even where suggestiveness does not appear in some passage [that we are] now [reading], if it contains words in which we once saw beauty in a suggestive passage in some other work, we will find by force of habit the same beauty in those words now taken out of the context that they had in the flow [of that former work].² How else would there be any difference in the beauty of words of which the denotative sense is the same?³ If it be objected that the difference is other than in suggestiveness, being something that is felt only by sensitive readers (*sahṛdaya*), we may ask what it means to be a sensitive reader. Is the prerequisite the recognition of certain conventions that apply to poetry and that bear no relation to *rasa* and *bhāva*? Or is it a broad and subtle knowledge of the nature of poetry as consisting in *rasa*, *bhāva* and the like? On the former alternative there would be no criterion for the beauty of particular words set up as beautiful by such readers, for one could perfectly well set up a different set of words by a different convention. But on the second alternative, being a sensitive reader amounts simply to having a knowledge of *rasa*.⁴ Now the peculiar property of words [sc., the property that renders them beautiful] that is felt by sensitive readers of this sort is the natural power such words have to transmit *rasa*; and so the primary beauty of these words is based on their suggestiveness. The only peculiar beauty that words can have when used denotatively is clarity when their beauty depends on meaning, or, when it is not dependent on meaning, alliteration, etc.

1. According to Abhinava "elsewhere" here refers to Udbhaṭa's *Bhāmaha-vivaraṇa*. The remains of what may be this work, edited by R. Gnoli, are not sufficient for us to discover what Udbhaṭa said on this subject, but he is not likely to have attributed the beauty of words to their suggestiveness. What we have here in Ānandavardhana is likely to be a criticism to the effect that in spite of what Udbhaṭa said on the subject, the real cause of a word's beauty is its suggestiveness. 2. This complicated sentence furnishes a persuasive argument against the critic who might object: "How can the beauty of a word be contingent on its suggestion when some words are beautiful everywhere they are used, even in expository prose?" The answer is that such words carry over their suggestions from other contexts. 3. Abhinava offers the example of *tatam*, *tatoh*, and *tati*, all meaning river-bank or shore, of which he finds only the last word beautiful. In English I would call "cellar" beautiful as opposed to "basement." The former suggests to me (D. I.) the cool milk and stored apples of my childhood, the latter the oil furnace and cast-off ironware of modern times. 4. (J. M.) Ānanda's argument here is not strong, although his objection to other critics of his day may well be taken. He argues that either one admits that *rasa* is the essence of poetry, or one does not. If one does not, then there is no objective basis for asserting that such and such is beautiful in poetry and such and such is not, for a different critic will hold a different view. Whereas if one believes in *rasa*, then *rasa* becomes the touchstone of beauty in poetry. But this is a valid argument only if one already accepts *rasa*. An opponent could argue in precisely the same manner, substituting some other criterion in place of *rasa*. If one were to put forward *vakrokti* or *svabhāvokti* as the essence of poetry, one would in no less degree have a standard by which to judge any given work. To do Ānanda justice, however, one must consider that at the time he wrote his work, no one had come forward with a comprehensive theory of poetics that allowed all the elements within literature to fall into place. Ānanda with his theory of *rasa* and *dhvani* was the first to do this. So if we interpret his words here as an objection to assertions that such and such elements in poetry are beautiful without a coherent theory to underlie such statements, we may fairly agree with him.

L It may be objected: The objection has already been resolved [at 3.1j A], but is here brought up in order to recall it to the reader's attention and to add something new. We answered: We have already said that denotativeness is not so necessary to the operation of suggestion that a non-denotative element may not be suggestive.¹ But when there is suggestiveness of *rasa* in a word, the word is not,² as is a song, etc., without a linguistic operation toward that end. Rather,

such a word is suggestive in the highest sense. That is the meaning; and it has been explained by us under Chapter One.³

In order to show that this [doctrine] is no new invention on his part our author proceeds with Furthermore the beauty of particular words, etc. Elsewhere: viz., in the *Bhāmahavivarāṇa*.⁴ With careful distinctions: Where Udbhaṭa says that the words *sraj* (garland) and *candana* (sandalwood) are beautiful in the erotic but not in the gruesome (*bibhatsa*), he is making a distinction based on *rasa*. We have already stated⁵ that it is the suggestive force only of a word that makes for *rasa*.

Even where: Such words as *sraj* and *candana*, even when they are at that time in a passage that lacks any suggestion of the erotic, etc., will still have the power to convey a meaning that has become beautiful by a sort of fragrance from our frequent experience of their suggestive power. For example, in *tati tāram tāmyati* ("the shoreline suffers sharply") the man of taste (*sahṛdaya*) rejects the masculine and neuter forms and uses the feminine *tati* on the principle that "even a name is sweet by being feminine."⁶ Or as in the following verse of my teacher Bhāṭṭendurāja, that prince of scholars, poets, and sensitive critics:

Even if he bore not
his water-lily colored stigma,
even if, by merit gained
in other births, he might assume
those tempting graces that alone
win all our wonder,
still, could the moon have, could he ever have,
the lovely softness of her cheek?

For here the words *indūvara*, *lakṣma*, *vismaya*, *suhṛd*, *vilāsa*, *nāma*, *parināma*, *komala*, etc., all of which we have seen elsewhere to be suggestive of *sṛngāra*, bring to the verse the highest degree of beauty.⁷

That this [basis of verbal beauty in suggestiveness] must be admitted he states in the words How else, etc. As one cannot claim that this [difference in the beauty of words] is not felt, he says by sensitive readers, etc. A different set: for how could there be any criterion if the convention depended on unregulated individual whim? Primary beauty: to be construed as in agreement with "the peculiar property" above. Depends on meaning: that is, depends on the denoted (literal) meaning. Alliteration, etc.: this peculiar property of words depends on their arrangement in relation to other words. By the term

"etcetera" he would include the excellences of sound (*sabdagunas*) and the figures of sound (*sabdālarikāras*). The meaning of the whole passage is that in poetry one should use words that are strengthened by their arrangement, their clarity, and their beauty [of suggestiveness].

1. Cf. Abhinava's remarks, 3.3-4 L. 2. As is clear from *BP*, we must read *na tu na gitādiuad iva* (not *nanu na*). 3. Compare pages 87-88 and 187 in Chapter One. 4. See above 3.16 m A, note 1, and also J. Masson, "On the Authenticity of the So-called *Bhāmāhavivaraṇa*." 5. 1.4 g L. 6. Both the quotation and the reason given for the choice of words seem to be taken from some earlier author (Udbhaṭa?), for they both appear in Kuntaka's *Vakroktijūti* (2.22, ex. 79), which gives the verse from which the quotation comes as follows (I emend the last word from *subhagā* to *subhagah*):

yatheyam grīsmoṣmavyatikaravati pāñdurabhidā
mukhodbhinnamānānalatalalavallitikisalayā
taṭī tāram tāmyati atusasiyāśa ko 'pi jaladas
tathā manye bhāvī bhuvanavalayākṛanti subhagah

I do not know what *bhidā* means, but for the rest, the stanza may be rendered as follows.

The shoreline suffers sharply in the summer heat,
pale and with her foliage trembling
under the exhausted breezes of her sighs:
from which I guess that soon some lucky cloud
will rob the moon of his white glory and will lie
victorious on this bracelet of the earth.

The original choice of *taṭī* here, it seems to me, had little to do with the inherent beauty of the word. The shore must be made feminine to fit with all the other suggestions of a lady and her lover. Just as a lady pines in her lover's absence, stirring the curls above her forehead with the sighs from her mouth, just so the shore in the summer heat. And the black cloud, defeating the white moon in combat and thereby overcoming the earth, will be blessed with the joy of physically "overcoming" or lying upon his beloved. The sight of a shoreline just before the advent of the monsoon has put the poet in mind of these suggestions. But the odd alliterating phrase *taṭī tāram tāmyati* sticks in the mind. Udbhaṭa or some other ancient critic must have explained its haunting beauty by the "feminine" charm of the word *taṭī*. Of course to one who remembers the verse, the word *taṭī* even in other contexts may retain some of the charm it has in this verse. 7. Abhinava, it seems to me, here goes too far. By seeing suggestive force in so many words he runs the danger of ascribing true art to a work merely because of its poetic diction. In fact

one does not write poetry simply by stringing together words that Keats or Kālidāsa once used.

A Having thus stated the nature of the suggestors of *rasa* and the like, he proceeds as follows in order to define that which is obstructive to *rasa*.

K An intelligent author who would compose *rasas* and the like in an extended work or in a single verse must take care to avoid those things which obstruct them.

A A poet who has set his mind to composing *rasas* or *bhāvas* in an extended work or in a single verse must take the greatest care to avoid that which obstructs them. If not, he will not succeed in producing a single verse that contains *rasa*.

L Thus:¹ The connection with the preceding is that he has stated the nature of the factors suggestive of *rasa* and the like: namely phonemes, words, and so on up to the work as a whole; now he proceeds, etc. What the present *Kārikā* does is to state the purpose in defining the obstructive factors, namely that one can thereby avoid them. The actual definitions will be given in the next two *Kārikās*, beginning with the words *virodhirasasambandhi*.

1. One must supply the *pratīka* "evam iti" before the word *rasādinām*.

3.18-19 Introduction

A Now what are the obstructive factors that a poet must take care to avoid? They are:

3.18-19

- K** (1) The taking into a work of *vibhāvas*, etc., that belong to an obstructive *rasa*;
 (2) the description at great length of something alien, even though it be connected with the subject in hand;
 (3) breaking off [the *rasa*] too suddenly;
 (4) revealing it too suddenly;
 (5) flashing it on again and again after it has reached full maturity;
 (6) and impropriety of style (*vr̥t̥tyanyauicitya*).¹

These are the factors obstructive to a *rasa*.

1. The *Vṛtti* will allow a very wide meaning to the term; see below, 3.18-19c A and note 2.

A [The first type of obstruction.] The taking into a work of a *vibhāva*, a *bhāva*, or an *anubhāva*¹ which belongs to a *rasa* that is obstructive of the *rasa* in hand must be considered a cause of obstructing that *rasa*. Thus one would be introducing the *vibhāva* of an obstructive *rasa* if after having described persons and situations as being revelatory (*vibhāvatayā*) of *sāntarasa* one were to describe that which is revelatory of *śringārarasa* or the like.² One would be introducing a [basic] emotion (*bhāva*) that belongs to an obstructive *rasa* if when the wives of the hero have been angered by a love quarrel he were to console them with remarks on disenchantment with the world (*vairāgyakathābhīṣṭ*).³ One would be introducing *anubhāvas* that belong to an obstructive *rasa* if when his beloved is angered in a love quarrel and refuses to be appeased, one should describe the hero as beside himself with anger and exhibiting the symptoms (*anubhāvas*) of fury (*raudra*).

1. *vibhāvabhbhāvānuhbhbhāvānām*: the reading of the compound is in doubt. All editions except the Kashi read *vibhāvānuhbhbhāvavyabhicārnām*. In favor of the Kashi reading is the order of the examples which follow. The commoner reading seems to have been introduced by someone who misunderstood Abhinava's gloss on *bhāva* (see *L* below, esp. footnote 3). 2. Ānanda, in introducing 3.24 below, lists four pairs of rasas which are mutually obstructive. One of the four pairs is *sānta* and *śrigēra*. 3. *Vairāgyu* or *nirveda* is the *sthāyibhāva* of *sāntarasa*; cf. *ABh* Vol. 1, p. 268.

L It might be objected that these obstructions could all be understood by the negation of [those prescriptions for the forming of *rasa* listed in 3.10-14, as "a plot] beautiful because of the appropriateness of its *vibhāvas*, [*sthāyi*]bhāvas, *anubhāvas*, and *sañcārinsrasa*). And the mere absence of a good property is not so injurious as the possession of its contrary. The failure to eat healthy food is not so productive of illness as the eating of unhealthy food. That is why he says one must take care [to avoid these obstructions].

The half *śloka* 3.18ab gives the contrary to what was expressed in the full *śloka* 3.10. The half *śloka* 3.19ab gives the contrary of 3.13ab; 3.19cd the contrary of 3.13cd; while 3.19ef gives the contrary of 3.14 together with other matter that is obstructive.

The *Vṛttikāra* explains these items one after another: The taking into a work, etc. He realizes that there is no contradiction between the *vibhāvas* (revelatory factors) of comedy and the erotic, of the heroic and the marvellous, of the cruel and the tragic, of the fearsome and the loathsome.¹ So he mentions the peaceful (*sānta*) and the erotic (*śrigēra*), as there is contradiction between calm (*prasama*) and passion (*rāga*).²

Introducing an emotion that belongs to an obstructive *rasa*: he means, [as a] transient emotion (*vyabhicārin*), because the basic emotion (*sthāyibhāva*) of the obstructive *rasa* could not be introduced as basic, so the case could never arise. However, as a transient emotion it could be introduced. That is why he has chosen the [neutral] term *bhāva*.³ What he is referring to by the word "disenchantment" (*vairāgya*) in remarks on disenchantment with the world is disillusionment (*nirveda*), the basic emotion (*sthāyibhāva*) of the peaceful (*sānta*). An example is the verse which begins:

Turn to forgiveness. Show happiness and leave your anger

only to end with a figure of substantiation (*arthāntarayāsa*) expressed in these words:

Sweet lady, the antelope of time does not run backward.⁴

The slightest introduction of disillusionment will kill the emotion of sexual love (*rati*), for how can a man who has once realized the true nature of the objects of sense give himself to a woman under the illusion that she is the all in all of life? To a man who realizes the true nature of the nacre that shines as silver, the idea of taking possession of it will not occur except as being an illusion (*samṛti*). By the use of the plural in "remarks" (*kathābhī*) in "remarks on disenchantment" our author would include other transient states of peace such as firmness (*dhṛti*), intelligence (*mati*), etc.⁵

1. These four pairs are given by Bharata (*BHNS* 6.39) to exemplify various ways by which one *rasa* can lead to another. They are what one might call compatible *rasas*. 2. *Prasama* and *rāga* are not *vibhāvas* but aspects of the *sthāyibhāvas* of the two *rasas* in question. However, it would follow by a small inference that the *vibhāvas* of the two *rasas* must likewise be contradictory. 3. By *bhāva* Ānanda certainly meant *sthāyibhāva*, for such is his regular usage. Nowhere does he use the simple word to mean *vyabhicāribhāva*. But Abhinava wishes to furnish a reason for Ānanda's abbreviating the full expression (*sthāyibhāva*) in this way. His explanation is that if one removes the *sthāyibhāva* from *sānta* and places it in *śrigāra*, it must there become a *vyabhicāribhāva*. Otherwise there would not be simply obstruction to *śrigāra*: *śrigāra* would cease and *sānta* would take over. Thus, according to Abhinava, Ānanda used the neutral term *bhāva* because he wished to cover that which is a *sthāyibhāva* in the obstructive *rasa* and at the same time a *vyabhicāribhāva* in the *rasa* that is being obstructed. 4. The two lines are the first and last of a verse by the Kashmirian poet Canda or Candraka. The verse is given in *Śāriṅg.* 3565 and *Subhā* 1629. For the poet, see *Rāj. Tar.* 2.16. For *arthāntaranyāsa*, see 1.13 i L, note 8; a particular injunction is here substantiated by a general law. A good English parallel is from Andrew Marvell, who begins an *anunaya* with "Had we but world enough and time,/ This coyness, Lady, were no crime" and proceeds to the *arthāntaranyāsa*: "The grave's a fine and private place,/ But none, I think, do there embrace." 5. For the *vyabhicāribhāvas* of *sāntarasa* see *Abh.* Vol. 1, p. 340, line 4 and Masson and Patwardhan's *Sāntarasa*, p. 139. Abhinava's reasoning seems to be that the plural shows that the lover makes remarks on other subjects as well.

§ 3.18-19 b A]

3.18-19 a

A [The second type of obstruction.] Here is another cause of obstructing the *rasa*, namely the describing at length of some alien matter, even if it may be somehow connected with the matter in hand. As, for example, when a description has been begun of the chief character in a state of love-in-separation, if the poet then proceeds, because of his liking for the composition of ornaments such as *yamakas*, to describe mountains or the like in a long passage [decked out with these ornaments].

L As no one other than a madman would describe a wholly alien subject, much less do so at length, he says, even if it may be somehow connected.

3.18-19 b

A [The third and fourth types of obstruction.] And here are what must be considered further types of obstruction to the *rasa*, namely the sudden breaking off of the *rasa* or its sudden revelation. An example of an inopportune interruption of the *rasa* is this.¹ The chief character has arrived at the highest pitch of love for a certain lady with whom he longs to have a rendezvous. Further, it is known that this love is mutual. Suddenly he abandons the action appropriate to his concern for a rendezvous and we have the description of another action in no way related. An example of an inopportune revelation of a *rasa* is this. A battle has begun in which many great heroes are dying, as in the destruction at the end of an era. And now we have a hero, and almost a god at that,² who has not experienced love-in-separation, described as suddenly and without any proper occasion speaking of love. In such a case one cannot use the excuse that the character in the tale

has been driven out of his senses by fate; because the chief reason for a poet's writing at all is to produce *rasa*. The plot is merely a means to that end; as was said above (1.9 K), "Just as a man who wishes to see will take pains with the flame of the lamp as the means thereto," etc. Poets frequently stumble in this way by giving their main attention to the plot and by constructing *rasas* and *bhāvas* that lack a proper relation between what should be predominant and what subordinate; and it is on this account that we have worked at this treatise: not because of an infatuation with every possible description of *dhvani*,³ but in order to show that the proper goal of poets is suggestion in the form of *rasa*, *bhāva*, or the like, this and nothing else.

1. The example, as Abhinava points out, is taken from the *Ratnāvalī*, just as the following example is taken from the *Venīsaṃhāra*. But Ānanda here follows his frequent practice of criticizing without mentioning any names. 2. *devaprāyasyāpi tāvat*: The Kashi ed., but no other, adds the word *rāma-* before *deva*. As this makes no sense to us, we have omitted it in the translation. Badarīnātha Śarmā (*Haridas* ed. p. 358) explains the force of the passage thus: *devaprāyatvataḥanena nāyakasya dhīrodāttatayā 'nucitopanyāsoparāṇi-mukhaśilatā sūcye* "by speaking of his being 'almost a god' it is indicated that the hero is of the 'firm and noble' type and should be averse to the mention of anything inappropriate." 3. *dhuanipratipādanamātrābhinivesa*: The word *mātrā* is here used in its sense of extension ("all"), not restriction ("only"). Examples of this use are *M.Bh.* 13.22.3 *dyāvāprthivīmātraiṣā kāmyā* "this desire exists throughout all heaven and earth." *Kāśi* on *Pāṇ.* 3.2.106 *linmātrasya yathā syāt* "so that [the substitution] may apply to all cases of *hit*." This seems to be the way that Abhinava understood the word here.

L Of another action: as in the Fourth Act of the *Vatsarāja-carita* [= *Ratnāvalī*], where Vijayavarman gives his report, without even a mention of *Ratnāvalī*'s name.¹

By the two words *at that* (*api tāvat*), which show that such a scene is really out of the question for Duryodhana, he hints at the fact that the Second Act of the *Venīsaṃhāra* is the example he has in mind. That is why he goes on to say driven out of his senses by fate. The passage here referred to was mentioned earlier (3.10-14 f A) as an example of how not to compose a *sandhyāṅga*. The character in the tale: here he means the villain [Duryodhana].

On this account: viz., because the construction of *rasa* is the chief business of a poet and if he gives his chief attention to narrating the

plot, he will construct *rasas* and *bhāvas* that "lack a proper relation between what should be predominant and what subordinate," that is to say, where no consideration has been given to the relation of major and minor. In this way he will stumble and all sorts of faults will arise; that is the sense. With every possible description of *dhvani*: What he has in mind is that the mere instance of a suggested sense is of no importance. To become infatuated [with describing] all such instances would be like examining crows' teeth.²

1. There can be no doubt that by *Vatsarājacarita* Abhinava is referring to what we now know as the *Ratnāvalī* by King Harṣa, for in its Fourth Act just such an interruption occurs. The king and the Vidūsaka have been talking about the disappearance of Sāgarikā (*Ratnāvali*), whom the king yearns to meet with. Suddenly Vijayavarman is brought on stage and gives a long account of his uncle's victory over the King of Kosala. We should probably read *vijayavarmā* in place of *vijayavarma* in compound, which breaks the rule of syntax that the subordinate member of a compound should not be construed with a word outside the compound.
2. Examining crows' teeth is a proverbially useless endeavor because a crow has no teeth. J. M. adduces a popular verse: *kākasya kati vā dantā meṣasyāñḍam kiyatpalam / gardabhe kati romāni vyarthoivōśā vicārṇā //* The third of these proverbial follies would seem to offer a more appropriate *nyāya* here. Describing every instance or type of *dhvani* would be useless because there would be so many and most of them poetically insignificant.

3.18–19 c

A [The fifth type of obstruction.] And here is what we must regard as another cause of obstructing the *rasa*, namely that one should keep flashing it after it has reached full maturity. For a *rasa*, after its set of causes (i.e., *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, and *vyabhicāribhāvas*) has brought it to maturity and it has then been enjoyed, will wilt like a flower if it is then constantly handled.

[The sixth type of obstruction.] Likewise any impropriety of *vṛtti*, that is, behavior (*vyavahāra*), can only be obstructive to a *rasa*, as, for example, if a certain lady were to state her desire of sexual enjoyment to the hero without the use of appropriate periphrasis. Or we

may take "vṛtti" to refer to the modes of speech and action, known to Bharata, such as the *kaisiki* (the graceful mode), etc.,¹ or to the style of compounding and alliteration, such as the *upanāgarikā*, known in other works on poetics.² Any impropriety in such a *vṛtti*, that is, its use in the wrong place, is a cause of obstructing the *rasa*. In order to avoid these obstructions to the *rasa* and others along the same line that he may discover by himself, a good poet must be attentive. The following verses will give support to our position.

The principal object of the work of poets are the *rasas*, [bhāvus,] and the like. In constructing them he must be constantly on guard.

A work that lacks *rasa* is a deep reproach to a poet. By it he ceases to be a poet and is forgotten by others.

It is true that the ancient poets gained fame without chaining their language [to rules]. But a wise man will not abandon our system in reliance on them.

The system that we have set forth is not alien to the aims that were held by the great masters of poetry, beginning with Vālmīki and Vyāsa.

1. *BhNS* 20.8f; see above 3.6g *L* and footnote 1. 2. To keep *kāvyā-*
lārikārāntaraprasiddhānām parallel with *bharataprasiddhānām*, we must take
 the phrase *kāvyālankāra* to refer to a book, such as Udbhaṭa's *Kāvyālārikāra-*
sārasaṅgraha, rather than to "poetic figures of speech." Udbhaṭa does use
 the word *vṛtti* to refer to such styles as the *upanāgarikā*; see 1.1a 4, note 4.
 Only the last of the *Vṛtti*'s three explanations of *vṛttyanauicityam* agrees with
 the way in which the *Vṛtti* has used the similar phrase *vṛttyanauicityam* (3.7a 4
 and note 2; 3.16f 4 and note 1). The fact that the *Vṛtti* here gives three
 explanations has been used as an argument in favor of dual authorship of
Kārikās and *Vṛtti* (Kane *HSP* p. 181), as though the *Vṛtikāra* had not been
 certain of the *Kārikā*'s meaning. But it is not unusual for an author to elicit
 from his own words as wide a scope as their meaning will bear.

L He explains the *Kārikā* passage *vṛttyanauicityam eva ca* ("and
 impropriety of style") in several ways. By likewise he is glossing the
 word "and" (*ca*) in the *Kārikā*; and by the word only (*eva*) in "can
 only be obstructive to a *rasa*" he shows that the order of the words is
 reversed in the *Kārikā*, for what the *Kārikā* means is *vṛttyanauicityam*
ca rasasya virodhāya eva. To the hero: The reason is that a hero,

to whichever of the four different types of hero he belongs, must be steeped in *vītarasa*. To give him a timidity¹ characteristic of a coward would be a fault.

Them: viz., the *rasas* and the like. They: viz., good poets. Reproach: the sense is, disgrace.

But now Kālidāsa keeps flashing the *rasa* of tragedy in the laments of Rati² even after it has reached maturity. So why this insistence on avoiding obstructions to the *rasas*? In anticipation of such an objection he says, the ancient poets, etc. If for some reason Vasiṣṭha and others left the path of tradition, we are not also to leave it on that account;³ because those of exalted conduct have reasons that we cannot understand.⁴ The word *iti* (sc., the closing quotation mark) marks the end of the supplementary verses.

1. Such timidity would naturally be assumed if the lady had to tell him directly of her desire. 2. KumSam. Book 4. 3. Vasiṣṭha begot a son on the wife of King Kalmāṣapāda (*MBh* 1.113; 1.173). But we must not on that account imitate Vasiṣṭha's example by begetting children on other men's wives. Similarly we are not to imitate the exceptional traits of the ancient poets. 4. Abhinava is quoting from Kālidāsa, KumSam. 5.75.

K But when the intended *rasa* has been firmly established, there is no fault in mentioning these obstructive factors if they are stopped short, or if they are brought into a subordinate role.

A But when the intended *rasa* has been brought to maturity by its set of causes (i.e., *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, and *vyabhicāribhāvas*), there is no fault in the mention of obstructive factors, that is, elements belonging to an obstructive *rasa*, if they are stopped short, or if they are brought into a subordinate role. For obstructive factors are stopped short only when they can be overcome, not otherwise; and in that case their mention serves to magnify the intended *rasa*. And when such factors are brought into a subordinate state their obstructiveness ceases.

That such factors should become subordinate may be due to their very nature; or it may be due to some artificially imposed property. To begin with those which become subordinate by their own nature, there is no obstruction at all in mentioning such factors; as, for example, in love-in-separation, the mention of such states as physical illness which are subordinate to this *rasa* [as being its *vyabhicārins*, although they are also elements of the obstructive *rasa* tragedy (*karuna*)].¹ But it is only of such [obstructive factors] as are subordinate to the intended *rasa* that the mention is without fault, not of such as are not subordinate.²

Death,³ while it can form a subordinate element [in love-in-separation], is an element the use of which is inadvisable, because if the human receptacle of the *rasa* is cut off, the *rasa* itself will be cut off. One should not argue that the tragic will thereby be increased, because tragedy is not what is here aimed at and what is aimed at will be cut off. Only where we are actually aiming at the tragic will death prove unobstructive. Or we may admit the use of death to be occasionally not entirely obstructive in *śrigāra* if there is a possibility of revival in a short space of time. But if the revival occurs only after a long time, the force of the *rasa* will be lost in the interim. Accordingly, a poet, who is chiefly concerned with constructing a *rasa*, should avoid such a element in his plot.

1. The erotic embodies the largest set of transient (and therefore subordinate) states of any of the *rasas*. *BhNS* Vol. 1, p. 306, specifies that *śrigāra* is capable of all the *vyabhicāribhāvas* except *ālasya* (laziness; Abhinava restricts the word so as to exclude languor), *augrya* (cruelty), and *jugupsā* (disgust). In love-in-separation the lovers can become physically ill, a state that is also found in the obstructive *rasa* tragedy (*karuna*). What Ānanda is telling us is that to introduce this factor of illness (*vyādhi*), which is *primo facie* an element belonging to an obstructive *rasa*, into *vipralambhaśrigāra*, is not a fault because illness by its very nature can be subordinate (as a *vyabhicāribhāva*) to *śrigāra*. 2. There are only three of these (see previous footnote). To introduce *ālasya*, *augrya*, or *jugupsā* into *vipralambhaśrigāra* will indeed be obstructive because these states cannot naturally be subordinated to the intended *rasa*. 3. Death (*maraṇa*) is specifically included by Bharata among the *vyabhicāribhāvas* of *śrigāra*, because one can die of love.

L [Comment on the *Kārikā*.] Having thus laid down a general rule for avoiding obstructive elements, he states an exception¹ within a limited area: But when the intended *rasa*, etc. If they are

stopped short: The meaning is [that they may be introduced] with the intention of stopping them short or with the intention of making making them subordinate. *Accala* means "without fault."

[Comment on the *Vṛtti*.] He explains the intention of stopping them short by saying, For [obstructive factors] are stopped short, etc. He explains the intention of subordinating such factors in two ways. Of these he first describes the natural way: which are subordinate to this, etc. Now tragedy (*karuṇā*), by its being without hope of relief (*nirapekṣabhāva*), is obstructive to love-in-separation, which contains an element of hope (*sāpekṣabhāva*)² and physical illness and the like are certainly seen as its factors. Of such [factors the mention is without fault], for while they occur in tragedy and they alone occur there, they also occur in *śrigāra*, but not only they.³ Of such as are not subordinate: such as laziness, cruelty and disgust.⁴

While it can form a subordinate element: because it has been said that all the *vyābhicārins* [except the three mentioned above] are found in *śrigāra*; our author is aware of this. But if the receptacle, that is, the man or the woman who forms the base, is destroyed, then love (*rati*) will be cut off because it stands in each of them in the form of the illusion that the other is their all in all in life.

What is here aimed at: viz., love-in-separation. Actually aiming at: i.e., when that is the matter in hand. But at this rate the doctrine that all the *vyābhicārins* exist in *śrigāra* will be destroyed. Anticipating this objection, he says, Or we may admit, etc. Death may serve as a *vyābhicārin* (subordinate state) of *śrigāra* in those cases where the death, being of brief duration, is not the point on which our apprehension comes to rest.⁵ Occasionally: that is, when a poet is skilful enough to accomplish such a turn. For example:

Leaving his mortal body at the junction
of Ganges and Sarayū and being thus
admitted into everlasting life,
he met once more with his beloved queen,
now of fairer form than ever, and enjoyed her love
in the pleasure halls of Indra's paradise.

[Kālidāsa, *Raghuvamśa* 8.95]⁶

In this passage death is clearly subordinated to physical love (*rati*). And because it is to be subordinated, this wise poet has not allowed death a foothold [in our memory], mentioning it merely in the non-predicative part of the sentence.⁷ If he had given it a foothold, the

result would certainly be to produce sorrow, no matter how short the period of time before reunion.

But now, can it be with reference to what sensitive critics would consider a long time that death is stated to be subordinate whenever it is followed "in no long time" by reunion? At this rate, since intelligent persons when they hear of the machinations of Yaugandharāya and his accomplices, will not believe that Vāsavadattā has really died at all, there could be no tragedy in the Tāpasavatsarāja. So enough of this side issue and let us take "long time" to mean rather the furnishing of a foothold [for our memory to dwell on].⁸

Here ends the explanation of natural subordination. As one may infer the nature of artificially imposed subordination by its being contrary to natural, he does not explain it in so many words [although he will give examples of it].

1. *pratiprasava*: lit., a reviving of the permission that naturally obtained before the prohibition was made. The term is taken from the grammarians.
2. The terms *sāpekṣabhdva* and *nirapekṣabhdva* are taken from Bbarata (*BhNS* Vol. 1, p. 309), where they are used to distinguish *vipralambhaśrīgāra* from *karuṇa*. Love-in-separation is always a temporary form of *rasa*. It looks toward and hopes for and is succeeded by love-in-union. Tragedy (*karuṇa*) does not have this *apeksā*, this relativity, or this ulterior state to which to look forward. The two *rasas* being thus distinguished, the question arises how we are made aware of the *apeksā* or its lack. Does the difference lie in the perceived experience of the character portrayed, or in the reader's knowledge (his knowledge, for example, of how the story will end), or in the poet's emphasis? Abhinava will raise this interesting question and will favor the last of these explanations.
3. Illness and other painful factors (e.g., discouragement, weariness, despair) are the only *vyabhicāribhdvās* of *karuṇa* (see *BhNS* Vol. 1, p. 317), so they certainly belong to *karuṇa*. But they are also *vyabhicāribhdvās* of *śrīgāra* and therefore subordinate to it also. The only difference is that they are not the exclusive subordinates of *śrīgāra*, which contains pleasurable factors also.
4. Ālasya and *ugrotā* are given in the list of *vyabhicāribhdvās* *BhNS* 6.18 and 20. *Jugupsā* is listed as the *sthāyibhdva* of *bibhatsā* (*BhNS* 6.17). As Bbarata says that *śrīgāra* possesses all the *vyabhicārins* except these three (Vol. 1, p. 306), Abhinava in his *Abh.* infers that the *sthāyibhdvās* (when outside their proper *rasa*) may act as *vyabhicārins*.
5. *vitrāntipadabandha*: Hemacandra, who borrows largely from this passage of the *Locana*, renders the term as *pratitiitrāntisthānatva* (Parekh ed., p. 110, lines 19–20; *KM* ed., p. 85, line 3 from bottom).
6. In *pada c* the reading *adhiakacaturuyā* is also given by the oldest commentator on Ragh., Vallabbadeva. There is no need to emend, as is commonly done, to

adhikatararucā. Kālidāsa elsewhere uses the word *caturu* to mean "beautiful." In *Ragh.* 9.47 Mallinātha glosses it by *upabhoga-kṣama*, which would do very well here also. 7. The *tātparya* or final purport of a sentence, that on which our apprehension comes to rest (*visrānti*), is the *vidheya*, approximately translatable as predicate. The *vidheya* is the new information which the sentence gives us as opposed to the *uddesya* or *anuvdda*, the matter already known, about which this new information is stated. What Abhinava here means is that Kālidāsa has not written in such form as "And then King Aja died," in which case our mind would come to rest on the unhappy event of his death. Rather, his words have taken the form, "King Aja, having died and been reborn in heaven, enjoyed the love of his queen." Here the *tātparya*, the portion of the sentence that leaves its impression on the mind, is concerned with love, not death. 8. Ānanda's doctrine that death in love-in-separation must be of short duration is unpalatable to Abhinava because if it means short in the opinion of the audience, any verse dealing with Aja's death would qualify. There would be no need for skill on the part of the poet, as the audience can guess from what preceeds (cf. *Ragh.* 8.93) that Aja will be shortly reunited with Indumati; while in the *Tāpasavatsarāja* the audience will not even believe in the death of Vāsavadattā at all. As usual, instead of changing Ānanda's doctrine Abhinava reinterprets it. A "death of long duration" is to be taken as a death so described, by being placed in the predicate or by being made in some other way predominant over *śringāra*, etc., as to linger in the memory.

A Of these [types], an example of the mention, when the intended *rasa* has been firmly established, of obstructive elements, a mention without fault because they are stopped short, is the following:

How can a king of the Lunar Dynasty do a forbidden deed?

May I see her once again!

I have learned the scriptures in order to abstain from sin.

Even in anger her face was lovely.

What will the wise and sinless say?

One could not find her even in a dream.

My heart, come to your senses!

But what blessed man will drink her lower lip?¹

Another example would be the lecture [in the *Kādambarī*],² given by the other young ascetic to Pundarīka who has fallen deeply in love with Mahāśvetā.

1. The verse was quoted above by Abhinava. See 2.3 L and footnote 10 thereon. 2. The passage begins on p. 313 of the NSP ed. of the *Kādambarī* (Peterson's ed., p. 146) with the words *sakhe Pundarīka, naitad anurūpam bhavataḥ*.

L Having thus explained the three types [of situation where obstructive elements may be mentioned], he illustrates them in the order [of his presentation]: Of these. "How can a king," etc. Here compunction is stopped short by longing, intelligence by memory, doubt by despair, and firmness by anxiety. We have already said this toward the beginning of Chapter Two. The other [young ascetic]: What he has in mind is that the strength of [Pundarīka's] passion is expressed by its proving unshakable even when disenchantment (*vairāgya*) and the *vibhāvas* of an obstructive *rasa* [viz., *sānta*] are particularized.

A There is no fault in the natural subordination [of an obstructive element], in such a verse as:

The cloud serpents pour forth water
pour forth venom
which brings to ladies whose husbands are away
a sudden dizziness, a listlessness and weariness of heart,
then fainting, darkness, emaciation, death.¹

There is likewise no obstruction where [the subordination is] artificially imposed, as in "Your pale emaciated [face]," etc., or

In anger she has bound him
tightly in the noose of her soft arms.²

§ 3.20 b L]

1. The verse has already been quoted under 2.18-19 e. Dizziness, fainting, etc., are *vyādhicāribhāvas* of *karuṇa* but also of *vipralambhaśrigāma*. Apparently listlessness of heart (*alavahṛdayatā*) is regarded as different from *ālasya*; see above, 3.20 a A, note 1. 2. For the first quotation see *Locana* below; for the second, see above, 2.18-19 e A.

L Artificially imposed: one must supply "subordination." the verse,

Your pale emaciated face,
your surfeited breast
and your listless limbs, my gentle friend,
proclaim a terminal malady
in your heart.¹

the disease, as belonging to tragedy, is imposed by the trick of a double meaning.

[Comment on the verse "in anger," etc.] The referents of "in anger," "has bound," "is struck," are symptoms (*anubhāvas*) of the cruel (*rādra*) which have been imposed by metaphor on, and have been made subordinate to, [the erotic] because they are not fully carried out [in their proper sphere]. This was spoken of above in connection with never oversustaining [a figure of speech; cf. 2.18-19 K].

. 1. The word *kṣetriya* in *kṣetriyarogam* (terminal malady) is noticed by Pāṇini 5.2.92, who says that it denotes that [disease] which is curable only in another body, that is, in the next life; in other words, a terminal malady. But the context of the present verse: the vocative *sokhi* "my female friend" and the pun in *hr̥dayam sarusam* (a heart that has received too much nourishment from eating strong foods or a heart that is filled with passion) give to "terminal malady" a second meaning, viz., "a fatal passion." Thus the words which in a straightforward sense denote a tragic situation are playfully adapted to love-in-separation. Mammata, who is more scholastic and less imaginative than Ānanda, quotes the verse twice: once to exemplify the figure of speech *tulyayogitā* (10, ex. 460), in which he is scholastically correct, and once (7, ex. 332) in order to reprove Ānanda. There is no obstructive factor here. Mammata says, because a sickness is a natural state of love-in-separation. He thus misses the point of the verse, which Ānanda clearly saw. The "terminal malady" is entirely imaginary. It has been superimposed (*samāropita*) on the ordinary yearning of unrequited love in order to sharpen our visualization of the pangs of that love. Thus an element of an obstructive rasa (tragedy) has

been artificially created and then subordinated to the intended *rasa* (*vipralambhasringdāra*). I see no reason to object to Ānanda's distinction between artificial (fanciful) and natural subordination.

A There is also another method of achieving subordination. Two *rasas* or *bhāvas* which are mutually obstructive may become subordinated to the single main sense of the sentence, as that is the true subject matter (*adhikāra*); and there will be no fault of obstruction here. An example has been given in the verse "The women of the Triple City wept," etc.¹ How can we say that there is no obstruction here? Because the two [mutually obstructive elements] are both placed in subordination to a third. And if it be asked how the obstruction ceases even if the two obstructive elements are subordinated to a third, our answer is that the fault of obstruction occurs when the obstructive elements are placed in the predicate, not when they are contained in the subject. For example:

"Come here! Go!
Lie down! Get up!
Speak! Be still!"
Such is the way that the rich play with men
who are bitten by the demon of hope.

[Nārāyaṇa, *Hitopadeśa* p. 49]²

In this verse there is no obstruction (i.e., no contradiction of sense) because the contradictory elements are mentioned in the subject.³ The same holds of the verse on the women of the Triple City. For in that verse the love-in-separation due to jealousy and the element of tragedy⁴ are not predicated; because the overall sentence meaning is the extraordinary power of the enemy of the Triple City (viz., Śiva) and because these two elements are subordinated to that.

And it cannot be claimed that distinctions of subject and predicate do not apply to the *rasas*, for it is admitted that the *rasas* are a sentence meaning and the distinction of subject and predicate that applies to the directly denoted sentence meaning must apply also to the *rasas* that are suggested by those direct meanings. Even those critics who

deny that the *rasas*, etc., are, without mediation, the meaning of a poem, must at least admit that they derive from its meaning. So, even at that, there would be no obstruction in the verse.⁵

Again, there is no obstruction because the apprehension of a specific emotion (*bhāva*) arises from the predicate portion of the sentence, that portion being helped to achieve its result by elements of *rasa* caused by the subject portion of the sentence; for it is seen in the world that a specific result can arise from a cause that is helped out by mutually obstructive auxiliaries.⁶ It is obstructive (contradictory) for a single cause at one and the same time to bring about mutually obstructive results, but not for it to have mutually obstructive auxiliaries.

If it be asked how the actor can represent on the stage such mutually obstructive elements, the answer is that he will proceed just as he does in representing comparable denoted (as opposed to suggested) elements in a subject. In this way the obstructiveness in the verse is explained away by making use of the distinction of subject and predicate.

1. See 2.5c A, above, where the verse was quoted as an example of *rasavadarikāra*. In the discussion under the present Kōrikā Ānanda will offer two interpretations. The first, according to which the erotic and tragic elements of the verse are subordinated to a predication of God's power, which in turn produces a feeling (*bhāva*) of love of God, is compatible with the Chapter Two explanation of the erotic and tragic elements as *rasavadarikāra*. The second explanation (3.20d) finds the tragic to be the most moving element in the verse and treats the verse as an example of *karunarasa*.
2. Quite possibly the verse is borrowed by Nārāyaṇa, as are many other verses of the *Hitopadeśa*. It is attributed to Vyāsa by the author of the *Subhāgītāvṛti* (3168), by whose time it was well enough known to be used in the game of *samasyāpūrana* (see *SubhA*. 1228). Mammata (7, ex. 339) and Hemacandra (AC 3.195, Parikh p. 165) quote it, doubtless taking it from Ānanda. The usefulness of the verse to the present discussion is that its contradictions are *vācyā*, directly denoted rather than suggested, and so are obvious, as is their relation to the predicate. Ānanda will explain the contradictory suggestions of the verse of the women of the Triple City by analogy with this simpler example.
3. See above, 3.20 L, note 7. Ānanda is making use of Mīmāṃsā doctrine, for an explanation of which see *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa* of Āpadeva, BORI 1937, p. 39 and Kunjunni Raja *Indian Theories of Meaning*, pp. 184-185. The Mīmāṃsā distinction between permissible contradiction in the subject and impermissible contradiction in the predicate is a valid distinction and accordingly is found in other systems of logic. A modern Western example would be: "John is in Boston and John is in Cambridge" is self-contradictory

and therefore false. "'John is in Boston and John is in Cambridge' is self-contradictory" is not self-contradictory and is true. 4. Ānanda here speaks of a "tragic element" (*karuṇavastu*) rather than a tragic *rasa* because *rasa* derives from the sentence meaning. The *rasa* (or more strictly speaking, *bhāva*) of the verse, as Ānanda is now interpreting it, is a feeling of the power of God. The tragic element lies in the subject and does not achieve the state of *rasa*. Later he will offer a different interpretation, by which the tragic can be regarded as the *rasa* of the verse. 5. Ānanda takes into account two opinions and shows that by either of them there need be no contradiction of *rasas* in the verse on the women of the Triple City. According to the first opinion, a *rasa* is the *kāvyaṛtha*, the overall meaning of the poem. It differs from the *vācyaṛtha* (the directly denoted meaning) by being *vyanigra*, not *vācya*. But just as the denoted sentence meaning derives from the predicate, not the subject, so also the suggested sentence meaning or *rasa*. The second opinion holds that a *rasa* is not directly the suggested meaning of the poem but is caused or brought about by the suggested meaning of the poem, i.e., by the *bhāvas*, *vibhāvas*, etc., that the poem suggests. Here too the *rasa* must derive from a meaning that is expressed in the predicate, not the subject. 6. For example, cooked rice arises from the raw rice grains as helped out by the mutually obstructive properties of coldness and heat belonging respectively to the water¹ the pot and the fire on the hearth.

L Another method: this is the fourth method [of avoiding obstruction]. In the previous [two methods] an element of an obstructive *rasa* became subordinate to the *rasa* in hand, whereas now the elements of two mutually obstructive *rasas* become subordinate to a third: this is the difference. The women of the Triple City: we have explained the verse under 2.5.c.

Now it may be objected that a thing's nature does not change by its being subordinated to something else and the obstruction that a thing presents is occasioned by its nature. With this in mind he says, And if it be asked, etc. The two obstructive elements: that is, obstructive in their very nature; the adjective furnishes the reason [for the objector's view that the obstruction will not cease]. Our answer is: What he has in mind here is that the obstruction or lack of obstruction in things occurs as they fall into particular causal combinations and not simply from their inherent natures, as may be seen by the absence of obstruction between hot and cold [in certain causal combinations].¹

In the predicate: as in "Do it! Don't do it!" By the word "predicate" he is saying that both actions are taken as predominant at the same time.² That is why the *Mīmāṃsakas* (*vākyavidah*) say that the

two Vedic statements with mutually obstructive predicates: "They use the *sodāśin* cup in the *Atirātra*" and "They do not use the *sodāśin* cup in the *Atirātra*" amount to a prescribing of option.²

In the subject: i.e., when they are subordinate to something else. Since the statement of these mutually obstructive (contradictory) elements is subordinate to the portion [of the sentence that asserts the] playing [of rich men], it is a statement of elements which are made dependent [and give up their natural opposition] by their looking up to something else, like two feuding opponents standing in the presence of their king. It is thus a statement of expressions which, as we hear them follow one upon the other, do not allow our minds to rest on the nature of the things expressed, much less to worry about the mutual relation among those things by which contradiction could arise.⁴ [The] only [effect of the contradiction is that] the connection that might later be inferred between them from the sentence syntax by the principle discussed in the *Arunādhikarana*, fails to be made because of their mutual obstruction.⁵

An objection arises. To predicate is to state something as the chief or predominant element of a sentence. If something is expressed as not predominant, it is in the subject. But you [proponents of *dhvani*] will not allow a *rasa* to be stated [i.e., directly denoted] at all. Anticipating this objection, our author says, And it cannot be claimed, etc. What he means is that predicate and subject are concepts depending solely on predominance and non-predominance and they apply to what is suggested as well as to what is stated. It has been said that a *rusa* when it is presented as predominant is the final sense of a poetic sentence. So when a suggested sense appears as non-predominant, it stands to reason that the *rusa* will be in the subject. Or, we may say that the *rusa* is placed in the subject when it is suggested by *vibhāvas* and the like which stand in the subject. This is what he states in saying [the distinction of subject and predicate that applies to the directly denoted] sentence meaning, etc.

Or, let us not speak of contradictory elements being introduced by being treated as the subject; they can be introduced as auxiliaries. In this way there is no difficulty in finding a logically sound relation of predominant and subordinate. He shows this in the sentence, Even those critics who deny, etc. That they derive from its meaning: the meaning of a poem is a *vibhāva* or the like; the *rasas* are *tan-nimittāḥ*, i.e., have that as their cause: such is their nature.

The pertinence (*sarigati*) [of these remarks to the stanza on the women of the Triple City] is this. We have the *vibhāvas* and the like such as the "catching of their hands" mentioned in the subject and so subordinated to the main *rasa*. Caused by them are matters of *rasa* (*rasavastu*) or *rasa*-like matters (*rasasajātīya*) belonging to both tragedy and love-in-separation. And these are auxiliaries of what is predicated, namely the burning away of sins by the fire of Śiva's arrows. From this [predicated burning of sin, so strengthened,] we apprehend a particular emotion (*bhāva*) called magnifying the power of God, which is the field of the figure of speech *preyo'lankāra*.⁶ We see in the world how two mutually obstructive properties, heat and cold, belonging respectively to fire and water, act as auxiliaries to a cause, e.g., grains of rice, from which a specific result arises, namely the softening of the grains into edible food. Indeed the process of cause and effect takes place in this manner [by means of auxiliaries] everywhere, even in seed and sprout, etc.⁷

At this rate it might seem that obstruction can never amount to anything [as it can always be explained away]. With this in mind he says, It is obstructive for a single cause, etc. Hence the maxim: there can be no cause of contradictory [results].⁸

Now [a difficulty presents itself]. When a sentence with mutually obstructive suggestions occurs in a poem that is to be acted out, if a total representation is given, how can the actor represent these mutually obstructive elements at one and the same time? With this in mind he asks how the actor can represent, etc. He answers the question by saying, just as he does, etc. The actor's procedure will be just the same as it is in an instance where there is a comparably contradictory denoted meaning, as in "Come here! Go! Lie down! Get up!"

What is meant is as follows. In acting out the verse, "The women of the Triple City," etc., the actor will begin by representing the meaning in hand [that is, the final or predominant meaning of the verse] by the use of frightened and distressed glances. Although the tragic as well [as the erotic] is subordinated to this, still the tragic is closer to the meaning in hand than is love-in-separation because the tragic is more pertinent to rendering the power of God and because love-in-separation is farther removed, being brought in only by the fancy or simile expressed by the word *iua* ("as it were," "like") in the phrase *kāmīva* ("like a lover"). Thus, up the phrase *sāstrunetrotpalabhir* [at the end of the third line], there should be used together with a representation that will be primarily pertinent to tragedy only a very slight

[representation]⁸ of love-in-separation, with indication being given of its similarity to tragedy. At the words *kāmīva* ("like a lover") the representation will be appropriate to a love quarrel, from which love-in-separation may be understood, but as this is immediately followed by the power of God, rendered with grandiose gestures as the words *sadahatu duritam*, etc., ("May this same fire burn away your sins") are to be enacted, the love-in-separation ends up by being subordinate to this [power of God] and there is no obstruction.

He concludes this [demonstration of the] avoidance of obstruction by saying, In this way, etc.

1. Hot fire and cold water combine to produce the cooking of rice.
2. Ānanda has used the singular *vidhau*, not the dual, to indicate the impossibility of contradictory actions by one person at one and the same time.
3. In order to maintain the meaningfulness of Vedic texts we are forced to interpret the predicate here as double: at one time they use the *śoḍasīn* in the *Atirātra*; at another time they do not. The use of the *śoḍasīn* thus becomes optional. The *Atirātra* is one of the five forms (*sāṁsthā*) of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, so called from the name of the final verse-sequence (*stoma*) employed therein. The *śoḍasīn* is a cup for holding *soma*. The apparently contradictory prescriptions for its use are discussed in *Mīmāṁsa Sūtra* and its commentary 10.5.34ff.
4. Because the mind is hurried along to the chief matter of the sentence, the predicate.
5. In the ritual texts we are told that one should pay for the *soma* with a red, brown-eyed, year-old heifer (*arunayā pīṅgākṣyā eka-hāyanyā somam kṛṇāti*). In the *Aruṇa* Section of the *Mīmāṁsa* (*Mīmāṁsa* pp. 673-698) the commentators show that the primary relation denoted by *arunayā*, *pīṅgākṣyā*, and *ekohāyanyā* is that of instrumentality in the buying of the *soma*. Only later does one infer the identity of the substance referred to by these three adjectives. One does so from the grammatical agreement of the words plus the fact that their referents can be found in a single substance. In the case of the verse *ehi gaccha*, etc., such a posterior inference cannot be made. We cannot infer that one and the same man at one and the same time is told to come and go, lie and stand, etc.
6. See 2.5 a L.
- In the present interpretation, the magnification of Śiva in the predicate is taken as *preyo'lanikāra*; the suggestions of tragedy and love in the subject as *rūṣavadarikāra*.
- Abhinava is using the terminology of Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa.
- Where the auxiliaries are earth, water and sunshine.
- BP suggests reading *upādanam* for *upādānam*. Actually one can give instances of mutually contradictory effects arising from a single *upādāna* (material source).
- Perhaps the words *abhinayaḥ karuṇiyāḥ* have dropped out between *vipralambhasya* and *karuṇena*. If not, they must at least be understood.

A Furthermore, in descriptions of the exceptional power of some hero whose success is to be celebrated, the relish (*rasa*) of tragic events happening to his enemies will not bring distress to judges of literature but will rather prove occasions of the greatest joy. Because its force is thus blunted, there is no fault here in such an obstructive element. Accordingly, it is proper to call an element "obstructive of the *rasa*" only if it is obstructive of the *rasa* or *bhāva* that is the overall sense of the sentence and not when it has been subordinated to that sense.

L He says that in other contexts the fault of obstruction may be explained away in a different manner: Furthermore, etc. Judges of literature: that is, an audience possessed of discrimination. Will not be distressed: that is to say, their hearts will not melt at such events, for their attention will not come to rest on the relish of compassion (*karuṇāsvāda*). Rather, the tragic here, resulting as it does from anger which is a transient state of the heroic, ends up, because of its suggesting its cause, simply as an increased relish of the heroic. As has been said, "the tragic *rasa* should be known as the effect of the cruel."¹ This is what our author says in speaking of occasions of the greatest joy. An example is the following:

O amaranth, you will lose the joy
of pressing close to our breasts;
O *bakula* vine, our sweet breath
will live only in your memory;
while you, the griefless *asoka*,
will be grieved without the touch of our feet.
Such are the words of his enemies' wives
as they flee their ancient city.

[Ratnākara]²

Or *bhāva*: that is to say, the *sthāyibhāva* in that *rasa*, or a *vyabhicāribhāva* if it has become predominant, as yearning (*utsukya*) might become in love-in-separation.

1. The quotation (*BhNS* 6.40; Vol. 1, p. 295) is not quite appropriate. Bharata is there speaking of the close relation between *rāudra* and *karuṇa*, rather than between *vīra* and *karuṇa*. Abhinava uses the quotation again in commenting on 3.24 Introduction. 2. The verse is ascribed to Ratnākara, the ninth century Kashmirian, by both Ṣaṅgī, 1269 and Subh. ī. 2564. It plays on the poetic conventions of the *dohadas* (whims of pregnancy) of flowers. In order to blossom the *asioka* must be touched by a woman's foot, the *bakula* must be sprinkled with wine from a woman's mouth, and the amaranth (*kurabaka*) must be embraced. For the last of these conventions see *Sattasai* 1.6 and *Saundaryalaharī* vs. 97. The verse quoted by Mallinātha on *Kum.Sam.* 3.26 presumably follows the same tradition, but in the *NSP* ed. the words *ālokitaḥ* and *ālokitāḥ* have been reversed. My note in *ROS* Vol. 44, p. 111, para. 7 should therefore be corrected.

A Or we may say that in any context of the tragic, even if this tragic *rasa* is made predominant, the joining to it of an erotic element by some special turn of speech will work toward the strengthening of the tragic *rasa*. This is because of the fact that when things that are sweet by nature come to be objects of grief, they occasion an even greater access of grief if we remember the erotic charm that belonged to them in their former state. For example:

Here is the hand that drew off my belt,
that felt my full breasts,
that touched my navel, my thighs and loins,
that untied the knot of my skirt.

[*Mahābhārata* 11.24.17]¹¹

And so in the verse on the women of the Triple City, the fire of Śiva's arrows acted "as a lover who has lately loved another." In this way too one may say that there is no obstruction. So, no matter in which of many ways the verse is examined, no fault is to be found in it. The same is true of the following:

They walk the ground about a forest fire,
seeming to drip lac from tender feet
which are bleeding from the spikegrass;

and as their eyes drop tears and in their fear
 they hold their husbands by the hand,
 the women of your foemen seem to be
 enacting once again their marriage.²

In all such verses one should understand that there is no obstruction.

We have thus shown, so far, the various areas in which rasa and the like may and may not be combined with obstructive rasas and the like.

1. The verse is the lament of the wife (not wives, as Abhinava says) of Bhūriśravas as she stands among the dead warriors on Kuru Field. Arjuna had cut off the hand of Bhūriśravas as that warrior was about to kill Sātyaki (*MBh* 7.117). This interference of Arjuna in what should have been single combat is often held up to his reproach, a fact that also adds to the karunaraṇa of the quoted verse. 2. The verse is found also in the *Khandaprasasti* attributed to Hanumān (*The Pandit*, Vols. 5-6) and in Mammata (7, ex. 338), etc. Each trait that is described of the now unhappy wives is likened by simile or suggestion to the erotic context of their earlier marriage. So if we interpret the verse according to the second interpretation given to the stanza on the women of the Triple City, we will say that the rasa of the verse is tragedy, which is heightened by the use of remembered love. If we interpret by the method used in 2.20d, the tragic element will be blunted by our delight in the power of the king who is being praised. If we follow the line laid down in 2.20c, both the tragic and the erotic elements will be subordinated to the panegyric (*preyo 'lankāra*) which is the main intention of the verse.

L Our author now uses a different method by which to explain away the obstruction in the previously cited verse on the women of the Triple City: Or we may say. What he has in mind is this. In his previous explanation he stated that there was no obstruction because love-in-separation and the tragic were both subordinated to something else. Now he is making the love-in-separation subordinate to the tragic and showing in this way that it cannot obstruct. Thus it has been said that the tragic rasa arises from determinants (*vibhāva*) such as the destruction of one's loved ones (*isṭajana*, *BhNS* Vol. 1, p. 317) and the property of being a "loved one" (*isṭatā*) depends on one's being the recipient of the emotion love. So in the figure of fancy used in the words "like a lover who has lately been unfaithful," the following is suggested. In looking at the motions of Śiva's arrows of fire the women are reminded of the events of former love quarrels. These quarrels, being now utterly erased, become *vibhāvas* (determinants or factors

which reveal) the grief of the women. This is what our author is saying [when he speaks of joining an erotic element]. By some special turn of speech: He means, by bringing in some determinant (*vibhāva*) or symptom (*anubhāva*) in an elegant way, in words that lack vulgarity.

He gives an example of just this: "Here is the hand." This is the lament of the wives¹ of Bhūriśravas as they see his hand lying on the battle field. "That drew off my belt": that drew off my girdle on occasions of making love. Many verses are amenable to this method of explaining away obstruction. With this in mind he says, The same is true, etc. The "tears" could be caused by the smoke of the marriage fire or by grief at leaving the house of parents. Their "fear" could be the natural timidity of virgins.

Thus he has given this long but useful explanation of the portion of the *Kārikā* (3.20) that states "there is no fault in mentioning [these obstructive factors] if they are brought into a subordinate role." He concludes by saying, We have thus shown, etc. The word *tāvat* ("so far") shows that there are other matters still to be stated.

1. As Jacobi has pointed out (*ZDMG* 57, p. 35, note 4), only one wife is speaking in this *Mahābhārata* passage.

A Now, in order to show the proper method of introducing these [rasas and the like] into a single extended work, the following is said:

K While it is well known that larger works contain a variety of rasas, a poet who seeks the excellence [of his works] will make just one of them predominant.¹

1. The antecedent of *teṣām* is not clear from the wording of the *Kārikā*, but in the *Vṛtti* Ānanda takes it to be the *rasāḥ* expressed in *nānārasa*. Abhinava says it is *prabandhānām*. Actually *teṣām* can be construed with both words (*kākagolakanyāyena*). Note that *anī* and *kartavyas* must be taken as separate words. If compounded, the long *i* would be taken as the suffix *cui* (*Pān.* 5.4.50), by which the meaning would be reversed ("just one of them must be made subordinate").

A In larger works, such as *mahākāvyas* or *nātakas*, many *rasas* are found dispersed in major and minor functions. While this is well known, an author who aims at a high degree of beauty for his works will make just one of these *rasas*, as being the intended *rasa* of the whole work, predominant over the others. This is the more proper way.

L He introduces those [other matters which, as we remarked at the end of the last section, remain to be stated]: Now, etc. Construe "method of introducing" with "these *rasas*."

[Comment on the *Kārikā*] Well known: having been described by the sage Bharata and others. Of them: viz., of his works.¹

[Comment on the *Vṛtti*] Such as: the word *ādi* in *mahākāvya*² means type; thus, "in works of the type of *mahākāvya*"; this refers to non-dramatic works; the second term refers to dramatic works. Dispersed: he means, among hero, villain, chief character of the *patākā*, chief character of the *prakarī*, and so on.² In major and minor functions: that is, depending on the particular character to whom they belong. More proper: There may be no predominance of a single *rasa* in a *samavakāra* or a *paryāyabandha*³ and these works will still not be improper. However, the sort of work [where a single *rasa* is predominant], such as a *nātaka* or a *mahākāvya*, is a finer piece of literature. That is what he means by using the comparative degree of the adjective: "more proper."

1. Abhinava's interpretation is thus: "a poet who seeks the excellence of his works will make just one *rasa* predominant." 2. *Patāka* is a short interlude, *prakarī* a longer one; see 3.10-14f. *L*, notes 7 and 9. 3. For *paryāyabandha* see above, 3.7 *L* and note 4. The *samavakāra* has not hitherto been mentioned. It was a dramatic performance in three acts, lasting for eighteen *nādikās* (somewhat over eight hours), exhibiting twelve heroes and a variety of love affairs and exciting events. The genre is described in *BhNS*.

18.62-76 and DR 3.62-68. The only surviving example appears to be Vatsarāja's *Samudramathana*, GOS, Vol. 8, which cannot have taken anywhere near eight hours to perform.

A But how can the predominance of a single *rasa* not be obstructed when a work contains many other *rasas*, all fully developed? In anticipation of this question the following is said:

K The inclusion of other *rasas* will not harm the predominance of the *rasa* in hand if that *rasa* appears as an abiding factor.

A In large works, if a *rasa* is first taken in hand and then constantly brought back, as an abiding factor that stretches throughout the entire work, its predominance will not be injured by the introduction of other *rasas* that occur in the intervals [of its appearance].

L But how: What he means is this. How can a *rasa* be subordinate if it is fully developed? Or if it is not fully developed, how can it be a *rasa*? It thus appears that being a *rasa* and being subordinate are self-contradictory concepts. And yet if these other *rasas* are not subordinate, how can a single *rasa* be predominant?

The inclusion of other *rasas*: If the *rasa* that has been taken in hand extends throughout the whole plot and is fitted for predominance by this extensiveness, its predominance will not be harmed by the introduction, by the filling in, of other *rasas* brought in by the needs of the plot and running through only limited sections of the narrative. Rather than being injured, the predominance of the *rasa* which appears

as an abiding factor throughout the plot will be strengthened. In other words, the subsidiary *rūpas*, although they attain a degree of charm by being fully developed each at its own stage by its own set of *vibhāvas* and the like, still do not attain such a charm that our apprehension will rest on them; rather, it will be carried on to some further delight. This is the process that is found everywhere in relations of minor and major. As the great master¹ has said:

The minor by being perfected goes to [the help of] the major, for in this way it works to the greater advantage of the major.

1. We do not know whom Abhinava means. Elsewhere he uses the term *tatrabhāvān* of at least three persons: Īvaraikṣṇa, Patañjali, Bhartrhari. The quoted verse is found also in Mammaṭa very near the end of the Seventh Book.

3.23 Introduction

A To demonstrate this, the following is said:

K As a single, abiding goal (*kārya*)¹ is demanded for a work, so also there is no obstruction (or contradiction) at all in demanding a single *rasa*.

1. Just what the *Kārikā* means here by *kārya* is hard to say: goal, line of action, or plot. Ānanda leaves the word as it is without a gloss or explanation. To Abhinava it carried the technical sense that it bears in *BhNS*, viz., goal as the third of the *arthaprakṛitis*. But Abhinava saw that this sense was too narrow. So by remedial interpretation he reads other senses into it as well.

A Just as a single, abiding goal is set up, extending throughout the body of the work with all its *sandhis*, without precluding its being

combined with other goals, nor is its predominance lessened by this mixture; just so is there no obstruction to a single *rasa* by its being mixed with others. Readers with a ready sense of discrimination, who are attentive and intelligent, will rather take a higher degree of pleasure in such a work.

L To demonstrate: be means, by furnishing an appropriate analogy. And the analogy stands to reason. For one must of necessity accept a single goal that sets the topic, that extends throughout the work, and that is helped out by other, occasional goals. And it is because of this [relation of major and minor] that the states of mind (*cittavṛtti*) of the chief characters, which depend upon these goals or objectives, themselves fall into relations of major and minor. There is nothing extraordinary about this. Such is the overall meaning.

Just so (*tathā*): exactly similar in its extending throughout the work.¹ Or we can take the word *eva* to be displaced, understanding it to go with *tathā* rather than with *na*. The sense will then be: it follows by necessity that the *rasas* too should be arranged in just the same manner (*tathā eva*), viz., in a relation of major and minor elements, as is found in the goals or objectives.

Goal:² [This includes] the *bija* (seed), which has been defined as "that which is of small compass at its first appearance but which spreads out in many ways."³ [Hence it is spoken of as "extending throughout,"] Again, the *bindu* (drop) is that which binds together again whenever there is an interruption of purpose, all the way from the *bija* to the end of the work.⁴ So the "goal" in its form of the *arthaprakṛti* called the *bindu* extends to the denouement of the work. He indicates this by saying that it is abiding (*anuyāyi*). Thus, by this word "goal" both the *bija* and the *bindu* are included. With other goals: This refers to the incidental goal resident in the fourth *arthaprakṛti*, called the *patākā*, which is defined as "not extending beyond the *garbha* or the *vimarsa sandhi*";⁵ and to the goals which characterize the still less extensive *prakṛti*.⁶ In this way, what is said implies that the five *arthaprakṛtis* should be so introduced as to form part of a single whole,⁷ as is done in the *Tāpasavatsarāja*.

The *Kārikā* has thus done two things: it has given an analogy to the relation of principal and subordinate [that should exist among the *rasas*] and it has shown how this relation among the *rasas* follows from

the force of the plot. The text of the *Vṛtti* is likewise to be interpreted as having these two intentions.

1. Abhinava is here giving the word *tathā* of the *Kārikā* a double function. It acts as a correlative of *yathā*, but it also acts as an independent adverb: "in the demanding of a *rasa* that acts 'so' (viz., throughout the work), there is no contradiction." 2. Abhinava takes *kārya* basically to mean the third of the five *arthaprakṛtis*, for an explanation of which see above, 3.10-14f L, note 7. But he makes it include, in a secondary sense, the first *arthaprakṛti* or *bija* (hence Ānanda calls it *vyāpakaṁ*) and the second *arthaprakṛti* or *bindu* (hence Ānanda calls it *anuyāsi*). He then takes *karyāntaraiḥ* to refer to the fourth and fifth *arthaprakṛtis*, which must be subordinated to the first three. 3. This is Bharata's definition. *BhNS* 19.22. 4. *BhNS* 19.23, which lacks the words *bijāt prabhṛti* and ends *yāvat samāptir bandhasya sa binduh parikirtitah*. 5. *BhNS* 19.24; for the five *sandhis* see above, 3.10-14f L. 6. *BhNS* 19.25. 7. *Ekavākyatā* is a term taken from the commentators on Pāṇini. It may happen that two statements are found separately given in Pāṇini's text but are to be taken as forming a consistent unit (*vākyā*) with the *mahāvākyā* or overall statement. *Vākyavākyavākyatā* comes to mean the consistency of smaller syntactic elements with an overarching whole.

A Now it may readily be granted that a relation of predominant and subordinate can be established between *rasas* which are not mutually obstructive, as between the heroic and the erotic, the erotic and the comic, the cruel and the erotic, the heroic and the marvellous, the heroic and the cruel, the cruel and the tragic, or the erotic and the marvellous. But it may be doubted how such a relation can be achieved between *rasas* which are mutually exclusive, as between the erotic and the loathsome, the heroic and the fearsome, the peaceful and the cruel, or the peaceful and the erotic. So the next *Kārikā* says:

L That the erotic is not obstructive of the heroic appears from the fact that the fairest maidens are won by battle, boldness, and diplomacy. The comic clearly fits in with the erotic. Comedy, while not in

itself one of the aims of man, can become one by its increasing our delight in the erotic when it forms part of it. It can even somehow be made out that the cruel is not obstructive to the erotic, for it has been said by Bharata that "they even make love with violence,"¹ where he is referring by the word "they" to devils, demons, and violent men. One need only avoid cruelty here as exercised against the heroine.² The heroic and the marvellous can combine because wonder is aroused by the hero's unexpected deeds such as sweeping the earth clear [of all his enemies]. As the sage [Bharata] has said, "the effect of the heroic is the marvellous."³ The heroic and the cruel combine in a proud and noble (*dhīroddhata*) hero like Bhīma because there is no obstruction between anger and heroic energy (*utsāha*).⁴ Of the cruel and the tragic the sage has said, "the effect of the cruel should be known as the tragic *rasa*."⁵ The erotic and the marvellous can combine, as in the mirage of the magician in the *Ratnāvali*.⁶

The erotic and the loathsome: How can there be a relation of predominant and subordinate between two *rasas* of which the one can arise only by elimination of the other? Love takes the form of plunging into the object of one's emotion; loathing the form of fleeing from the object. If the two were to take the same object, the one would destroy the natural inclination of the other. Fear and heroic energy⁷ must also be said to be mutually obstructive. And there is obstruction of the peaceful by either love or anger,⁸ for the peaceful takes its life from an indifference to worldly objects brought on by a knowledge of truth and so is void of desire, whereas love and anger live on one's attachment to worldly objects.⁹

1. *BHNS* Vol. I, p. 322. 2. If one exhibits the demon Rāvana as in love with Sītā, his nature must be portrayed by his cruel acts and words directed at others. He must not beat or insult Sītā. In the classical drama Rāvana always acts as a perfect gentleman toward Sītā. 3. *BHNS* 6.41. 4. *Krodha* (anger) is the *sthāyibhāva* of raudra, *utsāha* of vira. 5. *BHNS* 6.40. 6. *Rati*, 4.7ff. 7. *Bhaya* and *utsāha* are the respective *sthāyibhāvas* of the fearsome (*bhayānaka*) and the heroic. 8. *Rati* and *krodha* are the respective *sthāyi-bhāvas* of *grīgāra* and *raudra*. 9. Śāṅkarācārya remarks more than once that anger is nothing more than frustrated desire or love; see his *Gitābhāṣya* 2.62 and 3.37.

K Whether the rasa that is introduced into the predominant rasa is [naturally] obstructive or non-obstructive, it should not be developed to its full extent; then it will not produce obstruction.

A When a predominant rasa such as the erotic is to be suggested by a work, [any other] rasa, whether obstructive or non-obstructive, should not be developed to its full extent. Three principles of avoidance are here implied, of which the first is this. A non-obstructive rasa should not be more fully developed than the predominant rasa; because it will not obstruct the predominant rasa [not only if it is less fully developed, but] even if it is developed to an equal extent [with the predominant rasa].¹ As in this verse:

On one side his beloved weeps,
on the other the trumpet of battle sounds:
the soldier's heart swings to and fro
between love of wife and love of war.²

She breaks the necklace from her neck
and tells it over like a rosary;
she pretends her girdle strings are serpent coils
to bind her thighs in yogic posture;
her lips, which tremble with the syllables
of the silent spell, yet half reveal a smile,
for, jealous of the Lady Twilight,
she is mimicking the Lord of Cattle's prayers:
I pray you see the Goddess at that moment,
that her smile may ever bring you aid.³

1. The question may be asked how we are to know which rasa is predominant (origin) and which is subordinate (origin) if both are developed (*paripūrṇa*) to an equal extent. The answer is that we must take into view the whole work. The predominant rasa is that which continues beyond the verse in which we have this temporary combination. But if the temporary rasa

is overdeveloped, we might become confused. 2. One should read *ekkatto* and *annatto* for *ekanto* and *annanto*; see Pischel, para. 197. The verse appears in Weber's supplement to the *Sottasai* as number 966 and is quoted in Hemacandra's *Viveka*, ex. 187 (Parekh's ed. p. 168). 3. The source of this verse, in the meter and style of Bāṇa's *Candīatāka*, has not been found. One suspects it of being an insertion, as Abhinava does not comment on it nor is it quoted by Mammata or Hemacandra. It belongs to the type of benediction characterized in *HOS* Vol. 44, Section 1, para. 2 and Section 4, para. 20. It is the smile of the Goddess that forms the link between the divine incident protracted in the first three and a half lines and the benediction of the final half line. The smile in the incident is, of course, mischievous. Pārvatī, as in *Kum.Sam.* 8.49, is jealous of her husband's addressing prayers to another goddess and is mocking him by her imitation. He is telling over his beads as he recites the mantras and has bound his intertwined thighs with his attendant serpent, Vāsuki. Pārvatī uses her necklace and girdle strings in imitation. But a smile from the Goddess, however occasioned, is all that we mortals need in order to be blessed. The combination of *rasas*, à propos of which the verse is here quoted, is of śrīgāra, as revealed by the *vyābhicāribhāva* jealousy, and hāsa, as revealed by the mimicry. Badarīnāth Śarmā is mistaken in finding a combination of śrīgāra and sānta in the verse. The verse is adduced as an example of mutually non-obstructive *rasas*. Śrīgāra and sānta are mutually obstructive.

L [Commentary on the *Kārikā*:] Obstructive or non-obstructive: The intention of the alternative "or" is as follows. When an added *rasa* is made stronger than the predominant *rasa*, the added *rasa* will be objectionable even if it is non-obstructive. On the other hand, if it is made compatible by bringing it into subordination to the predominant *rasa* by some means, then even an obstructive *rasa*, being added on, as he will state,¹ by such means as by attaching it to a different person, will not be censurable. So the question of obstructive or non-obstructive is of no consequence. What is important is to pay heed to the way in which the *rasa* is introduced.

Into the predominant *rasa*: The locative (*arigati*) is locative of despite.² The sense is that a subordinate *rasa* should not be developed in despite of the given predominant *rasa* so that it puts that *rasa* down. It will not produce obstruction: the meaning is, it will be without fault.

[Commentary on the *Vṛtti*.] He speaks of three ways of avoiding over-development in the passage beginning with the word *tatra* ("of which") and ending with the word *trityāḥ* ("the third way," 3.24 a). But now,

one would have expected the *Kārikā* to state merely that the added *rasa* should be less developed. What possibility did its author envisage to make him say rather that it should not be more developed? The *Vṛtti* addresses this question with the words because even if it is developed to an equal extent, etc.

[After translating the Prakrit verse "On the one side," etc., Abhinava continues:] The words "his beloved weeps" show a development of love (*rati*), the words "the trumpet of battle sounds" and "the soldier's [heart]" show a development of heroic energy (*utsāha*). The words "swings to and fro" show an exact equality of the two. Here some have said that this [equality] can obtain only within the compass of a single verse, not throughout the extent of a whole work. But they are wrong.³ Because in the plot that forms the topic of a whole work the three goals of man (sensual enjoyment, power and religious merit) may all be equally predominant. For example in the *Ratnāvali*, from the point of view of what is accomplished by the efforts of the king's minister, the basic goal of the play will be the king's attaining sovereignty over the whole earth, while his gaining the most beautiful of maidens is only an incidental goal. But from the point of view of the king, the opposite is the case. Such then being the view of the minister and such the view of the king, by the maxim that success is achieved only by uniting the ministerial and the royal points of view, we end up uniting them and saying that each is predominant. Now it is a principle of practical government that success comes only from uniting the plans of the sovereign and his ministers. So [in this play] the two are united, which amounts to saying that ultimately they are of equal predominance. As has been said, "By the skillful effort of a poet [a goal is achieved] by all the chief characters in cooperation."⁴ But enough of this side issue.⁵

1. In 3.25. 2. Abhinava sometimes prefers to take a locative thus rather than as a locative of place; see 3.10-14c L, note 1. 3. I have translated the plural of the text: "some have said they are wrong." But Abhinava is doubtless referring, with intentional vagueness, to a single commentator, probably his favorite whipping boy, the author of the *Candrikā*. The opinion that Abhinava here refutes has much to be said in its favor. It is on the face of it nonsense to speak of an *arīga* and an *origin* as being equal without qualifying the statement in some way. One may do so by saying that the *arīga* and *origin* may be equal for the space of a single verse, but that the *origin* continues as fully developed in succeeding verses, whereas the *arīga*

does not. Such was apparently the interpretation of the previous commentator. On the other hand, the qualification preferred by Abhinava is that the *anga* may continue as equally important but only from the viewpoint of a secondary character. 4. The quotation has not been traced. One must complete it by some such words as *āpyate phalam*. 5. It seems to me that Abhinava's quick wit in putting down his adversary has led him into deep waters. Yaugandharāyaṇa's efforts may be as important to the plot of the *Ratnāvalī* as King Udayana's. But how are they as important to the *rasa*? If they are, to what *rasa* do we ascribe them? If we ascribe them to a *rasa* other than *śrigāra*, how does *śrigāra* remain, as everyone agrees that it does, the predominant *rasa* of the play?

A The second [principle of avoiding overdevelopment of a *rasa*] is this. One should not introduce too many transient states (*vyabhicārins*) obstructive to the predominant *rasa*. Or, if one does introduce them, one should follow them quickly by transient states of the predominant *rasa*.

The third way is to be constantly watchful that a subordinate *rasa* which is being developed remains subordinate. Other principles along these lines can be imagined. But any *rasa* that is obstructive must be kept less developed than the predominant, as, for example, the erotic when the peaceful is predominant, or the peaceful when the erotic is predominant.

It may be asked how a *rasa* which is not developed can be a *rasa* at all. The answer is that we are here speaking of its development relative to that of the predominant *rasa*. It must not be developed as fully as the predominant *rasa*. This does not mean that it may not have such development of its own as is possible [within this limit]. And this imparting of a relative prominence to a single *rasa* in works which contain many *rasas* cannot be denied even by a critic who would not admit a predominant-subordinate (or whole and part) relation between *rasas*.

In this way, whether they are obstructive or non-obstructive, if *rasas* are added to a work in a relation of subordinate to predominant, there will be no obstruction. All this has been said from the point of view

of those who hold that one *rasa* may act as a *vyabhicārin* (temporary state or variant) of another. Even in the opinion of others [who deny that possibility], one can take the *sthāyibhāvas* of the *rasas* to be referred to by the word *rasa* in its secondary sense and say that by the subordination of one of them to another, obstruction is avoided.

L Having thus described the first method, he states the second: One should not introduce, etc. Not introduce: viz., into the subordinate *rasa*. But at this rate, it might be objected, the subordinate *rasa* could not be properly developed. Anticipating this objection, he gives a different judgment: Or, if one does introduce them. The word "or" is here used to affirm the second judgment, not to offer it as an alternative.¹ Thus only one method [is here recommended],² whereas otherwise there would be two.³ A transient state which belongs [specifically] to the predominant *rasa* should follow, that is, should bring them into conformity. For example, in the stanza, "In anger she has bound him,"⁴ anger (*krodha*) has been expressed as subordinate to sexual desire (*rati*), which is the predominant *bhāva* of the stanza. A transient state [of this anger], indignation (*amarṣa*), has been introduced by the words, "bound him tightly." But by the words, "she weeps" and "with a laugh," this is quickly brought into conformity with such transient states of *rati* as jealousy, yearning, joy.

He states the third way: to be constantly watchful. One may take as example the *Tāpasavatsarāja*, in which the *rasa* of love-in-enjoyment, furnished by King Vatsa's relation to Padmāvatī, [is always kept subordinate].⁵ Other principles: [For example,] one should not overdevelop the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* of a subordinate *rasa*. If they are obstructive to the predominant *rasa*, one should not introduce them at all; or rather, if one does so, one should add to them *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* belonging to the predominant *rasa*. Where the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* of an obstructive *rasa* are developed, one must be vigilant to keep them subordinate. One can readily supply such rules by oneself.

Having thus described the methods that are common to cases of obstructive and non-obstructive factors, he now speaks of a particular [means] which differs by its being a method for avoiding overdevelopment which is peculiar to cases of obstructive factors: But any *rasa* that is obstructive, etc.

As is possible: supply, : being obstructive to the predominant *rasa*.

And this [imparting of a relative prominence], etc.: There exists an opinion that there is no such thing as a relation of helper-helped among rasas because a rasa has no further effect than its own aesthetic delight (*camatkāra*); that otherwise it could not be called a rasa; and if it were not a rasa, how could it take part in a relation of predominant and subordinate rasas? But even those who hold this opinion must admit the prominence of a single rasa in a work, that is, its extension over a greater part of the work, while other rasas are found accompanying smaller sections of the work, for otherwise there could be no coherence of the plot (*itiyūttī*).⁶ If there is no coherence of the rasa that extends over the greater part of the work with the other rasas, there will be no coherence of the plot; while if there is coherence of the plot, this will amount to admitting a relation of helper-helped among the rasas. That there is no contradiction between the fact that the rasas end in their own aesthetic delight [and the fact that they may exist in a subordinate or helping relation] will be stated just below.⁷ So he says, even by a critic who would not admit, etc. What he means is that the critic may refuse to admit it in so many words, but will be forced to admit it in principle.

Now another [commentator] has given a different explanation. The passage beginning "and this imparting of a relative prominence," he says, refers to the "second" opinion, according to which the relation of helper-helped does not exist among the rasas [but exists only among the *sthāyibhāvas*]. Even in that opinion, he says, there is predominance of one rasa by its extending over a greater section of the plot. This explanation is wrong.⁸ Because if we accept it, the author's summary, which refers to only one opinion, as is clear from the word "all" in "all this has been said," etc., and from his raising only later the second opinion with the words "even in the opinion of others": [this distribution of the two opinions] would be illogical. But enough of this argument with an older member of my family.⁹

Of those who hold: At the end of Bharata's chapter on the bhāvas is this verse:

Of many [rasas] which are used in the same work the one whose form is [of] large [compass] should be considered the 'abiding' (*sthāyin*) rasa;
the others, the 'transient' (*sāticārin*) rasas.¹⁰

According to what is stated in this verse, a state of mind (*cittavṛtti*) that extends over the basic plot must necessarily appear as "abiding," whereas that which accompanies only an incident in the plot will appear

as "transient." Thus there is no contradiction in an abider-transient [= principal-subordinate] relation between them at the time when they are relished in the form of *rasas*. This is how some people¹¹ have explained the verse. Thus, even Bhāguri,¹² after asking, "Are the *rasas* as well [as the *bhāvas*] to be regarded as abiding or transient?" answers it in the affirmative, saying, "Indeed they are."

But others understand the verse to mean that that *rasa* [i.e., *bhāva*] which is listed as a *sthāyibhāva* may become a *vyabhicāribhāva* of another *rasa*,¹³ as anger (*krodha*) [which is listed as the *sthāyibhāva* of the cruel] may become a *vyabhicārin* of the heroic, while a *rasa* that is listed as a *vyabhicārin* may become the *sthāyibhāva* in another *rasa*, as indifference (*nirveda*) [which is listed by Bharata as a *vyabhicārin* of the tragic], when it is revelatory of a knowledge of truth, becomes the *sthāyibhāva* of the peaceful. Or we may take the verse to mean that that which is really a temporary state (*vyabhicārin*) may be relatively permanent as compared with other temporary states, as, for example, madness in the Fourth Act of the *Vikramorvāsi*.¹⁴ The intention of the verse is to give all this meaning. Its literal interpretation is: "Of many *bhāvas* (emotional states) in their form of states-of-mind (*cittavṛtti*), that one whose form is found to be large is the *sthāyibhāva* (the abiding emotion) and it is a 'rasa' because it is capable of being made into a *rasa*; the others are called 'transient'." But with this permanence and transiency of the *rasas* the verse says nothing of their being related as predominant and subordinate. That is why still others read the term *rasasthāyi* as a compound,¹⁵ whether as a genitive *tatpurusa* (meaning "the abiding emotion of the *rasa*"), or as a locative ("the abiding emotion in the *rasa*"), or, on the authority of Pāṇ. 2.1.24, Vārt. 1, as an accusative.¹⁶ So he says, Even in the opinion of others, etc. By the word *rasa*: The reference is to the word *rasa* contained in Kārikā 3.22.

1. Abhinava is taking the word *vā* of the *Vṛtti* in the sense of "rather," as he did in 3.9 L. 2. Namely, the second of the three principles announced in 3.24 A. 3. And consequently the *Vṛtti* should have spoken of four principles in 3.24 A, not three. 4. See 2.18-19e A and 3.20 b A and L. 5. For the plot of the *Tāpasavatsarāja* see above 3.10-14g L. King Udayana's love for Padmāvatī is always kept subordinate to his sorrow for the loss of Vāsavadattā. 6. As in commenting on 3.23, Abhinava here again emphasizes the dependence of the *rasas* on the plot. Just as a plot demands the introduction of various *rasas*, so the coherence of the plot demands an *āṅgāṅgibhāva* or *upakāryopakārakabhbāva* among the *rasas*. 7. Viz. by Abhinava, Text. p. 386.

lines 5-8. 8. The interpretation to which Abhinava objects was that of the *Candrikā*. It is certainly the natural interpretation of the passage. What Abhinava has against it is that if such was Ānanda's intention, he seems to contradict himself in the words that follow, when he says, "All this is according to the opinion that one *rasa* may act as the *vyabhicārin* of another." To absolve his author from the charge of contradicting himself, Abhinava gives a more artificial explanation of the passage. The critic who "will not admit" the *angāngibhāva* (or the *anugrähyānugrähabhāva*) of the *rasas* is not an upholder of the second opinion (viz., the opinion that the *sthāyibhāvas* rather than the *rasas* are subordinated to one another). He is a believer in the *suc-*
camatkāravīśrānti of the *rasas*, one who is so obstinate in that belief that he will not admit the *angāngibhāva* of the *rasas* although he really must believe in them. Thus the critic "who will not admit" the *angāngibhāva* of the *rasas* can be included in those who really believe that one *rasa* can act as the *vyabhicārin* of another. There is now no contradiction in saying that "all that we have said is according to the belief that one *rasa* may act as the *vyabhicārin* of another."

9. See Introduction, p. 29.

10. *BhNS* 7.119 +1 (Vol. I, p. 379). The verse is missing in the shorter version of Bharata. The translation that we give here understands the third quarter of the verse as *sa mantavyo rasah sthāyi*, whether one reads it that way (as does the GOS ed. of *BhNS*) or whether one reads *sa mantavyo rasasthāyi* (as does the Kashi ed. of the *Locana*) and understands a dropping of the *visarga* by Pāṇ. 8.3.36. Vārt. 1. If one takes the latter reading and regards *rasasthāyi* as a compound, a different translation will be needed. We give it in footnote 15, below. 11. In the term "some people" Abhinava apparently includes himself. 12. Nothing more is known of Bhāguri as a drama critic than what is furnished by this reference. The Bhāguri quoted in Lakṣmīdhara's commentary on Vādirāja's *Yasodharacarita* 2.34 was a grammarian, if we are to judge from the nature of the quotation there given. It is possible, of course, that one man commented both on grammar and on the *BhNS*. 13. This first group of "others" differs from Abhinava in taking the word *rasa* in the verse to mean *bhāva*. Abhinava too believed in the interchangeability of *sthāyin* and *vyabhicāribhāvas*; cf. above, 3.20 L, note 4. But he does not understand the present verse to refer to it. 14. Madness (*unmāda*) is a *vyabhicāribhāva* of love-in-separation, but is so developed in the mad scene of the *Vikramorvāsi* as to become practically the *sthāyin*. 15. For this third interpretation we must translate the verse as follows: "Of many [*bhāvas*] which are used in the same work, the one whose form is [of a] large [compass] should be considered as the 'abiding' *bhāva* of [or in, or with,] the *rasa*; the others as the 'transient' [*bhāvas*]." 16. Abhinava quotes the *Vārttika* as it is given in Patañjali and in the *Kāśikā*. Its sense is "To the list given as 'śrīta, etc.' one should add *gami*, *gāmin*, and others." The list is of words which may be compounded with an accusative noun. Thus, *grāmagāmī* "going to the

village." So here, *rasasthāyī* "abiding with the rasa." *Sthāyī* is understood as *anusthāyī* and so can govern the accusative although the verb without prefix is normally intransitive.

A Having thus set forth the means of avoiding obstruction that are common to cases of naturally obstructive and naturally unobstructive elements when introduced into the predominant *rasa* of a work, it is now proposed to show one [means] that is limited in its use to the area of naturally obstructive elements. Thus, the *Kārikā* says:

K If an element, which would be obstructive to the abiding [rasa] because its belonging to the same base would be contradictory, is made to belong to a different base, it will be without fault if fully developed, even so.

A Obstructive (or contradictory) elements are of two sorts: obstructive because found in the same locus and obstructive because immediately successive. Of these, that which is obstructive to the predominant *rasa* that abides throughout the work, because its belonging to the same base would be contradictory to the rules of propriety, as the fearsome would be to the heroic, should be made to belong to a different base. The hero of the story is the base of heroism; so it should be introduced into his opponent. If that is done, even if the element is naturally obstructive, one may develop it without fault. For if one shows an extreme degree of fear in the enemy, one will thereby suggest all the more of competence and bravery on the part of the hero. This is shown clearly in my *Arjunacarita* on the occasion of Arjuna's descent into the underworld.

L By summing up the means that are common, he lays the ground [for describing] a means that is special: Having thus, etc. One: that is, a means of avoiding obstruction.

[Comment on the Kārikā.] The adjectival compound *viruddhaikāśrayo* contains the cause.¹ That abiding [state] that is naturally obstructive because its belonging to the same base with some other abiding [state] would be inconceivable, like fear with boldness, must be made to have a different base, that is, must be made to belong to the enemy of the hero. It [will be]: Even if it is naturally obstructive, if it is made thus, if it is constructed thus, its development will not constitute a fault because it will add to the prominence of the hero. This implies that it would actually be a fault not to develop it. The word *api* is displaced and is taken to be so by the *Vṛtti* as well [as by us].²

[Comment on the *Vṛtti*.] Obstructive because found in the same locus: that is, by its very connection with the same base [regardless of time], as boldness with fear. In other cases, even if connection with the same base may be possible, an element may be obstructive because it follows immediately, without any interval, as indifference [will prove obstrucitve] to love [when it follows immediately].³ Is shown: in such passages as this:

And as the fearsome sound of Arjun's bow was heard,
a panic rose within the city of the demons.⁴

1' Abhinava means that *viruddhaikāśrayo* acts as a causal clause. "Possessing a contradictory belonging to the same base" means "Because its belonging to the same base would be contradictory." 2. Both Ānanda and Abhinava understand the *api* with *tasya* [*virodhinoḥ*] rather than with *poṣe*: "There will be no fault even if the element is naturally obstructive" rather than "There will be no fault even if one develops fully a naturally obstructive element." 3. The distinction is this. Some emotions can never share the same person. A hero is never afraid. Some emotions can occur in one and the same person but not in immediate succession. A lover may become a saint; but not immediately. 4. One hopes that a whole canto was not written in this thumping iambic meter. Bharata calls it *mattaceṣṭita* (*BhNS* 15.21). It is called *bālagarbhiṇī* in the *Jāṇaśrayī Chandoviciti* (4.22). Piṅgala does not mention it.

A An element that is naturally obstructive by its belonging to the same locus with the abiding *rasa* of a work can be made in one way or another non-obstructive by bringing it into subordination to the abiding *rasa*. Now that this has been shown, the next *Kārikā* goes on to show that with the second [type of naturally obstructive factor] the same thing may be achieved.

K A *rasa* that may belong without fault to the same base but is obstructive when following [some other *rasa*] without interval should be suggested by a wise author only after the intervention of a third *rasa*.

A That *rasa* which is not obstructive merely by inhering in the same locus but is obstructive when following [some other *rasa*] without interval should be introduced into a work only after the intervention of a third *rasa*. An example is the way in which the peaceful and the erotic are introduced in the *Nāgānanda*.

L The second [type]: viz., that which is obstructive by its following without interval. The same thing: viz., avoidance of obstruction.

The sense of the *Kārikā* is this. That *rasa* which is without fault, that is, without obstruction, by reason of its belonging to the same base [as another *rasa*], but which would become obstructive by reason of its following that other *rasa* without interval, must be made to fit by inserting a third *rasa*, which is non-obstructive to the other two, between those two.

Into a work: This is said out of regard to the majority [of instances], but the introduction can sometimes be made even within a single verse, for he will go on to say, "standing even in a single sentence" (3.27 K).

An example, etc. For in the *Nāgānanda*¹ the *rasa* of peace is presented² from the *upakṣepa* up to the *nirvahana*.³ The *upakṣepa* (planting the seed) occurs with the lines [spoken by the hero on his first entrance]: "I know youth to be the house of passion, nor am I unaware that it is transient," etc. (*Nāg.* 1.5) The *nirvahana* (denouement) consists in his offering up his life for the sake of another. Now the hero's love (*śringāra*) for *Malayavatī* would be obstructive to this *rasa* of peace; so the poet, in order to make possible its breaking forth in succession to the peaceful, presents it only after inserting the *rasa* of the marvellous, which is unobstructive to either. He does this in the passage "Ah, what a song! Ah, what music!" (*Nāg.* 1.13 +1). And for this purpose the verse: "Clarity in all ten types of touch," etc. (*Nāg.* 1.14),⁴ while it is almost without *rasa* of itself, is here presented, as it raises the degree of *rasa* by strengthening the marvellous. After which, the next *rasa* is shown to break forth with "There can be no harm in looking at an unmarried girl" (*Nāg.* 1.14 +9). As the Sāṅkhyā philosophers, who are famous for their examination of how states of mind arise, have said:

As occasion is offered by causes and effects,
[through the power of *prakṛti*, the psychic self
takes up its different postures like an actor],
aiming at the various goals of man.⁵

Then we have this erotic mood, which has been brought in by causes and effects, strengthened by the comic, which is roused by the actions of Śekharaka. In natural opposition to this and in support of worldly disenchantment and peace is the scene of viewing the bones of the dead Nāgas. But this is introduced only after the insertion of the heroic, aided by the transient state (*vyabhicārin*) of anger as expressed by the verses beginning with: "[Blacking out the sun with aerial chariots]/ that fly from every side [along the roads of heaven]" (*Nāg.* 3.15), these verses being spoken by Mitrāvasu, whose entrance is the occasion for *Malayavatī*'s exit.

1. What follows is a most interesting analysis of the *Nāgānanda*, which shows that from the point of view of at least one sensitive critic it was not the dramatic failure that most Europeans have thought it. The student will have to read or reread the play in order properly to judge Abbinava's analysis. It

would be too cumbrous to relate the whole plot here in a footnote. 2. Lit., constructed; the word *nibaddhaḥ* (*Locana*, line 7, p. 389) must be taken with *sānto rasaḥ* in line 5 as well as with *śrigorāḥ* in line 6. 3. The *upakṣepa* is the first *sandhyārīga* of the first *sandhi* (the *mukhasandhi*); the *nirvahana* is the fifth and last *sandhi*; see above, 3.10-14f L. 4. The whole line runs: *vyaktir vyavijanadhātunā dośavidhenāpī atra labdhāmūnā*. I am not sure of the meaning. The verse praises the song and music of Malayavati with a wealth of references to technical terms of music. 5. The quotation is of the first half of *Sāṅkyakārikā* 42, to which I have joined a translation of the second half in brackets (*prakṛtier vibhutuyogān natavad vyavatisthate lingam*). Abhinava quotes the verse in order to show that the state of mind of the chief character (and therefore the *rasa* of the play) is not immutable and that a skilled dramatist will make use of these "occasions offered by causes and effects" in order to bring about changes therein. Actually one might argue that this factor is as important as the insertion of the third *rasa*. The drunkenness of Śekharaka and the sight of the bones of the sacrificed Nāgas are later instances in the *Nāgānanda*. It is these external events which serve to alter the *cittārūḍha* and the *rasa*. Even by the aid of such events, of course, they cannot be immediately reversed. As with an automobile, one must first shift into neutral.

A And the peaceful is indeed apprehended as a *rasa*.¹ It is characterized by the full development of the happiness that comes from the dying off of desire. As has been said:

The joy of pleasure in this world
and the greater joy of pleasures found i
are not worth a sixteenth of the joy
that comes from the dying of desire.

[*Mahābhārata* 12.168.36]²

1. Despite the fact that it is not mentioned as one of the *rasas* in the oldest version of *BhNS*. 2. The verse is found quoted throughout Sanskrit literature; see references in the critical ed. of *Mbh*.

L But now, it may be objected that there is no such *rasa* as the peaceful and that the sage [Bharata] does not even mention a basic

emotional state (*sthāyin*) for such a *rasa*. Anticipating this difficulty, our author says, And the peaceful, etc. The peaceful *rasa* may be characterized as the full development into aesthetic enjoyment of a certain type of happiness (*sukha*) occurring as a basic emotional state. This happiness consists in the dying off, that is, the complete cessation, of desires, that is, yearnings for objects of sense, and may be called an indifference to worldly things (*nirveda*).

Is indeed apprehended: [first explanation] that is, it can indeed be imagined even within one's own experience, as at a time when all desire for some particular sensual object, such as food, as ceased.¹

Others, on the other hand, imagine that the basic emotional state [of the peaceful] is a cessation of all states of mind (or thought-trends). But if the absence of desire is understood as a pure negation (*prasajya-prativedha*) and means the absence of all states of mind, it could not be called an emotional state (*bhāva*) at all; whereas if it is understood as a limitational negative (*paryudāsa*), it will fit in with our position.²

Others consider the statement of Bharata:

The emotions arise from peace, each from its
peculiar cause,
and when the cause has ceased, they melt
back into peace.³

and on this basis say that the peaceful (*sānta*) is the basic nature common to all the *rasas* and that its basic emotional state is that state where no specific state of mind has yet arisen. This view is not far removed from ours.⁴ The difference is one of *prāgabhāva* (the non-existence of something before its origination) and *pradhvansābhāva* (the non-existence of something after it has been destroyed). What is correct is to speak of [indifference to worldly things as] the posterior non-existence of [sensual] desires "because," as has been said, "we never see a man born without desire."⁵

Is indeed apprehended [second explanation:] The sage [Bharata] himself accepted it in saying, "sometimes peace," etc.⁶ Nor is there any need to describe its final stage, which, because of its complete cessation of action, could have no symptoms (*anubhāvas*) and so could not be [aesthetically] perceived.⁷ In its final stage we could say of the erotic too that it cannot be described.⁸ But in the previous stage [of the peaceful] there are activities of rules and restraints in their various forms—as is indicated by the [Yoga-] sūtras: "The mind's pure flow of peace comes from one's [repeated] will [to suppress thoughts of sense

objects]" (*YogaS.* 3.10) and "In the intervals [of trance] various worldly cognitions arise because of old predispositions" (*YogaS.* 4.27)⁹—or, in the case of men like Janaka,¹⁰ even though they were men of peace, one could have observed such activities as reigning over a kingdom. So there exist symptoms (*anubhāvas*) and transient states (*vyabhicārins*) which can be imagined among rules and restraints, from which this [rasa of peace] can indeed be [aesthetically] apprehended. If it be objected that it is not apprehended because it has *novibhāvas*, we deny the charge. It is apprehended; so there must be *vibhāvas*. Its *vibhāvas* (situations which reveal it) are such as the fruition of a character's former good deeds, his being favored by God, his close acquaintance with books treating of spiritual secrets and with men who are devoid of desire.

In this way we have demonstrated the existence of the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, and *vyabhicārins* [of the peaceful] and have shown its *sthāyin*.

1. Most of us are not sufficiently enlightened to experience *nirveda* in its full extent, but we can all imagine it by analogy with the partial or specific *nirveda* that everyone occasionally experiences. 2. The distinction between *prasajyapratisedha* and *paryudāsa* is frequently discussed in the commentaries on Pāṇini; see *Mahābhāṣya* 1.1.43., 1.2.4, 1.4.57. Basically the first means a verbal negation, as in the sentence "One must not bring brahmins" (*brāhmaṇā na netavyāḥ*, where *na* modifies the verb-form *netavyāḥ*), whereas the second means a nominal negation, as in the sentence "One must bring non-brahmins" (*abrahmaṇā netavyāḥ*, where the negative *a-* modifies the noun *brāhmaṇāḥ*). But more than this lies in the distinction. A *prasajyapratisedha* is purely negative; it refers to nothing positive. A *paryuddsa*, on the other hand, refers to positive as well as negative. *Abrahmaṇā netavyāḥ* means that one is not to bring brahmins but one is to bring others. These others, it is implied, have some properties similar to those of brahmins, for example humanity, for the sentence obviously implies that we are to bring men who are not brahmins, not that we are to bring horses or cattle. Thus the doctrine arises that a *paryudāsa* always implies a certain similarity of the enjoined entity to the forbidden entity. Now to come to Abhinava's point in the present discussion. To interpret *trṣṇākṣaya* (= *trṣṇābhāva*) as a *prasajyapratisedha* results really in a self-contradiction. There can be no happiness, in fact no emotion at all, in something purely negative. One is not happy in not desiring; one is happy in non-desire, a positive state that is similar to desire in being an emotion but different from desire in not having sensual pleasures for its objects. 3. *BhNS* Vol. 1, p. 335. This forms part of the interpolated *sānta* passage at the end of Book 6. Even Abhinava, in whose version of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* they occur, may have realized they were not composed by Bharata himself. Like other insertions in *BhNS* the section is prefaced by the words *atṛḍryāḥ*. On

a similar preface (Vol. 1, p. 327) Abhinava says (in *Abh.*), "These ḍryā verses are to be taken together. They were recited by earlier teachers as a definition. The sage inserted them in the appropriate place to serve as a summary (*tā etā hy ḍryā ekapraghāttakatayā pūrvācaryar lakṣaṇatrena paṭhitā muninā tu sukhasamgrahāya nivesitāḥ*). For a further discussion of the nature of such verses see Kane *HSP* p. 17. 4. The similarity would lie in the conception of *nirveda* as a positive emotional state. 5. *NyāyaS.* 3.1.24, where the fact is taken as evidence of the previous existence of the soul. The point here is that the calm state before any of the eight *sthāyibhāvas* arise does not belong to any observable human. If the peaceful is to be achieved by the exhibition of its *sthāyibhāva*, we must take that *sthāyibhāva* to be the non-existence of sensual desire after destruction, that being the only sort of *triṇābhāva* that is observable and that can be represented. 6. The reference is to *BhNS* 1.108 (Vol. 1, p. 38), which occurs in the following context: *traislokasyāsyā sarvasya nātyam bhāvānuwirtanam* (= 1.107b): *kuacīd dharmāḥ, kuacīt kṛidō, kuacīd arthaḥ, kuacīd chāmāḥ* (= 1.108a), *kuacīd dhāsyam, kuacīd yuddham, kuacīt kāmāḥ, kuacīd vadhaḥ* (= 1.108b). "The theater is a representation of the *bhāvas* of all three worlds. In some plays [one will find] *dharma*; in some, delight; in some, material advantage; in some, peace; in some laughter; in some, war; in some, love; in some, slaughter." Clearly the beginning of the list is a reference to the four aims of man: *dharma, kāma, artha, mokṣa*. So the word *bhāva* should be interpreted very generally as the states or activities or occupations of the whole world. Bharata recognizes that *mokṣa*, or *sānti* which leads thereto, is a fit subject to be treated in a play. But in commenting on these verses in his *Abh.* Abhinava goes further. He identifies the items listed with the dramatic *bhāvas* (emotions) which underlie the various *rasas* and so would ascribe to Bharata recognition of *sānta* as a *rasa*. It is this view which he now follows in his second interpretation of Ānanda's words "and'the peaceful is indeed represented as a *rasa*." 7. This is one of several passages where Abhinava seems to be directly refuting Dhanika. In his *Avaloka* on *DR* 4.35 Dhanika says, "We deny that *sāma* can be a *sthāyi* in a play, for a play must of necessity be performed and *sāma* is not amenable to performance, because it consists in the dissolution of all activity" (*sarvathā nātakādū abhinayātmani sthāyitvam asmābhīḥ sāmasya nesyatē. tasya sāmastav्यपारप्रविलयरूपस्याभिनयायोगः*). P. V. Kane has shown that Dhanika and Abhinava were contemporaries (*HSP* pp. 236-237). But it is possible that the view expressed by Dhanika and refuted by Abhinava goes back to some older source. 8. In the ultimate stage of sexual love all perception ceases in the pleasure of the climax. Compare *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.3.21: "Just as a man in the embrace of a beloved woman knows nothing outside or inside." From the woman's point of view compare *Amaru* 101 (by the poetess Vikaṇanitambā; see *SRK* 572) "But when within his arms, I can't remember who he was or who I was or what we did or how." 9. The

sense of *samskāra* differs from one *sūtra* to the other. I have translated in accordance with the commentaries.

10. We have the warranty of the *Gītā* (3.20) that King Janaka attained *mokṣa*.

A Even if this *rasa* is not within everyone's experience, one cannot on that account deny its existence as a separate state of mind among men of unusual greatness. And it is not proper to include it in the heroic because that differs by its being based on false notions of self, while this is found only in a form where egoism is set at rest. And if we were to imagine a unity of the two despite the existence of this distinction, we might just as well imagine a unity of the heroic and the cruel. There is no contradiction if we make a distinction in this fashion: that when certain states of mind such as the heroism of compassion and the like are entirely without egoism, they form a variety of the peaceful; otherwise they form a variety of the heroic. It is thus established that there exists a *rasa* of peace. Nor when we insert into it, in a work, a naturally obstructive *rasa*, if we do this with the intervention of a neutral *rasa*, will there be obstruction, as in the work to which we have just referred.

L But, says an objector, there is nothing in this [state of peacefulness] to appeal to the heart; so it cannot be something that is relished (*rasyamāna*). We answer: who can say it is not [something to be relished], when we have already said that "it is indeed [aesthetically] apprehended"? But the objector may continue: "Granted it is apprehended, still, it is not something that everyone admires." At this rate, we reply, as the erotic is not admired by men devoid of desire, the erotic too will have to be dropped from the list of *rasas*.¹ So our author says, Even if, etc. Then, considering the possibility that the peaceful might be simply the heroic in which a religious element is prominent, he says, And it is not proper, etc. Because that: By "that" he means the heroic. Based on false notions of self: that is to say, it takes it life

from heroic energy, which appears in such form as the thought "I am such a person [as can do all things]." While this: By "this" he means the peaceful. The sense of the word *ca* ("and") is *api* ("although"),² i.e., although they are diametrically opposed by the one's consisting in desire and the other's consisting in desirelessness. Between the heroic and the cruel, on the other hand, there is no such diametric opposition, for they have this in common that they are both useful in the pursuit of religion, wealth, and sensual pleasure.³

But, it may be asked, what shall we call the heroism of compassion? Is it the heroism of religion, or the heroism of generosity? It is neither; it is simply another name for the peaceful. For the sage [Bharata] says that there are only three kinds of heroism according to tradition:

Brahmā said that the heroic is of three kinds: the heroism of generosity, the heroism of religion, and the heroism of war. [BhNS 6.79]

So our author says, when certain states of mind such as the heroism of compassion and the like.⁴ By the word *ādi* ("and the like") he anticipates an objection that the peaceful, insofar as it takes the form of revulsion (*jugupsā*) from objects of sense, might be included in the loathsome (*bibhatsā*). But that [viz., revulsion] is a transient state (*vyabhicārin*) of the peaceful and does not become a basic emotion (*sthāyin*) because in the final stage of the peaceful it is eradicated.

The author of the *Candrikā* has said that the *rasa* of peace should not be used as the topic [i.e., as the predominant *rasa*] of a major work.⁵ We shall not discuss the matter here because its discussion belongs elsewhere. Suffice it to say that as the *rasa* of peace leads to *mokṣa*, which is the highest aim of man, it is the most important of all the *rasas*.⁶ This has been stated by my teacher Bhāṭṭatauta in his *Kāvya-kautuka* and, with full discussion of the arguments for and against, by myself in my commentary on that work.⁷ For the present this is enough.

1. Abhinava is a bit carried away here by the heat of the argument. It is true that different persons have a special liking (*hrdayasamuāda*) for different *rasas*. In *Abh.* Vol. 1, p. 339, lines 11ff. Abhinava speaks of the special liking that enlightened persons have for the peaceful, adducing *BhNS* 27.58 in support (*tasyanti tarunāḥ kāme mokṣesu atha virōgināḥ*). But to say that the erotic is not admired by men devoid of desire, while it leads to a rhetorically effective reply here, goes against what Abhinava says elsewhere. On 2.7 he has told us that even as ascetic is struck by the charm of the erotic and his remarks on 3.40 will be in the same spirit: "A man devoid of desires does not misapprehend the *bhāvas*. The sound of a *vīṇā* does

not turn into the cawing of a crow in his ears." 2. Either Abhinava's text of the *Dhv.* lacked the word *api* (in *-adbhāve 'pi*), or he overlooked its presence, for there is no need to assign the sense of *api* to *ca* if the word *api* is actually contained in the sentence. Commentators often assign the sense of *api* to *ca*; see Bhāskara, *Brahmasūtrabh.* 1.3.20, 2.1.30, 2.3.5. See also above, 2.1.d L, note 1. 3. Whereas the peaceful is useful only in the pursuit of the fourth aim of man, *mokṣa*. 4. The natural and correct interpretation of Ānanda's meaning, in my opinion, is that *dayāvīra* and the like, viz., *dharma-vīra* and *dānavīra*, are all three distributed into two *rasas*, viz., *sānta* and *vīra*, depending on whether they are void of or possessed of egoism. Abhinava does not take the natural interpretation and, as always in such departures of his, he has a reason. He wants to use the word *ādi* in *dayāvīradīndm* as a prop to bring in a reference to *jugupsā*. Abhinava's interpretation is that out of *dayā-vīra*, *dharma-vīra*, and *dānavīra* the first, as being without egoism, is always equivalent to *sānta*. The latter two, as being possessed of egoism, are always varieties of *vīra*. He proves his point by a quotation from Bharata. The word *ādi* in *dayāvīradīndm* is now free to refer to any other *cittavṛtti* that is free of egoism. Hence it could apply to *jugupsā* and *jugupsā* could be suspected of belonging to *sānta*. However, it does not belong to *sānta* as a *sthāyibhāva*, as Abhinava will point out, but only as a *vyabhicāribhāva*. The preceding explanation will show, I think, that the invaluable *BP* for once is wrong in its interpretation. *BP* takes the words *ādigrahanena* to have no connection with what follows and so is forced to supply the words, or actually to emend the text to read, *dharma-vīradānavīrayor grahanam* directly after *ādigrahanena*. Thus contradicts Abhinava's opinion and leaves the reference to *jugupsā* entirely without support. 5. Compare the remarks of V. Ragbavan in *Number of Rasas*, p. 22. "Evidently the Caudrikākāra also held the view that *Vīra* and *Śringdā* are the *Rasas* in the Nāgānanda in accordance with the ending in the attainment of *vidyādhara-caturvarṇīva*, the overlordship of the kingdom of *Vidyādhara*s, and the sustained love-theme, and that the *sānta* came in there as a subsidiary idea to give a new variety of *Vīra* called *Dayā-vīra*." 6. This statement is contrary to what Ānanda will say under 3.29, viz., that *śringdā* is the most important of the *rasas*. Masson and Patwardhan claim that it is also at variance with what Abhinava himself says in the *Abh.* See *Sāntorasa*, p. 103, note 1, where the first reference should be to *BANS* Vol. I, p. 338. 7. Both the *Kāvya-kāvya* and Abhinava's commentary on it have long been lost.

K Between two rasas, standing even in a si
obstruction ceases by the intervention of a third.

A That the opposition between two rasas standing in a large
work will cease cannot be doubted since the opposition between two
rasas even when they stand in a single sentence ceases in the above-
mentioned way; as in the following [sentence] and others like it.

On bodies soiled with dust they looked,
they whose breasts were scented with the pollen
of garlands from the trees of paradise;
bodies seized greedily by jackals.
they whose bodies were now embraced by nymphs;
bodies fanned by the flapping, bloody wings of vultures,
they who were fanned with silken garments,
dipped in sandal ointment, from the wishing trees of heaven:
thus did the heroes then, reclining upon couches
in their flying chariots, look down with curious gaze
on their late bodies, pointed out by their companion damsels.
on the battle field.¹

Here the copresence of the erotic and the loathsome, or of their ele-
ments, is not obstructive because of the intervention of the heroic rasa.

1. This fine passage from some lost kāvya is also quoted by Mammata (7, ex. 334-335). It comes from a description of a battle, where the dead warriors are pictured as being led to Indra's heaven by the apsarases who hover over battle fields for that purpose and who point out to the warriors amid their new luxury the mortal bodies which they have left behind. "Their breasts were scented": the scent comes from the garlands of the apsarases who are embracing them. The fault of tautology is avoided by the use of synonyms: *hāhumadhyā* and *bhujāntarālā*, *surāgand* and *lalānā*, *upavījyamāna* and *sām-*
rūjita.

L To confirm: be means, in the minds of students. The word even shows that the matter is well known so far as large works are concerned.

On bodies soiled with dust: the adjectives indicate how far removed and how difficult to imagine [as their own]¹ these bodies were. And yet, by the phrase "look upon their bodies" we see that the warriors make the common correlation of body and self and so have been able to identify these bodies with themselves. Thus both [rasas] are given a single base, for otherwise, if they occupied different bases, there would be no obstruction to be avoided.

But it may be objected that the only rasa in the passage is the heroic, not the erotic or the loathsome and that what we have is love and loathing appearing as transient states (*vyabhicārins*) in the heroic. That may well be, but the passage will still serve as an example of the matter at issue. It is [to allow] for this [objection] that our author adds [the qualifying clause] or of their elements. By "their elements" he refers to their *sthānyibhāvas*.²

The heroic rasa: What our author has in mind is this. We understand the energy and other [heroic] qualities belonging to these [warriors] from the phrase "the heroes [looked down on] their bodies." From this understanding we perceive [the heroic] in both agent and object as they run through the syntax of the whole sentence. Hence the heroic, although it is not explicitly expressed in the middle [of the two other elements] does in fact [implicitly] intervene.³

1. The expression *asambhāvanāspada* is strangely elliptical and one suspects that some word like *svābhimāna* or *sviyatva* has dropped out before it. I have translated according to BP. 2. The *sthānyibhāvas* of *śrīgāra* and *bibhatsā* are *roti* and *jugupsā*. Here they could be regarded as *vyabhicārins* of *vira*. 3. The objection that Abhinava has in mind is clear enough. His

removal of it, though, would be difficult to understand without the *BP* or the commentators on Mammata. The objection is that the word *virāh* occurs only at the end of these verses, whereas the suggestion of the loathsome comes in the first adjective compound and the suggestion of the erotic in the second adjective compound. So how can one speak of the intervention of *vīra*? The solution is this. We are told at the end of the sentence that "the heroes looked down on their dead bodies." From this we understand the heroism that attaches to these warriors and to the bodies they have lost in battle. The remainder of the sentence consists mostly in adjective compounds, one set describing the dead bodies, the other set describing the revived heroes. Now adjectives in Sanskrit are said to give rise to two cognitions: the first, of a property; the second, of a substance to which the property can belong. The doctrine is connected with the fact that there is almost no formal difference in Sanskrit (as there is in English) between an adjective and a noun; every Sanskrit adjective can function as a noun. In the sentence under discussion the first adjective compound, in its adjectival force (*vīsesanatayā*) gives us a suggestion of the loathsome. But right after this, by its reference to the substance (*vīsesyatayā*), viz., bodies, it gives us a suggestion of the heroic which attaches to those bodies. We then come to the second adjective compound, which gives us *vīsesanatayā* an immediate suggestion of the erotic, followed by a suggestion *vīsesyatayā* of the heroism attaching to its substance, viz., heroes. Such is the succession of rasas based on the order in which the words of the poem are heard. But this succession can occur only on the second or further hearing of the poem, for we must have heard the final half verse before the adjectives can furnish these heroic suggestions. So the succession may be given in the order in which one construes the words of the poem. In mentally construing, one places the subject first and the object after. By so doing we shall get the succession *śringāra*, *vīra*, *bibhatsā*, *vīra*, etc. In either case *vīra* intervenes.

K One should pay careful attention everywhere to obstruction and to the absence of obstruction in this manner; but especially in the erotic, for it is the most delicate.

A The man of taste (*sahṛdaya*)¹ should pay careful attention, in accordance with the above definitions, to obstruction and to the absence of obstruction, both in large works and elsewhere; but especially

in dealing with the erotic. For, being the development of love (*rati*) and love being liable to damage from the slightest cause, the erotic is the most delicate of all the *rasas* and will not endure the intrusion of anything that is even slightly obstructive.

1. The word *sahrdaya* normally refers to the reader or audience, but we must here take it to refer to the poet, who also must be a man of taste, for the *Kārikā*, to judge from what follows (3.29), clearly has the poet rather than the audience in mind.

L And elsewhere: viz., in single verses and the like. The construction is: "for the erotic is the most delicate." Any member of the class of *rasas* is delicate; the tragic is more delicate; and the erotic is most delicate. Hence his use of the superlative suffix *-tamap*.

K A good poet must be especially heedful i
raſa, for a mistake here is noticed immediately.

A In this *raſa*, because it possesses a greater degree of delicacy than all the other *rasas*, a poet must be heedful, that is, must take pains. For if he is careless here, he will quickly become an object of scorn to men of taste. For the *sringāra-raſa*, as it is regularly the object of the experience¹ of humans and is therefore dear to them, is the most important [of all the *rasas*].

1. Note that Ānanda speaks here of the *raſa* as being the object of ordinary experience. In Abhinava's terminology this could be said only of the *bhāva*, *rati*.

L [No comment.]¹

1. Does Abhinava fail to comment because the text is easily understood, or because he disagrees with it? He has told us (3.26 b L) that in his opinion *sānta* is the most important of the *rasas*.

is being the case,

K That elements of the erotic should come in touch with a *rasa* that is opposed to it is not a fault, if done for the purpose of attracting the attention of the audience (*vineyān*), or in order to give beauty to a poem.¹

1. The word *vineyān*, which we have here translated "audience," for it often has that meaning, in its literal sense means "those to be instructed or improved." Both Ānanda and Abhinava emphasize the literal sense. We have taken the word *vā* ("or") to express an alternative between attracting the attention of the audience and giving beauty to the poem. Abhinava takes it, less naturally, as expressing an alternative to all the methods of avoiding obstruction that have been previously described.

A That elements of the erotic should come in touch with a *rasa* that is naturally obstructive to the erotic will not be a fault, not only when the [aforesaid] rules for avoiding obstruction are applied; because it will also not be a fault when done in order to attract the attention of the audience-to-be-improved (*vineyān*), or to give beauty to the poem. For such an audience, being attracted by elements of the erotic *rasa*, will more readily receive instruction for its improvement. For the sages have transmitted [rules for] entertainments such as plays, which take the form of instruction in good conduct, for the specific purpose of benefitting persons who need improvement. Furthermore, since the

erotic has a delight that charms all people, the introduction of elements of the erotic into a poem will furnish an addition to its beauty. So even if done in this way, the introduction of elements of the erotic into a rasa that is naturally opposed to it will not be obstructive. That is why there is no fault of obstructing the rasa in such verses as this:

Truly fair women are objects of delight
and truly wealth is fair;
but life is unsteady and as quickly gone
as the glance of a tipsy girl.¹

1. The verse has already been quoted and discussed by Abhinava; see 3.1g L.

L This being the case: that is, since the erotic appeals to everyone [Comment on the Kārikā] To it: that is, to the erotic. In rasas, such as the peaceful, which are opposed to the erotic, a touch that bears on elements of the erotic is not a fault. Vibhāvas and anubhāvas, even if they belong to another rasa, can be described by some such turn of phrase as has [elsewhere] made them belong to the erotic. As in a prayer of my own composition:

O moon-crested lord of my life,
at your sudden touch
after deep pain of separation,
my consciousness,
like a puppet carved from a moonstone,
melts and melts away.¹

For in this verse even the vibhāvas and anubhāvas of the peaceful are described by an erotic turn of speech.² The syntax of the Kārikā is this. "[A touch of the erotic] is not a fault if done in order to beautify the poem so as to attract the audience-to-be-improved." The word vā ("or") distinguishes this as a single alterantive [to the other methods described in 3.24-27].

[Comment on the Vṛtti] Our author interprets in the same way [as we have just done], saying, not only when, etc.³ The following will explain his use of the word vā: Methods of avoiding obstruction, such as the avoidance of overdevelopment, etc, have been mentioned above; [Now] one may introduce obstructive elements for the beauty of the poem in order to attract the attention of the audience-to-be-improved, and not only [utilize] the methods above mentioned. But it is not the

case, as would follow from the comments of others, that beauty of a poem can exist without attracting the attention of the audience, and that no such beauty is ever found in the interposing or not interposing [a third *rūpa* in the previously mentioned ways].⁴

More readily: the sense is, with pleasure. But an objector may say that a poem is something playful like a game; how can we talk of its giving instruction, a function that belongs to Vedic texts? It is with thoughts of this objection that he speaks of good conduct. By "sages" he means Bharata and others. We have already described how plays and poems educate us in the manner of a wife, by means of pleasure, as opposed to sacred texts and history, which instruct us in the manner, respectively, of a master or a friend.⁵ So we shall say nothing on the subject here out of fear of repeating ourselves.

But is it only by describing the *vibhāvas* as if they belonged to the erotic that one can attract the attention of the audience-to-be-improved? No, there is another way, which our author describes by saying, Furthermore, etc.⁶ By an addition to its beauty, he means it will strengthen, or render more beautiful, particular figures of speech such as similes. For it is said that "the properties productive of beauty in a poem are the *gunas*; the causes of an addition to this beauty are the figures of speech."⁷

"A tipsy girl": What is being described in this verse is the transience of all things and this is a *vibhāva* of the peaceful. This *vibhāva* has not been expressed by any erotic turn of phrase. Rather, by the word "truly" the statement enters directly into the listener's heart, as though the speaker had said, "I am not proclaiming any false infatuation for indifference to the world, but I am telling you that life, for which all these things are sought, is itself transient." In this statement the unsteady glance of a tipsy girl, which is an element referable to the erotic insofar as the glance can be considered either a *vibhāva* or an *anubhāva*,⁸ is used as a simile for transiency. For everyone takes delight in the sidelong glance of his beloved and so the hearer, who is to be improved, being started by this delight, will be led on to understand the true nature of things in an indirect way, just as a child is led on to take medicine by one's putting sugar on his tongue, and so will end up in a state of disenchantment with worldly things.⁹

1. The moonstone (*candrakānti*) is said to emit moisture under the rays of the moon. The moon-crested lord is Śiva. The melting of the consciousness refers to the yogic progress from discriminative cognition, where knower,

knowledge, and known are separate, to trance cognition (*samādhi*) where knower and knowledge melt into the known. 2. The ālambanavibhāvas, namely the worshipper and God, are portrayed as wife and husband. The *uddīpanavibhāva*, meditation on God, is described as the husband's touching his wife. The *anubhāva*, viz., the symptom of passage from *dhyāna* to *samādhi*, is described by a simile that would also be appropriate to the melting of a woman in her lover's arms. 3. Ānanda certainly contrasts the permission furnished by the present Kārikā with the permissions extended under the different circumstances mentioned in 3.24-27. But it does not follow that he took the word *vā* to set the present permission off as a single alternative. In fact, the passage "Furthermore," etc. (kim ca, text p. 399, line 2f.) shows clearly that he took *kāvyasobhārtham* as an alternative to *vineyān unmukhikartum*. But Abhinava noticed a logical fault that would ensue from taking *vineyān unmukhikartum* and *kāvyasobhārtham* as separate alternatives. He was also aware that another commentator, presumably his *bête noire* the Candrikākāra, had taken the natural interpretation. To exculpate Ānanda from the fault and to get in a blow against the earlier commentator he forces on Ānanda an interpretation which Ānanda did not intend. 4. There are many different readings of the text. For *labhyate* [Kashi ed.] one must certainly read *labhyate* [KM ed.], of which *kāvyasobhā* will be the subject. Before *labhyate* one should probably read *kvacit* (so BP; KM reads *kecit*, which is senseless), which we have translated as "ever." Thus appears the logical difficulty which has spurred Abhinava to his unnatural interpretation of *vā*. If one takes the natural interpretation, as did "the comments of others," it would be logically possible for a poem to aim at *kāvyasobhā* without the alternative of attracting the audience; and it would be possible to use any one of the previously mentioned methods of avoiding obstruction without any intention of making the poem beautiful. 5. Cf. 1.1e L (near end) and 3.10-14f L (near beginning). 6. Here we have a second unnatural interpretation, provoked by the first. If the word *vā* does not contrast *kāvyasobhārtham* with *vineyān unmukhikartum*, we must find some explanation of the passage "furthermore, etc." other than its natural meaning. Its natural meaning is that the introduction of erotic elements not only attracts the audience, but furthermore may add to the beauty of the poem. So Abhinava twists the meaning into the following. Not only does the introduction of erotic elements by treating the vibhāvas of sānto as if they were vibhāvas of śringāra beautify the poem so as to attract the audience; but furthermore, an introduction of erotic elements can strengthen an "addition to beauty," that is, a figure of speech (*alanikāra*, called an addition to beauty—*sobhātisaya*—because it causes an increase of beauty) and such figures of speech too will attract the audience. 7. The quotation is from Vāmana 3.1.1-2. 8. The sidelong glance of a tipsy girl is an *uddīpanavibhāva* (stimulative factor) of śringāra. It can also be considered an *anubhāva*, a symptom of the girl's affection. 9. It will help the reader

if we here set side by side the natural interpretation of Ānanda's words and the interpretation put on them by Abhinava. Ānanda: erotic elements may be introduced into an opposite *rasa* such as the peaceful, not only by means of the safeguards above mentioned (e.g., by inserting a neutral *rasa* between the two, etc.), but also when the purpose is (1) to attract the audience's attention, or (2) to beautify the poem. He quotes the verse "Truly fair women" (*satyam manoramā rāmdh*) as an example of (2). Abhinava: erotic elements may be introduced into an opposite *rasa* such as the peaceful not only by the safeguards above mentioned, but also when one wishes to beautify the poem in order to attract the attention of the audience. This may be done (1) by a turn of phrase that expresses a *vibhāva*, etc., of the peaceful as if it were a *vibhāva*, etc., of the erotic. As an example he quotes his own verse "O moon-crested lord" (*tuorū candracūḍam*). Or it may be done (2) by using erotic elements in a figure of speech. As an example of (2) he refers to the verse "Truly fair women," which employs in its second half the simile "unsteady as the glance of a tipsy girl." Note that in method (1) *śrigāra* is so fused with *sānta* that it cannot be eliminated without damaging the *sānta*; whereas in method (2), as may be seen from the example, it is not quite fused and, even if it were eliminated, no harm would be done to the *sānta*. For example, one could change the second half of the quoted verse to read *kintu padmapalāśāsthajālalolam hi jūvitam* and the *sānta* would remain unaffected although the *śrigāra* would be eliminated.

K Knowing thus the subject of obstruction and the avoidance of obstruction among the *rasas* and the like, a good poet never finds himself in difficulties.

A Knowing thus, that is, in the manner set forth just above, the subject of mutual obstruction and the avoidance of such obstruction among *rasas* and the like, that is, among *rasas*, *bhāvas*, *rasābhāsas* and *bhāvābhāsas*, a good poet, that is, one who possesses a high degree of genius in the area of poetry, never finds himself in difficulties in writing poetry.

L Summing up the foregoing, he states the practical benefit of the whole topic: Knowing thus, etc.

A As the usefulness has thus been shown of studying obstruction and its avoidance in the *rasas* and the like, it is now stated that in the study of the suggestive factors, viz., the denoted and the denotative elements within the same area, there is the same [usefulness].

K The putting together of denoted and denotative elements with propriety so far as the *rasas* and the like are concerned is the chief task of a great poet.

A The putting together of denoted elements, that is, the particulars of a plot, and denotative elements, that is, the words which denote these particulars, with propriety so far as the *rasas* and the like are concerned, is the chief task of a great poet. For the chief function of a great poet is the composing of words and meanings in such a way as to favor the suggestion of those *rasas* and the like which he takes as the chief meaning of his poem.

L In the *rasas*: that is, in the area of the *rasas*. The study of the suggestive factors: viz., the denoted elements, *vibhāvas* and the like, and the denotative elements, nouns and verbs. Within the same area: viz., the area of the *rasas* and the like. The same: i.e., usefulness.

[Comment on the Kārikā] The chief task: This is no more than what was said [in 1.9], "Just as a man who wishes to see," etc. Of a great poet: He speaks of the result as though it were a factor already given.¹ For it is only thus that one becomes a great poet. That is what he means.

[Comment on the Vṛtti.] The particulars of a plot: The plot (*iti-vṛtti*) is what is denoted in a work and its particulars are what have been listed above in 3.10: "the forming of a plot that will be beautiful because of its vibhāvas, (*sthāyi-*)bhāvas, anubhāvas, and sañcārins, etc." Which he takes as the chief meaning of his poem: Otherwise what would be the difference between the meaning of a poem on the one hand and the meanings of everyday speech and of scientific works on the other? The point has already been made in the First Chapter, where it was said that "just this meaning [viz., the suggested meaning] is the soul of poetry" (1.5 K).

1. Being a great poet is actually the result of composing words and meanings in a manner appropriate to the rasas. But the phrase used in the Kārikā speaks of the poet as a factor already given (*siddha*), viz., as the agent of such composition.
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'A To show that this composition of poetry with the ultimate purpose of [producing] rasas and the like was well known to Bharata and other [ancient authors], the following is said:

K The appropriate usage of words and meaning so as to conform to the rasas and the like is the basis for setting up the two sets of vṛttis.

A [This is so,] because usage (*vyavahāra*) may be called vṛtti (operation, employment). Of these [two sets], that which is based on

the appropriate use of expressed meanings (*vācya*) in conformity with the *rasas* is the set of *vṛttis* called *kaisikī*, etc.; that which is based on the appropriate use of expressors (*vācaka*, i.e. words) is the set called *upanāgarikā*, etc.¹ The *vṛttis*, when introduced for the ultimate purpose of [producing] *rasas* and the like, lend a special beauty to a play or poem, for the *rasas* and the like of both these [*vṛttis*] form the very life [of a play or poem]. Such elements as the plot are merely its body.

1. For *kaisikī*, etc., see above, 3.6g L, note 1; for *upanāgarikā*, etc., see 1.1a A, note 4. It is natural enough to regard *upanāgarikā*, etc., to be based on *vācaka*, as the members of this set are characterized by specified amounts and types of compounding and alliteration, both of which belong to the category of expressors rather than expressed. The characterizing of *kaisikī*, etc., as based on *vācya* is more artificial and would be hard to justify in detail. One can best explain it as due to a desire for symmetry.

L This [composition]: viz., such as we have described. By the expression and other in "Bharata and other [ancient authors]," he implies that *vṛttis* such as *paruṣā* are given in works on figures of speech (*alankārasaṅgraha*).² Of both these: He means, of both sets of usage which we call *vṛttis*. The very life: When Bharata says, "The *vṛttis* are the sources of poetry,"³ he is telling us that they must be based on plots that are appropriate to the *rasas* and this implies that the *rasas* are their very life.⁴ And Bhāmaha and others have said that those usages that we call the *sabda-vṛttis* (the *vṛttis* dependent on words) have their life in the use that they may be to the *rasas*. In Bhāmaha's words:

People will put to use the meaning of a sentence if it is mixed with the sweet rasa of poetry. Children who have first licked honey can be brought to drink the bitter medicine.⁵

Their body: Bharata says, "The plot is the body of the drama"
(*BhNS* 19.1). And the drama is just *rusa*, as we have said above.⁶

1. *Paruṣā*, *komalā*, etc., are varieties of alliteration defined by Udbhaṭa (Indurāja 1.4f. = Viśṛti 1.6f.). They are not mentioned by Bharata.
2. *BhNS*, KM ed., 20.62: evam etā budhair jñeyā vṛttayah kāryamātarah. But Abhinava seems to have used a manuscript which read kāryamātrikāḥ "sources of poetry," for he repeats the quotation in this form in his comment

on 3.47. He certainly did not follow the version that is found in the COS ed. of *BhNS* 20.72: *evam etā budhair jñeyā vṛttayo nātyasamśrayāḥ*. 3. Abhinava's trend of thought seems to be this. The four *nātyavṛttis* (*kaisiki*, etc.) are vitally connected with the *rasas* since they must be appropriate to the different *rasas*. So when Bharata says that these *vṛttis* are the sources (or mothers) of poetry, he means that the *rasas* suggested by these *vṛttis* are the source or essence of poetry. 4. *Bhāmaha* 5.3. All the editions of *Bhāmaha* read *sāstram* *ap्य upayurūjate* in place of *vākyārtham* *upabhūnjate*. 5. Viz., at 3.10-14f L, in quoting his teacher, *Bhāṭṭatāuta*.

A On this matter some people say:¹ "The relation between the *rasas*, etc., and the plot, etc., should be spoken of as a relation of [inalienable] quality and substance rather than of life and body;² for the expressed elements (*vācya*, i.e., plot, *vibhāvas*, etc.,) appear as wholly united with the *rasas*, etc., and not as something separate from them."

To this we reply. If the expressed elements are wholly united with a *rasa* or the like, as a given body is united wholly [i.e., over its whole surface] with a light complexion, then just as that light complexion invariably appears to everyone whenever that body appears, so would the *rasa* or the like appear together with the expressed elements to everyone, to persons of no literary taste (*asahṛdaya*) as well as to persons of literary taste. And that is not so, as has been stated in the First Chapter [1.7 K].

Or, it might be argued that the *rasa*-like nature of the expressed elements can be recognized,

as the genuineness of jewels is recognized
only by certain experts.³

This too would be wrong, for when a jewel is recognized as genuine, the genuineness is seen to be nothing other than the very nature of the jewel. By this analogy the *rasas*, etc., would be seen as nothing other than the expressed elements such as the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and the like. But this is not so, for no one supposes that the *rasas* are nothing more than the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, and *vyābhicārins*. Accordingly, as

the perception of the *rasas* is impossible without a perception of the *vibhāvas*, etc., the two are distributed into the positions of cause and effect; and that is why an interval must be posited between them. This interval, it has been said,

is not noticed because of its short duration;
and that is why the *rasas* when suggested
are of unperceived interval.*

1. Here begins an immense digression, 56 pages of text in length. What prompts it seems almost accidental. The *Kārikā* has spoken of the close relation between *rasas* and *vṛttis*. Thus leads Ānanda to consider the relation between *rasa* on the one hand and *vācya* and *vācaka* on the other; and this leads to a full-dress discussion of *vyāñjakaत्वा* (suggestiveness, suggestive power of operation) in all its varieties. Many points are brought up here that are nowhere mentioned in the *Kārikās* and that the *Vṛtti* failed to discuss at the beginning of Chapter Three or in Chapter One, in either of which places it would seem to have been more appropriately brought in. But one may overlook the fault of placement in view of the brilliance of the discussion. 2. By *guna* the objector means an essential or inalienable property. Life is not a *guna* in this sense; it is an activity that inheres in the body for a limited period of time. 3. These words form a half *sloka* and must be a quotation from some other author. 4. The printed texts misplace the opening quotation mark. The quotation begins with *lāghavān* no *prakāśate* and extends through *rasādayah*, thus forming the last three quarters of a *sloka*. The source of the *sloka* is not apparent. If the author is Ānanda himself, this would be the only instance in the book where he introduces a *sāriक्षेपस्त्रोका* that is incomplete. On the other hand, one hesitates to ascribe such an explanation of *rasadhvani* to some earlier author.

L Should be spoken of as a relation of quality and substance: Because the two appear so intimately connected, they should be spoken of as property (*dharma*) and property possessor (*dharmin*). Rather than: the idea is that there is no interval between them. In the First Chapter: it was stated in the passage which reads: "[*dhvani*] is not to be found by a mere knowledge of grammar and dictionaries" (1.7 K).

But the statement that the property of a substance always appears to everyone when the substance appears is not without exception. The special property of a ruby that we call its genuineness is not invariably apparent to everyone when the ruby is seen. In order to state this

objection he says, it might be argued, etc. He then refutes it with This too would be wrong, etc. In other words, in the syllogism "[a property always appears to everyone when the substance appears,] because it is a property" we must insert the proviso "so long as the property is of an obvious nature." And the genuineness of a gem, unlike its color, is not obvious, for its nature is well concealed. Now some persons have interpreted the refutation to imply that [in the author's opinion] the *rasas* are of an obvious nature. But our teacher has commented as follows. In denying the nature of quality and substance in the passage beginning "To this we reply," he is arguing as follows. If the *rasas* are properties (*dharmaḥ*) of the expressed elements, one of two alternatives must follow: they must be like [obvious properties] such as color, or they must be like [hidden properties] such as the genuineness of a ruby. The first is impossible because the *rasas* do not appear to everyone. The second is impossible because they do not appear as inseparable [from their substance] as does the genuineness of jewels. The reason here given [for rejecting the second alternative] can be applied with equal force against the first alternative. Our author states the second alternative and its refutation in the passage running from "One might argue" through the words "But this is not so."

He now substantiates what he has said: for no one [supposes], etc. Accordingly, etc.: as the *rasas*, etc., are not perceived as properties of the expressed elements and as the perception of the expressed meaning never fails to be helpful [to their perception], we must posit a succession, for of two simultaneous entities the one cannot aid [in the perception of the other]. But this succession is not perceived by sensitive persons, as has been remarked above (1.10 L), because of their lively imagination (*bhāvanā*) and their literary practice (*abhyāsa*), although otherwise it would be. As for him¹ who has already said that a *rasa* is itself a perception of a special kind, he too may speak of the perception of a *rasa* by treating the *rasa* as a *vyapadesin*,² as we have already said elsewhere.³

1. By "him" Abhinava means himself. 2. For an explanation of *vyapadesivadbhāva* (= *vyapadesivattva*) see 3.6 g L, note 5. The *rasas* in Abhinava's opinion do not qualify for the designation *pratiti-viṣaya*, as they are forms of *pratiti* itself. But one may speak loosely of *rasasya pratiti* as one speaks of *Rahōś śirah*. 3. See above, 2.4 L and note 39 thereon.

A An objection is raised that the word, as conditioned by context, etc., gives rise to our perception of both the expressed and the suggested meanings at the same time. So how can we hypothesize a succession of these meanings? Our reflection on its expressed meaning is not a prerequisite of a word's suggestiveness, for the rasas can be suggested by the words (or sounds) of songs or the like; and no reflection on the expressed meaning of these [words] is needed first.

To this we reply. We agree with the opinion that words as conditioned by context are suggestive. But this suggestiveness is sometimes the result of their phonetic form and sometimes of their expressive (denotative) power. In the case of those whose suggestiveness is bound to their denotative power, if the suggestion could arise without our perceiving what they denote and simply from our perceiving their phonetic form, their suggestiveness would no longer be bound to their denotative power. But if it is indeed bound to this [denotative power], it follows that our perception of the suggested meaning must necessarily be posterior to our perception of the denotative process. It makes no difference if the succession is too rapid to be noticed. If a rasa or the like could be perceived by means of the mere word as conditioned by context, without any perception of its expressed meaning, bearers who know the context 'but are themselves ignorant of the relation between the word and its expressed meaning would also have this perception of rasa from a mere hearing of a poem. Moreover, if the two meanings occurred simultaneously, the perception of the expressed meaning could not aid [in producing the suggested meaning]; whereas if it does aid, it cannot be simultaneous. Even in the case of those words (or sounds) of songs and the like whose suggestiveness is brought about by our perception of their phonetic form, there must be a succession in which perception of the form comes first and perception of the suggested [rasa] comes after. But this succession of activities of a word is not perceived in [the area] of the rasas and the like, which differ from any other meaning in that they do not contradict the expressed meanings. The succession is not perceived because the attachment (*ghatānā*) of the result [i.e., the attachment of a suggested meaning] to the word,

a result which can be brought about by no other means, occurs so swiftly.²

1. Of the printed texts only that of Krishnamoorty gives the correct reading: *avadhāritaprakaraṇānām*, which fits the context, in place of *anava-dhāritaprakaraṇānām*, which does not. His reading seems to be based on the variant readings reported by the *KM* ed. and on his Moodabidre palm-leaf. 2. Abhinava understands the passage which I have translated in this last sentence very differently, as follows. "The succession is not perceived because the various styles (*sanghaṭanā*, that is, the phonetic form of the words and the qualities resulting from word-compounding, etc.), each of which produces its unique effect, bring about their effect so swiftly [that we are not aware that our perception of the *rasa* is preceded by our perception of the style and of the literal meaning]." I have rejected this interpretation, preferring what seems to have been the interpretation of the *Candrikā*, for which Abhinava expresses heavy scorn at the end of his comment (see below). My reasons are that I can find no evidence of Ānanda's ever using *ghaṭanā* in the sense of *sanghaṭanā*, nor can I find any example where *bhāvin* in such a compound as *āśubhāvin* is used causatively. The interpretation of Abhinava leads to a very neat explanation of why the succession should be so swift, but I cannot believe that Ānanda had any such explanation in mind in writing this passage. It goes against the whole tenor of his remarks on style (*sanghaṭanā*) under 3.5-9.

L An objector may say: "We grant that *rasas* and the like are separate from the expressed meaning, but you yourself have said that no interval is perceived between the two. We would add that there is no valid reason for even hypothesizing such an interval. By induction from positive and negative examples we see that a perception of a *rasa* can arise without any perception of expressed meaning, as when it is brought about by the aid of mere sound in songs and the like where we have a meaningless succession of syllables (*svarālāpa*) without words. So the expressed meaning and the so-called suggested meaning or *rasa* appear at the same time through one and the same set of conditions (*sāmagrī*) and there is no use in assuming two operations, one of denotation and one of suggestion." Our author states this in the words, An objection is raised. Even where there is meaning to the words of a song, the understanding of that meaning is not necessary because we see that the *rasa* arises in accordance with the scale and mode, without regard to the suggested meaning. And although meaning may

be present, it is not seen by everyone. Our author states this, saying, and no [reflection], etc. Of these [words]: viz., words of the song, etc. By the word *ādi* ("etc.") he indicates the sounds of musical instruments, or of wailing, etc.

We agree: he has in mind that he has said, "Where word or sense," etc.¹ [Their suggestiveness] would no longer [be bound to their denotative power]: for in that case the *rasa* would appear from the words of a poem as it does in songs without any understanding of the meaning of the words. But as this is not the case, we must admit that the words have a denotative power also. And as this denotation takes as its object the expressed meaning,² we must admit that our perception of the expressed meaning occurs before [our perception of the *rasa*]. He says this in the words, But [if it is indeed bound], etc. This: viz. denotative power. Denotative process: i.e., denotative power. In other words, suppose even that the expressed meaning is not suggestive of the *rasas*, etc., and that our perception of them comes from the words (or sounds) themselves. Still, as the words necessarily rely on their denotative power as an aid in producing our perception of the *rasas*, it follows that the perception of the expressed meaning must come first.³

But it might be argued that the denotative power plays no part here any more than it does in the words of a song; and that if there is no perception of *rasa* after a poem has been heard, the reason is the lack of the necessary cooperating causes such as the understanding of the context. Our author guards against this argument by saying, If [a *rasa*], etc. For one may ask just what an understanding of the context means. Is the context a reference to the help given by [the phonetic form of] other sentences, or to the expressed meaning connected with [the phonetic form of] other sentences? Even if one should understand both, the *rasa* will not arise without one's understanding the literal sense of the central sentence. Themselves: what he has in mind are persons who might have had the mere context explained to them by someone else. And a man who would deny as a cause the perception of the expressed sense, a factor that can be shown to be a cause by positive and negative concomitance, and who would have recourse to the presence or absence of some unseen factor [to explain the occurrence or absence of *rasa*], is strengthening no argument except an argument in proof of his own perversity. This is the intention of the passage.

But the objector may admit that the denoted sense is useful [to the production of the suggested sense] and still ask what purpose is

served by adopting the theory of succession. A mere co-presence [of the suggested meaning], characterized by [that meaning's] being dependent on the same set of conditions [as the denoted meaning],⁴ can be the useful factor. Our author guards against this by saying, if [the two meanings occurred] simultaneously, etc. He means that to call such an entity a helper when it could give no help would be merely the inventing of a name without any substance. Even the objector has admitted the priority of the useful factor. Our author states this by saying, Even in the case of those words, etc. Our author's intention is by this very example to prove the priority of our perception of the expressed meaning [to our perception of the suggestion].

Now, if there is an interval [between the two perceptions] why is it not noticed? He addresses this question with the sentence. But this, etc. He states the nature of the interval to be a "succession of activities": succession of activities. The two activities (*kriye*) are the perceptions of the expressed and the suggested meanings, or, if you will, of the denotative operation and of the suggesting or hinting operation. The temporal succession of these activities is not apprehended. The phrase in the *rasas* and the like refers to the area where [this lack of apprehension is found]. Of what sort are these *rasas*, etc.? By saying that they are different from other, expressed, meanings, that is, from any other meaning that is expressed, as they are altogether inexpressible, he implies that there must be an interval. And yet they do not contradict the expressed meaning, for if they contradicted it, the interval would be noticed. He states the reason why this [interval] is not noticed in the form of a locative of cause, "... āśubhāvinī," which itself contains a further cause in "ananyasādhyatatphalaghāṭanā-su."⁵ Here *ghāṭanāḥ*⁶ refers to what were called *mādhurya* (sweetness), etc., in the section where the *gunas* (qualities) were described. They are *tatphalāḥ*, that is, they have perception of the *rasas* as their result and they are *anyāsādhyāḥ*; that is to say, whatever is accomplished by each such *ghāṭanā* is "not other," is *sui generis*, for one will not get a perception of the tragic (*karuṇa*), for example, from a *ghāṭanā* of strength (*ojas*).

In other words, the interval is not noticed because, in a poem that possesses the *gunas*, style (*saṅghāṭanā*) is used without any confusion of object [i.e., each style is used to produce a specific *rasa*]. But granted that there is a precise distribution of styles, we may still ask why the interval is not noticed. Hence he says, "because [the *saṅghāṭanās*] bring about [their effects] so swiftly." The sense is that without

waiting for our understanding of the expressed meaning, they immediately set about building up the rasas, giving us a foretaste (*āsvāda*) of them. This is as much as to say that as the rasas are suggested by style (*sarighatānā*), the ground is laid for the relishing of a rasa at the very beginning of the appropriate style before our understanding of the meaning has come into play; and that it is on this account that the rasa, even at the later moment, after we have understood the expressed meaning and when the rasa has assumed its full flavor, does not appear to have arisen later [than our understanding]. For wherever we have experienced a conclusion many times, the passage from understanding of the invariable rule to that conclusion goes unnoticed. Practice works such wonders that we can arrive at a conclusion by force of habit, without really paying attention, simply by being able to infer it. Thus, when we have by heart the universal law that where there is smoke there is fire, the only thing that is necessary [for the inference of fire] is the knowledge that the minor term has smoke; and this knowledge takes the place of the full "consideration" (*parāmarśa*).¹ As soon as the knowledge of smoke has arisen and has been aided by our memory of the universal law, without any attention to contrary instances or any perception of agreement, we pass without noticing any interval to the knowledge of fire. So it is in this case too. But if the rasa were contradictory to the expressed meaning, or if the style (*ghatānā*) were inappropriate [to that rasa], the interval would be noticed.

The author of the *Candrikā*, who simply repeats what the text says and who could easily fail to see an elephant in front of his eyes, comments as follows. "Since the *ghatānā*, that is, the formation, of the result of the word (or, of this result), namely the literal and suggested meanings, is produced by nothing else, that is, by no other power of the word." We fail to see the slightest conception of the true meaning in this explanation. But let me not argue at length with an elder member of my family.

1. The reference is to 1.13 K. Abhinava does not here distinguish the Kārikākāra from the Vṛttikāra. The point in his quoting this particular Kārikā seems to be that it takes for granted a knowledge of the context (*pīrakarāñḍījñāna*), since both *sabdo* and *vācyārtha* suggest the *pratiyamāñārtha* with the help of the context and other factors; see 1.13 d A and note 2. 2. BP glosses *vācyanīghā* by *vācyavisayikā*, "and as this power takes as its object the expressed meaning." For *nīgtha* used in this sense see below, 4.2 a L and note 1;

also Vakrokti 1, vs. 125, Vṛtti, lines 1-2: *ity avinayānupthānāni stham... abhi-*
dhiyamānam anau cityam āvahati. 3. The view that *rasa* can arise from the
 mere sound of words in a poem is here put forward only as an *abhyupagama*,
 a tentative concession for the sake of argument, and will be followed by Abhi-
 nava's approved doctrine that "there is no origin of *rasa* without knowledge of
 the meaning of the sentence involved." In other sections of the book, however,
 Abhinava comes close to holding the tentative view. Under 1.18 (p. 193), he
 speaks of alliteration, even without aid from the expression of meaning, as
 being suggestive of *rasa*. He says much the same in his comment on 3.3. We
 may perhaps bring the various expressions of his views on the matter into
 harmony by the following statement. In certain cases of the alliteration of
 gentle or harsh phonemes the mere hearing of the alliteration, even without
 accompanying knowledge of the expressed sense, prepares the proper atmo-
 sphere for the apprehension of a particular *rasa*. The clear apprehension of
 the *rasa*, however, comes only after the perception of the expressed sense. In
 other words, alliteration only cooperates with the knowledge of the expressed
 sense in bringing about *rasāvāda* and is not its principal cause. Compare the
 phrases *āstūrito rasāvuddhā* and *parisphuṭasvādayuktvo 'pi* toward the end of
 the present section (Kashi text, p. 409, lines 2-3). 4. The same set of
 conditions would be the particular word and its context, from which both
 the expressed and the suggested meanings arise. 5. *Ananyasddhyata* *phala-*
ghāṭanāsv āsubhāvinīṣu is interpreted as a locative of cause; cf. Pān. 2.3.36,
 Vārt. 6. It means, [they are not noticed] because their *ghāṭanās* are swift act-
 ing. Then the substantive portion of the locative construction itself contains
 a cause of that cause. The *ghāṭanās* are swift acting because each is capable
 of producing a unique result. 6. In what follows Abhinava takes *ghāṭanā* in
 an extended sense of *sāṅghāṭanā* (style). By it he understands not only style
 of alliteration and compounding, but the qualities (*guṇas*) such as sweetness,
 force, etc. He supposes that this "style" gives us our first hint of the *rasa* to
 be suggested, a hint that is later rendered specific by our perception of the
 expressed meaning. 7. For the later doctrine of inference, see Ingalls, Mate-
 rials, pp. 32-33. The instrumental cause of the inference "this mountain has
 fire" is a knowledge of the universal law "where there is smoke there is fire."
 The operation (*vyāpāra*) of this instrument takes the form of a consideration
 (*pārmarśa*) in the form "this mountain possesses smoke which is *vyāpya* by
 (i.e., included within the extension of) fire." Now where we have often made
 the inference, Abhinava tells us, we can dispense with a certain amount of this
 process. Instead of the full consideration "*parvato 'yam vahnivyāpyadhūma-*
vān," all we need is the knowledge "this mountain has smoke" (*pārrato 'yam*
dhūma-vān). The fact that the smoke is *vahnivyāpya* is supplied by memory
 and needs no attention to contrary instances (*vijātiyopranidhāna*, e.g., to the
 absence of smoke in a locus of non-fire such as a lake) nor any perception of
 cases in agreement (*anusarāṇapratiti*, e.g., "there is smoke in other loci of fire

such as a kitchen hearth"). We jump immediately from "there is smoke on this mountain" to "there is fire on this mountain."

A In some instances the interval is perceived, as in our apprehension of the type of suggested meaning that is similar to a reverberation. If in these cases too the question is asked why, we would give this explanation. First let us consider the type of suggested meaning similar to a reverberation in its subtype based on the power of meaning. Here we have two apprehensions, one of the expressed meaning and the other of the meaning implied by it. Since the latter is different in kind from any expressed meaning,¹ these two perceptions are utterly disparate. Hence their relation to one another as cause and effect cannot remain hidden and their succession in time is obvious, just as it is in the Prakrit verses quoted in the First Chapter to illustrate an "understood" [i.e. suggested] sense.² In such instances, because of the utter disparity of the expressed and suggested meanings our apprehension of the one cannot be confused with our apprehension of the other.

Next let us look at the type of suggested meaning similar to a reverberation in its subtype based on the power of words, as in

May these rays [or, may these cows] of the blazing sun engender
in your purified selves unending bliss.

[Mayūra, Sūryasatata 9]³

In verses such as this, where we have the verbal apprehension (*sābdi pratītiḥ*)⁴ of two senses ("rays" and "cows," etc.), the apprehension of a relation of simile and base between these two senses, since there is no word [such as "like"] directly expressive of the simile, is something implied by the capability of the situation. Here too the temporal succession of the apprehension of the suggested figure of speech to the apprehension of the expressed meanings is easily noticed.

Now to look at suggestion where the suggested meaning similar to a reverberation is of the type based on the power of words and where a single word [rather than a whole sentence] acts as the suggestor. Here there is the attachment [to two nouns] of an adjective [e.g., *jada*] that is capable of two senses ["helpless, wretched," when modifying *asmi* and

"insentient, cool," when modifying *kūpa*] without any joining word [e.g. "like," "and," "although"]. Although the attachment is non-verbal [as it is not denoted by a joining word], it is established by meaning.³ Just as in our previous example, the succession is here clearly marked. Here it is between the apprehension of the denoted meaning ["wretched," as applied to the speaker] and the figure of speech [si īle], but only that, which is thereby implied.⁴ Although the apprehension [of the figure of speech] derives from meaning, it can be considered as based on the power of a word because it is initiated (*prasāvita*) by the capability of a word [viz., *jada*] that can be attached to two meanings.

In suggestion of the type where the expressed meaning is unintended, the revelation of another meaning is preceded by an apprehension that the words take no notice of their proper objects. A succession is therefore necessary. We gave no attention to the temporal succession of suggested to expressed meaning in this type for the very reason that the expressed meaning is [always] unintended here. Thus there is necessarily a succession from the expressed to the suggested meaning [of whatever type] just as there is a succession from the word that denotes to the meaning that is denoted, because in either case the latter is related to the former as effect to cause. But the succession is sometimes noticed and sometimes not for the reasons above stated.

1. In 3.33 b Ānanda used the phrase *abhidheyāntaravilaksana* ("different in nature from any directly expressed meaning") to describe *rasa*. He uses it here to describe the suggestions of *ālankārudhvani* and *vastudhvani*. Jacobi, interpreting the phrase to mean "that which cannot be expressed by any other words," felt that the phrase was properly used only in the first instance. In the present instance he recommended emending it to *abhidheyavilakṣanatayā*. But the phrase does not have so restricted a meaning.
2. The *dhvani* of these Prakrit verses is *anurājanarūpavyāṅgya*, but it is not *vivakṣitānyaparavācyā*.
3. The *dhvani* in this (and the next) example is both *anurājanarūpavyāṅgya* and *vivakṣitānyaparavācyā*. See the discussion of the whole verse under 2.21 e A.
4. Verbal apprehension (*sābdī pratītiḥ*): what is meant is an understanding derived from a verbal expression, as opposed to *ārthī pratītiḥ*, an understanding which derives from an implication or suggestion.
5. The description will become clearer by reference to the verse *prātum dhanair* ("If fate will have it," etc.) quoted under 3.1 d A. See also our note on that verse.
6. I have taken the simplest interpretation of the compound *abhidheyatatsāmarthyā-*. Abhinava gives a different interpretation; see below. The word *mātra* ("but only that") is intended to rule out the *rasa*, which is also suggested by the denoted meaning but which is not perceived to be posterior.

L Where style (*sarighaśanā*) plays no part in suggestion, the interval is perceived.¹ He states this in the words, In some instances. He then raises the question why there should be this difference when there is a suggested sense in all cases: If asked why, etc.

Obvious: what lies back of this is the previous verse:

Either a word or a sentence may serve as the suggestor in the type of *dhvani* where the literal sense is not intended and, of the other type, in that subtype where the suggested sense resembles a reverberation [3.1 K]:

for in this verse alliterative style and the like were not mentioned as suggestive factors. Prakrit verses: such as "Go your round freely, gentle monk" [1.4 b A], on which we have commented above.

[Where we have the] verbal apprehension: the meaning is, although it is verbal.² Expressive of the simile: such as *yathā*, *iva*, etc. By the capability of the situation: as much as to say, by the capability of the sentence meaning.

Having thus discussed [sequential suggestion] based on the power of words where the suggestion is revealed by a sentence, he goes on to discuss the type that is revealed by a single word: where a single word acts as the suggestor.

An adjective: e.g., *jada*. Attachment: e.g., the bringing it in grammatical agreement with the well and with the speaker.³

The compound *abhidheyatatsāmarthyākṣiptālankāramātrapratiśiṣṭā*⁴ is to be analysed as: the two apprehensions of just the two figures of speech, namely that which is expressed and that which is implied by the capability of that.⁴ The succession between these apprehensions is clearly marked, that is, easily noticed. By saying "just," that is, only, these two figures of speech, he indicates that in our apprehension of the *rasa* the temporal succession is not noticed.

But now it appears to be contradictory that we should have here a figure that both derives from meaning and that is based on the power of a word. Being aware of this, he says, Although the apprehension derives from meaning, etc. The truth of the matter is that there is no contradiction. As we have already discussed the matter at length,⁵ we will not repeat ourselves here.

Of their proper objects: The proper object of the word "blind" (*andha*) is a person whose sight has been destroyed.⁶ The being turned

away (*vaimukhya*) from that object means the taking no notice of that object. We gave no special attention: sc. by describing [that aspect of the type] in the name that we assigned,⁷ because it could not even be suspected that the two apprehensions were simultaneous in this type.

The *rasas* and the like are the life of those *vr̥ittis* named *kaisiki*, etc., which form the plot element, and of those named *upanāgarikā*, etc., [which form varieties of style,] because the use of any one of the *vr̥ittis* of either set is limited to a particular area by these *rasas* and the like. This is the subject matter [of the *Kārikā*] and in connection with it, in order to prove that the *rasas* and the like are something over and above the expressed meaning, our author has furnished the above discussion of succession. He now sums up the discussion by saying, Thus, etc. We have first an apprehension of that which denotes, i.e., of a word, and only after that an apprehension of that which is denoted. As the master [Bhartṛhari] has said: "Words furnish no meaning until they are objects of our apprehension" (*Vāk.* 1.56); and again, "That is why, when we have not understood the form [of the words], we ask 'What did he say?'" (*Vāk.* 1.57). Here too, just as with [inferences based on] universal concomitance, if we have made repeated use of the convention [that attaches a given meaning to a given word], we may not notice the succession.

1. As Abhinava has just (3.33 b L) included under style (*sārighāṭanā*) the qualities *mādhurya*, *ojas*, etc., which are forerunners in all cases of *rasa*, this statement amounts to saying that where the suggestion is other than *rasa*, the interval is perceived.
2. Abhinava's gloss serves to contrast the *sābdī pratiṣṭhī* of the two senses of the word with the *dr̥thī pratiṣṭhī* of the *alaṅkāra*.
3. *aham*: Abhinava takes the *asmi* of the verse as an indeclinable particle synonymous with *aham*. It is listed as such in the *cādigana* of Pāṇ. 1.4.57.
4. In Abhinava's gloss *abhidheyam* and *ākṣiptam* are neuter because they modify the neuter word *mātram*. BP explains that the expressed figure of speech is *zeugma* (*dipaka*) because the adjective *jada* is applied to two substantives; and that the suggested figure of speech implied by the *zeugma* is simile. This is doubtless a correct explanation of Abhinava. But it seems doubtful that Abhinava's is a correct explanation of Ānanda. It is hard to see how Ānanda could have regarded *dipaka* here as a directly denoted figure of speech when he has said (3.1 d 4) that the application of *jada* to *kūpa* is suggested.
5. See 2.21 e L.
6. The example is taken from the verse quoted under 2.1c.
7. What Abhinava means is that this type has been

called *avivakṣitavācya*, not *samīkṣyakramavyāṅgya*, because the reference to temporal succession was not thought to be necessary in its nomenclature.

A After we have described the varieties of suggestion (*dhvani*) in this manner by means of the concept of suggestive power (*vyanjaka*), an objector may take issue with us. "What is this suggestive power?" he may say. "[We put the question] because suggestive power is merely the revealing of a suggested meaning.¹ If the being suggested (*vyanigyatva*) of a meaning is dependent on suggestive power and if the proof of suggestive power depends on having a suggested meaning, the two concepts rest on each other. By such circular definitions nothing is really defined."

But we have already shown that the suggested meaning is something distinct from the expressed meaning; and then, as dependent upon that we established suggestive power. What is there to object to in this?

But [the objector may continue:] "This much is true, that you have proved by your arguments the existence of something which is distinct from a given expressed meaning. But why should that something be called a suggested meaning? In fact, where it appears as the predominant meaning [of the sentence] it would be reasonable to call it the expressed meaning because the sentence depends on it. That is why the operation of the sentence which reveals it must be denotative. What is the point of hypothesizing another power? Let us therefore say that the meaning which forms the object of the whole sentence is the primary expressed or denoted meaning. If we apprehend any other expressed meaning in the course of arriving at that object, its apprehension will be merely a means to the apprehension [of the sentence meaning], just as the apprehension of word-meaning serves as a means to the apprehension of sentence-meaning."

1. I follow the text as corrected by Krishnamoorty on the basis of his MB manuscript: *kim idam vyanjakatvam nāma / vyanigyārtha prakāśanam hi vyanjakatvam / tad vyanigyatvam cārthasya vyanjaka siddhyadīnam vyanigyā-
peksayā ca*

L At the beginning of Chapter Three it was stated that the nature of suggestion (*dhvani*) would be explained through [an analysis of] those factors which possess suggestive power. In summing up that subject now, despite the fact that the existence of suggestive power was already proved in Chapter One, he states an objection to its existence in order to fix its nature in the minds of his students by dealing with the subject all in one place. He begins with, After we have described, etc. An objector: viz., a *Mimāṃsaka*. What is this, etc.: the opinion about to be stated is that of the objector.

Already: that is, in Chapter One, in the passage where the non-existence of *dhvani* was refuted. So it is not the case that the suggested meaning is proved to exist by proof of the suggestors, a process that would be open to the charge of circular definition; because it was proved by other reasons. This is what is meant. He puts it in the words, [then,] as dependent on that, etc.

But why should that something, etc.: We grant that there is a second meaning, [says the objector,] but if you give it the name of "suggested," why could you not just as well give it the name of "expressed" (or "denoted")? Or why not give the name of "suggested" to what you consider to be the denoted? For a word's denotative power [lit., its property of being a denotator] is nothing more than a word's having a meaning in so far as that meaning is understood. Denotative power should extend just as far as denotation extends. And since that chief meaning [of the sentence], which you have therefore described as the appointed king of suggestion,¹ stands at the limit of this extent, it is proper that the power of denotation should extend to it. Our author states this in the sentence, [In fact,] where [it appears as the predominant meaning], etc.

[Of the sentence] which reveals it: of that sentence which necessarily reveals this meaning which you consider to be the suggested meaning. Merely a means: by this one expression he refers to the school of Kumārila, the school of Prabhākara, and the school of the Grammarians. For according to Kumārila,

In the working of these [varṇas, phonemes] toward our understanding of the sentence meaning, it is a prerequisite that they convey a knowledge of the word meanings, just as the burning of fuel is a prerequisite for cooking. [*Ślokavṛttika*, *Vākyādhibhāraṇa*, vs. 343]

Thus [in his opinion] the meaning that is established as the final limit (*tātparyena*) by the word-meanings that we understand from the individual sounds is the sentence meaning and this is precisely what is denoted. In the view of the followers of Prabhākara, the [denotative] operation is a long one, extending all the way to the sentence meaning, which is the "caused element" (*nimittin*, i.e., the result). In their opinion the individual word-meanings, which are the causal element, have a metaphysical reality, whereas in the opinion of the Grammarians they have not; that is the only difference between them [in this matter]. But we have explained this at length in Chapter One [1.4 b L] and shall not take the trouble to do so again. We confine our remarks here to showing what the text is referring to. It is to these three opinions that the words of the objector refer.

1. The reference is to *rasa* as "the soul of *dhvani*."
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A To this we reply as follows. Where a word in denoting its own meaning gives us to understand some further meaning, is there a difference between its nature as denoter of its own meaning and its nature as cause of the understanding of the other meaning, or is there not? It cannot be that there is no difference, for the two operations are perceived to have different objects and to be of a different nature. Thus, the operation in which a word is denotative has for its object the word's own meaning. The operation that is suggestive (*gamaka*) has for its object some other meaning. And the designation of the denoted and the suggested meanings as its own and as other cannot be rejected, because the former is apprehended as something connected with the word, while the latter is apprehended as something connected with that which is connected with the word. The denoted meaning is something directly connected with the word. The other meaning, being implied by the capability of the denoted meaning, is something connected with that with which the word is connected. If it were something directly connected with the word, we could not refer to it as something different. So between these two operations the difference in the object operated upon is perfectly clear.

The difference in the nature of the operation is equally clear. For the power of denoting is not the same thing as the power of suggesting, because we see that the sounds of a song or the like, although they are not denotative, may suggest such things as the *rasas*. The same point can be made from the fact that gestures and the like, which are not even sounds, are known to reveal particular meanings. Thus, a great poet in writing "Her face was bowed in shyness," etc.,¹ has shown how a particular gesture can reveal a meaning.

Accordingly, both because of their difference of object and because of their difference of nature, a word's power to denote its own meaning and its power to cause us to understand some other meaning are different. Now if there is a difference, then that other meaning, which we are led to understand by the inherent capability of the denoted meaning, cannot itself be called a denoted meaning. That it is the object of some activity of a word, however, we are quite willing to admit; but it is so as being suggested by the word, not as being denoted. And since we apprehend a second meaning [e.g., the purity of the village in the phrase "a village on the Ganges"] by the fitness of that meaning to the relation [viz., denotedness] of a well known denoter [e.g., the word "Ganges"], when that second meaning can be made the object of our apprehension by a different word [i.e., "purity"] denoting its proper object, it is right that we speak here of suggestion (*prakāśanā*) [rather than denotation].²

1. The reference is to the verse quoted under 3.4 b A. 2. The syntax of this sentence has thrown all the translations which I have seen of it very wide of the mark. The correlatives are *tasya arthañtarasya* and *yadvिषयिकारानम्*. In suggestion we apprehend that meaning which could be given directly by the use of denotative word A, indirectly by the meaning's appropriateness to the denotation of word B. Purity, which could be denoted by the word "purity," can also be apprehended by the word "Ganges," because purity is appropriate to the Ganges. There is no need to emend the text.

L To this: sc., to the objection. We reply: that is, we furnish the correct view (*siddhānta*). Denotative power and suggestive power differ in nature and they differ in their objects, which are the word's own meaning and a different meaning respectively. Here an opponent may argue as follows. "If the second meaning is understood from the first, how can it be termed a 'different' meaning? If it is not [understood from the first], how can it bear any relation to the word by which it

could be called an object of the word?" Our author guards against this objection by saying, And the designation, etc.

We could not refer to it: In the phrase *vyavahāra eva na syāt* the word order is irregular; what is meant is *vyavahāra naiva syāt* ("we could not possibly refer to it").

Here it might be objected that the denotative operation of a single word, if the word has several meanings like the word *akṣan* (the eye, a die, etc.), may work on different objects. To guard against such an objection he points out that the denotative and the suggestive differ in nature: The difference in the nature, etc. He shows that the matter is well known: For [the power of denoting] is not, etc. He furnishes a reason to convince any one who might still disagree: although they are not denotative, etc. If the power of denotation were the same as the power of suggestion, the power of suggestion could not belong to that which is not denotative, nor would it be possible for that which is suggestive to lack the power of denotation. But neither of these implications is true, for we see in the sounds of a song that a factor which cannot denote can produce a suggestion, while in the lowering of the head, the heaving of the breast, and the onset of tears, it is obvious that suggestive factors may be incapable of denotation. This is the overall meaning, which he then sums up by saying, Accordingly, both because of their difference of object, etc.

Then [that other meaning] cannot [be called a denoted meaning]: because to be a denoted meaning is to be the object of the denotative activity of a word and not to be the object of an activity, taken indiscriminately, of a word. As for its being the latter [i.e., the fact that the "other meaning" is the object of some sort of activity of a word], that merely proves what is already proved.¹ Our author states this in the words, [That it is the object of some] activity of a word, etc.

Now the objector may say, "We will admit that there is no denotative force in songs and such like, but we insist that the word [of which we are here speaking] is denotative of this other meaning. For why should its denotativeness be cut short?" To guard against this objection our author says, And since we apprehend, etc. Where a given word takes for its object a meaning that belongs to another word, it is proper to speak of suggestion and not of the denotative power of the word. In the same case it is not proper to speak of the meaning as being denoted. This is because the power of denotation is the power of giving a meaning by convention, without any intervention, as we see in the case of that word in giving its own meaning. Our author says

this in speaking of a word's denoting its proper object. Because to be denoted [of a meaning] is to be given by force of convention without any intervention [of another meaning], just as the same meaning [that is here suggested] is given by some other word [viz. its proper denoter]. He says this in the sentence, And since we apprehend, etc. The compound *prasiddhābbhidhāñtarasambandhayogyatvena* is to be analysed thus: "(characterized) by a fitness consisting in, or a fitness for, the relation of being the denoted object of another word [e.g., "Ganges"], which is well known (inasmuch as it is denotative)." Now there is no such denotative power of the word here [e.g., in "Ganges"] toward the [suggested] meaning [e.g., purity]; and there is no denotativeness of this meaning by the word ["Ganges"]. If there is not, then how can the word be said to take this meaning for its object? He anticipates the answer by saying, "since we apprehend" it. Now if the meaning is apprehended without any denoter-denoted operation, the word's operation (or power) must be of a different character (from that of denotation). This is what the argument amounts to.

1. *Siddhasādhana*, the proving of what is proved, is a fault of inference noticed by the Naiyāyikas. One does not infer the presence of an elephant by its trumpeting after one already sees the elephant.

A And it is not true that the relation of expressed to suggested meaning follows the analogy of the relation of word meaning to sentence meaning.¹ For it is held by some scholars that our apprehension of word meanings is a pure fiction; and even those who do not admit the artificiality of this apprehension must take the relation of sentence meaning to word meaning on the analogy of the relation of a pot to its component causes [viz., the portions of the pot].² For just as when the pot is completed there is no perception of its component causes separate from itself, just so when a sentence or its meaning is apprehended [there is no apprehension] of the words or their meanings [as separate therefrom]. If there were a perception of them as separate, our understanding of the sentence meaning would disappear. This pattern

does not hold for the expressed meaning and the suggested meaning, for when the suggested meaning is apprehended our knowledge of the expressed meaning does not disappear, because that [suggested meaning] can be revealed only by the appearance of the expressed meaning.³ Accordingly, the analogy that applies here is that of a lamp and a pot. For just as when a pot is cognized by means of a lamp the light of the lamp does not disappear, just so the appearance of the expressed when the suggested is apprehended. As for the statement in Chapter One that "[the understanding of the suggested sense is preceded by understanding of the denoted sense] just as [the understanding of the sentence meaning comes] through the meaning of the words" [1.10 K], it was intended to show no more than that expressed meaning and word meaning are similar in both serving as means, [the first first to the suggested meaning and the second to the sentence meaning].

1. Ānanda here qualifies the statement of Kārikā 1.10. 2. "Some scholars" here refers to the grammarians who follow Bhartr̥hari. Bhartr̥hari held that words are essentially fictions invented by grammarians in order to analyse the meaning of sentences, the sentences being the only units that actually transmit information. For a discussion of this view see J. Brough, "Some Indian Theories of Meaning," TPS 1953, p. 165ff. "Those who do not admit the unreality of this apprehension" will refer to other grammarians and to the Mīmāṃsakas. The relation of a pot to its component causes is a concept derived from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The separate halves or portions (*kapālau*) of an Indian pot (*ghoṭa*) were molded with a stick on a revolving wheel and were later joined together to make the pot. In analysing the causes of a pot the Naiyāyikas say that the instrumental cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) is the stick, the component or inherent cause (*upādāna-* or *samavāyi-kāraṇa*) is the portions of the pot. The Nyāya always speaks of two portions (*kapālau*), but Abhinava here speaks of several portions (*kapālāḥ*) presumably in order to furnish a better analogy to the words of a sentence. The non-inherent cause (*asamavāyi-kāraṇa*) is the conjunction of the pot-portions. The potter is not a cause but the causer or agent (*kārtṛ*). 3. It is obvious that the expressed meaning (e.g. a description of a *vibhāva*) does not disappear when a *rasa* is suggested. It may take more thought to realize that the expressed meaning does not disappear in other forms of suggestion. But even in *avivakṣitavācya* of the *atyanlātirasikṛta* type a little thought will show that we must remain aware of the meaning that has been set aside even while we apprehend the suggestion. In the verse "Go your rounds freely, gentle monk," the speaker does not intend the expressed sense. But if we, the audience, did not keep it in mind, we should not be amused by the verse. Badarīnāth Śarma makes a useful remark on this passage. The *vācya*, he says, is not a component cause of

the *vyanigyo* as the pot-halves are of the pot, but an instrumental cause. The stick does not lose its identity in the completed pot; it is only the pot-halves that lose their identity in it. This is the reason why Ānanda shifts from the pot-halves and pot analogy to the lamp and pot analogy.

L An objector might say, "Very well, we will grant that the denotative power is not [the conveyor of what you call the suggested meaning]; still, the final power of the sentence (*tātparyasakti*) might well be." Anticipating such an objection, our author says, And it is not true that, etc. By some scholars: viz., grammarians. Even those who do not admit: viz., Bhaṭṭa Kumārila and his followers.¹ He then explains the analogy: For just as, etc. Its component causes: by this expression he is referring to the portions of the pot which are its inherent causes [according to the Nyāya]. In the opinion of the Buddhists and the Sāṅkhyas, of course, there is no existence of the components at the time when the pot is composed of them—in the Buddhist doctrine because the components [like all other entities] last only for a moment; in the Sāṅkhya doctrine because they cease to be manifested [as soon as their effect-form appears—but in either opinion there is no perception of them at that time as separate from the pot; and so the example serves to this extent. Would disappear: he means, because it would have no unity of meaning.²

Having thus rejected the analogy of word meaning and sentence meaning that was [intended] to establish the power of overall sentence meaning (*tātparyasakti*) in the area under discussion [viz., in the area of suggested meanings], he now applies to this area the analogy of the lamp and the pot in order to establish the power of which he approves, namely the power of revelation (or suggestion): Accordingly, etc. Since the analogy of word meaning and sentence meaning is not proper, he accordingly applies the pertinent analogy, after analysing it, to the situation which it will illustrate: For just as when a pot, etc.

But it was said above [1.10 K] that "the understanding of this matter [viz., the suggested sense] is preceded by understanding of the denoted sense just as the understanding of the sentence meaning comes through the meaning of the component words." One may ask why our author has gone to such pains here to reject this analogy. Seeing that such a question is likely, he says, As for the statement in Chapter One, etc. It [was intended to show], etc: he means that the two matters are not analogous in all respects.

1. Compare Abhinava's remarks on 1.4 b and 3.33 d. 2. It is a common postulate of grammar, Mīmāṃsā, and Nyāya that a sentence has only one meaning. Although the three schools differ in the way they analyse sentence meaning, they would all agree that if meanings are apprehended as separate, they cannot form one sentence.

A But at this rate, it will be said, we have arrived at giving two meanings at one time to a sentence; and that being the case, its nature as a sentence is destroyed, for this is defined as the having of only one meaning.¹

We reply that there is no such fault here, because the two [meanings] are distributed as principal and subordinate.² Sometimes the suggested sense is predominant and the expressed sense subordinate. Sometimes the expressed sense is predominant and the suggested sense subordinate. Of these [alternatives], where the suggested sense is predominant we have what is called suggestive poetry (*dhvani*). Where the expressed sense is predominant we have a different type [of poetry] that will be described in what follows. Accordingly, it stands established that even when the suggested sense is predominant in a poem, this suggested sense [although it is the main sentence meaning] is not denoted but suggested.³

However, where the suggested sense is not intended to be predominant, even you [Mīmāṃsakas] should admit that it is not expressed, for the word [that reveals it] is not directed toward that [final sentence meaning]. To this extent then the suggested forms a certain area of a word's operation. So even when the suggested sense is predominant, why should it then forswear its nature? Thus, [by the arguments given] so far, [it would appear that] the denotative operation is different from the suggestive operation. But there is this other reason why the suggestive differs from the denotative, namely, that the denotative is based solely on words whereas the other is based on both words and meaning; because we have already shown that both words and meanings act as suggestors.

1. See above, 3.33f L, note 2. 2. That is to say, a sentence that contains a suggestion is a complex semantic unit. 3. Here at last we have the conclusive answer to the objection, raised in 3.33d, that where a suggested meaning appears as the predominant meaning of a sentence it should be called the expressed meaning "because the sentence depends on it."

L [Mīmāṃsaka objection:] At this rate: he means, by [following] the pattern of the lamp and the pot, both of which appear [separately] at the same time. This: viz., the nature of a sentence. A sentence is defined as having only one meaning, because it is stated [in *MīmāṃsāS.* 2.1.46] that a sentence is [known to be] one from its having just one meaning. For when a word is heard once, it rouses our memory of its conventional attachment to a given meaning and that meaning is what is understood by the word. Since there is no activity [of the denotative power] after it has ceased and since there cannot be a simultaneous recall of several conventions, what chance is there for two different meanings? On the other hand, if [the word is] repeated or later remembered, it is not the same word.¹ Such is the [objector's] meaning.

[Ānanda's reply:] The two: sc. the two meanings. Of these: the sense is, if we take the first of these alternatives. A different type: sc. that which is termed *guṇibhūtavyāyāga* ("in which the suggestion is subordinated"). Suggested: i.e., revealed (*prakāśya*).

Now since that toward which a word is directed (*yatparah sabbah*) is the word's meaning, it might follow that when the suggested meaning is predominant it [will be the meaning toward which the word is directed and so] should be called the expressed meaning. But what about the case where that meaning is not predominant? If you designate the meaning as suggested in that case, we have won our argument. He states this in the sentence, Moreover, etc. But the objector may hold out against calling the meaning suggested when it is predominant. So our author says, So even when, etc. What he means is that the necessary conditions for being a suggested meaning are these: the meaning must be different from [the expressed meaning]; it must be connected with that [viz., the direct meaning] with which the word is connected; and it must not have been arrived at by using the convention [e.g. by using the dictionary]. As these conditions are found where the suggested meaning is predominant just as well [as where it is not], there is no reason to suppose that it changes its nature [from the one case

to the other]. He sums the matter up by saying, Thus, sc., because it differs in its objects and in its nature.

So far (*tāvat*): this expression lays the ground for a further argument.² He proceeds to give it in the words, But there is this other reason, etc. By these words he shows that as there is a difference in the complex of conditions [necessary to produce these two types of meaning], there must be a difference in their causes. But we have shown this matter at length in Chapter One, on the definition of *dhvani*, when explaining the use of the word *vā* and of the dual form *vyaktah* in the passage "whenever a meaning or a word," etc. (1.13 L). So we do not enter into details here.

1. Thus the Mīmāṃsaka would analyse what we should call a sentence containing a pun as two sentences, in the first of which the ambivalent word or phrase gives the meaning that best suits the context and in the second of which the word or phrase is repeated (or, as we should say, "supplied") or remembered; but this second occurrence is not really the same word or phrase, so it can give a different meaning. 2. Abhinava has explained the force of *tāvat* in much the same way before; see 3.20e L, end.

A It is true that secondary usage (*gunavṛtti*), whether metaphorical (*upacāra*) or relational (*lakṣṇā*),¹ is also based on both [word and meaning]. But from secondary usage also, suggestiveness differs both in nature and in object.

To speak first of its nature: it is obvious that secondary usage is a non-primary (*amukhya*) operation of a word whereas suggestiveness is a primary (*mukhya*)² operation, for not the slightest hint of a non-primary nature can be observed in our apprehension of any of the three types of suggested sense that arise from meaning. Then there is this other difference of nature: that secondary usage may be called a denotative operation applied in a non-primary way, whereas suggestiveness is entirely different from denotation, as we have already explained.³ And still another difference of nature is this: that in secondary usage a meaning that indicates a second meaning becomes transformed into that indicated meaning, as in *garigāyāṁ ghosah* ("a village on the

Ganges"); whereas in the process of suggestion the meaning that suggests a second meaning is apprehended to reveal that second meaning only by revealing itself at the same time.⁴ It acts in this respect like a lamp, as may be seen in such examples as "Pārvatī counted the petals of the lotus in her hand."⁵ If we were to give the name relational usage (*lakṣaṇā*) to an operation where one meaning indicates another without our setting aside the apprehension of the first meaning, we would be making relational usage into the primary operation of words. For almost every sentence reveals a meaning, the object of the *tātparyā* (the overall sentence operation), which is different from its expressed meaning.⁶

"But even in your view," the objector may ask, "what sort of operation of the word can you hypothesize when a meaning suggests one of your three types of suggestion?" We answer this by saying: since this sort of suggestiveness attaches to meaning only by force of some word as conditioned by context, it cannot be denied that the word in question plays a useful part in the process.⁷

1. For discussion of these terms see 1.1 K, note 2.
2. Here "primary" means based upon the literal sense and "non-primary" means deviating from the literal sense. In *gaṅgāyām ghosāḥ* ("a village on the Ganges; see 1.4 b L, note 6) the suggestion of coolness and purity carried by "Ganges" comes directly from the literal sense of India's holiest river, whereas the application of "Ganges" to the bank which borders the river is a deviation from the literal sense.
3. In *gaṅgāyām ghosāḥ* we are denoting the bank of the river, but in a roundabout way, viz., by directly denoting something contiguous to it. But we are not denoting coolness and purity at all; we are suggesting them.
4. The meaning of *gaṅgā* becomes transformed into the meaning *gaṅgātāraḥ* (bank of the Ganges) for the purpose of locating the village. But its proper meaning must also remain before our minds in order for the suggestion of coolness and purity to take effect.
5. The example has been discussed under 2.22 A. Whether we consider the suggested meaning to be a *vyābhicāribhāva* or a *rūpa*, the primary meaning remains clearly before our mind at the very moment that we apprehend the suggested meaning.
6. Abhinava fails to comment on this sentence. I take it that it means little more than "every sentence carries a meaning other than the expressed meaning of its words." Denotation and suggestion are the primary operations of a word. *Gunavṛtti* is secondary and unusual.
7. The point of the final objection and answer of this section is not clearly brought out by Abhinava. The objector is hoping to show that *vyāñjikatva* is not a property of the word at all because it is the meaning (*arthā*) that is responsible for the suggestion; the word is simply denotative or secondary as the case may be. Ānanda's reply is that the

suggestion furnished by the meaning would be impossible without the help of the word. This implies that *vyañjikatva* attaches to the word.

L Having thus shown that the suggestive operation is different from the primary operation of denotation on the grounds of difference of object, nature, and cause, he foresees a question as to what difference there can be between the suggestive and the secondary operations since the two are alike in being based on both word and meaning. To show that the suggestive is different from the non-primary (i.e., secondary) operation he now says, It is true that secondary usage, etc. Based on both: viz., both word and meaning. The natures of metaphor (*upacāra*) and of relational secondary usage (*lakṣaṇā*) have been distinguished and explained in Chapter One, so we shall not repeat the matter here. Is a primary operation: i.e., is of non-stumbling gait (*askhaladgati*).¹ The three types of suggested sense: viz., *vastu* (fact or situation), *alaṅkāra* (figure of speech) and *rasa*. A denotative operation: for even here there is still an employment of convention.² As we have explained: viz., just above. Transformed: so that it no longer appears in its proper form.

What sort of: i.e., primary or non-primary, for there is no other sort. If [you assign to the suggestive word a] primary [operation], then it is denotative. Otherwise it is secondary. The term *gunavṛtti* (secondary operation) is to be explained as the operation of a word when its function (*vṛtti*) is through some *guṇa*, that is, some special cause (*nimitta*) such as similarity [of some other object to the proper object of that word], etc. Now, our author's intention is that suggestiveness is a primary operation but that it differs from denotativeness because its set of conditions (*sāmagri*) differs from that of denotativeness. Accordingly he says, We answer this, etc.

1. See 1.17 *K* and 1.4 b *L*, note 17. 2. One could not apply "garīgā" to *garīgītāḥ* if it were not for the dictionary meaning of "garīgā." On the other hand, one could suggest purity by words with quite other dictionary meanings.

A The difference in the area¹ of secondary and suggestive operations is likewise perfectly clear. For the three areas within which suggestiveness operates are: the *rasas* and the like, certain types of *alaṅkāras*, and facts or situations provided that they appear in suggested form. Of these, no one claims, nor could he claim, that our apprehension of *rasas* and the like is due to secondary operation.² The same holds for our apprehension of suggested *alaṅkāras*. A suggested [fact or situation] is one which is intended to be conveyed without taking the help of the proper denotative words, in order that we may apprehend some special beauty [in that fact or situation]. This does not wholly coincide with the area of secondary operations, for we see that words are used metaphorically [not only to achieve beauty but] also because of idiom or conformity [to convention]. This has already been stated.³ And even if an instance does fall within the area of secondary usage,⁴ this is only because of an admixture of suggestiveness. So we see that suggestiveness is radically different from secondary operation.

While suggestiveness is different from the denotative and secondary operations, it has a distribution that includes dependence on both of them. For suggestiveness sometimes depends on the denotative operation, as in that type of suggestion where the expressed meaning is intended as leading on to another meaning (*vivakṣitānyāparavācyā*); and sometimes it depends on secondary usage, as in that sort of suggestion where the expressed meaning is not intended (*avivakṣitavācyā*). And it was in order to show this double dependence that the very first analysis of *dhvani* was into these two divisions. Inasmuch as suggestiveness depends on both, its nature cannot be said to be that of either. It cannot be of the same nature as the denotative operation, because some of its occurrences depend on secondary (or relational) use (*lakṣāṇā*); and it cannot be of the same nature as *lakṣāṇā*, because in other occurrences it depends on the denotative operation. Nor is this double dependence the only reason that its nature cannot be that of either. There is a further reason, namely that we find suggestiveness occurring as a property of sounds that are devoid of denotative or secondary power. Thus, the sounds of a song can also be suggestive of the *rasas*.

and the like, whereas no denotative or indicative power can possibly be found in these [sounds]. As we find suggestiveness in areas even outside of sounds, it is clearly improper to speak of it as a mode of some such verbal property as denotativeness and the like. And if, despite the fact that suggestiveness differs in nature from the mode of operation of the well-known properties of words, namely power of denotation and *lakṣaṇā*, etc., you would still imagine it to be their mode of operation, why not just as well imagine it to be a mode of operation of the word itself?³

Thus, in the matter of verbal communication [we may speak of] three modes of operation: the denotative (*vācakatva*), the secondary (*guṇavṛtti*), and the suggestive (*vyāñjakatva*). Of these, where we find suggestiveness, if the suggested sense is predominant, we have *dhvani*, of which the two main varieties were given at the outset as that where the expressed meaning is not intended (*avivakṣitavācyā*) and that where the expressed meaning is intended but as leading on to a further meaning (*vivakṣitānyaparavācyā*); and both these varieties have been described in detail.

1. *visaya*: area (range) of operation, or objects operated upon. 2. I have taken the *iti* in *gunavṛttir iti* as a mark of cause, understanding the whole phrase as equivalent to *gunavṛtteh*. 3. Viz., in 1.14 A. 4. That is, if some fact or situation which is rendered in secondary terms (by metaphor, metonymy, etc.) happens to be beautiful, this is because of the suggestiveness of the phrase, not because of its secondary usage. 5. This sentence has given trouble to all commentators and translators. *BP* tries to make sense of the passage by taking *sābdaprakārānām* as a genitive of limitation ("among"), but this does not go far enough. Jacobi emended by reading *sābdadharmapra-kārānām* in place of *sābdaprakārānām*. V. Patwardhan suggests changing the order of the words so as to read: *yod ca vācakatvalakṣaṇādīnām prasiddhā-nām sābdaprakārānām vilakṣanavate 'pi*. My translation embodies both these suggestions. Abhinava's remarks (see below) I find to be of no help.

L Thus suggestiveness, because of the three modes in which it operates, to wit, without stumbling in its march [from word to meaning], without the slightest aid from the conventional [or dictionary meaning], and with a [continuing] appearance [of the expressed meaning] as separate [from the suggested meaning], is different in nature from secondary operation, which is carried on in the reverse of these three ways. Our author, having explained this difference, now states

the difference in its area of operation: The difference in the area, etc. As facts and situations are also in the area of secondary operation, he makes a distinction: provided that they appear in suggested form.

The area of suggestiveness is not the area of secondary usage and further differences [viz., those discussed in Chapter One] from the area of the latter may be added.

He begins by speaking of the first variety [of suggestiveness]: Of these, etc. Nor could he claim: because in this [perception of the rasas] the set of conditions for secondary usage is lacking, as has previously been stated.¹ The same holds: he means that secondary usage is impossible here also. He then explains the qualification he has just given of a fact or situation: that we may apprehend some special beauty, etc. In saying that this does not wholly [coincide], he means that there is a partial coincidence. For example in the line "and like a mirror blinded by breath" [the word "blinded" is used both as a secondary meaning and as a suggestor].² As has already been stated, "secondary usage can sometimes be an adventitious characteristic of a certain type of dhvani" [1.19 K]. Because of idiom: for example, such words as *lävanya* (literally, "saltiness," idiomatically, "charm"). Because of conformity: that is, because of conformity to past practice (*vṛtta*) or conformity to current convention (*vyavahāra*), as in such phrases as "this lotus-petal couch speaks."³ Already: viz., in Chapter One, in the verse, "Words which are used idiomatically," etc.⁴ He now clarifies, along the lines of our explanation above, what he meant by [calling the areas] "not wholly" coincident: And even if, etc. From secondary usage: the word *gunavṛtter* is ablative.

He now shows that suggestiveness differs from both denotative operation and secondary usage by showing in turns its difference from the former because of its being given life by the latter and its difference from the latter by its being given life by the former: [While suggestiveness is different] from the denotative, etc. The particle *ca* has the sense of restriction and is in irregular position, as is also the particle *api*.⁵ That is, not only do the previous reasons go to form a syllogistic proof⁶ of the difference [of suggestiveness] from denotative operation and secondary operation, but so also does its distribution into instances based on both. that is, based on the primary and based on the secondary operation. So the general sense of the sentence is: it is different from either of these, because instances can be found which are based on the other.⁷

He distinguishes these [two forms of suggestiveness]: For suggestiveness [sometimes depends], etc. The very first: viz., as given in Chapter One in the passage, "And it is [in general of two sorts]," etc. [1.13 m A]. He now indicates another reason: and it cannot be. The indicated reason is that the place of its occurrence differs both from denotation and from secondary usage. He makes the point clear: Thus, the sounds of a song, etc. In these: in the sounds of songs. He now indicates another reason: As [we find suggestiveness in areas] even outside of sounds, etc. The reason here indicated may be given in syllogistic form thus: Suggestiveness is different from denotative and secondary operations because it occurs in areas even outside of sound, like the property of being knowable.⁸

Now the opponent might say, "I grant that the suggestiveness that occurs in something that is not denotative is different from denotativeness,⁹ but I still insist that the suggestiveness in that which is denotative is not different." To guard against this our author says, And if, etc. By the word *ādi* ("etcetera") he includes *gauna* (secondary usage in the specific form of metaphor) [in addition to *lakṣaṇā*, the relational form of secondary usage]. Of the word itself: if "suggestiveness" and "denotativeness" are imagined as synonyms, why not imagine "suggestiveness" and "word" to be synonyms?¹⁰ For there is no obstacle to wishful thinking. But, when we have shown the nature of suggestiveness to be distinct, how can one misassign this property to an area not its own? The sense is that at this rate one could say that smoke on a mountain does not derive from fire [but rather from water or rocks]. Now he sums up the distinction [of suggestiveness from denotation and secondary usage]: Thus, etc. By the word communication he rules out the roar of the sea and such like.

1. The set of conditions for *lakṣaṇā* is that the primary meaning must be blocked, that the secondary meaning must be related to the primary meaning in one of certain ways, etc. See Abhinava's comment on 1.17
2. See Abhinava's remarks on this question, 2.1 c L
3. See above, 1.14 A
4. The reference is to 1.16 K.
5. By "the sense of restriction" is meant the sense of *eva*; see 2.10 L, note 3. So Abhinava is interpreting the sentence to mean: *vācakatvagunavṛttivilakṣaṇasyaiva tasya ... vyavasthānam api*.
6. The syllogism would be in the form: *vyāñjakatvam vācakatvagunavṛttivilakṣaṇam pūrvoktahetukalāpāt*. For the portion *pūrvoktahetukalāpa* that forms part of (is a *ghaṭana* of) the *vyāpti* of this proof, one may substitute *ubhayāśrayata* *enā vyavasthānāt*.
7. Literally, "it is different from *ubhaya* because it is distributed into instances that are based on *ubhaya*." Logic and idiom forbid

one to translate *ubhaya* here by its dictionary meaning of "both." 8. The proof derives from the fact that the minor term (*pakṣa*, here = *vyanjikatva*) is of wider extension than *vācakatva* and *gunavṛtti* with which the opponent seeks to equate it. Accordingly, the property of being knowable (*prameyatva*) is chosen as the example (*udāharana*), this being a property of the widest extension possible. *Prameyatva*, according to the *Nyāya*, occurs in everything, for everything is knowable, if not by us at least by God. 9. To be strictly logical, in line 4 of *L* on Text, p. 428 we must either emend *vācāke* to *vācakādāu* or emend *vācakatvādā* to *vācakatvāya*.

10. Clearly Abhinava takes the apodosis of Ānanda's sentence (viz., *tac chabbasyaiva prakāratvena kasmān na parikalpyate*) to be an outrageous suggestion, just as the protasis is outrageous. Hence his analogy to regarding smoke as produced by non-fire. But it would seem to me that the apodosis actually embodies Ānanda's accepted view, for Ānanda continues in his next sentence by stating that the *vyanjikatva* is one of the three modes of a word. I hesitate to say that Abhinava is wrong, however, because the reading and meaning of the first part of Ānanda's sentence, on which Abhinava is here commenting, are obscure. See above 1.33 i A, note 5.

A To this someone might object.¹ "We grant you," he might say, "that there is no secondary operation in that type of suggestion where the expressed meaning is intended but leads on to a further meaning, just as you have said. For how can we speak of a secondary operation where our apprehension of a second meaning is preceded by an apprehension of a denotative word and its expressed meaning? For in secondary usage it is impossible that the expressed meaning should be intended."² This is true of both types of secondary usage: (a) where a word because of some special reason is superimposed on a foreign object, the native sense of the word being completely set aside in the process, as in such phrases as 'the brahmin boy is a fire';³ and (b) where a word holds on to a part of its native sense and by means of some connection [of the foreign sense] with that [native sense] passes on to the foreign sense, as in such phrases as 'a village on the Ganges'.⁴ And so it stands to reason that we should speak of suggestiveness in that type of *dhvani* where the expressed meaning is intended as leading on

to a second meaning, for there we not only apprehend the nature of the denotative word and its expressed meaning but we also understand a [second, suggested] meaning. That which casts light on something else in the very act of revealing its own self is called a suggestor. As it is only a denotative word [and never a metaphorical or indicative word] that can be suggestive in such a case, we can never speak of secondary operation here. But where the expressed meaning is unintended, how does your dhvani differ from secondary usage? For in its two subtypes we see the two types of secondary usage."⁵

To this we reply that here also there is no fault; because while the type of suggestion where the expressed meaning is unintended relies on the path of secondary usage, it is not itself secondary usage. Secondary usage can also be found [in instances that are entirely] without suggestiveness. Again, suggestiveness is found nowhere without the suggested meaning's being a source of beauty as we have stated, whereas secondary usage may come into being in the form of a metaphorical identity resting on a property belonging to the expressed object and on a suggested meaning of any sort [not necessarily a beautiful meaning].⁶ For example, [we call] the young brahmin a fire because of the sharpness [of fire];⁷ we speak of a woman's face as a moon because of the delightfulness [of the moon]. The same is seen in the line, "there is no tautology in lovers."⁸

And that variety of secondary usage which is relational (*lakṣaṇarūpā*) can occur without our apprehending any beautiful suggestion, simply by making use of some connection [of the expressed object] with the indicated object, as in such examples as "the benches cry out."⁹

1. The objector here is closer to Ānanda's views than were the previous objections. Most of his speech is an explanation of why *gunavṛtti* is impossible in *vivakṣitānyaparavācyadhvani*, a view which Ānanda shares. Only at the end of his speech, when he comes to *avivakṣitavācyadhvani*, does he disagree. 2. The structure of the sentence is obscured by the mispunctuation of the Kashi text. The structure is: *na hi gunavṛtitou yaddā ... yaddā ca ... taddā vivakṣitavācyatvam upapadyate*. 3. The meaning of the phrase is that the boy is quick to anger. The reason for the superimposition is similarity: both the boy and fire flare up quickly. The example is thus of the variety of secondary usage called *gaunī* (metaphorical). Mammata and later authors further analyse the type into two subtypes. In the first, called *sādropā*, the metaphorical word (fire) is superimposed on its base (the brahmin boy as in the present example). In the second, called *sādhyāvasānikā*, the metaphorical word "swallows" its base. An example is *agnir evāyam*, "he is a real fire." One

may note that the "metaphor" of Greco-Latin rhetoric shows a still greater degree of swallowing: "The fire of Rome spoke to the senate," meaning that Cicero spoke. 4. This is an example of the relational or non-metaphorical variety of secondary usage, called *suddhā lakṣaṇā* by Mammata. This particular example is based on the relation of proximity between the Ganges and its bank. See 1.4 b L, note 6. We may now turn to a difference between Ānanda and later writers in the interpretation of this famous example. Later writers regard *gaṅgāyām ghoṣah* as an example of *jahatsvārthā lakṣaṇā*, a secondary use of a word which abandons its native sense. The stock example of the opposite, *ajahallakṣaṇā*, is *kuntih pravīṣanti* "the spears enter (the city)," where what is meant is spearmen. Here it is clear that the native sense is not wholly abandoned, because the spears do come into the city together with the spearmen. Ānanda, on the other hand, regards *gaṅgāyām ghoṣah* as an example of *ajahotsvārthā lakṣaṇā*. What led him to this view was probably the fact that even in its secondary use here *gaṅgāyām* does not mean just any river bank. It means specifically the bank of the River Ganges. So the native meaning of *gaṅgā* appears in a subordinate or shadowy form. However, as the full native sense of *gaṅgā* is not present, one may properly designate the example as *avivakṣitauḍya*. 5. By the two subtypes of *avivakṣitauḍya*-*dhvani* the objector means the *at�antatiraskṛta*, as in *agnir mānavakah*, and the *arthāntarasañkromita*, as in *gaṅgāyām ghoṣah*. By the two types of secondary usage he means the *gaunī* and the *lākṣaṇī*. 6. There is a trick of terminology here that Abhinava in his comment does not cure. It is implied by 1.17 K that wherever there is *gunavṛtti* there must be a *vyanigra*. Logically it follows that the word which furnishes the *gunavṛtti* must also possess the power of *vyanijakatva*. But Ānanda says no. When he speaks of *vyanijakatva*, he means only the power to produce a beautiful *vyanigra*. In the conventional and unbeautiful instances of *vyanigra* which he here adduces, the *vyanigra* is merely a by-product of the *gunavṛtti*. It requires no separate *vyāpāra* of the word for its explanation. I call this a trick, because it assigns a wide meaning to the root *vyañjū* when used in one derivative (*vyanigra*) and a narrow meaning when used in another (*vyanijakatva*). Ānanda uses the same trick later on (see 3.33 m A, note 1). If I were a Mīmāṃsaka, I should call the trick unfair. 7. In *agnir mānavakah* the suggested sense (*vyanigra*) is the sharpness (the quickness to flare up) of the boy. This suggested sense is assumed to be identical with , and so rests on, the well-known property of sharpness in fire, fire being the expressed sense of *agni*. But there is no particular charm or beauty given to the sentence by this suggestion. Clearly this lack of beauty is felt by Ānanda in all three of the examples here given. In the third example the English reader might take issue with him, but that is because "tautology" is a rarer and more striking word in English than *pounaruktam* in Sanskrit. Badarīnāth Sarmā quite misunderstands the passage. 8. The quotation is from the verse quoted in 1.14 A. The *tertium comparationis* in

the latter example would be tedium or unattractiveness. 9. The quotation in slightly different form, viz., *manicā hasanti* ("the benches laugh"), goes back to *Mahābhāṣya* on 4.1.48, Vārt. 3 (Vol. II, p. 218, line 16), which even there served as an example of secondary usage. *Nyāya S. bhāṣya* 2.2.62 quotes the sentence as we have it here, *manicā krodanti*, again as an example of *upacāra*. In view of the *Mahābhāṣya* quotation, the reference was doubtless originally to persons sitting on the benches of a theater. For *manica* in this sense see *BhāgPur.* 10.42.35 and 38. Later commentators, forgetting the original context, sometimes speak of the watchers on field platforms or even of children crying in their cradles.

L An objection may be raised to the two reasons that have been given [for the difference of suggestiveness from secondary operation], namely that it is given life [in some instances] by a denotative operation and because it is given life [in other instances] by a secondary operation. These reasons do not hold in that division of suggestiveness where the expressed meaning is not intended, because the instances of that division are nothing more than secondary meanings. In order to show this point of view, our author begins, To this someone might object, etc. Although the problem has already been solved by his saying that suggestiveness [as a whole] depends on both [the other types of operation], he proceeds as he does in order to remove all doubts for one who finds the difference hard to distinguish between secondary usage and suggestiveness of the type where the expressed meaning is not intended. So he directs the objection against the second type only, after admitting the difference in suggestiveness of the first type. In the passage beginning, [We grant you] in that type — where the expressed meaning is intended but leads on to a further meaning, etc., the objector is shown as conceding a point to his opponent. In order to show why one cannot speak of secondary usage [in this type] he shows just where secondary usage does occur: For it is impossible, etc.

Guna-vṛtti means a *vṛtti*, that is, a semantic operation (*vyāpāra*) that occurs because of the presence of some *guṇa* (i.e. some special reason). And when because of some special reason (*guna* = *nimitta*), such as similarity, a word operates on a foreign object, we get a case of apposition [between the two words and identification of their senses]. Hereby he shows the *guna* type. He then shows the *lakṣaṇā* (relational type) with the words, or when a word holds on, etc. By these two types he shows that he accepts the fact that suggestion where the expressed

meaning is not intended is of two types. That is why he mentions the two types specifically in the words, the native sense of the word being completely set aside and [where the word] passes on to a foreign sense.¹

And so [it stands to reason]: because there are not the aforesaid causes to justify the name of secondary usage. He then shows that his argument is consistent with everyday usage: [That which casts light while revealing] its own self, etc. Is called: as for example a lamp. On the other hand, the physical senses [sight, hearing, etc.] are not termed suggestors, because they are the instruments, not the suggestors (or revealers), of our perception.²

Having thus expressed the matter on which he agrees, the opponent now shows his objection: But where the expressed meaning is unintended, etc. The word "but" distinguishes this type from the preceding. For in its [two types], etc.: the sense is that in the two types of suggestion where the expressed meaning is unintended the two types [of secondary meaning], namely the metaphorical (*gaṇa*) and the relational (*lakṣaṇika*) are observed, that is, stand revealed.

Our author now disposes of the criticism: Here too [there is no fault]. *Guna-vṛttimārgāśraya* (that which relies on the path of secondary usage) is to be analysed as: that of which the basis (*āśraya*) is the *mārga*, that is, the two varieties, of secondary usage. Here the word "basis" refers to a factor which plays a causal part only in the earlier stages of the process. This process has already been described.³ He states the reason why they cannot be of the same nature: Secondary operation, etc. He means both metaphorical and relational.

But how can secondary usage occur without there being a suggestion? For it has already been said that "When a word abandons its primary operation and reveals an object by secondary usage, the purpose for which this is done is one to which the word moves without stumbling." [1.17 K]. So you have said that there is no secondary usage without a purpose and that the operation which is responsible for [showing us] this purpose is the suggestive operation.⁴ It is in expectation of such an objection that he says that the suggestiveness that is here intended is one that arrests the attention⁵ and that in these [examples] there is no such suggestiveness. He says this in the sentence beginning, Again, suggestiveness, etc.

A property belonging to the expressed object: the meaning is that secondary usage can occur on the basis (*āśrayena*) of denotation, that is, in order to strengthen denotation, which is a property (i.e., a

power of words) which conveys the literal meaning; because the "other" [or secondary] meaning is in the last analysis simply a way of making sense (*upapādāya*) of the literal meaning, as in *śrūtarthāpatti* (material implication).⁶

Of these [secondary usages] he gives an example of the metaphorical type: For example, etc. He proceeds to show the second [non-metaphorical type] in an instance devoid of suggestiveness, with the words, And that variety, etc. By beautiful he means one that holds our attention. Without that, the power of suggestion cannot unfold, because our attention turns back and comes to rest on the literal sense, like a common man who catches a glimpse of divine wealth only to lose it the next moment.

1. Abhinava means that the object has associated the *guna* use of a word with the subtype of *avivakṣitavācya* suggestion called *at�ntatiraskṛta* and has associated the *lakṣyā* use with the subtype called *arthāntarasāṅkramita*.
2. The analogy of a lamp naturally brings up the subject of the senses. One must remember that *vyāñjyati* can mean to manifest or reveal as well as to suggest. In verbal perception a suggestive word or phrase, for example a description of *anubhāva*, suggests or reveals an extra meaning, for example a *rasa*, by its very revealing of itself. In the same way in ocular perception a lamp reveals to us a jar by its very revelation of itself. But could we not say that our eye reveals the jar? No. Our eye is the instrument that perceives the jar; it is not the *vyāñjaka*. So likewise in verbal perception: the ear and mind are the instruments. The ear perceives the sound and the mind perceives the sense.
3. At 1.4b L (Text pp. 58–59, Translation pp. 86–87) and 1.13m L (Text p. 140, Translation p. 173).
4. The objector has logic on his side. See 3.33j A, note 6.
5. Literally, one on which [the heart] comes to rest; that is, one which takes our attention away from other verbal operations.
6. The stock example of *śrūtarthāpatti* is *pino devadatto divā na bhūnkte*, "fat Devadatta does not eat by day." In order to make sense of this statement we assume that Devadatta eats at night. So, when we hear *agnir māṇavakah*, in order to make sense of the statement, we resort to a secondary operation which shifts the meaning of *agni* from fire to a property of fire.

A But where secondary usage is the cause of our apprehension of a beautiful suggested meaning, this is because suggestiveness is involved. In this respect secondary operation is similar to the denotative operation. And where we make use of an impossible [literal] sense, as in "These men reap the earth of its flowers of gold,"¹ it is the [desire to bring about an] apprehension of a beautiful suggested sense² that provokes [the use of the metaphor]. So in similar cases also, even though there is the use of a secondary sense, it stands to reason that we may speak of *dhvani*. Thus in both types of suggestion where the expressed sense is not intended [we may have] a secondary usage that is intertwined (*āvista*) with some particular suggestive operation but is not identical therewith, because, while it is apprehended as delightful by the hearts of men of taste, it is [only] the cause of our apprehension [of the beautiful meaning]³ and because we can find other instances of secondary usage which lack this [delight]. All this has already been pointed out, but is restated in order to give the reader a clearer understanding.

1. See 1.13 m A. The literal sense here is more than blocked (*bādhita*), by the surrounding context; it is inherently impossible. The flowers of this earth are not made of gold. Whenever a literal operation is blocked, a secondary operation will come into play. But where the literal sense is inherently impossible, it is obvious that the speaker never would have chosen such words except out of a desire to give beauty to his expression. 2. The suggestion of the whole verse according to Abhinava is that the courageous, the wise, and the faithful are worthy of praise. See 1.13 m L. 3. *pratīshethu* must have the same meaning here that it had at the beginning of the section. What is meant here is therefore *vyanigyapratīshethutuṭi*.

L Now how shall we handle cases [of secondary operation] where our mind comes to rest on the suggested meaning? He addresses this question with the words, But where, etc. The sense is that in such cases there is clearly a separate suggestive operation. He uses an

example that is acceptable to the opponent: similar to the denotative operation. What he means is this. Even you have accepted a suggestive operation in cases where a denotative operation [precedes] this follows from your having made no objection to the first type of *dhvani*.¹

Moreover,² upon one thing that is possible in the world in its primary sense [e.g., a boy] a second thing which is also possible in its primary sense [e.g., a fire] can be superimposed [that is, fire can be superimposed on a boy who is quick to flare up], and we speak of superimposition simply because the area of application has been shifted [from fire to boy]. This is the essence of the metaphorical process. But flowers made of gold are inherently impossible, so how can we speak of superimposing the notion of harvesting upon these imaginary flowers in the verse in question? So, as there is indeed a superimposition in the phrase "the earth's flowers of gold," we see that the suggestive operation is predominant here rather than the use of superimposition. The latter arises only in order to help the suggestive operation. Our author states this in the words [where we make use of] an impossible [sense], etc. That provokes: for it is the suggested meaning only, whose nature it is to provoke [the superimposition], that brings our attention to a halt. One cannot even imagine that the attention would come to rest on the superimposed meaning, which is impossible.

Even though there is: he means, although the secondary sense serves us as a temporary prop in order to attain the suggestive operation. Thus: [the secondary sense is] unqualified (*avisiṣṭa*)³ by a variety (*vिशेषा*) in the form of suggestiveness, where "unqualified" means not possessing a variety (*vिशेषा* = *bhedana*) of that sort. In other words suggestiveness is not a variety of secondary operation. Or [by understanding the final member of the compound as *āvisiṣṭa*], we can take the passage to mean that the secondary sense is pervaded throughout (*ā* = *samantāt*) in such a way that its own nature is subordinated to (*vi* = *nyakṛtam*, + *sīṣṭa*) a particular suggestive operation.

But is not identical: here *tadekarūpā* means that of which the nature is one with that, viz., with what is called suggestiveness; secondary operation is not of this sort. Suggestiveness is separate from secondary usage in that type of *dhvani* where the expressed sense is not intended, because the suggestiveness is the cause of our apprehension of beauty, just like the suggestiveness in that type of *dhvani* where the expressed meaning is intended; for the secondary operation does not cause the apprehension of beauty.⁴ This our author shows in the words

[because we can find] other instances, etc. "The boy is a fire" is such an instance. Already: viz., in Chapter One [1.18 K and A].

1. Viz., the *vivakṣitānyaparavācya* type; see 3.33j A, beginning. 2. The words *kim ca* (moreover) gloss the word *ca* in the sentence beginning *asambhavind cārthena* ("and when we make use of an impossible literal sense"). In the passage that follows Abhinava shows that metaphors which employ words with an inherently impossible literal sense can be brought into use only by a desire to produce a beautiful or striking suggestion. 3. Abhinava's text read *viseśāvīśīṣṭā* where in our translation of A we chose the reading of KM, *viseśāvīśā*. Accordingly, he is faced with a difficulty. He cannot allow the passage to exhibit the normal meaning of *avīśīṣṭā*, for it would then say that *guṇavṛtti* is indistinguishable from, that is, identical with, *vyañjakatuvāseṣā* and this is precisely what Ānanda is seeking to disprove. So Abhinava offers us a choice of two extraordinary interpretations, the first etymologizing *avīśīṣṭā* and the second *avīśīṣṭā*. Both are far-fetched, but they both furnish a meaning that is compatible with Ānanda's views. 4. Abhinava's text must have been differed from ours.

A Furthermore, the property of words and meanings called suggestiveness is in conformity with a generally recognized relationship and cannot be called contrary to the doctrine of any school.¹ Between words and meanings it is generally accepted that there exists a denoter-denoted relation. Quite in conformity with this but connected with a different set of conditions is an operation accidentally attaching (*upādhika*) to word and meaning called suggestiveness; and on this account it is different from the denotative power. A denotative power is the very self of each individual word, bound to it from the time of our first understanding the word, for the word is never known to be without it. But suggestiveness is not bound to the word, but accidental, for our apprehension of it is conditioned by context, etc. and it is not apprehended in the absence of those conditions. If it be asked why we bother to study its nature if it is not essential, we answer that we are not at fault, because while it is accidental to the word [which carries it] it is not accidental to its object, which is

its suggested meaning. A suggestor in this respect is seen to act like the *līrīga* (middle term) of an inference. Just as the property of being a *līrīga* appears irregularly in the entity which possesses it, as it depends on one's desire [to infer], and yet is invariable in its relation to what it works toward, [viz., the *sādhyā*, the major term or probandum], so is the suggestive power, as we have described it, [accidental to the word but invariable in relation to what it suggests].² From the very fact that it is not bound to the word, it follows that it cannot be taken as a mode of the denotative power. If it were a mode of the denotative power, it would be bound to its word, just as the denotative power is.

And this sort of accidental property of words must necessarily be assumed by him [viz., the Mīmāṃsaka] who holds that there is an inborn (*autpattīka*) relation between words and meanings.³ He is an expert in the meanings of sentences and claims that there is a difference between human and non-human sentences. For if he did not assume such a property, he could make no distinction between what is stated by a non-human and by a human sentence, since the connection between the component words and meanings is the same in both cases.⁴ If he does assume such a power, however, he can explain how human sentences can be false by possessing an accidental operation, other than the denotative, superimposed upon the words in accordance with human desire, despite the fact that the words never abandon their connection with their denoted objects.

We see that there are entities in the world which, without abandoning their essential nature, may act in contrary ways by some accidental operation imparted to them by various combinations of conditions. For example, such an entity as the moon possesses a coolness that refreshes all living beings, and yet it is well known that it can cause pain when viewed by men whose hearts are burning with the pain of separation from their beloveds. Accordingly, one who would explain the falsity of human sentences despite the inborn connection [of their words] with the objects [of those words] will clearly have to posit an accidental property of some sort in addition to the power of denotation. And this property is nothing other than suggestiveness (*vyanijatāva*), for suggestiveness is simply the revealing of a suggested sense (*vyanigya*) and human sentences regularly reveal a human intention (*puruṣābhī-prāya*). The sense is suggested, not denoted, because the words are not connected with this [intended or suggested sense] by a relation of denoter to denoted.

1. The present section (3.331) is an attempt to bring the operation of suggestion, and thus the doctrine of *dhuani*, into harmony with the views of the *Mimāṃsā* and the *Nyāya*. The *Mimāṃsā* too posits a verbal operation in addition to *vācakatva* and *guṇavṛtti*. It is forced to do so in order to explain how the meanings of sentences made out of words with invariable meanings can ever be false. They are so because a final sentence operation (*tātparyavyāḍ-pāra*) is given to these words by human intention (*vaktrabhiprāya*) whereas the denotative power does not derive from human source but is eternal. The *Nyāya*, on the other hand, posits a property, *lingatva*, which belongs to an object (e.g., smoke) when, at the prompting of our mind, it serves as an inferential means for our reaching a probandum (e.g., fire). Ānanda will here show that his *vyāñjaktatva* (suggestiveness of a word) is analogous to the *tātparya* of the *Mimāṃsā* and to the *lingatva* of the *Nyāya*. In later Sections he will make it clear that this is only an analogy, not an identity. 2. *Lingatva* and *vyāñjaktatva* are relational abstracts; see Ingalls, *Materials*, pp. 44-47. They are not properties essential to an entity but properties that appear in an entity under certain conditions, or when the entity is set in a certain relation. The entity smoke possesses *lingatva* (the property of being a signpost or middle term) to fire only under the double condition that (a) we do not already know of the presence of fire and (b) we wish to infer the presence of fire. The word *garigā* possesses suggestiveness of coolness and purity only under certain conditions, not, for example, in the sentence *garigāyām bahavo matsyā jīvanti* "there are many fish in the Ganges." But when the conditions are present, it invariably gives those suggestions. It is important to note that Ānanda is likening a *vyāñjaka* to a *linga* only in this one respect. Later, in arguing with the *Nyāya* (3.330 A), he will show that the *vyāñjaya-vyāñjaka* relation is in other respects different from the *lingi-linga* relation. 3. Cf. *MimāṃsāS.* 1.1.5: *autpattikas tu sābdasyārthena sambandhah*. 4. It is only in putting the sentence together and in what he intends by his sentence that the human speaker differs from the inhuman source of the eternal Vedic text. The accidental property of his sentence, its *tātparya*, will reflect his limited knowledge and fallibility, even though each word faithfully denotes its object just as it does in the *Veda*.

L He now shows that suggestiveness, which by being accidental is unbound, must have a different cause from the denoter-denoted relation, which is bound: Furthermore, etc. Accidentally attaching: he means that it is thus because of the complex character (*vaicitrya*)¹ of suggestiveness that has been mentioned; and this is as much as to say that on this account it is different from the denotative power, which is bound by convention. He makes this clear with This is why, etc.

He shows just how suggestiveness is accidental by saying, [for our apprehension of it is conditioned by] context, etc.

Why we bother: he means that something unbound or unregulated can be imagined as one wishes and lacks any reality. There is no point in studying a nothing. To the word: to the particular word-form which carries the convention. In the entity which possesses it: because smoke is not always informative of fire, as we see when it is sometimes informative of something else and sometimes is uninformative of fire.²

Depends on one's desire: desire here includes the wish to know the paksadharmatā (e.g., that smoke is actually on the mountain), the desire to remember the universal law (e.g., "where smoke there fire"), etc. In relation to what it works toward: it never fails to gain its proper goal once the triple condition (*trairūpya*) has been apprehended within itself and within that toward which it works (i.e., within the *linga* and the *sādhyā*).³

He now clarifies what he said above, that his theory does not run counter to anyone's doctrine: And this sort, etc. By "this sort" he means characterized by suggestiveness. An inborn (*autpatti*) relation:⁴ *autpatti*, [which denotes primarily that which belongs to the first *bhāvavikāra* (stage of life),⁵ namely birth,] here indicates in a secondary sense the second stage, existence, because of the proximity of existence to birth. Or, we can take the word by a relational secondary usage, indicating the contrary,⁶ to mean that which is not born [but is constantly present]. Or, we can take *autpatti* to be used idiomatically⁷ as a synonym of *nitya* (constant, eternal). The sense is that the Mīmāṃsaka, who posits an eternal relation between word and meaning, which he calls [the word's] power, must admit this sort of property.

He could make no distinction: because in that case the entry of human shortcomings would bring about no change and the invalidity of human sentences, which depends on these shortcomings, could not be explained. If we say that what is understood is like that [i.e., is false], because it is [the understanding] of a faulty listener, it would follow that the sentence itself is faultless. So how could we call it invalid? And even Vedic sentences would be invalid because of the faulty comprehension of the listener.

But now, even if we accept another property (viz., *tātparya* or *vyavijñatva*), how can human sentences become false, for the word will not abandon its inherent nature of revealing the object? He addresses this question in the passage, We see [that there are entities], etc.

[And human sentences] regularly [reveal]: as has been stated [in Śabara's *Bhāṣya*],⁸ "This is what this man thinks' is what we understand [from human sentences], not 'this is actually the case.' " And so it is that the knowledge we receive from other valid means [such as perception] may be contradicted [in a human statement], while the relation of word to meaning is not abrogated. That is why such statements as "āṅgulyagre /karivaraśatam/" ⁹can be said to be false only by bringing into consideration the intention of the human speaker.

With this: what he means is that due to uncertainty [of the relation between the words and their suggested sense, viz., the human speaker's intention], there is no inherent [or invariable] connection between them.

1. Just what Abhinava means by *vacitrya* is hard to say with certainty. BP's suggestion (*vaciyavacakayor guṇaprádhányād*) is unlikely. More likely Abhinava is referring to the *prakaranddyavaccheda* which Ānanda mentioned at the end of 3.33b. That would include the conditions of context, speaker, person addressed, etc.
2. The Nyāya examples of the former would be: when we use the presence of smoke to infer the presence of fireness (*vahnīva* rather than *vahni*), or of the opposite of coldness, or of wet fuel; of the latter, when we already know that the fire is there, or when we are inattentive, or simply do not wish to make an inference.
3. It is most unlikely that Ānanda intended the compound *svavṛṣaya* as a *dvandva*. But by so analysing it Abhinava renders Ānanda's statement far more precise. The "triple condition" of *linga* and *sādhya* is: *pakṣadharmatā*, *sapakṣvarttīva*, *apakṣvarttīva*. In the stock example of inferring fire from smoke, the smoke must indeed occur on the mountain; it must occur in similar loci of fire (kitchen hearth, etc.); and it must not occur in dissimilar loci (a lake, etc.).
4. Abhinava takes the literal sense of *autpatti* to be "connected with birth" (*utpatti = janma*). The difficulty then presents itself that an *autpattikāḥ sambandhaḥ*, if taken in the literal sense, would cease directly after birth. So Abhinava offers us three ways of taking the term in a secondary sense. The first is from Śabara on *MīmāṃsāS.* 1.1.5. The real source of the difficulty is that Pāṇini has not given a specific sense to the suffix *thaḥ* that would suit its present employment in the word *autpatti*.
5. Yāska, *Nirukta* 1.2, lists the stages as *jdyate*, *az-*
ti, *vardhate*, *vipariṇamate*, *apakṣiyate*, *vinasyati*.
6. *Viparītalakṣaṇā* is the secondary sense commonly seen in irony, e.g., *śūro 'yam*, "he is a great hero," when we mean "he is a coward."
7. *Rūḍhyā*: that is, without reference to etymology.
8. *MīmāṃsāS.* Vol. I, pp. 16–17.
9. The quotation begins a *mandākrānta* verse. It is usually used as an example of absurdity; see 1.4 b L, note 9. But the absurdity depends on the intention of the speaker. If he means, "a hundred fine elephants are on the tip of my finger," that is absurd.

is absurd. But if he means, "a hundred fine elephants are in front of my finger, i.e., I am pointing at them," that may be true.

3.33 m

A But at this rate the term *dhvani* (suggestion, suggestive poetry) must be applied to every human sentence, for all these sentences are suggestive in the way just described. That is true. But the suggestiveness that comes from the revealing an intention on the part of the speaker is common to all human sentences without distinction. It is not apart from the denotative power, for that which is suggested in this case is inseparably present with it. This, however, is not true of a suggestion which the speaker wishes to convey (*vivakṣita*). It is where what is suggested stands as intended to be conveyed that the suggestiveness [of the sentence] can prompt us to call it *dhvani* (suggestive poetry).¹

A suggested sense which is revealed by word and meaning, if it is a specific intention, becomes a *vivakṣita* (something that the speaker wishes to convey), when it is revealed as the *tātparya* (final sentence meaning). However, this alone will not explain the term *dhvani*, which covers an immense area, because it is insufficient. Rather, it is a suggested element in any of the three forms, [*vastu*, *alaṅkāra*, or *rasa*], whether in the form of the speaker's intention or not,² if it is suggested as the final sentence meaning, that justifies the term *dhvani*, as we said in defining *dhvani* in terms of the aforesaid types of suggestiveness. Our definition was neither too wide nor too narrow.

So it appears that a verbal suggestion characterized by suggestiveness does not conflict with the doctrines at least of the experts on sentence meaning [sc. the *Nīmāmsakas*]. As for those scholars who have exactly determined the nature of brahma as it appears in speech [sc. the Grammarians], we adopted the term *dhvani* from their philosophy,³ so the question whether or not we are in conflict with them does not arise. Among the masters of argument [sc., the *Naiyāyikas*⁴], who regard the connections of word and object as artificial constructions, the fact that words, like other things, can be suggestive, is proved by experience and uncontradicted [by other means of knowledge]; so it does not fall among those concepts which they reject.

1. The distinction made in this paragraph is between a suggested element (*vyanigya*) in the form of *vaktrabhiprāya* (the speaker's intention to convey the information embodied in the sentence) and a suggested element that the speaker wishes to convey (*vivakṣita*) as a suggested element. The former sort of suggestion is present in every sentence. The latter sort is present only in poetically suggestive sentences (sentences which possess *vyanijatva*). Here again (cf. 3.33j A, note 6) Ānanda assigns a very wide meaning to the root *vyañjū* as used in one derivative (*vyanigya*) and a narrow meaning as used in another (*vyañjaka*). This distribution allows him to eat his cake and have it, as the saying goes. In 3.33l A he used *puruḍbhīprāya* (= *vaktrabhiprāya*) to show that his *vyanijatva* was no more than what the Mīmāṃsakas are forced to admit. Human sentences are distinguishable from Vedic sentences by their suggesting *vaktrabhiprāya*. Now he denies that the suggesting of *vaktrabhiprāya* is a case of real *dhvani* and thereby clears his criterion of poetry from the criticism that the Mīmāṃsā concept would incur if so used. 2. The *vyanigya* need not be intended by the speaker. A naive girl, to give an example not seldom used in Sanskrit poetry, may make a suggestion of which she is quite unaware and which she is so far from intending that she would avoid it if she were. The figure of speech *apahnuti* often contains such an unconscious suggestion, which is then denied as soon as it becomes apparent to the speaker. 3. See 1.131 A. 4. Possibly Ānanda would include the Buddhists also; so Abhinava.

L What our author has in mind is this. When we hear the words, "Bring the cow," and an intention of the speaker is thereby suggested, a meaning characterized by that particular intention is associated with [i.e., prompts] the activity of bringing the desired object, not intention in general, which would be quite ineffective. Which the speaker wishes to convey: he means, as predominant. What is suggested: viz., in examples of *dhvani*. From the sentences of poetry we do not seek an apprehension that is pertinent to taking and bringing things. We seek an apprehension that holds our attention [i.e., that is aesthetically satisfactory]. And this is an apprehension that comes to rest on the intention [i.e., on the suggested meaning] and does not end on the [directly denoted] desired object.¹

But now, if what is suggested is only the speaker's intention, how do we explain the three varieties of suggested meaning that have been posited? He speaks of this problem with the words, A suggested sense [in the form], etc.

Having thus shown that it would be wrong to find anything here in conflict with the doctrines of the Mīmāṃsakas, he shows that there is no

conflict with the Grammarians, with the words, As for those scholars who have exactly determined, etc. The compound *pariniścita-nirapabhramśāśabdabrahmanām* is to be analysed as follows: those by whom *brahman*, which is unimpaired (*nirapabhramśā*), that is, without any latent impression of *avidyā*, because of its being devoid of all dualities, and which is in that form of revelation and reflection called speech, has been completely (*pari*) determined (*niścita*), that is, has been established by valid means of proof. Here *brahman* is derived from the root *br̥h* "to increase,"² because it is great (*br̥hat*) through its wide extent, because it is swollen (*br̥mhitā*) with a wealth of special powers, and because it is an instrument of increase (*br̥mhanā*) through Brahma's being the god who has the power of creating the universe.³ This is as much as to say that the Grammarians, while they admit no other factor in the state of pure *brahman*, so there can be no question of denotative and suggestive power there, do admit a further operation in the phenomenal world (*avidyāpade*). We have explained this at length in Chapter One.⁴

Having shown that both the scholars of sentences (*Mīmāṃsakas*) and the scholars of words (Grammarians) fall within the area of agreement, he proceeds to show that there should be no conflict with the Logicians, who know the principles of the means of knowledge. Artificial constructions: Those who hold that the connection between word and meaning is an artificial construction are the *Naiyāyikas*, the Buddhists, and the like.⁵ Thus we have the statement, "No, [the relation of word to meaning is not like the relation of *hetu* to *sādhyā*], because the idea we have of a thing from a word is conventional" (*NyāyaS.* 2.1.55). Again, "Words give a conventional sense" (*Dharmakīrti*, *PV*. 3.91; ed. Gnoli 1.92).⁶ Like other things: e.g., such things as a lamp.⁷

Now we might prove by experience [of an astygmatic observer] that there are two moons and this could well form a subject for disagreement. To guard against such a possibility our author adds, and uncontradicted. Uncontradicted is that to which there is no obstruction, no sublation by a second [corrective] cognition. So the sense is, that it is both proved by experience and not sublated. That which is proved by experience is not to be rejected, any more than the denotative power.

1. Abhinava ḡere expands on Ānanda's basic distinction of *vaktrabhī-prāyavāyāṅga* and *vivakṣīvāyāṅga*. He equates the former with the literal meaning of the sentence, to which it is invariably bound, and makes a distinction between literal sentences, which refer to such matters as taking or

bringing a cow, and poetically suggestive sentences, which speak about vi-bhāras, etc. 2. Br̥hi-mohi vrddhau, DhP 1.664-665. 3. The first and third of these etymologies are given by Vācaspati Miśra in a verse: br̥hattudt br̥mhanatvād vā dītmā brahmēti giyale (Bhāmati, Intr. to 1.1.1, p. 3, line 2). 4. See 1.4b L (Translation p. 90) and 1.131 A and L (Translation pp. 169-71). 5. The Naiyāyikas hold that the connection (*sambandha*) is determined by God, the Buddhists that it is determined by men. 6. Gnoli was the first to identify this quotation. Abhinava quotes the verse in full in 4.7 a L. 7. We should not say in English that a lamp "suggests"; we should say that it "reveals" its objects. But *vyanakti* has both meanings.

A Let the Logicians disagree about denotative power, arguing on such questions as whether it is an inherent power of words or a power imparted to them by convention. On the matter of suggestive power, which follows behind, which is common to other entities besides words, and which they admit as something well known in the world, what occasion is there for them to disagree? For it is with matters beyond worldly experience that all the arguments of the Logicians are concerned, not with matters of ordinary experience. We do not see them disagree on a matter that lies within everyone's sense perception and that is free of obstacle, such as the identity of what is blue, or sweet, or the like. If one says of a blue object that is open to view, "It is blue," another does not contradict him by saying, "It is not blue; it is yellow." So who can deny the suggestive power, which belongs to denotative words, to such non-denotative sounds as those of songs, and to non-verbal gestures and the like, and which is proven to exist by the experience of everyone? For various occupations and activities, both sustained and isolated, which suggest a beautiful non-verbal meaning, are found to be honored in assemblies of the skillful.¹ What man of sense, if he would avoid exposing himself to ridicule, would scorn them?

1. The reading of our text *vyāhārds* is apparently supported by no manuscript (see Krishnamoorthy). The MSS read *vyaavahārds* and from his comment on the next sentence it appears that this was Abhinava's reading also. For

nibaddha in the sense of a large, sustained literary work, as opposed to *ani-baddha* (= *muktaka*, isolated stanza), we have the authority of Vāmana 1.3.27 and 29 and the Kāmadhenu commentary thereon. I suppose that the occupations and activities could include pantomimes, painting, the cutting out of symbolic figures and ornaments (*patraccchedya*, *viseṣakacchedya*, cf. KāmaS. 1.3.16) and other such pastimes.

L An objector may claim that the Naiyāyikas do argue about the denotative power. But that is not really the case. Their argument is not about the existence of denotative power but about whether it is an inborn or acquired property. So our author says, Let the Logicians disagree, etc. Now it might be suspected that the suggestive power too could be brought into debate through [a similar argument over] some other property. So he says, On the matter of suggestive power, etc. Common to other activities: When he sees that the ability to give signals by winking, etc., is an inborn aptitude of the eyes, etc., he will say to himself, "Let there be doubt in regard to a word's revealing of objects by denotation [as to whether this power is inborn or acquired], the suggestive power, at least, must be of the same nature [viz., inborn] in the object we are studying [viz., words] as it is in other things." When this unitary nature has been determined, what room is left for doubt?

For philosophers do not argue over something blue, saying, "it is not blue," but over matters outside worldly knowledge, such as the origin [of this blue object], whether it came from the pradhāna, or from atoms, or from pure consciousness, or from nothing.¹ To denotative words: as in the examples of *dhvani* [that have been given]. Non-verbal: that is, without a touch of denotative operation. Which is beautiful: that is, which becomes beautiful by the very fact of being hidden in this way. He thus implies that the purpose in having the meaning suggested is to produce a striking impression. Sustained: well-known. Them: viz., occupations [and activities]. What man of sense would scorn: that is, would fail to honor. The *śatrādesa* (the participial substitute for the personal ending) is used adjectively to characterize the actor [cf. Pāṇ. 3.2.126]. The sense is: a man characterized by avoiding ridicule of himself (an objective genitive). In other words, a man who seeks to avoid such ridicule.

1. The four alternatives represent the doctrines of the Sāṅkhyā-Yoga, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Vijñānavāda Buddhists and the Śūnyavāda Buddhists respectively.

A Here an objection might be raised. "There is good reason to scorn them. The suggestiveness of words is informative (*gamaka*) and to be informative is to be a *liṅga* (inferential mark, as smoke is informative of fire) of an inference. Accordingly, the apprehension of a suggestion is simply the apprehension of an inference and the suggestor-suggested relation of words is nothing other than a marker-probandum relation. For this reason too you will have to accept our point of view: because you have just now explained that suggestiveness is with reference to the speaker's intention. Now the speaker's intention is essentially an *anumeya* (an inferendum, a fact to be arrived at by inference)."

To this we reply: Come now, even if things were as you say, what harm would that do us? What we are insisting on is the existence of a verbal operation other than denotative and secondary operation, one that is characterized by suggestiveness. Even if the operation were as you say, our thesis would not suffer. Let the suggestive operation be the operation of an inferential mark or let it be something else: in any case, it will still be within the area of verbal operations and yet different from the other known verbal modes. So there need be no argument between us.

But it is not really true that the suggestive operation is simply an inferential operation, nor that our apprehension of a suggested meaning is always the apprehension of a *liṅgin* (probandum of an inference).¹ As you have repeated our words in order to prove your own point, claiming that since we admitted the speaker's intention to be something suggested, the words that reveal this intention must act as inferential marks,² we shall go over what we said, making some needful distinctions to which we invite your attention.

The area of words³ is of two sorts: the area that can be inferred (*anumeyo*) and the area that can be communicated (*pratipādya*). Of

these the area of inference is that of *vivaksā* (the speaker's desire to say something). And this *vivaksā* is of two sorts: a desire to manifest speech-sounds and a desire to manifest a meaning by means of these sounds. The former of these is not a part of verbal communication. It merely results in our knowing that the speaker is a living being. The latter is ultimately responsible for the speaker's limiting himself to particular sounds [i.e. certain words] and it is also the cause, at one remove, of his communication by words.⁴ Both these desires fall within the inferable area of words. As opposed to this area, the objects that can be communicated consist in the meanings which the user wishes to communicate. Now these also are of two sorts: those to be expressed (or denoted) and those to be suggested. For sometimes the user chooses to reveal his meaning by means of the word naturally attached to it and sometimes, out of regard to some special prompting, he chooses to reveal it as not denoted by its natural word. This twofold area of what can be communicated does not itself appear as a probandum (*līgīnī*, something inferred) but as a term in some other sort of relation, either an artificial or a natural one. The fact that the meaning is something that the speaker intended to communicate is apprehended as a probandum inferable from his words, but the meaning itself is not so apprehended. If the operation of words in this area [viz., in communicating their meanings] were as inferential marks, there would be no disagreements as to the truth or falsity of a word's meaning any more than there is in other cases of inferring a probandum [like fire] from a mark like smoke.⁵

And the suggested meaning, being implied by the capability of the expressed meaning, must be connected with the word, just as is the expressed meaning. Whether the connection is direct or indirect makes no difference; and we have already shown that the suggestive power depends on the relation of the word to its denoted meaning. Therefore, to sum up: words operate like inferential marks only when the suggested element is in the form of the speaker's intention; but when the suggested element is turned into object of the speaker's intention, they operate as things to be communicated.

Now when this communicated sense is understood (rather than directly expressed), both when it is in the form of intention and when it is not in the form of intention,⁶ is the verbal activity a denotative operation or is the operation through some other connection? It has already been stated [3.33 e A; Text p. 418, lines 3-4] that it cannot be a denotative operation in this case. If it acts through some other connection, it must be suggestive.

Moreover, that which is a suggestor (or revealer) cannot be identified with that which is an inferential mark, because one sees that such is not the case with a lamp, etc.⁷ It follows that no communicated object of words is related to them as a probandum is related to its mark, any more than the expressed object is so related. For that which is related to words as their probandum, namely the object which we have so described [the speaker's intention, his desire to use words, etc.] is not understood as something denoted but as an accidental attachment (*upādhi*). If the communicable object were a probandum, there could never be the disagreements regarding it that people are seen to engage in. This too has been stated.

1. Actually this is true only when the suggested meaning is *vaktrabhiprāya*, the fact that the speaker has an intention. 2. Ānanda admitted the *vaktrabhiprāya* to be *vyavīgya* (3.331 A; Text p. 440–441). He also admitted that in one respect, at least, a suggestive word acts like a *linīga* (3.331 A; Text p. 437, line 3 to p. 438, line 1). 3. *Vyavīgya* (area) here means the area in which words can serve any purpose as informing us of anything. It includes both their objects (their expressed, indicated, and suggested meanings) and also the facts that can be inferred from our using words. 4. Read -āvastā and separate from the following *vyavahīta*. Thus, if we follow the psychological process sequentially, we shall find that the second-mentioned desire comes first. We first wish to manifest or transmit some meaning. We then decide to employ speech sounds to do so. 5. If a man says, "I am your friend. You have nothing to fear," we will have no doubt of his intention, which is inferable. But we may well doubt the truth of what he says (the verbal object of his intention), which is communicable. 6. See 3.33 m A and note 2. 7. A lamp is *vyavījaka* of pots and cloths; it is not a *linīga* of pots and cloths.

L There is [good reason]: there is no denying suggestiveness here; but it adds nothing; it is simply the relation between the marker (*linīga*) and the result (*linīgīna*) of an inference just now: that is, in bringing up the Mīmāṃsaka objection.

Even if things were as you say: by this he shows that even if he were to put on a bold face and accept the objection, his thesis would not fail.¹

Within the area of verbal operation: [Such is our translation of *sabdavyāparavīśayatvam*, but Abhinava takes the compound differently, as follows]: being the operation of a word, it is also an object of our apprehension. Others have taken *vīśaya* here to mean *vīśeṣa* and have explained the compound as "a particular verbal operation."

But it is not really true: The relation of a lamp, or of sunlight [to the objects they reveal], is a *vyāñjya-vyañjaka* (revealer-revealed, suggestor-suggested) relation while being in no sense an inferential relation. As the inferential relation does not pervade the *vyāñjya-vyañjaka* relation, the latter cannot be essentially² the same as the former.

The area of words: by a word's *visaya* is here meant everything that we apprehend upon the pronunciation of the word. Both types of *vivokṣa*, the desire to use speech sounds and the desire to transmit a meaning [by means of these sounds], are inferable. But that which is the object in the speaker's desire to transmit meaning [i.e., the meaning that he wishes to transmit] is something for [the understanding of] which the word serves as instrument; and this something is not inferable. All that we can infer is that the speaker had a desire to transmit it. Where the word is used as an instrument there is not found the *modus operandi* which is found in the working of a *linga*, such as our perceiving that it occurs in a minor term [e.g., as smoke occurs on a mountain], but rather a different *modus operandi*, such as the activation [in our memory] of the convention [that connects the word with its meaning]. So the word here cannot be an inferential mark. And we may note that the *modus operandi* [where a word transmits a meaning] is of two sorts: by the one, the word engages in the activity of denotation; by the other, it engages in the operation of suggestion. Our author states this in the passage, Of these, etc. Out of regard to some [special prompting]: what is meant is, out of an intention or wish to obtain some special effect of hidden beauty or the like. Of a word's meaning: this is so because the nature of an inference is precise.

As an accidental attachment (*upādhi*): The desire of the speaker appears only as a qualification of the expressed or suggested meaning. The communicable object: to wit, the suggested object. A probandum: i.e., inferable. That people are seen to engage in: people do not disagree about our wishing something. Their disagreement is about what we mean.

1. With the text as printed, the use of *sua* to refer to the opponent's doctrine is very awkward. Furthermore, the point is really not that the opponent fails but that the *siddhyānta* does not fail. I suspect that *siddhyatīti* is a scribal error for *chidyata iti* and have translated accordingly. 2. *Tād-ātmya* does not quite mean identity; it means identity of essence. A *śimśupā* tree has *tādātmya* with (a) tree. This is because treeness (*vrksatva*) pervades *śimśupatva*. "Pervades" (*vyāpnoti*) means that it occurs in every substance in

which *simsupatva* occurs. The inferential relation does not pervade *vyarigya-vyanjakabhadra* in this way. So suggestiveness cannot be essentially identical with (cannot be a variety of) the inferential relation.

A As in the area of expressed meanings it sometimes happens that their accuracy is apprehended by recourse to some other means of knowledge, yet even when they have been found to fall within the area of that other means of knowledge it is not denied that they were objects of a verbal activity, so also should it be with suggested meanings. Furthermore, in the area of poetry an inquiry into the truth or falsity of suggestions is useless; so the testing of the suggestive operation by other means of knowledge [like inference] is a laughable occupation.¹ Thus it cannot be said that the apprehension of a suggested meaning is in all cases the apprehension of an inferable result. The sort of suggestiveness of a word which has for its object a suggested meaning that is also inferable² is not the sort to which one could apply the term *dhvani* (poetic suggestion). It was mentioned by us, however, in order to show that an operation of words characterized by suggestiveness must be admitted even by those [*Mimamsakas*] who posit an inborn connection between words and meanings, for our whole effort has been to show that the suggestiveness of words, whether of denotative or non-denotative words, whether by an inferential process or by any other process, is something that no school of philosophy can deny.

Thus suggestiveness must of necessity be held to be different at least from such verbal modes as the secondary (metaphorical) and the denotative. Although there are some who insist on forcing suggestiveness into those categories, this treatise on the special type of suggestiveness called *dhvani*, which has been composed for the removal of disagreement and for the enlightenment of men of taste, should not be scorned. Because definitions of particulars that are useful must not be rejected in favor of a definition of the whole, lest upon our defining existence we should find all definitions of existing things to be superfluous. And so,

That which was a subject of controversy,
never fully understood by the wise,
that type of poetry which is called dhvani,
has here been revealed.

1. This sentence is repeated almost verbatim in the *Vyaktiviveka*, p. 75: *kāvyavīṣaye ca vācyavyāyāgryapratītiñām satyāsatyavicāro nirupayoga eva iti tatra pramāṇāntaraparikṣopahāsyaiva sampadyate.* 2. Such a suggestion, for example, as the fact that the speaker desires to communicate something.

L Now it may be objected that after the suggested meaning is understood, its truth can be determined only by another means of knowledge, namely inference. So here again, the suggested meaning turns out to be inferable. But the objection is groundless. Of an expressed meaning also the truth can be determined only by inference. As [Kumārila] has said,

If [you claim that] an inference is present there [viz., in cognitions of sentence meaning], namely, an inference drawn from the property of accuracy common to other statements of a reliable person.¹

that does not prove that our understanding of the expressed sense is known from inference, but that the truth which belongs to the expressed sense and is something in addition to it, is known from experience. The same should hold for the suggested sense also. Our author says this in the passage beginning, As in. But he has stated this [inferability of the truth of a suggested sense] only as a concession to the opponent. In fact, [if there were such inferability], it would be useless to us. So he says, Furthermore, in the area of poetry, etc. Useless: because from the sentences of poetry we do not seek for the performance of certain acts on the basis of the transmission by the sentence of a meaning that is true, as we do from such Vedic sentences as "agnisfoma/m juhuyāt/" (one must offer a fire sacrifice). This is because the end of poetry is pleasure, for it only by pleasure, in the form of an otherworldly delight, that it can serve to instruct us. We have spoken of this above at some length.² A laughable occupation: The laughter consists in this, that the person who follows it is not sensitive to poetry, but has a heart so hardened by his efforts at logic that he cannot understand pleasure.³

Very well, the opponent may say, we grant that we do not have inference wherever we have suggestion. But how can one deny that we have suggestion wherever we have inference? In view of such an objection, he says, [The sort of suggestiveness that has for its object a suggestion] that is inferable, etc. He means that such suggestiveness does not characterize *dhvani*, because such suggestion does not operate on any object outside the intention of the speaker. But, the opponent may say, if the suggestiveness which has for its object the intention of the speaker, and is equivalent to an inference, does not deserve to be called *dhvani*, why did you mention it? He answers by saying, It was mentioned by us, however, etc. He examines this [purpose] briefly with the words, for our whole effort, etc.

Inasmuch as we see that the suggestive (or revelatory) operation is aided: sometimes, as in the case of its suggesting the speaker's intention, by inference; at other times, as when lamplight reveals [the objects in a room], by perception; sometimes, as when the sounds of a song [reveal a *rasa*], by causality; sometimes, as in that form of *dhvani* where the expressed meaning is intended as leading on to a suggested meaning, by denotation; sometimes, as in that form of *dhvani* where the expressed meaning is not intended, by the secondary operation; it follows that we can prove its nature to be different from all these auxiliaries. He states this in the words, Thus [suggestiveness must be held different], etc.

The opponent may ask why we reduce the nature and extent of such well-known entities as the denotative and secondary operation. Why not say that suggestiveness is exactly of their nature but distinguished by subjection to a different set of conditions?⁴ He addresses that question with the words, [Although there are some who insist on forcing it] into those categories, etc. What he means is that he does not begrudge their giving it whatever name they wish. Disagreement: viz., the view that there is no such type [of suggestiveness as *dhvani*]. Enlightenment: the removal of doubts and ignorance. Because definitions, etc.: in *upayogivisēsalakṣaṇādām*, the word *upayogi* modifies *vīseṣa*. By the use of the word *upayogi* (useful) he rules out the useless, such as [definitions] of crows' teeth.⁵ Lest [upon our defining]: We might define all substance, quality and action [as the Vaiśeṣikas do] by saying "existence is the common character of these three categories," and by this put an end to all the works that are useful to life on earth: scripture, tradition, works of medicine, military strategy, and the rest.

He gives the reason for the disagreement: never fully understood [by the wise]. That is why, in order to show that now, from this moment onward, there will be no disagreement, he says, "which was."

1. This is the first half of Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika* 7 (*Vākyādhikarana*), 243. The word *sāmānya* has been added here, making the sense clearer but destroying the meter. The whole verse, as Kumārila wrote it, runs thus: "*āptavādāvādād atro ced anumānatā / nirnayas tāvatā siddhyed buddhyut-pattir na tatkṛtā*." If [you claim that] an inference is present there [viz., in cognitions of sentence meaning], namely, an inference drawn from the accuracy belonging to statements of a reliable person, that inference merely proves that we judge [the sentence meaning]; it has nothing to do with our cognition of it." Kumārila's argument is directed against the Buddhists. The Buddhists claimed that there is no separate verbal means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). You can know that there are mango trees by the river in only two ways: by perception, i.e., by going to the river and seeing them, or by inference, as when someone informs you that they are there. For if someone tells you, "There are mango trees by the river," it is by inference that you gain your knowledge. The inference will run thus: "There are mango trees by the river, because this sentence shares the property of being accurate with other sentences of speakers whom I have found to be reliable." Kumārila points out that establishing the truth of a sentence is distinct from understanding its meaning. The anti-Buddhist thesis is most clearly put by the verse which immediately follows: *anyad eva hi satyatvam āptavādatvahetutvam / vākyārtha anya eveti jñātah pūrvataras tatoḥ*. "The truth of the sentence is one thing and has its cause in its being the statement of a reliable person; the meaning of the sentence is something else, which must be known before its truth can be known." 2. Viz., 3.10-14f L (Translation pp. 437-8) and 3.30 L (Translation p. 533). 3. *Pritīti* in older texts (e.g., the *Rāmāyaṇa*) often means pleasure, but I rather think that here we have a misreading for *prītim*. 4. E.g., intelligence on the part of the listener, his knowledge of the special character of the speaker, etc. 5. Crows have no teeth.

K A different type of poetry is found, called poetry of subordinated suggestion (*gunibhūtavyāgya*), where the beauty of the expressed meaning predominates in connection with a suggested sense.

A The suggested sense, which has been described as comparable to the charm of a beautiful woman, has been called *dhvani* when it predominates [over the expressed meaning]. But now a type of poetry is envisaged where this sense is subordinated, the expressed meaning being more beautiful. This is called *guṇibhūtavyānyaya*. In this type, the suggestiveness of a subordinate element belongs sometimes to a suggested fact or situation which is understood from an expressed meaning that is set aside (*tiraskṛta*), but where the suggested element is still subordinate to the sentence meaning which is directly expressed. For example, the following:

What an unique river of allurement is this,
where waterlilies float together with the moon;
from which arise an elephant's cranial lobes,
and where new trunks of plantain trees
and stems of lotus fiber grow.

[Attributed to King Vikramāditya]¹

In other cases the suggestiveness may belong to a meaning that is understood from the expressed meanings which are not set aside (*tiraskṛta*), but where the suggested meaning is subordinate in respect to the beauty of the poem because of the predominance of the expressed sense. An example is such a stanza as that already quoted [at 1.13 e A]:

The sunset is flushed with red, the day goes ever before.
Ah, such is the way of fate that never the two shall meet.²

A subordinate nature of the suggestion also results from the revealing of the very same thing by express words, as in the example [quoted at 2.22 a A]:

Knowing that her gallant had set his heart
on a rendezvous, the subtle lass
smiled and to show her meaning folded
the petals of the lotus in her hand.³

The subordinate use of a suggested meaning in the form of a *rasa* and the like has previously been shown to be in the domain of the *rasavat* figure of speech (2.4-5). In this domain the subordination of these [*rasas* and the like] to the principal sense of the sentence is like a king's following after his servant in the servant's wedding procession.

Where a suggested figure of speech is subordinated [to the expressed], we have the domain of such figures as *dipaka* (see 1.13 f L and note 1).

1. The attribution is found in *SRK* 426 and *SūktiM.* 49.17. The verse is frequently quoted; see *SRK* text volume, under no. 426. The suggestions are very nearly the same as the secondary senses of the words, viz., a woman, her eyes, her face, her breasts, thighs, and arms. See Abhinava's remarks and note 4 thereon. 2. Ānanda quoted the stanza at 1.13e as an example of the figure of speech *dkṣepo*. Abhinava preferred to identify the figure as *samāsokti*. Whichever we choose, the suggestion (of two lovers prevented by adverse fate from ever joining) is regarded as subordinate because it forms a figure of speech. Here the words sunset and day are clearly used in their literal sense, so the suggestion arising from them is *ātirakṛtauācya*. The word *anurāga*, however, presents a problem, for which see Abhinava's comment. 3. The stanza has already been quoted, 2.22a A. The woman is hinting that her lover must wait to visit her until nightfall. But the suggestion is subordinated (or should we say spoiled?) by its being given away through a direct expression, "to show her meaning." Again, see Abhinava's comment.

L After setting forth [in Chapters One and Two] the essential nature of *dhvani* together with its types and subtypes, and after giving [in the first part of Chapter Three] its forms from the viewpoint of the various possible suggestors, our author composed a section [viz., the *Vṛtti* on 3.33] establishing the doctrine of suggestiveness¹ in order to instill in the minds of students in a single lesson an understanding of the all-important relation of suggestor to suggested. Thus he has said all that need be said with regard to *dhvani*. But now, in order to justify the doctrine that the suggested sense is the soul of poetry by the [*a fortiori*] argument that this sense even when it is subordinated beautifies the words of a poet, he says,² A different type, etc. What he intends is that [in this type of poetry] the connection with the suggested sense ornaments the expressed meaning.

Which has been described: viz., in the verse, "on the other hand, the suggested is something different," etc. [1.4 K]. Has been called: viz., in the verse, "The type of poetry which the wise call *dhvani*," etc. [1.13 K].

The suggested sense is of three sorts: a fact or situation (*vastu*), a figure of speech, and a *rasa* or the like.³ From among these, our author now demonstrates in succession the subordinate use of the varieties which have been described of suggested fact or situation: In this type.

What an unique river of allurement is this: This is the speech of a certain young man, which contains desire and wonder. In it

the word "river" suggests the fullness [of a lady's beauty], the word "waterlilies" the sidelong glances of her eyes, "the moon" her face, the words "elephant's cranial lobes" her breasts, "trunks of plantain trees" her thighs, and "lotus stems" her arms. As the literal meaning of these words is wholly impossible, it is set aside in the manner that the literal meaning of "blinded" was set aside [in the example of "a mirror blinded by breath"].⁴ These meanings, although they are suggested, attain beauty [only] in the literal portion "what an unique [river] is this," because here the literal meaning by emerging [in a single inclusive image] has submerged all the [individual] suggestions. Its beauty arises first from its becoming a stimulant (*vibhāva*) of wonder⁵ through its being a collection achieved by the coming together in one beautiful place [viz., the wondrous river] of a number of the most precious objects in the world, such as waterlilies and the like, whose coming together can scarcely be imagined; in the second place, by its then being ornamented by the suggested meanings and thereby made delightful (*vicitra*), so that as this literal sense raises itself up it becomes a stimulant of desire (*abhilāṣa*) and the like [which lead to *śringārārūpa*]. That is why, although there is to this extent a predominance here of the literal sense, this sense assumes a subordinate position to *rasadhvani*.⁶ This statement will be found to apply to the mode of operation in all cases of *gunībhūtavyāyā*; and that is why we have said over and over again⁷ that *dhvani* is the soul [of poetry].

Other sensitive readers have explained the stanza as a speech referring to a river which is beautified by the flowing charm of a number of young women who have entered it to play in the water. Even if one accepts this, the interpretation will be along the lines we have stated. Still another explanation is that it refers to a young woman who has come down to bathe and is standing by the river. But in all cases there is subordination of the suggested meanings since the suggestive activity occurs to this extent only because of the wonder [excited by the literal sense] which is primary.⁸

Already quoted: this example was explained in Chapter One. Our author has called the stanza an example of a suggestion where the primary sense is not put aside (*atiraskṛta*). He does so with the understanding that the word *anurāga* (etymologically, "redness"), which applies to desire (*abhilāṣa*) because of its secondary sense of "being colored by redness," is here used directly for passion as the word *lāvanya* [is used directly for beauty].⁹

The very same thing: viz., the situation [embodied in the suggestion]. *Rasa* and the like: by the term "and the like" the *bhāvas*, etc. are meant. By the term *rasavat*; figures of speech such as *preyasvin*¹⁰ are also intended.

But now, how can a *rasa*, which is the very chief element of poetry, become subordinate, or if it did become subordinate, how would it not cease to be beautiful? Anticipating such questions, our author shows by a well-known example that on the other hand it remains beautiful: In this domain, etc.; that is, in the *rasavat* and such figures of speech.

Having thus shown how a suggested situation or *rasa* can be subordinate, he shows the same capability of the third variety of suggested sense, a figure of speech: Where a suggested figure of speech is subordinated, etc.: viz., a simile or the like.

1. The context seems to demand *vyanjikatvavāda* rather than *vyanjikāvāda*.
2. It will be noticed that in this passage Abhinava makes no distinction between the author of the *Vṛtti* and of the *Kārikās*.
3. Cf. 1.4a A.
4. The example was adduced at 2.1c A to illustrate the *atyanta-tirṇkṛta* variety of *avivakṣitavācyā dhvani*. Ānanda does not here give any example of the other variety of *avivakṣitavācyā dhvani*, called *arthāntarasa-n-kramita*. In interpreting the stanza here quoted Abhinava jumps directly from the literal meanings to the suggested meanings (*vyanjyā arthāḥ*) without any mention of the secondary meanings (*lakṣyā arthāḥ*) which call them forth. Patwardhan writes as follows. "This happens many times, as it is often not possible to state the *prayojana* separately from the *lakṣya artha*. Frequently the *vyanjya-prayojana* is stated to be only an intensified degree (*utkātata* or *atiśaya*) of the *lakṣya artha*. For example, in *garīgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ* the *vyanjya-prayojana* is stated as *sātyapāvanatvātīśaya*—an excessive degree of coolness and holiness—which is only an intensified form of *sātyapāvanatva*, a property associated with the secondary sense, viz., the bank of the Ganges (*garīgāṭa*). This difficulty of explaining the *vyanjya-prayojana* distinctly from the *lakṣya artha* must have been the main reason why the *bhaktivādins* wanted to oppose *dhvani* (suggested sense) and subsume it under *bhakti* or *gunavṛtti*".
5. *Vismaya* is the *sthāyibhāva* of *adbhutarasa*.
6. Compare Abhinava's remark at 1.13d L (Translation, p. 139).
7. See Translation, pp. 47, 49, 167.
8. By this sentence Abhinava seems to mean that the suggested meanings arise in order to render rational the literal sense, which has aroused wonder. On the interpretation of the stanza as a whole Patwardhan writes as follows. "In the case of this stanza Abhinava gives three different explanations. According to the first explanation the stanza is a description of a beautiful woman who is spoken of as a river of loveliness. The several examples of *gunībhūtavyanjya*

arising out of the words *sindhu*, *utpala*, *sasīn*, etc., become finally subordinated to the *rasadhvani* in the form of the suggested *abhilāṣarati* of the speaker of the stanza for the beautiful woman in question. Under the second explanation the stanza is primarily a description of a river in which a number of beautiful women are swimming and playing. Under this explanation the *gunibhūtavyāngya* does not arise out of the word *sindhu* (as there is no *jahal-laksand* in it), but it does arise out of the remaining words like *utpala*, *sasīn*, etc. Here the *gunibhūtavyāngya* arising out of the words *utpala*, *sasīn*, etc., becomes subordinated to the *rasadhvani* in the form of the suggested *abhilāṣarati* of the speaker for all the beautiful women. Under the third explanation the stanza is a description of a single beautiful woman standing near a river and wishing to make a plunge into it. Under this explanation, as under the first, all the words *sindhu*, *utpala*, *sasīn*, etc., give rise to *gunibhūtavyāngya*, which then becomes subordinated to the *rasadhvani* in the form of the *abhilāṣarati* of the speaker of the stanza for the beautiful woman in question. Abhinava introduces these three explanations without expressly showing his preference for or disapproval of any one of them. The *Bālapriyā* commentary, however, suggests that Abhinava is in favor of the first and third explanations and disapproves of the second because under that explanation the blue waterlilies, the moon, etc., coexist not in a beautiful woman but in a river, which means that under the second explanation the stanza is a glorification of a river and not of a beautiful woman. The point likely to be raised by some that under the second explanation there is the suggestion of the speaker's *abhilāṣarati* for several women and hence it is inferior to the other two, is not important, as there is nothing improper (*anucita*) in a man's entertaining *abhilāṣarati* for several women. Even supposing that there were impropriety in such a case, it would still become an example of *dhṛṣṭa* of *abhilāṣarati*, which is aesthetically as enjoyable as *abhilāṣarati*.⁹

9. See 3.34 A, note 2. While the words sunset and day can suggest a lady and her lover without abandoning their primary meanings, it would seem that *anurāga* can suggest the passion of the lady only by a metaphorical shift of *anurāga* from its etymological sense of redness. If so, the suggestion should be called *tiruśkrīaudcya* (one where the primary meaning is set aside). Abhinava admits the shift from the etymological meaning, but says that *anurāga* is like the word *kāvanya* (see 1.16 K and 3.1c L, note 2) in being a frozen metaphor. On hearing it we have no sense of its etymological meaning. The primary sense may therefore be said not to be set aside.

10. *preyasvin* is another name for *preya'lankāra*, for which see 2.4 L, note 1 and 1.4e A, note 1.

A And so,

K To poems of which the words are clear and deep and which bring him delight, a man of intelligence will attach just this character.¹

1. *Yojyāḥ* is here almost equivalent to *jiyejāḥ*. In these poems a man of intelligence "will recognize" this character, viz., of "a poetry of subordinated suggestion."

A To all poems which are charming because of meanings of this sort [viz., of subordinated suggestion] and so bring pleasure to men of discrimination, although these poems appear to be of infinitely varied natures, one should attach this character. For example:

With Lakṣmī for daughter and Viṣṇu for son-i
with Ganges for wife,
with ambrosia and the moon for two other children:
ah! what a family does the Ocean possess!¹

1. For *tamsa* read t̄ so; for *dhariniā*, *ghariniā* (cf. *Sattasai* 5.9); for *āmīa*, *amīa*.

L Having demonstrated the subordinate use of the three types of suggested sense [situation, figure of speech, *rasa*], now in order to show the very wide area in which they are found, he says, And so.

[Comment on the *Kārikā*:] Of which the words are clear because possessed of the quality of *prasāda* (clarity) and deep because of their hinting at suggested meanings. Which bring him delight: he means

that the cause of beauty is just this character [of subordinated suggestion]. A man of intelligence: what he means is that a man who cannot attach this character to such poems will be laughed at by people, saying that he closes his eyes in a wholly false pretense of being a connoisseur.

[Comment on the poem quoted by the *Vṛtti*:] Lakṣmī [the goddess of wealth, or wealth itself], the object of every man's desire, is his daughter. His son-in-law is Viṣṇu, who ever exerts himself in the granting of all enjoyments and of final release. Then, too, his wife is the Ganges, who is the irresistible means of attaining all desirable things. Ambrosia and the moon are his children.¹ Here ambrosia means wine. As it is from bathing in the Ganges and worshipping the feet of Viṣṇu that one gains *lakṣmī* (wealth) and from wealth that one attains the chief goal [of life on earth] characterized by the enjoyment of drinking parties at moonrise, we understand his preeminence throughout the three worlds. Ah! what a family does the ocean possess! The suggestion takes a subordinate position because of the word "ah."²

1. They were born from the ocean when it was churned by the gods and demons.
 2. The exclamatory word points expressly to the wonders suggested by the rest of the stanza and so shifts the suggestions from the category of *dhvani* to that of *guṇibhūtavyāṇigya*, just as the words "to show her meaning" shifted the category of suggestion in the last example under 3.34 A.
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K All the expressed figures of speech are seen in poetry generally to attain the highest beauty when accompanied by a suggested element.

A Those who have defined [the figures] have shown in part (*ekadeśena*) how the expressed figures of speech attain an extra degree of beauty when accompanied by a suggested element, whether a situation or itself a figure of speech as the case may be. But in general all these [figures of speech], if they are carefully examined in poetic literature, are seen to be of this sort. Thus, just as *dipaka* and *samāsokti*,¹ other

figures also are generally seen to be associated with a further suggested figure or suggested situation. For one thing, first of all, every figure of speech can be made to contain some hyperbole; and when so constructed by great poets, it blossoms with a special poetic beauty. For how could the attachment of hyperbole, if managed with propriety to the subject matter, fail to impart a superiority to the poem?

In defining hyperbole, when Bhāmaha says:

This is the whole of figured speech;
by it the meaning is exalted.
A poet must take pains with it,
[for] what figure of speech is without it?

(Bhāmaha 2.85)

we must here understand his meaning to be that inasmuch as there is extra beauty in any figure of speech over which, through a poet's genius, hyperbole presides, whereas another [which lacks hyperbole] is a mere figure of speech, [we see that] hyperbole is able to incorporate itself in all figures of speech; hence by a metaphorical use of identity, [Bhāmaha can say that] it is every figure of speech. Now this mixture of hyperbole with another figure is sometimes done expressly and sometimes by suggestion. Furthermore, when it is suggested, it is sometimes predominant and sometimes subordinate. The first of these [three types] belongs to the expressed figures, the second to dhvani, the third to gunībhūtavyāṇigya.

1. See 1.13d A and L; also 1.13e A and note 3.

L Having thus stated that a poem within the area of those without figures of speech, although it may appear empty from a superficial point of view, is made beautiful by the inner meaning [arising from subordinated suggestion], he now shows that an [expressed] figure of speech is made more charming by the same means: [All] the expressed [figures of speech], etc. Being an element of something means being subordinated to it.

In part (*ekadeśena*): by this term he refers to partial metaphor.¹ So what he means is as follows. In a partial metaphor, such as,

The pond-kings were fanned by autumn
with her wild geese

[Udbhāta, 1.*12 Indurāja = 1.24 Vivṛti]

inasmuch as those who have defined the figures have shown that [the suggested metaphor that] the geese are fly-whisks becomes subordinate to the expressed [metaphor], kings,² they have hereby indicated this sort [of subordinated suggestion]. Others³ have explained the word *ekadeśena* as referring solely to the complex character⁴ of the literal portion [of an *ekadeśavivartī rūpaka* or partial metaphor] and thus their explanation is not sufficiently developed (*anudbhinna*).⁵

[Seen to be associated, etc.:] The word *vyāgyālānikdrāntaravastvitarasamsparśino* means, [are seen] as being those which touch upon, that is, cling to for their own ornamentation, some other, suggested, figure of speech or some other suggested situation. Great poets: Kalidāsa, etc. He now gives the reason why such [a figure of speech] blossoms, as he has said, with poetic beauty: For how could, etc. The particle *hi* expresses cause. How could the attachment of hyperbole fail to impart a superiority: he means that such [a failure of hyperbole] is not found in poetry, if only the poet constructs the hyperbole while keeping in mind what is appropriate to his subject.

Thus, to take an example of Bhaṭṭendurāja:

A tremulousness of the eyes,
hesitating in mid-glance;
limbs daily growing thinner
like severed lotus stems;
and cheeks so pale they seemed
to imitate white dūrvā grass;
such was the costume put on by the gopīs
as they and Krishna came of age.⁶

Here the hyperbole is justified, as its object is the beauty of the Blessed One whose form was that of the love-god. Accordingly, the figure exhibits an otherworldly beauty in the poem. But when inappropriate, the beauty fails. For example:

God made space too small;
for he reckoned not
that such would be the future
expansion of your breasts.

Now it may be asked just how hyperbole is latent in suggested form-- in every figure of speech. For [an opponent may urge that] Bhāmaha spoke of hyperbole as being a generic character of all figures of speech. Now a generic character does not appear from a word separately and at a later time than one's perception of its particularity. So how can

hyperbole be suggested?" Anticipating this question, our author says, Bhāmaha says, etc. Here we must construe together words which are separated from one another, thus: "when Bhāmaha says . . . , we must here understand his meaning to be . . ." And what does Bhāmaha say? This is [the whole of figured speech], etc. That which has been defined as hyperbole is the whole of figured speech, that is, is every sort of figure of speech, for Bhāmaha has said:

An unusual or striking form of word or meaning (*vakrokti*) is considered an ornament (*alaṅkṛti*) of poetic utterance.⁸

For the "bent" (*vakra*) form of a word or of a meaning (*ukti*) is its presentation in an unusual or striking form (*lokottīrṇena rūpena*) and this constitutes the ornament of a figure of speech (*alaṅkārasyālaṅkāraḥ*). Now hyperbole is precisely the property of being unusual or striking (*lokottarataṭā*). Hence hyperbole is a common property of all figures of speech. Thus, [to explain the second quarter of Bhāmaha 2.85 quoted by the Vṛttikāra: "by it the meaning is exalted (*vibhāvyaṭe*)"] it is by this hyperbole that a meaning which has been worn out by everyone's use of it can be given new variety and interest [*vibhāvyaṭe* = *vicitratayā bhāvyaṭe*]. Again, it is hereby that pleasure gardens and the like can be turned into *vibhāvas* (i.e., stimulants of the *rasa* of love) [*vibhāvyaṭe* = *vibhāvatāṁ niyate*]. And the matter is hereby endowed with a special property, i.e., is given a content of *rasa* [*vibhāvyaṭe* = *viśeṣena bhāvyaṭe*]. This is what Bhāmaha actually said.⁹ As to what he meant here, our author continues, by a metaphorical use of identity [Bhāmaha can say that] it is every figure of speech.

Our author states the relation which furnishes the cause¹⁰ of the metaphorical usage by saying, [hyperbole is able to incorporate itself] in all figures of speech. He states the purpose (*prayojana*) of the metaphorical usage in the clause running from inasmuch as there is an extra beauty to another is a mere figure of speech. He points out also the blocking of the primary sense (*mukhyārthaṭadha*) in the words through a poet's genius, etc.¹¹

What our author has in mind is the following. To begin with, if hyperbole were a generic character in all figures of speech, it would in effect be essentially identical with them and no figure of speech would be without it. Such being the case, no poetic genius would be needed in [constructing] it and no "mere figure of speech" [i.e., figure lacking hyperbole] would be found to exist. On the other hand, if what is meant [by Bhāmaha] is that hyperbole is the life of poetry, then it might be

inhibited by a lack of propriety. Now if hyperbole constructed with propriety is the life of poetry, then, since nothing else can regulate this propriety than the *rasas*, *bhāvas*, and the like, we shall have to admit that it is they (the *rasas*, *bhāvas*, and the like) that are the chief inner life of poetry, not hyperbole. [Incidentally¹²], this refutes those critics who say, "When a poem consists in beautiful words constructed with propriety, what is the use of another factor called *dhvani*, as the soul of poetry?"¹³ For this saying, of which they are so proud, witnesses their admission of the existence of *dhvani*.¹⁴ Accordingly, this [statement of Bhāmaha that hyperbole is all the figures of speech] is a metaphor, because [we see that] the primary sense is blocked and [that] there is both a cause and a purpose of the metaphorical usage of identity. Accordingly, it is correct to say that hyperbole is suggested.

Our author now divides into three types the joining to itself by hyperbole of another figure of speech, [a mixture] of which he has just spoken: [Now this mixture] of hyperbole, etc. Expressly: that is, the hyperbole may be expressly stated, as in "what an unique river of allurement is this" (cf. 3.34 A). Here we have hyperbole attaching itself to the literal meaning of the words in a metaphor.¹⁵ Our author now distinguishes the areas [of the three hyperboles]: [The first] of these. What is meant is, the first among the three types.

1. Thus, Abhinava understands Ānanda to say that the older critics showed how a suggested figure of speech could give an extra beauty to an expressed figure by [their exposition of] partial metaphor. This interpretation, I think, wrongly restricts Ānanda's meaning. The older critics certainly recognized the suggestions implicit in *dipaka*, *samāsakti*, and other figures besides that of metaphor.
2. That the geese are fly-whisks is obviously subordinate, as the suggestion would never occur to us without our understanding the expressed metaphor that the ponds are kings.
3. Abhinava often refers to the Candrikākāra by a plural pronoun. Here he may be simply criticizing the comment of a single predecessor.
4. *vacīfrya*: the word should have the same sense here that it bears in 3.331 L (Text, p. 436, line 4 of Locana). Thus, the "other" interpretation would be that Udbhāta and others pointed out the suggested figure in speaking of the complex character of *ekadeśā-vivartīn* metaphors.
5. Because the other commentator(s) failed to make any reference to the subordination of the suggested metaphor. And indeed neither Udbhāta nor the other older writers do make any such reference. "In-sufficiently developed" seems to me a better rendering of *anudbhīna* than BP's "unclear" (*aspasīfārtha*), although the word does also have that sense.
6. Abhinava has already quoted this verse of his teacher at 1.4g L, where

be commented on other aspects of it. 7. The opponent's point is this. By saying that all figures of speech are just hyperbole, Bhāmaha is making by-perbole the sāmānya of the viśeṣas represented by simile, metaphor, etc., just as bovinity (*gotva*) is the sāmānya (generic character) of all cows. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine is that a sāmānya inheres in its viśeṣas; it is inseparable from and synchronous with them. Bovinity is perceived together with and synchronously with our perception of a cow. Such is the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine; we need not here question it by means of modern experiments in epistemology. So how can the Vṛttikāra say that hyperbole is a suggested meaning, which arises after and separately from our understanding of the expressed simile or metaphor? 8. Bhāmaha I.36, quoted above at 1.1 c L and see note 4 thereon. 9. The word *tāvat* implies that he did not say that *vakrokti* was the generic character inhering in the particular olorikāras as the opponent just argued.

10. For *nimitta* (cause) as one of the three conditions of the metaphorical or secondary operation, see 2.1 L, note 2 and 2.1 b L. The *nimitta* is actually the relation between the expressed object and the object of the secondary usage, here the relation between hyperbole and all figures of speech, viz., a relation of soul and body. 11. *Prayojana* and *mukhyārtha-baddha* are the other two conditions for metaphorical operation; see 2.1 L, note 2. Abhinava will demonstrate in what follows just how the word *kavipratibhāvāśat* shows the blocking of the primary sense. 12. Supplied by BP. 13. These critics must be predecessors of Kṣemendra, who in his *Aucityavicidracarca* has propounded the hypothesis that *aucitya* is the soul of *rasa*. See Kārikā 3 of that work: *aucityasya camatkārakārinās cāru-corvone / rasajivitabhūtasya vicidram kurute dhunā*. 14. It witnesses it because the "propriety" of which it speaks is regulated by the *rasas* and the like, which can be suggested only by *rasadhvani*. So BP. 15. (Patwardhan) The hyperbole in the stanza under discussion arises from the use of the words *aparā eva* and it is therefore expressly stated. It is the kind of *atiśayokti* which Mammata 10, p. 628, characterizes as *prastutasya yad anyatvam*, i.e., as representing the matter under discussion as something altogether different from its own self, as being out of the ordinary. Abhinava's remark that in this stanza there is a *rūpaka* (metaphor) is to be explained as follows. When it is said, "iyam (purāḥ sthitā yuvatiḥ) aparā eva lāvanya-sindhuḥ," there is clearly a superimposition (āropa) of the upamāna (lāvanya-sindhuḥ) on the upameya (iyam) and so the presence of *rūpaka* cannot be denied. The BP's explanation is half right and half wrong. It is right in saying that the *atiśayokti* is located in the words *aparā eva*. It is wrong in stating that the *rūpaka* consists in the representation of the eyes, face, breasts, thighs, and arms of the lady as waterlilies, moon, elephant's cranial lobes, plantain trunks, and lotus stems. For according to Abhinava (3.34 L) the words "waterlilies," "moon," etc., are cases of *latṣanā* (secondary metaphorical operation) based on the suggestion of a *prayojana* and are not

cases of rūpaka at all. When once the words "waterlilies," etc., are adjudged to be loci of laksanā and cases of gunibhūtavyānyga, they cannot be regarded any longer as loci of rūpaka. The seat of the rūpaka in the stanza is the phrase iyam lävonyasindhuh; the seat of the atisayokti is the phrase apāra eva.

A And this method of operation [sc., by subordinating itself to a second figure] is found among other figures of speech as well; but other figures cannot subordinate themselves to the whole range of figures. Hyperbole can be subordinated to all figures; that is its peculiarity. Among those figures which receive their title as figures from a notion of similarity, that is, among metaphor, simile, *tulyayogitā* (equal pairing),¹ *nidarsanā* (demonstration, instruction),² and the like, we may say that all these figures when they partake of an exceptional beauty are loci of subordinated suggestion (*gunibhūtavyānyga*).

In *samāsokti*,³ *ākṣepa*,⁴ *paryāyokta*,⁵ and the like, inasmuch as they cannot gain their title to these figures without the suggested element, their containing of subordinated suggestion is obvious.

In this matter [of subordinated suggestion], some figures of speech are limited to the suggestion of only certain other figures of speech. For example, trick praise (*vyājastuti*)⁶ must contain [as a suggested element] complimentary address (*preyo'latikāra*).⁷ For some figures of speech [on the other hand] the rule is merely that they shall contain some [suggested] figure or other. For example, poetic doubt (*sandeha*) and the like may contain simile [or other figures].⁸ Some figures may suggest one another, as *dīpaka* (zeugma) and simile. Here it is well known that *dīpaka* regularly contains a suggestion of simile;⁹ but a simile may occasionally join to itself a touch of *dīpaka*, as in a garland simile (*mālopamā*). For example a touch of *dīpaka* is obvious in such verses as the following:

As by its flame of glorious light a lamp,
[as by the Milky Way the path of heaven,
as by his Sanskrit speech a learned man,
so by Pārvatī her father
was both sanctified and given beauty].¹⁰

1. See 1.13f. *L*, note 1. 2. See 2.18-19g *L*, note 4. 3. See 1.13d. *A* and *L*. 4. See 1.13e *A*, note 3 and 1.13e *L*, note 1. 5. See 1.13h *L* and note 1. 6. See 1.13k *L*, note 1. 7. See 2.4 *L*, note 1. 8. For *sandeha* see 1.13i *L*, and note 7; also 2.26 *A*, note 1. *Sandeha* may suggest the further figure of *upamā* or *rūpaka* or *atīsayokti*. For this reason and also in order to bring out the contrast between *alankāramātra* and *alankāravīśesa*, we must follow Abhinava in reading *upamādigarbhavite* in place of *upamāgarbha-tive* (Text, p. 471.5). 9. See 3.27 *A*.

10. *Kumāra*. 1.28. Pārvati's father is the Himalaya Mountain. In each flower of the garland the notion of *zeugma* is present. Sanskrit being the sacred language and also the most beautiful of languages, a learned man is both sanctified and given beauty by his use of it. The Milky Way, in Indian mythology, is the Ganges of Heaven. As the Ganges washes away all sins and as the Milky Way is beautiful, the same *zeugma* applies to the night sky. Fire purifies, and so a lamp is sanctified as well as rendered beautiful by its flame. For the close connection in Kālidāsa's mind between beauty and holiness, see Ingalls, *Kālidāsa and the Golden Age*, pp. 19-20.

L But now, if hyperbole alone is like this [viz., present in all other figures of speech], with response to what [else] was a hierarchy suggested [by the *Vṛtti*] in its saying, "first of all" [3.36 A]? Anticipating this question, our author now says, And this, etc. This [method of operation through subordinated suggestion] which has just been described comes into consideration in other figures of speech as well.

Even so, by what superiority was hyperbole said to be "first"? Anticipating this question, he says, but other figures, etc. Thus, since he has said that there is a touch of suggestion in every figure of speech, he distinguishes just what suggested [figure] can appear [from each expressed figure]: Among those figures.

The definitions of metaphor, etc., have already been stated. *Nidarsanā* is defined thus by [Bhāmaha 3.33]: "Nidarsanā is the teaching of a given matter by means of an action [belonging to some inanimate object]." An example is:

The sun with lessened splendor
passes to its setting,
informing men that of the glorious
their rise leads ever to their fall.

[Bhāmaha 3.34]

Complimentary address: because trick praise (*vyājastuti*) ends up in a clever compliment [although it begins with what seems to be censure]. We have exemplified trick praise in Chapter Two¹

May contain simile: here the word "si ile" includes all such varieties as metaphor, etc.; or, since a similarity is common to all these figures, we may take them all to be implied.

Is obvious: In the phrase "by Pārvatī her father was both sanctified and given beauty," a *dipaka*, because it illuminates after the fashion of a lamp (*dīpa*), is brought in as something suggested, for this phrase is a statement of the common property underlying the si ile by the clear method of direct designation.²

1. The pronoun *sā* must refer to *vyājastuti*, not to *preyo'larikāra*. So either we must emend to *sa codāhṛta eva*, making the pronoun refer to *preyo'larikāra*, which Abhinava exemplified in Chapter Two (2.5 a L), or we must suppose that Abhinava's memory has played him false. He exemplified *vyājastuti* in Chapter One (1.13 k L), not Chapter Two. 2. That is, the simile (actually four similes, which together compose the garland simile) is directly expressed in all its members, but the *dipaka* is only suggested. If the poet had not used the word "as" (ive) in the first three lines, we would have a directly expressed *dipaka* with a suggested garland simile

A Thus metaphor and other figures of speech, when they attain unusual beauty by the touch of a suggested element, are all of them a path to *gunibhūtavyāyāga*, and the ability to carry subordinated suggestion is common to all figures of this sort, both those which I have mentioned and those which I have not. If one defines subordinated suggestion, all these [figures] will be well defined, while if one simply recites the peculiarities of particular figures without any general definition, they cannot be truly understood, any more than grammar can be understood by enumerating a list of words,¹ for they are endless. Countless are the forms of speech;² and the figures of speech are simply varieties of those forms.

There is also an area of subordinated suggestion in a different way [from the the suggestion of a figure of speech], namely, by [the poet's]

accompanying [the expressed statement] with a suggested fact or situation. This second form of the derivative of *dhvani*, which has been used by the great poets and can be extremely beautiful, should also be studied by sensitive readers. There is absolutely no form of poetry that charms the hearts of the sensitive, in which beauty does not arise from some touch of suggested meaning. Those who are wise will honor it as the ultimate secret of poetry.

1. One must read *protipadapāṭhena*, as in *Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. 1, p. 5, line 23. 2. Cf. 1.1c A.

L To all figures of this sort: that is, to all figures that are outstandingly beautiful.

Will be well defined: because the form of these figures as devoid [of subordinated suggestion] is of no use at all to poetry. Thus we have [mere] simile in "A wild ox is like a domestic ox";¹ metaphor, in "The *khalevalī* is a sacrificial post"; double meaning (*slesā*), in the technical repetition of [*dvirvacane*] employed in "*dvirvacane 'ci*";² We have (an unpoetic use of) sequential ordering in "*tūdūlātūra*";³ of zeugma (*dipaka*) in *gām aśvam*;⁴ of embodiment of doubt (*sasandeha*) in "it may be [a man] or a post";⁵ of denial (*apahnuti*) in "This is not silver";⁶ of periphrasis (*paryāyakta*) in "the fat man eats not in the daytime";⁷ of equal pairing (*tulyayogitā*) in "*sthā-ghuor ic ca*";⁸ of *oprastutaprasaṇḍā*¹⁰ in all those [enunciations of Pāṇini] which are indicative [of some extraneous fact], as for example his use of the word *anta* [in 1.4.14] in defining the technical designation "word," for this use implies that the principle of *tadantavidhi* cannot be applied when a suffix is used in the defining of a technical designation.¹¹ We have ākṣepa (a hint in the form of a denial)¹² in the double options (*ubhayatruṇibhāgāḥ*) [of Pāṇini], because, in order to prescribe particular options, he denies even that which he seeks before prescribing it, on the principle that after [the whole area] is levelled by a prohibition, [the particulars may be reconstituted].¹³ We have hyperbole in "The bowl is an ocean," or "The Vindhya Mountain grew so high it seized the path of the sun";¹⁴ and other figures in like fashion.

As such [examples] are of no use to poetry, it is subordinated suggestion, the heart of figurative speech, which, when defined, defines the figures properly. By it they are completely defined, that is, contained; otherwise, our definitions must surely fall short of the mark.¹⁵

Our author states this in speaking of reciting the peculiarities of each particular figure. There can be no general definition of hyperbole, *vakrokti* (striking expression)¹⁶, *sile*, and the like, if they lack beauty. So it is this subordinated suggestion, since the beauty [of a figure] is dependent on it, that furnishes the general definition.

Furthermore, the beauty of a suggested meaning is no more than its ability to manifest *rasa*, and since *rasa*, as the end product of the aesthetic process, is itself bliss, there is no infinite regress here.¹⁷

For they are endless: We have explained this in Chapter One in commenting on our author's statement that "the possibilities of speech are endless."¹⁸

But now, it is not the case that a second [subordinate] figure appears in every figure of speech. So how can all figures be included by defining subordinated suggestion? The objection is needless. The suggestion which is subordinate may be a fact (or situation), or it may be a *rasa*. Our author states this in the words, *There is also an area of subordinated suggestion, etc.* In a different way: that is, by the suggestion's being of a fact or of a *rasa*.

Or, one may lay the ground for the author's remark in a different way, as follows. It might be objected that if the figures of speech are to be defined by means of subordinated suggestion, why is that definition not now given? To which the author replies by saying, *There is also an area of subordinated suggestion, etc.* Here the word "area" will mean area to be defined. And how is it to be defined? By defining it as a type, different from that of *dhvani* (predominant suggestion),¹⁹ where the poet accompanies the expressed statement by the suggestion of a fact or situation. So, when suggestion (*vyanigya*) has been defined, and the subordinate variety of it has been described, what further definition is there to give? This is the final meaning.

Having thus established that suggestion (*dhvani*) is the soul of poetry, he sums up with the passage that begins with "This [second form]" and ends with "some touch of suggested meaning." Then, to show that this suggestion, as it is the secret of the poetry of all great poets, is no matter of deception or idle praise, he says, *Those who are wise ill honor it, etc.*

1. This is the standard *Nyāya* example of *upamāna*, *NyāyaSBhāṣya* 1.1.6.
2. The *khalavali* is the wooden post in the center of a threshing floor. To it is tied the ox who tramples out the grain.
3. Pāṇ. 1.1.59. The Kāśikā's *Vṛtti* on this sūtra is *dvirvacanant itte 'ci ajādeśah sthānivad bhavati dvirvacana*

eva kartavye, "when there follows directly a vowel (i.e. a suffix beginning with a vowel) which causes reduplication. [the substitute for a vowel acts like its base form] while the reduplication is to be made." Thus it takes the word dvirvacane twice, each time in a different sense. The Siddhāntakaumudi has a different interpretation, but also takes the word dvirvacane in two different senses (as dvirvacananimitte and as dvirvacane). The double meaning is necessary, as the sūtra must express two conditions if correct forms are to be generated from it.

4. Pān. 4.3.94. The full sūtra is tūdīsalāturavarmotsūcavārdā dhaṭchandhaṇiyataḥ, "To tūdī, salātura, varmoṭi, and tūcavārda are appended respectively the suffixes dhaṭ, chan, ḍhaṇ, and yataḥ."

5. The words are possibly taken from a verse quoted in the Mahābhāṣya under 2.2.29, Vārt. I: ahar ahar nayamāno gām aśvam puruṣam paśum / vānuṣvato na tryayati surāyā itva durmodi, "Though every day consuming ox, horse, man, and beast, death is no more slaked than is a drunkard by his rum." As the word nayamāno is construed with both gām and aśvam, the sentence qualifies as a dīpaka.

6. The logicians' stock example of doubt.

7. Another example taken from the logicians. After the erroneous perception that "this is silver," the correction, if it occurs, takes the form, "This is not silver."

8. For definitions of paryāyakta see Bhāmaha 3.8, Daṇḍin 2.295, Udbhaṭa with Indurāja 4.6. The definitions of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin will apply to any roundabout way of conveying information and so would include the here quoted sentence, which may be regarded as simply a periphrasis of "the fat man eats at night." The same statement has been quoted before by Abhinava (1.4g L and note 21) as the Mīmāṃsaka's stock example of material implication (arthāpatti).

9. Pān. 1.2.17. The sūtra prescribes the effect of certain suffixes on the verbal root *sthō* and on those roots which are technically called *ghu*. As both *sthō* and *ghu* refer to entities within the same area of discourse (both are verbal roots), the figure is here identified as *tulyayogitā*, not *dīpaka*. Compare what was said in 1.13f L, note 1.

10. See 1.13j A and note 1.

11. Normally, in Pāṇini's work we are to interpret a mere suffix as referring to a word ending in that suffix. This rule of interpretation is called *tadantavidhi*. But the rule does not hold in the defining of technical designations. Pāṇini does not state this exception explicitly, but gives us an indication of it by defining "word" as "that which ends in a case-ending or personal ending" (*suptināntam padam*), for if there were no such exception, he would have omitted the word *anta* ("which ends in").

12. See 1.13e. A and note 3.

13. An *ubhayatratvibhāṣā* is a *pratiṣedhapūrvavikalpaḥ* "an option preceded by a prohibition," just as the figure of speech *ākṣepa* is a *pratiṣedhapūrvako viśesapratipattiḥ* "the conveying of a particular, preceded by a prohibition." Hence the illustration furnished by Abhinava. An explanation of why an *ubhayatratvibhāṣā* came to be regarded as a *pratiṣedhapūrvavikalpaḥ* cannot be given briefly and a reader who is intimidated by Sanskrit grammar is advised to skip the rest of this note. Pān. 1.1.44 defines

the term *vibhāṣā* thus: *na vetti vibhāṣā*. The *Kāśikā*, following the guidance of Patañjali, interpreted this to mean "[If the operation may either] not [take place], or [take place], [the situation shall be called]" "*vibhāṣā*" (option). Paul Kiparski (p. 228) has shown that this is certainly not what Pāṇini intended, but the interpretation has become standard among Sanskrit grammarians and is said to explain why Pāṇini did not use the simple word *vā* ("or") in many instances of option. The argument runs thus. Options are of three sorts. A *prāptavibhāṣā* is where something already prescribed is made optional. For example, of the root *svi*, to swell, we are told that the *vi* must convert to *u* before weak endings (6.1.15). Thus one generates the form *susvatuḥ*, "they both swelled." However, the form without contraction, *sūsvyatuh*, must also be allowed. Such an option will be a *prāptavibhāṣā*, for it makes a previous rule only optional. It will be seen that a *prāptavibhāṣā* is in effect an optional rejection of a rule. On the other hand, before strong endings there is no rule for contraction of *vi* in *svi*. Thus we generate the form *susvāya* "be swelled" (with strengthening of the *vi* to *vāy* by Pāṇ. 7.2.115). But the form *susāv* (with *vi* contracted to *u*, which is then strengthened to *āv*) must also be allowed. This will be an *aprāptavibhāṣā*, for it is an option to follow a procedure (contraction before a strong ending) for which there exists no rule. It will be seen that an *aprāptavibhāṣā* is in effect an optional prescription. Now if Pāṇini, when he came to allow these options in 6.1.30, had simply said *vā svēḥ*, "[contraction] of *svi* may occur [in the perfect tense]," we might understand either that the *prāptavibhāṣā* was allowed, or that the *aprāptavibhāṣā* was allowed, but not both, because, so say the commentators, the force of *vā* would be used up in making the one type of option and would no longer be available for the other. Hence Pāṇini invented the special term *vibhāṣā* to permit a third type of option, the double option (*ubhayatrvibhāṣā*). The force of this word *vibhāṣā*, says the *Kāśikā*, is first to prohibit (*pratiṣedha*) contraction of *svi* by levelling the whole area (*somūrtte viṣaye*), and then to inaugurate a particular option. Thus the technical term "*vibhāṣā*," or its referent, a double option, is in effect an option preceded by a proscription. 14. The first of these examples is frequently used in the *Mahābhāṣya* (e.g., on 1.4.24, 2.3.50, 2.3.67, 3.2.110). In all cases it is followed by *vindhyo vṛdhitakam*, "The heap of rice is a *Vindhya*." It is not clear to me why Abhinava has changed the second example. 15. Literally, "otherwise there would be an *avyāpti*," that is, a definition of insufficient extension. J. Masson is tempted to emend to *ati-vyāpti*. The trouble with the traditional definition of simile, he says, is that it is too wide, not too narrow. It includes such mundane statements as "a wild ox is like a domestic ox," as well as the poetic uses. This is true, but only from the viewpoint of particular definitions. They are too wide. But from the viewpoint of a general definition, the traditional work of the *śāstri*-*kārikas* is too narrow. Even if we add up all their definitions of the figures, we never arrive at the heart of figurative speech, at that quality of it which

gives beauty to poetry. 16. Abhinava seems to take *vakrokti* here as the name of a specific figure. 17. It might be argued that if the beauty of the *alanikāras* is caused by the beauty of subordinated suggestion, that beauty in turn must be caused by some other factor, and that factor by still another. But if the beauty of subordinated suggestion is tied to *rasa*, there will be no infinite regress, for *rasa* is the end product of the aesthetic process. It is itself bliss. 18. In 1.1 c L, where Abhinava assigned three meanings to "speech" (*vāk*): word, meaning and denotative function. 19. Here lies the main difference between Abhinava's second (and therefore preferred) interpretation and his first. In the first, the words "in a different way" were taken to mean "in a way different from the suggestion of a figure of speech." Under the present interpretation they are taken to mean "different from the definition of *dhvani*."

K Of the words of great poets, even if they contain [other] ornaments (figures of speech), this luster of the suggested is the foremost gem, like bashfulness in women.

A By means of it even a trite subject is brought to a special kind of beauty. For example:

Prompted by intimacy and by Love's command,
the soft-eyed damsel uses graceful gestures
which are indescribable and come forth ever new.
I must find some solitary spot to ponder them
with my whole thought in constant meditation.

The literal sense of the word *ke 'pi* is "indescribable." What beauty is not given by the easy and endless suggested sense arising from this?¹

1. The suggestion, as BP points out, is that the gestures must be utterly delightful since they are incapable of being defined.

L The words foremost and gem go together [although in the Sanskrit they are separated]. The phrase "even if they contain [other]

ornaments" [means also by implication] "even if they are devoid of ornaments." The luster, that is, resplendence, brought about by what is suggested is like bashfulness,¹ as they both come to life from a beauty the essence of which is concealment. Bashfulness is the chief gem of ladies even if they are wearing jewels. Bashfulness is that by which a luster is suggested² in the form of that beauty of the heart which bursts forth from inner emotion, for bashfulness is a manifestation of emotion in the form of a desire to hide the workings of love which are bursting forth from within. For we see no trace of bashfulness in ascetics who are devoid of the emotions of love, even if their loincloth is taken away. For an example [of bashfulness] see the stanza of a certain poet, "She freezes like a deer."³

Also [one may take *pratiyamānacchāyā lajjā* to mean] bashfulness which gives beauty to the suggested yearning, beseeching, and hurt pride of one's beloved.⁴ For the ocean of love, meeting with the embankment of bashfulness, constantly throws forth amorous gestures in the form of mutual alterations of eyes and limbs; all this is the working of bashfulness, which is a beauty the essence of which is concealment.

Prompted by intimacy: The command is imperative, being given by the holy teacher, Love, whose rule is honored throughout the world and who can therefore dispel bashfulness and timidity. The gestures are presented at the time of intimacy, that is, at the time of love-play, when the command is obeyed, as it must be, by the dropping of fear and bashfulness. The gestures are of a soft-eyed damsel; this shows that they are rendered pure by glances appropriate to her being overcome by the genuine enjoyment of love-play. By gestures are meant all the other amorous alterations of eyes and limbs; hence they are said to be *akṣunnāḥ*, that is to say, they flash forth at every moment in new forms. They are to be meditated upon —here the gerundive has the sense of "can be" and "should be"⁵—with one's whole (thought), that is, with no other object of attention, by one who has retired to a solitary spot. This is because they are "indescribable"; they cannot be understood in any other way.

1. In this analysis of *pratiyamānacchāyā lajjā*, Abhinava takes *pratiyamānacchāyā* as a *madhyamapadolopī karmadhāraya*, with *pratiyamānacchāyā* as the upameya and *lajjā* as the upamāna. 2. Here Abhinava is taking *pratiyamānacchāyā* as an instrumental bahuvrīhi modifying *lajjā*. 3. The

complete stanza is printed at the foot of p. 476 of the Kashi edition of our text. In English one may give it thus:

She freezes like a deer fascinated by a song;
she asks her friend to tell again the tidings of her dear one;
she daydreams without sleeping: O, I know the signs;
Cupid has begun to water the new flower in her heart.

The point of Abhinava's quoting the verse is that it expresses how bashfulness restrains the passion springing from the heart. The stanza is quoted by Mammata and Hemacandra and is attributed by Sūktim. to Trivikramabhaṭṭa. Trivikrama was the author of the *Nalacampū* and the *Maddīlasacampū*; see Raghavan, *Bhoja's SP*, pp. 783, 801. There exists an inscription of A.D. 915 composed by him. The stanza in question might well be placed in the mouth of the heroine's confidante. 4. Literally, "bashfulness by which there arises a luster of the suggested yearning," etc. This third interpretation is like the second in taking *pratyamānacchāyā* as a *bahuvrīhi*, but this time the *bahuvrīhi* is regarded as *vyādhikarana*. The word *anunātha* seems to have been forgotten by the dictionaries. Here, as in *Kathāsaritsāgara* 2.6.89 (*kupitānunāthanāni*), it means beseeching, conciliation, begging for forgiveness. 5. Pāṇ. 3.3.169 and 172.

K The understanding of a different matter that may appear by a change of voice (*kāku*), it being subordinate, belongs to this variety of suggestion.

A The understanding of a different matter that appears by a change of voice, if the suggested matter is subordinate [to that which is denoted by the words], belongs to this variety of poetry characterized by subordinated suggestion. As in "They will be safe, the Dhārtarāṣṭras, while I am alive?"¹

Or as in:

So I am an adulteress? Come off it, chaste wife!
You have not sullied your character?
But I am not like the wife of a somebody
who is making love to a barber;²

[Sattasai 5.17]

because it is primarily the direct force of the words, which is only helped out by the change of voice which one may infer from the inherent capability of the denoted meanings, that is here the cause of our understanding the particular [suggested] meaning; not the change of voice alone. For if we were to change the matter of which the words speak, no change of voice that the speaker might invent could give us an understanding of such a meaning.

As the meaning is obtained from the inherent capability of the [directly denoted] meanings, although it is strengthened by the operation of the words in conjunction with a particular change of voice, it belongs to the type called suggested meaning (*vyanigya*); and when we apprehend the meaning of a denotation of this particular sort [viz., of the sort qualified by change of voice], as following upon the direct designation, we refer to the poetry which suggests such a meaning as the poetry of subordinated suggestion (*gunibhūtavyanigya*). For any poem which states a direct meaning qualified by a particular suggestion is a case of subordinated suggestion.

1. *Venisamhāra* 1.10 (Madras), 1.8 (Poona). The words are Bhima's and so imply the opposite. We would attain the effect in English by raising and accenting the word "I," and not dropping the voice at the end of the sentence.
2. Abhinava will explain the tone used in each phrase and the suggestions.

L [The *Kārikā*] furnishes another example of subordinated suggestion: The understanding of a different matter, etc. The word *kāku*¹ is derived from the verbal root *kaka* "to be greedy" (*Dh.P.* 1.90). The derivation from greediness is because a word by being enunciated in the expectant or non-expectant [tone] seeks for [i.e., is greedy for] a meaning over and above its ordinary sense. Or, the derivation may be from *ku* in the sense of "a little, slightly," with the substitution of *kā* for *ku* (by *Pāṇ.* 6.3.105) [plus *ku* meaning earth or ground]. Thus, *kāku* is the "slight ground" by which we apprehend the matter that is in the speaker's heart. Now, the type of poetry where we "understand a different matter" by means of this "slight ground" belongs to the type of subordinated suggestion. The reason why it belongs to this type is that the suggested sense is here subordinated. By the phrase "the understanding of a different matter" the *Kārikā* is referring to a poem; it does not mean that the understanding itself is subordinated suggestion. Or, [one may say that] a poem is so described [viz., as

subordinated suggestion] because of the understanding [through kāku of some further sense subordinated to the poem's literal sense].

Others explain that this variety [guṇibhūtavyāṇigya] occurs only when the sense suggested [by kāku] is subordinated,² saying that otherwise we should have dhvani proper. This is wrong, for when kāku is used, the suggestion that unfolds from it is always subordinate because it is touched upon (or revealed by) a word. This is because, as kāku is a particular property of a word, [the suggestion] which the kāku touches upon is merely aided (*anugṛhīta*) by it, just as the suggestions are aided by an [additional] word in "Thus did the Gopī once express a hint to Hari" (2.21 d A), or "The subtle lass smiled and to show her meaning folded the petals of the lotus" (2.22 a A).³ That is why, if we were to add kāku to the verse, "Go your rounds freely, pious monk," that verse would become subordinated suggestion (rather than dhvani), for everyone would take its suggestion as hereby being made obvious.

They will be safe: The tones on the separate elements of this line: *svasthā*, *bhavanti*, *mayi jivati*, *Dhārtarāṣṭrāḥ*, are varied by being expectant, fiery, interrupted, high-pitched, rising, and falling.⁴ The tone touches upon the suggestion that the thing is impossible, that it is utterly wrong, and being aided by this suggestion transforms the denoted sense, now embellished by the suggestion, into a symptom of anger.⁵

So I am an adulteress: [Abhinava translates the Prakrit verse into Sanskrit and then comments:] "So I am an adulteress" has the tone of an admission but is expectant and spoken with ridicule. Come off it: as this is delivered with non-expectant tone, it carries a hint.⁶ **Chaste wife:** with fiery tone and a sneer. You have not sullied your character: in expectant and interrupted tone.⁷ But I am not like the wife of a somebody who is making love to a barber: that is, to an outcaste. This is delivered in non-expectant tone, interrupted and with ridicule. The whole stanza is addressed to a lady of good family but who is in love with a barber, by the speaker, whose adultery the lady had seen and ridiculed. The stanza furnishes ridicule in return. What is important in the stanza is the tone (kāku) in which it is spoken.

In order to show the subordination [of the suggestion] he proves first that it is touched by [i.e., forms an object of] the component words: [because it is] the direct force of the words, etc. But then, one may ask, how can the meaning be "suggested"?⁸ Anticipating this question, our author says, As the meaning is [obtained], etc. Next he shows that [this suggested meaning] is subordinate: [and when

we apprehend the meaning as following upon] the direct designation. The process of suggestion follows upon and is therefore subordinate to direct designation. As we apprehend [in cases of *kāku*] a direct meaning as qualified by a particular suggestion, it is assumed that the poem is revelatory of just that [viz., of a particular suggestion] and it takes its name [viz., the poetry of subordinated suggestion] from that. It follows that wherever we find *kāku*, we have subordinated suggestion. So those who would speak of a metonymy of reversed sense (*viparītalakṣaṇā*)⁹ in such a line as "I will not crush in my anger a hundred Kauravas in battle"¹⁰ have not judged the matter properly. For we understand the negative here as being itself negated by force of the fiery, high-pitched, interrupted and expectant tone on *na kōpāt* ("not ... in my anger"), which we apprehend at the very time that the words are pronounced and which is [placed on these words] because of [Bhīma's] feeling that the peace policy pursued by Yudhiṣṭhīra is insufferable. As none of the obstacles is here present, such as blocking of the primary meaning, which require resorting to metonymy, what chance is there for metonymy to come into play? In a Vedic phrase like "one must sacrifice on the *darsa*,"¹¹ as there is no other means available such as change of tone, there may well be metonymy by reversed sense. But enough on an incidental matter.¹²

1. In the commentary which now follows Abhinava combines the sense which *kāku* bears in the works of the Ālāṅkārikas (a change of voice indicative of some extra meaning) with the sense which it bears in *BhāNS* 17.102ff. To Bharata *kāku* is one of the properties of enunciation along with pitch, place of utterance, phonetic content and concatenation. Tone in general rather than change of tone seems to be what Bharata has in mind. He divides *kāku* into expectant (*sāpekṣa*) and non-expectant (*nirapeksa*). As so used, "expectant" means an interrogative tone, "non-expectant" a declarative tone. These terms have a different sense in the grammatical literature; see *Mahābhāṣya* on 2.1.1. V. M. Kulkarni, *The Treatment of Intonation*, gives a useful summary of the views of later Ālāṅkārikas on *kāku*. But he says nothing of the varieties other than *sāpekṣa* and *nirapeksa*, for which see note 4 below.
2. The normal meaning of the *Vṛtti*'s phrase *gunibhāve sati* would certainly be the sense given by these "others," viz., so long as, or only where, there is subordination. But Abhinava has noticed that neither *Kārikā* nor *Vṛitti* ever gives an example of *kāku* functioning as predominant suggestion or *dhvani*. Accordingly, he interprets the phrase to mean "since there is subordination." Thus by a dubious interpretation he improves on his author.
3. One must not push Abhinava's analogy too far. All he means to do is to reinforce the

fact that the word on which *kāku* is placed takes as object the very same suggestion that is unfolded by the *kāku*. The *kāku* does not, however, "give away" the suggestion in the way that the words *sālesam* and *arpitākūtam* give away the suggestions in his analogies. Without the words *svasthā*, *bhavanti*, etc., we would not know at all to what the impossibility referred. In Abhinava's analogies on the other hand, the suggestion is already presented, at least to a trained audience, before the words *sālesam* and *arpitākūtam* are added.

4. Of these six adjectives we have already spoken of "expectant" in note 1 above. "Fiery" (*dīpta*) is what Bharata calls an ornament (*BHNS* 17.113) by which he means a special type of tone. "Interrupted" (*gadgada*) is a term not used by Bharata; see note 7 below. "High-pitched" is a term for the top two notes of the scale (Abh. Vol. 2, p. 398, line 8 of commentary). "Rising" (*dipana*) and "falling" (*prasomana*) are types of concatenation (*BHNS* 17.130). What is meant by the last two terms refers probably to volume rather than pitch. How these varieties of tone are to be distributed among the words of the stanza, one will have to imagine as best one can, for Abhinava is silent on the matter.

5. The process as envisaged by Abhinava is this. The context of the sentence (its being spoken by Bhima, who hates the Dhārtarāṣṭras) suggests to us that the literal sense of the sentence is something impossible. The tone (with its particular varieties, pitch, and concatenations) strengthens this suggestion and so transforms the literal sense of the words "They will be safe, the Dhārtarāṣṭras, while I am alive," which is already embellished by the suggestion that this is something wrong or impossible, into the emotion anger. As anger (*krodha*) is the basic emotion (*sthāyibhāva*) of *roudravr̥sa*, the use of *kāku*, although an instance of subordinated suggestion, leads ultimately to the highest poetic goal, *rusa*.

6. Any sort of *kāku* carries a hint, but none of the commentators tells us what the hint may here be. Possibly the words hint at the angry argument that must have gone before.

7. *Sagadgada* usually refers to a voice interrupted by sobs. I suppose, though, that it here refers to interruption by laughter. It would then be a type of concatenation (*anīga*).

8. One might think rather that the meaning is directly expressed.

9. For *viparītalakṣaṇa* see Translation pp. 64, 85, 190, 580.

10. *Venīśāmpāṭa* 1.17 (Madras), 1.15 (Poona).

11. One would expect *darsā* to mean on the day of the first seeing (from *dr̥śi*, to see) of the moon. The common opinion of the Śrautasūtrns, however, is that one should perform the *darsā* sacrifice on the day of the dark of the moon (*amāvasyām*). Accordingly, various improbable explanations were found for taking *darsā* to mean *amāvasyām*. The present explanation, that *darsā* means its opposite, viz., the day on which the moon is not seen, is used by Kṣīrasvāmin on *AK* 1.3.8. Dhūrtasvāmin on Āpastambha Śrautasūtra 1.1 says that the *darsā* is the day on which the moon is seen by the sages to be in conjunction with the sun. The *Matsyapurāṇa*, as quoted by Śabdakalpadruma s.v. *darsā* explains it as the day when the moon and sun see each other.

12. The incidental matter

is the interpretation of the Vedic *darsē yajeta*. The distinction of *kākvā guṇī-bhūtavyaṛgya* from *viparītalakṣandī* is pertinent and important.

K And the sensitive reader should not assign the name of *dhvani* to that area which can reasonably be perceived as belonging to this [subordinated] variety [of suggestion].

A For the paths of *dhvani* and of subordinated suggestion are sometimes found merged in a poem. That one of the two which has the benefit of reason should give its designation to the poem. One should not be unduly partial to *dhvani* in all cases. For example:

"With this, touch the moon in your husband's crest,"
was the laughing benediction spoken by her friend
after lacquering her foot; to which Pārvatī
said not a word but struck the girl with her garland.¹

[KumSam. 7.19]

Or again:

Her lover, reaching her high flowers from a branch
had called her by another woman's name.
The lady stood, her eyes suffused with tears,
saying nothing, scratching with her foot the earth.²

[Kirātārjuniya 8.14]

In both stanzas, as the phrases "without a word" and "saying nothing" appear by their negatives to denote to some extent the suggestion [furnished by the remainder of the stanza], it seems best to take the suggestion as subordinated. It is when the suggested meaning appears as the sentence meaning without any indirect statement [to the same effect]³ that we can speak of that [meaning] as predominant, as in "While the heavenly visitor was speaking."⁴ But here there is a literal statement, at least in an indirect way (*bhangyā*), so the literal statement also is important (literally, "predominant"). Accordingly, we should not designate these stanzas as *dhvani* of the type where the [literal sense is subordinated to a] suggestion [which] resembles a reverberation.⁵

1. Pārvati's attendant friend is decking her for her wedding to Śiva. Abhinava will point out the suggestions. 2. The flowers had grown too high for the lady to reach. For references in Sanskrit poetry to the reaction of a woman to being addressed by another woman's name, see Ingalls, *An Anthology*, Intro. to Sect. 21, Para. 5. The lady is here hurt but too proud to remark on the error. Scratching the ground with the toe is often given as a symptom of sadness; cf. BhāgP. 3.23.50, 10.29.29. 3. Two of the NS MSS read *tasmād yatrakṛtīm vīnā* in place of *yadā vatrakṛtīm vīnā* and their reading is accepted by Jacobi and Badarīnāth Sarmā. But it is easier to see how the latter reading with its unusual use of *vatrakṛtīm* might have been changed into the former than vice versa. Furthermore, *vatrakṛtīm* is just the right expression, for it is not a question here of what is clearly an *uktī*, but of what is indirectly (*vakrena*) or indistinctly an *uktī*. 4. KumSam. 6.84; see above, 2.22.A. 5. See 3.1 K.

L Our author now distinguishes an area where there is a mixture [of the characteristics of *dhvani* and of *gunibhūtavaryarigya*]: And the sensitive reader should not, etc. In saying reasonably, he means by reason of apprehending [a greater] beauty.¹

With this, etc.: Her friend says, With this, [may you touch the moon], etc., for the moon will attain a greater beauty by being tinged with laquer; and by this she instructs the bride not to give in straightway to what her husband will desire but to do so only after he has placated her by frequent obeisance at her feet. The crescent of the moon is borne on Śiva's head. By praying that she conquer it, the suggestion is that she will overcome her fellow wives.²

Without a word [she struck the girl]: Although this [action] suggests such things as shyness, bashful concealment of emotion, joy, anger, fear, pride of beauty, still these suggestions act only to supplement the meaning directly expressed by "without a word," namely the lack, appropriate to maidens, of a ready reply. It is the [direct] meaning as supplemented by these suggestions that goes toward forming the *śringārārasa*.

Her lover, etc.: By high flowers the poet means those which the lady could not reach herself and so had asked him to pick. But my teacher³ has said that *uccoīh* [does not go with the word *kusumāni*, "flowers," but] means "in a high or loud voice." Her lover had said, "These are beautiful flowers, so-and-so, take them, take them," and calling thus in a high voice had presented them to her with a great

show of honor. And that is why the poet says that she was *lambhitā*, made to receive or suffer [the other woman's name].

Saying nothing: The suggestion [of the stanza] that it would not be proper for the lady to show her hurt pride at his remembering another beloved on such an amorous occasion and that this [reticence] adds to her burden of grief, simply beautifies the direct statement which negates her speaking. This is what our author will say in here there is a literal statement, at least in an indirect way.

Of that: he means, of that suggested meaning. But here: he means, in the verse "With this, touch the moon," etc. The word also should be taken as out of order, [i.e., it goes with "predominant" rather than with "statement"]. He means that the direct statement is predominant in and by itself, while remaining subordinate with respect to the *rasa*, etc., which is developed. That is why he specifies, in the last sentence of his comment, that the *dhvani* from which it differs is a resemblance to reverberation.⁴

1. That is, if he judges the direct statement to furnish a greater beauty, he will designate the passage as subordinated suggestion; if the suggestion strikes him as more beautiful, he will call it *dhvani*. 2. This is a more tasteful interpretation, and I think more in accord with Kālidāsa's intent, than that of Mallinātha, who sees in the benediction only a reference to the sexual gymnastics soon to be practised by the newlyweds. 3. The reference is probably to Bhāṭṭendurāja, but could be to Bhāṭṭatauta. This is the only passage in the *Loocānā* where Abhinava seems to favor an interpretation that we are told is different from that of his teacher. The teacher's interpretation here seems to me ridiculous, but it was followed by Mallinātha. 4. It is doubtful if such was Ānanda's intention. He probably meant no more than that in cases like these the literal statement is as important as the suggestions, and that it is therefore to our aesthetic judgment to decide which is the more beautiful; on that basis we are to apply the designation *dhvani* or *gunībhūtavyāṇīya*. The only reason he specifies *anurājanarūpavyāṇīya* is that that is the type of *dhvani* to which one would assign the stanzas if one regarded the suggestion as predominant. They would then be placed in the same category with the stanza, "While the heavenly visitor was speaking" (2.22 A). But by taking the word *prādhānyam* literally and shifting the position of *api* Abhinava allows the two stanzas quoted in this section to qualify more logically as *rosadhvani* (see the next *Kārikā*), for although the literal meaning is predominant over the suggested, it is subordinate to an immediate (*asamṛaksyakrama* as opposed to *anurājanarūpavyāṇīya*) realization of *śringārārasa*.

K This type of poetry also, where the suggestion is subordinated, may take on the nature of *dhvani* when regarded from the viewpoint of its final meaning, if that meaning is a *rasa*, etc.

A Even the type of poetry where the suggestion is subordinated may again turn into *dhvani* when regarded from the viewpoint of *rasa*, or *bhāva*, etc., furnished by the sentence meaning. Such is the case in the two stanzas just quoted, as also in:

"Rādhā is hard to please, most favored sir,
since her tears have been falling even as you dry them
with that skirt from your beloved's loins.
Women are hard-hearted, and so enough:
leave off your blandishments." May Hari,
so reproved in his solicitations,
bring you welfare.¹

Such being the case, one may say of the words in the stanza "It is already a humiliation" (cf. 3.16 A) that although they furnish a literal sense qualified by [subordinated] suggestions, they are suggestive [just like *dhvani*] with respect to the *rasa* that forms the ultimate meaning of their sentence. One should not mistake them for furnishing that type of *dhvani* where the literal meaning is shifted to some other sense,² because the words here preserve their literal sense. In them we apprehend a denoted meaning as qualified by suggested meanings, not as altered into a suggested meaning. Accordingly, the sentence as a whole is an instance of *dhvani*; the words are instances of subordinated suggestion. And it is not only words containing subordinated suggestion that may reveal *alakṣyakramavyāṅgyadhvani* (that type of *dhvani* where the passage to the suggested sense is imperceptible). Words instancing a type of *dhvani* where the literal meaning is shifted to another sense may likewise reveal it.³ For example, in that same stanza the word Rāvana is of this other type and is similarly revelatory. But where the final meaning of the sentence is not a *rasa*, although the individual words may

suggest it, one can only say that subordinated suggestion is a property of the group of words.⁴ Examples are such verses as the following:

They serve even kings,
they enjoy even sense-obj;
and they love women:
men must indeed be clever creatures!⁵

One should devote great care to distinguishing the predominant and the subordinate among the literal and suggested meanings in order to recognize clearly the true areas of *dhvani*, subordinated suggestion, and the figures of speech. Otherwise, one will fall into confusion over the areas of even well-known figures of speech. For instance, take the following stanza:

He reckoned not expense of beauty's substance
nor the infinite pains that he employed;
nor did he stick at firing the hearts of men
who heretofore had dwelt without constraint.
And yet, poor lady, she's undone
from lack of lover matched in quality.
What purpose had the Creator
in making the body of this slender maid?

(Dharmakīrti)⁶

There is a commentator who has interpreted this stanza as containing the figure trick praise,⁷ but this is not sound, for it does not fit well to have what is said here end up as no more than a figure of speech. In the first place these cannot be the words of a lover, for the words, "poor lady, she's undone from lack of lover matched in quality" would be impossible for such a speaker. Next, they cannot be spoken by an ascetic, for his whole way of life would be opposed to such notions. Furthermore, the stanza is not reported to come from any larger work, by which we might imagine a meaning pertinent to its context. Accordingly, it must be an allegory (*aprastutapṛusāṁśā*),⁸ for by the subordination of the literal sense there appears [the suggestion]⁹ of a lament by a man puffed up with pride in his uncommon talents, on seeing that others fail to recognize his qualities because he has fired their jealousy by the degree of his brilliance. What is more, the verse is commonly ascribed to Dharmakīrti and this is just as one might expect, for in this other stanza he reveals the same intention.

My philosophy, into which the brightest minds
 have not trusted themselves to plunge,
 of which the ultimate truth has not been s
 by their greatest effort, has failed to find i
 a philosopher worthy of its challenge:
 it will grow old within myself like the unplumbed
 waters of the sea within the sea.

[Dharmakīrti]¹⁰

1. Hari (Krishna) has returned from some other amour to find his Rādhā weeping. He tries to appease her, wiping away her tears with his skirt, without realizing that on arising from his recent bout of love he had donned the skirt of the girl with whom he had been lying. In a culture where men and women wore skirts of similar cut, such confusions did not seem improbable. They figure not seldom in Sanskrit erotic poetry; see SRK 847 and Subhā 1441, 1442, 1443. The stanza here is in the form of a benediction, to which a rasa (*rasavadarikāra*) is subordinate, as in "The women of the Triple City." Ānanda and Abhinava are not concerned, however, about the relation between the *rasavadarikāra* and the ultimate meaning of the verse (viz., a *vastudhvani* of the loveableness of Krishna and thence the rasa of the poet's love of God). They are concerned rather with the relation of the suggestions of the individual words to the rasa of the *rasavadarikāra*. This rasa is the flavor of love-in-separation, where the separation is caused by jealousy (*irṣyāvipralambhaśringāra*). It is primarily suggested by the literal sense of Rādhā's words taken as a whole, but is helped out by the subordinated suggestions of the individual words. These subordinated suggestions are enumerated by Abhinava in his comment. Ānanda will point out that the relation between these two sorts of suggestion, i.e., between the *gunihūtavyāngya* of the individual words and the *rasadhvani* of the sentence, is the same as in the stanza "It is already a humiliation" (3.16 A). 2. That is to say, the stanza does not exemplify the *arthāntarasamkrāmitavācyā* variety of *avivakṣitavācyā-dhvani*, for which see 2.1. 3. The sentence is awkward in Sanskrit because of the repetition *vyanigya vyanigya vyanjakni*, and more awkward still in English. What Ānanda means is this. Not only words containing a subordinated suggestion, such as *me yad arayāḥ, tatrāpy asau tāpasaḥ*, etc., but also words containing *dhvani*, such as "Rāvana" (for "Rāvana" here is an instance of *arthāntarasamkrāmitavācyā*, which has been categorized as a type of *dhvani*), are capable of embellishing the literal sense and so leading ultimately to *rasadhvani*. 4. In such cases the subordinated suggestions do not qualify or embellish the literal meaning so that it may lead on to *rasa*. 5. The suggestions are that it is impossible to do these things without receiving the opposite of what one seeks. Accordingly, Abhinava claims that

one apprehends from the stanza *nirveda*, indifference to worldly things which is the basic emotion of the *rasa* of peace. But the chief charm (*camatkāra*) of the stanza lies not in the *rasa* but in the neat presentation of the literal meaning. We have not been able to trace the source of the stanza. In the second *pāda* the reading of the Kashi text (*vīyam apy upayūjyate*) makes nonsense. *Vīyam apy upobhūjyate*, found in one *NS* MS, is not much better. J. M. has suggested the emendation which we here translate: *vīyayam api bhūjyate*. It is clear that Abhinava read two occurrences of *api* in the stanza.

6. Ānanda (see below) believed the stanza to be by Dharmakīrti. It is ascribed to Dharmakīrti by the anthologies: *SRK* 454, *SubhĀ.* 1472, *SubhM.* 50.9, and by Kṣemendra, *Aucityavīcāracarō* 11. In most of the quotations the stanza is regarded as simply referring to a young woman. Such was clearly Kṣemendra's opinion, while the anthologies always place the stanza under the category of women or young women. Ānanda and Abhinava, and much later Appayya Dīkṣita (*Kudalayānanda* 72) take it as an allegory. Their arguments in favor of allegory are set forth in what follows.

7. That is to say, by appearing to censure the lady through censure of her creator, one is made aware of the extraordinary beauty of which she is possessed.

8. For trick praise (*vyājastuti*) a knowledge of the context is indispensable. But for *aprasutaprasaṁsa*, when it is used in an isolated stanza (*a muktaka*), a knowledge of the context is not necessary, as, in fact, there is no context in the case of such stanzas.

9. "For by the subordination of the literal sense there appears a suggestion" (*vācyena gunibhūtātmanā*). This phrase explains the pertinence of Ānanda's exemplar stanza, which has been questioned. It was quoted to illustrate the importance of distinguishing which is predominant and which subordinate among the literal and suggested meanings, so that one will not confuse the areas even of well known figures of speech. Now in *aprasutaprasaṁsa* of the fifth type (where like suggests like, i.e., allegory) Ānanda has said (1.13 j A) that we may have either *dhvani* (where the literal is subordinate) or a mere figure of speech (where the literal is predominant). In the exemplar stanza the literal is subordinate, so we have a case of *dhvani*. On the other hand, in trick praise Abhinava has said (1.13 k L, which doubtless reflects correctly Ānanda's view) that the literal meaning is merely embellished by (i.e., not subordinate to) the suggestion. Thus it is a mere figure of speech. So if we take the view of Ānanda's opponent, the exemplar stanza will be merely a figure of speech, while if we take Ānanda's view, it will constitute *dhvani*. This distinction is not made by Mammata, according to whose categories both trick praise and allegory are instances of the type of suggestion which he calls *vācyasiddhyānigavyānygo* (Mammata 5.126-127, a suggestion which is necessary in order to make sense of the literal). If one follows Mammata's categories, one will suppose that Ānanda has chosen an impertinent example.

10. Quoted in *K. Anu.*, *Viveka* 553. Other laments of Dharmakīrti on the lack of understanding shown for his works will be found in *SRK* 1726, 1729.

L Carrying this line of argument to its conclusion, he brings into full light the doctrine that *dhvani* is the soul of poetry: This type of poetry, etc.

The two stanzas: he means in the two stanzas of similar color, "With this, touch the moon," etc., and ["Her lover, reaching," etc.]. By the word "two" he excludes the stanza "While the heavenly visitor was speaking."

Rādhā is hard to please: Rādhā had become angry without reason. Her lover had fallen at her feet and said to her, "You will not forgive me. Ah, you are hard to please. Do not weep." And now he wipes away her tears. This is her speech, admitting that she is unappeasable. Much favored sir: this suggests "since your other sweetheart cannot part with you for a moment without leaving you with some ornament from your intercourse." With that skirt: she means, "Just look at it, that skirt, which you so prize that without any shame you are wearing it." As you dried them: from this we see that the tears are falling in a thousand streams. And your heart is so far gone that you forget me and are thinking of her, that she is angry. Otherwise you would not act as you are acting. Have been falling: the sense is that the time for my weeping is now past. And if you ask why I do not give up my anger with your showing me so much honor, the answer is that women's hearts are hard. The word "women" here refers to the mere object without any connection with love; and such is its nature. As applied to herself, the words suggest that the phrase "young women are tenderhearted" is nonsense. Their heart must be harder than a diamond if it doesn't break into a thousand pieces at a discovery of this sort. Blandishments: which you use only out of politeness. Solicitations: the plural suggests that this lover of many women must assume this posture time and again, that he is extremely well favored in love.

Such in essence are the suggestions which ornament [and so are subordinated to] the denoted sense of the words. But the denoted sense so ornamented becomes itself a component of [and so subordinated to] the true *rasa* of love in separation in its variety of jealousy.

As for a commentator who has explained that in these three stanzas the suggested senses [of the individual words] are a component of *rasa*, he has sold the image of the god to get enough money for its festival; because at this rate the subordination of suggestion [to the literal sense], which is the matter under discussion, would be wholly

destroyed. For in the case of a suggested meaning other than a *rasa*, etc., [i.e., in the cases of *vastudhvani* and *alankāradhvani*], the suggestion's being a component of *rasa*, just that and nothing else, makes it predominant [over the literal meaning]. But enough of arguing with an older member of my family.¹

Such being the case: the sense is, since a difference has been established between *dhvani* and subordinated suggestion in the manner just stated. Then, to explain the word "also" in the Kārikā, our author says, And it is not only, etc. The stanza [to which he is referring, namely, "It is already a humiliation," etc.] has been quoted before, so he does not here write it out in full.

But where, etc.: although we apprehend here [viz., in the stanza, "They serve even kings," etc.] the *rasa* of peace, which is identifiable with a disinterest in worldly things, the charm of the stanza lies in the literal sense. The suggestions, namely that the actions [expressed in the stanza] are impossible or bring about the opposite [of what one intends], merely follow along with the literal.² They are already touched upon [i.e., prematurely revealed] by the two words "even," of which each is to be doubly construed,³ by the word "and," which construes with three clauses,⁴ by the word "indeed," which is doubly construed [with "clever" and with "men"], and by the word "men."⁵ And so these suggestions are subordinated. Our author shows that a consideration of this distinction [between *dhvani* and subordinated suggestion] is not without use: One should devote great care, etc.

And the figures of speech: Where there is no suggested element at all, the predominance is of pure figures of speech. Otherwise: that is, if one does not make an effort. The force of the word even is this, that all the more surely is there ground for confusion in the type of suggestion to which he has just referred.

By the word substance is suggested that it was his most precious wealth, which had been useful to him in many creations.⁶ He reckoned not: on the other hand, one who spends his wealth slowly and not in a flash like lightning does of necessity reckon it. But the Creator, although he had been at work for endless years, used no consideration at all. Thus God showed no forethought. . . And so the poet speaks of infinite pains. Who had dwelt without constraint: that is, unchained [by desire]. And yet, she: the words "and yet" (*api* and *eva*) suggest that it is a great crime to destroy the very thing one has created. What purpose: the sense is none, for himself, for the world, and for what he had created.

For such a speaker: For a lover the expressions "poor lady" and "she's undone" would be unseemly, the first because it would contain disparagement, the second because it would be inauspicious; while the words from lack of lover matched in quality would cast unseemly aspersion upon himself. If he could not find the possibility of that role in himself, he would be no better than an animal to keep on loving her.

To this argument, however, there are possible objections. Why should these not be the words of a lover who has for some reason undertaken a vow of abstinence for some time, or who might be like Rāvaṇa with respect to Sītā, or who might be like Duṣyanta with respect to Śakuntalā before he knew to what caste she belonged; in which case the words could admit of a pride in his own qualifications as a lover and of his praise of the lady. Neither are the words impossible for an ascetic, who might see the lady, although with impartiality, as she really is through the influence of his memory of passion experienced from the endless span of his former births. After all, he who has put aside passion does not see things topsy turvy. The notes of a lyre do not sound to him like the cawing of a crow. Accordingly, if the stanza is taken to be about the subject which it states, the words would be possible for either [lover or ascetic]. If you take it as an allegory, you must show that the unintended subject [the matter actually stated] is something possible [of the intended matter]. For one cannot have an allegory about light that says, "Ah, curses on you for your blackness." As the allegory (*aprastutaprośamsā*) is dependent on the stated matter, there must be nothing in that matter which is impossible [in the allegory].

With these objections in mind our author states: Furthermore, the stanza is not, etc. By the four sentence-elements *nīḥsāmāṇya* (uncommon), *nījamahimā* (his brilliance), *vīśeṣajñam* [*na paśyataḥ*] ([seeing that others fail] to recognize his qualities), and *paridevitam* (lament), our author explains the [suggested] meaning of each successive line in the stanza.⁸ But what proof is there of this interpretation? Our author proceeds to answer the question: What is more, etc. But the objector may say, what if the stanza is [commonly ascribed to Dharmakīrti]? With this in mind, our author shows how the meaning furnished by a verse indubitably written by Dharmakīrti agrees with the meaning of this stanza: and this is just as one might suspect.

In which they have not trusted themselves to plunge: how much less have they really acquired it! The ultimate truth, beyond even such precious objects as the Kaustubha jewel,⁹ has not been received. Has failed to find: has not obtained, despite [my] strenuous efforts, a

pratigrāhaka (one who understands in return for being taught) worthy of it, [just as the sea] has not found a worthy counter-creature [*prati-grāha*] to any of its sea-born beings such as Airāvata, Ucchaiḥśravas, and Dhanvantari.¹⁰

The very same notion: he means, a lament. The literal sense so far [in the two stanzas just adduced] shows two figures of speech, allegory [in the stanza "He reckoned not expence," etc.] and simile [in the stanza "My philosophy," etc.]. But [in the case of the prior stanza], immediately after [apprehending the figure of speech], one becomes filled with amazement at the speaker himself, and so the aesthetic sense [of the reader] comes to rest in the *rasa* of wonder. Of the second stanza one should judge thus: that its point of rest is the *rasa* of heroism, for it touches on a moral hero (*dharma-vīra*) by its showing the benevolence of the speaker when one thinks that such [a philosophy], which is of great benefit by its producing heroic energy in the bearer because of its awesome reputation and the fact that it can be understood only with difficulty, has been made to favor a few select persons.¹¹ Otherwise, what would a mere lament amount to? If you claim that he is informing us that he acted without thinking of the consequences, what would that prove, as such a lament could be of no use either to himself or to others? So enough of the matter.

1. What Abhinava objects to in his older relative's interpretation of the stanza is that the *Candrikā*, the commentary written by this older relative, made the individual word meanings directly subordinate to the *rasa*, instead of directly subordinate to the sentence meaning which furnishes the *rasa*.
2. Compare 1.13 k A (Summary Verses 1 and 2). 3. Abhinava would interpret the literal sense as: "They even go into service and they even serve kings; they even enjoy and they enjoy even sense-obj' ts." This sense by itself goes a good way toward expressing the difficulty or impossibility of what men do.
4. The literal sense by its accumulation of three activities shows the difficulty of what men do.
5. That men (the word denotes a being who is not super-human) should do these difficult or impossible things implies in itself without any need for suggestion that they will not attain their object.
6. That is to say, the Creator had been drawing on his stock frugally whenever he wished to make a beautiful creature.
7. Thus, "Curses on your blackness" could serve as the *aprstutārtha* only in an allegory where the *prastutārtha* was some such object as a villain, a false doctrine, etc.
8. Each successive line is given by a couplet of lines in the English translation.
9. Abhinava is continuing the suggestion thrown out by plunging or diving. The Kaustubha jewel was one of the precious obj' ts hidden in the ocean.

10. Abhinava sees a play on words in *pratigrāhaka*, thus concluding the oceanic suggestions with which the stanza begins. The three creatures named were respectively the elephant, horse, and physician, among the precious objects churned up from the sea by the gods. 11. Abhinava has two reasons in mind for assigning the final effect of the stanza "My philosophy," etc., to *vīrarasa*. (1) The stanza shows Dharmakirti to have been a *dharmaśāstra* in composing a work so beneficial to others. (2) His philosophy rouses heroic energy (*utsāha*, which is the *sthānyabhdva* of *vīrarasa*) in its bearers. The syntax by which he joins the two reasons is awkward.

A And there are three ways of writing an *aprastutaprasāmsā* (here = allegory). Sometimes the literal sense is intended by the speaker, sometimes not intended,¹ sometimes partly intended and partly unintended. Of these an example where the literal is intended is this:

It suffers pressure for others' sake; is sweet when broken;
even in altered state it is prized by all.

What if it fails to grow if cast on barren land:
is this the fault of the sugar cane or of the hostile desert?

[*Bhallaṭa-sataka* 56]²

Another is my own verse:

These things which seem so beautiful achieve
their purpose surely by becoming objects,
if but for one brief moment, of the eye:
that eye, which in a world devoid of light
has now become the equal, or less, alas,
than equal, of the body's other parts.³

In these two stanzas the sugar cane and the eye, although intended in the literal sense,⁴ are not the subjects that the poet has in mind. What he does have in mind is through the final meaning to describe a man of great virtue who has not received high reward because he has fallen into the wrong situation.

§ 3.40 a A]

An example where the literal sense is unintended is:

"Who are you, sir?" "I will say it; I am a thorn tree
brought to misery by fate."
"You speak as if disgusted with the world."
"You've guessed aright." "But why do you speak thus?"
"You see that banyan on the left,
which every traveler honors with attendance?
I too stand by the wayside,
but to help a guest I have not even shade to offer."³

As questions and answers with a species of tree are impossible, the literal sense is unintended and we understand the final meaning of this stanza to be the lament of some poor man of intelligence in the presence of an evil man who is rich.

An example where the literal sense is [partly] intended and [partly] unintended is this:

For putting a fence around this *bodari*
that grows in an out of the way spot,
is ugly, and lacks flower, leaf, and fruit,
every one, O peasant, will laugh at you.⁴

In this stanza the literal meaning is not wholly possible nor is it impossible.

Accordingly, one should note with care whether the literal and the suggested senses of a verse are predominant or subordinate.

1. By "intended" Ānanda means inherently possible. 2. The stanza was quoted under 1.14 A, which see together with note 6 thereon. 3. This stanza also is in *Bhallaṭa*, as number 68. As remarked above (1.14 A, note 6), the *Bhallaṭasataka* is an anthology drawn from many authors. The allegory is this. A great poet, like a man's eye, can reveal the beauty of the world. But if he lacks a patron, or an audience, his activity is of no more use, in fact of even less use, than that of any other man. 4. Since what is said of them is inherently possible. 5. The verse is frequently quoted but without ascription of author: *Sāriṇī* 1046, *Subh. A.* 822, *Dhanika* on *DR* 4.9, *Mammaṭa* 10.99 (verse 447), *Kuṇḍa* ad 67. 6. This anonymous Prakrit stanza is given by Hemacandra. *Ālārikāśūḍḍmanī* 546 (*KĀnu.* p. 360), together with a word for word repetition of Ānanda's and most of Abhinava's comments. The *bodari* (*Zizyphus jujuba*, Hindi *ber*) is a thorn tree, which in favorable circumstances produces a small, edible but rather tasteless fruit. The literal sense of the stanza is certainly possible, but Ānanda apparently considered it improbable that a peasant would do anything so foolish. Hence he regards the literal

sense as intended and unintended. The suggestion, for which see *L* below, arises from the fact that the word *bodari* is feminine.

L Now it may be objected that we may well choose an allegorical interpretation where the literal sense will not fit, but here [in the stanza "He reckoned not expense," etc.] the literal sense fits. With this in mind, our author shows that we may have allegory even when the literal sense does fit. To show it, he begins: And there are three ways, etc.

[These things which seem]'surely: the poet means those things by which the world is beautified. The construction [of what follows] is: that eye, of which these things, having become for a moment the object, attain their purpose. Devoid of light: devoid of discrimination. Less than equal: for the hand is still useful for touching or taking things. Other parts: he means even those which are most useless. The compound *apraptaparabhadgasya* is to be analysed as: of a man by whom high, that is, outstanding, reward—in the form of receiving wealth or of becoming famous—has not been received.

I will say it, etc.: this is the reply. The suggestion is this: that I really should not tell you, for it will distress you to hear it; but if you insist, I will say it. As if disgusted: the disgust is suggested by the tone of voice and by the words "brought to misery by fate." You've guessed aright: this is the second reply. Why: the question is as to the cause of disgust. [Why do you] speak thus: [the suggestion is that] the answers began with a painful recollection and that what was stated was stated with difficulty. On the left: the sense is that it is characterized by such faults as inferior birth. Banyan: a tree which is proud simply because of its shade, although it is devoid of fruit or flower. Even shade: because the *sākhotaka* thorn-tree [as it grows in burning-grounds] has its branches and leaves scorched by the funeral fires.

Our author states the reason why the literal sense is not intended here: as questions and answers are impossible.

An evil man (*asatpuruṣa*) who is rich: If one takes the reading *satpuruṣa*,² one will have to understand the meaning to be a man who is good so far as mere wealth goes but not good in virtue.

Is not entirely: We cannot say that there is no basis for the existence of the literal sense, because the suggested sense [which is just as improbable] does exist.³ Thus, where it is said that the tree "grows in

an out of the way spot," [it is suggested that] the woman is not born of a good family. That it is ugly [suggests that] she lacks charm. It is said that the tree lacks fruit, flowers, and leaves. This suggests that even a woman of this sort [i.e., low-born and ugly] might be protected if she had sons, or if, through her brothers, etc., she had a group of relatives to care for her. O peasant, by putting a fence around this *badarī* you will be laughed at by everyone; this is the sense.

Having thus described the figure of allegory (*aprastutapraśamsā*) since the occasion presented itself [in connection with the verse "He reckoned not expense," etc.], he now sums up the matter that was at issue: Accordingly. The sense is: because we see that people are confused in regard to the figure of allegory in the stanza "He reckoned not expense," etc.

1. The *pratīka* seems to be wrongly given. One wants "*amī ye dṛṣyanta iti*" in place of "*nānv iti*." 2. Of the recorded manuscripts none has this reading. 3. I am uncertain of the translation of this sentence. The double *nāsti* in our text is surely a printer's error of ditto-*graphy*. *K.M.* reads *vācyā eva niyamo nāstīti*; the *Vidyabhāvanā* edition reads *vācyabhbhāvaniyamo nāstīti*. J. Masson would emend to *vācyabhbhāvaniyamo 'sti nāstīti*. Patwardhan would omit the whole phrase, as it is absent in *Hemacandra* (see above, 3.40a A, note 6). If we keep it, as I (D.I.) have done, there is a question of what *Abhinava* can mean. In all cases of *aprastutapraśamsā* there is a suggested meaning. In itself this does not rule out the literal meaning as being intended also. It seems to me, therefore, that he should mean that the literal meaning is improbable, but no more improbable than the suggested meaning. That is why the verse is not "wholly possible or impossible." It may be that some lines have dropped out of the text, as there is no other Prakrit verse in the book where *Abhinava* fails to give a *chāgyā*.

K By reference to the predominance or subordination of the suggested meaning the two types of poetry have thus been assigned their places. What is other than these is called *citra* (display).¹ *Citra* is assigned to two types depending on word and meaning. Of it one type is verbal *citra*; the other is semantic *citra*.

1.13a A, note 2 and the *Vṛtti* on the present stanza, especially

A Where the suggested meaning is predominant we have the type of poetry called *dhvani*; where it is subordinate, we have *gunabhūtavyayāgya* (the poetry of subordinated suggestion). That which is different from these, namely poetry which lacks *rasa* or an emotion (*bhāva*) as its final meaning, which lacks the power to reveal any particular suggested meaning, which is composed only by relying on novelties of literal sense and expression, and which gives the appearance of a picture, is *citra*. It is not real poetry [just as a picture is not the real thing], for it is an imitation of poetry. One type of this *citra* is verbal *citra*, such as difficult arrangements,¹ *yamakas* (echo alliterations),² and the like. Semantic *citra* differs from verbal *citra* and may be exemplified by poetic fancy (*utprekṣā*) and such figures, when they carry no suggested sense and lack any final meaning of *rasa*, etc. because of predominance of the literal meaning.

But what is this thing called *citra*, where there is no touch of a suggested meaning? For suggested meaning has already been shown to be of three sorts. Now we may let the word *citra* apply to that case where there is no suggestion of a thing (or situation) or of a figure of speech. But where there is no reference to the *rasas*, etc., there cannot be any type of poetry at all. Because poetry cannot be about nothing; and everything in the world necessarily becomes a constituent of a *rasa* or a *bhāva*, if only by its ultimately being a determinant (*vibhāva*) thereof. This is because the *rasas* are particular states of mind and there is nothing that does not produce some state of mind. If there were, it would not be in the area of poetry. And here you have described a certain area of poetry as being *citra*.

1. See 2.15 L, note 1. It is doubtless from these difficult pictorial arrangements (*citrabandha*) rather than from the factitious nature of pictures that the term *citra* actually originated. Stanzas were arranged in the shape of swords, drums, wheels, etc. Examples may be found in Ānandavardhana's *Devīśatata*, in *Kirātārjuniya*, canto 15, and in Māgha's canto 19. Similar tricks may be found in Greek in the *Anthologia Palatina*, Book 15, where they are known as *technopaignia*. What characterizes the *citrabandha* is an interlocking of the syllables which outline the various parts of the object represented. It is therefore difficult to compose. English pictorial verses, sometimes called topiary verses, usually depend for their effect on typographical arrangement. They

may be amusing, like the tale (tail) of a mouse in Alice in Wonderland, but they are not difficult to compose. 2. See 2.15 *L*, note 1.

L Having thus described the nature of suggestion, what is there to say of passages that entirely lack it? To treat of this subject we are given two Kārikās: By reference to the predominance, etc.

Verbal *citra*: this is well known as containing such pictorial effects as *yamaka*, *cakrabandha*,¹ etc. Semantic *citra* may be conceived as similar [in lack of suggestion, etc.]. This is what he means. The appearance of a picture: that is, it lacks the vitality of the *rasas* and is like the imitation of a real thing.

But what is this thing: viz., this notion that is about to be stated in the objection. The question is answered [i.e., the reprehended notion is given] by the words: where there is no touch, etc. The objector gives his own opinion in the words: For suggested meaning, etc.

About nothing: he means that poetry cannot be nonsense, like the string of syllables *ka-ca-ṭa-ta-pa*, or meaningless from lack of syntax, like "ten pomegranates, six pancakes," etc.²

An objector now anticipates an explanation, viz., that *citra* may very well not be within the area of poetry: [And you have described] a certain area of poetry, etc. He means that although *citra* has not been directly identified as poetry, the author must still admit that it falls in the scope of poetry because it would be as out of place to speak of anything other than poetry here as it would be to tell stories of Vāsuki.³ Now if it does lie within a poet's scope, it must give rise to delight and that ends up as simply the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, and *vyabhicāribhāvas*.⁴

1. A stanza written in the form of a wheel. An example is Śīśupāla 19.120, where the first three lines, each divided in half, may be written as six spokes, and the fourth line as the rim, of a wheel. It follows that every fourth syllable of the rim must form the initial syllable of one of the spokes, while the hub consists of the common central syllable of the first three lines. 2. See 1.4 b *L*, note 10. 3. Vāsuki, the king of snakes, lives in the nether world. Hence his adventures are taken as an example of that which has no pertinence to the matter of this world which the author has in hand. 4. For it is the combination of these factors that furnishes *rasa*, the sole source of aesthetic delight.

A To this we may say the following. It is true that there is no species of poetry where there is no apprehension of the *rasas*, etc. When, however, a poet, having no intention of revealing by his words a *rasa*, or *bhāva*, etc., composes mere figures of sound and sense, we may regard his composition from the viewpoint of his intention as being without *rasa*, etc. For the meaning of the words in a poem is greatly strengthened by the author's intention. By force of the inherent capability of the literal sense there may be an apprehension of *rasa*, even though the author had no intention of revealing it; but that apprehension will be very weak. In this way too we may regard such a composition as without *rasa*¹ and so assign it to the area of *citra*.

The matter is stated as follows:

That is the area of *citra* where the author's intent is not to write on the subject of *rasas* or *bhāvus*, etc., but to compose figures of speech.

But when the intention of the author, as the final sense of his composition, is the *rasas*, etc., one may say that there is no poetry that is not in the sphere of *dhvani*.²

We have set up this *citra* from our observing the way in which some poets of unconstrained speech have gone about the writing of poetry without regard to making the *rasas*, etc., their final meaning. But for modern poets, now that correct guide rules are being established, there is no sort of poetry other than *dhvani*. For the performance of mature poets has no beauty unless its final goal is the *rasas*, etc. When the *rasas*, etc., are the final goal, there is nothing that can be brought into connection with the intended *rasa* which does not gain in beauty thereby. There is even no insentient thing which cannot, either through its forming, as each case may require, some contextual factor (*vibhāva*), or by one's ascribing to it a sentient activity, be brought into connection with a *rasa*. And so it is said:

In poetry's endless worlds
the poet alone is God;
the universe revolves
according to his nod.

If the poet writes of love,
the world assumes its flavor;
if he becomes dispassionate,
all things lose their savor.

A true poet may treat unliving t
as living, and living as unliving;
his wish sole master of all propri
by his withdrawal or his giving.³

1. One of the meanings listed for the negative in Sanskrit is "very little." The meanings are listed in the following verse: *sādr̥ṣyam tadabhbāvā ca tad-*
anyatvam tadalpatā / aprūṣṭyam virodhas ca nañarthāḥ sat prakāśitāḥ // The *Mahābhāṣya* on 1.4.24, Vārt. 3 (Kielhorn 1.327.20) gives as examples of the negative used in the sense of very little alomikaidikā (a goat with no hair, that is with very little hair), anudarā kanyā (a young girl with no belly, that is with a slender belly). See also Mallinātha on *KumSam* 4.33. 2. Abhinava attributes these two verses to the author of the *Vṛtti*. 3. These verses too are doubtless by Ānanda. Abhinava quotes the second stanza in *ABh* Vol. 1, p. 294, specifically attributing it to Ānandavardhana. The first two stanzas are quoted, without attribution, by *Agnipurāṇa* 339.10–11; see Kane *HSP* pp. 7–8 and Raghavan, *Bhoja's SP*, pp. 479–80.

L When, however: he means, when an author does not apply the sort of circumspection in introducing figures of speech that was spoken of in the verse: "The intention must be to keep them subordinate and never acting as the chief element," etc. (2.18 *K*).

As being without *rasa*: he means, that one will find no taste (*rasa*) in it, as in a meat dish concocted by a cook ignorant of the culinary art. Here it might be objected that from the beauty of the thing itself there must be some relish of it, just as there is of a *si-kharīṇī*,⁴ even if prepared by one without skill. With this in mind, our author says, By force of the inherent capability of the literal sense, etc.

In this way too: Previously he had been speaking of a complete lack; now he is speaking of a weakness of *rasa*. Such is the sense given

by the word "too" (*api*). Furthermore, if a *sikharinī* has been prepared by one who is ignorant, there will be persons who will not exclaim in wonder at his art, "Ah, what a *sikharinī*," but who will say, "This is an unpleasant mixture of curds, sugar, and pepper."

Is stated: he means, by himself. [To compose figures of speech:] he means, to compose figures of sound and figures of sense.

But, an objector may ask, what was the point in specifying that "what [is other than that] is called *citra*" (3.41 K), since you have already said that it is not poetry at all? If you claim to have pointed it out as something to be avoided, you should also state that by making pots one does not become a poet.² With such an objection in mind, our author explains that poets have indeed written this [type of literature] and on this account he points it out as something to be avoided. Thus, We have set up this term, etc.

Mature poets: that is, poets whose maturity is shown by their choice of words and meanings appropriate to [the intended] *rasa*. Even the definition [of maturity by Vāmana], "when the words of the poem [being perfect] can no longer be changed,"³ must be said to be aiming at appropriateness of words to the *rasa*, for otherwise it would have no point.

Endless [worlds]: that is, without beginning or end. He then explains how the universe revolves at the poet's wish: If the poet writes of love, etc. A poet writing of love is one who takes delight in relishing the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, and *vyabhicāribhāvas* which have been ascribed to *śringārarasa*, not a man who is addicted to women. This is why the sage Bharata uses the word "poet" [and "poetry"] as primary [examples of the locus of the *bhāvas* and *rasas*], when he says [that the *bhāvas* transmit] "the state of mind (*bhāva*) which is in the poet,"⁴ or that the *bhāvas* "transmit the matter of poetry,"⁵ I have commented on this in my discussion of the nature of the *rasas*.⁶

The world assumes: the sense is, because it is plunged in *rasa*. The word "love" is used as representative of all the *rasas*. If he becomes: the sense is that as soon as he ceases to be a *rasika* (one inspired by the *rasas*), the various *bhāvas* that are seen, although they transmit everyday pleasure, pain, folly, or neutrality, will not form, without the strengthening of a poet's description, a basis for the transcendent relishing of *rasa*.

1. *Sikharinī* is a preparation of curdled milk and sugar. The rationale of the simile is that in preparing a meat dish the skill of the cook is important,

for meat is not, in its natural state, tasty; but a *sītharī*, since its ingredients are naturally tasty and sweet, cannot easily be spoiled. 2. That is, in order to be consistent you should list all the things that are not poetry. Why single out just one, namely *citra*? 3. The quotation is from a verse first found in Vāmana's *Vṛtti* on his *Kāvyañākārasūtra* 1.3.15. Rājaśekhara attributes it to "the followers of Vāmana" (*Vāmaniyāḥ* ... *āhuh*, *KāvyaM*. 5.20 = page 20, lines 9-10), which seems to show that he regarded the *Vṛtti* as not by Vāmana himself. Gopendra Bhūpāla, the 15th-century commentator on Vāmana, attributes the verse, wrongly, to Bhāmaha. 4. *BhNS* 7.2. Abhinava has adduced the passage before, on 1.6. What he would here point out is that the *bhāvōs* are located primarily in the sensitive poet, not in the common man. 5. *BhNS* Intr. to 7.1. Here again, the matter on which the *bhāvōs* (and *rāsas*) are based is said to be the possession of a poet, not of an ordinary person. 6. The reference could be to Abhinava's comment on 1.4 a (see Translation p. 81), or to his comment on 1.18 (see Translation p. 192). It is unlikely that he is here referring to his great discussion of the *rāsas* in *ABh* 6.31, which seems to have been written later than the *Locona* and which contains no passage notably pertinent to the point he is making here.

A Accordingly, if a poet is wholeheartedly intent on a *rasa*, there is nothing whatsoever which he cannot, if he wishes, form into an integral part of that *rasa*, or which, being so integrated, will not increase in beauty. All this is seen in the poetry of great poets. Even in my own works it can be seen as occasion arises. This being the case, no type of poetry falls outside the nature of *dhvani*. As has been said above, even that type of poetry which is characterized by subordinated suggestion, if the poet has regard to [its ultimate goal of] *rasa*, etc., forms part of this [general category of *dhvani*]. But even where the *rasa*, etc., assume a subordinate position, as in clever verses or prayers to the gods, etc.; also where the literal sense as qualified by some suggestion is the predominant element, as it is in *hrdayavati* verses¹ written by clever authors² in *gāthā* meter; in these cases also we must see subordinated suggestion as a derivative of *dhvani*.³ This we have already said. So now that instruction is being offered to modern poets in the true principles of poetry, while *citra* may be much used in the efforts of beginners

who are seeking practice, it is established for mature poets that *dhvani* alone is poetry. The following verses sum up the matter.

Where a *rāsa* or a *bhāva* or the like appears as the final meaning, where a fact or figure of speech is suggested in a hidden way: along that road of poetry, the sensitive critic will recognize that *dhvani* has its realm, being simply the ultimate predominance of the suggested sense.

1. Prakrit riddle verses; see Abhinava below (3.41-42 b L) and note 2 thereon. 2. Read *satprajñatagāthāsu*. The word *satprajñaka* is the Sanskrit form of Prakrit *chapponnaya*, a term regularly used for the clever authors of riddle verses. See A. N. Upadhye, "Chapponnaya-gāhā or the gāthā-kosā," JOIBaroda 9.387-88. 3. One should read *dhvaniniyanda* as in 3.36 b A (Text p. 474, line 2), rather than *dhvaninispanda*.

L The construction here is: "there is nothing which will not increase in beauty." In my own works: such as the *Viśamabāṇālīlā*.¹ In *hrdayavat* verses: that is, in verses called *hrdaya*,² which teach us cleverly the means to the ends of man³ and which are well known in gatherings of Prakrit poets. Clever authors:⁴ authors of literary sensitivity are so called. Their verses are like the following by Bhāṭṭendudrāja:

When she blessed the farmer, saying
"May your phalaki plants
grow higher than the sky,"
his neighbor also was delighted.⁵

In this verse, by a woman's granting a blessing to a farmer with the words "May your cotton plants grow higher than the sky," his neighbor was brought to happiness.⁶ It is the literal sense that is charming, qualified as it is by the suggestion of desire for stolen intercourse.

When the many rose-apples ripen in the thickets
on the bank of the Godāvari,
the farmer's wife puts on a dress
as purple as rose-apple juice.⁷

In this verse, by its saying that when the many rose-apples ripen in the thickets on the bank of the Godāvari the farmer's wife puts on a dress as purple as rose-apple juice, there is a subordinate suggestion of her hiding any possible spots⁸ that might come from her dress being

reddened by the juice of the fruit, as might occur from her hasty, stolen intercourse with her lover.⁹ This should be explanation enough.

Dhvani alone is poetry: What our author means is that in reality the soul and the body are the same, but for the purpose of analysis one may make a distinction.¹⁰

By the use of the [second] word *vā* ("or") our author includes the false or improper *rasa* and *bhāva* that were mentioned before (e.g., 2.3 K). In a hidden way: such that it receives beauty by being hidden. Along that road of poetry: on that path of poetry. Has its realm: as much as to say that the [whole] path of poetry is the realm of the three kinds of *dhvani*.¹¹

1. See Introduction, p. 10.
2. *hiāliyā* seems to have been Abhinava's original reading. The MSS read *oaliyā*, which our text has mistakenly corrected to *hiāoliyā*. The word *hiāli* is the Prakrit equivalent of *hrdayavatī* [*gāthā*], "a stanza which has a heart, i.e., a second meaning, underlying the literal, apparent sense; a riddle, an enigma" (M. V. Patwardhan, *Vajjālagga*, notes, p. 550; Section 64 of the *Vajjālagga* is entitled *hiāli-vajjā*).
3. The sections of the *Vajjālagga* are in general divided in subject matter into *dharma*, *artha*, and *kāma*, but of the *hiāli-vajjā* all the *gāthās* except one deal with *kāma*.
4. Following the *Vṛtti*, we should read *saṭprajñākāḥ*. See 3.41-42b A, note 2.
5. I have emended the text on the basis of BP's statement of a variant in Abhinava's explanation. It says: "A variant reading in the *Locana* is *pāṭivesiyako nirvṛtīm prāpitoh*. This is better. The Prakrit verse and its translation should be emended accordingly." My emendation, then, is: *laṅghīgaṇḍ phalakti-lādū hontu tti vadḍhaantie / halissa dīśam pāṭivesiyako vi niuvudio //* Hereby the riddle of the verse will be why the neighbor should be delighted by a blessing directed to another man. The answer will be that the woman speaking the blessing is giving a hint that the tall *phalakti* plants will make a good place for the neighbor and her to make love. If one keeps Abhinava's text as the editions print it, the Prakrit verse will end with *pāṭivesavuhū vi niuvudī*, "the neighbor's wife was also delighted." But the riddle and its answer are no longer neat. An unspecified woman gives the farmer a blessing and his neighbor's wife, lusting presumably for the farmer, is delighted. Abhinava glosses *phalakti* by *korpāśa* (cotton), but a cotton field, at least such as we have in Virginia, would make a poor place to hide one's love-making. I take *niuvudio* as ppp. of a denominative from *niuvuda* = *nirvṛta*.
6. The translation follows BP's variant reading. See note 5, above.
7. The *jambū* (*Eugenia jambolana*, the Anglo-Indian "rose-apple") is regularly associated by the poets with the Vindhya hills (see note on *SRK*, Translation, 157a) and so, as here, with the Godāvarī River. The *Kādambarī* (p. 37, line 11, to p. 38, line 1) notes that its juice is black-red and

astrigent but sweet (*nīlapatalah kāṣṭyamadhurah jambūphalaraṣah*). In the verse the syllable *su* is to be connected with *pacyamāṇa* as its inflection but goes metrically with the second half verse. 8. *Parabhāga* here means "contrast" (cf. 2.1 a L, note 1), and hence contrasting color, spot. 9. *BP* explains that she would naturally spread her dress on the ground for her lover and herself to lie on.

10. *Abhinava* means that real poetry is inseparable from *dhvani* (in its largest sense, that is, whether the suggestion is predominant or subordinate), just as body and soul are inseparable. *Kārikā* 1.1 stated that *dhvani* is the soul of poetry and *Kārikā* 1.5 that *rasa* (to which *dhvani* leads) is the soul of poetry. Thus, it has analysed *dhvani* and poetry into distinct entities comparable to soul and body. But as *dhvani* is invariably associated with real poetry, we can speak metaphorically (*upacārena*) of identity between them, as between soul and body. 11. Suggestion of a fact, of a figure of speech, or of a *rasa*, etc.

K *Dhvani* appears by fusion (*sarikara*) and association (*samsṛti*) with its own varieties, as well as with subordinated suggestion and with the figures of speech; and furthermore in many ways.

A And many varieties are seen in literature where a fusion or association of this *dhvani* is made with its own varieties, with subordinated suggestion, or with expressed¹ figures of speech. Thus we see:

- dhvani* fused with its own varieties,
- dhvani* associated with its own varieties,
- dhvani* fused with subordinated suggestion,
- dhvani* associated with subordinated suggestion,
- dhvani* fused with one of the expressed figures of speech,
- dhvani* associated with one of the expressed figures of speech,
- dhvani* fused with figures which are themselves associated,
- dhvani* associated with figures which are themselves associated.

Thus *dhvani* appears in many ways.²

Among these ways, the fusing [of an instance of] dhvani with one of its own varieties is sometimes by a relation of assisted and assister (*anugrähānugrähakabhāvena*), as in the stanza "While the heavenly visitor was speaking," (see 2.22 A and note 1) for in it we apprehend a variety of dhvani where the passage to the suggested meaning is imperceptible [viz. a rasadhvani], which is assisted by a type of dhvani based on the power of the situation, where the suggested meaning is at a perceived interval and is like the reverberation of a bell.

Again, there may be a fusion of two varieties of dhvani by a relation which puts us in doubt [as to which variety prevails] by the falling together of the two (*prabhedaduwayasampātasandehena*); as in:

Brother-in-law, your wife
has said something to your holiday guest
so that she sits weeping
in the loft behind the house.
Go comfort the poor girl.³

In this stanza we might take the word "comfort" as shifting the literal sense to another meaning [viz., to "make love to"],⁴ or we might take it as intended in its literal meaning but subordinated to a suggested sense [viz., that you really love her and have ceased to love me].⁵ Nor is there any decisive reason for choosing one interpretation rather than the other.

But by a relation of entering into the same suggestive unit it is very common for a suggestion of the type where there is no perceived interval to fuse with some other variety of its own type. An example is the stanza "White herons circle against dark clouds" (see 2.1 a A).⁶ A case of association of dhvani with one of its own varieties is offered by the very same verse. In it there is the association of that type of dhvani where the literal is shifted to another meaning with the type where the literal is entirely set aside.

1. The term "expressed figures of speech" is used, as Abhinava will point out (3.43 b L), in order to exclude the suggested figures of speech, which are included in dhvani or in subordinated suggestion. 2. Ānanda might easily have added two more categories where the figures of speech are themselves fused. But obviously these multiple combinations can be increased at will. Abhinava disregards them. By way of compensation he elaborates very considerably on Ānanda's first six categories. 3. Author unknown. The word *padohara*, or more correctly *parohada* is probably derived from Sanskrit *paro-*gha and means back yard (*ghoravādayam*); see Patwardhan, *Tājālalagga*, note

on vs. 523. The word occurs in several verses of that work. 4. The suggestion would thus belong to the first variety, viz. *arthāntarasantramitauācya*, of the first type, *anvakṣitauācya*. 5. The suggestion would then belong to the first variety, viz. *alakṣyakramavyāṅgya*, of the second type, *vivakṣitānyaparauācya*. 6. Here we have a fusion of *rasadhvani* and *bhāvadhvani*, as Abhinava will explain. Both of them belong to the type *alakṣyakramavyāṅgya*. Ānanda's quotation of the stanza in 2.1 a A was in order to point out a different sort of suggestion, which he now takes up in the next sentence.

L Having stated a summary of the matter by means of the two stanzas [at the end of 3.41-42 b A], our author recites the following, which shows the manifold varieties of *dhvani*: *Dhvani* appears in many ways. The general meaning of the sentence is that the varieties of *dhvani* are endless by its fusion and association with its own varieties as well as with subordinated suggestion and with the figures of speech. He demonstrates its manifoldness by *Thus, we see, etc.*

There are three types, as it combines¹ with its own varieties, with subordinated suggestion, or with the figures of speech. In each of these types the combination may be by fusion (*sankara*) or by association (*samsṛṣti*), thus making six types. Then there are three varieties of fusion, as the fused elements may stand in a relation of assisted and assistor (*anugrähyānugrähakabhbhāvena*), or may be related in a manner that gives rise to doubt [as to which element prevails] (*sandeḥāspadatvena*), or may be related by their both entering into the same suggestive unit (*ekapadānupravesena*).² Hereby we arrive at twelve types. Furthermore, the varieties of subordinated suggestion are to be counted as thirty-five, just as are the varieties [of *dhvani* proper] which were listed above (viz., in 2.31 L). The varieties of *dhvani* proper being thirty-five and the figures of speech being taken as a single unit, gives seventy-one [varieties with which a combination may be made]. Multiplying this figure by the three types of fusion plus the one type of association gives 284. Multiplying the primary types [which enter into combination] by this figure gives 7,420.³ But as the number of figures of speech is endless, the total number of combinations is innumerable.

Desiring to give examples of a few of these varieties by way of explanation, our author proceeds with four examples of the combination of one variety of *dhvani* with another, these combinations being the most important, as may be seen by the fact that in the *Kārikā* the word *prabhedaiḥ* ("with its own varieties") is the exocentric noun [which the

compounds *sagunibhūtavyaṇigyaḥ* and *sālāṅkāraḥ* modify]: Among these ways.

Which is assisted by: because the erotic mood (*śringārarasa*) in the form of desire is here assisted by the apprehended shyness, which acts as a *vyabhicāribhāva*.

[Brother-in-law:] The word *kṣana* means a festival or holiday. To the woman whom you invited for the holiday [i.e., to your sister-in-law], O brother-in-law, your wife said something, so that she sits weeping in the empty loft in the back yard of the house. Go comfort the poor girl. The woman here spoken of is in love with her brother-in-law and has been addressed sharply by his wife who has learned of the affair. The woman speaking the verse is secretly in love with this "brother-in-law" and has discovered the situation. She speaks about it in order, by indicating that his wife knows about his affair [with his sister-in-law], to cause a quarrel between him and his wife. Here the literal meaning of "comfort her" is shifted to the suggested sense of "comfort her by sexual intercourse," as would be natural in such a private place. Or, we may take the literal sense of "comfort her," intended only as leading to a suggestion of jealous anger, which gives the final meaning to the words, namely, that you are in love with just her. The speaker intends the comfort literally, meaning that the visiting woman is now the proper and uncensured object of his love, but only as leading on to the suggestion that "I have now become an object of scorn." As either of these suggestions serves to reveal the intention of the speaker [viz. her own love for the man addressed], there is no decisive reason for choosing the one or the other. [They are indeed two different forms of *dhvani*], for in the latter case the literal sense of comfort remains, pointing on to the further suggestion, while in the former the shift causes it to assume the very form of the suggestion.

Or, [we may explain in a different way, by saying that] the verse is spoken by a woman who is in love with her brother-in-law and who speaks to him thus after having seen him making love to another woman. This would follow from the use of the vocative, "O brother-in-law," whereas in the previous explanation we have to explain the vocative as used with reference to [the man's relation to] the other woman [rather than to the speaker].⁴

It is very common: Everywhere in poetry the final goal is the *rasas*, etc. Here we find the manifestation of *rasadhvani* and of *bhāva-dhvani* by fusion into the same suggestive unit, for in the stanza "White

herons circle against dark clouds" we relish both the *rasa* of love and its transient state of mind (*vyabhicārin*), the distress of sorrow.⁵

Having thus explained the three sorts of fusion, he now gives an example of association: [A case of association] with one of its own varieties.

In it: in such words as *līpta* (lit., "anointed"; here used as "covered, painted with") the literal meaning is set aside; while in such as "Rāma" it is shifted.

1. We accept *BP*'s variant *sammiṣryate* for the *prakāśyate* of the text.
 2. These are the three basic types of *sārikā* listed by Udbhaṭa (*Vivṛti*) 5.20-26. Udbhaṭa makes a double type of the last, depending on whether both members of the pair occur in one sentence or in one *vākyāṁśa*.
 3. Every careful reader has noticed the discrepancy of this figure; see *BP*, p. 500, or Tripathi, p. 1241. The multiplication of 284 by 35 actually gives 9,940, not 7,420. Abhinava has multiplied by 212, not by 284. Can it be that he regarded two types of fusion (that which gives rise to doubt and that where both members of the pair enter into the same suggestive unit) as impossible between a variety of *dhvani* on the one hand and a subordinated suggestion or figure of speech on the other? This would reduce the total by $(35 + 1) \times 2 \times 35 = 2,520$, and would result in the figure which he gives. But if he made such a reduction on this or other grounds, he should have told his readers.
 4. This last explanation is certainly the most natural one. It was probably Abhinava's own view, as commentators generally, though not always, put their favored view in it.
 5. Compare what Abhinava said of the verse in 2.1 a L.
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A There is fusion of subordinated suggestions [with *dhvani*] in such a stanza as "It is already a humiliation that I should have opponents" [see 3.16 A]; or in

Where is the proud cheater of the dice game,
 he who set afire the house of lac,
 was prompt to seize the hair and dress of Kṛṣṇā,
 and who called the Pāṇḍavas his slaves?
 Where is the ruler of Duhśāsana,
 the elder mentor of a hundred brothers;
 where is Karṇa's friend, Duryodhana?
 Tell him we have come not in anger to see him.'

[Veniśamhāra 5.26]

For here the final meaning of the stanza, which is a *dhvani* of the type where the suggested sense is without perceived interval [from the literal sense], is mixed with [subordinated suggestions expressed by] words which give a literal sense qualified by suggestions. And that is why there is no contradiction when a subordinated suggestion resting on the meaning of a word is fused with a *dhvani* that rests on the meaning of the whole stanza; just as [there is no contradiction in the fusion of *dhvani*] with one of its own varieties. For just as different types of *dhvani* can be fused with each other and, by their resting on word meaning and sentence meaning respectively, give rise to no contradiction, [so also here].

Furthermore, while there would be contradiction between predominant and subordinate if they rested on the same suggested sense, there is no contradiction when they rest on different suggested senses. For that reason too then there is no contradiction. And just as one may speak of fusion and association of several elements with one without contradiction in a relation of denoted and denoter,² we may consider the same absence of contradiction to obtain in a relation of suggested and suggestor.

On the other hand, where some words of a sentence are expressive of a suggestion of the type where the literal sense is unintended and others express the type where the suggestion follows like a reverberation, there we have association [rather than fusion] between *dhvani* and subordinated suggestion. An example is the stanza "Say, happy friend, if all is well still with the bowers" (2.5 f A). In it the words "companions to the dalliance" and "witnesses of Rādhā's love" carry a variety of *dhvani*, while the words "they" and "I know" carry a subordinated suggestion.

1. The last sentence of the stanza is intentionally ambiguous. The natural way of taking the literal sense of the Sanskrit would be, "Tell him that we have not come in anger, but to see him." Given, however, the situation of the play, the character of the speaker Bhima, and the reproaches contained in the preceding lines, the suggested way of taking the sentence is that we have come in anger not to see him but to kill him. 2. The sense is that just as two or more figures of speech (which are *vācya*) may combine in one word (which is *vācaka*), so may two or more suggestions (which are *vyanigra*) combine with one suggestor (*vyanijaka*).

L Having thus exemplified the four types of connection between *dhvani* and one of its own varieties, he proceeds to illustrate them as they occur between *dhvani* and subordinated suggestion: There is fusion of subordinated suggestions, etc.

For here: viz., in these two examples. Where the suggested sense is without perceived interval: viz., is of the *rasa* of fury (*raudra*). Qualified by suggestions: the term shows that the suggestions are subordinate. With words: this is an instrumental of characteristic;¹ the meaning that is so characterized occurs as a subordinated suggestion; with this there is mixture, that is, fusing, of the *dhvani*. And since fusion may occur as a relation of assisted and assistor, or as a combination subject to doubt, or as the entrance of two varieties into the same suggestive unit, it should be assigned to whichever type is possible when it occurs in these two exemplary stanzas. Thus, in the stanzas "It is already a humiliation that I should have opponents" and "Where is the proud cheater," the aesthetic relish of fury is aided by all the word meanings by their functioning as stimulants (*vibhāvas*), etc.²

In the stanza "Where is the proud cheater" one can see a suggestion in every word, every clause, and every compound. So I have not troubled to list them all. The words *Pāndavā yasya dāsāḥ* (lit., "whose slaves the Pāndavas are") are an echo of Duryodhana's own words.³ Here we can find a subordinated suggestion to conjoin, because it is the literal meaning here [as qualified by a suggestion] that furnishes a stimulus (*uddipona-[vibhāva]*) to Bhima's anger.⁴ At the same time, the suggestion that slaves, who serve a master, must of necessity come to see him, is a case of *dhvani* [where an interval from the literal sense is perceived] like the reverberation of a bell. As there is beauty in both these suggestions, there is no valid reason for choosing the one over the other.⁵

[The third type of fusion, namely] the entrance of both members into the same suggestive unit, [is also found in these stanzas,] because the same words furnish subordinated suggested meanings and also, through their manifesting its *vibhāvas*, etc., the *rasa* which is predominant in the stanza.

And that is why: [The initial] sense is, because [such a combination] is seen in the examples [just adduced]. But an objector may insist that a subordinated suggestion and a predominant one are mutually contradictory and that even if it is seen, the combination, because it is contrary to reason (*ayuktatvāt*), will not be believed. With this in mind, our author shows that there is no contradiction, because the suggestive units are different: that is why, etc.⁶

With one of its own: As he has already given examples of *dhvani* joined by fusion to one of its varieties, he now uses them to illustrate [the point here at issue, viz., the lack of contradiction]. He explains: For just as, etc. We must supply "just so here" at the end of the sentence. Or we may read *tathā hi* ("for just so") in place of *yathā hi* ("for just as").

While contradiction may be avoided by a difference of suggestive units when the fusion is one of the first two types, an objector may ask how it can be avoided in the third type, where both suggestions are present in the same suggestive unit. In response to that question our author gives the definitive reason for avoidance: Furthermore.

For that reason too: as the subordinated suggestion is one thing and the predominant is another, what contradiction could there be? But here an objector may say that he has heard these terms fusion and association used with reference to figures of speech but never to suggestions. With this in mind, our author says, And just as, etc. We should consider: he means that by considering, by understanding, we should decide the matter to be so [i.e. without contradiction], for understanding is our final recourse in both cases.

Having thus illustrated the three forms of fusion of *dhvani* with subordinated suggestion, he proceeds to illustrate association: On the other hand, where some words, etc. By the word "some" he rules out fusion.⁷ [In the stanza "Say happy friend"] we have *dhvani* of the form where the literal is unintended in the words "companions" and "witnesses."⁸ By the word "they," although a host of special qualities is suggested, the suggestion is subordinated because the beauty of the stanza derives primarily from remembered love, which is given by the literal sense, [as the word "they" denotes directly the remembered

fronds of the love bowers]. As for the word "I know," although it suggests an endless number of fancied qualities, its literal meaning in the form of knowing or fancying⁹ is primary.

Thus he has completed his illustration of the four types of combination of dhvani with a subordinated suggestion.

1. Abhinava hereby corrects the inexact phrasing of Ānanda. The fusion, strictly speaking, is between the dhvani and the subordinated suggestions (not the words that give them). Thus he rejects the natural interpretation of *padash sammisrotā* ("a mixing with words") for the interpretation "a mixture that has words," as we might interpret "an ox with horns" to be an ox that has horns. 2. Thus in these cases we have fusion of the first type, that is, through a relation of assisted and assister. 3. That is, Duryodhana had originally said, "The Pāṇḍavas are my slaves," and Bhima now repeats his words, changing only the form of the pronoun. 4. Anger is the *sthānybhāva* of the *raudrourusa* which is predominant, as being the ultimate suggestion of the stanza. 5. That is to say that one and the same phrase, *Pāṇḍavā yasya dāśāḥ*, can be regarded as a case of *guṇibhūtavāyanya* or of *arthasākty-udbhāvānurūpanarūpādhvani*. These are mutually contradictory in a single phrase, as the one is from a subordinate category and the other from a predominant. So we should choose one or the other. But as we are left in doubt which to choose, their fusion with the final dhvani of the stanza is of the type "subject to doubt." 6. BP notices Abhinava's odd method of procedure here: "First he comments on the words *ata eva* and then he gives an explanatory introduction to the whole passage from *ata eva* to *na virodhaḥ*." 7. Because in fusion the two elements must join in the same locus. As he here speaks of some words carrying one sort of suggestion and others another, the two sorts can be joined only by association. 8. In their literal sense the words *suhṛd* (friend) and *sākṣin* (witness) can denote only sentient beings. In the stanza in question *suhṛd* ("companions") is used metaphorically (*lakṣṇayā*) to indicate the helpfulness of the bowers to the cowherdesses by offering a secret and lonely place for their trysts, while the word "witnesses" indicates that they were present at Rādhā's love-making with Krishna. The purpose of the metaphorical usage is to suggest the special degree of helpful presence. Thus the dhvani furnished by these words is *avivakṣitavācyā* of the *arthāntarasākramita* variety. 9. The word *jāne* is a close relative of *manye* ("I fancy"), *śāṅke* ("I doubt, I might almost think"), etc., which are standard introductions to poetic fancy (*utprekṣā*); cf. Dandin 2.222.

A That there is fusion of express figures of speech with *dhvani* of unperceived succession is well established in all poetry of *rasa* that makes use of the figures. There is also fusion of the figures with some of the other varieties of *dhvani*, as in this verse of mine:

I am weary from much painting of the world,
for though I used the new and wondrous sight of poets
which busies it If in giving taste to feeling,
and used the insight of philosophers
which shows us objects as they really are,
I never found, O God recumbent on the Ocean,
a joy like that which comes from love of thee.

Here the type of *dhvani* in which a literal meaning is shifted is assisted by the figure known as contradiction.¹

1. The literal meaning of the word *drṣṭi* is shifted by metonymy to the meaning "poetic imagination." There is an apparent contradiction so long as one holds to the literal meaning (for sight cannot busy itself with taste), which is removed as soon as one accepts the shift. As one makes the shift because the contradiction blocks the literal meaning, the shift is assisted by the contradiction. The first three *pādas* of the verse are plagiarized by the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, Chapter on Nirvāṇa, second half, *sarga* 190, vs. 89 (p. 1521), as was first pointed out by V. Raghavan, *JOR* 13, pt. 2 (1936).

L He now exhibits the varieties of combination of *dhvani* with the figures of speech: [That there is fusion of express] figures of speech. The reason for using the word "express" is that if a figure is suggested, it will be included in the eight varieties [of combinations with suggestion] already described. Poetry: for poetry is always of this sort [viz., a poetry of *rasa*]. Well established: The three varieties of fusion, as well as association, can be found in the examples adduced in the Second Book under the *Kārikā* which begins, "The intention must be to keep them subordinate" (2.18 K).¹ In the stanza "Many times you touch the trembling corner of her eye" (2.18-19 A),

the figure metaphor-contrast (*rūpakavyatireka*), previously explained,² functions as assistant to the *śrīgārarasa*,³ while the figure *svabhāvokti* (naturalistic description) [inasmuch as it pervades the whole stanza] enters the same locus with the *śrīgārarasa*.⁴ In the Prakrit stanza "For putting a fence around this *badarī*," (3.40 a A) we may have either a naturalistic description of a peasant or an instance of *dhvani*. As we are given no context, there is no decisive reason for favoring the one or the other.⁵

Although a figure of speech must help the *rasa*, fusion of the two cannot take place in the examples illustrating the principle that "[the figures] should never be oversustained" (2.18 K, with examples given in 2.18-19 e, f A). Hence (what we have there is) association of *rasadhvani* with the figure, as in the stanza "In anger she has bound him" (2.18-19 e A).⁶

The other varieties: that is, the varieties other than *rasadhvani*.

Which busies itself: We have said that a *rasa* consists simply in its own arousal.⁷ In arousing it, poetic imagination is constantly engaged in the business, that is, activity, of a description consisting in the combination of the *vibhāvas*, etc., and then in the construction [of the various suggestors], beginning with phonemes and ending with sentence structure.⁸ To feeling (in Sanskrit, *rosān*, "to the *rasas*): the sense is, in making the *sthāyibhāvas*, which are the essence of what is tasted, to be tasted, that is, in making them fit to be aesthetically relished.⁹ Wondrous: for it comes awake by transcending the stage of perception of things which fall to a normal course of life. It is on that account that poets are called *kavayāḥ*: from their being able to describe [in this wondrous way].¹⁰ New: that is, constructing worlds at every moment with ever new and delightful variations. Sight: that is, in the form of poetic imagination (*pratibhā*). Here we have the figure of speech, contradiction, as if sight, that is, [literally] ocular perception, should give taste to sugar-cakes. Hence it is called "new." The *dhvani* in the word "sight"¹¹ is assisted by this figure. For ocular perception is not entirely unintended, as it is not impossible.¹² Nor is the word "sight" intended only as subordinate to some further [suggested] sense;¹³ rather, it is shifted to another sense, to the sense of imagination which blossoms forth from the constant practice of ocular perception. The contradiction assists in the shift. Our author will say just this further on in the words "is assisted by the figure known as contradiction."

[Two analyses are now given of the compound *pariniṣṭhitārtha-viṣayonmeṣa*.] That same sight, being *pariniṣṭhita*, that is, steady or

firm, had its vision opening upon *arthavisaya*, that is, the objects to be discriminated. We may also take the compound to mean: that sight which had its vision opening upon *parinishita* objects, that is, objects known in the everyday world, rather than upon novel (and fanciful) objects such as would be objects for poets. This insight of philosophers (*vipascit*) is called *vaipasciti*. In saying that he has used both, by his use of the two words *kavindam* ("of poets") and *vaipasciti* ("of philosophers") the author as much as says that he is not really a poet or a philosopher, and so suggests his modesty. His sense is that he borrowed these two sorts of sight from elsewhere, as a poor man might borrow provisions to serve [a guest]. "Both these," for one cannot carry out a description or portrayal [of the world] with one sort of sight. The world: everything [Much painting: the Sanskrit is literally "constantly describing or portraying"]: that is, again and again, without rest; describing it by portrayal and picturing things exactly; deciding by consideration, inference and such means that this is thus and that that is such; cogitating on the smallest details to discover what is the essence here. For when something is portrayed, the portrait is only perfect if the sight is sometimes busily active and sometimes rests motionless with fixed gaze upon one detail or another. I: who was wholly addicted to seeking fanciful¹⁴ and actual visions. Am weary: he means that not only has he failed to find the essence, but quite to the contrary, has found only weariness. The word *ca*, "and" (in "and I found") has the sense of *tu*, "but." Recumbent on the ocean: in yogic sleep.¹⁵ Thou therefore knowest the true nature of the essence; thou hast come to rest in that true nature. Such is the sense. One who is weary will have reverence for one who is at rest. Love of thee: of thee in thy highest form as highest self and essence of the universe; love (*bhakti*), that is, absorption in thee, an absorption born of successive acts of worship performed with such [preparatory virtues] as faith. Nothing even like that have I found, much less anything equal to it.

Accordingly, this stanza represents the words of a man who first took part in devotion to God, then, out of mere curiosity, lived the life of both a poet and philosopher, only at the end to realize once more that repose in the love of God is best.¹⁶ Above the joy that comes from having determined the nature of all objects by every valid means of knowledge, above the joy that is found in relishing transcendent aesthetic flavor, is put the bliss of repose in God the all-highest, for the relishing of aesthetic flavor is no more than the reflection of a drop of that ambrosial bliss. We have said all this before.¹⁷ The final sense is

that everyday joy is generally even lower in value than this, for such joy is contaminated with an even greater amount of pain.

In this same stanza we may [also] find, by reference to the word *dr̥ṣṭi*, fusion [of the third type], where both members of the pair [viz., *dhvani* and the figure, contradiction] enter the same suggestive unit.¹⁸ By other interpretations we may either take the figure of contradiction to lie in the phrase "making use of sight" as opposed to the description (or painting of the world), or we may take the *dhvani* in *dr̥ṣṭi* ("sight") to be of the variety where the literal is wholly abandoned, after the manner of [the literal sense of] the word "blind" [in the stanza "The sun has stolen our affection for the moon" adduced in 2.1 c A]. Of these interpretations there will be no valid reason for preferring the one to the other, as both are equally charming.¹⁹ But this [doubt] cannot be applied to the first interpretation which we gave, for there the word "new" by its verbal suggestion similar to a reverberation completely supports the presence of contradiction [rather than a *dhvani* where the literal sense is abandoned].²⁰

1. In what follows, however, Abhinava illustrates only two of the varieties from the examples of that section. 2. In the previous explanation (2.18-19 L) the recognizing of this figure in the verse was attributed to "others" with whom Abhinava seemed to disagree. The present remark does not mean that he has changed his mind. All he means is that if the presence of *rūpakavyatireka* is accepted, the stanza would be an example of *anugrähyānugrähatbhāvasarikara*, whereas if one accepts the presence of *svabhāvokti* it would be an example of *ekavyāfjakānupravesasarakara*. 3. The fusion of the *dhvani* with the figure *rūpakavyatireka* is therefore of the first type. 4. The fusion of the *dhvani* with the figure *svabhāvokti* is therefore of the third type. 5. Accordingly, the fusion of the *dhvani* with the figure of speech is here of the second type. 6. (Patwardhan) Abhinava here claims that when a figure of speech is left imperfectly developed and is not pursued to its logical end, there cannot be *anugrähyānugrähatbhāvasarikara* between the figure of speech and the *rasadhvani* arising from the stanza as a whole, in view of the phrase *nātīmruhāṇaisitā* in 2.18. The claim is not convincing. For the rule against pursuing a figure of speech to its logical end has been laid down in 2.18 only with the object of promoting the development of *rasa* in a poem. Consequently, the imperfectly developed figure can very well be said to be congenial to the development of *rasa*, which means that an imperfectly developed figure can be regarded as *anugrähaka* (an assistant) of the *rasa*. Further, the statement here by Abhinava that there can be *samsṛṣṭi* (association) between an imperfectly developed figure and *rasadhvani* is not correct. A *samsṛṣṭi*, according to Ānanda (3.43c A), occurs when the two elements

joined together occupy separate and independent parts of an *āśrayabhedā* (a poetry-unit, i.e., a stanza). But in a case where there is a partially developed figure and *rasadhvani*, the partially developed figure occupies only a part of the stanza and the *rasadhvani* pervades the whole of the stanza, covering even that part of the stanza where the partially developed figure is located. Here the two elements (viz. the partially developed figure and *rasadhvani*) cannot be said to be occupying two separate and independent poetry-units. 7. A *rasa* is nothing but its own arousal (*nispattā*). Bharata had spoken of the *nispatti* (arising) of the *rasas* from a combination of the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, and *vyabhicārins*. In 1.18 L Abhinava discusses this *nispatti* and shows that it differs from the activity which proceeds from a normal cause and results in a normal effect, for a *rasa* is nothing but the arousal itself; it is the process of relishing, not a manufactured relish. 8. Apparently the word *varṇa* has dropped out before *prabhṛti*, probably by haplography caused by the preceding *varmanā*. The reference in the second half of the sentence is almost surely to 3.2 K, where the suggestors of *alakṣyakramavayavyāgadhvani* are enumerated. The employment of appropriate *guṇas* and *alaṅkāras* would also be covered by *ghaṭāṇā* (cf. Locana text p. 59.6; 88.1; 104.7; 188.4). 9. In 2.4 L Abhinava remarked: "To say that 'rasas are perceived' is a turn of phrase as when we say, 'he is cooking the rice pudding' [where to be more precise we should really say 'he is cooking the rice grains']." The present passage is analogous. Where Ānanda speaks of a poetic vision that makes the *rasas* have taste, Abhinava takes the real meaning to be a vision which makes the *sthāyibhāvas* into *rasas*.

10. The word *kavī*, "poet," is derived by Indian tradition from the verbal root *ku* "to speak," (*kuri* *sabde*); so Abhinava 1.1 b L (Translation, p. 59 "poetry must be spoken") and 4.6 L (Translation p. 703). Kṣīrasvāmin on AK 2.7.5 derives the word precisely as Abhinava does here: *kavate varṇayati kavī*, "One is called a poet because he speaks, he describes." 11. The *dhvani* is of the *arthāntarasāṅkramitavācya* variety. The meaning is shifted to a metaphorical (*lākṣāṇika*) sense of the word. The purpose (*prayojana*) effected by using the word *drṣṭi* in that metaphorical sense is to suggest the extreme clarity of poetic vision. (*pratidhānasasyādīśphuṭatvam*). This is the *dhvani* that resides in the word *drṣṭi*. 12. Observation of the already existing world is a possible and useful activity of the poet. Abhinava says this is in order to show that the *dhvani* resident in the word *drṣṭi* is based on a shift of the literal meaning. It belongs to the variety *arthāntarasāṅkramitavācya*, not to *atyantatiraskṛtavācya*. 13. It does not belong to the type of *dhvani* called *vivakṣitānyaparavācya*. 14. The poetic vision is unreal (*mithyā*) in reference to the everyday world. Compare the stanza quoted by Ānanda in 4.3 A. 15. In which God contracts the universe into himself. In this state he knows the true essence of the phenomenal world to be identical with the highest *brahman*, for he is it. 16. It is tempting, but by no means safe, to infer that these remarks furnish valid biographical information about

Ānandavardhana. A poet does not always write in propria persona. Ānanda could have portrayed such a man without being one. Again, the character of the speaker, as drawn by Abhinava, is well known in Indian tradition. It would fit Bhartṛhari or Dharmakīrti as well as the speaker of this stanza. We know nothing of Ānanda's life, from which to verify his identification with the man whose emotion he here portrays. And yet I would like to believe it.

17. Unfortunately, Abhinava does not tell us where. Certainly not in the *Locana* or the *Abh.* 18. (Patwardhan) It is all right to say that there is *ārthāntarasankramitavācyadhvani* in the word *drṣṭi*. But it is not correct to say that there is *virodha* in the word *drṣṭi*. The *virodha* is between *drṣṭi* (physical sight) and the idea of its enabling one to enjoy such things as sugar cakes. A *virodha* can exist only between two things. If here it is said to be located in the word *drṣṭi*, that is only a loose expression. What Abhinava means to say is that there is not only *anugrähyānugrähakabhāvasaṅkara* between the *dhvani* and the *virodha* in the first two lines of the stanza, as explained above (viz., in Translation, in the sentence that contains reference to note 11), but also there is *ekapaddānupravesasaṅkara* between the same two elements.

19. Accordingly, the fusion of the *dhvani* with the figure of speech would be of the second variety, subject to doubt (*sandeḥāspada*). But the interpretation by which Abhinava justifies finding this type of fusion in the stanza is not a happy one. BP in explaining it is forced to say that by using sight one sees; to say that "by using sight one describes" is contradictory. Patwardhan writes as follows. "Actually in the third line of the stanza there is mention of both the visions (viz., of the poet and of the philosopher) and not of one vision only. Further, there is no *virodha* at all in the statement that poets describe the entire world by resorting to the two visions. Moreover, in the third line there is no question of *ātyantatiraskṛtvāvācyadhvani* in the word *drṣṭi*, as the third line speaks of the two separate *drṣṭis*, and there is no blockage of the literal sense of the word *drṣṭi*. Since there is neither *virodha* nor *ātyantatiraskṛtvāvācyadhvani* in the third line, the question of the presence of *sandehasaṅkara* between them does not arise at all. Abhinava's attempt to show that there is *sandehasaṅkara* in the third line is anything but successful. In the next sentence he says that the stanza in question is an example of all the three kinds of *sankara*. But it is doubtful that Ānanda intended this. What he seems to have intended is that the stanza exhibits only one kind of *sankara*, viz. that based on *anugrähyānugrähakabhāva*."

20. Let us divide the explanation of this difficult sentence into two parts, explaining first what Abhinava means by it and, second, treating the question of whether the sentence, when understood, is justifiable. First, then, Abhinava means that if we see the contradiction (*virodha*) in the stanza to be between the word "sight" and "gives taste to the rasas," we cannot assign to the word "sight" the sort of *dhvani* where the literal sense is wholly abandoned (*ātyantatiraskṛtvāvācyadhvani*). The word "sight" must preserve some part of

its literal meaning in order for the contradiction to occur. Now, if we are faced with a choice between *virodha* and *atyantatiraskṛtauśyadhuṇi*, there is indeed a valid reason for choosing *virodha*. That reason lies in the word "new" which qualifies the word "sight." This word suggests something fanciful and beyond normal experience and by this suggestion resolves the contradiction. The *virodha* must have been present for the *sabbasaktyanurānadhvani* in the word "new" to resolve it. So there is *virodha* here but no *atyantatiraskṛtauśyadhuṇi* and no fusion at all. On the second question, namely whether Abhinavā is justified, Professor Patwardhan writes as follows. "Actually it is not correct to say that there is verbal suggestion (*sabbasaktyanurānadhvani*) in the word *nauvā* ("new"). For it has one meaning only, viz. novel, i.e., wonderful, and that is directly expressed and not suggested. Further, the fact that there is *virodha* in the first two lines (between physical sight and its enabling one to enjoy tastes (*rūḍhi*) has been already stated and it has been already shown that the *virodha* is set aside when the word *drṣṭi* is understood in the sense of poetic vision. Where is the need now to say that the *virodha* in the first two lines is definitely supported by the word *nauvā* (which is in fact not the case as we have just shown)?"

A We have an association (*samsṛṣti*), however, of *dhuṇi* with an express figure of speech only with reference to single words, for it is where some words carry an express figure of speech and some carry a variety of *dhuṇi* [that we have it]. For example:

There, from the Siprā, every dawn a breeze,
reddened by its friendship with the nectar
of opening lotuses, prolongs the sharp,
sweet cry, amorously indistinct,
of paddy birds; and by its soothing motion
along the limbs of women, like a lover,
carries off their lassitude from love
and makes a flattering request for more.

[Kālidāsa, Meghadūta 31]

For in this stanza the word "friendship" (*maitrī*) carries the type of *dhuṇi* where the literal sense is unintended, while other words in the stanza carry various figures of speech.

L Having thus illustrated the three varieties of fusion, our author illustrates association: We have an association, etc. If a figure of speech, and if the suggested sense also, provided it is predominant, resides in the sentence as a whole, we then have fusion of the type where the terms are related as assisted and assister. But in the absence of this, the two will not come together and so we must have either the figure of speech or the *dhvani* singly, or both at the same time, attached to individual words.¹ These are the three types. Our author makes a restriction among these [three types]: only with reference to single words. He proceeds to illustrate the third type, where there can be no suspicion of a relation of assisted and assister:² for it is where, etc. Because it is only where some words carry a figure of speech and where some carry *dhvani*, as in the stanza "There, from the Siprā," that we have an association of *dhvani* with an express figure of speech with reference to a single word. These words [boldface in the translation] must be repeated from the previous line of text and brought into the syntax. For in this stanza: here the word *hi* ("for") should be placed after the term *maitripadam*.³ Such is the connection of the passage.

[Comment on the stanza "There, from the Siprā"] Prolongs: for that sound is carried far by the breeze from the Siprā; furthermore, the birds keep up their calling for a long time, being delighted by the delicate touch of the breeze; and the birds' cry, being mixed with the soft sound rising from the waves of the Siprā stirred up by the breeze, is prolonged by that fact too.⁴ Sharp (*paṭu*):⁵ thus that gentle breeze does not drown out the cry of the paddy birds, but rather, by acting in cooperation, sharpens it. Nor is this sharpening without benefit, for the cry is sweet and amorously indistinct and so is worth bearing. Every dawn: it is dawn that offers the right time for service of the sort [about to be mentioned]. The plural indicates that this kindness of the breeze is constant. Opening lotuses: they are *sphuṭitāni*, that is, bursting with the load of nectar which they contain; at the same time *sphuṭitāni*, that is, in full bloom and so a delight to the eyes. Friendship with the nectar of these lotuses suggests the gaining of mutual harmony that comes from a continuity of close contact. From this friendship the breeze is *kāṣaya*: both enamored, and colored red, by the nectar.⁶ Of women: the breeze, which does this to everything of this sort which is most beautiful in the world,⁷ carries off the lassitude, the weariness,

of those who have been engaged in sexual intercourse; and it carries off the lassitude in this regard⁸ by sharpening the appetite of the lovers for renewed intercourse. It does this not violently or roughly, but following their limbs smoothly, with delightful touch and with acceptance by their hearts. It causes a woman to make flattering requests in this regard⁹ of her lover. The lover too, his appetite for intercourse aroused by the touch of the breeze, makes flattering requests. As this is done by the breeze, it becomes love's most precious gift, for love takes its life from mutual passion. And this is to be expected, for that breeze, being associated with the Siprā, is a sophisticated gentleman and not like a country bumpkin. This is what is meant.

A lover too,¹⁰ after love-making, is attentive to the body of his partner by massaging her limbs and makes flattering requests. In this way he carries off her lassitude from intercourse. He prolongs her cries, that is, the sweet sounds with which she protests. And as he is flattering her, he becomes *kāḍya*, that is, enamored, by his "friendship" with the perfume, that is, his acquaintance with the natural fragrance, of her face which bears the resplendence of a fullblown lotus. He [too] follows the limbs, viz. the sixty-four manners of action in love-play.¹¹

The stanza as a whole is spoken by the lover to the cloud in the *Meghadūta* to the effect that the cloud should surely visit this place [Ujjayini] where there are such delightful sounds, sights, scents, and objects of touch, and where even the breeze is such a polished gentleman.

Our author applies his definitions to his example: for here the word "friendship," etc.: We have already said that the word "for" (*hi*) should be placed after. Various figures of speech: in order of occurrence they are:¹² poetic fancy (*utprekṣā*), naturalistic description (*svabhāvokti*), metaphor (*rūpaka*), and simile (*upamā*).

1. That is to say, there are three other possible distributions: (a) the figure of speech may reside in a single word, while the dhvani pervades the whole stanza; (b) the dhvani may reside in a single word, while the figure of speech pervades the whole stanza; or (c) the figure and the dhvani reside in separate words. 2. Actually, types (a) and (b) of the distributions listed in note 1 will be cases of fusion (*savikara*). So Ānanda, intending to illustrate association, rules them out. 3. Presumably Ābhinava feels that by so shifting the particle the sentence will emphasise the fact that the dhvani lies in a single word. But really it makes little difference in which of the two positions *hi* is placed. 4. The sound seems to come from as far off as the farthest source of the plashing of the waves. Thus three reasons are suggested for the

spatial and temporal lengthening of the birds' cry. 5. *BP* supposes that Abhinava took the word *poṭu* as an adverb, meaning skilfully, rather than in its normal adjectival meaning of "sharp." The breeze would prolong the cry skilfully by not overcoming it but rather making it more delectable. Aside from the fact that I think Kālidāsa meant the word as an adjective, Abhinava's use of *dipayati* (excites, sharpens) and *dīpanena* seems to show that he too understood *poṭu* in an adjectival sense. 6. Abhinava gives a double meaning to *kaṣṭya*: "enamored," to fit the simile of a lover, to be introduced in the last line of the stanza, and "colored by the nectar," to fit the breeze. As a color, *kaṣṭya* is yellow-red, the color of the Buddhist robe. See also below, 4.7 a A, note 1. 7. *BP* explains: By saying "everything," Abhinava explains the plural in "women." "Of this sort": i.e. of feminine gender. By "most beautiful in the world" he shows what is suggested. 8. *tadvīyādām* could mean lassitude toward intercourse (so *BP*), or it could mean the lassitude that takes place in them, viz., women. The former is perhaps better, as *tadvīyaye* surely has that meaning three lines below. 9. I.e., with regard to intercourse.

10. Abhinava here turns to the simile, which he carries out by suggestion in far greater detail than what is given by the literal sense of the stanza. 11. These were mentioned by Abhinava in 2.12 L, on which see note 2. The whole science of love in enjoyment has eight divisions, each of which has eight *arigñi* or *prayogāḥ*. 12. Patwardhan finds fault with the inclusion of poetic fancy in this list and he points out (against *BP*) that *samsṛṣti* can exist only between the *dhvani* resident in *maitri* (in line 2 of the stanza) and the simile in line 4. He writes as follows. *BP* says that the word *rūpata* is used by Abhinava here in the sense of *rūpaktisayuktī*. This is another name for *nigiryo adhyavasāna atisayuktī*; see *Kuvalayānanda* under *rūpaktisayuktī* (Kārikā 36). *BP* claims that this figure occurs in the word *kamala* (line 2), which also means *vadana-kamala*. It also says that there is a *gamyotprekṣā* (implicit *utprekṣā*) in *dirghikurvan* which (according to *BP*) stands for *dirghikurvan* *iva*. But this goes against the elaborate explanation of *dirghikurvan* given above by Abhinava, which clearly shows that *dirghikurvan* is a factual statement, not a statement based on fancy. According to *BP* *svabhāvuktī* occurs in the second line of the stanza. It would, however, be more correct to say that *svabhāvuktī* pervades the entire stanza, which is a life-like description of the breeze from the River Siprā blowing over Ujjayinī. There is no doubt that *upamā* occurs in the fourth line (*siprāvāṭah priyatama iva*). Since Ānanda says that there is *avivakṣitavācyadhvani* in the word *maitri* (line 2), and since this stanza has been cited as an example of *samsṛṣti* of *dhvani* with *vācyā* *alanikāra*, we must suppose that the *samsṛṣti* occurs between the *dhvani* in the word *maitri* (line 2) and the *vācyā* *upamā* (line 4). Ānanda should have said: "padāntaresu alanikārāntarāni, teṣām madhye upomayā saha avivakṣitavācyadhvaneḥ samsṛṣṭih." By *alanikārāntarāni* Ānanda perhaps meant only

svabhāvokti, *rūpaka* (i.e., *rūpaktisayokti*, i.e., *atīsayokti*) and *upamā*. By *alaṅkārāntarāni* he could not have intended *utprekṣā* in addition to the three *alaṅkāras* mentioned above, as *utprekṣā* is non-existent in the stanza. But even out of the three *alaṅkāras* mentioned above, there is no question of the *samsṛṣṭi* of the *avivakṣitavācyadhvani* in the word *maitrī* in line 2 with *svabhāvokti* or with *rūpaka*. For the areas occupied by *avivakṣitavācyadhvani* on the one hand and by *svabhāvokti* and *rūpaka* on the other hand, are overlapping and not distinct from one another, as required by the definition of *samsṛṣṭi* given by Ānanda (3.43c A, text pp. 510-511). Thus it is clear that although Ānanda speaks of the presence of several *alaṅkāras* in the stanza, he could have found *samsṛṣṭi* of the *avivakṣitavācyadhvani* (in line 2) only with *upamā* (in line 4) and not with either *svabhāvokti* or *rūpaka*.

A An example of *dhvani* fused with [a figure of speech] that is associated with another figure of speech is the following.

The marks of teeth and claws, given
by the lion's mate eager for your blood
with loving heart
to your body now bristling with joy,
are seen by even saints
with passionate envy.¹

For there appears here a *dhvani*, of the type where no interval is perceived [i.e., *rasadhvani*], fused with the figure of speech contradiction (*virodha*) which is associated with compressed statement (*samāsokti*), for the real object [described] in the stanza is a hero of compassion.²

An example of the association of *dhvani* with a figure of speech that is associated [with another figure of speech] is this:

On these days that rumble with fresh clouds
for persons with a taste for dramatic performance,
and are dark as night for travelers,
namely, the audience of travelers,
beautiful is the dance of peacock
with their outstretched necks.³
who pour forth their song.

for in this stanza we have the association of *dhvani*, of the type like a reverberation and where the suggestion arises from the power of words, with [the mutually associated figures] simile and metaphor.⁴

1. The author of the stanza is unknown. It is quoted by Mammata 7 vs. 337 (p. 453) and by Hemacandra, AC, vs. 196 (p. 167). On the stanza the Viveka quotes Abbinava's comments verbatim, without attribution. For interpretation see note 2. 2. The *dhvani* is the suggestion of *sāntarasa* roused by the portrayal of the Bodhisattva's virtue. The contradiction lies in the fourth line in the incompatibility of *sr̥phā* (passion or envy) with *munibhīḥ* (saints). For *samāsokti*, see 1.13d A and L and 1.13j A, note 1. It consists here in our superimposing the behavior of a *nādyikd* on the action of the lioness. The lady would have responded to her lover's caresses with the love bites and scratches prescribed by the *Kdmasāstra* and would have left his body in a gooseflesh of excitement. In developing the *samāsokti* one will take *raktamanas* to mean "with loving heart," and *mrgarāja* ("lion king") to mean "royal king." The lady (*nādyikd*) would thus be one of the king's wives. As the *samāsokti* occurs only in the third line and the contradiction only in the fourth, these figures of speech are associated, not fused. As the *dhvani* derives from the whole stanza, its area includes that of both figures of speech, with which it is therefore said to be fused, not associated. 3. The verse is a derivative of *Sattasai* 6.59, the words being slightly altered and transposed to permit of double meanings. 4. This stanza, or the stanza from the *Sattasai* on which it is based, has been variously analysed by Ālaṅkārikas, always with results different from Ānanda's. The *dhvani* arises from the double meanings of the words *paoa* (= *payoda* or *prayoga*), *sāmāiesu* (= *syādmāyiteṣu* or *sāmājikeṣu*), and *gīānam* (= *grīudnām* or *gīlāndām*); and there is an interval of time before we recognize it, so it is rightly called *sabdaśoktyudbhavānurūpanātarūpa*. Now if we take this *dhvani* as a whole, we must say that it occupies the space (viz., the word *sāmāiesu*) occupied by the simile and metaphor. Accordingly, it would not be associated with them but fused. To justify Ānanda's analysis we must consider only the portion of the *dhvani* arising from *paoa* or from *gīānam*. We may then say that that *dhvani* is associated with the figures. The simile (*upamā*) resides in *sāmāiesu* if we understand that word as *syādmāyiteṣu* (= *syādmā* + *kyac* + *kta*, literally, "which act like night, or like the night of doomsday" to travelers), because the suffix *kyac* is prescribed by Pāṇini (3.1.10) to be used "after a stem which serves as a simile." The metaphor resides in *sāmāiesu* if we understand that word as *sāmājikeṣu*, because *pathika-sāmājikesu* ("to traveler-audiences," i.e., audiences which are travelers) is a *rūpatasamāsa* justified by Pāṇ. 2.1.72. But the question arises how these two figures can be said to be associated rather than fused. Viśvānātha (SD 10.99) takes them as fused by the third type of fusion, where two figures reside in the same word. Others have taken them as fused by the

second type of fusion, where there is doubt as to which figure is present. No one other than Ānanda (and Abhinava, who piously refrains from disagreeing with him here) takes these figures to be associated. In fact, it is a wrong analysis.

L So far our author has explained and given examples for the portion of *Kārikā* 3.43 that reads "Dhvani appears by fusion and association with its own varieties, as well as with subordinated suggestion and with the figures of speech." He now proceeds to explain the words "and furthermore" and to give examples [of what is thereby intended]: An example of *dhvani*, etc.

The meaning of the word "furthermore" is this. Not only is it intended that *dhvani* fuses and is associated with its own varieties, etc., but [it does so also] with varieties, etc., which are fused or associated with each other. However, as it is hard to find the fusion and association of *dhvani* with such varieties of itself and such subordinated suggestions as are already fused or associated with each other,¹ no clear example can be given. So he is forced to illustrate [only] the fusion and association with *dhvani* of a figure of speech which has already been fused or associated with another figure of speech. Of this situation there are four varieties, of which he illustrates the first by the stanza "The marks of teeth?" etc.

Here someone speaks a flattering description of a Bodhisattva who has offered his own body to a lioness who was about to eat her cubs [out of hunger]: a body on which has arisen a thick-set horripilation from the great bliss born of his success in helping others. *Raktamana* means one whose mind has an appetite for blood; also one whose heart is full of love. There is contradiction when saints are spoken of as recipients of aroused passion. "With envy" suggests that their fondest wish takes the form, "May we too at some time rise to such a height on the pathway of compassion; then we should truly be saints." The figure *samsakti* (compressed statement) is present because of our apprehension here of the behavior of a loving woman (*nāyikā*).²

A hero of compassion: The term "hero of compassion" is used for a moral hero (*dharma-vīra*), as morality is needed for an act of compassion.³ The *rasa* here is the heroic *rasa* (*vīra-rasa*) because energy (*utsāha*, here the energy of doing good for others) is the basic emotion (*sthāyibhāva*). Or, we may say that by the word *dayā-vīra* the *rasa* is indicated to be the *rasa* of peace (*sāntarasa*).⁴

This rasa is perceived [as fused] with a figure of speech that is already associated [with a second figure of speech]. For the following sense is achieved by power of the figure *samāsokti*. Just as a man, at the time of his union with a beloved woman whom he has sought in all his wishes, will break out in horripilation, just so does it happen with you on your giving your own body for another's sake. And hereby a high degree of compassion is stimulated by the coming together of symptom (*anubhāva*, here the horripilation) and determinant (*vibhāva*; here the lioness forms the *ḍambananavibhāva* while the bites and lacerations form the *uddīpanavibhāva*).

He now illustrates a second variety: An example of the association of *dhvani*, etc.

On these days in which there is a rumbling of fresh, that is, beautiful, clouds and which are as dark as night for travelers, that is, which act like night inasmuch as they cause the stupor of travelers.⁵ Or, we may interpret as "days from which (i.e., because of which) there arises the travelers' dark complexion (*syāmikā*) from pain." Beautiful is the dance of peacocks with their outstretched necks.

[As the Prakrit words of the stanza are susceptible of a different Sanskrit rendering, the following sense is suggested.]⁶ There being an audience of travelers with a taste for dramatic performance, beautiful is the dance of the peacocks with their *prasārita* song, that is, whose song follows upon a prolonged keynote (?) (*sārūpa*),⁷ or whose necks (*grīva*) are stretched forth for a *grīvārecaka*.⁸ The suffix *kyac*⁹ is used in the sense that these days behave like nights to the travelers. Thus an elliptical simile is indicated by the suffix.¹⁰ As the word *pathika-sāmājikeṣu* is clearly a *karmadhāraya* compound,¹¹ it furnishes a metaphor. Our author's meaning is that these two figures of speech (viz., simile and metaphor) are associated with the suggestion (*dhvani*).

As the two remaining varieties¹² may be illustrated by this very stanza, our author has not furnished another example.

To explain: Since the *vyāghrādi* group of words [which are permitted by Pāṇini 2.1.56 to act as simile words when placed last in a compound] is an open-ended group,¹³ the compound *pathika-sāmājikeṣu* is subject to doubt whether it contain a simile or a metaphor;¹⁴ hence these figures are fused with each other in it. With these fused figures the (*dhvani* or suggestion) arising from the power of the words [viz., *ahinaapaoarasiesu* and *pasāriagiāṇam*] to suggest respectively *abhinayapravayoge rasikeṣu* and *prasāritagitāṇam* is connected only by association, [not by fusion] because the suggestion is not assisted by those figures. On the other

hand, the *dhvani* (suggestion) arising from the power of the words *pahasāmāiesu* [to suggest *pathikasāmājikeṣu*] is fused with these same fused figures because the *dhvani* and the fused figures occur in the same words. Thus the two remaining varieties, viz., association of *dhvani* with fused figures of speech and fusion of *dhvani* with fused figures of speech should be understood [as also present in this stanza].

1. For *dhvaninām* (text p. 514, line 1 of *Locana*) we must read *dhvaninā* with *BP*. Likewise, to produce normal syntax, we should read *dhvaninā* in place of *dhvanau* in line 3 of the same page. 2. In fact one's immediate apprehension on hearing the first three lines of the stanza is exactly that. Only in the fourth line do we see that a very different matter is the true subject (*prakṛitārtha*) of the stanza and that the suggestion of queenly passion is *apra-kṛita* (not the subject in hand) and so forms the figure *samāsokti*. 3. Abhinava's explanation is occasioned by the fact that *BhNS* makes no mention of *dayāvīra*, which seems to represent a preeminently Buddhist concept. The three types of hero listed by *BhNS* (6.79) are *dānavīra* (a hero of generosity), *dharma-vīra* (a moral or religious hero), and *yuddhavīra* (a military hero). One may note that likewise in the *Mahābhārata*'s long list (13.74.23-27) of twenty-one types of hero (*sūra*), there is no *dayāvīra*. 4. See Abhinava's discussion in 3.26 a L. 5. Abhinava gives the prescribed meaning of *upamānādācāre* ("in the sense of behaving like that, when suffixed to a simile-word") to the suffix *kyac* = (āya in *syāmāya*; see Pāp. 3.1.10). The days of the monsoon cause the travelers moha, because this is the season when lovers long to be together and because travelers in Sanskrit poetry are always supposed to be traveling without wife or sweetheart. 6. For the primary meaning, the rendering will be: *Abhinava-payoda-rasiteṣu pathika-syāmāyileṣu dvivaseṣu / sōbhate prasārita-grivānām nṛtyam mayūrvrndānām //* For the suggestion, the rendering will be: *abhinaya-prayoga-rasikeṣu pathika-sāmājikeṣu / sōbhate prasārita-grīlānām mayūrvrndānām //* 7. Both *sarāṇā* and *sāraṇā* seem to be used in this sense. See *PW* and *SRK* 1737c and note. 8. We do not know just what Abhinava means by this term. *BhNS* defines *grīvācīta* at 8.173 as a shaking or twisting of the neck used in dramatic performance. The *ABh* on Book 8 is lost, but Abhinava quotes 8.173 in a different form in commenting on 4.67 (Vol. 1, p. 99). He finds fault with the verse as quoted, but his correction is not intelligible to us. 9. See note 5, above.

10. A simile is full (*pūrmā*) when all four of its members are present: the simile proper (*upamāna*), the base (*upameya*), the common quality (*sāmāno dharmāḥ*) and a simile-denoting word (*aupamyavācaka*); for example, "her face is delightful as the moon" (*candra ita āhlādakam mukham*). Where one or more of these members is absent the simile is elliptical (*luptā*). According to Mammata, in a simile expressed by means of a word bearing the suffix *kyac*, the *aupamyavācaka* is absent (Book 10, comment on *sūtra* 127; cf. verse 403

and Jhalkikar, p. 570, lines 18-20). Other Ālaṅkārikas say that the *upomyavācaka* may be understood in these cases from Pāṇini's *sūtra* 3.1.10 and that it is the *somāno dharmah* or *sādharmya* that is absent (cf. *SD* on 10.19.). 11. Abhinava's expression is abbreviated. The word *pathika-sāmājikesu* as it occurs in the stanza (if we so render the Prakrit *pahiasāmāiesu*) is actually a *bahuvrīhi* compound modifying *divaseṣu*, but it is based on a *karmadhāraya*: days in which there are traveler-audiences (*yेṣu pathikasāmājikāḥ teṣu divaseṣu*). This formation, permissible by Pāṇ. 2.1.72, is a *rūpakasamāsa* (metaphor compound), meaning audiences which are travelers. 12. Viz., the association of *dhvani* with two *alaṅkāras* which are fused with each other; and the fusion of *dhvani* with two *alaṅkāras* which are fused with each other. 13. That is to say, the group *vyāghra*, etc., listed in the *Ganapāṭha* may be added to. Not only may we say *puruṣa-vyāghra* "a tiger of a man," i.e., a man who is like a tiger, or *puruṣa-simha*, etc., but, according to Abhinava, we we may say *pathika-sāmājikesu*, meaning travelers who are like an audience. Thus the compound need not be explained as a metaphor compound (see note 11 above), but might be a simile compound. As usual, Abhinava is grammatically correct, but the interpretation as a simile compound is most unnatural. 14. That is, *pathikasāmājikesu* may mean "for travelers who are like an audience," or "for an audience which is [i.e., which consists of nothing but] travelers."

K So who could ever enumerate the varieties and subvarieties of *dhvani*? We have said this much only to indicate the general direction in which they lie.

A For the varieties of *dhvani* are endless. We have said this much only to indicate for the instruction of sensitive readers the general direction in which these varieties lie.

L He sums up: So, etc. The meaning is clear.

§ 3.46 A]

K Good men, using their effort correctly, should study dhvani carefully as we have here defined it, if they are eager to compose good poetry, or to recognize it.¹

1. One may either supply a correlative *sa* before *vivecyah*, or take the reading "(a)yam" in place of "yo," which is reported by Abhinava as that of "others." Either method will furnish a syntax simpler than that recommended by Abhinava, who takes *kāvyatattvam etad* (in 3.46) as correlative with *yo dhvaniḥ* (in 3.45), thus making 3.45-46 into a single sentence.

A Because good poets and sensitive readers, if they are adept in discerning dhvani as of the nature here described, will surely attain the highest position in the realm of poetry.

L [See *L*'s comment on 3.46.]

K It was persons unable to analyse the true nature of poetry as here given, for it appeared to them [only] unclearly, who propounded the doctrine of "styles" (*ritayah*).¹

1. See 1.1 *A*, notes 5 and 6.

A The Vaidarbhi, Gaudi, and Pāñcāli styles were set up by persons unable to give a clear idea of the true nature of poetry, for this true nature, which we have analysed by using the concept of dhvani, appeared to them unclearly. For it appears that those who set forth the definitions of the styles did have some slight, but unclear, notion of the true nature of poetry. But as we have here demonstrated this nature clearly,¹ any other explanation, as by means of the styles, becomes worthless.

1. The *KM* reading *sampradarśitam* *its* is obviously preferable to *sam-pradarśitena*.

L It is with a view to showing that the promise indicated in the words "in order to delight the hearts of sensitive readers" (1.1 *K*) was no idle boast, but has now actually been carried out, that [the Kārikā-kāra] says [of dhvani that it should be studied] as we have here defined it. This statement is connected with the following Kārikā (3.46). The "styles" were propounded by definers of figures of speech¹ who were unable to analyse the true nature of poetry by describing its full extent as here given, a nature which is simply dhvani, namely, that which one should study carefully as we have defined it. But others read *ayam* in place of the word *yo* (in 3.45), [thus making separate sentences of the two Kārikās]. The highest position: be means, either in composing or in judging poetry.

He gives the reason for others' being unable to analyse [the true nature of poetry]: for it appeared to them unclearly. This is because "style" is ultimately a matter of the *gunas* (poetic qualities). As [Vāmana] has said,² "[style is a special way of combining words;] the specialty consists in the *gunas*." And the *gunas* are ultimately a matter of *rasa*, as our author has said above, when explaining the nature of the *gunas* in the passage, "It is just śringāra that is the sweetest *rasa*" (2.7).³

1. I read ḍārikārikaiḥ in place of ḍārikāraih, following the suggestion of Pāṭhak in his Hindi translation. 2. Vāmana 1.2.7-8. 3. The view that the *gunas* depend on *rasa* was stated in 2.6 A. In 2.7 A it was stated that the *guna*, mādhurya, is ultimately nothing but the *rasa*, śringāra.

K The *vṛttis* also, those which depend on the nature of words or sound and those which are connected with the nature of meaning, will appear [in their true nature] once this doctrine of poetry is known.

A Once this doctrine of poetry, which is based on an analysis of the relation between suggestor and suggested, is known, both those well-known *vrittis* such as the *upanāgarikā*, which are based on the nature of words or sounds, and those, such as the *kaisikī*, which are connected with the nature of the meaning, will follow precisely the same path as the *rītis*.¹ If this were not so, the *vrittis*, like invisible things, would be things we could not believe in and would not be validated by experience. So the true nature of *dhvani* must be clearly defined.

The definition of *dhvani*, given by a certain critic, is wrong and should not be given, when he says, "We may speak of *dhvani* whenever an ineffable beauty of certain words and certain meanings is perceptible only to special cognizors, just as the rarity of certain gems [is known only to special experts]."² For the special [virtue] of words, so far as their phonetic form is concerned is that they be pleasant to the ear and not repetitious. Their special [virtue] as denotative units is that they be clear [in their literal sense] and suggestive [of a further sense]. The special [virtue] of meanings is that they appear clearly and be subordinate to a suggested meaning [as in *dhvani*] or be qualified by a suggested element [as in subordinated suggestion]. These special [virtues] of words and meanings can be explained and have been explained in many ways. To imagine that there is some ineffable virtue over and above these is to admit that one's power of analysis has ceased. For ineffability, in the sense of being beyond the range of all words, cannot be predicated of anything, because in the last analysis a thing can be designated by the word "ineffable." As for the definition sometimes given of ineffability, that it is the appearance of a thing [viz., of a unique particular] which cannot be referred to by a word for a mental construct (*vikalpa*) which is based on (*samsparśi*, lit., which touches upon) the general or universal,³ this can no more apply to the special virtues of poetry than it can to the special virtues of gems. For the virtues of the former have been analysed by literary critics, while no estimate can be made of the value of a gem by reference merely to the general or universal. It is true, however, in both cases that these special virtues are recognizable only by experts. For only jewelers are knowers of gems and only sensitive critics (*sahṛdayāḥ*) are knowers of the *rasa* of poetry. On this point no one will argue.

In regard to the well-known doctrine of the Buddhists that ineffability is predicate of everything, I plan to write an exposition in a book which

will examine their theories.⁴ As it would give offense to literary critics to set forth here details which may be learned from another book, I shall not do so. Or, we may let our definition of *dhvani* stand just as the definition of perception stands in Buddhist doctrine.⁵

Accordingly, as no other characterization of *dhvani* [in the sense in which we have been using it] stands to reason,⁶ and as this [sense] is not the literal meaning of the word ["*dhvani*"],⁷ the correct definition is the one which we have given. This is stated [in verse]:

To say that it appears as an ineffable element
is no definition of *dhvani*,
inasmuch as its sense can be explained.
The correct definition is the one here given.

Here ends the Third Book of the *Sahṛdayāloka* composed by the teacher Śrī Rājānaka Ānandavardhana.

1. I.e., they will appear in their true nature as being no more than ways in which the *gunas* are employed and thus as being ultimately a matter of *rasa*.
2. The original form of what the critic said should be closer to that given in 3.33a A (Text p. 403, line 1), because the words there formed a half *śloka*. But in that passage Ānanda attributed the objector's simile to *rasa*, not to *dhvani*. The ineffability of *dhvani* is a view which was mentioned in 1.1e A.
3. The passage is translated in accord with Abhinava's interpretation, with the component *samsparśi* modifying *vikalpa*. In the Buddhist epistemology of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, later borrowed in part by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, it is supposed that of all objects of knowledge we first have an indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka jñāna*), a perception that contains no mental construction (*vikalpa*) but that responds to the mere that-ness which confronts our senses. In the determinate perception (*savikalpaka jñāna*) which follows, we identify the object with some universal, that of horse, man, or as the case may be. All our words refer only to these determinate perceptions. Where the Buddhists disagree with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is in their holding the unique and momentary particular (*svavakṣyāṇa*) of our indeterminate perception to be the sole reality. The mental construct, which permits us to speak of it, at the same time falsifies it. Hence the extreme Buddhist position, to which Ānanda next refers, that every real thing is ineffable.
4. This book, the *Dharmottarivṛtti*, was still available to Abhinava. It is lost to us.
5. Perception of the true nature of things is unverbalizable according to the Buddhist idealists. This did not prevent them, however, from giving highly useful definitions of correct and false perception on the level of *vyavahāra* (the give-and-take of the world, as opposed to ultimate truth).
6. I.e., *dhvani* cannot be characterized by *bhakti* or by *abhidhā* or by *tātparyavṛtti* or by *anumāna* or by saying that it is indefinable.
7. I.e., it is not literally a "tone" or "reverberation."

L Will appear: that is, they will become established by experience as being [included] in the life of poetry.

The same path as the *rītis*: because they will be like the *rītis* in being ultimately a matter of *rasa*. Or, we may take the variant reading *pratītipadavīm*, they will enter "the path of our perception." For that alliterative *vṛtti* which has [its name from its] similarity to a sophisticated lady terminates in such *rasas* as the erotic (*śringāra*); the harsh *vṛtti* terminates in fiery *rasas* such as the *rasa* of fury (*raudra*); the soft (*komala*) in such as the comic (*hāsyā*).¹ Similarly, when the sage [Bharata] states that "the *vṛttis* are the sources of poetry,"² he uses the word *vṛtti* for a kind of behavior [attitude, costume, bearing] appropriate to the prevailing *rasa*. He states this [explicitly] in the following words:

The Kaiśiki [*vṛtti*], which makes use of charming costume,
is born of [i.e., appropriate to] the erotic *rasa*.³

By his words here our author has accepted to some extent the concepts that were announced in the words, "The *vṛttis* and the *rītis* have reached our ears; what is this thing called *dhvani* that it should differ from these?" (1.1 a 4), these words having been given under the alternative views possible for those "who say that *dhvani* does not exist" (1.1 K). But he has also criticized them, in saying that [the true nature of poetry] "appeared unclearly" [to those who employed these terms] (3.46 K, A).⁴

He now criticizes the objection that *dhvani* "lies outside the scope of speech" (1.1 K), although he has already criticized it in Book One, for he feels that after all the detailed discussion [of *dhvani* which he has furnished], the view that it is ineffable becomes simply impossible.

Pleasant to the ear: without harshness to the ear. Not repetitious: not tautologous. These special virtues: viz., those of word and those of meaning. When the power of analysis ceases, one finds the state of *nirvivekta* (analytic incompetence). *Sāmānyasparsiviveka-sabda*: a word for a determinate knowledge corresponding to our indeterminate knowledge.

He now shows that ineffability cannot be predicated even of the example: to the special virtue of gems. But it may be objected that not everyone can cognize [these special virtues]. He admits this objection by saying, in both cases, etc. He means, in the case of gems and in the case of poetry.

But one may ask how it is said that things are ineffable in [such Buddhist statements as] "Words do not touch the real object" and "[it is] informative of the undamnable."³ To this our author replies, In regard to the well-known doctrine. What he has in mind is that at that rate ineffability would be too wide a definition for *dhvani*, for by it *dhvani* would be the same, as regards what one could say of it, as everything else. From another book: There exists an "Explanation" (*vivṛti*) written by our author on the *Dharmottari*, which is a commentary on the [*Pramana-*] *Viniscaya*.⁴ In that book he has explained the matter.

This is stated: he means, is stated by himself, to serve as a summary. That there appears in a poem an element that is ineffable is no sufficient characterization of *dhvani*; such is the syntax. He gives his reason: inasmuch as its sense can be explained, that is, because one can state it (*vaktum*) distinctly (*nis*). Another commentator has taken the prefix *nis* in *nirudcyā* in its negative sense [by which *nirudcyārthatayā* would mean "because its sense cannot be stated"] and takes this as giving the reason why the element is ineffable. But this is awkward, for the reason would not differ from what it was intended to prove. So the explanation we have given is the only correct one.

[May my words prove] auspicious.

This Eye, by surveying all the varieties
of *dhvani* spread out in this Light of Poetry,
will furnish men now with their sought-for goal.

I praise the Mediating Power,
the great goddess dear to Śiva,
who gives clarity to those differenc
which were previously prepared.⁵

Here ends the Third Book of the *Sahṛdayālokaṭolocana*, an exposition of *dhvani*, revealed by the great Śaiva master, the revered teacher, Abhinavagupta.

1. See 1.1 a L, notes 3 and 4. 2. See 3.33 L, note 2. 3. Cf. 3.6 g L, note 1. The quotation cannot be traced in Chapter 20 of *BHNS*, which deals with the *vṛttis*, either in the *KM* or *GOS* edition, although verses 53, 54, and 73 of the *GOS* edition contain the phrases *ślakṣṇanepathyā*, *śringārābhinaya*, and *hāsyāśringārabhūdā*. The quotation given by Abhinava must have formed part of the description of *kaisiki vṛtti* in the MS used by him. 4. In fact Ānanda has accepted the concepts of *vṛtti* and *rīti* as useful notions in poetic analysis if they are understood in the context of the doctrine

of *dhvani* and *raso*, but criticizes them if they should be used as a substitute for those doctrines. With the statement *katham cid abhyupagamah kṛtah katham cid dūṣanam dattam* compare the similar phrase, Text p. 84. lines 1-2 of *Locana* (= 1.4g L, near end) *dvitīyas tu katham cid dūṣitah katham cid arigūtah*. 5. The quotations form *pādas* in *śloka* meter, perhaps from the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. They do not occur in the *Pramanavārttika*. 6. The *Pramāṇaviniścaya* of Dharmakīrti (c. A.D. 600-660) is lost except in Tibetan translation. Dharmottara (second half of 8th century) wrote commentaries on all Dharmakīrti's works. His commentary on the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* is preserved in Tibetan (Toboku 4229). See N. Rastogi, *BORI Annals*, 56 (1975), p. 39. 7. See 1.19 L, note 5. In the *madhyamā* (intermediate or mediating) stage of metaphysical evolution, the objects of the world are clearly separated but not yet sensible. In linguistic evolution, the words are formed with their final succession of phonemes. All that is lacking is a physical apparatus (breath and organs of articulation) by which to render the words communicable.

CHAPTER FOUR

A Having thus defined *dhvani* in detail in order to remove the disagreements concerning it, the author now states a further purpose of this explanation.

L I bow to Śāṅkari Śakti,
than whom God needs no other aid
in the performing of his fivefold function.¹

To make clear the connection of this Fourth Chapter with the preceding, the author of the *Vṛtti* says, Having thus, etc. A further use: Although the purpose was already stated by the words, "in order to delight the hearts of sensitive readers" (1.1 *K*), and although this same purpose was somewhat clarified toward the end of the Third Chapter by the words, "in order to compose good poetry or to recognize it," an effort will now be made to clarify it further. He uses the words, a further purpose, because the purpose will now appear so precise that its description will seem other than the imprecise description which preceded. Or, we may take the passage differently, as follows. We will state something further, viz., a distinction between the said two purposes; we will describe the usefulness of *dhvani* in composing good poetry and its usefulness in recognizing good poetry. Of these, the way in which *dhvani* works in composing good poetry must be stated first, for we can recognize only what has first been created.² So the *Kārikā* now states: By this road of *dhvani*, etc.

1. Sāṅkari Śakti is here used as a name of Māyā. The components of the fivefold function (*kṛtyapāñcaka*) are listed in a verse attributed to King Bhoja in the *Sarvadarśanasarīraha* 7.77-78. They are: *sṛṣṭi* (creation), *sthiti* (maintenance), *samhāra* (dissolution), *tirobhāva* (concealment, illusion), and *anugraha* (the favoring of his devotees). 2. Abhinava's second explanation is not a happy one. The distinction between the way in which the *dhvani* theory helps in composition and the way in which it helps in recognition is not given anywhere in the Fourth Chapter. What is shown, and in considerable detail, is how the knowledge of *dhvani* helps the poet to compose good poetry. One must therefore suppose that the second aim, the recognizing of good poetry follows automatically. The "distinction" would thereby be obliterated.

K By this road of *dhvani* and of subordinated suggestion, which has been shown, the imagination of poets can be indefinitely extended.

A Of this path of *dhvani* and subordinated suggestion, which has been revealed, a further result is an infinite extension of the poet's imagination (*pratibhā*). If one asks how this is achieved, [the next Kārikā gives the answer].

L Now it may be objected that to say that an infinite extension of imagination comes from the varieties of *dhvani* is to confuse the loci [of cause and effect].¹ With this in mind, our author says, how is this achieved?

1. The varieties of *dhvani* reside in poetry; the extended imagination resides in the poet. The solution of this difficulty, of course, is that the extended imagination of the poet actually comes from his knowledge of the varieties of *dhvani*. Knowledge and imagination share the same locus (*saṁānādhikarana*).

K For hereby, when ornamented by even one of the varieties [of dhvani], speech acquires a fresh color, even though it follows a subject matter that is old.

A Hereby, when ornamented by even one from among the stated varieties of dhvani, speech acquires a fresh color, even though it takes for its subject a matter that has been treated by poets of the past. Thus, a freshness derives from use of the two varieties of dhvani where the literal sense is unintended, even where an old subject is treated, as in the following stanza.

Her smile is half innocent,
her wealth of glances tremulous and sweet;
the quaver of her voice is moist
with a new wave of dalliance;
the motion of her gait
is perfumed with budding grace:
what is not charming in a fawn-eyed maid
as she touches adolescence?

(Bhartṛhari 93)¹

A fresh color appears here by the use of that type of dhvani where the literal meaning is set aside, despite the fact that there are [older] stanzas such as:

Her beautiful opening smile,
her flashing eyes, tremulous speech,
and her gait languorous with weight of hips:
what is not endearing in this damsel?

In the same way, in the following stanza:

He who is first is first indeed.
And so the lion,
eating the mounded meat
of his slaughtered elephant,
is a lion to other beasts.
Who is there that can put him down?²

there appears a freshness by the use of that type of *dhvani* where the literal meaning is shifted to another sense, despite the fact that there are [older] stanzas such as:

He who has bought his greatness by his valor
is overcome by none.
Is the lion ever defeated
by elephants for all their size?

1. Both this stanza and the stanza quoted just below are *surbhāvuktis*, or naturalistic descriptions. The *Bhartrhari* stanza is quoted by *SRK* 367 and by other anthologies. It is also quoted by Abhinava in his *Abh.* on *BHĀŚ* 22.11. Abhinava will point out below the words of the stanza which carry *ātyanta-tiraskṛta-vācyadhvani*. 2. We do not know the origin of this stanza or of the one quoted just below. Both are *arthāntarānyasas* (substantiations, see 1.13i, L and note 8). The present stanza certainly gains a novel effect by its use of *arthāntarasavikramitavācyadhvani*. But one may note that the second illustration also is not devoid of *dhvani*. The word *kṛita* (bought) is certainly used metaphorically, a fact that would force Ānanda to recognize that some suggestion was envisaged by the poet. Presumably he felt that the suggestion was not sufficiently charming: compare his words in 1.14 A: *vyāgyakṛtam mahat sausūham nāsti*. One may also remark that the "greatness" (*mahimā*) is given away (*svaśabdānvedita*) by what follows in the second half of the stanza, thus destroying the effect of the suggestion.

L Herewith the answer [to the question just posed]: Hereby, etc. The force of the word "even" [in its first occurrence] is this: that granted there are many varieties, the effect occurs by even one of them alone. What is here stated amounts to the following. Poetic imagination (*pratibhāna*) is a special insight (*pratijñā*) into the matter¹ to be described. Because of the limited number of things worthy of description and because these have been touched on by the first poet [*Vālmīki*], a poetic imagination that takes these things for its object would be the same as his; and the poetry resulting therefrom would be the same. Accordingly, the profession of poet would by now have become obsolete. But by the multiplicity [of *dhvani*], of which we have spoken, these same things become limitless; hence there arises an infinity of poetic imagination taking them as its object. The *Kārikā* explains the result which is attained by this infinity of poetic imagination by saying, speech acquires a fresh color. By this, the speech of poetic literature, at least, acquires a fresh color. This can come about

only if the poetic imagination is endless; and that only if the objects to describe are endless; and that only because of the variety of dhvani.²

Our author illustrates the first in order of these varieties, namely that where the literal sense is wholly set aside: her smile, etc. Here the literal meaning of *mugdha* (confused, simple), *madhura* (sweet), *vibhava* (wealth), *sarasa* (moist), *kisalayita* (budding), *parimala* (perfumed), *sparsana* (touching), are wholly set aside. These words [in their metaphorical use] carry the following suggestions.. Her "mugdha smile" suggests its unaffected beauty. That her glance is "sweet" suggests that it is lovable to everyone. Her "wealth" of glances suggests their inexhaustible artillery. That her voice is "moist" suggests that it assuages the heat of fever and gives delight. "Budding" grace suggests its delicacy. That her gait is "perfumed" with such grace suggests the continuance of its impression for all time. That she is "touching" adolescence suggests that in spite of herself she is meeting with something desirable.³ As soon as a smile, which is a well known object, becomes endowed with a property other than those properties placed in it by old Brâhma, it becomes something new. The same principle holds in all the other cases.

The word *asya* (Text, p. 524, line 1) construes with the words *apûrvam eva pratibhâsate* (p. 524, lines 4-5) [literally, "of this (stanza) a fresh color appears"]. In the following instances also, where the word *asya* precedes a quotation, it is to be construed with the word *navatvam* which follows the quotation.

[He who is first:] The second instance of the word first suggests a sense that is shifted to something other [than the literal], namely, to such suggested properties as irresistible supremacy and uniqueness. In similar fashion [the second instance of] the word lion suggests a sense shifted to such properties as heroism, autocracy, and the calling forth of wonder.

1. *Vastunîshthah*, i.e., *vastuvîgâyakah*; see 3.33 b L, note 2. 2. The causal chain is as follows: *dhvanibheda* or *dhvanivacitrya* gives rise to *arthânantya*, which gives rise to *kavipratibhânanntya*, which gives rise to *kâvya-vâkyânâm navatvam*. What is notable here is that the variety of suggestiveness is placed outside the human mind; it is the cause, not the result of poetic imagination. It is as though our authors thought of the objects of the world as existing in a pattern which rendered them amenable to mutual suggestions when viewed by a great poet. The poet's imagination, in this view, would be the medium, not the primary cause, of the creation of new worlds. The worlds would be already there through the magic which underlies *dhvani*. Such a view

is in harmony with the origin of the Sanskrit word for poet, *kavi*. A *kavi* is a seer, a revealer. 3. Abhinava jumps directly from the literal senses to the suggested senses without mentioning the metaphorical (*bhākta, gauna*). One may supply them as follows: innocent, pleasing, abundance, soothing, beginning to manifest, rendered attractive, its encountering.

A A fresh color may appear in a verse by use of one of the described varieties of *dhvani* where the literal is intended but is subordinate to a second meaning. As an example, take the stanza:

The bride has lowered her lips to her beloved's face,
but afraid of waking him, for he pretends to sleep,
she checks the relish of her kiss and hesitates
with watchful turning; he too continues motionless,
fearing that in shame she may wholly turn aside.
In such a moment these two hearts, caught in the state
of their anticipation, have reached the peak of love.¹

A freshness appears in this stanza although there are [older] stanzas like the following:

Seeing that the attendant had left the bedroom.
the young wife rose half upright from the bed
and gazing long upon her husband's face
as he lay there feigning sleep, at last took courage
and kissed him lightly, only to discover
his feint by the rising flush upon his cheek.
When then she hung her head in shame, her dear one
seized her, laughing, and kissed her in full earnest.

{Amaru Collection 82]²

In the same way, the stanza, "Its waves are her frowns," etc., shows originality when compared with the stanza beginning *nānābhāgibhra-madbhrūh* ("with its many curling waves for frowns").³

1. The author remains anonymous. I have translated in accordance with Abhinava's comment, who in *pāda b* overlooks the word *api* and gives to *ābhogalolam* the sense of "hesitatingly turning (to examine whether he is asleep)." But I think a more likely interpretation would be "although (*api*) she had checked the relish of a kiss, she is waiting (*sthitā*) in eagerness (*lolam*) to enjoy it (*ābhoga = bhoga*)."
 2. Both stanzas contain *dhvani* of the type *vivakṣitānyaparavācyo*, subtype *asamīkṣyakrama*, leading to *sārigārāsa*. So Ānanda adduces the examples not as showing the presence and absence of *dhvani*, but as showing that any subject, whether or not *dhvani* has already been used in its treatment, can appear fresh by a new application of *dhvani*. The first stanza is more subtle than the second, for in it a kiss is only anticipated, not consummated, and the *vyabhicāridhāva*, shame or embarrassment, is only hypothetical, whereas in Amaru's verse it is directly expressed. Finally, the first stanza exhibits a special harmony of mood between the two lovers. For these reasons Abhinava prefers it, although he does not deny *raso* to the second, which, because of its simplicity, a modern reader may actually prefer.
 3. The first of these quotations is from the stanza of Kālidāsa's *Vikramorvāsiya*, quoted in 2.5 f A. We do not know the source of the second. From what Abhinava says at the outset of his comment on 4.3, he must regard the quotation from Kālidāsa as an example of the fourth variety of *dhvani*, *samīkṣyakramadyotita*.

L Having thus exemplified the two varieties of the first type of *dhvani*,¹ he now prepares to give examples of the second type, where the literal is intended [but is subordinate to a seond meaning].

[The bride has lowered:] *nindrākaīavī*, lit.; a pretender in sleep; that is, his sleep is false. Has lowered her lips to his face: she cannot renounce the heavenly joy that arises from the touch of his face; that is why he is called her beloved.

The bride: that is, newlywed. She is forcibly checked by fear of waking, that is, of waking her beloved. Time and again she starts forward, only with difficulty to check for the smallest instant her desire to kiss him. That is why she remains hesitant with turning, that is, examining again and again whether he is asleep. But still she cannot turn back altogether from her would-be kiss. While her dear one for his part makes no motion to kiss her, fearing that if he were to kiss her as she now is, she would be covered with shame and would turn away.

Their hearts are caught in the state of their anticipation (*hṛdayam sākāñkṣāpratipottī nāma*): [The literal sense of the *bahu-*
vrīhi adjective is that] their hearts are such that their state is one of *sākāñkṣā*, anticipation or yearning; that is, agitated by love-longing

rather than satisfied by the accomplishment of their desire. They have, however, achieved the ultimate bliss which consists in regarding one's partner as the all-in-all of life, a bliss which has not required any plunge through physical experience; and hereby their love (*śrigāra*) has become perfect.²

In the second stanza the kiss is achieved and the shame (or embarrassment) directly expressed. Although the love is strengthened by the words "he kissed her [in good earnest]," still, in the first stanza the passion, without there appearing any possibility that the mutual restraint of their burgeoning desires should cease, bespeaks the union in a single state of mind of the two lovers, and so the love is strengthened to a greater degree.

1. That is, the varieties *atyantatiraskṛta* and *arthāntarasāṅkramita* of the type *avivakṣitavācyā*. 2. The metaphor underlying the sentence is of the river of transmigration into which one is plunged and from which one may reach the farther shore (*pāram*), where lies the *summum bonum* (*parinirūpti* = *parinirvāṇam*). As for the final word *śrigāra*, it is hard to say whether Abbinava is thinking more of the quality of love exhibited by the lovers, or the aesthetic enjoyment of *śrigdrarasa* by the reader.

K In this way the manifold complexity of the rasas, etc., should be sought out. The path of poetry, although [it seems to be] limited, will extend to infinity by this aid.

A As has been said above, the area of the rasas, *bhāvas*, improper rasas and *bhāvas*, and the cessation of these four elements, is of manifold complexity if one calculates the variety of *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* that belong to each. This whole area should be sought out [or put to use] in this way so that by use of the rasas, etc., the path of poetry, which seems to be limited by its having been trodden by so many thousands, or really a countless number, of poets, may extend to infinity. For the rasas, *bhāvas*, etc., are limitless through the connection

of each of them with the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas*. Through the use of each one of them an event of the world, whatever it may be, can be made by a good poet at will to appear other than as it is. This too was stated above in our discussion of *citra* poetry (3.41-42 a 4, final verse). A great poet also has composed a stanza on the subject:

Victorious is the goddess Speech,
enlarger of the poet's field,
who many a matter, though it be not such,
can fit within our heart as if it were.

Thus it is well established that through recourse to the *rasas*, *bhāvas*, etc., the subjects of poetry are endless.

L Having thus exemplified the four basic types [of *dhvani*], our author, by extrapolation of the character found in the *alaksyakrama* type, makes a statement that holds for every variety:¹ In this way, etc. Should be sought out: should be illustrated.

As has been said: viz., in the words:

The varieties of the elements subordinate to this [rasa or the like] and the varieties within itself, when one imagines all the possible combinations with one another, are infinite. [2.12 K]

This too was stated: The word *ca* is here used in the sense of *api* and is placed in abnormal position. What is meant is "this too was stated" (*etad api pratipāditam*), viz., in the words, "may treat unliving things as living, and living as unliving" (3.40-41 a 4, final verse).

Though it be not such: this refers to the external (reality). As if it were: the sense is that the created vision is of the most wondrous form, because, as shown by the word *iva* ("as if"), the mind cannot come to rest on either one or the other (viz., the reality or the vision).

Within our heart: that is, on the touchstone for testing the true gold of all the *bhāvas*. Can fix: that is, can place it immovably within the heart of whoever has a heart. Hence these [visions] are different from everyday matters; they become a special sort of matter. And it is only when they have been fixed in the heart that they become so; and not otherwise.² Victorious: she is superior to the creator gods of limited powers. By her grace the poet's field, that is, the objects which he describes, become enlarged, li- itless.

1. Abhinava's reasoning seems to be as follows. It is only in the *asam-lokṣyakrama* type (the type where no sequence is observed from the denoted to the suggested meaning) that the *rasas*, etc. are prominent, and it is in the *rasas*, etc., that the manifold complexity is found. However, one may use this manifold complexity to explain how other varieties of *dhvani* also may impart an endless variety to poetry. 2. Here again, as in his introductory stanza to the *Locana*, Abhinava emphasises the importance of the audience. Compare also his remarks on 2.27. Poetry requires an auditor as well as a poet.

4.4

[There is no new *Kārikā* at this point. The stanza which Ānanda here introduces, as is obvious from the fact that he does not comment on it, is either a *sorighraśloka* (summarizing stanza) or a *parikaraśloka* (supplementary stanza). But we have thought it best not to disturb the traditional numeration.]

A To explain the same point, the following is said:

By use of the *rasas*, things that have been long seen
appear as if new, like trees at the coming of spring.

Thus there may be a fresh color by use of that type of *dhvani* where the literal sense is intended but where there is [subordination to] a suggestion, in the variety where the suggestion arises like a reverberation from the power of words; as for example in the passage:

You are now all that is left.
You are now the world-serpent Śeṣa.

[Bāha, *Hṛṣyacarita*]¹

although there exist such stanzas as the following:

Śeṣa, Himālaya, and you are great,
are dignified and firm:
you three hold steady the shaking earth,
never transgressing the law.

(Bhāmaha 3.28)²

There may be a fresh color by use of the same [type of *dhvani*] in the variety where the suggestion arises like a reverberation from the power of meaning. As for example in this stanza:

While the heavenly visitor was speaking, etc.
[Kālidāsa, *Kum. Sam.* 6.84]³

§ 4.4 A]

although there exist verses like the followi

When the talk
turns to news of the bridegroom,
maidens show their yearning
by their bristling flesh,
although their faces are lowered
in shyness.⁴

There may be novelty because of the embodiment, in an imaginative expression of the poet, of the variety where the suggestion arises like a reverberation from the power of meaning, as in:

The fragrant month prepares, etc.⁵

although there exist such verses as:

As the sweet-smelling season begins,
the lovely longings of lovers
break forth with the mango buds.⁶

There may be freshness because of the embodiment, in an imaginative expression of a character created by the poet, of the variety where the suggestion arises like a reverberation from the power of meaning, as in.⁷

Attentive youth
has lent a hand to your breasts
that they might rise as it were to
the visitor Love.
[Cf. 2.24 A, above.]

There is no redundancy of this stanza with the sense of the followi

As the slender chest of young girls
swells out with budding breasts,
Love, finding a place to live,
enters into their hearts.⁸

In the same way there is no triteness of the stanza, "Ah, merchant, how should we have ivory," etc. [cf. 3.1 h A], because of the existence of such verses as:

My son, who once with a single shaft
could widow the elephant herd,
by cursed daughter-in-law is brought
to bearing a basket of arrows.⁹

The subject matter of poetry will acquire freshness by recourse to the varieties of suggestors, just as it does by the variety of suggested meanings. But I have not given [examples of] this out of fear of extending my book too far. The sensitive reader can supply them himself.

1. The passage has already been quoted at 3.1 e A.
2. In the last quarter we must read *bibrtha* with all the editions of Bhāmaha. Two of the NS MSS of *Dhv.* read *bibhrthāḥ*, which makes a non-sequitur as well as a solecism. The reading of the Kāshi and Vidyābhāvan editions, *bibhrate*, falls into the latter of these faults. The snake, the mountain, and the king support the earth not for their own benefit but for that of others. The voice should therefore be *parasmaipada*. The verse is presumably by Bhāmaha himself, who was a good grammarian. The stanza raises a problem of chronology, as Bāna's *Hṛṣacorita* must have been written about A.D. 640, whereas Bhāmaha, since he mentions the Nyāsakāra, can scarcely be placed before 700. P. V. Kane deals with the problem, *HSP* pp. 116-117. He offers two possible explanations: (a) that Ānanda was not concerned with the chronology of his examples, wishing only to show that a passage could be fresh and charming by the use of *dhvani*, although there might be many other passages in one's library on the same subject; (b) that Ānanda was ignorant of Bāna's date. In the second quarter of the stanza there are puns in *guruvat* (dignified, of the king; heavy, of the snake and mountain) and *sthirāt* (firm-minded, of the king; steady, of the snake and mountain).
3. The stanza is quoted in full and discussed in 2.22 A. See also 3.39 A and 3.43 A.
4. The stanza states directly what is only suggested in the stanza of Kālidāsa. Thus it fails to achieve *rasa*.
5. For the complete verse and for discussion of this type of *dhvani*, see 2.24 A, L.
6. Anonymous. The verse is not good. It deserves the jingling alliteration that I have given it.
7. The passage which follows in the Kāshi and Vidyābhāvan editions makes no sense, because the stanza "Ah merchant, how should we have ivory," etc. (*vāñjaa hathidantā*) is not an example of the *kavinsaddhavaktrpraudhoktimātranispanna* variety but of the *sutahsambhava* variety of *dhvani*. What has happened is that some lines have dropped out. They are preserved, with a small lacuna, by the NS edition. After *sārirotvena navatvam* it continues as follows: *yathā "sāra-visṇṇa-jouvaṇa-hathlālamban samunnamantehim / abbhūṭhānamm iva mammahassa dinnam tuha thanehim //* {cf. 2.24 A} *asya ca gāthasya "udīhi... kādhoś/? ubbhinna-kādhoś/jaha jaha thanā vinanti bālānam / taha taha laddhāvāso vva mammaho hiām āvīwai //* etadgathārthena na paunaruktyam / *yathā vā*. Then follows "*vāñjaa hathidantā*," etc., as in the other editions. I have translated the NS version.
8. This strophe lacks such imaginative expressions as "attendant youth" and "rise up to greet," found in the preceding verse.
9. The hunter with his new wife

is a favorite exemplum in Prakrit poetry of the debilitating effect of sexual indulgence. See *Vajjälagga* 206-214.

L [First interpretation, on the presumption that the verse "By use of the *rasas*," etc., forms a new *Kārikā*.] As the endlessness of poetic imagination and speech which is brought about by *dhvani* has been insufficiently explained, the [following] *Kārikā* describes it in a new way [viz., by the use of analogy]. Accordingly, the *Vṛttikāra* says, To explain the same point. By "explain" he means, to set it forth with a substantiating argument. What he has in mind is that while the author of the *Vṛtti* has stated it [viz., *dhvani*] to be the cause for the endlessness of meanings, the author of the *Kārikās* has not [yet] done so.

[Second interpretation.] Or rather, his intention is to quote a summary stanza (*samgrahaśloka*). This will explain why there is no comment on the stanza in the *Vṛtti*.

Things that have been long seen: one may supply "by external means of cognition such as perception," or "by poets of the past." Poetry here acts the part of the month of spring.

What charm can there possibly be in naming such things directly as yearning, shyness, longings of lovers?

The examples [here given which contain *dhvani*] have been fully explained previously. There is no point in repeating here their explanation. For the present passage of the *Vṛtti* intends no more than to show that there is indeed a freshness [in these examples] thanks to the varieties of *dhvani*, even though the themes have been touched upon by older writers.

[Abhinava gives a Sanskrit translation of the Prakrit verse, "My son, who once with a single shaft," etc. He follows it by saying:] The meaning is obvious. One should connect syntactically the words of this stanza and there is no triteness.¹

1. In the Sanskrit the two phrases are separated by the verse.

A And now, although it has been stated this point is repeated because it is so essential:

K While this relationship of suggestor and suggested is capable of great variety, the poet should concentrate on that one type that achieves *rasa*.

A While words are capable of a varied relationship of suggestor and suggested and this is the source of their infinity of meaning, the poet who seeks to obtain an original meaning should concentrate his effort on the one relation which achieves *rasa*. For all original poetry is achieved by a poet whose mind attends closely to a suggested sense consisting of a *rasa*, *bhāva*, or the false or improper correlate (*ābhāsa*) of one of these, and on the suggestors, as we have described them,¹ in the form of words, sentences, texture (*rasanā*), or complete works. And so it is that in such works as the *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata* the battle scenes, etc., although they occur repeatedly, always appear new. Furthermore, one primary *rasa*, being woven into a work, gives it special meaning and extra beauty. Do you ask for an example? As in the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*?²

In the *Rāmāyaṇa* the *karuṇarasa* (flavor of compassion or tragic mood) is prepared by the first of poets himself, where he says that his "grief became verse."³ He carries out the same *rasa* throughout his composition up to Rāma's final, irreversible separation from Sītā.⁴

Again, in the *Mahābhārata*, which has the form of a didactic work although it contains poetic beauty, the great sage who was its author, by his furnishing a conclusion that dismays our hearts by the miserable end of the Vṛṣnis and Pāṇḍavas, shows that the primary aim of his work

has been to produce a disenchantment with the world and that he has intended his primary subject to be liberation (*mokṣa*) from worldly life and the *rasa* of peace. This has been partly revealed indeed by others in their commenting on the work. The most compassionate of sages [Bhīṣma]⁵ himself asserts the same when he seeks, by imparting the light of his pure knowledge, to rescue the world from the cruel illusion in which it is plunged. He expresses it in many ways, as in the following:

The more the world's affairs
go wrong for us and lose their substance,
the more will disenchantment with them
grow, there is no doubt.

[*Mahābhārata* 12.168.4]

The ultimate meaning of the *Mahābhārata* thus appears very clearly: the two subjects intended by the author as primary are the *rasa* of peace and the human goal of liberation. The other *rasas* and other human goals are subordinated to these; and how there may be a relation of principal and subordinate among the *rasas* is a matter we have already explained.⁶ It is no contradiction to this to concede that if we disregard the ultimate inner truth, there may be beauty in a subordinate *rasa* or human aim [in the *Mahābhārata*] regarded for the moment as paramount, just as there is beauty in the body [although it is in truth subordinate to the soul].

An objection may be raised that all the contents of the *Mahābhārata* are summarized in the Introductory Summary (*anukramanī*)⁷ and that these subjects [*mokṣa* and *sāntarasa*] are not mentioned there. Rather, it is specifically stated in that Introduction⁸ that the *Mahābhārata* will inform us of all human aims and that it contains all the *rasas*. To this it may be replied. It is true that the predominance of the *rasa* of peace and the predominance of *mokṣa* over other human aims are not specifically stated in the *Anukramanī*. But they are shown by suggestion, as in this sentence:

And the blessed Vāsudeva,
the ever-living, is here glorified.

[*Mahābhārata* 1.1.193 ab]

For the meaning intended to be hereby suggested is as follows. The adventures of the Pāṇḍavas and others which are here recounted, since they come to a miserable conclusion, represent the elaboration of worldly illusion, whereas it is the blessed Vāsudeva, representing ultimate truth, who is here glorified.⁹ Purify your minds, therefore, in blessed

God, the all-highest. Form no passion for insubstantial glories, nor let your minds dwell whole-heartedly on virtues such as statesmanship, modesty, courage, or the like, so as to regard them as sufficient in themselves.¹⁰ The word "and,"¹¹ graced with the full powers of a suggestor, appears clearly to be hinting that one should look farther [in the book] and see the worthlessness of all worldly life. The verses which immediately follow, "for He is the truth," etc. [*MBh.* 1.1.193c] are seen to reveal within themselves the same sense.

This sense is beautiful because it is concealed. The poet-creator Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana has made it perfectly clear, however, by composing the *Hariyamī* as a conclusion to his *Mahābhārata*. Since this sense stirs us toward an intense devotion (*bhakti*) to that other truth that lies beyond worldly life, all worldly activity appears now as a preliminary goal, to be rejected. He describes the power of gods, places of pilgrimage, and of ascetecism, only because these are the means of attaining the highest Brahma, because the various gods and sacred objects are epiphanies¹² of that Brahma. Even the narrative of the adventures of the Pāṇḍavas, since its purpose is to generate a disenchantment with the world, since this disenchantment is a cause of liberation (*mokṣa*), and since *mokṣa* has been described in the *Gītā* and other works as the chief means of attaining the Blessed One: even this narrative is indirectly a means of attaining the highest Brahma.

What is intended [by the word Vāsudeva in the *Mahābhārata* verse just quoted] is the highest Brahma, the abode of unlimited power, known under such designations as "Vāsudeva" and made famous under that name in the *Gītā* and other passages; the original whole,¹³ which possesses all the forms which were copied by the appearance at Mathurā. But the appearance at Mathurā, being a partial incarnation, is not meant, as it is excluded by the adjective "everlasting." And [there is no reason for limiting the epithet Vāsudeva to the son of Vasudeva], because we find the epithet used in such works as the *Rāmāyaṇa* of a still different incarnation.¹⁴ Furthermore, this sense [of the epithet as referring to an eternal entity] has been determined by the grammarians themselves.¹⁵

By that [one] sentence exhibited in the *Anukramanī*, which shows that everything other than the Blessed One is transient, we are already informed that the *Mahābhārata* as a work of doctrine (*sāstranaye*) considers the one supreme goal of man to be *mokṣa* and as a work of poetry (*kāvyanaye*) intends the *rāsa* of peace, which is a strengthening of the happiness that derives from the cessation of desire,¹⁶ to be the

predominant *rasa*. As this matter is most essential, it is given by suggestion rather than by direct statement, for an essential matter carries far greater luster by not being stated in so many words. For it is common knowledge among intelligent and well-educated circles that one should suggest rather than state in so many words the matter which one has most at heart.¹⁷

Accordingly, it is clear that in writing a poem one gains freshness and a large measure of beauty for the work by means of such factors as the predominant *rasa*. That is why we may see in literature a composition possessed of great beauty if it assembles its matter in harmony with a *rasa*, even if it lacks any particular figures of speech. For example:

Victorious is the great sage,
the prince of yogis, born of a water jar,
who in one cupped handfull saw
the Divine Fish and the Divine Tortoise.¹⁸

Here the vision of the fish and the tortoise in the palm of Agastya's hand, being in conformity with the *rasa* of wonder, adds a great beauty to the stanza, for the vision of the divine fish and tortoise, being an original touch, is more in conformity with the *rasa* of wonder than the [suggested] presence of the whole ocean in one palm of his hand. For a matter that is trite through being known to everyone, though it may be a marvel, does not give us a sense of wonder. Nor need the mention of an original trait in harmony with the *rasa* be limited to the *rasa* of wonder. It may harmonize with other *rasas*. For example,

Lucky man! Her side,
which you accidentally touched
as you brushed past her on the street,
still perspires, bristles, trembles.¹⁹

From this stanza, as one thinks about it, there arises a perception in the highest degree of *rasa*, which would not appear at all from the mere fact, being perceived, that the lady after touching you perspires, bristles and trembles.

We have thus described how a fresh color is given to the matter of poetry by use of the various types of predominant suggestion (*dhvani*). A freshness of the poetic matter may also arise from using a subordinated suggestion of any of the three kinds.²⁰ But I have given no example of these in fear that my book would become too long.²¹ The sensitive reader can easily supply them for himself.

1. Viz., in 3.2 and 3.16. 2. (J. Masson) Ānanda's view is that what makes the battles, for example, seem original each time is not merely the use of *dhvani* in the descriptions, but also their subordination to a more general aesthetic goal. In the *Mahābhārata* the more battles that are described, the more distasteful war becomes and the more firmly grounded becomes our feeling of detachment, of world weariness (*vairāgya*). So in the case of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the constant expressions of pain, sorrow, separation, all conduce to the overall end of the work, a feeling of *kāruṇya*. 3. *Rām.* 1.2.39; see also above, 1.5 K and note 1. 4. If the plot had admitted of an ultimate reunion, the rose would have been *vipralambhaśringāra*; see 2.5c L. 5. *Lokanātha* must here be used as an epithet of *Bhīṣma*, who speaks the verse which follows to the grieving *Yudhiṣṭhīra*. Normally the word is used of God, that is, of *Brahma* or *Viṣṇu*, or by the Buddhists of the Buddha. But the *MBh.* itself uses the term once of *Bhīṣma* (9.2.30). In Ānanda's use of the epithet here, it may have been chosen for its alliterative effect. 6. Viz., in 3.20ff. 7. *MBh.* 1.1.65ff. The *Anukramanī* is doubtless a summary of an earlier *Mahābhārata* than the hundred-thousand-sloka version that we now possess. It refers to very little of Book 3 and to nothing after Book 11. As the *Mokṣaparva* is in Book 12, it does not figure in the *Anukramanī*. 8. *uddesā*: the preliminary mention or listing of matters before they are discussed. 9. The same view of the *MBh.* is shared by *Nilakantha*. See his remarks on *Mbh.* Vulgate 1.1.275, which he concludes by saying, "One should therefore elicit the substance from the whole book and leave the rest."

10. The sense is that these virtues are worthless if they are *kevala*, that is, alone, or independent of an effort to attain to God. There is a pause between *rāgīno* and *gunētu* that might be represented by a comma. 11. *ca sādhaḥ* (Text 532, line 1) should be read together as a compound, meaning "the word 'and,'" as used in the quotation just given from the *MBh.* 12. *vibhūtayāḥ*: The word "epiphany," as popularized by Mircea Eliade, denotes a place where the sacred appears or becomes sensible to the worshipper. In this sense the word is a more precise translation of *vibhūti* than "manifestation." 13. Only K. Krishnamoorthy among editors has given the correct reading, which he takes from two *BORI* MSS. The word *amśirūpam* should be inserted between *sakalasvarūpam* and *vivikṣitam*. By "the appearance at Mathurā" is meant the incarnation as Krishna. Brahma is the *amśin*, the whole, whereas Krishna, Rāma, and other incarnations are *amśas*, parts. 14. In *Rām.* 1.39.24 (Vulgate 1.40.25) "Vāsudeva" is used as an epithet of Kapila. At the beginning of that chapter Vāsudeva is said to have incarnated himself in Kapila. 15. It is a bold move to appeal to the grammarians on this matter, for Pāṇini explains such words as *Vāsudeva* merely as patronymics; in this case, as the son of the sage Vasudeva of the *Vṛṣṇi* clan (Pāṇ. 4.1.114). Abhinava supposes that Ānanda is here referring to the *Kāśikī*'s comment on that *sūtra*, for he embodies a portion of that comment in his own remarks (see below under

L). "How," asks the *Kāśikā* "can words which are eternal be assigned to a formation by reference to objects which are not eternal such as the family members of the Andhaka, [Vṛṣṇi, and Kuru] clans?" The first explanation of the *Kāśikā* is this: "It so happens that a good many names like Nakula, Sahadeva [and Vasudeva] occurred somehow, merely by chance, in exactly that form among the Kuru, etc., clans. Pāṇini included them in writing his grammar." One might infer from this that the author of the *Kāśikā* supposed the name "Vasudeva" to have once referred to an eternal entity before it was accidentally applied to a human. But I see no logical means of inferring from the *Kāśikā*'s remarks that "Vāsudeva" also once referred to a non-human being. How could it when the only etymology of the word given by the *Kāśikā* or Pāṇini is as "the son of Vasudeva"? To justify Ānanda's view one needs a wholly different etymology of "Vāsudeva," which one will find in religious texts (e.g., *Vishnupurāṇa* 1.2.12), not in the grammarians. 16. The same phrase is used at 3.26a A (Text p. 390), on which passage Abhinava makes it clear that *trṣṇākṣayasukha* is the *sthāyibhāva* of *sāntarasa*. 17. See J. Masson, "Telling not Conveying," *JIP* 1 (1973), 144–155. 18. The prince of yogis to whom the stanza refers is Agastya, of whom many marvels are related. He is called *kumbhodbhava* (born of a water jar) in accordance with a myth related in *Bṛhaddevatā* 5.149. At a sacrifice the gods Mitra and Varuṇa, upon seeing the beautiful nymph Urvāśi, involuntarily ejaculated their semen, a part of which fell into a water jar, where it generated Agastya. The reference in the second half of the stanza is to Agastya's drinking up the ocean, which he is said to have done by his yogic powers in one sip from his cupped hands. He performed this miracle to help the gods, who sought to destroy the Kāleya demons, who had been hiding at the bottom of the ocean. This myth is told in *MBh.* 3.100–103 (Bombay Vulgate 3.102–105) and is often referred to by later poets. But the notion of Agastya's having a vision of the two incarnations of Viṣṇu, the fish and the tortoise, as he took the sea in his hands, is new. The former is that gigantic fish who rescued the earth from the deluge; the latter, the tortoise on whom the ocean rests. The verse is often quoted by later authors as an example of the figure of speech *bhāvitā* (so by Ruyyaka, p. 228, and by Viśvanātha, *SD* 10.94), but the older Ālaṅkārikas regard *bhāvitālonikārā* as a figure applicable only to complete works, not to single stanzas. Ānanda and Abhinava certainly do not see *bhāvitā* in the stanza. Abhinava sees *rasavadarikārā* (cf. 2.4 Introduction A and note 1), because the *rasa* of wonder is subordinate to Agastya's love of Viṣṇu. What is remarkable about the verse, however, and the occasion of Ānanda's here citing it, is that the freshness and charm is given to it by a direct statement (*vācyo 'rthaḥ*) of the vision of the fish and tortoise, rather than by a suggested meaning, viz., that Agastya held the whole ocean in his palm. This is because the direct statement is both original and harmonious with the *rasa*, whereas the suggestion is trite (*kṣunṇa*), as it can be found in a hundred other verses

about Agastya. 19. The verse is spoken by a lady's confidante to a gentleman with whom the lady would have a rendezvous. Again, the suggested meaning that the lady has fallen in love with him is trite. Classical Sanskrit is full of ladies who perspire and horripilate at the touch of their lovers. But the direct statement localizing the symptoms in that side of her that he brushed against in the street is original and effective. The version of the text in our edition limps. One needs the word *tī* between *suhaga* and *jendī*; see *KM* edition. Subhadrināth Śāstri gives a literal (unmetrical) gloss thus: *svidyati romāñcati veprate rathyātulāgrapratilagnah / sa pārśuo 'dyōpi subhaga tasyā yendasy atigatah //* For *tulagga* (= *kākatāliya*) see Patwardhan's glossary on the *Vajjälagga*. *Tī* is a shortened form of *tie*, Sk. *tasyāḥ*; see Hemacandra, Grammatik 3.64. *Volino* is from Sk. *vyapacalitah*; see Turner 12167.

20. The reference is to *vastudhvani*, *alanikāradhvani*, and *rasadhvani*. See 1.13 m L. 21. All editions and recorded MSS read *vistāra*. But the *a* should be short by Pāṇ. 3.3.33, as Abhinava has it, *vistara*.

L [Irreversible separation from Sītā]: By the word "irreversible," that is, unconditional, he rules out the possibility of the *rasa* of love in separation. [The miserable end of the Vṛṣnis and Pāṇḍavas]: the destruction of the Vṛṣnis in civil war, the unseemly fall of the Pāṇḍavas on the great pilgrimage,¹ the end of even Krishna by means of a hunter: everyone comes to a miserable end. The primary end: Although it is stated that the *Mahābhārata* contains whatever exists "and in dharma and in artha and in kāma and in mokṣa,"² the four words "and" in this verse suggest the following. Although there is here no wealth of *dharma*, *artha*, and *kāma* that cannot be found elsewhere, it is in this work that you can see the miserable end to which they come. On the other hand, that element which consists in *mokṣa* should be considered the essence of the whole.³

The more: The word *lokatantram* (the world's affairs) [may be etymologically explained as] that which is set in order (*tantryamāna*) by people (*loka*), that is, carefully gathered, viz., *dharma*, *artha*, and *kāma*, and the means of attaining them. These things, although they are regarded as valuable, still, in whatever way⁴ [one meets them], that is, in gaining, preserving, or losing them, [they prove to be] insubstantial and empty as a mirage. Go wrong: that is, turn out to the contrary. He means that there can be no thought of their being substantial. In all these ways will disenchantment with them, viz., with the world's affairs, grow. By the author's here suggesting the indifference (*nirveda*) to wordly things which arises from knowledge of

their true nature and which is the persisting emotion (*sthāyibhāva*) of the *rasa* of peace, and by his stating the insubstantiality of all else, he has made it clear that this *rasa* is predominant.

Our author anticipates an objection that a beauty of the erotic, the heroic, and of other [*rasas*] also appears in the *Mahābhārata*, saying: It is no contradiction, etc. Although a *rasa* may be subordinate, persons who are given to pleasure and subject to worldly passions will fix upon it erroneously, as others will fix upon the body as the cognizing self although it is merely the seat of the sense organs for the experience of the cognizer.

As sufficient in themselves: He means that on the other hand there is no harm if these virtues serve to promote one's devotion to God. One should construe the words *vibhūtiṣu rāgino gunēṣu ca*⁵ with *nivisṭādhiyo mā bhūta*. One should look farther: that is, at what comes in the *Mahābhārata* after the *Anukramani*.

Anticipating an objection that "Vāsudeva" refers to a son of Vāsudeva and not to God the highest, the supreme self, Mahādeva, he says: [What is intended] under such designations as "Vāsudeva," etc. In such passages as:

At the end of many births, the man of knowledge
will come to me, knowing that Vāsudeva is universal.⁶

the meaning is clear: that the entity designated by the name "Vāsudeva" is this [highest Brahman] i its form of the whole.

Has been determined: The sūtra 4.1.114 *rsy-andhaka-vṛṣṇi-kuru-bhyas ca* (Pāṇ. 4.1.114) is prescribed, because these words, while they are eternal, were later assigned by chance.⁷

As a work of doctrine: Insofar as one seeks in it the aims of man without being concerned with aesthetic taste, this designation is appropriate;⁸ but the designation of *rasa* applies to it as it is furnished with the means of aesthetic pleasure. Such is our author's intent, which he has stated at length in his *Tattvāloka*.⁹ Since it is not the main subject here, we do not discuss it.

Far greater luster: He gives the reason for this statement, saying: For it is common knowledge, etc. The word *ca* here has the sense of *yasmāt* ("because"). Since the matter [here referred to] has been in common knowledge from the earliest times, it follows that this was what the blessed Vyāsa also and his followers had in mind in expressing matter indirectly.¹⁰ Otherwise, [that is, if Vyāsa had written in disregard of convention,] we could have no assurance on reading "Having

paid homage to Nārāyaṇa,"¹¹ and so on, that the author intended us to construe the verb with its object, or of any similar [convention]. This is what our author intends. In using the words intelligent and well-educated our author follows [the distinction he has made of] "a work of doctrine" and "a work of poetry."

After this incidental discussion of the construction of the *Mahābhārata*, he now summarizes the matter stated [above in the words of the *Kārikā*], "The poet should concentrate his attention on that one type that achieves *rasa*": Accordingly, it is clear, etc.

That is why: because the matter is clearly established. That is why what we see in literature [viz., that the composition possesses great beauty if its material is in harmony with a *rasa*] is reasonable. Otherwise it would not be reasonable. And it is not unreasonable, because we experience it as being beautiful; and the sole cause of this experience is that the material harmonizes with a *rasa*. This is the sense. Any particular figures of speech: The word *antara* (literally, "other") here means *vīśeṣa* ("particular"). Or, since the example he is about to give actually contains the figure *rasavadalankāra*,¹² the compound *alankārāntara* may mean a figure of speech other than that.

[Victorious is the great sage, etc.:] It may be objected that his seeing the fish and the tortoise suggests the presence of the whole ocean in the palm of the sage's hand and from this we conceive the sage's greatness, but that there is no beauty added to the stanza by word-meanings that are harmonious with the *rasa*. Anticipating this, our author says, Here the vision, etc. But the objector may rise again. "We are willing to grant," he may say, "that the suggested sight of the ocean is in harmony with the *rasa* of wonder, but how can your example be illustrative in that portion of it where 'that which is in harmony with the *rasa*' is the literal meaning [of 'fish' and 'tortoise']?"¹³ In answer to this our author says, For in this stanza, etc. For a matter that is trite: The sense is of something that has lost its substance by being described and portrayed time and again, being like twice-pounded grain. He shows that this principle applies to many passages of literature: Nor [need the mention], etc.

Lucky man, etc.: That side of her next to you, touched *tulāgreṇa*, that is, accidentally, as you passed by in the street, lucky man, still [perspires, etc.]. The perception of *rasa*: the perception of the love that they feel for one another. He emphasises that the meaning here is in harmony with the *rasa* by giving the contrary: that the lady after touching you, etc.

The first Kārikā of the Fourth Book contained the words, "by this road of dhvani and of subordinated suggestion." Our author now summarizes the portion already explained, which states that by the road of dhvani poets may gain an endless stretch of imagination, by saying, We have thus described, etc. He then explains the portion that concerns subordinated suggestion by saying, [A freshness from using] a subordinated suggestion, etc. Of the three kinds: he means, by subordinating to the literal meaning a suggested meaning in the form of a fact or situation (*vastu*), a figure of speech, or a *rasa*. In this area an endless variety [is possible] by the subordination of all the different varieties which exist of dhvani. He indicates this in speaking of his book's becoming too long.

[The reader can supply them] for himself: A stanza of my own will furnish an instance where a suggested fact, by being subordinated, gives a fresh color, although it is close in matter to an older verse.

This is well done, O champion
of those who tremble in fear:
that you give not a moment of rest
to the money that seeks you for refuge.¹⁴

Here a fact, namely the generosity [of the addressee], being suggested by his constantly giving away his money, embellishes and gives freshness to the literal sense, although the sense is close to that of an older poet:

Coins, whose bodies are weary
of running from hand to hand of the generous,
regain their health as it were
when they sleep in the house of a miser.¹⁵

Freshness may be achieved by embellishing the literal sense with a suggested figure of speech, as in this verse of mine:

Your hair was once well fitted for love's increase,
when it was black as a cluster of bees in springtime.
How can it now, when it has turned as grey
as ashes on the graveyard, not bring dispassion?¹⁶

Here the suggested figures of *akṣepa* and *vibhāvanā*¹⁷ which embellish the literal sense give a fresh color, although the stanza is built on an old idea. For there is an old verse which runs as follows:

Hunger, thirst, lust, envy, and a fear of death:
all five increase in old age, even among the wise.

A suggested *rasa*, subordinated by its acting as an embellishment of the literal, may give freshness, as in my verse:

This is not age; the angry snake of Death
is spitting and has scattered his white venom
on a man's head.

That the man can see this and yet seem happy
in his heart, nor seek the goal of Śiva:
ah, how brave he is!¹⁸

Here the literal sense, being embellished by the *rasa* of wonder, becomes charming, for [the wonder] is subordinated to furnishing the *rasa* of peace. Thus a freshness is achieved in the presence of an old verse like the following:

That disenchantment does not arise
in one whose body is broken with age,
surely that man must believe in his heart
that death does not exist.

1. The *mahāpatha*, lit., "great road," is the pilgrimage of self-destruction. One walks north into the Himalaya until one perishes. The *mahāpatha* of the Pāṇavas is related in the 17th Book of the *MBh*. 2. *MBh* 1.56.33
3. Perhaps the rationale of this suggestion is based on the emphatic effect of repeating the word *ca*. If we say *Rāmāyaṇam ca Mahābhāratam ca tasya hrdayamgate* "He has memorized both the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*," the suggestion is that others may have memorized the *Rāmāyaṇa*, but he is outstanding in having memorized the *Mahābhārata* also. But the suggestion is farfetched. 4. By *yeno yena prakāreṇa Abhinava* is glossing *yathā yathā*
5. Apparently *Abhinava* read *ca* in place of *vā*. 6. *Gītā* 7.19. The completion of the verse is: *iti sa mahātmā sudurlabhaḥ*. 7. See above, 4.5 A, note 15. 8. Read *sodarāḥ*, as given by S. K. De, "The Text of *Kāvyaśāstra* iv," p. 251. Two lines later we must read *vityoktam* in place of *vityokyotam*. 9. See Introduction, p. 11.

10. What they had in mind was that their readers, following the convention, would take that which was indirectly expressed as most important.
11. The first words of the *Mahābhārata* in the Northern Recension. 12. See above, 2.4 Introduction A, and note 1. 13. Ānanda's thesis has been that *rasa*, the chief element of beauty in poetry, is achieved only by suggestion. The obj' tor's point is that it seems to go against that thesis to say that the beauty of a poem can be greatly increased by a literal meaning, not a suggested meaning, which harmonizes with the *rasa*. The answer is that if the suggestion is stale and trite, anything harmonious with the *rasa* which lifts the suggestion out of its triteness and gives freshness to the poem, will

bring about an increase of beauty. The importance of suggestion is not hereby abandoned, but is made less rigorous and exclusive. 14. (J. Masson) Abhinava's point is that the suggested idea of the generosity of the king embellishes the literal sense by rationalizing it and thereby becomes subordinate to it. This is always the case in that kind of *vyājas*'*vī* where the literal sense is a censure, eventually ending in a suggested compliment. 15. The second half of the stanza should read: *atthā kivināgharathā sathāvasthā su-vanti vva*. Note that the stanza, when translated into Sanskrit, is metrically perfect: *tyāgijana-kara-paramparā-saṅcārana-kheda-nihsaha-sarirā / arthāt kṛpana-ghasthā svasthāvasthā supantīva //* It would seem that the author composed the stanza in Sanskrit and converted it only later into Prakrit. 16. As Abhinava says that the stanza is built on the same idea as the next stanza, the subject addressed must be a man and both *rāgaurddhaye* and *viruktaye* must refer to that man's reactions. As BP says, "these are the words of someone addressed to a friend." 17. *Ākṣepa* here means "hint of a simile," as Abhinava has explained in 1.13e L (see note 2 thereon). The simile is, that just as the color of his hair might have influenced the man in youth, so ought it to influence him now. The figure *vibhāvanā* is the imagining of an effect as existing without a cause: see Bhāmaha 2.77, Dandin 2.199, *AlSarv.* p. 157, *SD* 10.66 and 67. Dandin's definition is "Wherever in the absence of a well-known cause we must imagine some other cause, or imagine that the thing is self-caused, we have the figure *vibhāvanā*." To apply the definition to the present verse: The man continues to be eager for love, although the normal causes of this affection, youth and a handsome appearance, are absent. So we are forced to imagine another cause, viz., that which is explicitly stated in the "old verse" which follows: men are even more subject to vice in their old age than they are in their youth. 18. *kālobhujagah*: the snake which is death, or the black snake, i.e., cobra. *śivopāya*: the means to his welfare, but Abhinava uses *upāya* regularly to mean a path to *mokṣa*; see the chapter headings of his *Tantrāloka*. The literal sense of the stanza must be close to that of the "old verse" quoted below. It is simply that a man (representing most men) does not prepare himself for death when it draws near. This sense is here embellished by the fancy that the snake of Death is already on the man's head; the white hairs are the snake's venom. That the man pays no heed even under such circumstances suggests the rasa of wonder. The final words, or as we should say, the punch line, is ironical. J. Masson says of himself that "he feels that the older verses [quoted in this section] are more virile than Abhinava's, which strike him as too self conscious and overly written. He has the impression that Abhinava might have written these verse expressly for the occasion of illustrating his thesis." The impression may well reflect the truth, but on the value judgment V. P. and D. I. disagree. The "old verses" are like a hundred others in the Cānakya collections and in the 12th Book of the *MBA*.

They become tedious. Abhinava's verses stir one's interest and so are more persuasive.

K In this way, by the help of *dhvani* and subordinate suggestion, the matter of poetry is without end, if the poet has the gift of imagination (*pratibhā*).

A Even if there exist products of earlier poets [on the same subject, but only] if the poet has the gift of imagination. For in the absence of that, there can be no subject matter whatsoever of poetry. Even beauty of style (*bandhacchāyā*), which is the employment of words appropriate to the two meanings [viz., *dhvani* and subordinated suggestion], is impossible if there is no imagination in regard to the meanings. To suppose that beauty of style can consist in the choice of sounds without regard to any particular meaning is to suppose something in no way close to [the view of] sensitive readers. For at this rate the stringing together of words that are clever and sweet regardless of sense must be called poetry. If it is asked¹ how such a composition could be called poetry at all in view of the fact that poetry is defined as the combination of words and meanings, we would remark that just as a composition built on the subject matter of another poet is called the poetry of that [other poet, regardless of the words which it contains],² so would a construction of poetry of this sort [viz., with a novel arrangement of words regardless of meaning, also be called poetry].

1. The question is the natural reaction of a reader to the exaggeration of the preceding sentence. It is answered by explaining the exaggeration as an extended or metaphorical use of the word poetry. 2. Note that the pronoun *tat* in *tatkāvyatva* must refer to the *para* in *paropanibaddha*; so *L*, *BP*, and Badarīnāth Śarmā. Jacobi, followed by all translations into English which I have seen, took the word *tat* as referring to the later poet. But that is syntactically impossible.

L Even if there exist, etc.: our author fills out the *Kārikā*. Assuming that the first three quarters are clear, he comments on the fourth: [but only] if. The sense is: if this gift of imagination is present, the matter of poetry may grow in the manner stated; but not if it is wholly lacking. [In the absence] of that: of that gift of imagination, which has become endless. No subject matter whatsoever: for every subject has been handled by some poet of the past; what is there now left on which the poet may exercise his faculty of description? Well, even if there is no new subject to describe, a beauty of style, also known by the synonyms *uktī* (expression), *paripāka* (perfect ripeness),¹ *gumpha* (weaving), *ghatanā* (arrangement, texture),² can be constantly new. By its use there will be a chance for the poetry of later times. Anticipating this thought, our author says, Even beauty of style, etc.

Two meanings: a suggested meaning which is subordinate and one which is predominant. In no way close: he means, it will not find ready acceptance in their hearts. He gives the reason by saying, For at this rate, etc. Cleverness (*caturatva*) is the [skillful] forming of compounds; sweetness is lack of harshness.

Poetry of this sort: that is, possessing a new style. Since we call a poem that is built on a meaning that has been used by another poet a poem of that other poet, one should strive for originality of meaning. A *kāvya* (poem) is that which is spoken (*ku* + suffix *nyat*); *kāvyatva* (poetry) is the abstract noun derived from that (*kāvya* + *tva*). Thus there is no fault here of appending an abstract suffix to an abstract suffix.³

1. *Pāka* or *paripāka* refers to the choice of the *mot juste*. As Vāmana says (1.3.15) "pāka . . . is when the words are incapable of being changed." Rājāsekbara deals with the subject in *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, Chapter 5 (especially p. 20). See S. K. De, *HSP*, II, pp. 240–242. 2. The usual term is *samghatānd*. See 3.33 bL, note 6. 3. Pāṇini says nothing about redundant suffixes, but they come under the censure of Patañjali (on 3.1.7, towards end). Hence Abhinava's etymology of *kāvyatva*, which avoids the apparent redundancy and from a historical viewpoint is certainly wrong.

A In order to convey [to the reader] that the endlessness of poetry depends not only on the suggested meaning but also on the literal meaning, it is now said:

K An endlessness arises of the literal meaning too, even taken by itself, as its nature differs according to the particulars of state (*avasthā*), place, time, etc.

A An endlessness arises of the literal meaning, taken by itself, that is, even without regard to the suggested meaning, by its very nature. For the nature of the things directly expressed, whether they are sentient or insentient, becomes endless from differences in state, differences in place, differences in time, and differences in individuality (*svālakṣanya*). By making these objects, varied in this way, into the subjects of a poem, even if it is a *svabhāvokti* (naturalistic description)¹ which portrays faithfully their many well known characteristics, the matter of the poem becomes limitless.

As an example of endless poetry achieved by a difference of state, we have the goddess Pārvatī in the *Kumārasambhava*. The first description of her ends with the stanza (1.49) "sarvopamādravyasamuccayena." [The complete stanza runs:

The creator used painstaking care,
setting in place each ideal form,
as though in making her he had wished to s
all beauty gathered in one person.]

Next, as she approaches the eyes of Śiva, she is described in a different way as the assistant of the God of Love, wearing "jewelry of springtime flowers" (3.53). [The complete stanza:

The *asoka* shamed the ruby's red,
the *karnikāra* the luster of gold,
the *sindhuudra* formed the necklace of pearls
in her jewelry of springtime flowers.]

Then when she is ornamented for her marriage, her beauty is described in still a different way in verses that begin (7.13):

The matrons placed her facing east
(and stood before her; but they tarried
with ornaments all ready, for their eyes
were captured by her natural beauty.)

The manner of this poet of frequently describing a single person never seems repetitive or without a wealth of fresh matter.¹ This has been shown in my *Viṣamabāṇalilā*.²

The winning gestures of loved women
and the matter of great poets
have no limit, nor do they seem
in any way to be repetitive.

There is another method of differentiation by states, inasmuch as of all insentient objects, such as the Himālaya and the Ganges, there is a sentient form, known as its presiding deity. Such an object appears entirely different when treated by joining it to the form belonging to the appropriate sentient being. As in the *Kumārasambhava* again, the Himālaya is [first] described in its form as a mountain (*Kum.Sam.* 1.1ff.); then, in the complimentary addresses of the seven sages (6.66ff.), when its sentient form is shown, it appears entirely new. This is a well known procedure of great poets and this path has been described in det 'l for the instruction of poets in the *Viṣamabāṇalilā*.

1. See 2.4 L, note 33. Ānanda seems to be using the term here of a stanza lacking both figures of speech and *dhvani*. But Abhinava will not agree to this. As for the *svabhāvokti* stanzas of the anthologies, some of them carry *dhvani* and some do not. See SRK, Section 35, translated in *HOS* Vol. 45. 2. Probably one should drop the negative *a* from *apunaruktatwena* and read *vāñavanavā* together. Krishnamoorthy notes two MSS which add a *na* before *pratibhāsate*, which would have the same effect. To take the first *na* with *ekatra* (so Jacobi) is unnatural. Furthermore, *ekatra* should mean not 'in one

place," but "about one subject," viz., Pārvatī. After all, the point is that one can write endlessly about a single person if one makes use of different *avasthās*, etc. 3. See Introduction, p. 10.

L In order to convey: one should supply "incidentally." Or, if our author's intention is that the literal is merely auxiliary to the various suggested meanings and that by force of its being endless the suggested meanings become endless, this [conveyed information] may be pertinent.¹

Taken by itself: the intention is, that it is endless in itself without any touch of that process by which it becomes subject to the suggested meaning; but that afterwards, while being endless in its own nature, it manifests the suggested meaning. To suppose that the suggested is not in play at all would rob the result of the name of poetry, for it would lack that which is the soul of poetry. And so it is that in the examples [about to be adduced] there does exist *rasadhvani*.

Our author specifies what is meant by "etcetera" in the *Kārikā*: Difference in individuality; that is, in the particular nature of the thing, as color and touch [which may be individually differentiated although occurring] in the same degree of intensity in one substance at one and the same time.²

[Abhinava translates the Prakrit stanza, "The winning gestures," etc., into Sanskrit, then continues:] The use of the two particles *ca* suggests extreme wonder.³ In any way: Being considered with the greatest care, no trace of repetition is observable. Of loved women: One like Krishna who is lucky in love, even in enjoying his many beloveds in his good fortune of sexual enjoyment, does not notice any repetitiousness at that time. As has been said:

To be at each moment ever new
is the very nature of loveliness.

[Māgha, *Sisupālavadha* 4.17]

Loved women: What is more, although these graceful gestures (*ubhrama*)⁴ of beloved women have been exercised since the beginning of time, they appear ever new. They are not a ritual taught by some one, like the laying of a Vedic fire, by which they might become repetitive from imitation of the teacher. Rather, they spring into appearance solely from the natural budding of the surging intoxication of love, and so are ever new. In just the same way, the matter of poetry flows forth

§ 4.7 a A]

from the poet's own gift of imagination without foreign i
This is the general intention.

1. Pertinent (*praktam*), is opposed to incidental (*prasarigat*). Ananda makes no reference to the subordination of *vacya* to *vyākya* in the *svabhāvokti* stanzas of which he speaks or in his citations from the *Kumārasambhava*. But as the thesis of his book is that *dhvani* is the soul of poetry, Abhinava feels that it must be brought in here. 2. Abhinava is thinking of properties, of a mango fruit for example, which are observed together as they undergo parallel development in the course of the ripening of the fruit. Even they can be distinguished. 3. The use of the double ca is emphatic: "They both have no limit and they do not seem to be repetitious"; see 4.5 L, note 3. I suppose the emphasis could suggest wonder. 4. *vibhrama*: "a swift, graceful motion, usually coquettish, that tricks or intrigues the eye of the beholder," Ingalls, "Words for Beauty," p. 104.

A It is well known that great poets achieve originality by distinguishing the states of sentient beings into childhood and so on. Even within a single state of sentient beings many subsidiary states can be distinguished: as, of young girls there are those whose heart has been pierced by the God of Love and there are others; and even among these there are those who are nice and proper (*vinita*) and those who are not. And among insentient things the individuality of each different stage from origin onward, if described in a poem, will produce endless variety. For example:

These buds, which being swallowed by the wild geese,
in rolling down their sweetened throats, produce
a new and limpid beauty in their cry,
are pushing up now from the lotus bulbs
like tender tusks of young she-elephants.

(Kamalāyudha)¹

One may follow the line thus indicated in treating of other [objects] also. Variety of insentient things, to begin with, is well known to arise from differences of place, as of winds that travel over different countries and regions; of other objects too, such as waters and flowers. Among

sentient beings, such as men, animals, birds, there is obviously a great difference between those who have been raised in villages, forests, rivers, or the like. If one makes these distinctions in writing of them, one will find an endless store of material. Thus, to take only humans, who could ever exhaust the manifold variety of customs and activities of persons from different countries and regions, especially of young women? All this is material for the composition of a good poet according to his genius.

There is a variety also from differences of time, as of insentient things such as the horizons and heavens and rivers, from the various seasons; while of sentient beings it is well known that such emotions as the yearning of lovers² depend upon the time of year. And it is obvious that there can be a different description [in poetry] of everything on earth according to its individuality. These matters, if only they are brought into one's composition each as it truly is, will lead to an endless stock of material.

On this point there are those who might object. The facts of the world, they might say, come into denotation in their general, not their particular, forms. For poets superimpose those states of mind like happiness which they themselves have experienced, as well as the causes of these states, upon others, and in this way bring the facts of the world into their works only by recourse to that form of the facts which is common to the experience both of the poet himself and of others. They are not, like yogis, able to perceive such things as the thought of others³ in the past, present and future. Furthermore, the general form of intelligible experience, which is common to all readers, is limited in extent and has been already surveyed by the ancients, for it is impossible that it should not have fallen within their range. Accordingly, the particular variety of facts which is taken by modern poets as [offering them scope for] originality is a delusion on their part. The only variety lies in the manner of speech (*bhaniti*).

1. I have corrected my translation from that which I gave in SRK 284, where this stanza appears, attributed to the poet Kamalāyudha. There are three words "kaṣāya" in Sanskrit with the distinct meanings of "red," "astringent," and "sediment or impurity." It is the first of these that the poets make use of; and since *rakta* ("red") also means passionate, *kaṣāya* extends its meaning in the same way. Sweet-voiced birds are called *kaṣāyakantha* (*Kum-Sam* 3.32, *Mālatīmādhava* 7.1 +30, and the stanza here quoted), whatever color their throat may be. The throat of the grey goose (*kalaharpa*, either *Anser anser* or *Anser cinereus*), of whom the term is here used, is grey

or blue-grey, not red. In the compound *kaṣyakanṭha* commentators often gloss *kaṣyāya* as *madhura* (sweet) or *manohara* (charming) and the compound is indeed about equivalent to "sweet-throated." As for the elephant tusks, those of the females are whiter than the tusks of the bulls. On a young female elephant they might well look like lotus shoots. The stanza is quoted by Kuntaka as an example of delightful charm (*Vakrokti* 1.23.73). There is a prose passage closely resembling our stanza in Bhavabhūti's *Mālatīmādhava* (7.1 +30). As Kamalāyudha, apparently the teacher of Vākpatirāja, should be placed in the late seventh century, Bhavabhūti (early eighth century) would seem to be the borrower. The passage runs: *kavaladravindakesararakasā-kanṭhakalahamsaghosaghagaraktaliagambhirabhāradī*, "a deep voice, limpid and stuttering as the voice of *kalahamsas* whose throats are *kaṣyāya* from the filaments of *arṇvinda* lotuses which they have swallowed." Bhavabhūti doubtless intended to give *kaṣyāya* a double meaning here, for the *arṇvinda* lotus is red. The birds will have acquired their *kaṣyāya* (passionate, sweet) voices from the *kaṣyāya* (red) flowers. 2. In the descriptions of Sanskrit poetry longing increases during the rains, whereas, as with us, new love blossoms in the spring. 3. We follow here the reading of the *KM* edition, *paracittādi*. But the Kashi edition reading, if a vowel is lengthened to agree with *BP*, is not impossible: *cáparicitādi*. The sense would then be "are not able to perceive things past, present, and future with which they have no direct acquaintance."

L To begin with (*tāvat*):¹ Granted that they will reach the highest degree of variety at a later moment by the touch of a suggested sense, still, there is variety by their very own sense.

The cause of these states: i.e. the seasons, garlands, etc.² Of the poet himself: by recourse to what is common to the experience of himself and to the experience of others, just that, without any further particulars. They are not able: sc., poets; this is said in order to show the utter impossibility. And even if they could perceive such things, arguments such as the following show that words touch only the general forms:

Words give a conventional sense;
this sense is for communication.

The particular does not exist at the time [of communication];
the convention therefore has no connection with it.

[Dharmakirti]³

1. By *tāvat* Ānanda doubtless meant "to begin with from among the various factors (viz., states, time, place, etc.) listed in *Kārikā* 4.7." Abhinava's is a tendentious interpretation employed in order to preserve the book's

doctrine of the predominant importance of suggestion. See 4.7 L, note 1.

2. The spring season and garlands would be stimulants of sexual desire (*rati*).

3. The verse is 1.92 of Gnoli's edition of the *Promāṇavārttikā*. 3.91 of the edition with Manoratha's commentary. The identification of the quotation was first pointed out by Gnoli, *The Aesthetic Experience*, p. xxii. The probative force of the stanza rests on the Buddhist doctrine of the momentariness of all things. From this it follows that anything which we experience has ceased before we can verbalize it. We can only verbalize its general aspect (*sāmānya*), which does not really belong to the particular but is superimposed on it by our mind.

A To this we would reply. "If poetry relies on general traits only, what of the varieties of poetry shown, arising from [the description of] particular states, etc.? Must we say they are simply repetition? And if not, then how should there not be endlessness in poetry?" It is wrong to say that poetry relies on general traits only, and that, since these are of limited extent and have therefore been employed by the ancients, there can be no originality of poetic material. For if poetry relied on general traits only, how should we explain the profusion of poetic material in the works of the great poets, or how ascribe the name of poet to any one other than Vālmīki, as there would be no poetic material other than general traits and these would have been revealed by the very first poet? If you would remove this difficulty by [reference to] the variety of expression (*ukti*), we would ask just what this variety of expression is. For expression is the speaking of words which convey the particulars of a meaning to be denoted. If the expression has variety, how should the denoted meanings not have variety also, for there is invariable concomitance between denoter and denoted?² The form in which the denoted senses appear in a poem is taken to be identical with the particulars of the external thing. Accordingly, he who speaks of variety of expression will be forced even against his will to accept a variety of denoted meanings also. The matter is summarized as follows.

If it is admitted that one poet at least
besides Vālmīki possessed imagination,
then the endlessness of poetic matter is safe.³

What is more, the statement that variety of expression is a condition (*nibandhana*) of poetic novelty is quite in accordance with our view, for all the modes [of existence], which we showed above to be the cause of endlessness in poetic material, again become doubled through variety of expression. The well-known figures of speech, classified as [figures of sense] such as simile and [figures of sound] such as double meaning, being themselves likewise, multiply [the material] a hundredfold when they are brought into a poem through variety of expression.

Furthermore, an expression framed in a different language may bring about a further endlessness of poetic material, as caused by the variety of meaning current in the respective language. An example is a verse of mine:

A man spends all his time
saying "mahumahu";
and yet the god Krishna
never occurs to his mind.*

1. The passage between asterisks translates the following words. *Yadi sāmānyamātrāśrayena kāvyapraurūptis tat pradarśitaprakāram kāvyaśicitryam avasthādiviśesat̄ kim, punaruktam evāstu, na cet tathā tat katham na kāvyanāntyam.* This passage is found in the *KM* edition, is reported by *BP* as occurring in this position in "a certain text" (*kvacid granthe*), and is necessary to furnish the *pratīkas*, viz., *kim iti* and *na ced iti* in Abhinava's commentary. It could easily have fallen out by haplography, the scribe's eye jumping from the first occurrence of *sāmānyamātrāśrayena* to the second. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine why it should have been added. 2. That is, between linguistic expression and thought. 3. The Kashi reading *akṣayam* must be changed to the *KM* reading *akṣatam*. To say that "endlessness is inexhaustable" (*ānāntyam akṣayam*) would be inexcusable tautology. 4. The stanza, which is corrupt in the printed editions and MSS, is composed in the Apabhramśa or, as Abhinava calls it, Sindhi language, in which *mahu* means "mine." Abhinava also tells us that the expression *Mahumahu* [in the same language] may mean Madhumathana, an epithet of Krishna. The point of the verse depends on the double meaning. A man may have the name of God ever on his lips, but if he is filled with selfishness and attachment to wealth (ever saying, "mine, mine"), God is not in his heart. The verse has been much discussed; see Jacobi's note and Krishnamoorthy's note *ad loc.* Without pretending to a knowledge of Apabhramśa or Sindhi, I propose altering slightly Pischel's emendation (*Die Prakrit Sprachen*, para. 14, note 2) to produce a rhymed stanza in the form of 14-12-14-12 mātrās, as follows. *Mahumahu itti bhanantāhu vajjat kālu janassu / to vi na deu janaddaṇau*

goarīhīcī manassu // The form *bhanantādu* is a present participle extended by a -ka suffix inflected in the genitive. For a Sanskrit translation, see Abhinav below.

L What of: he means, how is it then that men of authority admit to feeling no repetitiousness of matter [in this poetry]? He explains further: and if not, etc.

For expression is, etc. The intention is this. If a particular expression were no more than a synonym and the matter could be fully expressed by other synonyms, we would lack the impression of non-repetitiveness. Accordingly, the particularity of an expression is simply its power to convey a particular denoted meaning. With the particulars of the denoted thing: that is, as identical with the particulars of the thing which is grasped by such cognitive means as perception.

The point is this. Linguistic convention may bind a word to a universal, or to that which possesses a universal, or to an *apoha* (elimination of what a thing is not),¹ or to what all else; why argue? That a particular instance of this [universal, etc.] is understood from a sentence is a matter on which no one disagrees. In all theories of sentence meaning, e.g., the *anvitābhidhānavāda*, its opposite (viz., the *abhihitānvaya-vāda*),² the *samsarga* theory,³ or the *apoha* theory, there is never a denial that a particular [is what is finally understood]. Furthermore, it has been shown that variety of expression is not caused by the mere use of synonyms. As for variety of expression caused otherwise, it serves to further our thesis. Our author says this in the passage: What is more.

Again [become doubled]: furthermore⁴ [become doubled]. For simile becomes varied by such expressions as *nibha* (in likeness of), *pratima* (being an image of), *chala* (in the guise of) *pratibimba* (being a reflection of), *praticchāya* (mirroring), *tulya* (equivalent to), *sadr̥ṣṭa* (similar to), *ābhāsa* (appearing to be), because there exists a real difference of meaning underlying these expressions. One should say that the word *nibha* is properly used in connection with an appearance (*bhāna*), the word *pratima* where there is an imitation, and so on in each case. To regard these words as synonyms is an error which arises from the mischief of reading commentaries on poetry that are useful only for the young. This is the intention. In this way an endlessness of matter and an endlessness of figures of speech arises from variation of expression.

Our author now shows how this [endlessness] may arise [from varied expression] in another way. The word *pratiniyatābhāṣāgocarārtha-vacīcīryanibandhanam* is [a *bahuvrīhi* compound] to be analysed as "of which, sc., endlessness of figures of speech and of poetic material, the *nibandhana*, that is, the cause, is a variety (*vacīcīrya*) brought about by the meaning (*artha*) current in (*gocara*) the respective language (*pratiniyatābhāṣā*)."¹ The construction of the sentence is, "A variety of expression (grammatical subject) brings about that endlessness (grammatical object)." The cause is set forth by that [*bahuvrīhi* compound] which qualifies the grammatical object.

[Abhinava translates the Apabhramśa stanza A man spends all his time, etc., thus:]

*Mama mama iti bhanato vratjali kālo janasya /
tathāpi na devo Janārdana gocaro bhavati manasah //*

How should God not be present to the mind of one who constantly says "Madhumathana" (a name of Krishna)? This seems to be a contradiction. [The puzzle] is solved by the expression "*māhumahu*" in the Sindhi language [which means both Madhumathana and "mine, mine"].

1. *Samaya* is the convention which binds a given word to a given meaning. The schools of philosophy differed as to the nature of the meaning in this dyadic relation. The Mīmāṃsakas, as a result of believing the words of the Veda to be eternal, held that the meaning with which a word is connected, is likewise eternal. It is therefore a universal (*sāmānya*), not a transient particular. The older Naiyāyikas held that the meaning is a particular as possessed of a universal, for if told to "bring cow" (Sanskrit has no definite article), a boy brings a particular cow, not the universal, bovinity. The Buddhist idealists held that the meaning of a word is an *apoha*, for what is meant by such a word as "cow" is simply the denial of all things which are not a cow. All these schools agreed, however, that the meaning of a sentence, as opposed to that of a word, is a particular. Again, they differed in their analysis of the particular, the Mīmāṃsakas, for example, regarding it as an action or state qualified by nominal conditions, the Naiyāyikas as a nominal subject qualified by an action, etc. But these arguments do not affect the point here at issue.
2. For the *anvitābhidhānavāda* of Prabhākara and the *abhibhātāvayavāda* of Kumārila, see 1.4 b L, notes 3 and 30.
3. This refers to the Nyāya theory, according to which sentence meanings are analysed as particular relations. Thus, "The pot is on the ground" is analysed as "[There exists] a relation of conjunction of which the *pratiyogin* is pot and the *anyuyogin* is ground."
4. The reason for Abhinava's glossing the word *punar* by *dhūyas* is to show

that it is a separate word and does not form a compound with the following word *uktī* so as to give rise to the word *punaruktī* (repetition).

A In this way poetic material, in whatever manner we describe it, finds no lít. But the following is said:

K The use of literal meanings, varied according to the state, etc. [of an object].

A as shown above,

K in literature;

this cannot be denied:

K but this use really shines only by recourse to *rasa*.

L The *Kārikā* consists of the following: "The use of literal meanings, varied according to the state, etc., is often found in literature; but this use really shines only by recourse to *rasa*." The other words are supplementary insertions [by the *Vṛtti*.]¹

1. The disentangling of the *Kārikā* from the *Vṛtti* would be useful in any case because it might not have been indicated in a manuscript, but it is especially useful here, where the last portion of the *Vṛtti* is metrical and could easily be mistaken for the concluding quarter of the *Kārikā*.

4.9–10

[Abhinava refers to these *ślokas* as "two *kārikās*." But there is no inherent reason for ascribing these *sāṅkṣepaśloka*s to the *Kārikās* proper, any more than there is for giving the *Kārikās* the *sāṅkṣepaśloka*s furnished under 1.13k A, 2.5d A, and 3.41–42a A. It seems to me clear that both these so-called *Kārikās* are part of the *Vṛtti*. But I have kept the traditional numeration in order to avoid confusion.]

A The matter is here summarized for the instruction of good poets:

[K] If the subject matter [of poetry] is connected with the *rasas* and *bhāvas*, if it follows the principle of propriety and takes account of such differences as those of time and place.

then, not to speak of other poets of limited powers,

[K] in writing up [this subject matter] not even Vācaspati, in a thousand efforts, could exhaust it, any more than he could exhaust the nature of the universe.

A For just as the nature of the universe, although it has manifested this marvellous proliferation of matter through the succession of past ages, cannot be said now to be worn out and unable to create anything new, just so is the situation in poetry, which, although it has been worked over by the minds of countless poets, is not thereby weakened, but increases with ever new artistic abilities.

L Here [viz., in 4.9–10] the author, after having merely referred to the sense of the first three quarters [of *Kārikā* 8], states the meaning of the fourth quarter, as it is something new. The section from then to limited powers is supplementary material between the two *Kārikās* [viz., 4.9 and 4.10]. Our author goes on to comment on the fourth quarter of the second *Kārikā* [viz., 4.10].

/K/ coincidences [of thought] are likely among great minds.

A It is clear that the minds of intelligent men are in agreement. However,

/K/ a critic should not judge all these coincidences.

A If it be asked why, [the next sentence will give the answer].

L The first half of the *Kārikā* begins with coincidences (*sām-uddās*): the second half with a critic (*naikarūpataya* *vipascitā*). Fearing that this statement might be considered too dogmatic,¹ our author asks, why. The answer is given in the *Kārikā* which follows.

1. Literally, "fearing that this might be like a royal order." Royal orders state what is to be done; they do not furnish reasons.

§ 4.13 A]

K A coincidence is a similarity to something else. As with persons, it may be like one's mirror image, or like one's portrait, or like the body [of a person] which resembles one's own.

A For we call that a coincidence of poetic material which is similar to other poetic material. Here we may distinguish three types, as the material is like the mirror image of a person, or like his portrait, or like someone's body which resembles his. Some poetic material is like other material in the way that a mirror image is like a person, some in the manner of a portrait, and some in the way one person resembles another.

L [Abhicanda quotes the entire *Kārikā* and then adds:] The *Kārikā* is explained by the *Vṛtti* section by section. It shows that one is to supply the word "person" with each clause. Of a person: he means, like the body of the primary person, whose form we have clearly cognized.

K Of these the poet should avoid the first, which has no soul of its own, and the next, which has a worthless soul; but not the third, which has a soul indeed, although it is like something else.

A One who is wise should avoid the first type of poetic material here, which is like a mirror image, because it has no soul of its own, that is, it lacks any real substance. He should [also] avoid the next

type, which is like a painting, for, although it has a substance similar to another's, its soul is worthless. But a poet need not avoid the third type of poetic material, if it has a separate body which is beautiful, merely because it agrees [with other poetic material]. You cannot say that a person is the same because he happens to resemble another person. The next *Kārikā* is spoken in order to explain this.

L [Abhinava quotes the entire *Kārikā* and adds:] Of its own: That which owes its soul or nature to a poem of prior composition has no soul of its own. The form by which it assumes beauty was conceived by a previous poet, so that it is simply an image of that form. As to what it is in itself, our author says, it lacks any real substance. For nothing new has been imagined here by the later poet; it is just like the reflection in a mirror.

Having thus explained the first type, he goes on to explain the second: The next type, etc.: that is, the second. [The word *onyasāmya* is a *bahuvrihi* compound, meaning literally] "which bears a similarity to another." Its soul is worthless: In an imitation we are aware only of what is imitated, as in a painting or a manuscript. There is no conscious awareness of the medium and other paints [in which it actually consists]. And this [awareness] too [i.e., like our awareness of the first type] does not lead to our prizing it.¹

In order to explain this: viz., that one need not avoid the third type.

1. Abhinava, like Ānanda, is here considering a painting only as a representation, not as a source of aesthetic pleasure in itself. One could argue that in viewing a great painting we are aware of the material itself as well as of what it represents. But such a painting would not be purely representational.

K The poetic material, if it has a soul of its own, even if it follows a previous prescription, will shine all the more, as does the face of a damsel which resembles the moon.

§ 4.15 *K*]

A The poetic material, if it has an essential substance, a soul, of its own, even though it follows a previous pattern, will shine all the more. For poetic material, if graced by a resemblance to the ancient and the beautiful, attains the highest splendor, as does a body. Nor will it appear to be repetitious, any more than the face of a damsel which resembles the moon.

L [Abbinava quotes the entire *Kārikā* and adds:] The *Kārikā* is broken up and quoted section by section in the *Vṛtti*; but in some manuscripts the *Kārikās* appear in unbroken form.¹ Our author explains the word "soul" by the words "essential substance" which he prefixes to it.

1. As regards the present *Kārikā*, all the pri- tions and the MSS
of which we have record are of this second type.

A Thus the lines have been drawn between [the different types of] similar sentence meanings, which are meanings of compound structure. The next *Kārikā* is stated in order to show that poetic material in the form of word meanings [of uncompounded structure] are not at fault from being similar to other material.

K Where an old arrangement of [word] meanings¹ is used, just as where an [old] arrangement of syllables, etc., is used, there is obviously no fault if new poetic material appears.

1. *Vasturacanā* is an imprecise term for *padārtharacanā*. The precise term is furnished by the *Vṛtti* and by Abhinava. The stanzas of both *Kārikās* and *Vṛtti* from here to the end of the work are in Classical meters.

A Not even Vācaspati could put together new syllables or new words. Even if these are the same old ones that are now put into literary form, they do not hinder originality in poetry or other literature. The same holds for elements of meaning such as word meanings that consist of puns, etc.

L [Of similar sentence meanings]: We are taking the reading *sasamvādānām*. If one takes the reading *samvādānām* (noun instead of adjective), the construction will be of words which are not in grammatical agreement, viz., "[the different types of] similarity of compound structures in the form of sentence meanings."

[In the *Kārikā*] the word *vastu* [in *vasturacanā*] means one or two or three or four or more word meanings. Even if these: viz., syllables or words. Are still the same: i.e., still bear their old form without having undergone the slightest difference. Having explained the portion that consists of the illustration, contained in the words [of the *Kārikā*, viz.,] "just as where an [old] arrangement of syllables, etc., is used," our author connects it with the subject which is illustrated: The same holds, etc.

That consist of puns, etc.: that is, which have puns as their nature. For the words *sadūrtta*, *tejasvin*, *guna*, *dvija*, etc.¹ have been used punningly by thousands of poets from the most ancient past, and objects like the moon have been used as similes. After the words *tatthaiva padārtharūpāṇi*, one should supply the words of the previous sentence from *nāpūrvāṇi ghatayitum sakyate to viruddhyantī*.²

1. *sadūrtta*: of good conduct, or perfectly round. *tejasvin*: possessing light, i.e., the sun or fire, or possessing military charisma, i.e., hero or king. *guna*: string, or virtue. *dvija*: brahmin, or bird, or tooth. 2. I.e., "In the same way word meanings cannot be invented; although they are the same old ones, they do not hinder originality in poetry."

K Anything is beautiful if a person's mind rises
that something special has suddenly flashed before him.

A "Here is a flashing forth of something special": such is the sudden delight (*camatkṛti*)¹ which arises in a sensitive reader (*sahṛdaya*).

1. The only occurrence of this word in Ānanda. One may note also that he never uses the synonym *camatkāra*, which is so frequently used by Abhinava and later authors.

K By composing such a thing, even if it resembles something old, a good poet incurs no reproach.

A If a good poet of this sort puts such matter, although it resembles something old, into his verse in a form of composition which combines words capable of furnishing the denoted and suggested meanings that he intends, he does not incur reproach.

L Our author explains the word "person" by "sensitive reader." Rapture: a perception (*buddhi*) which consists primarily in a relishing (*āsvāda*) [of the *rasa*]. He explains "rises" (*abhyujjihite*) by "arises" (*utpadyate*); the sense is "goes up." He shows the form which the perception takes: "Here is a flashing forth," etc.

[Abhinava now quotes the entire *Kārikā* and adds:] The *Vṛtti* quotes the *Kārikā*, breaking it [into two sections].

K Let his words flow forth with balanced¹ variety of matter and ambrosial *rasa*. Poets should not despair of a blameless subject matter of their own.

1. *nimito*: a rare word. *Kāśikā* 3.3.87 takes it as meaning "balanced," and *BP* takes it here in that sense, which is appropriate to the context.

A worrying that since fresh poetic materials exist, it is no virtue of a poet to put together materials that have been used by others.

K For the great poet whose mind is averse to taking the property of others, the blessed Sarasvatī alone will furnish the material that he seeks.

A The blessed Sarasvatī ill furnish the material he needs to the great poet who is averse to taking the property of others. Great poets who perform with a ripeness of previous merit and practice and who are without greed of appropriating materials used by others need make no special effort of their own. The blessed Sarasvatī alone will reveal the material which they desire. This is what it means to be a great poet. Amen.

L Subject matter of their own: the sense is, that which flashes before them as something of their own time [i.e., new or modern]. After making a supplementary remark, the *Vṛtti* goes on to quote the second half of the stanza. The third quarter of the stanza is "For the great poet whose mind is averse to taking the property of others."

Anticipating a fear that the poet, knowing not whence to obtain something new, may give up all effort, or may make a livelihood out of others' works, [the Kārikā] says, the blessed Sarasvatī, etc. [The Vyāti] takes the term "great poet" in the Kārikā as a generic singular and explains the sentence by saying, Great poets, etc. He makes clear [who these poets are] in the passage beginning "who perform with a ripeness" and ending with "they do not."¹ Will reveal: the sense is, will bring forth the new [material].

1. Apparently the negative was placed before *teṣām* rather than before *kvacit* in Abhinava's text.
-

Conclusion

A There is a garden of the gods called poetry,
from which residence of all delights,
as it bears a wealth of quality and ornament
befitting the recipient of unblemished rasas,
the deserving gain whatever they may wish.
In this garden has been shown the wishing tree
of *dhvani*: may the pure of soul enjoy it.¹

The right path to the essence of true poetry
for long lay as one might say asleep
in the minds of men of ripened thought.
That path the far-famed Ānandavardhana
has explained for the benefit of connoisseurs.

- Here ends the Fourth Chapter of the *Sahṛdayāloka*² composed by the master, Śrī Rājānaka³ Ānandavardhana.

ished.

1. By metaphor and by a series of double meanings Ānanda likens poetry to the garden of Indra's heaven, and likens *dhvani* to the wishing tree of that garden from which the elect may pluck all objects of their desire. The double meanings will be pointed out by Abhinava. Note that the long compound in the first *pāda* ending in *bhrto* is ablative in agreement with *yasmāt*. *Yasmāt* surely refers forward to *kāvyākhye* *udygne*, as Abhinava takes it, not to *dhvani*. Not only would the latter construction be extremely awkward, but *dhvani* cannot be said to be *guṇālankārasobhābhṛt*. 2. The Kashi text here prints *dhuanyāloke*. All but one of the recorded manuscripts, however, read *sahṛdayāloke*. The one exception reads *sahṛdayālokanāmnī kāvyālankāre*. See Introduction, pp. 12-13. 3. "Rājānakā" was a title, originally given in Kashmir and Trigarta-Kāngra for service to the king. It was held by many Kashmiri authors and continues in the family name Rāzdān frequent among Kashmiri brahmins even now. See Stein's note on *Rājataranginī* 6.117.

L [In this garden has been] thus [shown]: that is, has been revealed by the exposition of the *Kārikās* and the *Vṛtti* thereon. [As it bears a wealth of qualities, etc.:] that is to say, as poetry, which has a wealth of qualities and figures of speech which are appropriate to a dwelling place of unblemished *rasa*. Also [in the literal sense] a garden bears a wealth of beauty by the rendering perfect (*alankāra*) of such qualities as delicacy, color and fragrance, a perfection due to its being a recipient of timely (*akliṣṭa*) moisture (*rasa*) occasioned by irrigation, etc. From which: that is, from the garden that bears the name of poetry. Whatever matter they may wish: what is meant are instruction, fame, delight. As we have stated this previously in some detail (cf. 1.1 e *L*), we limit our explanation here to the [immediate] sense of the stanza. The deserving:¹ those who can enjoy these desired fruits of poetry without painful instruction. The home of pure delight: the *dhāman*, that is, the one center, of unbroken (*akhila*) delight, that is, delight uninterrupted by any touch of pain. The author has in mind that it is difficult to find anything on earth that is both wholly delightful and wholly beneficial. A garden of the gods: Nandana. "The deserving" [in another sense] refers to those who have performed such ceremonies as the *Jyotiṣṭoma* by which they attain their reward [in heaven]. *Vibudhāḥ* [in addition to meaning the gods] means the enlightened, those who know the essence of poetry. Has been shown: being existent, it has been revealed, for if something is not revealed to us, how can it be enjoyed? The wishing tree: The

compound *kalpatarūpamānamahimā* is a *bahuṛihi* compound containing a second *bahuṛihi*. Its literal analysis is: [*dhvani*] of which there is a glory (*mahimā*) of a sort of which a likeness is only with the wishing tree. For the attainment of everything one desires in poetry depends on it [viz., *dhvani*]. This too we have [previously] stated in detail.

[The right path: Abhinava quotes the first three quarters of the stanza and then adds:] In these lines the connection, the nature of the book, and the purpose,² are summarized.

In this world a person usually takes up a matter only if he believes in a possibility [of success], a belief brought about by the reputation in the world [of his informant or teacher]. Now this confidence in such a possibility arises from his hearing the name [of his informant] and his consequent memory of the qualities for which the informant was well known: his conduct, his knowledge of poetry, etc. For example, suppose a man understands the following. "This book was written by Bhartrhari. This metrical composition is the work of a man of whom there was this [well-known] nobility of character and of whom there is seen to be such a proficiency in this science [of grammar]³ Accordingly, it deserves respect." Such a man will be seen to take up [the study of that book]. Now people must be brought to take up [the study of a book] if the purpose which it proposes is to be achieved. So the authors of books mention their names as part of an effort to bring their audience, whom they would help, to take up the book. It is with this intention that our author gives his name, Ānandavardhana. The word "far-famed" conveys just this: that while the hearing of his name may turn some readers away, that may be ascribed to the working of their jealousy and is a matter of no account. For on hearing that the purpose of a book is salvation, if some man of passion should turn away from it, what of it? We certainly cannot say that the purpose of the book has been rendered void. So it stands proved that a famous name is part of winning over those who are seeking [the goal which an author has to offer].

I praise the Fourth Power, which enabl
the clarified variety of things
to flow forth into the external world,
the power which shows us the objects of perception.⁴

The Eye which was here employed,
revealing all true objects that arise before it,
and which is of an excellence that may be judged
by its having brought together the essential meaning
of that brilliant Light of Poetry springing from the judgment
of Ānandavardhana, is that of Abhinavagupta.³

Having his small intelligence refined
by the mind of Bhattendurāja, a mind perfumed
by the lotus feet of Śri Siddhicela,
delighting in the study of books by the masters
of Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, and of Grammar,
he wrote this comment on the matter of suggestion⁴

This poet does not ask it of the good
—does he ask it of the moon?—to give delight;
nor does he keep reviling the ill-willed
—does fire, even if reviled, grow cold?
But if your heart is filled with Śiva,
the auspiciousness of Śiva will be everywhere
and nowhere will there be malignancy;
so may your state be filled with Śiva and auspicious.

Herewith the Fourth Chapter of the Kāvyaśālokacana composed by
the great Śaiva master, Abhinavagupta.⁵

This book is finished.

1. The literal sense of *sukrtibhiḥ* ("the deserving") is "those of good deeds." The implication is that the good deeds of their past lives enable them in this life to compose and to appreciate poetry without a long and arduous training.
2. *sambandhābbhidheyaprayojanāḥ*: These three *anubandhas* have been explained in 1.1 L, note 1. The purpose (*prayojana*) of the book is explicitly given by the third *pāda* of the present stanza, viz., to explain the path of *dvani* 'for the benefit of connoisseurs.' The *abhidheya* (nature of the contents) is furnished by the first quarter: "the right path to the essence of true poetry." That the *sambandha* (connection) between the book and its contents is one of *pratipādyapratiṣṭipādakabhāva* (the relation between the communicating instrument and that which is communicated) may be readily inferred.
3. The reference is to Bhatṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*.
4. See 1.19 L, note 5.
5. The fourth power (*turyā sakti*) of God is that by which the world becomes sensible and perceptible. As a stage in the evolution of speech, it is equated with the *turyam padam* of *RV*. 1.164.45, or with the *vashkarī*, by

which speech is given its articulatory apparatus and becomes communicable.

5. The Eye (*vilocana*) refers to the title of Abhinava's commentary. The Light of Poetry (*kāvyāloka*) is an alternate title of the *Sahṛdayāloka* (*Dhvanyāloka*).

6. I am not sure how to take the first quarter. The name Siddhicela occurs nowhere else to my knowledge. De ("The Text of *Kavyāloka-Locana iv*") records a variant reading, Śrī Mantrisiddhi, likewise unknown. Both names may be corruptions. Furthermore, one might construe the compound to refer to Abhinava "who was perfumed by the pollen, etc., and by the mind, etc.," so that we cannot be sure whether the obscure, or corrupted, name refers to a teacher of Abhinava or to his teacher's teacher. In the third quarter, the reading of the Kashi text, *vākya*, seems to me preferable to De's reading, *kāvya*, because the terms *vākyapramāṇapadaavedi* agree with the terms which Abhinava has already used in referring to these groups of scholars; see 3.33 m L, where Mimāṃsakas were called *vākyavidaḥ*. Grammarians *pada-**vidaḥ*, and Naiyāyikas *pramāṇataituvāvīdaḥ*. One must take De's reading *guru* (in compound) in place of Kashi's *guruh*.

7. The colophon of the Fourth Chapter differs from those of the first three in naming the commented text *Kāvyāloka* instead of *Sahṛdayāloka* and in omitting *ācaryavarya* (the best of teachers) from Abhinava's titles. This bespeaks a separate manuscript tradition and indeed almost all manuscripts of the first three chapters lack the fourth.

ABBREVIATIONS AND WORKS CITED

CORRECTIONS OF THE KASHI TEXT

INDEX OF FIRST LINES
(TRANSLATIONS)

PRATĪKA INDEX OF VERSES
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GENERAL INDEX

ABBREVIATIONS AND WORKS CITED

Where the names of books have been abbreviated in the translation and notes they are here listed under those abbreviations. For other works to which reference has been made, those in Sanskrit are here listed under the title, those in Western languages under the author. Cross references are given where it appeared that they would be helpful.

Entries for editions of Sanskrit texts give the titles of texts and commentaries and the names of their authors in the transliterated form of their standard spelling. The names of modern Indian editors are given in the form in which they appear on an English title page if one exists, omitting titles other than those inseparable from the scholar's name (such as the title "Śāstri" in "Subba Śāstri") and the titles abbreviated here as "MM." (Mahāmahopādhyāya) and "Pt." (Pandit).

A: Ānandavardhana's *vṛtti* in the *Dhv.*, as translated in the present volume.
Abh: Abhinavabharoti of Abhinavagupta. See *BhNS*.

Abhidhānatāmīni of Hemacandra. Ed. and tr. Otto Böhtlingk and Charles Rieu. St. Petersburg: Kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1847.
Abhidhārvitīmātrka of Mukulabhaṭṭa. Ed. M. R. Telang. Bombay: *NSP*, 1916.

Abhinanda: see Kādambarikathāśāra.

Abhinavagupta: see *BhNS*. *Dhvanyāloka*, *Citābhāṣya*, *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśini*, *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśini*, *Paryantapañcāśikā*, and *Tantrāloka*.

Abbyankar, Kashinath Vasudev. *A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar*.
134. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1961.

AC: Alarikāracūḍāmani. See *K. Anu*.

Agnipurāṇa. [Ed. by the pandits of the Ānandāśrama.] ASS 41. Poona: Ānandāśrama Press, 1900.

AK: The Nāmalīṅgānuśāsana (*Amarakośa*) of Amaraśiṁha. With the *Amarakośodghāṭana* comm. of Kṣirasvāmin. Ed. Krishnaji Govind Oka. Poona: - Law Printing Press, 1913.

Alarikāracūḍāmani: see *K. Anu*.

Al.Saru: Alarikārasarvasva of Ruyyaka. With the *Alarikāravimarsini* comm. of Jayaratha. Ed. Girijāprasād Dvivedi. 2d ed. KM 35. Bombay: *NSP*, 1939 [First ed. 1893. ed. Pt. Durgāprasād and Kāśināth Pāṇḍurang Parab].

- Amarasat.*: *Amarasatāka* of Amaru. With the *Rasikasorṇīśvīnī* comm. of Arjunavarmadeva. Ed. Pt. Durgāprasāda and Kāśinātha Pāndurang Parab. KM 18. Bombay: NSP, 1889.
- Ānandavardhana*: see *Dhvanyāloka* and *Deviśatāka*.
- Āriguttara-nikāya*, Part 2: *Catukā Nipāta*. Ed. Richard Morris. Pali Text Society 20. London: Pali Text Society, 1888.
- Āpadeva*: see *Mimāṃsaśyāpṛakāśa*.
- Āpastamba Śrautasūtra*. With the *bhāṣya* of Dhūrtasvāmin and the *Vṛtti* of Rāmāgnicit. Ed. Vidvan So. Narasimbachar. Oriental Institute Sanskrit Series 87, 93, 104. Mysore: Government Branch Press, 1944–60.
- Appayadīkṣita*: see *Kuvalayānanda*.
- Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya. Ed. with his own *Śrīmūla* comm. by T. Ganapati Śāstri. 2 vols. Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 79, 82. Trivandrum: Government Press, 1924–25.
- Āścaryacūḍāmani* of Saktibhadra. Ed. C. Sankararama Sastry with an Introduction by S. Kuppuswami Sastry. Sri Balamanorama Series 9. Madras: Sri Balamanorama Press, 1926.
- ASS*: Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series, Poona.
- Aucityavicārocarā* of Ksemendra. KM Gucchaka 1, pp. 115–160. Ed. Pt. Durgāprasāda and Kāśinātha Pānduranga Parab. Bombay: NSP, 1886. The work is also available in the Haridas Sanskrit Series, No. 25, ed. Pt. Dhundhirāja Śāstri (Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1933) and in the Sanskrit Academy Series, No. 7, A.5, ed. E. V. V. Rāghavācharya and D. G. Padhye (Hyderabad: Sanskrit Academy, Osmania Univ., 1961).
- Bālerāmāyaṇa* of Rājadekhara. Ed. Pt. Govinda Deva Śāstri. Benares: The Medical Hall Press, 1869 [first published in *The Pandit*, Benares, 1868–1869].
- Bāṇa*: see *Harṣacarita* and *Kādambarī*.
- Bhagavadgītā*. With the Śāṅkarabhāṣya comm. and the subcomm. of Ānandagiri, the Nīlakanṭhi comm., the Bhāṣyotkāraśadipikā comm. of Dhanapati, the Śridhāri comm., the Gītārthaśaṅgraha comm. of Abhinavagupta, and the Gūḍhārthaśadipikā comm. of Madhusūdana with the Gūḍhārthatattvāloka subcomm. of Dharmadatta (Bacchāśarman). Ed. Wāsudeva Laxman Śāstri Pansikar. Bombay: NSP, 1912.
- Bhagavadgītābhāṣya* of Śāṅkara. *Works of Shankaracharya*, Vol. I. Ed. Hari Raghunath Bhagavat. 2d ed. Poona: Ashtekar & Co., 1929.
- Bhāg.Pur.*: *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. With the Cūrnikā Tīkā. Ed. Rāmateja Pāṇḍeya. Benares: Pandita-pustakālaya, Sarvat 2014 [= A.D. 1957]....
- Bhallatāsatāka*. KM Gucchaka 4, pp. 140–146. Ed. Pt. Durgāprasāda and Kāśinātha Pānduranga Parab. Bombay: NSP, 1887.
- Bhāmaha*: see *Kāvyādarikā* of Bhāmaha.
- Bhāmatī*: *Brahmasūtrasāṅkarabhāṣya*. With the *Bhāmatī* of Vācaspati Miśra,

- the *Kalpataru* of Amalananda, and the *Parimala* of Appaya Dikṣita. Ed. Ananta Krishna Śāstri and Vāsudev Laxmaṇ Śāstrī Pāṇḍikar. 2d ed. Bombay: NSP, 1938 [First ed. 1917].
- Bharata: see *BhNS*.
- Bhāravi: see *Kir.Arj.*
- Bhartṛhari: see *Nitisātaka* and *Vāk*.
- Bhāskara: see *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*.
- Bhāskara: see *Īśvarapratyabhiññāvimsa*.
- Bhattākāya (*Rāvaṇavadha*) of Bhatti. With the *Jayamāngala* comm. of Jayamāngala and the *Mugdhobodhinī* comm. of Bharatamallika. Ed. Jivānanda Vidyāsāgara Bhattācārya. 4th ed. Calcutta, 1905.
- Bhīmaseṇa Dikṣita: see *Sudhāśāgara*.
- BhNS*: *Nāṭyaśāstra* of Bharata. With the *Abhinavabhāṣa* of Abhinavagupta. 4 vols. Ed. Manavalli Ramakrishna Kavi. COS 36, 68, 124, 145. Baroda: Oriental Institute. Vol. 1, 2d ed., 1956 [1st ed. 1926]; vol. 2, 1934; Vol. 3, 1954; Vol. 4, 1964.
- Bhoja: see *Sarvasvatiṣṭhābhāraṇa* and *ŚP*.
- Bhoja's *ŚP*: see Raghavan, V.
- Bilhana: see *Caurapānicāśikā*.
- Böhtlingk, Otto von. *Indische Sprüche*. 2d enl. and rev. ed. 3 vols. St. Petersburg: Kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1870–1873.
- BN*: Bhaṭṭānāyaka as quoted by Abhinavagupta.
- BORI*: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona.
- BP*: Bālapriyā of Śrī Rāmaśākra, commentary on *Locana*. See *Dhvanyāloka* (Kashi edition).
- Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* of Bhāskara. Ed. Pt. Vindhyaśvari-prasāda Dvivedin. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 20. Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, 1903–1915.
- Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. With the Bhāṣya comm. of Śāṅkara and the Tīkā subcomm. of Ānandagiri. [Ed. Kāśinātha Śāstrī Āgāśe.] ASS 15. Poona: Ānandāśrama Press, 1891, 4th printing 1939.
- Bṛhaddeśī* of Mataṅgamuni. Ed. K. Sāmbasiva Śāstri. Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 94. Trivandrum: Government Press, 1928.
- Brough, John. "Some Indian Theories of Meaning." *TPS*, 1953, pp. 161–176.
- Brough, John. "Theories of General Linguistics in the Sanskrit Grammarians." *TPS*, 1951, pp. 27–46.
- Cāṇakyaśāstra*: *Cāṇakya-Rāja-Nīti, Mazīms on Rāja-Nīti*, Compiled from various collections of mazīms attributed to Cāṇakya. Ed. Ludwik Sternbach. The Adyar Library Series 92. Adyar, Madras: The Adyar Library, 1963.
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- Dhanañjaya: see DR.
- Dhanika: see DR.
- Dharmakīrti: see PV.
- DHP: *Dhātupāṭha*. Our numeration of the roots follows that of Otto Böhtlingk, *Pāṇini's Grammatik* Abth. 2, pp. 61-84 (Leipzig: H. Häessel, 1887).
- Dhv.: *Dhvanyāloka*. See the following entries.
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- Dhvanyāloka*, Vidyābhawan edition: *The Dhvanyāloka* of Ānandavardhana. With the Locana comm. of Abhinavagupta and the Prakāśa Hindi translation of both texts by Jagannāth Pāthak. Vidyabhawan Sanskrit Granthamala 97. Vārāṇasi: Chowkhamba Vidyabhawan, 1965.
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- Didhiti: see *Dhvanyāloka* (Haridas edition).
- DR: *Dasarūpaka* of Dhananjaya. With the *Avaloka* comm. of Dhanika and the *Laghutīkā* subcomm. of Bhāṭṭānāsiṇpha. Ed. T. Venkatacharya. The Adyar Library Series 97. Adyar, Madras: The Adyar Library, 1969. More readily available is the less critical edition of Kāśīnātha Pāndurang Parab.

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- Gautama: see *Nyāya S.*
- GGA*: *Göttinger Gelehrte Anzeiger*, Göttingen.
- Gitābhāṣya* of Abhinava (*Gitārthaśaṅgraha*): see *Bhagavadgītā (NSP, 1912)*.
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- HOS*: Harvard Oriental Series, Cambridge, Mass.
- HSP*: *History of Sanskrit Poetics*. See Kane, P. V., and see also De, Sushil Kumar.

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- IJ*: *Indo-Iranian Journal*, The Hague.
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- JIP*: *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, ed. Bimal K. Matilal, Dordrecht, D. Reidel Publishing Co.

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- JOIBaroda: Journal of the Oriental Institute of Baroda*, Baroda.
- JOR: Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras.
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- Kāvyālāñkārasūtravṛtti:** see *KASV*.
- Kāvyālāñkārasūtrasaṅgraha** of Udbhaṭa [also called Bhaṭṭodbhaṭa]. With the Laghuvṛtti comm. of Indurāja [also called Pratihārendurāja]. Ed. Narayana Daso Bambatti. Bombay Sanskrit Series 79. Poona: *BORI*, 1925 [2d ed. 1982].
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- Kāvyamīmāṃsā:** see *Kāv.M.*
- Kāvyaprakāśa:** see *KP*.
- Kiranāvalī** of Udayana: see *Padārthadharmaśaṅgraha*.
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- Kum.Som: Kumārasambhava of Kālidāsa. With the *Sañjīvini* comm. of Mallinātha and the comm. of Sitārāma. Ed. Vāsudev Laxman Śāstri Paṇḍīkar. Twelfth ed., Bombay: NSP, 1935.
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- must be reduced by one to fit all non-Bengali editions.
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- Śāṅkara: see *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, *Saundaryalaharī*, and *Tait. Up.*
- Śāṅkara Miśra: see *Upaskāra*.
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- Vācaspati Miśra: see *Bhāmatī*, *NVTT*, and *Yoga S.*
- Vajjälagga: see Patwardhan, M. V.
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- Viurti, see Kávyálarikárasútrasaṅgraha.
- VS: Vaïśeṣikasútra. See Upaskára.
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CORRECTIONS OF THE KASHI TEXT

| <i>Page</i> | <i>Line</i> | <i>In place of:</i> | <i>one should read:</i> |
|-------------|-------------|--|---------------------------------|
| 10 | Loc. 3 | arthattvāyogāt | arthavattvāyogāt |
| 12 | Dhv. 1 | tadabhāvādinām | tadabhāvavādinām |
| 17 | Loc. 1 | (smeared type) | tathā dhvanir api |
| | 2 | (smeared type) | tadanatirikta |
| | 3 | (smeared type) | tathā by anuprāsānām |
| 30 | Loc. 5 | [Delete comma. Place danda after probhedādau.] | |
| 33 | Loc. 2 | mātraṇeti | mātreneti |
| 34 | Loc. 5 | [Place danda after hetulā.] | |
| 40 | Loc. 2 | svābhuyupagamaprasiddhi | svābhuyupagamaprasī |
| 48 | Loc. 6 | prayogārthāḥ | prayogāḥ |
| 49 | Dhu. 4 | lāvaṇye | lāvaṇyam |
| | 5 | (nirvarṇya)mānām-nikhilā | (nirvarṇya)mānanikhilā |
| 57 | Loc. 4 | [Delete danda, or replace by comma.] | |
| 59 | Loc. 7 | na (caivam) | Begin new paragraph. |
| 67 | Loc. 4 | ye 'py avibbaktam | Begin new paragraph. |
| 68 | Loc. 2 | bhiruviratva | bhirutvaviratva |
| | 3 | kevalārthsāmarthyaniṣedhā | kevalārthasāmarthyam niṣedhā |
| 77 | Loc. 6 | [Delete sahasvety api ca tadvisayam vyanigryam.] | |
| 79 | Loc. 3 | [Place danda after bhāvābhāsāḥ.] | |
| 82 | Loc. 7 | [Place danda after vā.] | |
| 84 | Dhu. 3 | kāvyasyātmā | kāvyasyātmā |
| | Loc. 10 | kāvyasyātmeti | kāvyasyātmeti |
| 87 | Loc. 1 | karuṇarasasamuccalana | karuṇarasasamuccalana |
| 88 | Loc. 3 | [Delete semicolon.] | |
| 91 | Dhu. 3 | tat vastutatattvam | tadvastutattvam |
| | Loc. 1 | kāvyatmatāṁ | kāvyatmatāṁ |
| 94 | Loc. 4 | dvāviṣati | dvāviṣati |
| 96 | Loc. 3 | svarūpabhedena | svarūpaviṣayabhedena |
| 109 | Loc. 4 | samasokti | samāsokti |
| 110 | Loc. 1 | rātryā | tayā rātryā |
| | 2 | [Delete semicolon.] | |
| 111 | Dhu. 2 | [Place danda after cōrūtvam.] | |
| | | vācyārtha | vācyārtha |

Corrections of the Kashi Text

| | <i>In place of:</i> | <i>one should read:</i> |
|-----|---|-------------------------|
| | tatropasarjanā | tātropasarjanī |
| | [Delete dāṇḍa after iti; place dāṇḍa after chāyāntareṇa.] | |
| | ramayase | sma ramase |
| | pahīṇusai | pahnavai |
| | cande piāmuhe | cande na piāmuhe |
| 125 | Loc. 6 prastutam, prastutarp | prastutam aprastutam |
| 126 | Loc. 9 mahumānassa | mahumānassa |
| | 13 [Delete semicolon.] | |
| 127 | Loc. 12 yadavajñāyate | yadāvajñāyate |
| 129 | Loc. 15 apratibandhas tu | apratibaddhena |
| 130 | Loc. 1 apratibandho | apratibaddho |
| | 4 kām | kīm |
| 131 | Loc. 2 deā pasianjātāsu | de ā pasia nivattasu |
| | 5 saṅkārālañkāre | saṅkarālañkāre |
| 134 | Loc. 3 (broken type) | svapi satsu |
| | 8 bhede | bhedam |
| 136 | Loc. 5 prṣṭe | prṣṭhe |
| | 9 [Place dāṇḍa after svātmā.] | |
| 140 | Loc. 6 [Delete dāṇḍa. Place dāṇḍa after pratiपatteḥ.] | |
| 143 | Dhu. 7 asahuttam | saahuttam |
| | 8 pio janō | pie Jane |
| 144 | Dhu. 3 savattiṇam | savatiṇam |
| 145 | Dhu. 2 piḍābhā | piḍāma |
| 148 | Loc. 3 viśayayodharma | viśayayor dharma |
| 149 | Loc. 4 laksanālakṣaṇāyā | lakṣitalakṣaṇāyā |
| 151 | Loc. 7 (first word) kāra | prakāra |
| | [Delete dāṇḍa after ityarthah.] | |
| | 8 (first word) pasampharati | dupasampharati |
| | 9 (first word) -ārityarthah | -ddhetor ityarthah |
| | 10 (first word) tivyāptim | mātivyāptim |
| 152 | Dhu. 1 [Delete dāṇḍa.] | |
| 155 | Loc. 1 svātha | svārtha |
| 156 | Loc. 4 [Close quote after vijnānārthah.] | |
| 158 | Loc. 1 na tvayam | naavayam |
| | 5 [Delete second dāṇḍa. Put dāṇḍa in place of semicolon.] | |
| 159 | Loc. 1 [Place dāṇḍa after lokah. Delete semicolon.] | |
| 161 | Loc. 3 pratyāyitum uttam | pratyāyitum uktam |
| 166 | Loc. 1 prakāśitah | prakāśitasya |
| | 8 gato lakṣyamāno | gato 'lakṣyamāno |
| 169 | Loc. 7 anudbhū viśeṣatvena | anudbhinnaviśeṣatvena |
| 170 | Loc. 5 bādhānimittam | bādhā nimittam |
| 172 | Loc. 2 [Delete both dāṇḍas. Put dāṇḍas in place of the dashes.] | |

Corrections of the Kashi Text

| Page | Line | In place of: | one should read: |
|------|---------|---|------------------------|
| 173 | Loc. 12 | vivakṣā tadabhbāvayor | vivakṣātadabhbāvayor |
| 176 | Loc. 7 | vyabbhic ⁻ iṇaḥ | vyabbicāriṇoḥ |
| | 9 | sumthī āīm | sumhiē |
| | 1 | vibhbāvānubhbāsāc | vibhbāvābhāsāc |
| | 7 | [Place danda after bandhbhbhdvāt.] | |
| 179 | Loc. 4 | [Place danda after niṣyandā.] | |
| | | prayojakamevamamśamp | prayojakamekamamśamp |
| | 5 | māsyādi | māṃsyādi |
| 180 | Dhv. 5 | hetunām | hetūnām |
| 181 | Loc. 2 | [Delete second danda.] | |
| 186 | Loc. 11 | [Delete semicolon.] | |
| 190 | Loc. 3 | pratipādānābhyāmp | pratipādanābhyām |
| 192 | Loc. 5 | bhāvālāñkāra eva | bhāva eva |
| 194 | Loc. 5 | tathā | yathā |
| | 6 | [Delete danda.] | |
| 195 | Loc. 1 | ityathah | ityarthah |
| 201 | Dhv. 7 | taṇbī | tanvī |
| 202 | Dhv. 1 | cintā maunam | cintāmaunam |
| 203 | Loc. 7 | [Replace danda with comma, comma with danda.] | |
| 204 | Dhv. 7 | punas tad āśritās | punar āśritās |
| 212 | Loc. 5 | magna | bhagva |
| | 8-9 | vyāpārakatvam | vyāpakatvam |
| | 9 | [Delete danda. Place danda after dr̥ṣṭāntena ca.] | |
| 214 | Loc. 3 | [Delete danda. Place danda after śrutiduṣṭāḥ.] | |
| 215 | Loc. 5 | loṣṭapratrārenā | loṣṭapratrānyāyena |
| 219 | Dhv. 4 | pramāditvām | pramāditvam |
| | 10. | apṛtagtānirvartyah | apṛtagyatānirvartyah |
| 221 | Dhv. 6 | bāspastanatāṭīm | bāspah stanataṭīm |
| | 9 | atyūhya | atyuhya |
| 222 | Dhv. 3 | [Delete danda after ākṣeptavtyāḥ.] | |
| | 4 | [Place danda after śabdāḥ.] | |
| | Loc. 5 | sāṅgrhitē | sāṅgrhitam |
| 223 | Dhv. 5 | [Delete comma.] | |
| | 6 | [Delete danda. No new paragraph.] | |
| | Loc. 5 | samīkṣyeti (both times) | samīkṣeti (both times) |
| | 6 | rūpakādir | rūpakāder |
| 224 | Dhv. 1 | rūpakādir | rūpakāder |
| | 6 | bastās | batās |
| | Loc. 4 | vyañjakam | vyañjakam |
| 227 | Dhv. 1 | upamā śleṣasya | upamāśleṣasya |
| 228 | Dhv. 4 | śabde prakārāntareṇā | śabde |
| 229 | Dhv. 3 | śleṣamukhenaiva | śleṣamukhenaiva |

Corrections of the Kāshī Text

| <i>Page</i> | <i>Line</i> | <i>In place of:</i> | <i>one should read:</i> |
|-------------|-------------|--|---------------------------|
| 229 | Dhv. 5 | kṣyādhārasyāpi | kṣmādhārasyāpi |
| | Loc. 2 | āśokasāsōkādiḥ | āśokādi |
| 231 | Dhv. 7 | dagdham | dagdhum |
| 232 | Loc. 7 | sarpaḥyādi | sakhyādi |
| 236 | Loc. 1 | mūḍhāpahāraka | mūḍhāpahāraka |
| 237 | Dhv. 9 | prasahyap | prasahya |
| | Loc. 6 | dhanirnāsti | dbhanirnāsti |
| 238 | Dhv. 3 | vvia | ccia |
| | 5 | iva | eva |
| | Loc. 4 | [Advance first dāṇḍa to after sasāratvāt.] | |
| | 5 | [Advance dāṇḍa to after prasātrapratāpāsārāḥ.] | |
| 239 | Loc. 6 | [Delete dāṇḍa.] | |
| | 10 | akṣiptabhā nirākaroti | akṣiptabhāsāmp nirākaroti |
| 241 | Dhv. 2 | eva vaner | eva dbvaner |
| 243 | Loc. 6 | [Delete first dāṇḍa.] | |
| | | abhidhāsakteḥ | abhidhāsakteḥ |
| | 7 | [Delete first dāṇḍa.] | |
| | 8 | r̥vatra | pūrvatṛ |
| 244 | Dhv. 2 | sr̥tabh | sr̥ṣṭaib |
| 248 | Dhv. 2 | sayavāya | samayāya |
| 251 | Dhv. 2 | sāktyā kṣipto | sāktyākṣipto |
| 252 | Dhv. 3 | kā vā | ko vā |
| | 5 | lakṣmīmadvād | lakṣmīmadād |
| | Loc. 8 | paryākuūktāṁ | paryākuūktā |
| 253 | Loc. 5 | goparāgādi śabda | goparāgādiśabda |
| 255 | Dhv. 2 | lakkhaṇuhe | lakkhaṇehe |
| 256 | Loc. 1 | samunnamabbhyām | samunnamadbhyām |
| | 6 | vacanena | vacane na |
| 257 | Loc. 9 | yatra | tatra |
| 263 | Loc. 13 | jalādayaḥ | jaḍādayaḥ |
| 264 | Loc. 10 | r̥āja | gaja |
| 265 | Loc. 7 | darsana | daśana |
| 266 | Dhv. 6 | kañkillapallavāḥ | kañkellipallavā |
| 267 | Dhv. 4 | pahujāṇaa | bahujāṇaa |
| | Loc. 8 | yakṣyate | vakṣyate |
| 269 | Dhv. 8 | [Delete dāṇḍa.] | |
| | Loc. 2 | [Delete raktas tvam navapallavatāḥ.] | |
| | 4 | rūpayoṭānā | rūpaghaṭānā |
| 273 | Loc. 2 | arthasaundaryabalād | arthasāmarthyabalād |
| 278 | Dhv. 5 | gataḥ | gatāḥ |
| 279 | Dhv. 2 | [Begin new paragraph with arigītvena.] | |
| | | [Delete dāṇḍa after api.] | |

Corrections of the Kashi Text

| <i>Page</i> | <i>Line</i> | <i>In place of:</i> | <i>one should read:</i> |
|-------------|-------------|---|-------------------------|
| 279 | Dhv. 5 | tayā | tadā |
| 281 | Dhv. 2 | bhavānurañjarūpa | bhavānurañjanarūpa |
| | 10 | naṃ maliā | na maliā |
| | Loc. 1 | 'yam arthaśaktyu | 'yam arthaśaktyu |
| 282 | Dhv. 1 | pbalibam | vvīḍbam |
| | 8 | nirdakṣyate | nirdeksyate |
| 283 | Dhv. 4 | paḍia kusumam | paḍiakusumam |
| | Loc. 5 | gr̥hakarmayogena | gr̥hakarmayoge na |
| 285 | Loc. 4 | parisamāptau | parisamāpto |
| 287 | Dhv. 2 | dvavanyāloke | sahṛdayāloke |
| 290 | Loc. 2 | [Delete <i>donda</i> .] | |
| | 3 | nijapūryajana | nijapūrvajana |
| | 9 | dayā | damah |
| 291 | Loc. 9 | kodhāndbhāḥ | krodbāndbhāḥ |
| 292 | Loc. 10 | ramāneti | rameṇeti |
| 293 | Loc. 3 | dadāti | dadātu |
| | 7 | kapolasyāpamāyāṁ | kapolasyopamāyāṁ |
| 294 | Dhv. 1 | vākyena | vākye na |
| | 5 | visamaio kāṇa | visamaio vvia kāṇa |
| | 7 | vālei | bolei |
| | Loc. 3 | viṣamayitah | viṣamaya iva |
| 295 | Loc. 6 | mitbyādrīṣṭā | mitbyādrīṣṭau |
| 296 | Dhv. 2 | vibhrāntam | viśrāntam |
| 297 | Dhv. 2 | saṅkramitavācyasyā | saṅkramitavācyasya |
| | Loc. 3 | [Delete numeral after verse.] samāmādhikaraṇa | saṁāmādhikaraṇa |
| 298 | Dhv. 3 | chaṇamapyasara- | chaṇapasara- |
| | | mahaghbhaṇa | mahagha |
| | | mahārgbhāṇa utsava | mahārgbhēnotsava |
| | | sūcayamātādiyasya | sūcayattādiyasya |
| | | patirjātam | patirjāta |
| | | katkatham | tatkatham |
| | | tena | te na |
| | | rka | rkra |
| | | vṛttivirodhinī | vṛttir virodhī |
| | | [Delete <i>donda</i> .] | |
| | | samārthyamāṇas | samārpyamāṇas |
| | — 8 | laksyamāṇārbhāṇ- | laksyamāṇo 'rbhāṇ- |
| 305 | Loc. 8 | nibharasya | nirbharasya |
| 306 | Loc. 1 | hyanūddisamyāna | hyanūddekṣyamāṇa |
| 307 | Dhv. 4 | śuddhā | śuddho |
| | Loc. 2 | garvamantharam | garbhamadburam |

| <i>Page</i> | <i>Line</i> | <i>In place of:</i> | <i>one should read:</i> |
|-------------|-------------|---|---|
| 307 | Loc. 7 | [Place <i>danda</i> after <i>rasādimayam eva</i> .] | |
| 308 | Loc. 1 | <i>tvananyatra bhāva</i> | <i>tvananyatrabhāva</i> |
| | 11 | <i>kriñcid</i> | <i>kiñcid</i> |
| 310 | Dhv. 1 | <i>kevalam anadyedam</i> | <i>kevalam anūdyedam</i> |
| 314 | Loc. 1 | <i>(atsāmathyam</i> | <i>atsāmarthyam</i> |
| 315 | Dhv. 8 | [Delete <i>danda</i> .] | |
| | Loc. 3 | <i>anupravīśa tatra</i> | <i>anupravīśatu tatra</i> |
| 316 | Dhv. 4 | [New paragraph after <i>darśanam</i> .] | |
| | 5 | [No new paragraph after <i>guṇāḥ</i> .] | |
| 317 | Dhv. 3 | <i>yathaucityatyāgas</i> | <i>yathaucityatyāgas</i> |
| 319 | Loc. 4 | <i>sattvopetāt kāvyārthān</i> | <i>sattvopetān kāvyārthān</i> |
| | 7 | <i>madhyamapra tyāśraya</i> | <i>madhyamaprakṛtyāśraya</i> |
| 320 | Dhv. 3 | <i>madhyasamāse</i> | <i>madhyamasamāse</i> |
| | 6 | <i>samāsāsaṅghatanāsamā-</i> <i>sānām</i> | <i>samāsā saṅghatanā samā-</i> <i>sānām</i> |
| | | [Delete second <i>danda</i> .] | |
| | | [Delete <i>danda</i> .] | |
| | | <i>sanvito</i> | <i>samanvito</i> |
| | | <i>asvādavighnarūpāvi-</i> <i>rodhinaś</i> | <i>-vādavighnarūpā vi-</i> <i>rodhinaś</i> |
| 321 | Loc. 2 | [Delete second <i>danda</i> .] | |
| | 4 | <i>ityarthāḥ</i> | <i>ityarthah</i> |
| 323 | Dhv. 5 | [Add hyphen at end of line.] | |
| 325 | Dhv. 7 | <i>nātyantaprasa</i> | <i>nātyantarp rasa</i> |
| 326 | Dhv. 2 | <i>darśanādrasa</i> | <i>darśanāt / rasa</i> |
| 327 | Dhv. 1 | [Delete <i>danda</i> .] | |
| | 2 | [Delete first <i>danda</i> .] | |
| | Loc. 6 | [Place <i>danda</i> after <i>tyaktam</i> .] | |
| 328 | Dhv. 1 | <i>bhavati</i> | <i>bbāti</i> |
| | Loc. 2 | <i>cūrapādaīḥ</i> | <i>cūrapadaīḥ</i> |
| | 8 | <i>prathamam dāvaditi</i> | <i>prathamam tāvaditi</i> |
| 330 | Dhv. 5 | <i>kevalamānuṣasya</i> | <i>mānuṣasya</i> |
| 332 | Loc. 1 | <i>dimādeḥ</i> | <i>dimādeḥ</i> |
| 333 | Dhv. 4 | <i>mahākavīnāpya</i> | <i>mahākavīnāmapya</i> |
| | Loc. 3 | <i>yathāsaṅkhyena prakhyāto</i> | <i>yathāsaṅkhyenotpādyā-</i> <i>vastuprakhyāto</i> |
| | Loc. 7 | <i>sambhramēṇa</i> | <i>sambhramēṇa ca</i> |
| 334 | Dhv. 2 | [Add hyphen at end of line.] | |
| | 7 | [Add hyphen at end of line.] | |
| 335 | Loc. 7 | <i>sthitam iti yathā śayyām</i> | <i>sthitim iti yathāśayyām</i> |
| 337 | Loc. 1 | <i>tadraso</i> | <i>tattadraso</i> |
| | 2 | <i>-vaśāddavatā</i> | <i>-vaśāddevatā</i> |

Corrections of the Kashi Text

| <i>In place of:</i> | <i>one should read:</i> |
|---|--------------------------------|
| parin̄yaso | parin̄yāśo |
| parāthavān | parāthavān |
| hi | ca (?) |
| [Put <i>danda</i> in place of first comma.] | |
| yathā tattvam | yathātattvam |
| punarābdha | punarārabda |
| nivaddhab | nibaddhab |
| jägrate/ | jägrato |
| [Delete <i>danda</i> .] | |
| ñilādādhā śuddhyuddhbā | ñilādādhagguddharia |
| mahimāñḍalasaści | mahimandalassa cia |
| kīṣmasuñāharatujjaāi | kīṣa munālāharanām |
| āngammi | pi tujhā guruāi āngammi |
| miavahañdi | bumi avabatthiareho |
| avivea | aha vivea |
| savipa vi tumammi puñō- | sivipe vi tujhā samee pat- |
| vanti a atanti purpmas- | tibi bhattip na pum- |
| imi | mbasini |
| 347 Dhu. 4 | [Delete <i>danda</i> .] |
| 348 Loc. 2 | [Place comma before yadi vā.] |
| 4 | [Delete <i>danda</i> .] |
| 6 | babuvacanam |
| 7 | pau śakathā |
| 349 Dhu. 8 | [Delete <i>danda</i> .] |
| Loc. 1 | hanyamānatatayā |
| 5 | grāmatiketi svārthika |
| 351 Dhu. 4 | śiñjadhvaya |
| 7 | avasara rōttum |
| 8 | damsanamettumbhet- |
| | tehim jahim |
| | rundhō |
| | ambe nīricchāo |
| | hnā antim kīm mām |
| | puloesieam |
| | vianā |
| | [Place hyphen at end of line.] |
| | sambandhitādām |
| | nirātāpārdharamyaiḥ |
| | viśvāsopagabbhād |
| | samasī |
| | manupya |
| | sambandhi tādām |
| | nirātāpatvaramyaiḥ |
| | viśvāsopagamād |
| | tamasi |
| | manuṣya |

| <i>Page</i> | <i>Line</i> | <i>In place of:</i> | <i>one should read:</i> |
|-------------|-------------|--|-------------------------------------|
| 355 | Dhv. 13 | vṛthāprāṇayam | vṛthā prāṇayam |
| | Loc. 7 | kṣitīmṛtām | kṣitibhṛtām |
| 357 | Loc. 2 | sarvanāmavyañjakam | sarvanāma vyāñjakam |
| 358 | Loc. 5 | nanu na | na tu na |
| 359 | Dhv. 8 | vācakatvāśrayāñantu | vācakatvāśrayas tu |
| 360 | Loc. 6 | rasādīoām | evamiti rasādināmp |
| 361 | Loc. 6 | virodhinī | virodhino |
| 363 | Dhv. 5 | pravṛtta | pravṛddha |
| | 6 | rāmadeva | deva |
| | Loc. 2 | vijayavarṣmṛtānta- | vijayavarṣmaṇo vṛttānta- |
| 364 | Dhv. 3 | upayukto | upabbukto |
| | 12 | bhāvye | bhāvyam |
| | Loc. 4 | [Insert danda after vyācoṣṭe.] | |
| 365 | Loc. 1 | rativíjāsesu | rativílāpesu |
| | 7 | āṅgabbhāvā | āṅgabhbhāvā |
| 369 | Loc. 2 | iti śesah | iti viśesah |
| 370 | Dhv. 1 | dusṭatvam vānuvāde | dusṭatvam nānuvāde |
| 371 | Loc. 1 | kriḍāṅgatve na | kriḍāṅgatvena |
| 373 | Loc. 3 | yāvati | yairveti |
| 374 | Loc. 8 | sāśranetra | sāśrunetra |
| | 9 | bhiratyantamp | bhirityantamp |
| | | vipralambhbasya | vipralambhasyābhīnayah karaṇiyah |
| 375 | Loc. 4 | mukhasava | mukhāsava |
| 377 | Dhv. 6 | āṅgulivaladraktaḥ | āṅguligaladraktaḥ |
| | 8 | tvadvairinātho | tvadvairināryo |
| 381 | Loc. 8 | yayo hi | yayor hi |
| | | [Place danda after ko 'ngādīgībhōvah.] | |
| 382 | Loc. 3 | 'ṅgabbhāvatānayeno | 'ṅgabbhāvatānayaneno |
| 383 | Dhv. 2 | ekanto ... appanto | ekatto ... appatto |
| | Loc. 8 | itmalam | ityalam |
| 384 | Loc. 1 | paritusto | paripusto |
| | 12 | virodhivisayā sādhāraṇa- | virodhivisayāsādhāraṇa- |
| | | doṣa | poṣa |
| | | bhūyah prabandha | bhūyahprabandha |
| | | bhūyah prabandha | bhūyahprabandha |
| | | cātmakāra | cāmatkāra |
| | | bhūyo vṛtti | bhūyovṛtti |
| | | rasasthāyi | rasaḥ sthāyi |
| | | [Insert danda at end of line.] | |
| | | vāśritādiṣu | vāśritādiṣu |
| | | matāntare tu | matāntare 'pi |

Corrections of the Kashi Text

| <i>Page</i> | <i>Line</i> | <i>In place of:</i> | <i>one should read:</i> |
|-------------|-------------|--|---|
| 388 | Loc. 3 | bhayanoṣṭāḥḥāḥ. | bbayenoṣṭāḥḥāḥ / |
| 389 | Loc. 8 | rasarasaṭā | saraṣaṭā |
| | 9 | [Delete opening quote before <i>citta</i> .] | |
| | 10 | [Insert opening quote before <i>puruṣārtha</i> .] | |
| 390 | Loc. 9 | [Delete <i>danda</i> .] | |
| 391 | Loc. 4 | svābhāvam | svabbāvam |
| | 9 | [Delete opening quote. Place <i>danda</i> at end of line.] | |
| 393 | Loc. 6 | nanvevaṁ dayāviro dhar- mavīro dānaviro vā | nanvedam dayāvīraḥ ko 'bhidbiyatām, dhar- mavīro dānaviro vā? |
| | Loc. 9 | rasavīram | rasam viram |
| 394 | Loc. 2 | [Delete first <i>danda</i> .] | |
| 396 | Loc. 4 | ramamti | raseti |
| 398 | Loc. 6 | nāpi labbyete | nāpi kvacil labbyate |
| | 6-7 | nanu kāvyam | nanu kva kāvyam |
| 400 | Loc. 8 | [Delete second <i>danda</i> .] | |
| 401 | Dhv. 10 | [Delete <i>danda</i> .] | |
| | Loc. 9 | kāvya | kāvya |
| 404 | Dhv. 3 | [Insert open quote before <i>lāghuān</i> .] | |
| | 4 | [Delete open quote before <i>iti</i> .] | |
| | Loc. 1 | tathāsatī | tathā satī |
| | 5-6 | saṛvatbāṇupayoginī | saṛvathā nānupayoginī |
| 406 | Dhv. 5 | tadaṇavadhbārīta | tadavadbārīta |
| 408 | Loc. 2 | kriyete iti | kriyeti |
| | 4 | tadabhidheya | tattadabhidheya |
| 411 | Loc. 5 | yojakam iti | yojanam iti |
| , | 6 | [Delete <i>danda</i> at end of line.] | |
| 413 | Dhv. 4 | kim idam vyāñjakatvam | kim idam vyāñjakatvam |
| | 5 | nāma vyāñgyārtha- | nāma? vyāñgyārtha- |
| | | prakāśanam, na | prakāśanam hi vyāñjaka- |
| | | hi vyāñjakatvam | tvam / vyāñgyatvam |
| | | vyāñgyatvam | |
| | 5 | vyāñgyatvam | Delete |
| Loc. 1 | | tatra bhāvān | tatrabhāvān |
| | 3 | [Place open quote at beginning of line.] | |
| | 5 | vyañjanamukhena | vyañjakamukhena |
| 415 | Dhv. 1 | nyenāvasthānam | nyenāvasthānam |
| 416 | Loc. 2 | nimitini | nimittini |
| | 4 | [Place <i>danda</i> after <i>punarādyasyate</i> .] | |
| | 5 | tadetanmatrayam | tadetanmatatrayam |
| 417 | Loc. 5 | āvacakasya | avācakasya |
| 418 | Dhv. 3 | avagamanasyā | avagamanājyasyā |

| Page | Line | In place of: | one should read: |
|------|--------|--|-----------------------------------|
| 420 | Dhv. 4 | [Place danda after padatadarthanām.] | |
| 421 | Loc. 1 | prakāśa- | prakāśana- |
| 422 | Dhv. 3 | avidheyatvam | abhidheyatvam |
| | Loc. 1 | cedanenaivāgamitah | cedanenaivāgamitah |
| | 7 | [Place danda after yuktam.] | |
| 423 | Loc. 5 | dvirvacanam | dvivacanam |
| 424 | Dhv. 6 | [Delete first danda.] | |
| 425 | Loc. 4 | [Delete danda.] | |
| 427 | Dhv. 1 | [Set new paragraph beginning with vācakatva.] | |
| | 3 | [No new paragraph.] | |
| | Loc. 2 | [Delete comma. Place danda after (a)piśabdo 'pi] | |
| 428 | Dhv. 2 | [Delete first danda.] | |
| | | dharmatvenāpi | dharmatvenāpi darśanāt |
| | | [Delete danda. Separate taddā from vivakṣita.] | |
| | | dvayor | rdvayor |
| | | svarūpaparartī | svarūpapratīti |
| | Loc. 1 | vivakṣitavācyabhedā- | vivakṣitavācyam bbeda- |
| 433 | Loc. 2 | opapādāna | opapādāya |
| 435 | Dhv. 2 | viśeśāviśīṭā (this is Abhi- nava's reading) | viśeśāviśīṭā (correct reading) |
| | | viyāśāntare | viśayāntare |
| | | -śūnyāyā darśanāt | -śūnyāyās ca darśanāt |
| | 6 | sāmagra | sāmagrya |
| 440 | Loc. 2 | puruṣā | puruṣo |
| | 3 | prāmāṇā | pramāṇā |
| 442 | Loc. 3 | (ā)nayaṇādhyupayo | (ā)nayanādyupayo |
| | 4 | pratītivisṛānti | pratītir viśrānti |
| 444 | Dhv. 1 | yaiḥ | taiḥ |
| | Loc. 1 | brahmaṇadenānyat | brahmaṇade nānyat |
| | 4 | māṇatattva- | pramāṇatattva- |
| 446 | Loc. 3 | bipratipattiḥ | vipratipattiḥ |
| | 4 | damiti | midamiti |
| 447 | Dhv. 2 | vyābhārāś | vyavābhārāś |
| 448 | Dhv. 1 | brūyat | atba brūyat |
| | | [Place danda after āvasarāḥ.] | |
| | | śidbyatīti | chidyata iti (?) |
| | | [Begin new paragraph with na punar ayam.] | |
| | | [No new paragraph.] | |
| | | tadvibhajyarp | tadvibhajya |
| | | āvasitavyavahitāpi | āvasitā vyavahitāpi |
| | | [Begin new paragraph with pratipādyas tu.] | |
| | | [No new paragraph.] | |

Corrections of the Kashi Text

| <i>Page</i> | <i>Line</i> | <i>In place of:</i> | <i>one should read:</i> |
|-------------|-------------|--|--|
| 449 | Loc. 2 | vyañgyañjaka | vyañgyavyañjaka |
| 451 | Dhv. 4 | língitayā | língatayā |
| 452 | Dhv. 1 | samyañ mitbyā- | samyañmitbyā- |
| 453 | Dhv. 1 | [Delete <i>danda</i> .] | |
| 454 | Loc. 3 | pratotir | pratītir |
| | 4 | tadvyañgye 'pi abbyupagamyaktam | tadvadvyāñgye 'pi abbyupagamyoktam |
| 455 | Loc. 1 | tmenena | tvanena |
| | 2 | väkyanām | väkyānām |
| | 5 | pratītim | prītim (?) |
| | 8 | vyāparāditi | vyāpārāditi |
| 456 | Dhv. 1 | [Delete <i>danda</i> .] | |
| | Loc. 1 | nirūpati | nirūpayati |
| | 3 | viksitānyapare | vivaksitānyapare |
| 457 | Loc. 1 | antarapanipātād | antaropanipātāt |
| 458 | Loc. 5 | vyañjaka | vyañjakatva |
| 459 | Loc. 2 | [Place <i>danda</i> after <i>ityatrāntore</i> and delete final co.] | |
| 460 | Loc. 4 | subbagakādhibikarapa | subbagaiķādikarapa |
| | 5 | vibhāvanāprapti | vibhāvatāprapti |
| 462 | Dhv. 1 | rasavadalañkāre darśitah | rasavadalāñkāravīsayah prāk pradarśitah |
| 463 | Dhv. 7 | tamsa dhari. | tassa gharinīā |
| | Loc. 1 | gabhirāñi | gambhirāñi |
| | 2 | [Delete first <i>danda</i> .] | |
| | 6 | vastunyapahata | vastuṇyanapahata |
| 464 | Dhv. 1 | āmiamiañkā | amiamiankā |
| 465 | Loc. 8 | [Delete <i>danda</i> at end of line.] | |
| 471 | Dhv. 5 | upamāgarbbatve | upamādīgarbbatve |
| 472 | Loc. 2 | [Place <i>danda</i> after <i>sułakṣitā</i> iti. <i>Sułakṣitā</i> should be in boldface.] | |
| | | tudisālā | tūdiśalā |
| | | cobbhayatra vibbāśasu | cobbhayatravibbāśasu |
| | | pratipāda | pratipada |
| | | gr̥bañāt | gr̥bañāt |
| | | kāvypagñti | kāvypayogñti |
| | | lakṣitāḥ | lakṣitā |
| 474 | Loc. 5 | [Place <i>danda</i> after <i>keno lakṣaṇiyatūm</i> .] | |
| | 6 | kim anyad asya lakṣam | kim anyad asya lakṣanam |
| 478 | Loc. 1 | [Place <i>danda</i> after <i>kākuḥ</i> .] | |
| | 4 | [Place <i>danda</i> after <i>vaktavyam</i> .] | |
| 480 | Loc. 2 | [Place <i>danda</i> after <i>vyanjakabhbāvasya</i> .] | |
| 481 | Loc. 2 | [Place <i>danda</i> after <i>parubhāgalābhāḥ</i> .] | |

Corrections of the Kashi Text

| | <i>In place of:</i> | <i>one should read:</i> |
|------------|--|-------------------------|
| | prāyacchato | prayacchato |
| | prāyacchato | prayacchato |
| | barir anunayaśveva | barir anunayeśveva |
| | [Delete first <i>danda</i> .] | |
| | vīṣayam aśvapayuñjate | vīṣayam aśvapihuñjate |
| | dhvanigunībhūta | dhvaniguñibhūta |
| | tyopagītvam | tvopayogītvam |
| | śabdena vakāreṇa | śabdenaivakāreṇa |
| | guṇāvalo- | guṇāvale- |
| | [Insert <i>danda</i> after <i>kothayāmi</i> .] | |
| | sevata | sevate |
| | ityādiśanirveda- | ityādi sanirveda- |
| | nā casambhavī | na cāsambhavī |
| | nāstī nāstī | nāstī |
| | gunabbhāge | gunabbhāve |
| | [Place <i>danda</i> after <i>prasiddham eva</i> .] | |
| | [Place <i>danda</i> after <i>abhidhāṇḍyogat</i> .] | |
| | [Add hyphen at end of line.] | |
| | [Delete <i>danda</i> .] | |
| | bhāvayati | bhāvayanti |
| | [Place <i>danda</i> after <i>atipatati</i> .] | |
| | saprājñaka | śatprajñaka |
| | nispanda | nisyanda |
| | bīālālia | bīālā |
| | [Delete <i>danda</i> at end of line.] | |
| | opāyopeya | opeyopāya |
| | [Place <i>danda</i> after <i>kuśalāsu</i> .] | |
| | saprājñākāḥ | śatprajñākāḥ |
| | [Delete <i>danda</i> after <i>ucyote</i> .] | |
| | phalabīlaāo | phalabīlaāu |
| | vaddhaantīa | vaddhaantīe |
| | bāli assa | bāliassa |
| | pālivesavatuā | pālivesiako |
| | vīñiñiñbhaviā | vīñiñvuddio |
| | abhihitau | abhihitam |
| 500 Dhv. 3 | | |
| Loc. 1-2 | prātiveśyakavadbukā | prātiveśiko |
| 2 | prāpitā | prāpitah |
| 4 | [The final <i>su</i> belongs metrically in the next line.] | |
| 6 | [Delete <i>danda</i> .] | |
| 501 Dhv. 2 | prabhedāḥ | prabhedaiḥ |
| Loc. 2 | labdhasaundharya ty- | labdhasaundaryamity- |
| | arthāḥ | arthāḥ |

Corrections of the Kashi Text

| <i>Page</i> | <i>Line</i> | <i>In place of:</i> | <i>one should read:</i> |
|-------------|-------------|---|------------------------------------|
| 501 | Loc. 2 | kāvyāddbhvanīti | kāvyadbhanīti |
| | 7 | prakāsyata | sammiśryata |
| 502 | Dhv. 6 | dbarammi | gbarammi |
| | Loc. 3 | viśatya | vīpsatya |
| | | ānanyātvasaṁkhyatvam | ānanyāt tvasaṁkhyatvam |
| | | tatrā vyutpattaye | tatra vyutpattaye |
| | | [Delete second danda.] | |
| | | padābhare | padobare |
| | | [Place danda after tāvad asti.] | |
| | | [Shift danda from before to after raudrasya.] | |
| | | tadupalakṣitā | tadupalakṣito |
| | | tathā hi me | tathā hi nyakkāro byayam eva me |
| 506 | Loc. 2 | dṛṣyamānam apyuktatvāt | dṛṣyamānam ayuktatvāt |
| | 7 | pāramāthikam | pāramāthikam |
| | 11 | saṅkarabhedāḥ trī | saṅkarabhedāḥs trī. |
| 507 | Loc. 12 | jāyā iti | jāe iti |
| 508 | Loc. 1 | vyāpāravatātī | vyāpāravatītī |
| | 2 | tataḥ prabhṛti | tato varṇaprabhṛti |
| 509 | Dhv. 1 | viśvemanīśa | viśvamanīśam |
| | Loc. 12 | [Shift danda from before to after yoganidroyā.] | |
| 510 | Dhv. 1 | virodhālaṅkāraṇa | virodhālaṅkāreṇa |
| | Loc. 8 | andhapadanyāsenā | andhapadanyāyena |
| 511 | Loc. 5 | pūrgranthena | pūrvagranthena |
| | 10 | śabdamīśram | śabdamiśram |
| 512 | Loc. 1 | [Delete danda.] | |
| | 6 | prasabyaprabhūtatayā | prasabya prabhūtatayā |
| | 7 | [Delete danda at end of line.] | |
| 513 | Dhv. 1 | alaṅkāra- | alaṅkāra- |
| | Loc. 13 | [Place danda before suaprabhēdānām.] | |
| 514 | Loc. 1 | dhvaninām | dhvaninā |
| | 3 | dbvanau | dhvaninā |
| 515 | Loc. 3 | giānarpa | giānam |
| 516 | Loc. 4 | [Delete danda.] | |
| | 9 | āśaknuvadbhir alaṅkāraib | āśaknuvadbhir ālaṅkārikai |
| 517 | Dhv. 6 | āśāditi | āśāditi |
| | 7 | saṁpradarśitenānyena | saṁpradarśitamityanyena |
| 518 | Dhv. 1 | [Delete danda.] | |
| 519 | Loc. 2 | [Place danda after śabdah.] | |
| 523 | Loc. 6 | bbāsata | pratibbāsata |
| 526 | Dhv. 1 | bhrāmadbbūḥ | bhrāmadbhrūḥ |
| | 3 | mitbo | mito |

| Page | Line | In place of: | one should read: |
|------|----------|---|----------------------------|
| 526 | Dhv. 3 | prāptab | yāti |
| | 7 | mitbo | mito |
| 528 | Dhv. 7 | bibhrate | bibhr̥ta |
| | 12 | satsvarthaśakti | satsu / arthaśakti |
| Loc. | 2 | [Put danda in place of first comma.] | |
| | 4 | [Place danda after punarukt̥yā.] | |
| 529 | Dhv. 1 | [Large omission after first danda. See Translation, 4.4 A, note 7.] | |
| | 12 | vicitram | vicitre |
| 530 | Dhv. 2 | rūpam | rūpe |
| | 5 | [Delete hyphen at end of line.] | |
| Loc. | 8 | [Delete both dandas.] | |
| | 10 | [Delete danda.] | |
| 531 | Dhv. 18 | [Delete dash between cāgre and paśyata.] | |
| 532 | Dhv. 1 | ca śabdah | caśabdah |
| | 11 | [Shift danda to follow paramparayā.] | |
| | 13 | svarūpam | svarūpam amśirūpam |
| 533 | Loc. 4 | sāda(rah) | soda(rah) |
| | 6 | ktyoktam | tyoktam |
| 535 | Dhv. 4 | sopāśo aija vi suhaa | so pāśo aija vi suhaa tīm |
| | 9 | vistāra | vistara |
| Loc. | 1 | rathyāntulāgrena | rathyām tulāgrena |
| | 8 | guṇbhūtetyāhīnā | guṇībhūtetyādīnā |
| | 12 | mallasaranāgāñānasthāna | malla saranāgāñāna aṭṭhāna |
| 536 | Loc. 2 | khe a | khea |
| | 3 | ramthyā | ratthā |
| | | sathnāpaththāsvantī | satthāvatthā suvantīva |
| | 5 | kala | kila |
| | 6 | kathantadetena | kathamp tadete na |
| | 15 | śivo pāyanneccchan | śivopāyamp necchan |
| 537 | Loc. 2-3 | [jarājīrnāśārūryasya, etc. should be printed as verse.] | |
| 538 | Loc. 2 | [Place danda after yuktāndm̥ api] | |
| | 7 | [Place danda at end of line.] | |
| 539 | Dhv. 7 | apunaruktatvena vā nava- | punaruktatvena vānava- |
| | | navā | navā |
| | 14 | cetana | sacetana |
| 541 | Dhv. 12 | sābhānyā | sāmānyā |
| | 15 | paricitāḍi | paracittādi |
| | 17 | tasyā viṣayatvā- | tasyāviṣayatvā- |
| Loc. | 2 | vicitreti | vicitrateti |
| 542 | Dhv. 2 | [Place danda after mātrameva.] | |
| | 3 | [Large omission after latrocyate. See 4.7 b A, note 1.] | |

Corrections of the Kashi Text

| <i>Page</i> | <i>Line</i> | <i>In place of:</i> | <i>one should read:</i> |
|-------------|-------------|--|-------------------------|
| 542 | Dhv. 6 | kāvyarthānām [Delete dāṇḍa.] | kāvyaṛthānām |
| | Loc. 3 | nāḥ | na |
| | 4 | paunaruktyam | paunaruktyam |
| | 5 | prākaranājair | prāmāṇjikair |
| 543 | Dhv. 5 | akṣayam | akṣatam |
| | Loc. 1 | pratipādakanāivokter | pratipādakataivokter |
| | 2 | yo abhedāḥ | yo 'bhedaḥ tena |
| | 3 | tenāyam arthaḥ | ayam arthaḥ |
| | 9 | [Delete dāṇḍa.] | |
| 544 | Dhv. 5-6 | [See Translation, 4.7 b A, note 4.] | |
| | Loc. 1 | [Place dāṇḍa after vācyam. Join bālopayogi with kāya.] | |
| | 10 | mabamaha | mahumahu |
| 547 | Loc. 4 | pūrvopanibandaḥ | pūrvopanibaddha |
| | 9 | citrāpustakādāv | citrāpustakādāv |
| 549 | Loc. 3 | tathaveti | tathaveti |
| 550 | Dhv. 7 | kāvyaṛthāḥ | kāvyaṛthāḥ |
| 551 | Loc. 7 | kāvyam | kāvyam tasmat |
| | 8 | cchāyāvatva | cchāyāvattva |
| | 9 | prabhṛtiṇam | prabhṛtiṇām |
| 552 | Dhv. 3 | [Separate var̥tma from cira.] | |
| | Loc. 2 | tathāvi dha | tathāvidha |
| 553 | Loc. 4 | samanusamaranena | samsmaranena |
| | 5 | [Place dāṇḍa after mahimā and delete dāṇḍa after chāstre.] | |
| 554 | Loc. 3 | pravṛtyāṅgannāma | pravṛtyāṅgam nāma |
| , | | prasiddham | prathitam iti siddham |
| 555 | Loc. 2 | guruḥ prabandha- | guruprabandha- |
| | | dhvani vastu- | dhvanivastu- |

INDEX OF FIRST LINES

This index gives the first line of each of the poetic translations in the present volume. The index includes poetic passages from the prose kāvyas, but does not include passages of prose dialogue from the Sanskrit plays. The Kārikā verses of the Dhvanyāloka have been excluded, as have the more prosaic of the expository verses from the treatises on poetics, such as those that merely state a definition of a figure of speech.

For each entry the opening words of the original text are supplied in parentheses. Numbers in bold type refer to pages on which the translation of the verse appears; other numbers refer to further pages on which the verse is discussed or referred to.

Readers seeking verses remembered in their original language should first consult the Pratīka Index of Verses, which provides cross-references to the corresponding entries in this index.

- A fool will take a poem that has no content. (*yasmīn asti na vastu*) 61, 62-63.
- A jewel placed against the whetstone. (*manūjā sāṇollīḍhah*) 148.
- A man spends all his time. (*mahumahu iti bhaṇantāahu*) 711, 713.
- A scoundrel aims at his own interest. (*yad vāñcandhītamatir*) 468, 469.
- A timid deer ran about among the tents. (*trāḍākulaḥ paripaton*) 343, 345.
- A tremulousness of the eyes. (*yad vīramya vilokiteṣu*) 108, 109, 603, 605 n6.
- A true poet may treat unliving things. (*bhāvān acetanān api*) 639.
- Ab merchant, how should we have ivory. (*vāñcas hattidantā*) 385, 687, 688 n7.
- Ab verily, your courage must be envied! (*aho batāśi sprhāṇiyavīryah*) 467, 468.
- Ab, the cruelty of worldly life. (*aho samsāraṇairghnyam*) 160.
- All times of happiness are passed. (*atikrāntasukhāḥ kālāḥ*) 457, 458-459.
- Alone the god of the flowered bow. (*sa ekas trīṇi jayati*) 148.
- Although his friends have waked him. (*dhūta 'pi sahāyair*) 147, 148-149.
- Although with feigned anger. (*kṛtakakupitair bāṣpāmbhobhiḥ*) 396, 397, 398 n3.
- Although your face is afflicted by anger. (*īśākalusassa vi tuha*) 343, 344.
- And as the fearsome sound of Arjun's bow was heard. (*samutthite dhanur-dhvanau*) 517.

Index of First Lines

- And the blessed Vāsudeva, (*bhagavān vāsudevaś ca*) 691, 692.
As by its flame of glorious light a lamp, (*prabhāmahatyā sikhayeva dīpah*)
607, 608-609.
As even without a necklace (*tasyā vīṇāpi hārēṇa*) 294, 295-296, 300, 304
n4.
As he holds in his hand the discus "Beautiful" (*ślāghyāśeṣatanum sudarśana-*
karāḥ) 297, 306.
As I am a weak woman, (*ekākinī yad abalā taruṇī*) 166, 168 n3-4.
As occasion is offered by causes and effects, (*puruṣārthahetukam idam*)
519, 520 n5.
As Śiva, favoring his devotee, (*pratigrahītum pranayipriyatvāt*) 314.
As some lover brought by many prayers (*tais tair apy upayācītair*) 125,
126.
As the slender chest of young girls (*ubbhinnākuābhoā*) 687, 688 n8.
As the sweet-smelling season begins, (*surabhisamaye pravṛttī*) 687, 688
n6.
As the young wife (*vāñjirakudāngoddīna-*) 361.
At Bhaṭṭendurāja's lotus feet I heard (*bhaṭṭendurājacaraṇābja-*) 43, 45 n2.
At the end of many births, the man of knowledge (*bahūnām janmanām ante*)
697, 700 n6.
Attentive youth (*sāraṇīṇajovvāṇa-*) 322, 324, 687.
- Blacking out the sun with aerial chariots (*samsarpadbhīḥ samantātī*) 519.
bodies fanned by the flapping, bloody wings of vultures, (*sasōṇītāḥ kruṣya-*
bhujām sphuradbhīḥ) 527, 528-529.
Bow down to the sole refuge of men, the everlasting, (*sarvaitāraṇam*
akṣayam) 309, 310-311.
Brother-in-law, your wife (*khanapāhuniā dears*) 645, 646-648.
[But] if it were not thus, (*yadi na sydt*) 51, 53 n7.
But if your heart is filled with Śiva, (*vastutāśivamaye hrī sphuṭam*) 726.
But Śiva, stirring slightly from his calm (*haras tu kīncit parivṛttedhairyoṣ*)
314.
By the imperious command of his discus stroke (*cakrābhīgātprasabhbh-*
jñāyasa) 278, 277.
By use of the rasas, things that have been long seen (*dr̥ṣṭapūrvā api hy*
arthāḥ) 686.
- Can she be angry (*tis̄het kopavaśāt prabhāvapihitā*) 215.
CI ity in all then types of touch (*vyaktir uvañjanadhatunā*) 519.
Coins, whose bodies are weary (*cāṇakarāparampara-*) 699, 701 n15.
"Come here! Go! (*ehi gaccha patottīgha*) 492, 493-497.
- Daśaratha was like Rāma, (*rāma iva daśaratho 'bhūd*) 152, 153 n9.

Did not your eyes rain moisture (*dṛśtir nāmrītavarsinī*) 444.

Don't block my way; move on. (*mā pantham rundhī no*) 461, 462 n1.

if he bore not (*indūvaradyuti yadā bibhṛyān na lakṣma*) 475.

irrness, forbearance, self-control (*dhṛītīkṣamā dayā śaucam*) 371, 372, 373.

Flying about the ketaka trees, (*dhūṇḍullanto marīhiśi*) 350, 352 n2-5, 353 n6-7.

for He is the truth, (*sa hi satyam*) 692.

For putting a fence around this bādari (*uppahajāde asohinīe*) 633, 634-635, 654.

iving joy to all creatures (*dattanandāḥ prajānām*) 303, 304 n3, 306, 548, 549 n3.

Go away! Don't wipe (*osara rottum cia*) 460, 461.

Go somewhere else, you innocent puppy. (*annattha vacca bālāa*) 462, 463.

Go your rounds freely, gentle monk; (*bhama dhammia visaddho*) 83, 84-98, 150, 151, 168 n4, 169 n5, 462 n1, 550, 558 n3, 618.

Go, and let the sighs and tears (*vacca maha vrisi ekkei*) 100, 101.

God made space too small: (*alpam nirmitam ākāśam*) 603.

Happy is he who strolls within the rooms (*preñkhalpremaprabandha-*) 364, 365 n2-3.

Having his small intelligence refined (*śrīsiddhicelacaranābja-*) 726, 727 n6.

Having paid homage to Nārāyaṇa, (*nārāyaṇām namaskṛtya*) 697-698.

He can express all Hayagrīva's virtues (*sa vaktum akhilāñ sākto*) 337, 338.

He reckoned not expense of beauty's substance (*lāvanyadravinaivayayo na gaṇitah*) 625, 627 n6-9, 629-631, 634.

He seems to me the equal (*phainetai moi kēnos*) 39.

He who brought you back to life (*prāṇā yena samarpitāḥ*) 162, 164 n5.

He who destroyed the cart and is unborn (*yena dhvastam ano 'bhavena*) 292, 293, 300, 306.

He who has bought his greatness by his valor (*svatejākṛitamahimā*) 680.

He who has kissed a face (*osurusumhiāe*) 216, 219 n8.

He who is first is first indeed. (*yāḥ prathamāḥ prathamāḥ sa tu*) 679, 680 n2, 681.

He who shows no respect to the teacher (*avajñayāpy avacchādyo*) 151, 153 n2.

Her beautiful opening smile, (*savibhramasmitodbhedā*) 679.

Her face was bowed in shyness (*vrīdāyogān natavadanayā*) 395, 396, 555.

Her lover, reaching her high flowers from a branch (*prayacchatoccaīt kusumāni mānini*) 621, 622-623, 628.

- Her smile is half innocent, (*smitam kiñcincinmugdham*) 679, 680 n1, 681, 682 n3.
- Here is the hand that drew off my belt, (*ayam sa rasanotkarṣi*) 499, 500 n1, 501.
- How can a king of the Lunar Dynasty do a forbidden deed? (*kuākāryam śasālakṣmaṇaḥ*) 216, 219 n10, 489, 490.
- How can it be that you who lifted (*lilādāḍhagguvṛūḍha-*) 449, 450 n3, 451 n4.
- How can you be deceived (*amum kānakavarnābhām*) 450, 451 n4.
- Hunger, thirst, lust, envy, and a fear of death: (*kṣutṛṣṇākāmātāsaryam*) 699.

- I, Abhinavagupta, praise God's perceptive force. (*prājyam prollāsamātram*) 366, 367 n2.
- I am a deep man. (*gambhiro 'ham na me kṛtyam*) 318, 317 n2.
- I am weary from much painting of the world. (*yā vyāpāravatī rasān*) 12, 653, 654-659.
- I bow to Śāṅkari Śakti, (*kṛtyapāñcakanirvāha-*) 677, 678 n1.
- I call to mind the Goddess (*smarāmi smarasamdhā-*) 369.
- I cannot bear to lose my love (*ayam ekapade tayā viyogaḥ*) 463, 464.
- I give my praise to him (*karpūra iva dagdha 'pi*) 148, 149 n3.
- I have kept this garland woven by my love (*dayitayā grathitā srag iyam*) 265.
- I have spent the day in gazing at her moonlike face, (*tadvaktrenduvilokanaṇa divaso*) 444, 445 n5.
- I know youth to be the house of passion, (*rāgasyāspadam ity avāsi*) 519.
- I merely heard her name (*dūrākaraṣṇāmohamantra iva*) 107, 111 n4, 217.
- I praise the Fourth Power, which enables (*sphuṭikṛtārthavaicītrya-*) 725, 726 n4.
- I praise the magic branch that bears (*yā smaryamānā śreyāṁsi*) 201.
- I praise the Mediating Power, (*āśutritānām bhedānām*) 674, 675 n7.
- I remember before the churning of the sea (*saggam apārijāam*) 161, 162, 163 n4.
- I see your body in the śyāma vines, (*śyāmāsu arigam cakitahariniprekṣane*) 288, 289.
- I will not crush in my anger a hundred Kauravas in battle (*mathnāmi kau-ravasātām samare na kopāt*) 619, 620 n10.
- I would rather be born somewhere in a forest (*jāejja vanuddese*) 341, 342.
- If all poetic qualities (*samastaguṇasampadah*) 242.
- If fate will have it that I am not born (*prātum dhanair arthijanasya*) 379, 380-381, 549 n5, 550-551.
- If I slept, I should doubtless dream about the queen (*devīsvikṛtamānasasya*) 445, 446 n7.

- If in my longing (*aham tvāṁ yadi nekṣeya*) 143.
 If it is admitted that one poet at least (*vālmīkivatiriktaśya*) 710, 711 n3,
 713.
 If the poet writes of love, (*śrīgārī cet kavīḥ kāvye*) 639, 640.
 If the rays of the moon are pencils of ambrosia (*sītāṁśor amṛtacchaṭā yadi
 kardāḥ*) 289, 290.
 If what is within the body (*yadi nāmasya kāyasya*) 51, 53 n6.
 In anger she has bound him (*kopāt komalalolabāhulatikāpāśena*) 287, 288,
 490, 491 n2, 512, 654, 656 n6.
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 In poetry's endless worlds (*apāre kāvyasamsāre*) 639, 640.
 In spring the Malabar wind, (*candanāśaktabhujaga-*) 343, 344-345.
 In this great disaster you are now all that is left (*vr̥te 'smiṁ mahāpralaye*)
 381, 382, 686, 688 n1.
 In what is night to all creatures (*yā niśā sarvabhūtānām*) 376, 377.
 Infatuation creates desire (*mado janayati prītiṁ*) 152, 153 n8.
 Is this her hand, or might it be (*tasyāḥ pāṇīr iyaṁ nu*) 327, 328 n2.
 It is already a humiliation (*nyakkāro hy ayam eva*) 453, 454-457, 624, 626
 n1, 648.
 It is bursting with new buds and pale of hue; (*uddāmoṣṭakākāṁ vīpāndura-
 rucam*) 278, 279.
 It is not so much that at first the fool imagined (*etat tasya mukhāt*) 160,
 161, 163 n2.
 It suffers pressure for others' sake, is sweet when broken, (*parārthe yaḥ
 piḍām*) 179, 180 n6, 182, 632, 633 n2.
 Its waves are her frowns, (*taraṅgabhrūbhāngā kṣubhitauhaga-*) 246, 247,
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- Knowing that her gallant had set his heart (*sāṅketakālamanasam*) 316,
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- Lady Autumn beautifies the moon (*aindrām dhanur pāṇḍupayodhareṇa*)
 144, 145 n3.
 Leaving his mortal body at the junction (*tīrthe toyavyatikarabhave*) 487,
 488.
 Let others thus compare (*emea jaño tissā*) 374, 375.
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- Many times you touch (*calāpāṅgāṁ dr̥ṣṭim spr̥ṣasi bahuśo*) 274, 275, 653-
 654, 656 n2.
 May both sets of the sun god's feet lead you to welfare (*kham ye 'tyujjuvala-
 yanti*) 309, 311.
 May he protect you, (*sa pātu vo yasya hatāvāśeṣāḥ*) 242, 243, 244 n9-10.

- May you never find honor, Niśāda. (*mā niśāda pratiṣṭhām tuam*) 113-114, 115, 116-119.
- Meanwhile the long period named Summer, (*atrāntare kusumasa mayayugam*) 82-93, 302, 303-308.
- Moon-faced she is, (*sasivadanārātasa rasija-*) 154, 155.
- Mother-in-law sleeps here, I there: (*attā ettha nīmajjai*) 14, 98, 99-100, 167.
- "My child, come hither and be not distressed; (*vatse mā gā viśādam*) 318, 319-321.
- "My dear traveler, what causes this sudden collapse?" (*bho bho ki, akānda*) 143, 145 n2.
- My eyes with difficulty pass her thighs (*kṛcchrenoruyugam uyatitya*) 218, 219 n16.
- My groans are like your thunder; (*ākrandāḥ stanisair vilocana-*) 284, 285 n5, 286.
- My ministers persuaded me to live (*tuatsamprāptivilobhitena*) 445.
- My philosophy, into which the brightest minds (*anadhyavasitāvagāhanam*) 626, 627 n10, 630-632.
- My son, who once with a single shaft (*karinīvehaavaaro*) 687, 688 n9, 689.
- Neither at home nor when abroad (*gr̥heṣu adhvāsu vā nānnam*) 151, 152, 153 n3.
- Night is ennobled by moonlight, (*candamaūhi nīśā*) 329, 330.
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- O amaranth, you will lose the joy (*turabaka kucāghātakridā-*) 498, 499 n2.
- O Auntie! Without touching the lotuses (*kamalārā ṣa maliā*) 358, 359 n1, 360.
- O clever lover, to apologize (*hīoṭṭhādītamannum*) 339, 340 n2, 341.
- O farmer's bride, (*uccīṇasū padīkutsumām*) 362, 363.
- O foremost of the numerous entourage of Love, (*viśamakāṇḍakuṭumbaka-*) 365.
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- On bodies soiled with dust they looked, (*bhūreṇudigdhān naupārijāta-*) 527, 528-529.
- On one side his beloved weeps, (*ekkatto ruai piā*) 508, 509 n2, 510.
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PRATIKA INDEX OF VERSES

Listed here, for the convenience of readers who have in mind the original text of a particular verse, are brief pratikas of the text of each of the items included in the preceding Index of First Lines, together with the first few words of the corresponding entry in that index, which should be consulted for a list of the pages on which the verse is translated, discussed, or referred to.

The entries are listed in Sanskrit alphabetical order. The pratikas conform to the readings accepted in the present volume, as given in the Corrections of the Kashi Text and in the notes on the passages in question.

ākūrtitā pallavītā The mango tree
angulyagre kari- There are a hundred
aydēm pahārō With a newly flowered
annatta vacca bālā Go somewhere
atāhotthie vi- Victorious is the goddess
atītrāntasukhātālā All times of
allā ethā Mother-in-law sleeps here
atrāntare kusuma- Meanwhile the
anadhyavasīlāvā- My philosophy
anavaralanayanā- Who would not
anurāgavatī sandhyā The sunset is
apāre kāvyasamśāre In poetry's
apūrvam yad- Victorious is the Muse's
ambā sete 'tra That's where my aged
amī ye dṛṣyante These things which
amum kanakavarnābhām How can you
ayam sa rāśonot- Here is the hand
ayam ekapade tāyā I cannot bear
ayam mandadyutir The sun with
alam sthitvā śmaśāne Stay not at
alpam nirmītam ākāsam God made
avayñāyāpāvuccādya He who shows
asokanirbhartsita- The asoka shamed
aham tuām yadi If in my longing
ahinaapacarausiesu On these days that
aho batān sphāniya- Ab verily, your
aho samsāraairghy- Ab, the cruelty

ākrandātā stanitair My groans are like
ādityo 'yam sthito The sun still
ānandavardhana- The Eye which
āma asaio So I am an adulteress?
āśin nātha pīḍmohī The great earth
āsutrānām I praise the mediating
āshuto 'pi sa- Although his friends
ity āklistarasā- There is a garden
indīvaradyuti yadā Even if he bore
isākalwassa vi- Although your face
uccinasu padia- O farmer's bride
uttakampini bhaya- You were trembling
uddāmotkālakām It is bursting
unnataḥ prollassad- They are high
upeyusām api divam The authors of
uppahajāāe asohinie For putting a
upoḍharāgena vi- The reddening moon
ubdhīṇṇākuābhōd As the slender chest
ekasmin sāyane They lay upon
ekātīnī yad abalā As I am a weak
ekkātto ruai piā One one side his
etat tasya muthāt It is not so much
emea janō tissā Let others compare

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evamudūni While the heavenly
ehi gaccha patottishta Come here!

aindram dhonuh Lady Autumn

osara rottum cia Go away! Don't
osurusumhiāe He who has kissed

aucityam vacasām Words appropriate

kah sannaddhe When you put on
kanthāc chittvāksamolā- She breaks
katham apī kṛta- She had suffered
komalārā na malī The lotuses have
kapole patrali Your palm erases
karinīvehavvaaro My son, who once
kartā dyūtacakhalāndā Where is the
karpūra wa dagdho I give my praise
kas tuam bhoh Who are you, sir?
kassa vā na hoī Who wouldn't be
kāuyāloke prathām nilān This Eye
kim locanam vñnd loko Will the world
kim vrtlāntaih What good is done
kim häyena na me Why do you laugh
kurangivāngāni She freezes like a deer
kurabaka kucāhāla- O amaranth,
kuriā pasannāo Whether angry or
krchrenoruyugam My eyes with
kṛtakakupitair Although with feigned
kṛte varakothālōpe When the talk
kṛtyapānicaka- I bow to Śāṅkari
kelikondalitasya Your eyes are
kopāt komalalolā- In anger she has
krāmantyah kṣatifikomolā They walk
kvākāryam sāśa How can a king
ksane ksane yan nava- To be at each
kṣipto hastilāvalagnah The women of
kṣutrymākāma- Hunger, thirst, lust

kham ye 'tyujvalayanti May both sets
khanapāhuṇiā deara Brother-in-law,

gaanām ca motta- Though the sky
gambhīro 'ham I am a deep man
gṛheṣu adhvāsu vā Neither at home
golākacchakudange When the many
grāmatarunām tarunyā On seeing the

cakrābhīghāta- By the impious
caricadbhujabhrāmīla- The brutal
candanaśaktabhrūjaga- In spring the
candamañehi nūsō Night is ennobled
camahiamāñasakarīcana- Whose war
calāpāngām drṣṭim Many times you
cāianakaraparampara- Coins, whose
cumbijī sahuttam You kiss a
cūrākurdvāamsam The face of early

jorājīrṇaśarirasya That disenchanted
jord neyam mūrdhni This is not age
jāejja vanuddese I would rather be
jyotsnāpūraprasara- On this sand

ti kanakacit

dhundullanto marshini Flying about

tathābhūte taśmin When the sage's
ted geham natabhitti That house with
teduaktrenduvilokanena I have spent
tom tāna srisahāra- Their hearts
tanū meghajalādrā- This slender vine
tarāngabhrūbhāngā It waves are
lava datapatrapatramṛdu- Your foot
tasāy pāṇīr iyam nu Is this her hand
tasāy vñnapī hārena As even without
tasāy tan mukham When we have
tām prāṇīmukhim tatra The matrons
tālā jānti gupā Virtues blossom
tālāt śrīñjodvalaya- On which your
tishtet kopavasāt Can she be angry
tirthe toyayatiśvara- Leaving his
tesām gopavadhū Say, happy friend,
tulyodayāvasānatvāt They rise and
tas tair apy upa- As some lover
trāsātulā poripolā A timid deer
tuatsampāptivlobhitena My ministers
tuām candracūḍam O moon-crested
tuām ālīkhyā When I would paint

dallānandāḥ projānām Giving joy
dantakṣetāni karajāś ca The marks

dayitayā grathīd I have kept this
dīrghakurvan potu There, from the
durārādhā rādhā Rādhā is hard to
dūrākārganamoha- I merely heard
drṣṭapūrv api By use of the rosas
drṣṭir nāmrtavarṣini Did not your
drṣṭyā keśava O Kēśava, my eyes
de à paśa niuatasu Turn back, I beg
devuṣvātāmānasasya If I slept
devudattammi phale Since fruit

dharanidharanāyādhunā In this great
dhriti kāma Firmness, forbearance

nakhām nakhāgreṇa Rubbing one nail
na ceha jñātah kāscit Whether hateful
na mugdhe pratyetum Sweet lady,
nānābhēgibhramadbhūt With its
many
nārāyaṇam namaskṛtya Having paid
nidrākāśavīnah The bride has
nidrādhanimūlā- With half-closed
nirvānabhūyistham Then came the
nūdrātī dūkagarbha- Rice grains lie
neyam vīrūti This is not the buzzing
no kālpāpāyevāyor The wind of
nyaktātī hy ayam eva It is already a

paryuh śrīścandra- With this, touch
parārthe yah pīdām It suffers pressure
parimilānam pīra- Wilting at either
pāndukādam vikramā Your pale
puruṣārthatetukam idam As occasion
pratigrahītum pranayi- As Śiva
pratyākyānaruṣaḥ The cruel demon
prabhāmohatyā tikkhayeva As by its
prabhācchayatī ultiari- When darkness
prayacchatoccaḥ kusumāni Her lover,
prauḍanālōtpala- These glances of
prasāde vartava Turn to forgiveness
prājyam prollāsa- I, Abhinavagupta
prānā yena He who brought you
prātum dhaneṣi If fate will have it
prāptāśrī eṣa kasmāt Why should he
preññātīpremaprabandha- Happy is he

phainetas moi kēnos He seems to me

bahūnām janmanām ante At the end

bhaavahalerakthanekata- This is well
bhagavān vārudevaḥ And the blessed
bhāttendurāja- At Bhāttendurāja's
bhāma dhammia Go your rounds
bhāvaurātā hāṭhāj Troop of delights,
bhāvū acetanām api A true poet may
bhūrenusidghān On bodies soiled
bho bho kīm kīm "My dear traveler
bhramim arātī The cloud serpents

manī sānollīghāḥ A jewel placed
mathnāmī kaurava- I will not crush
modamukharakapotam With its enrap-
moda janayati Infatuation creates
manasyaūrtiyā samupā- So human
mandhārakutsumorenū- With locks
mahumahu iti A man spends all
mā niśāda May you never bad
mā pantham rundhi no Don't block
mā bhavantam analāḥ Not fire or
munīr jayati Victorious is the great
muhurañgūlaṁmurtā- She turned her

yam sarvāśādāḥ The mountains made
yah kālāgurupattra- On this reservoir
yah prathamaḥ prathamaḥ He who is
yoc ca kāmasukham lake The joy of
yatā ca mātāniga- Where the women
yahā yahā nīparyeti The more the
yatheyam grīṣmoṣma- The shorelines
yadi na syāt [But] if it were not thus
yadi nāmasya If what is within
yad vāñcanāhītāmotiř A scoundrel
yad uñramya vi- A tremulousness
yasmīnn asti na vastu A fool will take
yātē gatraviparyaye The slender
yātē duāravatī When Madhu's foe
yā niśā sarva- In what is night
yātāl pūrṇo na Until he is filled
yā vyāpāravatī rasān I am weary from
yā smaryamānā I praise the magic
ye jīvanti na Once, when people
yena vastam anō He who destroyed
ye yāntī abhyudaye They who take
yo yah s̄ trām Whatever man

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uktas tuam neva- You are raka
 amyā iti prāpta- Where young men
 uvisirkrntasubhāgyas The sun has
 āgasyāspadom ity I know youth
 dīyahemair avijanta The pond-kings
 ājānam apि sevante They serve even
 āma iua dasaratho Dasaratha was

anighaagaenā Who she blessed
 acchi duhidā jāmāuo With Lakṣmi
 āvanyakāntipari- Truly insensate
 āvanyadravuṇoyayo He reckoned not
 āvanyasindhur apo- What an unique
 dādādhaggurūdhā- How can it be

acca maha vni Go, and let the sighs
 latse mā gō visādam My child, come
 vasantamattaliparam- Your hair was
 vasantapuspēdhārenam The aśoka
 vāstulas śivamaye But if your heart
 vāghenur dugdha Prompted by the
 vānīoa hattidantā Ab merchant, how
 vānirukudāngoddina- As the young
 vāmativayastrikasya If it is admitted
 vāmativisayo ya āśin That which was
 vāmānaparyanya- Thus did the heroes
 vārambhotthā Prompted by intimacy
 vānamakāndakutumbaka- O foremost of
 vāsamaio /vā/ kāna u- The passing
 vārānām ramai The eyes of warriors
 vāte 'smi mahā- Is this great
 vāktr̄ vāyanjanadhātund Clarity is
 vādāyogān nata- Her face was bowed

vātrucchedadrdhē- The sage Rāma
 vāstivadanāsita- Moon-faced she is
 vātharinī kva On what mountain
 vātāmfor amrtacchāṭā If the rays
 vātāyam vāsagṛham Seeing that the
 vāngārhāṣya- The erotic, comic,
 vāgārī cet kavī If the poet writes
 vāgo himagiris tuam Śeṣa, Himalaya,
 vāmāsu angam cakita- I see your
 vāsiddhicelacaranā- Having his small
 vālāghyāśeṣatanum As he holds
 a ekas trini jayati

samārpaddhī samantāt Blacking out
 saggam apārijām I remember before
 sanketakālamanasam Knowing that
 sajjonān kavir asau This poet does
 sajjehi surahimāśo The fragrant
 sakāryatattvanaya- The right path
 satyam manoramāś Truly fair women
 samavasamānurūsēśā The Goods level
 sa pātu vo yasya May he protect you
 samavāya svā She was the meeting
 samastagunasampodāḥ If all poetic
 samutthite dhanurdhvau And as the
 sarasijam anuviddham The pond lily
 sarāmsi hamsaih In autumn lakes
 sarvatra juhiteśu The rooms are
 sarvakāsaranam Bow down to the
 sarvopamēdravyā- The creator used
 sa vaktum akhilān He can express
 sa vibhramasmitodhēdā Her beautiful
 sajoniśaih kṛavya- Bodies fanned
 sa hi satyam For He is the truth
 sajāraṇīnājorvāna- Attentive youth
 sajāi romanīcījāi Lucky man! Her
 sahipacakannapūrā The bunter's
 surabhisamāyē praurile As the sweet
 suvarnapuspām prthivīm Three men
 sajāi sarvaiwa This is the whole
 strīyo narapaler Women, kings,
 smigdhāsyāmalakānti- White herons
 sphuṭīrtārtha- I praise the Fourth
 smaranavānadi- We have seen lovers
 smara smaram iua Remember as
 smarāmi smarasam- I call to mind
 smistam kiñcīnmuḍgham Her smile is
 suam suam nimittam The emotions
 svāñcīlapakṣmākāpātām Opening by
 svāstahākṛta- He who has bought
 svāsthā bhavantu mayi Shall they be
 svecchākesarināḥ Of Madhu's foe

homśānām ninadeśu yaśi These buds
 horas tu kiñcit But Śiva, stirring
 hīoḍhābhāmaṇnum O clever lover
 humi avahathīreho Though I may
 helāpi kāṣyacit The playful gesture
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GENERAL INDEX

Numbers refer to pages. Technical terms are given in both Sanskrit and English with cross-references from one to the other. Page references are usually listed only under the Sanskrit term.

A mere list of all occurrences of such a term as *dhvani* or *rasa* would be of little use, as nearly half the pages of the book would be listed under each term. Accordingly, I have tried to analyse by inset headings under such a term the types and varieties of the concept which it denotes and the content of statements made concerning it.

The abbreviation "n" following a page number refers to a note on that page; "(q)" following a page number means that the author or work named in the entry is quoted on that page. The abbreviation "q.v." after a word means that one will find further information and page references under that word.

Note that in the transliteration of Sanskrit words nasals are assimilated within a single word, wherever permitted, to the following letter. Thus, for example, one should look for *Saṅkara*, *sañjñā*, *sandhi*, not *Śaṅkara*, *saṁjñā*, *sam̄dhi*.

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- viuakṣita* (intended to be conveyed), it is only when the *vyāngya* is intended to be conveyed that the suggestion should be called *dhvani*, 582.
- viuakṣitānyaparauḍya* (where the literal sense is intended but only as leading on to something further). Abhinava analyses the term in five different ways to fit his five

- that appears as the predominant meaning of a sentence, it is called *dhvani*, q.v., 516.
- characterized by *askhaladgatitva* (not stumbling in its gait), 564, 566 (see *skhaladgati*), by *samayānupayoga* (lacking the help of convention, i.e., of the proper denotative words), 565, and *prthagdharma-mānatva* (a continuing appearance of the expressed meaning as separate from the suggested), 566; it is an *upādhi* *dharma*, q.v., analogous to *lingatva* and *tātparyatva* in some respects, 577-578, but not in all, 589-591. These and other characteristics are noticed in Ānanda's long digression or appendix, 552-594, cf. 540 n1. objections to the concept and their rebuttal: that the definition is circular (*vyāñjaktatva* depends on *vyonyatva* and vice versa), 552; that it is simply *tātparya*, 552-554, refuted 554ff.
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- vyāñjanasakti* (suggestive power), 27n, 88; same as *dhvananasakti*.
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